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76 0278-0097/20©2020IEEE IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE ∕ SEPTEMBER 2020
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MTS.2020.3012332
Date of cu rrent v ersion: 2 S eptem ber 2020
Ning Wang
“We Live
on Hope…”
on Hope…
s international humanitarian assis-
tance from governments and private
donors continued to increase in
recent years, the pace of growth,
however, has slowed down [1].
For ins t a nc e , in 2018, wh ile
US$17.0 billion out of US$28.1
billion funding was committed to UN-coordinated
appeals, there was still a funding shortfall of US$11.1
billion, with only 61% of requirements met [1]. Against
this backdrop, international organizations are in -
creasingly implementing innovative solutions to
respond the needs of affected communities [2], [3].
Many of these solutions involve the use of digital
technologies, such as geographic information sys-
tems (GIS), robotics, spatial decision support sys-
tems, and unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as
drones [4]. Although drones are not the first use of
robotics in commercial and industrial settings, the
humanitarian use of drones represen ts the first
wave of robotics applied in the aid sector, and is
WANG
Ethical Considerations
of Humanitarian Use
of Drones in
Post-Disaster Nepal A
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SEPTEMBER 2020 ∕ IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE
representative of emerging technologies being used
for humanitarian purposes [5]. Examples of success-
ful drone use in this setting include the 2010 Haiti
earthquake (damage inspection), 2012 Hurricane
Sandy in the U.S.A. (epidemic prevention), 2013
Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (rescue logistics),
the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa (medical
equipment delivery), and the 2015 Nepal earthquake —
the site of this case study — when Nepal was stricken
by one of the most devastating natural disasters in
history, leaving the country with heavy burdens of
immediate emergency relief and long-term post-
disaster reconstruction [6]–[8].
Several authors have suggested that the use of novel
technologies in the aid sector may challenge the princi-
ple of humanity, and the related humanitarian princi-
ples, such as “Do No Harm” [9]–[11]. The noticeable turn
to technology in humanitarian action raises issues relat-
ed to humanitarianism, sovereignty, as well as equality
and access for at-risk populations in disaster zones or
remote areas lacking sufficient healthcare services [11],
[12]. On a technical level, practical challenges include
heightened risks of data safety and security, and the
potential malicious use of technology. On a societal
level, humanitarian innovation may disrupt relations
between different stakeholders, may widen inequality
between those with access and those without, and may
threaten privacy, disproportionately affecting the vulner-
able population.
This paper constitutes one element of a research
project that examines technological innovation in the
aid sector and how it intersects with moral values,
norms, and commitments. As par t a series of field stud-
ies of different uses of drones by humanitarian organi-
zations, we conducted an in-depth case study following
the 2015 Nepal earthquake. An earlier paper presented
a detailed narrative account of the case study, in which
drones were used to map a landslide area in rural Nepal
[13]. The current paper draws upon the empirical find-
ings to develop a normative analysis with the goal of
identifying contextualized ethical considerations, and
illuminating the wider debate about how ethical techno-
logical innovation in the aid sector should be operation-
alized. The paper comprises two parts: 1) a short
summar y of the case study of drone mapping in a land-
slide area in rural Nepal, where the livelihood of the
local community was threatened by the 2015 earth-
quake, and a humanitarian organization, assisted by the
use of drones, attempted to find a solution to restore
safety; and 2) an in-depth analysis of the ethical chal-
lenges that emerged in the context of the case study,
relating to five thematic categories: community, technol-
ogy, data, regulation, and stakeholders. In conclusion,
on the normative level, a prudent attitude in adopting
novel technology in the aid sector is required; while on
the operational level, it is argued that proposals for
actionable ethical standards to guide and safeguard
sector-wide innovation practices are needed.
Case Study
Drone Mapping Project
On April 25, 2015, a magnitude 7.8 earthquake hit
Nepal with a maximum intensity of VIII. Amidst the
post-disaster chaos, many humanitarian organizations
drew upon technologies to assist their relief work on the
ground, opening a gateway for new and emerging tech-
nologies to enter the humanitarian space [4]–[6]. This
situation was illustrated in an earlier paper, in which a
case study of using mapping drones in a landslide area
in rural Nepal was described in great detail [13]. In this
case study, a humanitarian organization X needed to
assess safety for reconstruction work in the landslide
area but faced challenging geological conditions, and
opted for using drones to capture high-resolution aerial
images of the area for further hazard analysis as part of
its risk-reduction assessment [13]. To handle the techni-
calities of the project, X collaborated with an NGO (Part-
ner A), which was actively involved in previous crisis
drone-mapping in the Philippines; and a university spi-
noff (Partner B), specializing in geological risk assess-
ment software engineering [13]. To receive government
and community permissions, X obtained a total of six
approvals to use drones, from four government authori-
ties at national level and two at district level, taking a
total of three months [13]. X also worked actively to gain
community consent, whereby information sessions with
community members and meetings with community
leaders were organized [13]. Eventually, a high-resolu-
tion map using the drone images was created, following
which Partner A developed a 3D model, and Partner B
studied the susceptibility of the landslide to further ero-
sion and submitted a technical report to X [13]. The
main conclusion was that, to gain a thorough under-
standing of the risks, more research and data were
needed [13]. Although X was the official owner of the
datasets, data ownership was in principle shared by the
three project partners, alongside the national govern-
ment [13]. The community’s expectations that the drone
data could be used to enable the management of the
landslide were not met, while X had to end the project
due to the lack of continued funds, among other rea-
sons [13]. There was a general perception within the
community that, while the project created value with
respect to evidence and awareness-raising, it was incon-
clusive; and that to make substantial impacts on the
local community’s livelihood, more efforts would be
needed [13].
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IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE ∕ SEPTEMBER 2020
Research Methods
Research Design
The case study was carried out in Nepal in January
2019, as part of a larger program on “value sensitive
humanitarian innovation (VSHI)” consisting of multiple
case studies. The research was conducted within a con-
structivist paradigm, in which human experience is
understood as subjective, local, socially and experien-
tially based, and culturally and historically specific [14].
Study design drew upon case study me tho dolo g y, and
we employed qualitative description as our method-
ological framework, which aims to gain first-hand
knowledge of stakeholders’ experiences, and describe
their views and perceptions of a particular topic in a lan-
guage similar to their own [15], [16]. The objective of a
qualitative description is to stay especially close to the
data it self, developing a low-inference analysis by direct-
ly organizing and synthesizing data without further inter-
pretation [16].
Participant Recruitment
We recruited interview participants using two approach-
es. First, guided by an Interview Plan, we sent email
invitations to targeted stakeholder representatives,
which were jointly identified by the research team and
our local partner in Nepal. We initially recruited six indi-
vidual participants, including four humanitarian workers
(at international, national, and field levels), one techni-
cian, and one government official (elec ted community
leader); as well as two focus groups of local community
members (twelve villagers in tot al). All initial partici-
pants were involved in, experienced, or witnessed the
drone mapping project.
Second, following snowball sampling logic, we
recruited further participants through recommendations
of previous participants, to expand the scope of investi-
gation and gain complementary and contextualized
data. The further recruitment included two aviation
regulators and one academic with expertise in geospa-
tial information systems, none of whom were directly
involved in the mapping project, but all of whom had
extensive knowledge and experience in drone mapping
in Nepal. The final sample of 21 participants consisted
of a diverse representation of stakeholder groups
engaged in the drone mapping project, meeting our
goal of acquiring ma ximum variation sampling to
explore the common and unique perspectives on the
subject [17].
Data Collection
Our main data collection was semi-structured qualita-
tive interviews with recruited participants upon their
provision of written informed consent. Other sources
included texts (e.g., the report Partner B provided to X),
and observations by the author (e.g., how X interacted
with the community members), who carried out the
field study in Nepal as the principal researcher. Two
types of interviews were conducted — those that fol-
lowed an Inter view Guide, which was developed prior to
the field study based on expert knowledge; and free-
style thematic discussions, which involved more in-
depth explorations of selected topics (e.g., the
post-earthquake regulatory environment in Nepal, the
technicalities of drone mapping, etc.). Ten inter views
were conducted between January 16 and Januar y 31,
2019 (eight individual and two focus group interviews).
All interviews were conducted face-to -face and were
audio-recorded, ranging from 3 9 -151 min in duration
(average 86 min). The individual interviews were con-
ducted in English; and the focus group interviews with
the community members were conducted in the local
dialect, with translation provided by our local pa r tner.
Data Analysis
Based on the interview recordings, and with reference
to the available texts and observations, we developed
Interview Sy nopses, which were then compared with
interview notes taken by the author during the inter-
views. Through this process, core concepts were clus-
tered in categories and extrapolated by themes for
further analysis. Ten inter view synopses were developed
with the support of a research assistant, based on
which a comprehensive descriptive summary of the
interviews was developed by the author. The summary
was then sent to an anonymous r ev iewer, who was
involved in the mapping project but not interviewed
(due to potential conflict of interest), to ensure that it
was factually accurate and complete. This analysis was
then used as the basis for developing a detailed narra-
tive account of the case stu dy, which was presented in
an earlier paper [13]. In the current paper, I build on the
empirical findings from the case study to elaborate on
an in-depth ethical analysis.
Ethical Analysis
From the ethical perspective, while no severe ethical
tensions, trade-offs, or dilemmas are observed in this
case study, there are ethical considerations related to
consent, expectations, priorities, and responsibilities
among the involved stakeholders. Through an induc-
tive analysis of the empirical data acquired through the
fieldwork, five categories of ethical considerations
were identified. In the sections that follow, I present a
normative analysis of how these categories were mani-
fest in the drone mapping case, and consider them in
relation to relevant ethical concepts and the wider aca-
demic literature.
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Community: Consent and Care
X followed a deliberative consent process by providing
necessary information to the community members
through information sessions, and by acquiring consent
from the community leaders elected to guard the villag-
ers’ interests. Although their rights over the land were
respected, the community members are still in a vulner-
able situation. This is because while X did the right
thing to gain community consent for conducting activi-
ties over their land by following the procedure; norma-
tively, the core issue is not solely how community
consent was acquired, but what led to such consent,
and what resulted from such consent. In other words,
two additional aspects need to be considered, i.e., the
sources and the consequences of the acquired commu-
nity consent [13].
The first aspect relates to where the consent comes
from. Firstly, throughout the interviews, “trust” was
repeatedly mentioned by stakeholders, including both
community members and those who were involved in
working with the community. In fact, according to our
interviews, this trust had little to do with the mapping
project itself; rather, it was built upon prior experiences
between X and the community, and an idealistic under-
standing about aid agencies altruistically delivering aid
to beneficiaries. This implies that, to some extent, trust
was pregiven regardless of the specificities of the map-
ping project, as opposed to newly established taking
into account the risks and benefits of the project. Trust
is a complex philosophical conception, as the very
nature of trust inevitably involves risk (associated with
optimism), vulnerability (in par ticular to betrayal), and
even harm (as a result of selective interpretations) [18]–[20].
Secondly, “hope” was another recurrent word fre-
quently popping up from the interviews, conveying the
deep faith and optimism of the community towards
those whom they believed to be change-enablers. With-
in the community, there seemed to be a commonly
shared sense of frustration at their inability to self-save,
alongside a recognized need for, and dependence on,
lifesavers from outside. Torn by perennial threats of
social problems mixed with natural disasters, the com-
munity members could afford little but a genuine hope.
Lastly, the community members’ literacy level, including
both general and technological literacy, renders it diffi-
cult for them to understand the potential risks, begging
the question as to what exactly the community mem-
bers had consented — to what they were able to under-
stand, or to what they were expected to understand?
These factors might have created communication gaps
between X and the community with respect to the
expectations of using drones in the community.
The second aspect concerns where the consent land-
ed eventually. Firstly, based on the aforementioned
factors, it is plausible that there might have been a phil-
anthropic misconception embedded in the community’s
general understanding about the purpose of the map-
ping project. Philanthropic misconception (akin to “ther-
apeutic misconception” in research ethics) is closely
linked to the notion of trust, and in particular its opti-
mistic nature [21], [2 2]. Such misconception typically
occurs when beneficiaries of philanthropic projects
entrust those who exhibit good will or benevolence
towards them, thereby misunderstanding the purpose
of the activity, while overestimating the intended bene-
fits or underestimating the potential risks [22]. In the
context of this case study, it seemed that, for the project
partners, there were two sets of objectives, i.e., in the
short-term, the project was intended to produce a high-
resolution map of the landslide using drone images; in
the long-run, and granted that all other conditions would
be met, the mapping results could potentially contribute
to managing the landslide. What is unclear, however, is
whether the community at large had built their expecta-
tions in alignment with these objectives; and if not, what
might have created a mismatch between the two. This
implies that the account of philanthropic misconception
concerns how goodwill ought to be interpreted, in that
reliance on goodwill creates certain expecta-
tio ns, sometimes even normative — rather than merely
predictive — expectations [21], [ 22].
Secondly, a broader question worth asking is what
would follow if community expectations fail to be satis-
fied, and community relations are negatively affected
due to misconceptions. Ultimately, this invokes a discus-
sion about the moral responsibility of the aid sector —
in particular, the duty of care towards vulnerable
communities. The humanitarian sector is sensitive
politically, socially, and culturally. The proposals for
innovation in this sector, thus, must be guided by rigor-
ous evaluations of the necessity for innovation. In par-
ticular, the way in which information is transmitted, the
extent to which the conveyed messages may be (mis)
interpreted, and the direction towards which expecta-
tions are channeled, are all pertinent aspects that
humanitarian organizations need to carefully consider
before introducing technology in their operations. A
benchmark of the humanitarian duty of care should be
not introducing new vulnerability, and not exacerbating
existing vulnerability.
Technology: Risks and Benefits
Risks are inherently imbedded in any kind of technolo-
gy. As a tool or an instrument, there are technical limita-
tions in terms of mechanical errors; and as a
convention or an institution, there are societal implica-
tions in that technology is neither value-neutral nor apo-
litical, in terms of both its design and its use. As the
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IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE ∕ SEPTEMBER 2020
case study demonstrates, drone technology holds prom-
ise in assisting humanitarian action in counties like
Nepal. Nonetheless, technology alone cannot change
things for the better. Recognizing technological limi-
tations also entails practical implications, i.e., stake-
holders need to proactively conduct risk-benefit
assessments within particular contexts, prior to the
deployment of new technology in their practice [13].
On the technical side, although drone technology is
evolving at a rapid pace, how it can be utilized depends
considerably on the level of development of the technol-
ogy. To illustrate, in terms of quality of information, a
collection of sensors may be installed on drones to
achieve richer data in mapping, such as laser scanning
or environmental sensors. However, there is an inevita-
ble tension between the quality of images collected by
the sensors on the one hand, and the increased payload
and the decreased batter y life of the drone on the other.
As regards types of drones, taking the case study as an
example, if X had used multi-rotor drones, then the
chances of technical failure would have been reduced,
as the technicians could have fully controlled the drone.
This, however, would have resulted in a technical com-
promise, whereby the data captured would not have
been as accurate as that of fixed-wing drones as a result
of flight stability. These technical trade-offs highlight the
fact that technology alone cannot provide solutions to
social problems as it is inherently inhibited by its own
technical limitations.
On the societal side, questions about for what pur-
poses drones are deployed, in what conditions they will
be used, and in what contexts their use is justified,
should be placed at the center of a risk-benefit analysis.
In many disaster settings, drones have effectively
helped emergency relief and aid delivery in a timely
manner [23]. In other circumstances, however, drones
have created public safety concerns associated with
near-airport drone flights [24], [25]. As a rule of thumb,
deploying technology in the aid sector needs to be
backed up with a strong rationale and justified with ref-
erence to the added value. This will make a difference
in terms of how the general public perceives humanitar-
ian technology — as a positive force for change that
enables previously unattainable prospects, or as an
anecdote that draws media attention and costs donor
funds, yet leaves fundamental problems unresolved.
The questions remain, hence, as to why and how tech-
nology is being utilized in this space, at what cost, bene-
fiting whom, and whose responsibility it is when things
go wrong.
Finally, regarding risk-benefit assessments, the key is
conducting them critically in light of the context in
which technology is to be introduced. Since 2015, the
number of activities involving drones in Nepal grew at a
frenzied pace due to an increasing demand for recon-
struction after the earthquake. Consequently, some
humanitarian organizations operating in Nepal prema-
turely followed the trend, and raced into uncritical inte-
gration of new technologies in their operations [26]. By
projecting themselves as “tech-friendly,” these organiza-
tions attempted to convey the message to donors and
the public that they were committed to finding innova-
tive solutions to tackle longstanding development chal-
lenges. Granted that post-disaster relief is time
sensitive, and that new technologies are increasingly
used in diverse settings including the aid sector; still,
the mentality of finding the “silver bullet” risks blinding
practitioners as to where the matters of concern lie, and
how the priority of the agenda should be set. As
observed by scholars, the “technological turn” in the
humanitarian space has reshaped perceptions about
what aid is, and redefined the meaning of aid provision
in the digital age, i.e., technology mediates human rela-
tions and understandings of what protection consists of
[9] – [12]. In countries like Nepal, an overwhelming
emerging demand for technical expertise may put pres-
sure on steady and sustainable technology develop-
ment, resulting in a distorted dynamic in society,
whereby technological advance appears hasty and
aggressive, while the society’s social, economic, and
political growth lags far behind.
Data: Safety and Security
Closely related to the technology aspect, in the case of
mapping drones, is the data aspect. If data safety and
security are compromised, risks and harms are height-
ened for those whose data are at stake, potentially ren-
dering the already vulnerable worse off. In our case
study, the datasets produced have been stored relatively
safely, with defined ownership and controlled access
among a small group of partners. However, the possibili-
ty of sensitive datasets being disclosed to, or misused
by, external parties with non-humanitarian intentions, is
not unconceivable. This potential risk suggests that data
management measures should be set as a regulatory
priority, such that operational guidelines can be devel-
oped to reduce potential risks and to prevent breaches
of data safety and security from occurring [13].
The risks connected to data include three aspects:
data collection, storage, and usage. Regarding data col-
lection, which concerns privacy, those whose images
are being captured in the data should be aware of what
images are captured, why they are captured, and who is
capturing the images. With respect to data storage and
data usage, which link to data safety and security, it is
crucial to understand where the data are stored, how
they are stored, whether there is a data management
protocol in place, as well as to know who owns the
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SEPTEMBER 2020 ∕ IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE
data, who can access the data, who has authority to
share the data, and what compliance mechanism gov-
erns if the data are to be shared. These questions may
not seem difficult in principle, yet they continue to pose
operational challenges. Ultimately, the question points
towards, to what degree and level should we realistically
aim for data accuracy — a cluster of households, a visi-
ble landmark, the color of the street graffiti, or the
freckles on someone’s nose?
In the mapping project of the case study, the images
collected by the drone were left in the hands of all who
had worked on, or been given access to, the datasets.
This implies that, hypothetically, all of them could share
the data with external parties. Moreover, there was no
effective way to prevent anyone who had access to the
datasets from making copies, or modifying or manipu-
lating the data. Had the partner organizations or the
technicians involved in the mapping project intended to
share the datasets without X’s consent, X would not
have been able to discover, track, or manage it, as
there was no compliance mechanism in place. This, in
effect, leaves data safety and security dependent on the
professional and personal ethics of those who have
access to the data, downplaying the importance of insti-
tutional reforms at the structural level which require col-
lective effor ts.
The other aspect that concerned the partners of the
mapping project was data sharing. Today, there are mul-
tiple organizations working on drone mapping in Nepal,
sometimes mapping the same areas at the same time,
because there is no coordinated data sharing mecha-
nism. Technical experts in our interviews have suggest-
ed local governments take the initiative to set out
mapping needs, then identify the agencies working on
projects in that area to join forces in their initiatives.
However, one obstacle is the lack of a digital manage-
ment system at the national level. To date, all mapping
data in Nepal are collected and managed in traditional
ways, with no digital repository that allows for the mon-
itoring and tracking of existing datasets. One way to
move forward is to create and utilize open data plat-
forms that will be publicly available and accessible, so
that no repetitive data are generated as a result of lack
of access. Reality, however, suggests that in the
absence of adequate infrastructure, open data may be a
far-fetched ideal in resource-poor countries like Nepal.
Regulation: Authority and Procedure
It is a common concern among drone stakeholders that
the lack of effective regulatory mechanisms creates
ambiguity in operations. In the case of drones, regulato-
ry issues include, e.g., who the lead agencies should be
at the national and international levels, how compliance
and enforcement mechanisms could be established,
and what legal and administrative procedures should
be set up. Unless these regulatory challenges are
addressed, it is unlikely that there will be a safe and
healthy environment in which society at large can man-
age technological risks, and the aid sector can drive its
innovation process responsibly. In this sense, the regu-
lation aspect is an overarching layer with a top-down
force, which determines the scope and magnitude of
the other sets of ethical challenges. In particular, two
aspects need to be attended to, i.e., regulatory authority
and provisions and procedures [13].
Regarding regulatory authority, there are two subdi-
mensions, i.e., who the lead agency should be, and at
what level it should be set up. In the context of Nepal,
as the case study shows, several government authorities
were involved in drone flight permissions, which created
some obstacles. First, government officials at the Minis-
tries have multiple commitments, and drones often-
times are not a priority. Second, for many government
departments, there is a general lack of in-house exper-
tise in technology. Third, without clarity about the lead
agency, authority becomes ambiguous and implement-
ers are at loss to determine by whom and in what for-
mat initiatives should be organized. Take the Civil
Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) for example: as the
only technical agency involved in drone regulations in
Nepal, they are mandated to grant permissions only in
terms of air traffic concerns, such as on which route
and at what height the drone can fly. As regards national
security, although CA AN is responsible for protecting
sensitive and protected areas, they do not take into
account the purpose of the drone flights. Similarly, con-
cerning flight safety, although CAAN holds that drone
pilots should be trained and licensed and be aware of
the relevant legislation, it is not their duty to provide
training and licensing services. While the creation of a
lead agency may be a challenge for resource reasons, it
is not unattainable to establish an independent agency
that can coordinate with other agencies during the pro-
cess of regulation development.
Alongside the “who” dimension of regulatory authori-
ty is the “what level” dimension. In the case study,
stakeholders consistently advocated for the establish-
ment of a global authority operating along the lines of
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
which is the existing global regulatory agency for the
use of flying objects, including drones. In the absence
of a global authority dedicated particularly to drone reg-
ulations, national authorities follow the provisions of
ICAO at present. However, stakeholders in our inter-
views expressed a strong preference for a drone-specific
regulatory authority at the global level. Although stream-
lining authority may not be immediately feasible, efforts
for bringing uniformity to regulatory initiatives across
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IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE ∕ SEPTEMBER 2020
the globe are called for. Regarding the nature of such a
regulatory agency, stakeholders in our interviews gener-
ally favored that its staff members to be technical
experts, such that future regulations will be based on
technical rather than political parameters. Meanwhile,
stakeholders suggested that a national expert commit-
tee could help provide inputs to global regulation devel-
opment, and that if a global consensus for airspace
regulation is sought, countries can adapt it to their par-
ticular situations and develop their own regulations
based on the knowledge and experience acquired at the
national level.
With respect to provisions and procedures, the big-
gest challenge seems to be how stringent compliance
and enforcement mechanisms should be, such that they
are robust while not hindering the development of the
technology or oppress its applications for social good.
There are two subdimensions to this challenge, i.e., that
of the content, and that of the process. Content-wise, in
Nepal, there already exist some regulatory guidelines.
For instance, if a drone flies over a sensitive area, such
as military installations or near airports, or flies above
300 feet beyond the-visual-line-of-sight (BVLOS), it can
be seized and its operator fined. In reality, however, as
long as no one reports it, the government can do little,
as they do not have a digital tracking system that can
monitor drone flights. This indicates how context-insen-
sitive the provisions and procedures are, and how left-
behind regulation is compared to the pace of
technology development.
Process-wise, as shown in the case study, flight per-
mission applications can be lengthy and complicated.
Some stakeholders raised the concern that if it contin-
ues to take 4-5 months and 6-7 agencies to get flight
permissions, then people will simply tr y to “cheat the
system,” and the authorities would have no control over
this as, again, there is no digital monitoring system in
place. In the mapping project, if there had been a lead
agency serving as a central point of contact, it would
have considerably shortened the flight permission pro -
cess. Moreover, it was envisioned that if the Ministries
could keep records of the technical specificities of exist-
ing drone use, such as ranges of frequency, it would
largely simplify the administrative procedure. Another
proposal for improving the process was the adoption of
a licensing system similar to that of automobile, allow-
ing only certified pilots to fly a drone. Regarding sensi-
tive areas, signal blockers were deemed useful for
restricting flights over special locations, and a buffer
zone could be put in place around airports. According
to technical experts in our interviews, these approaches
have been discussed on various occasions with govern-
ment officials in Nepal. Although none of the proposals
are technically demanding or high cost, the challenge
seems to be priorities. This implies that continued effort
needs to be made to sensitize the authorities on the
need to establish regulatory provisions and procedures.
Stakeholders: Responsibility and Accountability
An additional aspect of the humanitarian use of tech-
nology lies with stakeholder responsibility and
accounta bility — not only regarding the deployment of
technologies, but also towards each other. Like regula-
tion, the stakeholder aspect is an overarching layer situ-
ated in the background, but with a bottom-up force.
The danger of lacking a deep understanding of respon-
sibility and accountability is that it creates a moral haz-
ard, whereby stakeholders advocate the principle of
“Do No Harm,” while potentially causing harms to those
whom they intend to protect by introducing new actors
into the space without caution [15]. Humanitarian
stakeholders should clearly define their commercial
incentives and operational priorities, meanwhile estab-
lishing ethical standards to guide and safeguard their
innovation practice [13].
In terms of the responsibility of the government, in
the context of the case study, this was somewhat ambig-
uous, due partially to its political priority-setting. For
example, at the national level, the National Reconstruc-
tion Authority (NR A) acted as the lead agency after the
earthquake to restore damaged houses, and conduct
research on landslides in Nepal. Yet, when X proposed
that the NR A incorporate this landslide area as one of
their research sites, the proposal was dismissed — it
was not a priority for the NRA as the houses in this area
were not already damaged. At the community level,
when X raised awareness about the increasing risks of
the landslide, some community leaders did not see the
immediate necessity for action as the landslide did not
cause loss of life — how people’s lives will be affected
in the future was not seen as a priority for the present
time. While humanitarian and development actors may
assist in post-disaster reconstruction, their primary role
is to coordinate aid delivery and provide technical
expertise, rather than involving themselves in every
aspect of reconstruction. Ultimately, it should be the
local government and local communities who take
responsibility to rebuild lives. The local government
may lack resources; still, they can take the lead to
establish evidence. And once resources are available,
action plans can be implemented at the national and
local levels.
With respect to the accountability of humanitarian
organizations, the center of discussion is why they
introduce new technology in their practice in the first
place, and how to introduce it to vulnerable popula-
tions without causing harm. In the case study, the
drone was not brought to Nepal for the specific
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purpose of mapping landslides, but with an intention of
potentially using it to assist relief work, implying a
somewhat undefined vision. Thus it begs the question
as to what exactly was the justification to use the drone
— was it because of the availability of the technology?
Was it guided by the understanding of local needs? Fur-
thermore, after having decided to use the drone to map
the landslide, achievement of the objectives still
depended on many factors, in particular financial
resources and political will; both were obviously chal-
lenging in Nepal. This, again, invites questions regard-
ing the rationale of the project — was it overly
ambitious, in that the intended outcome was predomi-
nantly determined by factors out of the hands of an aid
agency? Was it overly optimistic, in that both the vision
and the methodology of the project represented the
best-case scenario? These reflections point out the
importance of self-positioning of humanitarian organi-
zations. Many aid agencies do not have the technical
capacity to operate advanced modern technologies
themselves, but they have strong relationships with the
government and the community, which is appealing to
other stakeholders as it may potentially help advance
particular interests of their own. The question, ultimate-
ly, boils down to who benefits from such endeavors, if
eventually there is no positive impact on the lives of the
affected communities?
The responsibility of stakeholders does not lie solely
on the service providers, but also on the receivers,
namely the community. In the case study, the local
community was unfamiliar with the drone technology
initially; but when it was introduced in the name of help-
ing manage the landslide, they believed that they need-
ed it. Yet, their fundamental need was simply to live
safely. Nepal has long been portrayed as a breeding
ground for “humanitarian experimentation” in the name
of innovation [4], [9]. The use of technology in the
humanitarian space is neither good nor bad in itself, it
depends on why and how it will be used [27], [28]. The
rationale to use technology should not be determined
from a donor perspective, whereby they experiment
with ideas and test out new tools; but from a need per-
spective, whereby strategies are reflective and the local
community’s livelihood is catered to. This not only calls
for humanitarian organizations to care for, and advo-
cate on behalf of, the communities, but also encourag-
es the communities to be aware of what is at stake, take
ownership of it, and approach government authorities
proactively. Although living with hope is praiseworthy,
living on hope can be futile.
Finally, to substantively move forward in the process
of humanitarian innovation, a pragmatic tool would be
action-guiding ethical standards, e.g., on privacy, on
data management, on informed consent, on stakeholder
engagement, etc. At the outset, such standards need
not be lengthy or comprehensive, and may not be
immediately enforceable or endorsed by every stake-
holder involved. Nonetheless, they create thresholds,
form benchmarks, and clarify ambiguity. For instance,
case studies encompassing best practices can be an
effective instrument to educate regulators, and to help
foster regulatory frameworks that are value-sensitive
and context-specific. Similarly, multi-stakeholder consul-
tation, including seeking expertise from outside the
country and across sectors and disciplines, can contrib-
ute to the collection of inputs from diverse perspectives.
Furthermore, local beliefs and indigenous knowledge of
the affected populations should be respected and
included in the standards, in that it is these people who
are exposed to risks, harms, and vulnerability, and
whom the humanitarian sector strives to protect. If the
stakeholder aspect is attended to, the principle of “Do
No Harm” will not be rendered a mere slogan or a moral
disguise of those who drive the humanitarian innova-
tion enterprise.
Categories of Ethical Consideration
In this paper, an in-depth ethical analysis of a case
study of using drones to assist post-disaster humanitari-
an work was presented. Five categories of ethical con-
siderations were identified and are summarized in Table 1,
along with lessons learned in relation to each theme.
While these themes do not suggest a specific order of
criticality, they are presented here with a bottom-up
logic for ease of discussion.
To conclude, from the perspective of humanitarian
action, it may seem that challenges exhibited in this
case study are merely implementation issues “typical”
to the aid sector when new technologies are deployed in
time-sensitive and resource-constrained environments.
However, from the ethical viewpoint, it is precisely this
caution-free (mis)conception about “typical” that war-
rants attention — the seemingly non-harmful use of
Need callout Need callout
Need callout Need callout
Need callout Need callout
Need callout Need callout
Need callout Need callout
Need callout Need callout
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IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE ∕ SEPTEMBER 2020
TABLE 1. Five categories of ethical considerations.
Theme
Analytic
Focus Analytic Angle Ethical Consideration Lesson Learned
Community
• Consent
• Care
• Procedure of consent
• Sources of consent
• Consequences of
consent
• Trus t: pre-given vs. newly established
• Hope: need for aid & dependence on
lifesavers
• Literacy: what is expected to be
understood vs. what is actually
understood
• Philanthropic misconception:
unrealistic expectations & neglected
communication gap
• Duty of care: being vulnerable vs.
being made vulnerable
• Identify communication barriers in
the consent process
• Evaluate the value and validity of
consent
• Assess the necessity of
technological innovation
proposals
• Ensure new vulnerability is
not introduced, and existing
vulnerability is not exacerbated
Technol o g y
• Risks
• Benefits
• Technological
limitations
• Societal implications
• Risk-benefit
assessments
• Technical tensions, compromises &
trade-offs: quality of information, types
of technology, etc.
• Purposes, conditions & contexts: wh y,
how, at what cost, benefiting whom,
whose responsibility, etc.
• Matters of concern: “silver bullet” vs.
fundamental problems
• Priority of the agenda: hasty
technological advance vs. sluggish
social, economic, and political growth
• Technology alone is not the
solution
• Technology is neither value-
neutral nor apolitical
• Deploying technology in the aid
sector needs strong justifications
of rationale and added value
• Uncritical integration of new
technology in humanitarian action
may be harmful
Data
• Safety
• Security
• Regulatory priority
• Operational
guidelines
• Data collection: degree & level of data
accuracy
• Data storage & usage: compliance
mechanism on data safety & security
• Data sharing: digital data
management system
• Acknowledge inherent risks of
data-driven technology
• Establish procedures governing
data ownership, access,
management, and compliance
issues
• Develop publicly available open
data platforms is the vision
• Construct open data within
existing structural and institutional
reality is the challenge
Regulation
• Authority
• Procedure
• Top-down force
• Regulatory authority
• Provisions &
procedures
• Lead agencies: who & at what level
• Compliance & enforcement
mechanisms: content & process
• An independent agency can help
foster future regulations
• Future regulations should be
based on technical rather than
political parameters
• Existing regulatory frameworks
are context-insensitive vis-à-vis
technology development
• Continued effort needs to be
made to sensitize authorities
Stakeholders
• Responsibility
• Accountability
• Bottom-up force
• Moral hazard
• Ethical standards
• Government: priority-setting
• Humanitarian organization:
self-positioning
• Community: needs-oriented
• Ethical standards: action-guiding
• Local government and community
should take the lead
• Justification and rationale behind
the use of technology are crucial
• Understanding and articulation of
the local needs are key
• Effective tools include best
practices, multi-stakeholder
consultation, indigenous
knowledge, etc.
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SEPTEMBER 2020 ∕ IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE
technology in the aid sector may not provoke immediate
harm; the sector-wide attitude towards technology,
nonetheless, should not be imprudent. The reasons for
this are that this sector serves vulnerable populations,
and that the fundamental humanitarian principles are to
protect these populations on the basis of their humanity
[29]. Hence, any proposal for technological innovation
in the aid section should keep the humanitarian princi-
ples as its prime rationale. Additionally, technology is
neither a “magic solution”, nor a “troublemaker” — there
is nothing inherently good or bad about it; what matters
is why and how it is being used [30]. Thus, if technologi-
cal innovation is effective, and the rationale and
approach of adopting it are ethically justified, then it
indeed can and should be deployed in the aid sector. As
proposed in this paper, ultimately, the key lies with
ensuring rigorous reflections about the ethical challeng-
es technological innovation may invoke, developing
responsive methodologies to assess its potential for
harms relative to potential for benefits, and establishing
actionable ethical guidance to identify, address, and
tackle such challenges. Following these insights, future
work should strive to shed light on the establishment of
a humanitarian innovation framework and toolkits that
are value-sensitive and context-specific.
Acknowledgment
This work was financially supported in part by the Swiss
Network for International Studies (SNIS), Grant No.
C18006, and in part by the Swiss National Science
Foundation (SNSF), Grant No. P1ZHP1-181401.
Author Information
Ning Wang
is affiliated with the Institute of Biomedical Eth-
ics and History of Medicine (IBME), University of Zurich,
8006 Zurich, Switzerland. Email: ning.wang@ ibme.uzh.ch.
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