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International Journal of Social Impact
ISSN: 2455-670X
Volume 5, Issue 3, DIP: 18.02.003/20200503
DOI: 10.25215/2455/0503003
www.ijsi.in |July - September, 2020
© 2020 I licensee IJSI. This is an Open Access Research distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any Medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
China’s Policy of ‘String of Pearls’
Neeraj Singh Manhas
1
*
ABSTRACT
The Indian Ocean is extremely important internationally. Coasting countries hold more than two-
thirds of the world's oil reserves, 35 per cent of the world 's gas wealth, 60 per cent of uranium, 40
per cent of gold and 80 per cent of all diamond stocks. The Indian Ocean is extremely important
for India and China. In the context of the Chinese and Indian naval policies, the geo-strategic and
relevance of the Indian Ocean needs to be considered in order to fully understand the IOR 's
security dynamics. In the Indian Ocean, Chinese ownership consists mainly of commercial ports
owned by China and station supplies owned by the central government of China. China's strategic
rivalry with India 's maritime dimension has been compounded by increasing resource dependence
and seaway trade. The Chinese penetration of the Indian Ocean is increasing. At the end of the
day, however, China will use soft diplomatic influence to enhance its position in the area. China
and India are simply following in the footsteps of other major world countries that have established
military bases abroad. It will undoubtedly face the name given to it by the American pentagon of
Booz-Allen-Hamilton, China's 'String of Pearls,' to make this a crucial route for China. It refers to
the Chinese army and the network of trade along its seas, from the Chinese region to Port Sudan.
There are several major maritime shock points in these seas, such as the Malacca Strait, the
Hormuz Strait and others in Pakistan, Sri Lanka , Bangladesh and the Maldives.
Keywords: China, Indian Ocean Region, Chinese, 'Pearls' 'String' Policy, Far Seas Operation
The Indian Ocean has a high global value. More than 2/3 of global petroleum reserves, 35% of
global gas reserves, 60% uranium, 40% gold and 80% of the world's diamond reserves are in the
coastal countries. India and China oppose the Indian Ocean very strongly. In order to fully
understand the security complications of the IOR the geo-strategic value and importance of the
Indian Ocean must be understood in Chinese and Indian naval policies. Chinese assets in the Indian
Ocean include mainly commercial ports owned and controlled by Chinese companies and central
government supply stations. The growing wealth and reliance on maritime trade have led to its
strategic rivalry with India. China has gradually penetrated the Indian Ocean. Essentially however,
1
M.Phil Research Scholar, Political Science, Sardar Patel University, V.V. Nagar, Gujarat-388120, India
*Responding Author
China’s Policy of ‘String of Pearls’
© International Journal of Social Impact | ISSN: 2455-670X | 18
through soft-power diplomacy, China has increased its presence in the region. China and India
follow other world major powers that have built their military assets abroad to secure access to
international resources and markets. China's interference into the Indian Ocean leads to confusion.
It is crucial to the Chinese naval presence in India, and the US pentagon name Booz-Allen-
Hamilton, China's 'Pearl Line,' is likely to cope with that. This applies to China's military and
commercial network from Chinese mainland to Port Sudan along its shipping lines. These sea
routes are connected to several significant shocking areas such as the Malacca Strait, Hormuz and
the Maldives, in Pakistan, Srilanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives.
In the Indian Ocean Region in recent years, Chinese attempts at creating powerful "nodes" have
become clearer. China would have a legitimate concern for the Indian Ocean, particularly in the
security calculations in India and the major powers, because of China's naval presences in those
waters. Beijing politicians increasingly agree that China should further exploit itself as a global
force abroad for the security of its geopolitical and strategic spatially rising interests. The IOR has
become China's key focus and is inexorably linked to its strategy for the West Pacific military. It
has worked hard to protect its vital supplies across the Indian Ocean through the construction of
overland pipelines. Therefore, Chinese maritime involvement in the Indian Ocean is considered
crucial to the advancement of their own interests. It is likely that China will tackle this via its Perl
String strategy. In a report entitled 'String of Pearls,' China 's latest naval strategy was first
recognized.
There is no concrete sign, yet, that every 'Pearl' alone strongly suggests China's strategy for
military force, which is also driven by Beijing's ongoing distrust of New Delhi and of America's
ocean dominance. The "Pearls" also have a particular potential for military use in China. Even
though China will manage to persuade one country to give up its military need, it will still be able
to maintain its expected naval presence in the Indian Region, which will have significant security
consequences for India and India will perhaps have to take the necessary steps to safeguard its
vital interests at an appropriate moment.
Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean include mainly Chinese commercial ports and fuelling
stations that operate jointly with the central government in China, owned and controlled by
Chinese companies. The main two projects are a Chinese-financed commercial shipping center in
Hambantota, Sri Lanka and a deep-water port in Gwadar, Pakistan, controlled by China on the
mouth of the Persian gulf. Both sites expressed concerns about neighboring powers, most notably
India, which is worried about the prospect of a 'strand' of Chinese Hambantota investment and
some observers claim that a broader strategy of China's circle reflects Sri Lanka's dialog with the
Shanghai Organization. Another concern of the Indian Government is the Port of Gwadar linked
to the Arab Sea by the Karakoram route, which sees the port as clear proof of the complicity of
China and Pakistan with India 's security and its economic expectations.
China’s Policy of ‘String of Pearls’
© International Journal of Social Impact | ISSN: 2455-670X | 19
China builds strategic links and growth capacity to establish a potential maritime presence. These
sea lines project several strategic lines, such as 'Pearls' around South Asia and India in particular.
The "perl string" can not be created pursuant to a policy directed specifically by the Central
Government of China. Instead, an aspect of China's foreign policy that some in the USA use might
be a realistic mark. In Beijing it is difficult to share Washington 's view of China's de-facto policy.
Yet economic benefits and political rhetoric have prompted countries to support China's
geopolitical aspirations in the region. The "string of pearls" strategy has that ambition.
The "String of Pearls " refers to the Chinese military and trade facilities and maritime links that
stretch from mainland China to the south of Port Sudan. Every knot is a "pearl" in the string that
increases the parent country's overall power.
OK, China's Perlline strategy represents a major danger because it seeks to round up India in a
strategic manner across many parts of the Indian Ocean and other parts of the Indian Ocean. In a
report by the defense contractor, BOOZ-Allen Hamilton, called "Energy Futures in Asia" ("Energy
Future in Asia"), "Strings of pearls" was used for the first time as the definition for China's
emerging maritime tactics and was commissioned by the U.S. Defense Section's Net Assessment
Office in 2005.
The Karachi port currently handles 90 per cent of Pakistan's maritime trade which due to its
proximity to India is highly susceptible to blocking. This happened in the Indian-Pakistan War of
1971 and was again threatened in the Kargil conflict of 1999. As a potential port in 1964 is located
450 miles west of Karachi, Gwadar, a fishing village that Pakistan identified, but lacked resources
to build. The strategic reach of the Indian shoreline of India will be strengthened in a modernized
port in Gwadar. Gwadar is a 240-mile-long distance from the Hormuz Strait for China's strategic
interest. The development of Gwadar is sponsored by China. While Pakistan's political, diplomatic
and economic relations with China have been strengthened by the Gwadar project. In November
2003, China signed an agreement to provide Cambodia with military hardware and training in
exchange for the right to fly from Southern China to the Gulf of Thailand. In Thailand's Kra
Isthmus, China had an ambitious proposal of 20 billion for the building of a canal to enable ships
to circumvent the Malacca Straits' shock points. While Thailand, Malaysia , Singapore and his
political opposition have been obstructed due to Thailand 's unwanted role in Indonesia, it shows
the size and scale of China's ambitions for this "perl ring."
A revised airbase on Woody Island, 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam in Parcel Archipelago, is
a "Pearl," and Bangladesh is a shipping container facility in Chittagong. Each Chinese "Pearl" is
the source of geopolitical power or military presence inside the "Pearls Line." Myanmar is a "pearl"
to build a deep port in Sittwe, as it is in the Gwadar, Pakistan, to build a marine base. Building
port and airfield ventures, diplomatic relations and modernising powers focused on China's style
of perl. The Pearls range from China's mainland coast to the port of South China, the Straits of
China’s Policy of ‘String of Pearls’
© International Journal of Social Impact | ISSN: 2455-670X | 20
Malacca, the Indian Ocean, and the Arab Sea coastlines, and the Persian Gulf. China wishes to use
ports as construction facilities for its forces operating in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the so-called
"line of pearls" around India has to be studied so as to protect all of Chinese strategic military
infrastructure.
In order to be ignored as a deed of aggression against India and to recognise the true nature of the
threat posed by this policy , it is important for India to conduct a passionate study of Perl String
policy. As we know, the Chinese government gave no identity, but it was a name established by a
Pentagon analyst somewhere in 2005. But it does not mean that the Chinese stopped posing a
significant threat to India's energy security only after creating those perils, but that they still
constitute a long-term challenge. This is true, however, or it is in trying to make this energy-related
policy via the use of resources a reality. Beside that there are also big danger of submarine land
attack missiles and torpedos from India's vital installations such as oil, gas, ports and nuclear
plants. The recent challenge is also China's discovery of energy in water from Bangladesh and
Srilanka Indian territorial waters. Beijing's Indian Ocean military strategy has a more serious
impact on the safety of India than the other major powers. The broad naval presence of China in
the sea will overlap with India. India. India. In addition, China has conducted military drills and
surveys in waters off its coastal neighbours without advance warning. If Chinese ships gather
intelligence or conduct live weapons on the Indian Ocean, there would be significant safety
consequences for India. India 's response to the challenges posed by China's rising naval presence
within the Indian Ocean should be two-way and a judgmental mix between engagement and
strategic discussion in the Indian Ocean should be two-way.
This also means that India must monitor emerging threats through the development of strategic
and operational geopolitical leveraging and disarmament. India and other major powers like the
United States definitely had, at this time, developed a strategic military reaction to China, using
its geographical location and maritime forces. Geopolitical action needs to be aimed at improving
ties to the Indian Ocean region in all dimensions – political, cultural, military, and so on. New
Delhi may also be a prerequisite for the political and diplomatic involvement of the west coastlines
in order to strategically undermine China.
Above everything, the shortcomings in India must be alleviated. This will fill the military /
maritime space currently in vacuum. For example, maritime domain knowledge, including its anti-
submarine warfare or its underwater nuclear submarines. We will need to 'harden' the major
regions and central areas of their continent and islands. Indian closely surveillance of Chinese
shipbuilding and defence activities will ensure sufficient warning (re)orientation of its strategies,
strength systems and capabilities is given to India 's security institution. There must be continuous
monitoring of the Indian Ocean access routes and the production of the "Pearls" of China around
India. Several Indian and American strategists have used the word "Pearl String" to set the stage
for China. "Pearls" previously discussed:
China’s Policy of ‘String of Pearls’
© International Journal of Social Impact | ISSN: 2455-670X | 21
PAKISTAN, GWADAR PORT
Gwadar is a small fishermen's city for Pakistan and China, 450 miles to the west and east of
Karachi, Iran. Gwadar Port gives China and Pakistan a range of great advantages and winners. For
the Pakistani government, the port of Gwadar is considered to be hidden from the possible Indian
blockade on Karachi Port, currently managing 90% of the Pakistani seafarers trade. Though it was
established as a potential port in 1964, Pakistan lacked capital to build the port at that time. It is a
dry deep sea, situated on the Arabian Sea pinnacle and the entrance to the Persian Gulf in the
Balochistan province of Pakistan. The port is located strategically between three major regions:
Middle East, Oil rich, heavily populated Pakistan and Central Asia. A new port in Gwadar will
extend Pakistan's strategic depth along the coastline with India. Gwadar is one of China's main
strategy footholds, financing a majority of 1.2 billion buildings, which are only 240 miles away
from the HorMUZ Straits. China invested four times more in the port itself than Pakistan, and
supplied Gwadar-Karachi with an additional 200 million since its construction began in 2002.
Central Asia 's increasing militarization, which Chinese government officials explicitly described
as a major stimulus for building the Gwadar project The state-owned China Overseas holding firm
was officially controlled by port on 18 February 2013 in Islamabad and President Asif Ali Zardari,
Chinese Ambassador Ciu Jian, Federal Ministers, Members of the Parliament and high-level
officials attended the hearing. The ceremony was held to mark the transfer to COPHC (China
Overseas Port Holding Company) of the PSA (Port of Singapore Authority) concession agreement,
thus further strengthening China 's influence on the Gwadar project. Next, it will boost Western
Chinese economic mobility by having shorter access to the sea. This will in particular help China's
western trade and foster the growth of its western areas. The port is also the shipping pipeline for
oil transportation from Gwadar to its west Xinjiang district as a possible Chinese naval anchor.
The access to international trade routes is also to China's benefit. However, the effect is also severe
on India, which is only 180 Nm away from the Hormuz Strait and allows Pakistan to manage the
global energy jugular and the ban on Indian tankers.
BANGLADESH, CHITTAGONG PORT
Bangladesh 's largest maritime port is Chittagong. With its large reserves of natural gas, China
respects Bangladesh and is located near Myanmar. In Chittagong, Bangladesh the government of
China sponsored a container shipping facility called "Pearl." However, Bangladesh's government
has maintained that the port is purely commercial and that it is not limited to military vessels,
despites rumours of the possible military role of Chittagong to the Chinese people. However, close
ties between Bangladesh and India's investment in infrastructure projects in Bangladesh
exaggerate Chittagong's strategic importance to the Chinese.
SRI-LANKA, HAMBANTOTA PORT
Hambantota port on the southern coast and only 6 NM from the shipping route of the Indian Ocean.
In compliance with the 2007 agreement, China shall provide financial and technical support for
the construction of Hambantota port. Development of Hambantota included:
China’s Policy of ‘String of Pearls’
© International Journal of Social Impact | ISSN: 2455-670X | 22
1. Construction of container port
2. Creation of the fuel-supply bunker system for ships
3. Build an airport and other installations.
Moreover, it should be noted that Hambantota is little relevant to Chin, as opposed to Gwadar, in
which China is constructing pipelines for oil. Therefore, it's because China has a physical naval
presence in the region. Why is this port so highly invested.
MYANMAR, SITTWE
Myanmar is projected in 19 fields onshore and three main offshore areas to have more than 90
billion cubic foot in natural gas reserves. Burma has the highest natural gas reserves in South-East
Asia and is rich in oil.
The gas pipelines from Myanmar's Western Arakan State to Yunnan Province and Sittwe Harbour
are China's major projects in Myanmar.
Over the years, China assisted Myanmar on various occasions in improving and upgrading existing
military facilities. Under the 1992 Treaty, in exchange, China was able to upgrade Myanmar's
naval facilities by allowing Coco Islands to be used. The Myanmar projects involve road
construction between Kunming and Sittwe in 2005, construction of the maritime port in Kyaukpyu
and the financing of the highway from Rangoon to Akyab. The project was carried out by a
feasibility study in 2005. Chinese oil tankers from Middle East and Africa will cross Bengal once
the pipelines at Sittwe and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar are fully expanded to their province of Yunnan.
In contrast with the Gwadar-Xinjiang pipeline of the Pakistani government, China gives more
importance to the Arakan-Yunnan pipeline because of the security involved. Arakan-Yunnan
pipelines are too beneficial compared with Gwadar, will help to move the gas purchased locally
from Chinese businesses to Arakan and also be of use to transport oil from Western Asia and
Africa from Chinese tankers. However, its potential as a logistical supply route for the naval forces
of China on the Indian Ocean can not be ignored. Myanmar is also Indian strategic interests in SE
Asia at greatest threat.
HAINAN, ISLANDS
Generally speaking, the Chinese naval institution on Hainan Island is the first of the Perls. The
PLAN Strategic Nuclear Underwater Port is the smallest PRC province that hides from spy
satellites up to twenty nuclear submarines. In addition to the already expanished facilities located
at Hainan, the newly constructed underwater submarine bases seem to be another evidence of
Hainan's perceived significance as the control base for the claims of China in the South China Sea.
Woody Islands was also named as a 'Pearl' hosting a Chinese airstrip upgrade.
China’s Policy of ‘String of Pearls’
© International Journal of Social Impact | ISSN: 2455-670X | 23
SOUTH CHINA SEA
The South China Sea is situated in South China, in Taiwan, the West Philippines, northwest
Malaysia, and north-eastern Indonesia in Vietnam. The area has demonstrated 7,7 billion barrels
of oil reserves and is estimated at 7,500 km3 of natural gas reserves. The critical maritime lines
between China as well as the oil-producing states in the Middle East cross the Sea of South China
and turn the Chinese Government into a strategic and trouble spot. China has had unresolved sea-
territorial disputes with many South-Eastern Asian countries in the hydrocarbon-rich South China
Sea ( SCS). Beijing has been welcoming those countries with steps such as the 2002 'non-binding'
signature from the turn of the century onwards. China-ASEAN, the 14th agreement on the "CSS"
and the 2005 Joint offshore drilling Agreement in contested areas with Vietnam and the
Philippines. Although several CBMs were taken, military tensions continued, until November
2007, when Chinese milliard-dimensional exercises brought protests into Vietnam in the disputed
Paracel Islands. This one month later, India also was sucked into. Surrounding atmosphere has
designated Blocks 127 and 128 (near Paracel Island) for "illegal" exploration powers afforded by
the NGC vidsh to Vietnam and issued a New Delhi demarcation. This means that Vietnam can not
seek Indian financial / technological assistance while the Chinese-Vietnam Joint Exploration
Agreement permits exploration of resources. This is a symbol of the Chinese-Indian rivalry.
Later on the exercise and visiting the army increased Chinese security contacts with IOR coasts
and even major powers. As a result, India has gradually broadened its naval forays into the Pacific.
India conducted a naval exercise in 2000 which was a major milestone. India's first South China
Sea exercise demonstrated Indian 's increasing naval reach. It invited Chinese protests. In April /
May 2007, the Indian Navy engaged in a series of Western Pacific exercises.
The stability of China is strongly influenced by events in the South China Sea. For the protection
of its trade and even for energy imports in India, the South China Sea is important, but not so
critical for China. It is not difficult to detect the root of China-India strategic maritime rivalry. The
approach of China is clearly driven by strong strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean region,
which would demand its military projections into the India Ocean in the coming decades. Chinese
naval vessels patrol the seas of South China heavily and conflicting territorial claims regularly
broke out during naval clashes. As a result, the Chinese attempts to control the South China Sea
have been speculating so much on China's greater ambitions to build a power projection chain
across Asia. Nevertheless, in these seas, it expects to face the strong naval force of India, maybe
also in America, despite China-India 's competitive and even adversarial capacity. On the other
hand, equilibrium is necessary for India. China's rising strength. Failure to do that would
undermine India's growing position as a regional power, with significant consequences for India
's supreme national security interests.
China’s Policy of ‘String of Pearls’
© International Journal of Social Impact | ISSN: 2455-670X | 24
MALLACA, STRAITS
The Straits of Mallaca and Hormuz are now China's main waterways. Close cooperation with
Myanmar and Pakistan is therefore also important. It is one of the biggest shipping lanes in the
world. Cross this Strait almost 80 percent of Chinese oil. Basically, everyone controlling Malacca
threatens China's oil supply route. The strategic supply of energy in China is most vulnerable in
Málaka Straits, the largest maritime shock point between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Yet China
still remained subtle and indirect in its rivalry with India. The improvements in India's Andaman
and Nicobar have greatly improved India 's capacity for military missions in the Malacca Straits
to the irritation of China.
COCO ISLANDS
The Coco Islands were previously part of India under British rule, but in the absence of closer
control they were moved to Myanmar. It is reported that the islands were leased to the People's
Republic of China from 1994. Various sources have been published. These are a couple of strategic
islands located in the East Indian Ocean under the Yangon Division in Burma. The main Coco
Islands (10x2) and the smaller Coco Islands (5x1) are divided by Alexandra Canal. They are
separated from the Andaman by Coco Pipe.
The Coco Islands' Chinese operations include the development of a Coco Island Maritime Base
and the setting up of SIGINT and ELINT in the Great Coco Island Collection Station. They are
too important for China , especially from the Bay of Bengal into the Strait of Malacca, to track
ships and boats moving from the islands. The Indian analyst recorded that Indian tai service
command could endanger Port Blair (190 Nm away).
CONCLUSION
The paper analyses the dangers posed by these "Pearls" and stresses that while pearls are not the
greatest military danger, they are not an energy security threat to India. The marine presence of
China in the waters will result in India being overlapped. China's energy exploitation in waters
along the Indian Territorial Seas, including Bangladesh and Srilanka, is also a latent threat. Unlike
China, India primarily relies on foreign oil producers for its energy needs. Around 89% of India's
oil is exported and about 33% of India's energy consumption is supplied with oil. The security of
the main communication maritime lines is therefore recognized as an economic imperative. In the
past, India has been primarily focussed on pirating and terrorist counterattacks against Somali
pirates across the Indian West Sea.
Many such activities in combination with the US forces have been performed against terrorism
and anti-piracy, whereas Indian officials generally have limited joint military exercises to mutual
interest programs, mainly pursuant to UN sanctions. However, renewed US interest in fighting the
threat of Islamic terrorism in South Asia has led to more concrete US and India-based military
cooperation. The US military officials and strategists widely see this growing bilateral relationship
China’s Policy of ‘String of Pearls’
© International Journal of Social Impact | ISSN: 2455-670X | 25
as an opportunity to counteract threats from the Chinese regional hegemony. Popular concerns that
the growing involvement of China in the Indian Ocean threatens India's economic and military
stability are promoting bilateral cooperation efforts against China's risings.
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