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Justifying Forced Labor in Xinjiang?
A Review of the White Paper “Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang”
Alexander Kriebitz
22 September 2020
The Chinese government has recently (17 September 2020) published a White Paper on Employment and Labor
Rights in Xinjiang, which has been circulated via Xinhua, the Global Times and other public news channels. In
difference to earlier publications (for example: “The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights
Protection in Xinjiang”), centering on anti-terrorism measures, this paper centers almost exclusively on
economic questions and on the labor situation in China’s Western province. The fact that the Chinese
government feels the need to “clarify” and “justify” the situation in Xinjiang indicates the pressure generated
by the latest measures imposed on entities in the region and the international media coverage in regard to the
situation.
Most of the reports devoted to the paper (Guardian, South China Morning Post, Deutsche Welle) have been
focusing on the absorption of Xinjiang’s labor surplus in the urban centers and labor migration within Xinjiang.
According to researchers (South China Morning Post), labor migration within Xinjiang could be an indicator of
assessing the scale of forced labor. Earlier studies have focused on forced transfers of the Uighur population to
Justifying Forced Labor in Xinjiang? - A Review of the White Paper “Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang”
Alexander Kriebitz
Page 2
other parts of Xinjiang and even to other Chinese provinces (Australian Strategic Policy Institute). The topic of
forced labor surfaced in the media against the backdrop of revelations of forced labor and U.S. American
sanctions passed on entities complicit in forced labor and involved in the re-education camps established by the
Chinese government to quell Uighur resistance against the Chinese government. Quite unsurprisingly, the White
Paper portrays the Chinese official position that it is “preventing and punishing any incidents of forced labor in
the region”. However, the paper does not refer directly to the sanctions imposed by the United States and to the
international debate on Xinjiang. It has rather the design of a report on progress, which describes the degree to
which current policies have been implemented.
Besides these insights, I find three aspects noteworthy, which have not received much media coverage so far
and which highlight the official justification of China’s economic measures in the region:
The White Paper begins with a lengthy philosophic elaboration on the role of labor as an incubator of
the development (“劳动是人的存在方式，也是人类的本质活动。劳动创造美好生活，促进人的
全面发展和人类文明进步”) and argues that human beings “achieve their own development through
hard work.” (“人都能通过辛勤劳动创造幸福生活、实现自身发展. ”)
The White Paper illustrates that the Chinese government maintains the view that its policies in Xinjiang
are directed to realize its (constitutional) mandate to provide employment and the facilitation of
employment as the most fundamental project for ensuring and improving people's wellbeing.
Finally, the paper provides socio-economic data on per capita disposable income and average annual
salaries of employees broken down by different groups. These figures are noteworthy as they support
the claim of a strong discrepancy between different socio-economic groups in Xinjiang.
Justifying Forced Labor in Xinjiang? - A Review of the White Paper “Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang”
Alexander Kriebitz
Page 3
Justifying Economic Measures
The first two points are crucial for understanding China’s narrative on the Xinjiang measures or the way the
Chinese government wants its measures to be perceived.
The Chinese government continues to brand its measures in Xinjiang as means of “poverty alleviation”. The
Chinese state is here leading the development of the region in the sense of a developmental state, which uses its
resources and “manpower” to modernize “poverty-stricken” areas. (This includes “the four prefectures in
southern Xinjiang, namely, Hotan, Kashgar, Aksu and Kizilsu Kirgiz.”) According to the paper, China’s mission
is in first place the realization of “utilitarian considerations” such as “improving their living standards, and
promoting social harmony and stability”. Development is here understood as a precondition for happiness and
the pursuit of a safe and happy life. In addition to employment, education constitutes another pillar of economic
policy. Some commentators understand the remarks in the paper as a reference or even a justification of the re-
education camps in the region. Earlier publications on re-education by the Chinese government headed exactly
into this direction.
As in earlier documents, the Chinese government referred to the importance of poverty alleviation and education
as a means to tackle the root cause of Islamic fundamentalism. The document continues this tradition (references
are here: ‘refuse to improve their vocational skills’; “some local people have outdated ideas”). However, the
paper does not focus solely on anti-terrorism, suggesting a slight change in the narrative of the Chinese
government on Xinjiang leaning to economic matters. In addition, the framing of the measures (“right to work”)
is influenced by Communist ideologies, which is strongly focusing on the role of labor as a means for individual
development. The document explicitly refers to “the right and obligation (!) to work.” Labor shapes a person’s
role in their society (another relevant formulation is “劳动是人的存在方式”) and creates decent human beings.
Finally, the measures are framed within a “rule by law” setting. The actions of the Chinese government are
portrayed as activities to realize constitutional duties of the Chinese government vis-à-vis its people and proceed
Justifying Forced Labor in Xinjiang? - A Review of the White Paper “Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang”
Alexander Kriebitz
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within the legal framework of the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, the document refers here to policy
implications from regional authorities and highlights the information exchange between local and central
authorities.
Socio-Economic Data on Xinjiang
Although we must be careful about the validity of the numbers presented in the paper, they might be insightful
for assessing the role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) within Xinjiang’s political
economy (compare: Kriebitz and Max, 2020).
The main finding is that the white paper supports earlier claims (compare: Yajun Bao, 2018) on the specific role
of the XPCC in the economic set-up of the province. In fact, the XPCC is dominated by ethnic Han Chinese and
the organization has been often described as a mechanism to foster Han migration in Xinjiang (Matthew and
Cliff, 2017). According to the figures in the white paper, the disposable income per capita figures of those, who
live under the administration of the XPCC and of “residents of the company residence areas” are higher than of
individuals living in other rural areas of Xinjiang. We argue that the figures hint at the economic disparities
among the different ethnicities in Xinjiang, and the Chinese government has little interest in exaggerating the
gap between Han and Non-Han ethnicities as it would expose the failure of earlier policies by the Chinese
administration.
Similar patterns might be observed in the wage gap between the non-private and private sector, in terms of
annual incomes and salaries. The numbers here focus entirely on urban areas (with considerably higher living
standards than rural areas), so that they represent only a part of the entire picture. Based on the figures, we
conclude that the Chinese government is able to use public sector jobs, which outperforms the private sector in
terms of salaries, as an instrument of cooperation for loyal Uighurs and as an incentive for Chinese settlers from
other provinces.
Justifying Forced Labor in Xinjiang? - A Review of the White Paper “Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang”
Alexander Kriebitz
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Finally, the publication also provides figures on the growth of these income groups per year. However, we do
not focus on these numbers, as they could be biased toward the Chinese government and lead to erroneous
conclusions. Researchers interested in these figures might here refer to the original document.
Disposable Income per Capita in Xinjiang by Group
2014
2019
Urban residents
RMB 23,200
RMB 34,700
Rural residents
RMB 8,724
RMB 13,100
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (administration)
RMB 27,600
RMB 40,700
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (residence)
RMB 13,900
RMB 22,000
Average Annual Salary of Employees by Sector
Non-private sector (urban)
RMB 53,500
RMB 79,400
Private sector (urban)
RMB 36,200
RMB 45,900
Source: Table based on figures of the White Paper (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/17/c_139373591.htm)