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The intoxicating effects of conciliatory omniscience

DOI:10.1007/s11098-020-01528-6
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David Mcelhoes at Arizona State University
David Mcelhoes
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Abstract

The coherence of omniscience is sometimes challenged using self-referential sentences like, “No omniscient entity knows that which this very sentence expresses,” which suggest that there are truths which no omniscient entity knows. In this paper, I consider two strategies for addressing these challenges: The Common Strategy, which dismisses such self-referential sentences as meaningless, and The Conciliatory Strategy, which discounts them as quirky outliers with no impact on one’s status as being omniscient. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. The Common Strategy fails because it is both unmotivated and impotent. The Conciliatory Strategy fails because it leads to embarrassing situations in which omniscient entities are epistemically inferior to non-omniscient entities: we can, for example, devise trivia-based drinking games that force omniscient entities into an intoxicated state; and, given plausible closure principles for belief, such entities are unable to have the sorts of beliefs that give them reason to refuse to play (e.g., they are unable to believe that they can lose the game).
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The intoxicating effects of conciliatory omniscience
David McElhoes
1
Accepted: 30 August 2020 / Published online: 11 September 2020
Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract The coherence of omniscience is sometimes challenged using self-ref-
erential sentences like, ‘‘No omniscient entity knows that which this very sentence
expresses,’’ which suggest that there are truths which no omniscient entity knows. In
this paper, I consider two strategies for addressing these challenges: The Common
Strategy, which dismisses such self-referential sentences as meaningless, and The
Conciliatory Strategy, which discounts them as quirky outliers with no impact on
one’s status as being omniscient. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. The
Common Strategy fails because it is both unmotivated and impotent. The Concil-
iatory Strategy fails because it leads to embarrassing situations in which omniscient
entities are epistemically inferior to non-omniscient entities: we can, for example,
devise trivia-based drinking games that force omniscient entities into an intoxicated
state; and, given plausible closure principles for belief, such entities are unable to
have the sorts of beliefs that give them reason to refuse to play (e.g., they are unable
to believe that they can lose the game).
Keywords Omniscience Paradox Self-reference Liar Truth Epistemology
Philosophy of religion
1 The problem
The classical notion of omniscience—viz. knowing all truths—is sometimes
accused of being incoherent on the grounds that there are self-referential sentences
which express truths that no omniscient entity knows. Patrick Grim (1983,2000),
&David McElhoes
David.McElhoes@asu.edu
1
School for Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe,
USA
123
Philos Stud (2021) 178:2151–2167
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01528-6
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