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Mining Science
Mining Science, vol. 27, 2020, 165–181 (Previously Prace Naukowe
Instytutu Gornictwa Politechniki
Wroclawskiej, ISSN 0370-0798)
www.miningscience.pwr.edu.pl ISSN 2300-9586 (print)
ISSN 2353-5423 (online)
Received November 22, 2019; reviewed; accepted September 16, 2020
UNIVERSAL APPROACH
FOR RISK IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION
IN UNDERGROUND FACILITIES
Witold PYTEL1, Krzysztof FUŁAWKA2*,
Bogumiła PAŁAC-WALKO1, Piotr MERTUSZKA2, Jan KISIEL3,
Panu JALAS4, Jari JOUTSENVAARA4, Vitali SHEKOV5
1Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Wrocław, Poland
2KGHM CUPRUM Ltd. Research & Development Centre, Wrocław, Poland
3University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland
4University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland
5Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia
Abstract: Underground laboratories provide a unique environment for various industries and are the
perfect place for developing new technologies for mining, geophysical surveys, radiation detection as
well as many other studies and measurements. Unfortunately working in underground excavations is
associated with exposure to many hazards not encountered in the laboratories located on the surface.
Water inflow, gas burst, roof fall and even seismic hazards translate into high accident rates in the under-
ground mining industry across the globe. Therefore, to minimise the risk of serious accidents, a lot of
research investigations related to the development of effective risk assessment procedures are being
carried out. One of the initiatives aimed at improving the work safety in underground laboratories in the
Baltic Sea Innovation Network project implemented under the Interreg Baltic Sea Region Programme.
This study presents the process of compiling a database on hazards within underground laboratories.
Finally, a proposal of unification of the procedure for risk assessment, including methods for determining
the likelihood and potential impact of unwanted events has been developed.
Keywords: risk assessment; risk matrix; numerical modelling; underground laboratory
_________
* Corresponding author: kfulawka@cuprum.wroc.pl (K. Fuławka)
doi: 10.37190/MSC202712
W. PYTEL et al.
166
1. INTRODUCTION
Underground laboratories due to their unique environment are characterised by high
research, educational and touristic potential. Apart from the development opportuni-
ties of mining technologies in the environment corresponding to real working condi-
tions, underground laboratories are a suitable place for various types of geophysical
surveys, radiation detection or radioactive waste disposal. Unfortunately working in
underground excavations is inherently associated with a high level of risk, related to
both natural and technical hazards as well as technological problems (Martyka 2015;
Groves et al. 2007). The scale of hazard depends on many factors. One of the key
elements affecting the level of safety in underground laboratories’ operation is their
depth below the surface, as the geomechanical hazard growths with its increase (Li et al.
2007). The problem of the presence of fumes and explosive gases in the mine atmos-
phere, the size of the mined-out area in the vicinity of active underground workings
(Fuławka et al. 2018) and the distance of workings from the fault-affected zones is
also of practical significance (Zorychta and Burtan 2012). As a result, the mining in-
dustry, which undoubtedly includes underground research laboratories, is associated
with a relatively high incident rate.
According to a report by The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
of the US, only in the United States, as many as 726 mining disasters occurred in the
years 1900–2016 in underground mining. These disasters have resulted in more than
12,800 casualties among the miners during the recorded period (CDC, 2018). The
situation in underground mines in Europe and Asia is also not encouraging, as, since
the beginning of the 21st century, several dozen mining accidents have been recorded
there, resulting in several hundred deaths.
Despite the strong emphasis on the training of mining personnel in occupational
safety and the use of preventive measures, the incident rate in the mining industry
remains at a very high level (Sanmiquel et al. 2010; Dhillon 2010; Komljenovic et al.
2008). This problem concerns almost all underground facilities, as even under good
geomechanical conditions, there are still other kinds of hazards related to lighting,
watering, ventilation, etc. (Galvin 2017). Therefore, to improve occupational safety in the
mining industry, and consequently, in underground laboratories, a number of research
works are being carried out around the world, focused on minimising or preventing
these hazards.
The first step, crucial from the safety point of view is proper identification and
classification of possible unwanted events. It is of high importance especially in cases
where establishing a new underground facility, e.g., in abandoned mine is considered,
by an external entity, which may be not fully aware of possible risk.
In this study, selected methods of risk assessment were described and their appli-
cability at the stage of design, construction and operation of underground laboratories
was defined. Data on possible risks in underground laboratories are presented and
Universal approach for risk identification and evaluation in underground facilities 167
assigned to individual categories. Also, the preliminary risk assessment for under-
ground laboratories of BSR region was conducted. As a result, unified procedures for
hazard identification and risk assessment in underground research laboratories were
developed.
2. THE UNDERGROUND LABORATORIES IN BSR
In order to identify, evaluate and finally mitigate the risk surveys concerning hazard
evaluation in ULs of Baltic sea region were conducted. Risk database was discussed
and completed with supervisors of underground laboratories of the research and de-
velopment sector (Callio Lab from Finland, Äspö HRL from Sweden, Reiche Zeche
from Germany, UL of Khlopin Institute, Russia) and laboratories intended mainly for
tourist purposes (Ruskeala, Russia). Also, the history of accidents observed in Polish
underground mines was examined. In result even most rigorous assumptions were
analysed added to the database. The locations of the underground laboratories in-
volved in the risk identification process are shown in Fig. 1.
1 – KGHM underground copper mines, Poland; 2 – Callio Lab, Pyhäsalmi mine, Finland;
3 – Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory, Oskarshamn, Sweden; 4 – Reiche Zeche, TU Freiberg Research
and Education mine, Germany; 5 – Ruskeala, Russia; 6 – Khlopin Institute Underground Laboratory, Russia
Fig. 1. Underground Laboratories in the Baltic Sea Region
W. PYTEL et al.
168
3. REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS
As noted by Shooks et al. (2014), according to international standard IEC/FDIS
31010 Risk management – Risk assessment techniques (2009), a comprehensive risk
assessment should include:
Risk identification (definition of the type of hazard),
Risk analysis (determination of frequency/probability of occurrence and possi-
ble consequences),
Risk assessment (whether it is acceptable and if can be minimised).
Still, the risk is a very broad concept, and it is difficult to define it unequivo-
cally, as evidenced by the multitude of definitions in world literature. According
to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the risk is the effect
of uncertainty on objectives (ISO Guide 73:2009). For industry, the definition that
risk is the product of frequency and severity of events is often used (Suddle 2009;
Aven 2010). Whereas in economic analyses risk is described as a mathematical con-
cept in the form of expected consequences, both in terms of losses and profits
(UNISDR, 2004). The definition proposed by Fenton and Griffiths (2008) that risk
is the product of the probability of failure and the cost of its consequences is also
widely used.
However, due to the multitude of hazard categories in underground research labo-
ratories, for this study, the authors used the definition which states that risk is the re-
sult of probability multiplied by consequences of an unwanted event, also a failure,
occurrence:
RISK = RP RI (1)
where:
RP – the value of the probability of occurrence of an unwanted event,
RI – consequences of the event, most often expressed by financial measures.
This is a universal approach applicable in assessing the risk of underground labo-
ratories’ operation, as it enables the risk to be presented in both cost or dimensionless
form. Unfortunately, estimating the degree of probability and possible consequences
of individual events occurrence is also a highly complex issue. It depends mostly on
the quantity and quality of input data used in the analysis. In general, risk assessment
methods can be divided into quantitative and qualitative.
3.1. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
Qualitative methods are very efficient in terms of economy and are characterised by
high ease of implementation (Curtis and Carey 2012; Vardar et al. 2018). At the same
Universal approach for risk identification and evaluation in underground facilities 169
time, they may be used as a preliminary method with the joint determination of risk
occurrence probability against the potential severity of the analysed event. The esti-
mation of both parameters is usually based on a survey or questionnaire. As a result,
the estimation is rather based on the subjective assessment of employees what could
be sort of disadvantage (Smolarkiewicz et al. 2011). However, the essential benefit of
this method, is the ability to relatively quick characterise the risks which are the most
dangerous. Consequently, it is possible to prioritise individual events from the least to
the most dangerous. Recently few methods of qualitative analysis are in use among
which the most popular are:
Delphi Technique – method of risk assessment based on brainstorming of ex-
perts with deep knowledge about the examined issue, What is important experts
can review experts notes, and during all process, some consensus should be
reached.
Structured What-If Technique (SWIFT) – this method uses a systematic,
team-based evaluation of each risk in the form of a workshop. During risk as-
sessment process effect or impact of different hypothetical situations in analysed
with use “What if” considerations.
Decision Tree Analysis – approach close to Event Tree Analysis, but without
quantitatively presenting the result. In most cases, this method has been used to
determine the best way to achieve a goal with the lowest level of risk.
Bow-tie Analysis – in this method each risky event is examined in two direc-
tions. One branch describes all the potential causes of the event. In turn, in the
second branch potential consequences are listed. In result, it is possible to iden-
tify risk and apply prevention solution to minimise hazard.
Risk Matrix – At the moment this is the most commonly utilised approach
in establishing risk severity. One of the most frequently used techniques of
qualitative risk assessment is the method based on the so-called two-di-
mensional risk matrix (Fig. 2). In result, it is possible not only to determine
the impact of each event but also identify how the risk is affected by its prob-
ability or consequence. This information is of high importance, during the
process of mitigations procedures development (PMI, 2013). The risk assess-
ment method based on a risk matrix for underground laboratories can be ap-
plied already at the design stage of a given facility. The assessment must be
carried out exclusively by specialists in a particular field. Only a thorough and
critical analysis allows identifying those aspects of the activity which involve
a high level of risk. The assessment enables the early implementation of ap-
propriate preventive and risk minimisation measures. At the same time, there
are no technical limitations to use it as the basic method of classifying se-
lected events as part of the periodic risk assessment of the operation of under-
ground facilities throughout their entire life cycle.
W. PYTEL et al.
170
Geologicdiscontinuities
occurrence
Spallingofsidewalls Unsupportedroof RoofFailures
MIn ecollapse
Lackofmonitoring
devices
Rockburs tSqueezingofpillars
PROBABILITY
IMPACT
EXTREMELYSMALL LOW MODERATEHIGHVERYHIGH
UNNOTICE ABLE SMALL MODERAT ESEVERE CATASTROPHIC
ACCEPTABLE LOW MEDIUM S ERIOUS UNACCEPTABL E
Fig. 2. Example of a 5 5 risk matrix
3.2. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The second group of methods includes so-called quantitative methods, which are usu-
ally based on statistical and numerical calculations. Quantitative methods are much
more reliable than qualitative methods, as they are not directly based on subjective
evaluation of the personnel involved in the analysis. Unfortunately, in order to carry
out this kind of risk analysis properly, access to a large amount of detailed data on the
examined facility or event is required.
One of the quantitative methods of risk assessment is probabilistic analysis. In
many numerical simulation software using, e.g., DEM, FEM and LEM methods, prob-
abilistic analysis allows to estimate the probability of, e.g., loss of stability of under-
ground excavations, while taking into account the uncertainty and variability of model
input parameters. The probabilistic risk assessment method of this type is widely used
Universal approach for risk identification and evaluation in underground facilities 171
in geotechnical (Park et al. 2005; Zennir et al. 2011) and geomechanical analyses all
over the world (Idris et al. 2011; Szurgacz 2015; Ghorbani et al. 2017). Numerical
models of underground workings utilized in these analyses can be formulated as 2- or
3-dimensional (Fig. 3) problem, depending on the requirements and local geome-
chanical and mining conditions.
Fig. 3. The geometry of 3D FEM-based numerical model of underground excavations (left)
with predicted changes of safety margins within the analysed area (right)
Numerical models allow determining the range of a hazard and possible conse-
quences. Therefore, the numerical analysis combined with probabilistic analysis shall
be required at the design stage of the ULs life cycle either. Moreover, for safety pur-
poses, this kind of analyses should be conducted periodically, as the conditions en-
suring the stability of excavations are crucial for this type of facilities.
Of course, numerical tools are not fully useful to determine the risk of all types of
events. In the case of events related to, e.g., fires or traffic accidents, it is possible to
use the so-called incident rates, which allow determining the frequency of an incident
and its effect expressed in the time of inability to work.
The incident rate (IR) should be calculated in relation to working time according to
the formula (OSHA, 2018):
200,000
c
R
Elh
N
IN
,(2)
where: IR – incident rate, Nc – number of recorded cases, NElh – the number of em-
ployee labour hours worked, hours.
The number of 200,000 in the formula refers to the number of hours worked in
a year by 100 employees (100 employees 40 hours per week 50 weeks per year).
The incident rate may also be calculated in relation to the number of employees.
For every 1,000 employees, IR is calculated, e.g. from the formula:
W. PYTEL et al.
172
1,000
c
R
E
N
IN
,(3)
where NE – the number of employees.
Calculated incident rates can be used to define the probability of an incident ac-
cording to the relationship (Rothman 2002):
()
1R
IT
oI
Pe
,(4)
where: PoI – probability of an incident, IR – calculated incident rate, T – time, year.
Based on the above, the probability of an incident will increase over time as well as
with the increase in the incident rate.
To determine the risk of complex events resulting from the overlapping of several
negative factors, the “event tree” method may be used. This method is applicable to
identify all elements that can initiate a series of consecutive events (branch of a tree)
leading to specific consequences (Clemens 1998). Each case within a branch of tree
must have a certain probability of occurrence. The product of successive probabilities
is the resultant probability of the occurrence of a specific sequence of events (Clifton
and Ericson, 2015). In terms of underground laboratories’ operation, the event tree
method should be used especially to assess the risk of complex events, e.g. when ana-
lysing the rockburst hazard. It enables the simultaneous consideration of the probabil-
ity of a high energy tremor and the occurrence of excavation instability as a result of
the dynamic seismic event (RocScience 2018).
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Failure Mode, Effects and Criti-
cality Analysis (FMECA) can also be used to assess the risk of underground laborato-
ries’ operation. The FMEA method is used to identify potential mechanisms of facility
failure and to estimate their consequences. This kind of analysis is based on the infor-
mation on the object construction, the type of operation and the strategy for the devel-
opment of underground workings included in the design documentation. In turn, the
FMECA method is additionally extended by a semi-quantitative classification of de-
struction mechanisms based on the frequency of particular events occurrence and se-
verity of their consequences (IEC, 2006).
The reliability of risk assessment depends mainly on the involvement of qualified
experts from different fields related to the considered facility. From the geomechanical
point of view, the most important is the knowledge on the depth and geometry of under-
ground excavations, the development plans, induced seismicity level and the strength
parameters of the surrounding rocks. The issues related to monitoring and observation
of the rock mass condition and the environmental impact of a facility are also impor-
tant. Selection of the optimal risk analysis method depends on the quality of input
data. Basically, a comprehensive risk assessment for underground laboratories’ should
always begin with qualitative analysis to define the events that have a key impact on
Universal approach for risk identification and evaluation in underground facilities 173
occupational safety. Then a quantitative analysis should be performed in particular for
events with a potentially high risk.
4. IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE UNWANTED
Within the framework of this study information regarding the risks in Polish coal
mines (reports of the State Mining Authority) and Polish copper mines (hazard cata-
logue of KGHM Polska Miedź S.A.) were collected. As a result, a group of hazards
associated with the operation of laboratories located in the vicinity of active mine
workings were defined. The database has also been supplemented with information
from underground laboratories supervisors (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. BSR units taking part in the identification of risks in underground laboratories
Individual hazards were assigned to one of the four groups (Fig. 5) taking into ac-
count their origin, including:
The first group called Environmental Risks is related to hazards of natural ori-
gin. The risks listed in this group are characterised by a negative impact on the
working environment and are difficult to be prevented or eliminated. In this
group, such events like seismic tremors, rock bursts, water inrush and the explo-
sion of gases should be mentioned. The occurrence of one of the abovemen-
tioned events always generate a significant threat and may result in underground
workings destruction or even fatalities. Therefore, monitoring of selected pa-
rameters is crucial from the risks minimization point of view.
The second group described as Risk At The Workplace is directly related to the
working environment and the technologies applied. Most of the risks in these
group can be defined as common risks, which also exist in other industrial sec-
tors, usually not resulting in fatalities, but implying a risk of occupational dis-
W. PYTEL et al.
174
eases. Still, in underground conditions, such factors like dust, vibration and
lightning issues are much more harmful in comparison to activities conducted at
the surface and thus comprehensive monitoring and periodical assessment need
to be utilised in a regular manner.
The risks belonging to the third group are related to mining operations and re-
search activities in underground environment. Exploitation and tests of huge
machines and use of explosives may be related to a great threat of an accident.
When a hazard occurs, the consequences can often be very serious (fatalities).
However, in the case of comprehensive monitoring of hazards as well as good
work organisation and the application of preventive measures, the risk associ-
ated with the operation of underground workings can be effectively limited.
The last group of hazards has been defined as OTHER. The risks of this type
usually are not strictly related with the exploitation of underground laboratory
and do not pose a severe threat to employees, but they may have a significant
impact on the socio-economic aspects of the facility's operation. These risks are
most often caused by external factors, which makes it difficult to prevent.
Among such risks, some legal and social issues should be mentioned. In the ex-
ample there is a risk that the local community, for various reasons, will not sup-
port all activities in the underground environment, due to the belief that the
mining industry is highly harmful to the environment. In such a case, the entire
project may be in danger of failure.
Fig. 5. Classification of identified risks by source
Based on the above, more detailed analysis was performed and included 106 haz-
ards which were defined and divided into 18 hazard categories (Fig. 6).
Universal approach for risk identification and evaluation in underground facilities 175
Fig. 6. Summary of identified risks in particular categories of hazard
In the quantitative domain, most of the risks are related to the so-called natural
hazards (red bars). In this group, more than 46.6% of all categorised hazards were
defined. Almost two times fewer hazards were observed in categories II – Risk At The
Workplace (20.9%) and III – Risks Related To Mining Operations (20.1%) marked in
green and blue, respectively. The smallest group of threats (12.4%) turned out to be
socio-economic threats marked in yellow.
In the next step, the risk was estimated by defining the probability and conse-
quences of individual events. Based on the created database, each unwanted event was
categorised and evaluated (Fig. 7). The preliminary risk assessment was conducted
with representatives of underground laboratories from BSR and rock mechanics spe-
cialists knowing the risks observed in deep underground mines. As a result, detailed
data on the distribution of the level of hazards related to unwanted events in particular
categories were obtained. Figure 9 shows the percentage of events classified into sub-
sequent risk groups. All events were considered separately for each category. For ex-
ample, among all identified events in the Gases category, 66.67% of events were asso-
ciated with a medium level of risk, while 28.57% with the low risk and 4.76% with the
acceptable risk level
The number of observed risks depends strongly on the scale of the underground fa-
cility and its core activity. In the example, small facilities, which are settled in hard
rocks, and does not utilise explosives during the lifecycle, are less affected by seis-
micity in comparison to Underground Labs located near to active mine. Still, there was
the assumption that risk analysis should be conducted in a rigorous manner. Therefore,
all experts, from each site, were asked to determine the probability and impact of all
106 hazards.
W. PYTEL et al.
176
Unacce ptable Serious Me dium Low Acce ptable Total
Ground Contro l 0 ,00% 24,0 0% 52,00 % 20,00% 4,0 0% 100 ,00%
Gases 0,00% 0,00% 66,67% 28,57% 4,76% 100,00%
Seismic Activity 0,00% 40,00% 13,33% 20,00% 26,67% 100,00%
Radiation 0,00% 0,00% 16,67% 50,00% 33,33% 100,00%
Water 0,00% 5,88% 23,53% 52,94% 17,65% 100,00%
Lightening and Electric 0,00% 8,00% 24,00% 28,00% 40,00% 100,00%
Technological 0,00% 3,57% 7,14% 75,00% 14,29% 100,00%
Infrastructure Related Risk 0,00% 0,00% 22,22% 55,56% 22,22% 100,00%
Noise 0,00% 9,09% 18,18% 45,45% 27,27% 100,00%
Vibration 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 50,00% 50,00% 100,00%
Blasting Works 0,00% 31,25% 25,00% 25,00% 18,75% 100,00%
Ventilation and Air Condition 0,00% 15,79% 26,32% 47,37% 10,53% 100,00%
Machinery 0,00% 22,22% 33,33% 44,44% 0,00% 100,00%
Dust 0,00% 0,00% 50,00% 50,00% 0,00% 100,00%
Economic 0,00% 0,00% 13,33% 26,67% 60,00% 100,00%
Social 0,00% 0,00% 8,33% 41,67% 50,00% 100,00%
Political Risk 0,00% 12,50% 0,00% 25,00% 62,50% 100,00%
Pollution 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 30,00% 70,00% 100,00%
ENVIRONMENTAL
RISKS
RISK AT TH E
WOR KP LAC E
RISKS RELATED TO
MINING
OPERATIONS
OTHER
Perce nta
g
e o f risk in eac h cate
g
or
y
[%]
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Fig. 7. Summary of the intensity of identified risks for all defined risk categories
As expected, the highest risk (Serious) is associated with problems in maintaining
the stability of underground workings as well as with induced seismic activity. Based
on the collected data, it was concluded that in the Seismic Activity category as much as
40% of events involves a serious risk of an accident. Similar conclusions apply in the
case of hazards related to Ground Control, where 24% of events were classified as
serious. The reason for this is the high level of consequences, e.g., loss of life or seri-
ous damage to the infrastructure of underground workings. This is a clear alert con-
firming that the risk assessment should be always carried out at the design stage of
underground laboratories e.g. with the use of numerical tools. In addition, due to the
nature of the environment surrounding ULs, the numerical analysis should also pre-
cede all significant changes in the geometry of a facility.
For facilities located near the seismic zones, besides calculations under static loading
conditions, dynamic analyses using numerical modelling are also strongly recommended
(after high energy tremors mainly). It can then minimise the possibility of workings sta-
bility and roof falls. A similar problem applies to laboratories in the vicinity of active
mining operations where blasting works are being carried out (Yang et al. 2018). In-
duced seismic waves can have a negative impact on the stability of the rock mass sur-
rounding the facility. It was also observed that there is a serious risk associated with
the machinery movement within underground workings. This is linked to large ma-
chine dimensions and low visibility inside the cabin. The risks in this category should
therefore be determined using the so-called incident rates. In case of lack of sufficient
data, the risk matrix method should be used. For the remaining 14 categories, it was
observed that most of the hazards were associated with medium to low risk, most often
not resulting in a serious threat to health or life. However, these hazards must be con-
tinuously monitored and a number of preventive measures must be taken. It allows to
obtain necessary data, and in case of emergency, to prevent or eliminate these risks.
Universal approach for risk identification and evaluation in underground facilities 177
For events with low or acceptable risk, the risk matrix method should be used for peri-
odic evaluation.
5. UNIFICATION OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES FOR ULs
Based on authors, experience and surveys with ULs supervisors, a flow chart describ-
ing the risk assessment procedure in underground facilities were developed. As shown
in Fig. 8, the whole process should begin with identifying the hazard and adding it to
the database.
Fig. 8. Flowchart of a risk evaluation process for Underground Facilities
W. PYTEL et al.
178
After defining of each possible risk it is possible to move on to a second stage,
which involves determining the possibility to calculate the probability of the unwanted
event occurrence based on data collected in the past, or on results of numerical analy-
ses. If the data cannot be presented in a numerical form, the risk matrix method should
be used. The expected consequences of the dangerous incident may then be estimated.
These consequences may be quantified as dimensionless or, if possible, presented as
costs of compensation the consequences of an unwanted event. The last step in the
process of risk assessment is to check whether the level of risk is acceptable. If not,
preventive or mitigation action must be undertaken, and the risk assessment procedure
shall be repeated. As can be seen in the flow chart (Fig. 8), particular emphasis was
placed on the universality of the proposed solution. This paper focuses on the elements
between START and RISK ASSESSMENT fields (red frame), i.e., concerning strictly
the risk assessment in underground laboratories. Nevertheless, an important element of
the created diagram is the decision area which qualifies individual risks as acceptable
or not (blue box). If a risk is too high, it is necessary to develop and implement pre-
ventive measures to minimise the hazard. Further work on this issue will be carried out
and published.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The article presents selected results of research work concerning the unification of pro-
cedures, which may be used for risk identifying and assessment in underground laborato-
ries. Information on possible hazards in underground laboratories located in the Baltic
Sea Region was supplemented with the summary on hazards occurring in Polish deep
underground mines. As a result, a database of 106 types of the hazard was created. Based
on the analysis of the collected data, it was concluded that the risks occurring in under-
ground workings, from point of view of their origin, can be attributed into one of 18
categories classified in the four groups, i.e., Environmental Risks, Risk At The Work-
place, Risks Related To Mining Operations and Other Risk. The preliminary risk assess-
ment was then performed based on the risk matrix, which enables the definition of events
causing a higher level of threat. According to conducted surveys, in case of Underground
Laboratories, most dangerous events are related to ground control issues, ventilation and
induced seismic activity as well. Also, machinery and transport in underground condi-
tions may lead to harmful events occurrence. Therefore, in the case of adaption of un-
derground space for long term use, e.g., underground Laboratory, these risk should be
evaluated and if necessary mitigated at first stages. Rest of risk related to H & S in un-
derground conditions, should not bring tragic consequences, nevertheless, their impact
and probability have to be assessed before running up with works on-site.
International cooperation within the created network of underground laboratories
has allowed developing a procedure for estimating the level of risk in underground
Universal approach for risk identification and evaluation in underground facilities 179
laboratories. The proposed solution is universal and can be used not only in for exist-
ing laboratories but may also be adaptable to facilities in the planning phase. Prelimi-
nary risk analysis with the use of developed risk evaluation flow chart may be also
already useful during the application phase with the mining authorities. Detailed
knowledge about possible treats allows preparing a mitigation plan, which makes the
whole project more approachable and fulfil requirements of the EU in terms of CSR
and Sustainability.
The database of possible unwanted events and their categorisation will be made
available on an open platform, which in turn will be the basis for the risk management
by users of underground research infrastructures and further work on the exchange of
experiences related to the operation of ULs.
The presented research is the first step in the creation of a publicly available online
tool for preliminary risk assessment for users and managers of underground facilities. All
gathered data, risk assessment questionnaire and developed methods of risk mitigation
will be available in open access at the web-based tool of Baltis Sea Underground Inno-
vation Network founded within the framework of Interreg BSR programme.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper has been prepared through the Interreg Baltic Sea EU funded project on “Baltic Sea Under-
ground Innovation Network” (BSUIN) Grant Agreement No. R2.073 (http://bsuin.eu/).
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