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Globalizations
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What does degrowth mean? A few points of
clarification
Jason Hickel
To cite this article: Jason Hickel (2020): What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification,
Globalizations, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1812222
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What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification
Jason Hickel
Department of Anthropology, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
Degrowth is a planned reduction of energy and resource use designed to bring
the economy back into balance with the living world in a way that reduces
inequality and improves human well-being. Over the past few years, the idea
has attracted significant attention among academics and social movements,
but for people new to the idea it raises a number of questions. Here I set out
to clarify three specific issues: (1) I specify what degrowth means, and argue
that the framing of degrowth is an asset, not a liability; (2) I explain how
degrowth differs fundamentally from a recession; and (3) I affirm that
degrowth is primarily focused on high-income nations, and explore the
implications of degrowth for the global South.
KEYWORDS
Degrowth; COVID-19;
recession; global South
Introduction
Human civilization is presently overshooting a number of critical planetary boundaries and faces a
multi-dimensional crisis of ecological breakdown, including dangerous climate change, ocean acid-
ification, deforestation and biodiversity collapse (Lenton et al., 2020; Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen
et al., 2015; Steffen et al., 2018). Contrary to the general narrative about the Anthropocene, this crisis
is not being caused by human beings as such, but by a particular economic system: a system that is
predicated on perpetual expansion, disproportionately to the benefit of a small minority of rich
people (Moore, 2015).
The relationship between economic growth and ecological breakdown is now well demonstrated
in the empirical record. In mainstream economics, the dominant claim is that we must continue to
pursue perpetual growth (see Hickel, 2018a), and therefore must seek to decouple GDP from eco-
logical impacts and make growth ‘green’. Unfortunately, green growth hopes have little grounding.
There is no historical evidence of long-term absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use (as
measured by material footprint), and all extant models project that it cannot be achieved even
under optimistic conditions (Hickel & Kallis, 2020; Vadén, Lähde, Majava, Järvensivu, Toivanen,
& Eronen 2020; Vadén et al. 2020b). Absolute decoupling of GDP from emissions can be achieved
simply by replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy; but this cannot be done quickly enough to
respect carbon budgets for 1.5°C and 2°C if the economy continues to grow at usual rates. More
growth means more energy demand, and more energy demand makes it all the more difficult to
cover it with renewables in the short time we have left (Hickel & Kallis, 2020; Raftery et al., 2017;
Schroder & Storm, 2020).
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Jason Hickel j.hickel@gold.ac.uk
GLOBALIZATIONS
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1812222
In light of this evidence, scientists and ecological economists are increasingly calling for a shift to
‘post-growth’and ‘degrowth’strategies. The 2018 special report of the IPCC indicates that, in the
absence of speculative negative-emissions technologies, the only feasible way to remain within
safe carbon budgets is for high-income nations to actively slow down the pace of material production
and consumption (Grubler et al., 2018; IPCC, 2018). Reducing material throughput reduces energy
demand, which makes it easier to accomplish a rapid transition to renewables. This approach is also
ecologically coherent: reducing material throughput not only helps us to address climate change, but
also removes pressure on other planetary boundaries.
This is known as ‘degrowth’. Degrowth is a planned reduction of energy and resource throughput
designed to bring the economy back into balance with the living world in a way that reduces inequal-
ity and improves human well-being (Kallis, 2018; Latouche, 2009). It is important to clarify that
degrowth is not about reducing GDP, but rather about reducing throughput. From an ecological per-
spective, that is what matters. Of course, it is important to accept that reducing throughput is likely
to lead to a reduction in the rate of GDP growth, or even a decline in GDP itself, and we have to be
prepared to manage that outcome in a safe and just way. This is what degrowth sets out to do.
While degrowth theory is attracting increasing attention among academics and social movements,
for people new to the idea it raises a number of questions. Here I address questions about language
and terminology, questions about economic recession, and questions about international political
economy and the North–South divide.
The language of degrowth
Many of the objections to degrowth have to do with the term itself. Some people worry that degrowth
introduces confusion because it is not, in fact, the opposite of growth. When people say ‘growth’they
normally mean growth in GDP, so one might reasonably assume that degrowth is likewise focused
on reducing GDP. Proponents of degrowth are therefore condemned to perpetually clarify that
degrowth is not about reducing GDP, but rather about reducing material and energy throughput.
It would seem that this creates unnecessary problems.
But, in fact, the problem here arises from the word growth, not degrowth. In reality, people pursue
growth not in order to increase an abstract number (GDP), but because they want to consume or do
more, which of course requires using more materials and energy. So when economists and politicians
talk about growth they really mean an increase in materials and energy (and specifically an increase in
commodified materials and energy), even though this is not stated outright. The preoccupation with
GDP is a fetish that obscures this fact; it makes it seem as though growth is immaterial when in reality
it is not. If GDP growth did not come along with an increase in material consumption, people would not
pursue it (what’s the point of having a higher income if it doesn’t enable you to expand military spending,
buybiggerhousesandfastercars,orpaypeopletodothingsforyou?).Inthissense,degrowth,withits
focus on reducing material and energy use (and reducing patterns of commodification), is in fact an
appropriate opposite to growth, and indeed clarifies what growth itself is actually about.
Now, one might ask, why use the term degrowth at all, when you could just say ‘we want to reduce
energy and material throughput’and avoid the confusion? There are a few reasons for this. First, most
economists would agree that reducing energy and material throughput is important, but they assume
this can be accomplished while continuing to pursue economic growth at the same time (indeed, they
may even believe that more growth will eventually lead to a reduction in throughput). We need some
way of distinguishing the degrowth position from this standard ‘green growth’assumption. If we accept
the empirical evidence that green growth is unlikely to be achieved, then we have to accept that
2J. HICKEL
reducing throughput will impact on GDP itself, and we must focus on how to restructure the economy
so that this can be managed in a safe and just way. For this, ‘degrowth’is a simple, handy term that
allows us to clarify what is at stake, and concentrates the mind on what is required.
Proponents of degrowth often argue that the word degrowth is useful as a ‘missile’word. For an
increasing number of people, it is obvious that perpetual growth is a problem; for them, degrowth
seems intuitively correct as a response to ecological crisis, and they can getonboardimmediately.
Other people have a negative initial reaction to the word, but it is nonetheless useful in such cases to
the extent that it challenges and disrupts people’s assumptions about how the economy should work,
by questioning something that is generally taken for granted as natural and good. In many cases, negative
initial reactions give way to contemplation (do high-income countries really need more growth?), and
then curiosity (perhaps we can actually flourish with less throughput,andevenlessoutput?),and
then investigation (what is the relevant empirical evidence?) that eventually leads people to change
their views. This kind of intellectual transformation is enabled, not inhibited, by using a provocative
term. Trying to avoid provocation, or trying to be agnostic about growth, creates a milieu where proble-
matic assumptions remain unidentified and unexamined in favour of polite conversation and agreement.
This is not an effective way to advance knowledge, especially when the stakes are so high.
Some people worry about using degrowth because it is a ‘negative’term, rather than positive. But
it is only negative if we start from the assumption that more growth is good and desirable. If we want
to challenge that assumption, and argue the opposite (that more growth is unnecessary and dama-
ging, and that it would be better if we slowed down), then degrowth is a positive term. Take the
words colonization and decolonization, for example. We know that those who engaged in coloniza-
tion felt it was a good thing. From their perspective –which was the dominant perspective in Europe
for most of the past 500 years –decolonization would therefore seem negative. But the point is pre-
cisely to challenge the dominant perspective, because the dominant perspective is wrong. Indeed,
today we can agree that this stance –a stance against colonization –is correct and valuable: we
stand against colonization, and believe that the world would be better without it. That is not a nega-
tive vision, but positive; one that’s worth rallying around. Similarly, we can and should aspire to an
economy without growth just as we aspire to a world without colonization.
We can take this observation one step further. It is important to recognize that the word ‘growth’has
become a kind of propaganda term. In reality, what is going on is a process of elite accumulation, the
commodification of commons, and the appropriation of human labour and natural resources –a process
that is quite often colonial in character. This process, which is generally destructive to human commu-
nities and to ecology, is glossed as growth. Growth sounds natural and positive (who could possibly be
against growth?) so people are easily persuaded to buy into it, and to back policies that will generate more
of it, when otherwise they might not. Growth is the ideology of capitalism, in the Gramscian sense. It is
thecoretenetofcapitalism’s cultural hegemony. The word degrowth is powerful and effective because it
identifies this trick, and rejects it. Degrowth calls for the reversal of the processes that lie behind growth: it
calls for disaccumulation, decommodification, and decolonization.
Degrowth vs recession
Another common question about degrowth has to do with recessions. Indeed, when the COVID-19
recession hit, some detractors of degrowth pointed to it as an example of why degrowth would be a
disaster. For the most part, this is not a good-faith argument but rather an intentional attempt to
mislead, for it is impossible to make this mistake with even a cursory reading of the actual literature
GLOBALIZATIONS 3
on degrowth. In fact, degrowth is in every way the opposite of a recession. We have different words
for them because they are different things. Here are six key differences worth noting:
(1) Degrowth is a planned, coherent policy to reduce ecological impact, reduce inequality, and
improve well-being. Recessions are not planned, and do not target any of these outcomes.
They are not intended to reduce ecological impact (even though this might in some cases be
an unintended outcome), and they are certainly not intended to reduce inequality and improve
well-being –indeed, they do the opposite.
(2) Degrowth has a discriminating approach to reducing economic activity. It seeks to scale down
ecologically destructive and socially less necessary production (i.e. the production of SUVs,
arms, beef, private transportation, advertising and planned obsolescence), while expanding
socially important sectors like healthcare, education, care and conviviality. Recessions, by con-
trast, do not discriminate so wisely. Indeed, they quite often destroy socially important sectors
while empowering socially less necessary sectors. In the present COVID crisis, for instance,
schools, recreational facilities and public transportation are negatively affected, while Amazon
is expanding and stocks are rallying.
(3) Degrowth introduces policies to prevent unemployment, and indeed even to improve employ-
ment, such as by shortening the working week, introducing a job guarantee with a living wage,
and rolling out retraining programmes to shift people out of sunset sectors. Degrowth is expli-
citly focused on maintaining and improving people’s livelihoods despite a reduction in aggregate
economic activity. Recessions, by contrast, result in mass unemployment and everyday people
suffer loss of livelihood.
(4) Degrowth seeks to reduce inequality and share national and global income more fairly, such as
with progressive taxation and living wage policies. Recessions, by contrast, tend to make
inequality worse. Again, the COVID crisis presents an example of this, where the response
packages (QE, corporate bailouts, etc.) have made the rich richer (specifically to the benefitof
asset owners), and billionaires have added billions to their wealth, while virtually everybody
else has lost, with the poorest 50% of humanity losing $4.4 billion per day (Sumner et al., 2020).
(5) Degrowth seeks to expand universal public goods and services, such as health, education, trans-
portation and housing, in order to decommodify the foundational goods that people need in
order to lead flourishing lives. Recessions, by contrast, generally entail austerity measures that
cut spending on public services.
(6) Degrowth is part of a plan to achieve a rapid transition to renewable energy, restore soils and
biodiversity, and reverse ecological breakdown. During recessions, by contrast, governments
typically abandon such objectives in order to instead focus everything on getting growth
going again, whatever the ecological cost might be.
We have different words for recession and degrowth because they are different things. Recessions happen
when growth-dependent economies stop growing: it is a disaster that ruins people’s lives and exacerbates
injustices. Degrowth calls for a different kind of economy altogether: an economy that does not require growth
in the first place, and which can deliver justice and well-being even while throughput declines.
Degrowth and the global South
Some people worry that proponents of degrowth want to see degrowth universally applied, in all
countries. This would be problematic, because clearly many poor countries in fact need to increase
4J. HICKEL
resource and energy use in order to meet human needs. In reality, proponents of degrowth are clear
that it is specifically high-income countries that need to degrow (or, more specifically, countries that
exceed per capita fair-shares of planetary boundaries by a significant margin; see Hickel, 2019), not
the rest of the world. Again, because degrowth is focused on reducing excess resource and energy use,
it does not apply to economies that are not characterized by excess resource and energy use.
This brings us to an important implication of degrowth policy. The vast majority of ecological
breakdown is being driven by excess consumption in the global North, and yet has consequences
that disproportionately damage the South. We can see this in terms of both emissions and material
extraction. (1) The North is responsible for 92% of global CO2 emissions in excess of the safe pla-
netary boundary (Hickel, 2020a), and yet the South suffers the vast majority of climate change-
related damages (in terms of both monetary costs as well as loss of life). (2) High-income countries
rely on a large net appropriation of resources from the rest of the world (equivalent to 50% of their
total consumption). In other words, resource consumption in the North has an ecological impact
that registers largely in the South (Dorninger et al., 2020).
In terms of both emissions and resource use, then, excess consumption in the North relies on pat-
terns of colonization: the appropriation of the South’s fair share of atmospheric commons, and the
plunder of Southern ecosystems. From this perspective, degrowth in the North represents a process
of decolonization in the South, to the extent that it releases communities in the South from the press-
ures of atmospheric colonization and material extractivism.
Still, some worry that degrowth in the North might have a negative impact on economies in the
South. After all, many global South economies rely heavily on exports of raw materials and light
manufactures to the North. If Northern demand declines, where will they get their revenues? This
might seem like a reasonable question on the face of it, but it rests on a problematic logic, namely,
that excess consumption in the North must continue to rise, even if it causes ecological breakdown
that disproportionately harms the South, because it is necessary for the South’sdevelopmentandis ulti-
mately for the South’s own good. This argument echoes arguments that were regularly made under colo-
nialism, namely, that extraction and exploitation by the colonizer is ultimately good for the colonized. For
instance, Nicholas Kristof, in a New York Times column titled ‘Three cheers for sweatshops’has argued
that sweatshops are the best way to get people out of poverty, so we need more of them: if we care about
the poor, we should not boycott sweatshop products but rather consume more of them.
The fallacy in this argument shouldn’t need to be pointed out. Obviously, the best way to reduce
poverty isn’t more exploitation, but more economic justice: the South should receive fair prices for
the labour and resources they render to the global economy. No one would ever suggest that an
American company paying American workers $2 a day is a good way to reduce poverty in America;
we would insist that reducing poverty requires paying a living wage. But for some reason this logic is
not applied to workers in the South, likely because it would reduce the rate of surplus accumulation
among Northern companies and countries that rely on Southern labour and resources. In other
words, justice for the South (fair wages for labour and fair prices for resources) would entail
degrowth in the North. We should embrace this outcome. In fact, abandoning the pursuit of growth
in the North would be salutary inasmuch as it would remove the constant pressure applied by North-
ern governments and companies to depress the costs of labour and resources in the South.
This brings us to another, related point. Degrowth in the North creates space for Southern econ-
omies to shift away from their enforced role as exporters of cheap labour and raw materials, and to
focus instead on developmentalist reforms: building economies focused on sovereignty, self-
sufficiency, and human well-being. This was the approach pursued by most global South govern-
ments in the immediate post-colonial decades, during the 1960s and 1970s, before the imposition
GLOBALIZATIONS 5
of neoliberal structural adjustment from the 1980s onward (Hickel, 2018b). Structural adjustment
sought to dismantle developmentalist reforms across the South in order to create new frontiers
for Northern accumulation. In a degrowth scenario the pressure for this ‘fix’would be ameliorated,
and Southern governments would find themselves freer to pursue a more human-centered econ-
omics (Hickel, 2020b; Nirmal & Rocheleau, 2019). Here too, it becomes clear that degrowth in
the North represents decolonization in the South.
Of course, the global South need not and should not wait for decolonization; they can cast offthe
chains themselves. Here I have in mind Samir Amin’s notion of ‘delinking’: the refusal to submit
national development policy to the imperatives of Northern capital. For instance, global South gov-
ernments could organize collectively to increase the prices of their labour and resources, and could
mobilize to demand fairer terms of trade and finance, and more democratic representation in global
governance (as they did with the New International Economic Order in the early 1970s). These ideas
are today represented in the discourse of post-development. In addition to rejecting the tenets of
neoliberal globalization, post-development thought also rejects the notion (introduced by colonizers
and international financial institutions) that GDP growth should be pursued for its own sake, pre-
ferring instead a focus on human well-being (Escobar, 2015; Kothari et al., 2019).
Either way, decolonization in the South along these lines would likely cause degrowth in the
North. This is true in a very concrete sense. Right now, high-income nations maintain high levels
of income and consumption through an ongoing process of net appropriation (of land, labour,
resources and energy) from the South, through unequal exchange: in other words, they seek to depress
the prices of labour and resources to below the global average price (Dorninger et al., 2020). This is a
continuation of the basic tenets of the colonial relationship,although (in most cases) without the occu-
pation. Ending this exploitative relationship would mean either ending the pattern of net appropriation
or ending unequal exchange, both of which would likely result in a reduction in the rate of surplus
accumulation by economic elites, and a reduction in the growth driven by this accumulation in the
North, but to the benefit of communities and ecologies in the global South.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributor
Jason Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on global inequality, political economy,
and ecological economics. He is the author of a number of books, most recently Less is more: How degrowth
will save the world (Penguin Random House, 2020) and The divide: A brief guide to global inequality and its
solutions (Penguin Random House, 2018). In addition to his academic work, he writes for The Guardian,
Foreign Policy and Al Jazeera, serves as an advisor for the Green New Deal for Europe, and sits on the Har-
vard-Lancet Commission on Reparations and Redistributive Justice. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts.
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GLOBALIZATIONS 7
