Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life
Abstract
Adam Smith wrote two books, one about economics and the other about morality. His Wealth of Nations argues for a largely free-market economy, while his Theory of Moral Sentiments argues that human morality develops out of a mutual sympathy that people seek with one another. How do these books go together? How do markets and morality mix? James Otteson's 2002 book provides a comprehensive examination and interpretation of Smith's moral theory and shows how his conception of the nature of morality applies to his understanding of markets, language and other social institutions. Considering Smith's notions of natural sympathy, the impartial spectator, human nature, and human conscience the author also addresses the issue of whether Smith thinks that moral judgments enjoy a transcendent sanction. James Otteson sees Smith's theory of morality as an institution that develops unintentionally but nevertheless in an orderly way according to a market model.
... Smith had argued in his Theory of Moral Sentiments that our moral sensibilities are not present at birth; neither are they transcendent truths awaiting to be apprehended by reason. Instead, they are learned by our interactions with others (Otteson 2002;Hanley 2009;Forman-Barzilai 2011;Weinstein 2013). 12 Smith believes, however, that all of us do have an innate desire for "mutual sympathy of sentiments" (TMS, pp. ...
... This is a contested issue among Smith scholars, however. SeeOtteson (2002),Raphael (2007), andOslington (2011).Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved. ...
Elizabeth Anderson claims that the prevailing culture of business is one of domination. “Most workplace governments in the United States are dictatorships, in which bosses. . don’t merely govern workers; they dominate them” (2017, p. xxii; italics in the original). If this diagnosis is correct, then the culture of business poses a significant threat to human liberty, as each year millions of people in the employ of businesses spend hundreds or thousands of hours on the job. This essay provides a further argument supporting Anderson’s analysis, by extending her treatment of Adam Smith and drawing on his claim about the potentially mind-numbing effects on workers of extreme division of labor. Smith’s analysis, though consistent with Anderson’s, implies that the problem is more worrisome than she allows, and accordingly that Anderson’s own remedy might be insufficient. Our Anderson/Smith argument suggests that worker unfreedom might warrant more aggressive institutional remedy.
... Brown 2016), and there have been more recent suggestions to put the lectures on rhetoric to work for reading the Wealth of Nations (Cremaschi 1984, pp. 118-126;2002;2017a;McKenna 2008, pp. 133-47;Pack 1991, pp. ...
... Besides a few principles of human nature, principles put to work in the Wealth of Nations include trans-individual mechanisms systematically described in terms of physical analogies (Cremaschi 1984, pp. 91-94;2002; Fiori 2021, pp. 31-63) but also, less frequently, analogies with biological phenomena (Cremaschi 2002, pp. ...
The paper sheds fresh light on what Adam Smith was doing in writing the Wealth of Nations by looking at its place inhis unaccomplished oeuvre. The Wealth of Nations is just a partial implementation of a part of his project: the history and theoryof law and government. In this work, the ‘Socratic method” of persuasion and the “Newtonian method” of didactical discoursecoexist with moral discourse. Such coexistence allows a smooth transition from (i) an argument aimed at persuading the publicopinion of the advantage carried by non-aggressive commercial policies, high wages and provision of public goods by the publicauthority to (ii) a simplified reconstruction of economic mechanisms and tendencies through either conjectural history or ‘systems”,and (iii) an argument showing how all the oppressive inequality existent in modern societies is, besides deplorable on whatever moral standard, contrary to everybody’s interest
... The interpretation of Smith's invisible hand, therefore, should not be oversimplified as an endorsement of laissez-faire principles without recognition of the essential functions that he attributed to government intervention. Otteson (2002) emphasizes that Smith envisioned a balanced role for the state, one that supports the market's ability to self-organize while correcting its failures and ensuring a fair distribution of wealth. This balanced approach suggests a governance model that respects the efficiency of markets but also recognizes the need for a moral and legal framework to guide economic activities (Sen, 1987). ...
Building on a comprehensive examination of the incorporation of business ethics in modern economics, this paper proposes a novel interpretation of Adam Smith's "Invisible Hand," and subsequently, discusses the impact of spiritual intelligence on ethical thinking in contemporary workplaces. Business ethics as a highly necessary construct is accentuated by its role in establishing trust, promoting sustainability, and meeting stakeholder expectations in a globalized market. As a departure from superficial interpretations, Adam Smith's notion of the "Invisible Hand" suggests a market efficiently regulated by self-interest within a foundation of sensible laws and ethical norms, rather than a pure advocacy of unbridled laissez-faire economics. Furthermore, the paper discusses how spiritual intelligence, characterized by a deep sense of purpose, empathy, and interconnectedness, enhances ethical decision-making and behavior in contemporary organizational settings. Empirical research evidenced a positive correlation between spiritual intelligence and ethical leadership, thereby suggesting that spiritual intelligence not only cultivates conducive ethical workplace cultures, but also helps in the alignment of personal values with professional responsibilities. By integrating spiritual practices like mindfulness and self-awareness, spiritual intelligence enables one's navigation of ethical dilemmas with integrity and a commitment to the greater good. This paper surmises that business ethics, interpreted through Adam Smith's nuanced perspective and enriched by the principles of spiritual intelligence, is essential for sustainable and responsible business practices in the modern economic landscape.
... Вкратце, говоря современным языком, то, что хотел максимизировать смитовский человек было право на самоопределение, но при этом оставляя место моральным и социальным чувствам и даже проявлению альтруизма [14, с. 239]. Точные детали смитовской концепции человеческой природы оспариваются [12]. Однако следует понимать, что Смит, как и его современник Дэвид Юм, глубоко интересовался психологическими основами человеческого поведения. ...
Экономика — это социальная наука о людях и о том, как они организуют себя,
чтобы удовлетворить свои потребности и улучшить свое благосостояние. В
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АГЕНТСТВО МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ ● https://ami.im
конечном счете, любое экономическое поведение является поведением человека.
Исходя из таких рассуждений экономисты, в качестве отправной точки,
традиционно использовали некое заявление о мотивах, стоящих за
экономическими действиями.
В работе рассматривается модель “экономического человека” в классической
экономической мысли. Отдельно расматриваются работы представителей
английской классической школы, а именно А.Смита, Д. Рикардо, Дж. Ст. Милля
... We will see that while in Sentiments and Lectures there are more instances concerned with crime or punishment, the most prevalent type of reasoning used by Smith differs greatly from brief passages in Wealth where crime is more directly addressed. For Smith, punishment are applied due to the need to repair harm done to an individual citizen and punishment intensity is measured by the resentment caused to an impartial spectator by such victimization (Brooks 2012;Otteson 2002). This thesis is central to Smith's thinking since Sentiments was first published (Smith 1982, 69, 76-79). ...
The economic approach to crime and punishment began to be applied to a research program based on a rigorous and mathematically structured theoretical model by Becker (1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76 (2): 169–217) in his paper Crime and punishment: An economic approach . However, only brief mentions regarding the historical origins of the “economic” thought on crime and punishment can be found in the field’s pioneering modern texts. Thus, our main objective is to rebuild this history. In this paper, we do this by reviewing the thoughts of Adam Smith and Cesare Beccaria (1759–1776). In section one, we show how Smith’s position, despite being different from that of the utilitarian outlook, actually hides passages where the author comes very close to employing an economic rationale to reflect on criminality. In section two, we revisit Beccaria’s arguments and find surprising nuances and exceptions, even though he is a thinker explicitly recognized as influential by Becker and other authors linked to the Law and Economics movement. We conclude by highlighting key insights and looking for a broader history where the economic rationale on crimes and punishments can be traced back from centuries ago to modern times.
... For discussion of Smith's notion of an "impartial spectator," seeRaphael (2007). 7 For accounts of this process, seeOtteson (2002),Hanley (2009), Forman-Barzilai (2011), and Weinstein (2013. ...
Most Adam Smith scholars hold that Smith endorsed public provision of education to offset deleterious consequences arising from the division of labor. Smith’s putative endorsement of publicly funded education is taken by some scholars as evidence that he tends more toward progressive than classical liberalism, or that this is a departure from, perhaps an inconsistency with, Smith’s otherwise strong presumption against government intervention in markets. This paper argues that these interpretations are flawed because Smith ultimately does not advocate public provision of education. He raises the idea and explores its potential benefits, but he ultimately does not endorse it. Smith also provides reason to be skeptical of public provision of education, which suggests that his final position may have inclined against it.
... 23. For useful discussions see Muller (1993); Young (1997); Otteson (2002);Fleischacker (2004); Hanley (2009). ...
Throughout the history of economic thought and political philosophy, many have identified a common thread between the ideas of Adam Smith and Charles Darwin. In the same way that Smith showed how national wealth and aggregate prosperity are unintended consequences of competition among individuals driven by their selfinterest, Darwin showed how complex design and ecological balance are unintended consequences of competition among organisms. The analogy, notably defended by F. A. Hayek, states that the economic and natural orders were not deliberately designed from the top-down, but they emerged spontaneously from the bottom-up. Taking Hayek’s lead, contemporary popular science writers and political theorists have argued that creationists and “Intelligent Designers” who follow Smith in economics should accept Darwinian mechanisms to explain biodiversity. Otherwise, they are guilty of philosophical inconsistency. The same charge has been levelled against socialists who accept Darwin’s ‘blind watchmaker’ in nature but reject Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ in economics. The paper explores this charge and finds it vulnerable indifferent ways. Among other problems, it violates Hume’s dictum that we do not derive ought from is; it obscures the differences in which individual agency deploys in biology and economics; it underestimates the specific non-chaotic conditions in which each order emerges; it ignores the epistemic features of an omniscient god in Christian theology; and it misreads the extension that Hayek himself gave to the Smith-Darwin analogy.
By exploring Adam Smith’s considerations of arts, this paper stresses that the philosopher establishes a profound connection between music and sympathy. In his essay “Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in what are called The Imitative Arts,” Smith delves into esthetic theory, dedicating a significant portion of the text to music and its role in eliciting pleasure and emotions. While previous studies have acknowledged the presence of art-related vocabulary and an esthetic dimension in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, they have not comprehensively mobilized his art essay to illuminate his moral theory. Following this unexplored path, this paper rallies the parallel Smith creates between emotions and musical aspects, such as rhythm and melody, to find a connection between his esthetic and moral ideas. In essence, it reveals how the human esthetic sensibility to look for regularities and order serves as a foundational element in Smith’s understanding of sympathy and social harmony .
This article explores how the external conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic have affected individuals’ moral psychology. We will argue that challenging contexts like the pandemic are external conditions that shape human moral behavior. Supported by Adam Smith’s theory of virtues, it is argued that individuals can balance self-interest with concern for others, even in challenging circumstances, through the virtues of justice, benevolence, prudence, and, most importantly, self-control. We will conclude by stating that, even in challenging contexts, individuals need to balance private and public interests to develop appropriate moral action.
The social benefits derived from competitive markets certainly depend upon participants conforming to generally accepted notions of moral duty. These notions include perfect duties such as those against fraud, deception, and coercion, as well as imperfect duties such as those that favor beneficence but with practical limits. These duties are examined here where product markets, capital markets, and internal labor markets are shown to be capable of imposing conformance through both formal and informally organized boycotts. A categorization of classic and recent boycotts into those motivated by (i) sympathy for the suffering of others and (ii) outrage over violations of generally accepted social norms is provided. It is argued that the former motivation seeks to establish new norms, and the latter seeks to enforce existing norms. Through this exploration, a resolution of the so-called Adam Smith problem concerning the morality of the invisible hand is offered.
This article critiques the account of the invisible hand theory that individual actions bring about macro-level social benefits. The standard account of the invisible hand theory asserts that individual actions, motivated mostly by self-interest, advance the common good inadvertently and unknowingly. The invisible hand theory provides explanation how social reality, such as emergence of language, social morality and culture, evolve through individual actions. The account of the invisible hand embedded in self-interest is generally attributed to Adam Smith. Adam Smith's account of the invisible hand is centred on self-interest and freedom. In the invisible hand theory, freedom unfetters individual actions based on self-interests and promotes a kind of competition in an economic sense, which is known as capitalism. Certainly, the account of the invisible hand theory, which is based on only self-interest is un-Smithian. I argue that although the invisible hand theory provides an adequate explanation for the evolution of language, morality, culture, and market, it promotes an unbridled capitalism, which, in an economic sense, may cause malign consequences. In qualitative research methodology, I adopt the empirically informed philosophical analysis method to documentary resources, including journal papers, academic books, and proceedings of conferences and congresses.
This article explores the metaphysical dimensions of the global monetary system, treating money as a concept influencing human thought and culture beyond its economic utility. The paradoxical nature of money – as both a tangible transaction mechanism and a metaphysical construct – shapes philosophical inquiry and social norms. Historical and philosophical perspectives reveal that money impacts societal structures and behaviour. The research uncovers the “hidden metaphysics” of money, showing its influence on Western thought and its role as a metaphor for value, trust, and cohesion. Understanding money's metaphysical qualities offers insights into economic crises and suggests reevaluating these aspects for robust philosophical and economic models. By recontextualising money within metaphysical discourse, this article broadens the understanding of its role in shaping human thought and social structures.
The ‘History of Astronomy’ is fundamental to understanding Smith’s epistemology. The most problematic issue of this text is that Smith intended to analyse the history of astronomy according not to the principles of ‘truth’ that they embodied, but in terms of their logical coherence. However, he was also influenced by Newton’s realism. My thesis is that Smith had no doubts that external reality exists, but believed that it is necessarily filtered by our perceptions and our scientific beliefs. Perceptions and theories do not reflect objective reality as such but reconstruct it according to the procedures and constraints that characterise them. Two generally neglected Smithian sources, Copernicus and Berkeley and ‘Of the External Senses’ seem to legitimize this interpretation. At first sight, Fontenelle used the same arguments of Berkeley and Smith, but the difference is that Fontenelle was convinced that astronomical science is characterised by progress toward truth.
Resumo O artigo de Lisa Herzog examina como Adam Smith e G. W. F. Hegel conceitualizam a identidade de trabalhadores no mercado. Embora ambos vejam seres humanos como indivíduos formados dentro de relações sociais e por meio delas, a relação entre o trabalhador e seu trabalho é vista por eles de modos diferentes. Para Smith, trabalhadores “possuem” capital humano, enquanto, para Hegel, trabalhadores “são” cervejeiros, açougueiros ou padeiros, pois sua profissão é parte de sua identidade. Essa diferença conceitual, que se reflete em diferentes “variedades de capitalismo” contemporâneas, mostra que não apenas graus, mas também tipos de enraizamento devem ser distinguidos na discussão sobre a relação entre indivíduo e sociedade. O artigo é precedido de uma apresentação feita pelos tradutores.
This article critiques of the account of invisible hand theory that individual actions bring about macro-level social benefits. The standard account of the invisible hand theory asserts that individual actions, motivated mostly by self-interest, advance the common good inadvertently and unknowingly. The invisible hand theory provides explanation how social reality, such as emergence of language, social morality and culture, evolve through individual actions. The account of the invisible hand embedded in self-interest is generally attributed to Adam Smith. Adam Smith’s account of the invisible hand is centred on self-interest and freedom. In the invisible hand theory, freedom unfetters individual actions based on self-interests and promotes a kind of competition in an economic sense, which is known as capitalism. Certainly, the account of the invisible hand theory, which is based on only self-interest is un-Smithian. I argue that although the invisible hand theory provides an adequate explanation to evolution of language, morality, culture, and market, yet it promotes an unbridled capitalism, which in economic sense, may cause malign consequences. In qualitative research methodology, I adopt the empirically informed philosophical analysis method to documentary resources, including journal papers, academic books, and proceedings of conferences and congresses.
Central to the debate on the moral relevance of shame is whether we take others’ assessments of our moral shortcomings seriously. Some argue that viewing shame as a social emotion undermines the moral standing of shame; for a moral agent, what is authoritative are his own moral values, not the mere disapproval of others. Adam Smith's framework sheds some light on the contemporary debates in philosophy on the moral value of shame. Shame is mostly a social emotion but has moral value for Smith. This is because we desire sympathy and share an ongoing social practice of morality with others. Smith developed the underpinnings of an account for a sympathetic basis of shame. An agent is evaluated through the sympathetic process to determine whether he/she has lived up to shared norms and morality. Shame emerges from the understanding that we ought not to be favorably thought of by others, the impartial spectator, or by our own conscience. We want to avoid shame for two reasons: first, we want to receive praise which gives pleasure, blame and blameworthiness operate by giving pain. Secondly, we are pleased with the sympathy of others. According to Smith, shame is a very painful emotion. Given our dread of pain and love of pleasure, we are motivated to be not blamed or blameworthy. We want to be favorably thought of so as not to be, or feel, shamed. Our dread of blameworthiness and our desire for sympathy motivates us to be a person who acts according to the norms and morality of society. Shame has a moral value both as a social emotion and when it arises from our conscience; however, Smith was also aware that there are limits to shame as a moral value, which arises from misjudgments of spectators.
For Smith, the historical process is indispensable for understanding in what sense and to what extent we can speak of harmony between the individual self and others. Indeed, the historical process is not only a driving cause of self-development in terms of the differentiation of the individual self of each human being in society, but it also influences the nature of the relationships that human beings have with each other. Starting from these premises, this chapter describes in what sense Smith’s understanding of human beings would be based on an idea of harmony between oneself and others that depends on the historical process. Therefore, I outline in what sense it would be possible to speak of a relationship between historical context, moral conduct and human nature in Smith’s conception of the human being. In particular, after outlining some features of Smith’s philosophy of history, I explore one of the main features of Smith’s philosophical anthropology through an examination of the figure of the savage. In doing so, I provide an example of how the development of the self would be linked to the satisfaction of a desiderative human nature of the human being depending on the historical and social context.
This chapter describes in what sense Smith’s conception of human nature can be defined in different ways, and how it is related to some tendencies and desires, such as sociability, language, the human propensity to exchange, self-love, harmony, the desire to gain deserved approval from real and imagined spectators, the desire to improve one’s condition and happiness. In particular, I describe how, in Smith’s moral philosophy, these desiderative and motivational dimensions, across several categories of discourse (philosophical, psychological and anthropological), are all linked to the possibility of harmony between oneself and others in society.
This chapter shows in what sense sympathy would be central to understanding Smith’s conception of harmony between oneself and others. Specifically, assuming the centrality of the concept of immediacy, I describe in what sense sympathy would be central to understanding human nature, mind and the self in relation to Smith’s conceptions of the origin of moral judgment, the moral development of the self, and emotional expression. Firstly, I analyse the fundamental role of the passions as the object and origin of moral judgment in human beings, showing their immediate dimension. Then I consider the crucial role of the imagination in the articulation of the imperfect and perfect degrees of sympathy, understanding this imagination as a mental process consisting of two moments: a natural-immediate, linked to sensory perception; a moral-rational, marked by an intellectual effort. Thus, imperfect sympathy is defined as that related to the perceptual dimension, which a person experiences only when he has a general idea of the cause that provokes the feeling with which she sympathises; perfect sympathy is described as that which a person has when, considering the other’s situation, she expresses a moral judgment on the character and conduct of the other. Finally, the chapter offers an inventory of Smith’s main qualifications of the concept of sympathy in his moral theory.
The eighteenth century is often thought of as an important era for the secularization of British philosophy. One dimension of this secularization involves philosophers developing theories that, while not explicitly rejecting God, are less reliant on claims about God for their intelligibility and plausibility. A comparison of Adam Smith with his teacher, Francis Hutcheson, reveals an underappreciated facet of this process. Hutcheson portrayed God as an impartial legislator and used this metaphor to clarify contested moral rules in a way that would make little sense if God did not exist. In contrast, Smith's impartial spectator does not require belief in a God who is the author of the moral law in order to determine the correct interpretation of contested moral principles. By pursuing this alternative conception of impartiality, Smith developed a theory that was, in this respect, less reliant on religious premises than Hutcheson's had been.
Adam Smith was born 300 years ago, in June 1723. The son of a Scottish lawyer and customs commissioner grew to become a great Enlightenment thinker who gained global fame for his writings in moral philosophy and political economy. His second major work, the “Wealth of Nations” (1776), enabled economics to establish itself as a separate academic discipline. In numerous countries, the book had not only a theoretical but also a practical policy impact. Yet many distortions crept into the reception history of Smith’s oeuvre. For some years now, an interdisciplinary group of Smith scholars has taken on the received wisdom to challenge the clichés. In this survey written on the occasion of the Adam Smith tricentenary, Karen Horn presents some insights from recent Smith scholarship and shows just how inspiring and fruitful an engagement with the great Scot continues to be – even for economists, who are so far remarkably underrepresented in this activity.
Zusammenfassung
Vor 300 Jahren, im Juni 1723, kam Adam Smith auf die Welt. Aus dem Sohn eines schottischen Anwalts und Zollkommissars wurde ein großer Aufklärer, der vor allem mit seinen moralphilosophischen und ökonomischen Schriften Berühmtheit erlangte. Mit seinem zweiten Hauptwerk, dem „Wealth of Nations“ (1776), etablierte sich die Volkswirtschaftslehre als eigenständige akademische Disziplin. Das Buch entfaltete nicht nur theoretische, sondern in zahlreichen Ländern auch praktische Wirkung. Freilich ging die Rezeptionsgeschichte mit erheblichen Vergröberungen und Verzerrungen einher. Gegen diese Klischees stemmt sich seit einigen Jahren eine interdisziplinäre Gruppe von Smith-Forschern. In diesem Überblicksartikel aus Anlass des Jubiläums stellt Karen Horn einige der Einsichten aus der jüngeren Literatur der Smith-Forschung vor und zeigt, wie reizvoll und fruchtbar die Auseinandersetzung mit dem großen Schotten weiterhin ist – auch für die hier unterrepräsentierten Ökonomen.
La innovación fue el problema económico clave del Siglo XVIII, una época privilegiada donde empiezan a resonar unos discursos exaltados, enaltecedores de la necesidad de innovación constante, pero en la que muchos señalaban también los riesgos de esta innovación. En este artículo se presentan las visiones de la innovación que surgieron en el siglo dieciocho de la mano de tres autores prototípicos, David Hume (1711-1776), Adam Smith (1723-1790) y Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Sus tres teorías arrojan luz sobre las consecuencias de la innovación, al estar basadas en sus distintas definiciones del agente económico, del tipo de interés, del empresario y del desarrollo económico.
Seeking Justice: Access to Remedy for Corporate Human Rights Abuse explores victims' varying experiences in seeking remedy mechanisms for corporate human rights abuse. It puts forward a novel theory about the possibility of productive contestation and explores governance outcomes for victims of corporate human rights abuse across Latin America. This foundation informs three pathways that victims can use to press for their rights: working within the institutional environment, capitalizing on corporate characteristics, and elevating voices. Seeking Justice challenges the common assumptions in the governance gap literature and argues, instead, that greater democratic practices can emerge from productive contestation. This book brings to bear tough questions about the trade-offs associated with economic growth and conflicting values around human dignity-questions that are very salient today, as citizens around the globe contemplate the type of democratic and economic systems that might better prepare us for tomorrow.
Que doit-on comprendre lorsqu'on nous dit « Mets-toi à sa place ! » Sans aucun doute, il s'agit d'empathie ou de sympathie. Mais ce genre de phénomène peut-il être une action ? C'est la thèse que nous nous proposons de défendre. Pour cela, nous présenterons quatre arguments montrant que la sympathie a une direction de causalité esprit-monde mais aussi qu'elle implique un effort. Puis, nous définirons l'effort en termes de forces et finirons par proposer une théorie substantielle de l'effort sympathique, ce dernier ayant reçu peu d'attention dans la littérature en général. En tant qu'action, sympathiser consisterait alors à volontairement provoquer un changement d'état affectif en soi, et ceci en ressentant une émotion analogue à celle d'une autre personne à la suite d'une projection dans sa situation et, à l'issu d'un effort, à l'adoption son point de vue. Que doit-on comprendre lorsqu'on nous dit « Mets-toi à sa place ! » ? Sans aucun doute, il s'agit d'empathie ou de sympathie. Mais ce genre de phénomène peut-il être une action ? Intuitivement, il semble que la sympathie puisse être une action réalisée par un agent. Bien qu'en général ce phénomène soit considéré comme un processus, certains auteurs insistent sur le fait que la sympathie projective repose sur des mécanismes conscients et contrôlés et implique un effort. Prenant ces deux aspects au sérieux, nous arguerons en faveur d'une théorie actionnelle en montrant que la sympathie a une direction de causalité esprit-monde mais aussi qu'elle implique un effort, tous deux étant relatifs à l'action. Pour ce faire, la section 1 établit le contexte de l'argument et des distinctions entre les
There has been debate over the coherence of Hutcheson’s writings. Hutcheson’s writings on ethics have been taken as inconsistent with his work on jurisprudence and economics. This article argues that Hutcheson’s works are coherent when situated in theological context. We find across Hutcheson’s works a belief that God has benevolently designed the natural order. Hutcheson’s later works outline the rules by which we make our efforts to serve the common good effective in practice. The article contributes to our appreciation of the relationship between theology and the idea of mutual benefits in the history of economic thought.
Adam Smith (1723–1790) was a Scottish moral philosopher and political economist. He is best known today for his later influence on the field of economics although in his own time it was his moral theory that received most attention. He published two books in his lifetime, both of which were highly acclaimed on publication, leading Smith to become a prominent part of the Scottish Enlightenment and one of the foremost figures in European intellectual life. Smith’s first book was The Theory of Moral Sentiments (first published in 1759, but continually revised until his death and ran to six editions). It remains a significant text in the history of moral philosophy although it has been eclipsed in the popular consciousness by his subsequent work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, or more commonly, The Wealth of Nations (1776). Shortly after his death his reflections on the history of astronomy were published as Essays on Philosophical Subjects (1795) and, much later, student notes from 1762–1763 were collected and published as Lectures on Jurisprudence (1978) helping shed light on and clarify aspects of his philosophy, particularly on issues of justice and government.
What explains the ambition to get rich? Adam Smith is clear that commercial ambition, the passionate desire for great wealth, is not simply a desire to satisfy one’s material needs. His argument on what underlies it, however, is not obvious. I review three possibilities suggested by Smith’s work and the scholarly literature—vanity, the love of system, and the desire for tranquility—and conclude that none of them captures the underlying motive of commercial ambition. Instead, I argue that Smith understands commercial ambition as a misguided desire for excellence. Ambitious pursuers of wealth are driven by the desire to deserve and to enjoy recognition for their excellence, but their judgment of what is truly excellent is corrupted by the standards of a wealth-worshipping society. Instead of appealing to the moral standpoint of the impartial spectator, they construct in their minds and follow a corruptive moral guide: the wealth-worshipping spectator.
This paper elaborates the coherence of Hutcheson's ethics, jurisprudence, and political economy by analyzing his views on the role of self-love in God's plan for furthering the happiness of humankind. God's benevolent order is such that we serve the good of all even as we tend to our local parts. That concord is facilitated by institutions of property and exchange, which encourage individuals to steward their resources and, through the division of labor, yield increased material returns. Hutcheson's ideas illumine the soul of classical liberal political economy and its provenance in ideas of divine providence.
This essay uses concepts from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments to develop ideas about choice and welfare. I use those ideas to offer several challenges to common approaches to behavioral welfare economics and new paternalist policy making. Drawing on Smith’s dialectical concept of practical reason, which he develops in expositing ideas about self-awareness and self-judgment, I first argue that inconsistency need not be viewed as pathological. Inconsistent choices might indicate legitimate context-dependencies as individuals reflect over disjointed perspectives and act accordingly. Understanding inconsistency as reasonable raises epistemic difficulties for identifying errant choices and designing corrective policies. Second, I draw on Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator to discuss dynamic aspects of welfare. Welfare is not simply a matter of preference satisfaction but involves a sense of progress and improvement towards better preferences. Smith’s account suggests that economists interested in welfare should focus on institutional arrangements that facilitate self-development.
El presente trabajo pretende mostrar cuál es el rol de la utilidad en la teoría moral de Adam Smith desarrollada en su primer libro, La teoría de los sentimientos morales, mostrando los elementos de la teoría que evitan su deslizamiento hacia el utilitarismo; particularmente, en el ámbito de la justificación moral, puesto que, si bien la corriente ética utilitarista comenzó propiamente con Jeremy Bentham y fue sistematizada por John Stuart Mill en la primera mitad del siglo XIX, algunos han llamado a Smith proto-utilitarista. Para eso se explica el concepto de simpatía que maneja Smith –distinguiendo entre simpatía psicológica y moral– y el de propiedad, claves a la hora de distanciarlo del utilitarismo, y se analizan las lecturas de T.D. Campbell y James Otteson, dos grandes expertos en Smith que lo califican (con matices) como utilitarista.
Mientras que la justicia ha sido vista por muchos de los comentadores de Smith como la virtud fundamental de su teoría moral y política, en este ensayo mi objetivo es rescatar otra virtud menos discutida, pero igualmente importante: la beneficencia. Cómo surge, cómo se relaciona con la justicia, a quiénes se dirige y qué deberes genera son las principales preguntas que intentaré responder en la primera parte. En la segunda parte, me referiré brevemente a dos objeciones que se le pueden hacer a la interpretación smithiana de esta virtud y sugeriré el lugar que ésta podría ocupar en los debates contemporáneos de justicia social o ayuda humanitaria.
This paper engages Adam Smith’s reflections concerning the moral and economic dimensions of business–society relations in the context of the Multinational Corporation (MNC). The paper argues that Smith formulates a pronounced moral criticism of prevailing corporate business practices, which emphasize profit while de facto undermining the moral underpinnings and social cohesion of commercial society. Rather than simply promoting selfish profit maximization by individuals, businesses, and society at large, Smith’s work reveals a deeply entangled analysis of the complex interplay between material interests, moral aspects of human behavior, and Smith’s overall goal of broad socioeconomic welfare. The balancing of moral and material motivations requires the social embeddedness of economic exchange within normative community frameworks. In this context, the sociopsychological process of moral approbation via Smith’s impartial spectator mechanism has the potential to temper humans’ tendency for excessive (material) self-love. Smith’s scrutiny of internationally active corporations problematizes a range of institutional and governance issues and their implications for the moral bonds between individuals, MNCs, and global society. Most importantly, Smith worries about the potentially negative impact of increasingly anonymous and emotionally distant economic relationships between market participants on their ability to reckon with the moral consequences of their actions. Building on Smith’s entangled perspective, the paper proposes a normatively grounded framework to critically contend with contemporary efforts to redefine corporate citizenship in the global economy.
El presente artículo describe diversas prácticas internacionales en materia de innovación e investigación en Formación Profesional. El objetivo del artículo se centra en acumular conocimiento en este campo para aplicarlo a nivel regional en Cataluña, España, dónde la FP ha mantenido siempre un discreto segundo plano mientras que los objetivos UE 2020 y organismos como el CEDEFOP apuntan que este nivel de instrucción será necesario al menos en el 50% de los puestos de trabajo europeos mientras que en España sólo el 16% de la población (25-65 años) dispone de un título de FP.
Adam Smith wird gemeinhin als Begründer der Wirtschaftswissenschaft angesehen. Am bekanntesten ist er als der Prophet des Eigennutzes, aber diesen Ruf hat er gewiss nicht verdient.
We hope that the reader of our work agrees that there is plenty to say about Smith which has not been said before, and that there are important lessons to draw from his works for renewing and bettering our understanding of man (alone and in his interactions in society), especially in economics. These reasoning routines identify a hitherto poorly understood deep structure of Smith's work, explaining its main characteristics and its development from Smith's early research on the principles of the human mind which allow humans to understand the natural and social world alike, and to exchange with others their ideas and sentiments about it.
Under the light of Adam Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (LRBL), the aim of this paper will be to reinterpret some Smithian economic and moral issues. More precisely, it will try to highlight the relationship between discursive practice and economic reality in apparent simplicity, exchange. According to Smith, the essence and foundation of exchange and commerce lies in language. The departure point of this study will be to examine the dichotomy that he establishes between two main types of discourse: the rhetorical discourse and the didactic discourse.
In order to identify the “deep structure” of Smith’s works, we identify a set of three “reasoning routines” that are triggered by Smith’s Wonder–Surprise–Admiration meta-routine (WSA routine from here on) that, at an early stage of his career, in juvenile works such as History of Astronomy and early lectures such as those on languages and rhetoric, Smith developed and later put to good use as moral philosopher, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and as economist, in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
Artykuł zawiera porównanie dwóch koncepcji sympatii, autorstwa Davida Hume’a i Adama Smitha. Chociaż w obu systemach filozoficznych pojęcie topełni centralną rolę, jej znaczenie jest nieco inne. Drobiazgowe analizy teoriopoznawcze Hume’a pozwalają na wyodrębnienie w jego filozofii trzech płaszczyzn opisu: zdroworozsądkowy, mechanicystyczny i fenomenalistyczny, przy czym sympatia pełni na każdej z nich nieco odmienną rolę. Smith dostrzegł centralne znaczenie tego pojęcia w Hume’owskiej koncepcji umysłu i uczuć, a także zaadoptował je w swej teorii uczuć moralnych, ale brak u niego subtelnych analiz „mechaniki” ludzkiego myślenia. Brak ten jednak można traktować zarówno jako zaniedbanie, jednak z drugiej strony – paradoksalnie – pozwala on dostrzec doktrynerski charakter koncepcji Hume’a wynikający z przyjęcia fizykalistycznego modelu eksplikacji ludzkiej afektywności.
Adam Smith’s discourses aim to encourage mores, practices, and public policies in service to the common good, or that which a universally benevolent spectator would approve of. The Wealth of Nations illustrates how in pursuing our own happiness within the bounds of prudence and commutative justice, we may be said, literally or metaphorically, to cooperate with God in furthering the happiness of humankind. The Theory of Moral Sentiments elaborates an ethic, here called “focalism,” that instructs us to proportion our beneficent efforts to our knowledge and ability. The relationship between political economy and focalism is bidirectionally reinforcing. In one direction, the ethic of focalism contributes to the moral authorization of self-love, thereby invigorating and dignifying honest commercial activities. In the other direction, the insights of political economy reinforce the ethic of focalism by elaborating how through prudent commerce and focal beneficence, we cooperate, even if only metaphorically, in a grand social enterprise.
David Hull accounts for the success of science in terms of an invisible hand mechanism, arguing that it is difficult to reconcile scientists' self-interestedness or their desire for recognition with traditional philosophical explanations for the success of science. I argue that we have less reason to invoke an invisible hand mechanism to explain the success of science than Hull implies, and that many of the practices and institutions constitutive of science are intentionally designed by scientists with an eye to realizing the very goals that Hull believes need to be explained by reference to an invisible hand mechanism. Thus, I reduce the scope of Hull's invisible hand explanation and supplement it by appealing to a hidden hand explanation.