![Equilibrium of the model for different values of λ
We use C = 0.6, c = 0.45, c̃\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\widetilde c$$\end{document} = 0.3 and P = 0.1 to graph the equilibrium of the model for different values of λ. a, Fitness inside and outside organization (we multiply fitness by 2.5 to obtain fitness equal or superior to 1). b, Percentage of the population that has a technology tuned to the state. c, Share of social and individual learners outside the organization. d, Share of social and individual learners inside the organization.](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344335711/figure/fig1/AS:938435221131292@1600751800415/Equilibrium-of-the-model-for-different-values-of-l-We-use-C06-c045_Q320.jpg)
![Comparative statics
For the baseline case, we reproduce the equilibrium fitness with PO depicted in Fig. 1a. The red lines modify one parameter at the time. a, We set c = 0.4. b, We set c̃\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\widetilde c$$\end{document} = 0.35. c, We set P = 0.12. d, In the red line, we make the PO secretive, that is, social learners outside cannot imitate members of the PO (see the section “Robustness to different assumptions for social learning”).](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344335711/figure/fig2/AS:938435221135370@1600751800466/Comparative-statics-For-the-baseline-case-we-reproduce-the-equilibrium-fitness-with-PO_Q320.jpg)
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Articles
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-00957-x
1London Business School, London, UK. 2School of Management, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Santiago, Chile. 3Instituto Sistemas Complejos de
Ingeniería, Santiago, Chile. ✉e-mail: fbrahm@london.edu
Organizations, defined as a stable and interacting collec-
tion of individuals with a common and specific goal1, have
played a crucial role throughout human history. One type
of organization, which we define as a productive organization (PO),
focuses on producing and delivering the goods and services that
satisfy the needs of human populations (for example, food, shelter,
clothes and tools). Whether it is the societas in Roman times2, the
guilds in medieval times3, the partnerships in early Renaissance4 or
the modern corporation5, POs have played a crucial role in our spe-
cies’ success. Not surprisingly, Herbert Simon noted that our ‘mar-
ket economies’ are in reality ‘organizational economies’6.
An often-neglected corollary is that the theories about the nature
of these organizations have an important impact on public policies
about markets and organizations, as well as how these organiza-
tions are managed. Consider, for example, the consequential debate
around the role of corporations in society7,8. However, while extant
theories explain how POs work (that is, their inner workings), we
lack a clear explanation for their evolution. This is not a minor gap,
as understanding POs’ origin is a requisite to fully understand and
thus to improve the capacity to harness, manage or regulate this
dominant institution.
In this paper, we propose such an explanation drawing from
cultural evolution theory9–14. Cultural evolution studies the trans-
mission and inheritance of culture, defined as information—beliefs,
norms, knowledge, skills and techniques—acquired from other indi-
viduals via social learning (for example, imitation, teaching). A cen-
tral insight of this theory is that social learning, by way of diffusing
innovations in a society, produces their gradual accumulation over
time. This process of cultural accumulation has allowed humans to
adapt and conquer every environment in the globe. We propose that
POs evolved because they enhance the capacity of social learning to
generate cumulative culture. This contributes to the nascent discus-
sion on the importance of studying organizational evolution and its
impact on cumulative culture15–18.
Our model and its extensions can illuminate several aspects of
POs that have eluded an integrated and parsimonious explanation
so far. First, we use culture as the main explanatory lever, away from
the focus on incentives and governance in the existing (economic)
theories of POs. These theories propose that POs’ role is to avoid the
myriad of transaction hazards involved in market exchange19–24. For
each type of hazard, POs provide a distinct solution. For example,
when assets are specific to a transaction and therefore hold-up is
likely, POs resolve ex post conflict using authority22. While empiri-
cal evidence supports this approach25, recent evidence shows that
POs are, to a large extent, carriers and transmitters of culture26–30.
Our theory informs the latter: it proposes that two specific and
ever-present characteristics of POs—restricted access and improved
social learning—favour cultural accumulation in societies. Thus,
while current theories assume a pre-existing cultural pool from
which transactions emerge, we endogenize culture and POs.
Second, the importance of cooperation for POs’ nature is a point
that has been frequently made6,18,31–34 but scarcely formalized17,35.
Our theory proposes that cooperation is a cultural quality of POs
that evolves via group selection, instead of being enforced on
self-interested agents via incentives and other governance devices.
For this, we use the idea of teaching as a cooperative act that
enhances the effectiveness of social learning14,36,37.
Third, we lack an understanding of the evolutionary mechanisms
that selected POs. Current theories focus on how POs work, that is,
they provide a ‘proximate explanation’ by detailing the mechanisms
of governance and incentive provision20,22,24,38,39. The spread of POs
is then explained by invoking agents’ causal understanding whom
adopt POs to increase their expected use. However, causal under-
standing does not need to be present to produce complex cultural
phenomena13,40,41 and thus, POs might not be adopted via complex
foresight and calculations. Instead, as with other traits that societies
carry and transmit over time, entrepreneurs may simply adopt POs
as the inherited default at their disposal. Therefore, if one assumes
limited causal understanding in humans6,13,40, asking how, when
and why POs originated and spread is pertinent. This is the type of
explanation we provide in this paper, known as ‘ultimate explana-
tion’ in biology39,42,43. Just as biologists study the function of a trait
for reproduction and survival, we unpack the POs’ function for
cumulative culture, the key enabler of our species’ success13,14,40. Our
ultimate explanation of POs complements evolutionary approaches
in economics44—that focus on change but not origin—and, by
unpacking the role of exclusivity and enhanced social learning, it
provides a clue that can guide empirical work in cultural evolution,
be that historical2,29,45,46, cultural-phylogenetic47 or archaeological48.
In this paper, we provide a step in that direction by testing the model
The evolution of productive organizations
Francisco Brahm 1 ✉ and Joaquin Poblete 2,3
Organizations devoted to the production of goods and services, such as guilds, partnerships and modern corporations, have
dominated the economic landscape in our species’ history. We develop an explanation for their evolution drawing from cultural
evolution theory. A basic tenet of this theory is that social learning, under certain conditions, allows for the diffusion of innova-
tions in society and, therefore, the accumulation of culture. Our model shows that these organizations provide such conditions
by possessing two characteristics, both prevalent in real world organizations: exclusivity of membership and more effective
social learning within their boundaries. The model and its extensions parsimoniously explain the cooperative nature of the
social learning advantage, organizational specialization, organizational rigidity and the locus of innovation. We find supportive
evidence for our predictions using a sample of premodern societies drawn from the Ethnographic Atlas. Understanding the
nature of these organizations informs the debate about their role in society.
NATURE HUMAN BEHAVIOUR | VOL 5 | JANUARY 2021 | 39–48 | www.nature.com/nathumbehav 39
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