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PEACE BUILDING IN IRAQ POST 2003
Abstract
Peace-building over the years have been part of the major arguments of international relations which aims at resolving conflicts, nation building, and the making of important reforms in the different institutions and sectors of the state. It includes strategies that aim at stopping the future reoccurrences of conflict, which is important for the maintenance of global security and protecting the security of the civilians. Iraq entered a new phase of political transition in 2003 after the intervention of US and its allies and the fall of Saddam Hussein. The US intervention in Iraq not only led to the collapse of the regime of Saddam, but also led to the collapse of the Sunni-dominated Iraqi state. The aim of the intervention was to build a liberal state where there is the presence of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and a system where the government is accountable to the citizens of the country. The United States involvement in Iraq can be explained by its role as a hegemonic power to maintain global peace and security because Saddam Hussein was accused to possess weapons of mass destruction that can risk the global security. Through the use of qualitative research method using analytical, descriptive and historical dimensions, the aim of this thesis is to answer two major research questions: (1) Despite the substantial design and implementation of peace building approach, why peace building reached a limited success in Iraq?(2) what are the main obstacles of peace building in Iraq?
Keywords: Peace building, Terrorism, Instruments of peace building, US foreign policy, State building.
... Peace-building over the years has been part of the main arguments of international relations aimed at resolving conflicts, nation-building and making essential reforms in various institutions and sectors of the state. It includes strategies to prevent future recurrences of the war, which is vital for maintaining global security and protecting the security of civilians [7]. ...
... The purpose of the intervention was to build a liberal state with a presence of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and a system where the government is accountable to the country's citizens. The involvement of the United States in Iraq can be explained by its role as a hegemonic power to maintain global peace and security because Saddam Hussein was accused of possessing weapons of mass destruction that could endanger global safety [7]. ...
The creation and functioning of world peace have always been the mission and goal of international relations, which is based on specific actions and strategies depending on the extent of the situation, but how many successes and results have been cannot always be predicted. The fight against transnational terrorism and the fight against general evil must always rightly be supported by all influential states in the world. The US intervention in Iraq is often seen with criticism and praise from various scholars and states. In our paper, we aimed to present the US intervention in Iraq based on the comparison and presentation of arguments from different studies and experts in the face of the question; was this intervention necessary or not, and was it humanitarian or aggression? We have tried to present the problem in the most scientific and argumentative way through descriptive, analytical and comparative methods, always based on scientific and factual approaches. In conclusion, we can say that based on general facts and arguments regarding the US intervention in Iraq, the goal has not been achieved correctly and that other forms could have been used to achieve the goal. The failure to find nuclear weapons inside Iraq and the failure to democratize it are two key arguments that shed light on hasty military action against Iraq.
The end of the Cold War was to usher in an era of peace based on flourishing democracies and free market economies worldwide. Instead, new wars, including the war on terrorism, have threatened international, regional, and individual security and sparked a major refugee crisis. This volume of essays on international humanitarian interventions focuses on what interests are promoted though these interventions and how efforts to build liberal democracies are carried out in failing states. Focusing on Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, an international group of contributors shows that best practices of protection and international state-building have not been applied uniformly. Together the essays provide a theoretical and empirical critique of global liberal governance and, as they note challenges to regional and international cooperation, they reveal that global liberal governance may threaten fragile governments and endanger human security at all levels. Indiana University Press, 2016. See http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?cPath=1037_3025_9335&products_id=808208.
This article assesses whether the 2003 invasion of Iraq can be justified as a humanitarian intervention. Because of the potential loss of life inherent in any military action, the author contends that a threshold test of a humanitarian intervention is whether it is necessary to stop ongoing or imminent mass slaughter. Although that test might have been met, say, at the time of the 1988 genocide against the Kurds, there was no ongoing or imminent mass slaughter in Iraq in March 2003. That lack is decisive in undermining claims that the invasion of Iraq was a humanitarian intervention. Apart from this threshold test, the author also considers several secondary factors: whether force was the last resort, whether the invasion was guided primarily by a humanitarian purpose, whether it was conducted with maximum respect for international human rights and humanitarian law, whether it was likely to produce more good than harm, and whether, ideally though not necessarily, it was endorsed by the UN Security Council. The author concludes that the invasion of Iraq fails most of these secondary tests as well: the war as conceived in early 2003 was not primarily about stopping atrocities; non-military options for achieving its other stated purposes had not been exhausted; although the invading forces generally respected international humanitarian law, there were certain major exceptions; and the UN Security Council was never asked to contemplate a humanitarian intervention in Iraq. At most, it was reasonable to conclude in March 2003 that overthrowing Saddam Hussein might do more good than harm. On balance, therefore, the author concludes that the Iraq war cannot be justified as a humanitarian intervention.
The central thesis of this article is that when faced with state collapse, rising violence, and a complex stabilisation effort, the US, UN, and NATO in Afghanistan and the US and Britain in Iraq, deployed the dominant, if not only, international approach available, Liberal Peacebuilding. The article traces the rise of Liberal Peacebuilding across the 1990s. It argues that four units of analysis within neoliberal ideology, the individual, the market, the role of the state and democracy, played a key role within Liberal Peacebuilding, allowing it to identify problems and propose solutions to stabilise post-conflict societies. It was these four units of analysis that were taken from the Liberal Peacebuilding approach and applied in Afghanistan and Iraq. The application of a universal template to two very different countries led directly to the fierce but weak states that exist today.
A recent report by Refugees International notes that Iraq is currently faced with one of the most acute displacement crises in the world, with over 5 million Iraqis displaced by violence - 2.7 million of whom are internally displaced within Iraq. Such a situation creates not only a humanitarian crisis but also a perverse opportunity for insurgents and militia groups to exploit the displacement crisis in order to legitimate themselves and achieve geo-political goals. It is critical, therefore, to find adequate remedies for displaced person and forge a sustainable, long-term solution to the ongoing displacement crisis. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Pinheiro Principles provide an articulation of the rights and obligations relating to displaced persons under international law. Those instruments make certain demands on a nation's substantive civil law, primarily in the way the nation's legal architecture frames the nature of ownership; the means of restitution; and the protection given to secondary occupants. The existing Iraqi civil law system is an adequate legal scheme for providing restitution to property owners who have been displaced or who have suffered a loss due to damaged property. Although it contains a major "blind spot" in a lack of remedies for those who lose property due to military action, such a blind spot is not due to any organic defect in the Iraqi legal system but, rather, the imposition of legislation by the CPA. This exception notwithstanding, the provisions of the Iraqi Civil Code provide a legal scheme to effect restitution that is compliant with the demands of international law.
This article discusses what an IR and peacebuilding praxis derived from the ‘everyday’ might entail. It examines the insights of a number of literatures which contribute to a discussion of the dynamics of the everyday. The enervation of agency and the repoliticisation of peacebuilding is its objective. It charts how local agency has led to resistance and hybrid forms of peace despite the overwhelming weight of the liberal peace project. In some aspects this may be complementary to the latter and commensurate with the liberal state, but in other aspects the everyday points beyond the liberal peace.
This article explores the relationship of theorizing about responses to ending conflict, more specifically a broad understanding of peacebuilding, with debates about globalization. The tension between aspects of globalization which have raised public and political pressure and awareness in the West to respond to conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and inequalities on their periphery and beyond, challenges previous approaches to dealing with conflict through approaches to peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention. This also has an impact on how those caught up in conflict react to peacebuilding approaches. These discourses and practices tend to be based on developing western liberal norms pertaining to an uneasy collusion between so-called states and non-state actors, the concept of human security and the practices of humanitarian intervention. The globalization of responses to conflict is constituted by conflicting forces that require ever-deeper intervention in conflicts, ultimately requiring the importation into conflict zones of alternative forms of governance. The extent of a ‘peacebuilding consensus’ in terms of discourses is not reflected in the interventionary commitment this liberal ideal entails. This has tested the will and consensus of the international community in ways which merit further examination, especially in the context of the claims and counter-claims associated with globalization.
This paper describes the Coalition Provisional Authority's attempts to stabilize and reform Iraq's economy along market lines. It argues that while security concerns remain serious, Iraq's economy has not been crippled by violence. However, sustained economic growth will depend on whether Iraq's future leaders pursue the pro-market approaches the Coalition has advocated. If the Iraqi economy is to reach its potential, it will need to go even farther than the Coalition did, implementing reforms the Coalition did not pursue because of security concerns.
The International Monetary Fund has imposed its traditional policies in Iraq. Few have considered the consequences. But the author notes that business as usual will probably not work in Iraq, and may well be destructive. He also wonders why there is so little imagination at the IMF.
There is a tendency to reduce peacebuilding, in theory as well as in practice, to a technocratic question. Academics and policymakers in Western capitals, as well as military officers and aid workers from Liberia to Afghanistan, ask themselves how to make a durable peace. The question of ‘how to make peace?’ is the subject of endless number of books and articles, as well as manuals and consultancy reports, that try to describe the best techniques for making peace. However, this focus on how to make peace might have turned our attention away from what kind of peace is actually being made. Perhaps, and this is more troubling, this inattention to the nature of the peace which one strives to achieve is the reason why peace all too often remains unattainable, as well as the reason why the price other people pay for the schemes of the academics, policymakers, officers and aid workers is at times so terribly high.
The United States articulated a new concept of preventive self-defense last fall that is designed to preclude emerging threats from endangering the country. Rising like a phoenix from the ashes of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the preventive approach to national security is intended to respond to new threats posed by “shadowy networks of individuals [who] can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.” The Bush administration wisely concluded that it could not rely solely upon a reactive security posture, due to the difficulty in deterring potential attacks by those determined to challenge the United States and the magnitude of harm that could occur from weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. Although the administration has characterized its new approach as “preemptive,” it is more accurate to describe it as “preventive” self-defense. Rather than trying to preempt specific, imminent tiireats, the goal is to prevent more generalized threats from materializing.
The Arab uprisings of 2011 are still unfolding, but we can already discern patterns of their effects on the Middle East region. This article offers a brief chronology of events, highlighting their inter-connections but also their very diverse origins, trajectories and outcomes. It discusses the economic and political grievances at the root of the uprisings and assesses the degree to which widespread popular mobilization can be attributed to pre-existing political, labour and civil society activism, and social media. It argues that the uprisings' success in overthrowing incumbent regimes depended on the latter's responses and relationships with the army and security services. The rebellions' inclusiveness or lack thereof was also a crucial factor. The article discusses the prospects of democracy in the Arab world following the 2011 events and finds that they are very mixed: while Tunisia, at one end, is on track to achieve positive pohtical reform, Syria, Yemen and Libya are experiencing profound internal division and conflict. In Bahrain the uprising was repressed. In Egypt, which epitomizes many regional trends, change will be limited but, for that reason, possibly more long-lasting. Islamist movements did not lead the uprisings but will benefit from them politically even though, in the long run, political participation may lead to their decline. Finally, the article sketches the varied and ongoing geopolitical implications of the uprisings for Turkish, Iranian and Israeli interests and policies. It assesses Barack Obama's response to the 2011 events and suggests that, despite their profound significance for the politics of the region, they may not alter the main contours of US foreign policy in the Middle East in a major way.
This article examines the role that local governance plays in creating an effective state and in building constructive state—society relations. Reconstruction efforts in fragile, post-conflict states have focused largely on central government, yet decentralized local authorities offer a number of positive features. Looking at the governance reconstruction experience in Iraq, the analysis explores the extent to which these positive features have characterized Iraqi sub-national government. The article draws lessons for governance reconstruction more generally, addressing decentralization choices, capacity-building, and political factors.
Points for practitioners
In fragile, post-conflict states, good governance reconstruction agendas often aim too high. Targeting good enough governance solutions is more realistic. Decentralized local governance can be integral to such solutions, and offers several advantages to counter problems that central governments face: weak roots beyond the center, poor distribution of services, and weak national integration. Experience shows that local governments can increase speed of service delivery, address ethnic/regional inequities, build democratic and conflict management capacities, mitigate political conflict, experiment to find creative solutions, and enhance legitimacy. We examine governance reconstruction in Iraq in terms of how efforts to build local governance have resulted in these positive outcomes. The Iraq case offers some support for our argument that in fragile, post-conflict states, decentralized local governance is an important feature of good enough governance.
The vigorous debate addressing the potential of the European Union’s security and defence policy is indicative of high hopes and severe policy problems. This article examines the likelihood that EU member-states will develop the strategic culture - reflecting common interests and views of the world - that can be said to be a precondition for a successful security and defence policy. The article first investigates the EU’s predominant values and the reigning conception of the legitimate use of military force, and it then weighs this political potential of the security and defence policy against obstacles to unity: the ‘post-modern’ complexity of multilevel governance coupled with the necessity of ‘modern’ executive authority to undertake military coercion, as illustrated by the recent fight against global terrorism. In the light of the conclusion that the EU does not have the potential to construct a strong strategic culture, the article suggests steps the EU could take to safeguard liberal achievements in its history of integration while also enabling strategic military action by groups of countries sharing a particular view of the world, an interest in a particular conflict, or both.
Indexes of corruption compiled by the World Bank and Transparency International suggest that Iraq is one of the world's most corrupt countries. While corruption thrived under Saddam Hussein, it has worsened further in the post-Saddam era. Controlling and eradicating Iraqi corruption has proved difficult owing to the fact that it is the product of an interrelated set of forces including: (a) the growth and dynamics of the shadow or informal economy; (b) the deterioration in social capital, and in particular the near absence of trust between the different regions, religious groups, tribes and even within local neighbourhoods; and (c) the evolving relationship between tribes, gangs and the insurgency. Any effort that attempts to control corruption without taking these factors into account will have little chance of success.
Though critics have made a number of telling points against the Bush admin-istration's conduct of the Iraq war, the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers – criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups – were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself. Military and civilian planners were culpable in failing to plan for certain tasks, but the most serious problems had no good solution. Even so, there are lessons to be learned. These include the danger that the imperatives of ‘force protection’ may sacrifice the broader political mission of US forces and the need for scepticism over the capacity of outsiders to develop the skill and expertise required to reconstruct decapitated states.
The political side of counterinsurgency has long been recognized as more important than the military side. The major works on counterinsurgency call for political reform that redresses legitimate insurgent grievances. Thereby, insurgents are encouraged to pursue their aims via political instead of military means. In western Iraq, insurgent perceptions of US weakness inhibited effective political reform. Moderate Sunnis did not engage the Coalition or Iraqi government until these perceptions had been revised. The connection between insurgent perceptions and effective political reform deserves greater attention. With the exception of some arguments from the political science field, the literature on counterinsurgency insufficiently addresses the importance of insurgent perceptions.
Since the end of the Cold War the United States has led six major nation‐building operations – that is to say, the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin a transition to democracy. In Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and most recently Iraq, the US has renewed with varying success a form of activity upon which it had embarked in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War. Study of these past missions suggests a host of lessons applicable today in Iraq, and raises the question of why, in light of its substantial and recent experience, the US government's learning curve appears so flat.
At the beginning of the twenty–first century, terms such as state collapse and failed states are becoming familiar, regularly used in international politics to describe a new and frightening challenge to international security. The dramatic events of September 11 have pushed the issue of collapsed states further into the limelight. This article has two aims. Firstly, it explains the contextual factors that gave rise to the phenomenon of state collapse. In the early post–Cold War period, state collapse was usually viewed as a regional phenomenon, and concerns were mainly limited to humanitarian consequences for the local population and destabilizing effects on neighbouring countries. Now, state collapse is seen in a more global context, and concerns are directed at the emergence of groups of non–state actors who are hostile to the fundamental values and interests of the international society such as peace, stability, rule of law, freedom and democracy. Secondly, the article offers some observations about the normative implications of the phenomenon of state collapse for peace–building and reconstruction.
This paper addresses an aspect of the 2003-2004 Iraq war that was central to American foreign policy but, to date, has been almost wholly ignored as a legal question. This is the program of reform and reconstruction undertaken by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the US civil administration in Iraq. The CPA changed virtually every aspect of Iraqi public law, abolishing many institutions, creating new ones and introducing areas of regulation (such as anti-corruption) previously unknown in the Iraqi legal system. The reforms were the very antithesis of what is usually understood as a central obligation of occupying powers: to preserve existing laws and institutions to the extent possible. Sweeping legislative action of the kind undertaken by the CPA is generally reserved for the indigenous government that returns to power at the end of the occupation. An occupier is a de facto but not a de jure sovereign. To hold otherwise, most writers say, would border on allowing an occupier to annex the territory and assume all the law-making powers of a legitimate government. The paper asks whether an accommodation is possible between these two compelling imperatives: to reform a society in which many laws and institutions lag far behind international standards, but also to preserve the ability of Iraqis to make fundamental decisions about their political and economic institutions for themselves. It examines a series of justifications for the reforms, some of which seek an accommodation with occupation law and some that challenge its central premises. The article concludes that only the core of human rights-related reforms can be justified.
Existing scholarship on the Iraq War decision-making process generally treats the event as a logical extension of pre-existing ideas and policies. This paper considers the Bush administration’s decision to absorb Iraq into the broader War on Terror as a deviation from long-held views of Saddam Hussein. I argue that the decision to incorporate Iraq into the wider post 9/11 mission was pathologically driven by groupthink, which caused a shift in the administration’s view of Saddam from a troubling dictator to an existential threat to US security. Therefore, groupthink can simultaneously explain the defects in the decision-making process and the shift from cautious restraint to accelerated urgency with respect to US relations with Iraq.
The theory of humanitarian intervention has received new attention since the humanitarian crises of the 1990s and the United States’ becoming the world's sole superpower. The actual practice of humanitarian intervention, however, has declined. It is difficult to forge the political will for it when the countries composing the global organizations that could provide the political legitimacy disagree on an intervention, and with so few countries—mainly the United States and Great Britain—capable of providing the required expeditionary forces. Moreover, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have diminished the United States’ political will, military capability, and diplomatic credibility to conduct future humanitarian interventions. In particular, those wars precluded its intervention in the current genocide in Darfur. Regional bodies such as the African Union may be the only entities that can, with aid and training, undertake effective interventions.
What does the world's engagement with the unfolding crisis in Darfur tell us about the impact of the Iraq war on the norm of humanitarian intervention? Is a global consensus about a "responsibility to protect" more or less likely? There are at least three potential answers to these questions. Some argue that the merging of strategic interests and humanitarian goods amplified by the intervention in Afghanistan makes it more likely that the world's most powerful states will act to prevent or halt humanitarian crises. Others insist that the widespread perception that the United States and its allies "abused" humanitarian justifications to legitimate its invasion of Iraq has set back efforts to build a global consensus about humanitarian action. A third group argues that the "responsibility to protect" inhibits the potential for abuse and, as a result, consensus is likely to strengthen post-Iraq for precisely this reason. Through a detailed study of the international engagement with Darfur, I suggest that the latter two arguments have merit but need to be adjusted. I argue that the humanitarian intervention norm has changed in two subtle ways. First, while the strength of the norm itself has not changed, the credibility of the United States and U.K. as "norm carriers" has been significantly undermined. Second, while the "responsibility to protect" has been invoked to support international activism, it has also re-legitimated anti-interventionist arguments.
© 2008 SAGE Publications. Post-print version. 12 month embargo by the publisher. Article will be released May 2009. This paper assesses the discursive environment of post-conflict intervention as a prism through which to view the international politics of the post-Cold War era. I argue that the ‘liberal peace’ is not a single discourse but a tri-partite international discursive environment that dynamically reproduces technical solutions which fail to address the core issues of conflict in a given place. The paper starts from the assumption that over the last twenty years we have seen a shift from an understanding of peace as a state of affairs in a given territory (as explored by Michael Banks in a 1987 paper) to peace as a process of post-conflict intervention; a move from peace to peacebuilding. This ‘liberal peace’ sets a standard by which ‘failed states’ and ‘bad civil societies’ are judged according to ethical, spatial and temporal markers. However, the apparent homogeneity of the model obscures the divisions and mergers which characterise the scholarship and practice of international peacebuilding. The boundaries of the peace debate remain; the political differences latent in Banks’ three concepts are retained in the evolving discourses of democratic peacebuilding, civil society and statebuilding. The paper shows how these three basic discourses are reproduced in international policy analyses and major academic works. Moreover, the discursive mediation of their differences is the dynamic by which the liberal peace is sustained, despite its detachment from the lived experiences of post-conflict environments. It is in this sense that we can comprehend international peacebuilding as a virtual phenomenon, maintained in the verbal and visual representations of international organisations, diplomats and academic policy-practitioners. In light of this disaggregation of the discursive environment, a better, more nuanced understand of the liberal peace can be attained; one that is able to grasp how critics and criticisms become incorporated into that which they seek to critique. The paper concludes with three propositions regarding the nature of world order in the era of the tripartite ‘liberal peace’. During this time coercion, military force and even warfare have become standard and legitimate features of peacefare. The discursive dynamics of international peacebuilding illustrate how peace has become ever more elusive in contemporary international politics.
In the lead paper of the issue Alejandro Bendaña looks at state building and international intervention in post-war situations. He argues that peacebuilding doctrine and practice has slowly given way to conflict pre-emption legitimating external political intervention laid the basis for legitimating military force, away from peacebuilding towards imperial nation-building. He argues that people's movements need to reclaim peacebuilding, nation-building and state-building, and confront the corporate neo-liberalism and the militarist agenda of the USA and its allies. He asks that we work for peace by supporting of democratic gender sensitive democratization with economies based on solidarity not profit. He proposes peacebuilding serves as the framework for state-building and nation-building, through and for the promotion of justice. Development (2005) 48, 5–15. doi:10.1057/palgrave.development.1100159
In the arguments over how best to rebuild Iraq, too little attention has been given to channeling the benefits of its oil reserves. In fact, too many nations have squandered their natural resources. This economist proposes an interesting plan to ensure that some proportion of oil revenues in Iraq go to both its citizens and its local governments.
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