Equality and Partiality
Abstract
Thomas Nagel addresses the conflict between the claims of the group and those of the individual. Nagel attempts to clarify the nature of the conflict – one of the most fundamental problems in moral and political theory – and argues that its reconciliation is the essential task of any legitimate political system.
... Yet, this prediction is at odds with various widely held conceptions of justice that emphasize proportional treatment according to merit (Aristotle, c. 350 BC/2009), the importance of egalitarian concerns and treating everyone equally (Nagel, 1995) or of not worsening the situation of the least advantaged (Rawls, 1971). If both authors have made equal contributions to the article, it might be considered unfair for the disadvantaged party (the student) to be held to stricter moral standards than the advantaged party (the advisor). ...
For contractualist accounts of morality, actions are moral if they correspond to what rational or reasonable agents would agree to do, were they to negotiate explicitly. This, in turn, often depends on each party’s bargaining power, which varies with each party’s stakes in the potential agreement and available alternatives in case of disagreement. If there is an asymmetry, with one party enjoying higher bargaining power than another, this party can usually get a better deal, as often happens in real negotiations. A strong test of contractualist accounts of morality, then, is whether moral judgments do take bargaining power into account. We explore this in five preregistered experiments (n = 3,025; U.S.-based Prolific participants). We construct scenarios depicting everyday social interactions between two parties in which one of them can perform a mutually beneficial but unpleasant action. We find that the same actions (asking the other to perform the unpleasant action or explicitly refusing to do it) are perceived as less morally appropriate when performed by the party with lower bargaining power, as compared to the party with higher bargaining power. In other words, participants tend to give more moral leeway to parties with better bargaining positions and to hold disadvantaged parties to stricter moral standards. This effect appears to depend only on the relative bargaining power of each party but not on the magnitude of the bargaining power asymmetry between them. We discuss implications for contractualist theories of moral cognition and the emergence and persistence of unfair norms and inequality.
... This encompasses basic civil and political rights, socio-cultural and economic rights. For example, the right to employment, education, health care, housing, and fair treatment in favor of inclusiveness (Nagel, 1995). In view of this it is expected that Norwegians treat and relate with people from different ethnic groups, cultures and minorities on the principles of equality and respect. ...
This study explored the experiences of inclusion and exclusion of African academics in Norway in various sectors of the society and their participation in these sectors. Using a mixed method research approach, 166 African academics completed a 20-item questionnaire entitled Perceived Exclusion Scale (PES) and two open-ended questions about their mental effects and coping mechanisms of exclusion. Descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis procedures were used to analyze the data. The results showed that the participants experienced exclusion in almost all the sectors of the Norwegian society with concomitant effects of depression and insomnia for most of the participants. Participants mentioned acceptance, confrontational strategy, avoidance strategy, theological group discussion and positive attitudes as key coping mechanisms to exclusion and discrimination. This study could be used as a baseline for future research on the psychological and mental health effects of discrimination of Africans and African- Norwegians. The study is a pointer to the public discourses on the positive sides of immigration in general and the role of migrants’ contribution to the Norwegian society. Keywords: Norway, African academics, inclusion and exclusion, mental wellbeing, minorities
... We appreciate the efforts of self-described communitarian thinkers and activists to revive concern for the cultural and ethical foundations of citizenship and for the everyday, interpersonal interactions that build and sustain "social capital": norms, networks, and activities providing a relational foundation for collective governance (e.g., Putnam 2000). At the same time, we worry that communitarian language often muffles the pluralistic noisiness of American life, muting the inescapability and creative potency of citizens' conflicting commitments, perspectives, and interests that writers such as Nagel (1991) and Stout (2001) have emphasized. Thus, we prefer to rehabilitate a larger and richer conception of the "civic" as including all those activities in which individuals and groups seek to negotiate their differences and reconcile their personal interests in a spirit of genuine public mindedness and creative, constructive "public work" (Boyte, 2015;Boyte & Throntveit, 2021). ...
It is one of few statements upon which Americans left, right, and center agree: The nation faces a civic crisis. Polarization, rage, and militancy vie with cynicism, disengagement, and despair in the much-vaunted battle for America’s political soul—all while trampling grace, deliberation, and cooperation underfoot. What can and should our institutions of higher education do to address this situation? Such a question demands at least as many responses as there are distinctive functions of higher education. This article explains one effort to answer it with reference to the sector’s most visible—and arguably most essential—field of endeavor: undergraduate teaching and learning. The Third Way Civics initiative (3WC) unites institutions across the country in an experimental approach to civic learning in college, centered on a one-semester, credit-bearing course on American political and social development across time. Orchestrated by the Minnesota Humanities Center (MHC) and funded by MHC, the Teagle Foundation, and Lumina Foundation, 3WC directly fosters the embrace and development of several core commitments and building blocks identified by MJCSL guest editors as essential to healthy civic identity, including commitments to liberal democracy, personal integrity, and public-minded self-reflection, and building-block capacities for engaging constructively across differences and for active, collaborative acquisition of democratic knowledge, habits, and skills. In these ways, 3WC responds not only to pundits’ predictions of a civic apocalypse, but to what surveys reveal to be a growing (and far more hopeful) desire among students for a practically democratic education: one that positions them for economic success but also prepares them for lives of public purpose and productive citizenship.
... However, there are various hybrid perspectives that partly incorporate certain arguments of these two counter-stances even though not all of these hybrid perspectives are developed in a conceptually systematic manner. Luck egalitarianism inter alia, a relatively new normative perspective, that has been initially developed by Ronald Dworkin (1981a;1981b;; see also Arneson, 1989 and2015;Cohen, 1989;Nagel, 1991;Vallentyne, 2002;Barry, 2008;Knight, 2013;Segall, 2013) and sometimes named as "equality of fortune" (Anderson, 1999, p.289) has recently proposed a systematically advanced conceptual framework aiming to provide particular evaluative framework for question of to what extent can individuals be kept responsible for achieving a good and affluent life? Building upon an aim to conceptually respond the question of responsibility, luck egalitarianism has in essence provided a considerable support, as Cohen notes (1989, p.933), for egalitarian normative positions since it borrows the most powerful underpinning and source of moral justification of the non-egalitarian distributional principles, namely individual's choice and responsibility, and use these underpinnings to advance and strengthen egalitarian principles. ...
To what extent can individuals be kept responsible for the disadvantages they experience? This is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental questions that have led to a historical cleavage between egalitarian perspectives that underline roles of structural inequalities leading to disadvantages and anti-egalitarian/libertarian perspectives that tend to keep individuals themselves responsible for their own living conditions. Taking a mediating position between these perspectives, a relatively new normative framework, viz. luck egalitarianism, has recently provided an analytical answer to this question. Building upon an authentic conceptual framework in which two distinct forms of luck are defined, it claims that individuals cannot be kept responsible for their disadvantaged conditions so long as these conditions have appeared as consequences of factors that are beyond their own control, such as luck, which inescapably brings forth a normative idea that individuals should take responsibility of disadvantages that are consequences of their own choices/decisions. This paper discusses that evaluative aspects of individuals’ choices/decisions within the given configuration of luck egalitarianism’s analytical framework are excessively ambiguous, which can easily lead it to turn into a perspective morally justifying quite a number of disadvantages. Drawing on various hypothetical cases and empirical findings, it suggests that luck egalitarianism should recognize sociological formation of individuals’ choices/decisions in modern stratified societies to overcome such jeopardy. Following this, it addresses two positive implications of such recognition as (1) saving luck egalitarianism from being a means of right-wing exclusionary political positions and (2) opening up a space to incorporate egalitarian social policies.
Various arguments that consider utopianisms as risky or dangerous will be discussed—many of them related to the notion of perfectionism: violence as a result of careless politics, stagnation and the assumption of normative superiority. Rebutting these concerns, paves the way toward a more positive perception of utopianism. Utopianism, while unable to directly guide governance, can fulfill both important cognitive and dispositional functions, which are intertwined.
In this chapter, it will be outlined in more detail and with some examples, how technological utopias relocate justice from institutions and individuals, for example, to human biology. The idea is controversially discussed and need not be endorsed to fulfill its illustrative function for the purpose of the present argumentation. Additionally, technological utopias suggest the possibility of reconciling incompatible views of the good life in virtual reality and resolving the problem of scarcity that underlies some of the most prominent theories of justice.
When a misfortune befalls us, it is natural for us to react: “Why me?” This is not just the question: “Why did this unfortunate event occur?” Nor are we simply wondering: “Why do such things happen?” The self-reference implies a comparison we generally manage to keep at the back of our minds: “Why did this happen to me, and not someone else?” Importantly, this is not an expression of idle curiosity. It is an expression of shock, dismay, and disbelief. I am interested in both the moral significance of this natural reaction and the moral significance of our disinclination to acknowledge it. If, as I believe, we are often morally permitted to promote our own interests over the interests of others, if it is our disposition to do so that underlies the “Why me?” reaction, and if we are nonetheless right to think there is something shameful about reacting this way, what does this suggest about the moral significance of our morally permissible self-privileging behavior? How close can we come to reconciling (i) our right to live lives that express very little concern for the fate of others with (ii) an ideal of human solidarity that manifests itself in our self-censuring attitude toward the “Why me?” thought and toward the very self-privileging actions whose moral permissibility we have least reason to challenge?
As opaque algorithmic systems take up a larger and larger role in shaping our lives, calls for explainability in various algorithmic systems have increased. Many moral and political philosophers have sought to vindicate these calls for explainability by developing theories on which decision-subjects—that is, individuals affected by decisions—have a moral right to the explanation of the systems that affect them. Existing theories tend to suggest that the right to explanation arises solely in virtue of facts about how decision-subjects are affected by opaque systems. But this ignores an important part of the normative landscape: sometimes, facts about a decision-maker’s rights and freedoms can make a difference to whether she owes anyone explanations of her decisions. I illustrate the point by calling attention to examples of artistic, romantic, and supererogatory altruistic decisions; in at least some cases of this sort, even highly influential decisions can legitimately be kept entirely private and opaque
Daniel A. Bell’s book “The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy” presents an argument for a Chinese Model different from Western liberal democracy to explain the changes and developments in Chinese political reform. The aim of the China Model is to select and promote leaders with superior ability and virtue to serve as officials, specifically expressed as a version of “vertical model of democratic meritocracy,” with democracy at the bottom, experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the top. Some scholars have criticized this based on the legitimacy crisis and practical defects of political meritocracy. In response to these criticisms, I believe that Rawls’ concept of public reason could be used to improve political meritocracy. Based on its legitimacy dilemma, the substantive content of public reason provides fundamental guidance for exercising political power, expressing equal respect for free citizens, and providing normative explanations for the legitimacy status of political meritocracy; procedural rules of public reason require deliberative democracy at the top level to facilitate the expression of diverse interests and maximize social consensus; and based on risks such as system ossification and corruption, exclusive view of public reason provides external constraints on government officials. Therefore, a form of political meritocracy based on public reason offers a logical response to academic criticisms regarding political meritocracy and represents a modern understanding of Confucianism-based political meritocracy focused on the well-being of individuals.
This commentary, on an article by Satz and White, argues that redistribution of wealth for the purpose of advancing equality (rather than improving the worst off) can be provided an institutional defence. The argument is that major institutions of society—the market, the legal system, the educational system, and agency regulation—perform their social functions most effectively when inequality is not too high.
Imprisonment affects prisoners’ families. Empirical research tells us that some families benefit from this separation, particularly when they are victims of crime or abuse. But for many, imprisonment has a negative impact on family life, which can be intensified by other pre-existing factors. The main literature on the harm that imprisonment causes family members is empirical, but these empirical findings raise difficult moral questions. How might we approach these side-effects? One view, The Simple View, suggests these side-effects are proportionate so long as the overall harm produced does not outweigh the good punishment aims to achieve. This paper defends The Complex View. Here, proportionality requires us to think about factors beyond the magnitude of harm. Drawing upon existing moral and political philosophy, I aim to show three other factors that may alter how certain harms and benefits figure in proportionality calculations.
Of all the risks we face in life, ranging from unemployment to old age, early death is among the most tragic and yet most neglected by modern states. Liberal egalitarians might find it easy to dismiss social insurance against early death, but I argue they should not. Early in this paper, I explain why social insurance should include the risk of premature death by replying to four common criticisms. What follows is a case for a novel form of insurance that is more liberal and egalitarian across ages than the status quo. More specifically, I show that granting storable pensions in all life stages-youth, middle, and old age-promotes liberty and reduces lifetime inequality. Writers on age group and longevity justice often overlook the extent to which liberal lifetime equality can supply insightful arguments against inequality across ages. These call for a policy that gives each age group the freedom to draw a storable pension. I call that policy freetirement.
In recent years, a distinction between two concepts of equality has been much discussed: “distributive” equality involves people having equal amounts of a good such as welfare or resources, and “social” or “relational” equality involves the absence of (certain kinds of) social hierarchy and the presence of (certain kinds of) equal social relations. This contrast is commonly thought to have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between equality and justice. But the nature and significance of the distinction is far from clear. I examine several accounts of this issue and argue none are entirely satisfactory. In turn, I offer an alternative proposal. Relational equality, on my account, involves a concern with each person having an equal “civic status.” I characterize this concern and show it has distinctive and normatively significant positional and temporal aspects.
Consequentialism is often criticized as being overly demanding, and this overde- mandingness is seen as sufficient to reject it as a moral theory. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection—the Demandingness Objection—as a given. Our question, therefore, is how to respond to the Objection. We put forward a response relying on the framework of institutional consequentialism we introduced in previous work. On this view, institutions take over the consequentialist burden, whereas individuals, special occasions aside, are required to set up and maintain institutions. We first describe the Objection, then clarify the theory of institutional consequentialism and show how it responds to the Objection. In the remainder of the paper, we defend the view against potential challenges.
In the course of criticizing indirect forms of consequentialism Bernard Williams argued that because virtues of character enter into the very content of the self, they cannot be instrumentalised. They must, instead, be viewed as cognitive responses to intrinsic value. This paper investigates this argument and relates it to similar claims in the work of Sartre. The inalienability of the first personal point of view represents a common theme and informs a further argument that an agent can only think of him or herself as merely one amongst others via a distinctive ethical use of the trope of irony.
I argue that monarchies, in any possible form (absolute or constitutional), should be abolished once and for all. This is because of the deeply immoral presuppositions such a system of government upholds (implicitly or explicitly). Call this ‘the moral argument against monarchy’. I identify three basic moral principles that monarchy by definition breaches: ‘the basic moral equality principle’, ‘the basic dignity principle’ and ‘the basic moral desert principle’. Finally, I examine and reply to three objections, including the common objection that constitutional monarchy should not be abolished because it is pragmatically useful.
We argue for asymmetries between positive and negative partiality. Specifically, we defend four claims: i) there are forms of negative partiality that do not have positive counterparts; ii) the directionality of personal relationships has distinct effects on positive and negative partiality; iii) the extent of the interactions within a relationship affects positive and negative partiality differently; and iv) positive and negative partiality have different scope restrictions. We argue that these asymmetries point to a more fundamental moral principle, which we call Morality's Harmonious Propensity . According to this principle, morality has a propensity toward preserving positive relationships and dissolving negative ones.
This chapter focuses on the policy commitment enshrined in 2030 Agenda with respect to schooling's role for social justice and equity as a horizon of pedagogical meaning for educational action. The reflection unfolds in three steps: (1) construction of a theoretical-conceptual framework on social justice and equity, with attention to classical and non-traditional factors of inequality; (2) analysis of the idea of equity promoted by 2030 Agenda, with particular reference to Goal 4 on quality education placed in relation to Goals 5, 10, and 16; (3) focus on the Italian context through a thematic analysis of public education policies developed to achieve Goal 4 and a literature review to understand their effect, with ameliorative proposals to increase equity in the school system. This chapter delves into 2030 Agenda's strategies for equity; the focus on the Italian context may also prove useful for those school systems with similar characteristics and issues.
In domains as disparate as playing Go and predicting the structure of proteins, artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have begun to perform at levels beyond which any humans can achieve. Does this fact represent something lamentable? Does superhuman AI performance somehow undermine the value of human achievements in these areas? Go grandmaster Lee Sedol suggested as much when he announced his retirement from professional Go, blaming the advances of Go-playing programs like AlphaGo for sapping his will to play the game at a high level. In this paper, I attempt to make sense of Sedol’s lament. I consider a number of ways that the existence of superhuman-performing AI technologies could undermine the value of human achievements. I argue there is very little in the nature of the technology itself that warrants such despair. (Compare: does the existence of a fighter jet undermine the value of being the fastest human sprinter?) But I also argue there are several more localized domains where these technologies threaten to displace human beings from being able to achieve valuable things at all. This is a particular worry for those in unequal societies, I argue, given the difficulty of many achievements and the corresponding amount of resources needed to achieve great things.
This paper argues that the Lockean proviso can be utilized as a relevant principle of justice for food security under global climate change. Since reducing GHG emissions is key to enhancing food security, we suggest a global food security scheme that systematically allots, among all people, access to GHG sinks in food systems impacted by global climate change. For consideration of the scheme, it is important to have a principle of justice. Furthermore, it should incorporate the value of fairness. A relevant principle of climate justice for food security should meet the following criteria: (1) the parties concerned under the scheme are states; (2) fairness does not undermine the requirement that the basic needs of all people must be met; (3) when determining fair burdens, a fair distribution of the rights to use GHG sinks should be sensitive both to each state’s responsibility for its GHG emissions and to (4) each state’s effort to reduce such emissions. With them in mind, first, we argue that the Lockean proviso can provide legitimate guidance for each state. Second, the Lockean proviso reasonably enjoins that a state has a right to a food system that secures its citizens’ basic needs, and a duty to meet the basic needs of other people. Third, the Lockean proviso can be deployed as a principle of both global justice and intergenerational justice for food security. Finally, the Lockean proviso enables us to count the reduction of GHG emissions by each state as “the fruits of its labors”.
Following the political and philosophical debates explored in Chap. 1, six ontological features of the human condition are identified, described and explored in this chapter, and which are central to The Ontology of Well-Being Thesis (TOWT) defended here and throughout the book. The features are, in no prioritised order, human embodiment, finiteness, sociability, cognition, evaluation, and agency. The main argument is that these features need articulating in any plausible epistemological account of well-being, concerning what we know about this phenomenon, focussing on how we establish what, in and of itself, helps a life go better. And concerning how well-being is understood normatively, and so is promoted as a social value, notably in social policy and welfare practice. The principal assumption is therefore existentialist in character – that is, well-being, while is promotable as a substantive social ideal to be enhanced for future populations, must first reflect the existential and ontological features of what and who human beings are presently, with these features reflected across a gamut of human experiences. A further claim of TOWT is that these ontological features interrelate in complex ways, producing various conflicts in the epistemology and normativity of human well-being, and how it is understood and practically applied. Significantly, conflicting experiences of time, emotion, and self-consciousness are revealed, which, it is argued, must be accommodated for in any comprehensive epistemological and normative account of human well-being, which then can be usefully applied to a range of social policies and welfare practices.
As with Chap. 6, this chapter starts with sociability as one of the six ontological features of the human condition, identified in Chap. 2, via The Ontology of Well-Being Thesis (TOWT), and defended throughout the book. The argument here maintains an important sociological distinction between the social causation and the social construction of mental health/illness. The socially causation of mental health, focuses on its social epidemiology, so on what kind of social determinants lead to or produce mental health/illness. Whereas the social construction of mental health/illness focuses on how notions of illness, health and care are ‘given meaning’ within and between societies, so on those social determinants that socially define certain people as mentally ill, which, in turn, affects how this group is publicly viewed and treated. Drawing from this sociological distinction, the main claim here is that promoting mental health must accommodate the six ontological features of the human condition identified in Chap. 2, and in TOWT – these features being, in no prioritised order, human embodiment, finiteness, sociability, cognition, evaluation, and agency. Therefore, when exploring the social causation and social construction of mental health/illness, any epistemological and normative implications for people diagnosed as mentally ill must, in some way, reflect these ontological features. For example, the claim here is that a person who is socially constructed as ‘mentally ill’ should also be viewed publicly as someone who can exercise agency, cognition, and evaluation. That is, with these features underpinning a non-determinist epistemological and normative account of mental health/illness and well-being. The further argument is that this account should be central to the co-productive development of mental health policies and practices (notably concerning the practice of social prescription), so opening-up new ways for viewing and treating those people who are socially constructed as ‘mentally ill’.
This chapter adds philosophical interpretation to the book’s central themes, derived from The Ontology of Well-Being Thesis (TOWT) and defended throughout the book, so as to understand further how well-being might be better conceptualised and promoted. The main argument, to be developed in Chap. 9 the final chapter, is based on three assertions defended here. First, there is a distinction between, what is called, explanatory and purpose-based approaches to understanding well-being and its promotion in social policy and welfare practice. These approaches reflect two very different accounts of ontology, epistemology, and normativity, which have been uncovered and explored. Second, without siding with one over the other, a pluralist response is recommended, arguing that both the explanatory and purpose based approaches should be promoted simultaneously. The main claim is that this pluralist response underpins a fully articulated understanding of TOWT, helping to make better sense of debates in social policy and welfare practice which intend to enhance well-being for populations. Third, a pluralist response also claims that the dichotomy between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ categories of well-being, while can be important to maintain politically, at least in certain circumstances, is a distinction that can break down, or become very blurred, philosophically speaking. As argued here and throughout the book, philosophically a false dichotomy between these categories of well-being is revealed when examining complex and conflicting human experiences, and particularly if the six ontological features of the human condition identified in TOWT and in Chap. 2, are fully recognised and accommodated.
2019 saw a wave of youth-led climate strikes that demanded states ‘listen to the science’. Some of these states are committed to protecting free speech through neutrality on climate change. That commitment inhibits informed democratic deliberation by remaining neutral between climate science and denial. In response, using the United States as our example, we argue that the state can and should use its expressive capacity to promote climate literacy and doing so does not violate free speech commitments. Public deliberation must move on from whether climate change exists to the urgent question of how we should respond.
Kosmopolit*innen können eine Pluralität grundlegender politischer Einheiten gutheißen und den Eigenwert der durch die jeweiligen Mitglieder in ihren Gemeinschaften realisierten besonderen Lebensweisen anerkennen. Anders als loyalistische Kollektivist*innen begründen liberale Kosmopolit*innen neben dem intrinsischen Wert partikularen Gemeinwohls auch universelle Werte wie Gerechtigkeit und Toleranz. Zudem haben akteurrelative Handlungsgründe zugunsten besonderer Pflichten der Mitglieder von Gemeinschaften untereinander geringeres Gewicht als akteurneutrale Handlungsgründe zugunsten genereller und universeller positiver Pflichten. Die mit dieser kosmopolitisch ausgewiesenen kritischen Idee des Gemeinwohls einhergehenden universellen positiven Pflichten können Einzelpersonen und einzelne Pflichtträger*innen allerdings überfordern. Die kosmopolitischen universellen Wohlergehenspflichten können fair und effizient nur in institutionell abgesicherter moralischer Arbeitsteilung (vollständig) erfüllt werden. Entsprechend stehen Einzelpersonen unter der Pflicht, ein geeignetes System staatlicher Institutionen und arbeitsteilig wirkender kollektiver Akteur*innen zu schaffen, aufrechtzuerhalten und diese Institutionen und Akteur*innen dabei zu unterstützen, ihre Pflichten bestmöglich zu erfüllen.
Each paper can be read independently, but the general problem that’s at the focus of this dissertation is the following. On the one hand, morality and justice appear to impose the same requirements on all. According to some of the most influential moral and political theories, what we owe to each other should be informed by ‘impartial’ requirements of fairness or respect for persons—requirements that apply regardless of whether the people you interact with happen to be relatives, friends, or members of the same society. Yet many would balk at the notion that we cannot permissibly favor some—they would charge that these sorts of views of morality or justice don’t do justice to the importance of ‘special’ relationships. This dissertation focuses on how we should think about resolving this tension between requirements, especially when it comes to national or democratic ties in emergency contexts. The first paper offers a critical analysis of the special relationship that nationalists claim we hold to co-nationals. The second paper assesses the limits of this relationship under the emergency conditions provided by the pandemic. The third investigates our special relationship to democratic society and the limits of action under the climate emergency. In ‘Against Cultural Identity as Grounds for the Intrinsic Value of Self-Determination’ I argue against the liberal nationalist claim that national self-determination is intrinsically valuable because it’s grounded in national cultural identity. In ‘Vaccine Nationalism and Basic Rights’ I argue that the case against COVID-19 vaccine nationalism is robustly overdetermined because it violates duties we have to uphold a basic subsistence right to health. In ‘Eco-Sabotage as Defensive Activism’ I argue that we can do justice to our commitments to democratic society and yet still engage in illegal and coercive property destruction with environmental aims.
Do individuals have moral duties to fulfil all the demands of their jobs? In this paper, we discuss how to understand such ‘occupational duties’ and their normative bases, with a specific focus on duties that go beyond contractually agreed upon duties. Against views that reduce occupational duties to contractual duties, we argue that they often have greater moral weight, based on skills, roles, and the duty of social cooperation. We discuss what it would take to make sure that individuals are not unfairly overburdened by such occupational duties, distinguishing between choice conditions (voluntariness, availability of alternatives, full information) and conditions concerning the role and the social structures within which such duties are embedded (feasible role design, existence of support structures, employee voice). These conditions, however, are not fulfilled for many existing jobs, especially for jobs typically occupied by structurally disadvantaged groups such as women or ethnic minorities. This leads to a dilemma between the claims of those who depend on the occupational duties to be fulfilled, and the rights of those who hold these occupations and are unfairly overburdened. We conclude by arguing for the need for structural reform to dissolve this dilemma.
In recent years, Ingrid Robeyns and several others have argued that, whatever the correct complete account of distributive justice looks like, it should include a Limitarian requirement. The core Limitarian claim is that there is a ceiling – a limit – to the amount of resources that it is permissible for any individual to possess. While this core claim is plausible, there are a number of important questions about precisely how the requirement should be understood, and what its implications are regarding the obligations of various agents, that have not been adequately addressed in the discussions thus far. In this paper, I focus on questions about the relationship between the grounds for the Limitarian requirement and its role in generating obligations of justice for different agents. I argue that the plausible grounds for the requirement are incompatible with the widely accepted view, deriving from John Rawls, that the principles of justice apply directly to the institutions of what Rawls calls the “basic structure of society,” but do not apply directly to the conduct of individuals and other possible agents (e.g. corporations) acting within that structure. If my argument succeeds, then Limitarians must accept that if the grounds that they have offered in defense of Limitarian policy interventions are compelling, then individuals are obligated to voluntarily direct any resources that they possess above the threshold in ways that will promote the same goals that justify Limitarian policies.
Distributive justice is generally important to persons in society. This was widely recognized by early Confucian thinkers, particularly Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, in ancient China. Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi had developed, in varying degrees and with different emphases, their respective conceptions of distributive justice to address the relevant social problems in their times. These conceptions not only are intrinsically valuable political thoughts, but may prove useful in dealing with current or future social issues. Thus in this essay, first I provide a detailed interpretation of each of those thinkers’ conceptions of distributive justice, then I combine some essential elements of those conceptions to form a general and coherent conception, which is called a complex Confucian conception of distributive justice, and finally I evaluate this conception by considering some of its implications and limitations, in theory and in practice. This aims mainly at exploring the meaning and practical bearing of basic Confucian conceptions of distributive justice.
Partiality is the special concern that we display for ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise in the context of enquiry into several moral topics, including the good life and the role in it of our personal commitments; the demands of impartial morality, equality, and other moral ideals; and commonsense ideas about supererogation. This paper provides an overview of the debate on the ethics of partiality through the lens of the domains of permissible and required partiality. After outlining the conceptual space, I first discuss agent‐centred moral options that concern permissions not to do what would be impartially optimal. I then focus on required partiality, which concerns associative duties that go beyond our general duties to others and require us to give special priority to people who are close to us. I discuss some notable features of associative duties and the two main objections that have been raised against them: the Voluntarist and the Distributive objections. I then turn to the justification of partiality, focusing on underivative approaches and reasons‐based frameworks. I discuss the reductionism and non‐reductionism debate: the question whether partiality is derivative or fundamental. I survey arguments for ‘the big three’, according to which partiality is justified by appeal to the special value of either projects, personal relationships, or individuals. I conclude by discussing four newly emerging areas in the debate: normative transitions of various personal relationships, relationships with AI, epistemic partiality, and negative partiality, which concerns the negative analogue of our positive personal relationships.
Political egalitarians tend to defend equal distributions of voting power at specific times, as in ‘one election, one vote’. Appealing as it is, the principle seems incompatible with distributing power proportionally to the stakes voters have at different elections, as in ‘one stake, one vote’. This article argues that the tension above stems from the temporal scope ascribed to political equality, as at specific moments of democratic decision-making instead of over entire lives. More specifically, ascribing a lifetime view to political equality renders equality compatible with proportionality at different elections. I first show that storable votes differ from standard votes in their distinctive commitment to lifetime political equality. I then argue that storable voting schemes are compatible with three key reasons to value political equality: equal consideration of interests, relational equality, and non-domination. Finally, storable votes are also consistent with proportionality at specific times. I conclude that the neglected idea of lifetime political equality can, through storable votes, deliver proportionality without inequality.
How much should we sacrifice for the sake of others? While some argue in favour of significant sacrifices, others contend that morality cannot demand too much from individuals. Recently, the debate has taken a new turn by focusing on moral demands under non-ideal conditions in which the essential interests of many people are set back. Under such conditions, in some views, moral theories must require extreme moral demands as anything less is incompatible with equal consideration of everyone’s interests. The insistence on the extremeness of moral demands, however, presupposes a simplistic account of non-ideal conditions as characterized mainly by the non-compliance of many individuals. Non-ideal conditions are also characterized by institutional non-compliance, whereby institutions often do not do what they ought to do. Institutional non-compliance is significant as it increases the size of moral demands significantly, thereby exacerbating the conflict between these demands and the self-interest of individuals subjected to these institutions. I argue that individuals have a meta-interest in not experiencing such internal conflicts as these can undermine their affirmation of self-respect. Meta-interest can be advanced by adopting the promotion of just institutions as an ultimate aim, as such institutions lessen the conflict and, accordingly, enable us to live more harmonious lives. Moreover, the promotion of just institutions allows us to affirm our sense of self-respect under non-ideal conditions too. Because the promotion of just institutions is in our self-interest, this is not an extreme but a moderate moral demand.
Deciding whether, when and how to restrict or counter the right to freedom of expression in ways that are lawful, necessary and proportionate requires broader consideration of moral principles that guide policy making and regulation in free, open and democratic societies. This chapter discusses hate and harm, “hate speech” and “hate crime”, and the harm principle, then asks what, in any case, we can reasonably expect of one another in pluralist, open societies where people want and value different things. It introduces the idea of the liberal state, dealing with diversity and conflict in open societies, and an agonistic politics of difference that might enable us to live together, even when we hate each other, managing the inevitable conflicts between us politically, institutionally, under the rule of law, without recourse to violence. Freedom of speech enables us to fight things out using words and arguments instead of sticks and stones, knives and guns.KeywordsHate speechHate crimeHarm principleLiberal democracyPluralismAgonistic politics
This chapter examines how the use of asylum as a form of reparation by states might affect the operation of their asylum systems on the domestic level. First, Souter asks whether an application of reparative justice in this context could warrant unfairly preferential treatment to some refugees over others within their states of asylum, and identifies means through which states could mitigate or avoid this risk of unfairness. Second, the chapter questions how states could justifiably prioritise reparative and humanitarian asylum claimants in cases of genuinely limited state capacity, and argues that the priority to be given to either reparative obligations or humanitarian duties is sensitive to refugees’ differing levels of need, which can at times justify departures from reparative justice in this context.
The nature of state governance in consolidated liberal democracies has important implications for the ideal theory debate. The states of these societies are polycentric. Decision-making power within them is disaggregated across multiple sites. This rules out one major justification for ideal theory. On this influential view, the ideal furnishes a blueprint of the morally perfect society that we should strive to realise. This justification is not viable in consolidated liberal democracies because their states lack an Archimedean point from which the institutional structure as a whole can be designed to accord with the true ideal – whichever it might be. However, knowledge of the ideal can still aid agents in those societies to determine the worth of more modest political objectives other than the ideal itself.
Along this chapter I develop a criticism of relativism and objectivism in moral thinking. I propose instead a contextually situated point of practical adjudication showing a universal pretense of validity. Whereas moral relativism is self-contradictory and does not prove to be immune to criticism even in its emotivist version, objectivism appears to assume an unattainable ‘view from nowhere’. I therefore reject both views and suggest the possibility of a third way, a paradigm of practical reasoning capable of keeping contextual situatedness and the pretense of universal validity together. This will be the role that exemplar universalism in human rights will assume. The vantage point of this under investigated form of universalism proposed by Kant in the Third Critique is a constructivist capacity for universals which are not yet given. I incorporate such form of universalism within a reformulated discourse theory where the validity claim is made to depend on a more demanding normative standard than the Habermasian (procedural) one.
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