![China's budget structure by regional divisions For example, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) stopped reporting its full regional domestic security budget beginning with its 2016/17 spending and budget report. It now only provides the much lower budget figure for its regional level (自治区本级) spending (TAR government, 26 January 2017). Its 2017 figure was therefore estimated based on both budgeted and actual spending figures on the regional level together with five of its seven prefecture-level cities and regions. [4] Unfortunately, TAR prefectures and prefecture-level cities also do not consistently report domestic security figures.](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Adrian-Zenz/publication/343971146/figure/fig1/AS:929947510136838@1598728172564/Chinas-budget-structure-by-regional-divisions-For-example-the-Tibet-Autonomous-Region_Q320.jpg)
![Dotted lines pertain to estimates. Sichuan Tibetan Regions are Aba and Ganzi prefectures. Sources see [5].](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Adrian-Zenz/publication/343971146/figure/fig2/AS:929947510112262@1598728172772/Dotted-lines-pertain-to-estimates-Sichuan-Tibetan-Regions-are-Aba-and-Ganzi-prefectures_Q320.jpg)
![Domestic security spending in RMB per capita for select regions. The average of all provinces and regions excludes central level spending. Sources and calculations see [6].](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Adrian-Zenz/publication/343971146/figure/tbl1/AS:929947514335232@1598728173357/Domestic-security-spending-in-RMB-per-capita-for-select-regions-The-average-of-all_Q320.jpg)
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China's Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data
Abstract and Figures
This paper examines the structure and growth of China's domestic security spending, drawing on previously unpublished data.
During Hu Jintao’s second term as general party secretary (2007 to 2012), total national expenditures increased 51 percent faster than domestic security spending. During Xi Jinping’s current term (2013 to 2017), China’s domestic security spending grew 34 percent faster than total spending.
In particular, security-related expenditures in sensitive regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet have risen so rapidly that they now exceed the United States average on a per capita PPP basis. As China continues to invest heavily in developing ever more advanced security technologies, every dollar spent on domestic security will experience further leverage.
These figures begin to reveal the cost of maintaining stability especially in restive minority regions.
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... According to the Jamestown Foundation, a U.S.-based think tank, Xinjiang's domestic security spending per capita (mea-sured in Renminbi) ranks second out of all China's regions, behind the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). However, between 2006-2017, domestic security spending in Xinjiang increased faster than other regions, growing by 411% compared to 404% in Tibet (Zenz, 2018;. ...
... Estimates suggest that such camps have roughly 1 million Uyghur residents. (Amnesty International 2018;Human Rights Watch, 2018;Zenz, 2018). Based on the accounts of Uyghur people who fled China and gave a rough account of the conditions in these camps, "Detainees are forced to pledge loyalty to the CCP and renounce Islam, they say, as well as sing praises for communism and learn Mandarin" (Maizland, 2019). ...
This book aims to explore how the Central Asian Republics have managed their relations with small and major powers during the 25 years following the collapse of the USSR. The authors identify and discuss the questions like: what are the Central Asian states' interests and how they are pursuing them? What are the CAR states' relationships with these powers, and what is changing? Are the great powers outsourcing policing or security responsibilities to the CAR?
... During Xi Jinping's first term from 2013 to 2017, however, the country's domestic security spending grew 34% faster than the total expenditures. Thus, national domestic security spending exceeded spending on national defense for the first time in 2010, and the gap between the two grew to 13% in 2016 (Ong, 2018c;Zenz, 2018). ...
The recent authoritarian turn in Chinese politics under Xi Jinping has invigorated interest in the concept of “public security,” a metamorphosis of the term “weiwen” (stability maintenance) fashioned by his predecessor Hu Jintao. Both concepts emphasize a preventive repression that involves a whole-of-society approach to preserving social order. Drawing on an original protest dataset and the Chinese government statistics on public security spending, we conduct an empirical study of the repression-protest nexus to investigate the extent to which the Chinese state has been effective in preempting social contention. While we find correlational evidence of increased security spending and a decline in protests, this provides modest support for the strategy’s effectiveness. Despite political tightening under Xi, we find evidence for increased frequency, larger size, and pluralization of grievances for protests during his rule. Overall, our methodological approach allows us to compare contention and repression between the Hu–Wen and Xi periods and to investigate the empirical evidence for preventive repression, which lies at the core of the Chinese approach to the preservation of social order.
... and Xinjiang surpassed that of Beijing and possibly even the United States.100 None of this includes the money spent on development.Regimes dealing with regions of comparable geographic and demographic size might find the expense prohibitive. ...
This edited volume highlights key challenges the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faces in its rise and contextualizes the potential contributions of special operations to compete for advantage based on the CCP’s interests and vulnerabilities. Competing for advantage means accruing power and influence in such a way that the adversary’s plans cannot be realized. This volume focuses primarily on appreciating the CCP’s worldview, interests, and political culture while promoting a strategic vision for the future—a future where SOF will need to reinterpret their value from providing a military effect to providing a political effect through military means.
... Over the course of one year (2016 to 2017), Xinjiang's security spending nearly doubled, increasing from 30.05 billion yuan (USD 4.3 billion) to 57.95 billion yuan (USD 8.4 billion) (Zenz, 2018b). In comparison, Xinjiang's security spending was 5.45 billion yuan in 2007 (USD 780 million), meaning that in only a decade, the province's security spending rose tenfold (Dou & Wen, 2020;Zenz, 2018a). As Zenz (2018b) points out, security spending in Xinjiang between 2016 and 2017 increased most dramatically in minoritydominated prefectures within Xinjiang (167%) compared with the region of Xinjiang as a whole (92%). ...
We use the predatory theory of the state to explain China’s violent assimilationist campaign targeting the Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim minority group in China that constitutes a population majority in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Our analysis suggests that growing political centralization under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, combined with technological changes that reduced the costs of implementing predatory policing in Xinjiang and elevated the perceived economic benefits from integration, contributed to the choice of destructive cultural assimilation rather than respect for the rights and autonomy of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. While the economics literature sometimes describes the political economy of China’s growth miracle as the byproduct of a constrained Leviathan, the present paper shows that a predatory theory of the state is more useful for understanding how a cultural genocide can occur alongside economic growth.
This article examines the substance and mechanisms of Chinese nationalism. It does so by probing the boundaries of the permissible in online discourse, and explaining how the uncompromising emotions expressed online interrelate with the patriotic messages that the government espouses. The party's obsession with maintaining social stability stems from a profound fear of the people demanding freedoms it cannot give. With a stagnating economy, China under Xi Jinping (习近平) has doubled down on the repression and propaganda levers. This means that constructing external enemies and keeping down projected traitors is deemed key. Yet a scenario where government censors, digital cheerleaders, or the covert police state are no longer able to “cool popular emotions” is no inconceivable possibility, and would mean a challenge to the Chinese Communist Party's rule that is entirely of its own making.
The paper discusses hybrid threats and actions UE and NATO
have took last years within various national, UE and NATO initiatives to prevent them. Although these threats are not a new challenge for states and international entities, they have become the main problem for European countries
after the hybrid war in Ukraine started in 2014. The author claims that hybrid threats prevention is a continuous, never-ending process which requires
building social and state resistance. Hybrid threats are changing and developing all the time which means that response to them must be also changing
and developing. Todays security threats are not only technologically intense
but also horrendously expensive which requires a solid economic base and
the latest technological – industrial means.
The paper discusses hybrid threats and actions UE and NATO
have took last years within various national, UE and NATO initiatives to prevent them. Although these threats are not a new challenge for states and international entities, they have become the main problem for European countries
after the hybrid war in Ukraine started in 2014. The author claims that hybrid threats prevention is a continuous, never-ending process which requires
building social and state resistance. Hybrid threats are changing and developing all the time which means that response to them must be also changing
and developing. Todays security threats are not only technologically intense
but also horrendously expensive which requires a solid economic base and
the latest technological – industrial means.
Zadaniem zespołu Autorów pierwszej części monografii była próba uchwycenia i przeanalizowania najważniejszych zagrożeń współczesnego świata, które są nieodłączną częścią codziennego funkcjonowania każdego podmiotu bezpieczeństwa. Podczas funkcjonowania tego podmiotu występują różne negatywne zdarzenia dotyczące np. sfery polityki państwa, rozwoju gospodarczego, interesów narodowych, naruszenia stanu środowiska naturalnego, naruszenia praw człowieka i jego podstawowych wolności, destrukcyjnego działania sił natury, niekorzystnych konsekwencji postępu naukowo-technicznego i rozwoju cywilizacyjnego czy utraty dóbr materialnych, zdrowia lub życia.
Idea VUCA została wymyślona przez armię amerykańską w latach 90. XX wieku, aby opisać świat po zimnej wojnie: zmienność (niestabilność, szybko zmieniające się konteksty i warunki), niepewność (brak informacji, która ma kluczowe znaczenie dla rozwiązania problemu), złożoność (wiele czynników trudnych do sklasyfikowania lub kontrolowania) i niejednoznaczność (niejasne dane podlegające wielu interpretacjom). Od tego czasu VUCA została przyjęta przez liderów we wszystkich sektorach społeczeństwa, aby opisać naturę świata, w którym działają: przyspieszające tempo zmian, brak przewidywalności, wzajemne powiązania, przyczyny i skutki oraz duży potencjał błędnych odczytów.
Środowiska VUCA rzucają nam wyzwanie. Chodzi o to, jak poruszać się po świecie VUCA, w którym się dzisiaj znajdujemy. Używając tego samego akronimu – VUCA (Vision - Understanding – Clarity - Adaptation), planowanie przyjmuje inne podejście - przechodząc od zmienności do Wizji, od niepewności do Zrozumienia, od złożoności do Jasności i od niejednoznaczności do Adaptacji.
After the 9/11 incidents, global counter-terrorism efforts have focused increasingly on community policing as a proactive and preventive approach to thwarting terrorism. This article explores the developments, tensions, and prospects of counter-terrorism community policing (“CTCP”) in China. By applying the concepts of police legitimacy and social capital to the normative and operational framework of CTCP, I argue that this vital counter-terrorism endeavour is fraught with problems, for both Chinese police to procure effective civic co-operation and the local community to develop its capacity as a self-reliant player in preventing terrorism. More specifically, community co-operation in China’s CTCP is largely an obligatory process in the form of forced mobilization by local bureaucracies that does not necessarily entail trust and support from citizens based on their legitimacy judgement. My analysis on social capital building in Chinese communities further suggests that both police and citizens are unable to form deep and meaningful partnerships for counter-terrorism. While an authoritarian regime like China is reluctant to cede substantial power and authority to people in most of all aspects of policing, the public has become apathetic towards and alienated from voluntary collaboration with police in formal community affairs—a dichotomy lies between reality and ideal in China’s CTCP.
The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.
Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China�s nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity regarding its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. Nevertheless, China�s effort to maintain its strategy of assured retaliation while avoiding an arms race could backfire. Those efforts increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a crisis between the United States and China, even though China views this possibility as much less likely than the United States does.
This article examines the modernization of China's nuclear missile force and assesses the implications for the U.S.
China's Nuclear Modernization: Surprise, Restraint, and Uncertainty
- Jeffrey Lewis
Jeffrey Lewis, "China's Nuclear Modernization: Surprise, Restraint, and Uncertainty," in Ashley J.
Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner, eds.,
Strategic Asia 2013-14, Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau
of Asian Research, October 2013, pp. 67-96;
China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States
- Samuel K Garafola
- Berkowitz
Garafola, and Samuel K. Berkowitz, China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United
States, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1628-AF, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_re-ports/RR1628.html.
Academy of Military Science Researchers
- Andrew S Erickson
Andrew S. Erickson, "Academy of Military Science Researchers: 'Why We Had to Develop the Dongfeng-26
Analysis and Related Links
Ballistic Missile' -Bilingual Text, Analysis and Related
Links," AndrewErickson.com, December 5, 2016,
http://www.andrewerickson.com/2015/12/academy-of-military-science-researchers-why-we-had-to-develop-thedongfeng-26-ballistic-missile-bilingual-text-analysis-links/.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Lora Saalman
Lora Saalman, "China's Calculus on Hypersonic
Glide," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
August 15, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide;
): one seemingly near Kangaamiut or Maniitsoq in the island's southwest, and another near the Citronen Fjord zinc project of interest to China Nonferrous. Its location could provide a unique vantage point, being farther north than Denmark's Station Nord and the US Thule Air Base
- Sermitsiaq Twitter
- Jichang Lulu
Two possible locations have been hinted at (Twitter,
Sermitsiaq, Jichang Lulu, October 2017): one seemingly
near Kangaamiut or Maniitsoq in the island's southwest,
and another near the Citronen Fjord zinc project of interest
to China Nonferrous. Its location could provide a unique
vantage point, being farther north than Denmark's Station
Nord and the US Thule Air Base (Pituffik).