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NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests

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Abstrakt: Artykuł przedstawia układ sił pomiędzy Organizacją Traktatu Północnoatlantyckiego a Organizacją Układu Bezpieczeństwa Zbiorowego w odniesieniu do interesów geopolitycznych obu sojuszy polityczno-wojskowych. W badaniach potęgi gospodarczej, wojskowej i geopolitycznej wykorzystano metody polskiej szkoły potęgometrycznej. Prezentowane wyniki badań oparto na aktualnych danych empirycznych. Konkluzje wskazują na ilościowe i jakościowe dysproporcje w układzie sił oraz oceniają ich wpływ na realizację interesów geopolitycznych obu organizacji Słowa kluczowe: NATO, WNP, OUBZ, geopolityka, potęgometria, potęga gospodarcza, potęga wojskowa, potęga geopolityczna.
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Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
- 33 -
Robert BIAŁOSKÓRSKI
Uniwersytet Przyrodniczo-Humanistyczny w Siedlcach
NATO AND CSTO: THE GAME
OF POWER AND INTERESTS
Abstrakt:
Artykuł przedstawia układ sił pomiędzy Organizacją Traktatu
Północnoatlantyckiego a Organizacją Układu Bezpieczeństwa Zbiorowego w
odniesieniu do interesów geopolitycznych obu sojuszy polityczno-wojskowych. W
badaniach potęgi gospodarczej, wojskowej i geopolitycznej wykorzystano metody
polskiej szkoły potęgometrycznej. Prezentowane wyniki badań oparto na aktualnych
danych empirycznych. Konkluzje wskazują na ilościowe i jakościowe dysproporcje w
układzie sił oraz oceniają ich wpływ na realizację interesów geopolitycznych obu
organizacji
Słowa kluczowe: NATO, WNP, OUBZ, geopolityka, potęgometria, potęga
gospodarcza, potęga wojskowa, potęga geopolityczna.
Introduction
The rising tension in political-military relations between the West and
Russia is taking on the symptoms of the new Cold Warwith the more advantage
of struggling over cooperation. The game of power and interests between the
two West and East military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an
important factor in the study of the international security system. The both
alliances are increasing their power to successfully implement adopted
geostrategic goals. The economic, military (conventional) and geopolitical power
of these two military alliances as well as their permanent member states are
calculated according to the methodology of powermetrics (Białoskórski,
Kiczma, Sułek, 2019, p. 7; 2020)1.
1 Powermetrics is a new term, introduced by the Polish scientist Mirosław Sułek, combining
two concepts –“power” and “metric”. It has been adopted on the ground of Polish science.
Powermetrics is the applied science dealing with measurements, assessments and evaluation
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
- 34 -
The states are rivaling about the possible best position in the hierarchy
(ranking) of the international system. This rivalry is a so-called ‘zero-sum game’,
where winning of one side is a loss the other side with the same size. A global
power is always equal to a one hundred percent, while the ratio of power of
states is constantly changing. To get the best possible position in the
international system states have to maximize their power. It depends on the
state’s geostrategy and will and political determination to achieve assumed
national interests (goals). Such interactions (clash) of national interests are
determined by the political system (authority) and the implementation
conditions. Thus, states has to calculate the possibility of pursuing their national
interests according to their power and will of society (in democratic system) or
hard decision of leader(s) (in an autocratic regime). It is also limited by the
global energy resources and takes two forms: (1) cooperation (trade resources)
or (2) struggle (taking other people’s resources). The cooperation is a so-called
‘positive-sum game’, where all players profit, though in different degree.
Struggle (in a different spheres: political, economic, military etc.) is a so-called
‘negative-sum game’, in which all players lose, though in different degree. Thus,
in constant competition for maximum share of power, states alternate between
cooperation and struggle, depending on the specific conditions (Sułek, 2013, pp.
23–27). The military alliances are strong the resultant of the power and
geopolitical ambitions (interests) of their member states.
Powermetric methodology
The powermetric study based on the quantitative and qualitative
methods of the research of the international balance of power seems to be very
useful in the geostrategic studies (Białoskórski, 2018). To fulfill this scientific
task a powermetrics implements the formal models of power and its derived
indicators. Among many different approaches (Höhn, 2011) I have adopted the
modern model developed by the Polish scientist Mirosław Sułek (Sułek, 2020),
(Sułek, 2013).2 This model recognizes three types of power: (1) economic
(general) power (EP), (2) military power (MP) and (3) geopolitical power (GP).
of public life participant’s (actors) power, particularly of states, and the modelling,
simulation and forecast of relationship between them in global, regional and local dimension.
The powermetric research focused on two main areas: (1) economic – resulting from the
desire to rationalize the costs (expenditures) of the development and defence in the certain
circumstances and conscious of their formation; (2) political-military – resulting from the
desire to occupy the best position and to play the best role in the international distribution
system.
2 Mirosław Sułek is a professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies
of the Warsaw University. He is an economist, praxeologist and analyst of the strategic
studies. He is an active member of the Polish Society of International Studies and Polish
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
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The rivalry in the international system, states aims at maximization of
power in form of sociological power (Mazur, 1996, p. 183).3 It relies on
establishing proportions between cooperation and struggle (and therefore
changing management standards) in order to achieve the best ratio of power.
The international relations are synthesis of cooperation and struggle, in different
spheres and proportions, determined during rivalry.
In the international distribution of power, the states pursue their goals
defining a potential (capability) and employing social support (will) and
appropriate strategy.
In general approach, the national power is the product of tangible,
intellectual and spiritual potential (Sułek, 2010, p. 98), (Moczulski, 1999, pp.
402–403):
Where:
NP – national power,
TP – tangible potential,
IP – intellectual potential,
SP – spiritual potential.
It can be also expressed as the product of national resources (potential),
strategy and will to pursue national strategy by the political unit:
Where:
NP – national power,
R – resources,
NS – national strategy,
W – will to pursue of national strategy.
In both formulas, the tangible potential (resources) relates to presented
synthetic concept of economic power (EP), military power (MP) and
geopolitical power (GP).Taking, that the expression of the organizational and
production ability or the collective action ability is the stream (flow) of the gross
Geopolitical Society and Vice-President of the Polish Scientific Society of Praxeology. He is
considered as the founder and popularizer of the Polish powermetric school.
3 It refers to cybernetic theory of known Polish scientist Marian Mazur and considers a
power in the category of sociological power. There are two principle forms of sociological
power of state: (1) Internal power – within political system of state and (2) External power –
in the international system.
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
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domestic product (GDP) in time, economic (general) power can be expressed
by the formula4:
Where:
EP – economic (general) power (Sułek, 2001, p. 87–97),
GDP – gross domestic product,
L – population,
a – area (territory).
Concept of military power (MP) formal (synthetic) model is based on
economic power approach (EP) stressing the total character of state power,
including military power.
Assuming that the expression of organizational and production skills
(ability to collective activity) is the flow of military expenditures (expressed in
time unit), the military power can be expressed by the following formula:
Where:
MP – military power,
MEX – military expenditures,
S – soldiers (active),
a – area (territory).
It has to be noted that the synthetic model takes into account the
military power, as a conventional military power without nuclear factor, which
must be researched separately.
The concept of geopolitical power (GP) formal (synthetic) model is
based on economic (general) power (EP) and military power approach stressing
the total character of state power, including economic power and military
power.
The geopolitical power is expressed by the following formula:
4 The economic power can be understood narrowly or broadly. In the narrow meaning of the
main component of economic power is the value of GDP expressed in time, while in a broad
sense, the expression of economic power are also demographic and spatial (territory) factors,
which are an expression of the general power. In reflection, I took the view of a broad
economic (general) power, which part is the military power. The exponent values of the
powermetric formal model formulas were determined by the deductive method.
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
- 37 -
Where:
GP – geopolitical power,
EP – economic (general) power,
MP – military power.
This formal model has assumed that the power of the world is a whole
and equals 1. The power of each state is therefore a fraction (share) of this size.
To clarity of the presented results, the fractions can be multiplied by any
number, e.g. if we multiply them by 100, we will get results in percent of the
world's power (then the power of the world = 100%). We can also multiply
them by 1000 (then the power of the world = 1000), which means that it can be
expressed in the millimir (mM) i.e. the thousandth parts of the power of the
world.
The formal powermetric model adopted in this research can be
implemented to measure the power of the individual states as well as the
organizations (i.e. a sum of power values of the all permanent member states).
The synthetic balance of power
The research results clearly indicate a significant advantage of all
indicators of the powermetric formal model related to NATO over CSTO. The
all three power indicators (EP, MP, GP) of CSTO are the only about 10% of
NATO volumes. The equally low values of GDP (11%), L (5%) and MEX (5%)
are accompanied by a smaller difference values of a (86%) and S (33%)
indicators of CSTO in relation to NATO (Figure 1).
The quantitative indicator of the difference in the number of the alliance
permanent member states gives NATO advantage (NATO – 29; CSTO 6),
but the qualitative indicators ultimately determine the balance of power. The
power of top member states (the political-military leaders), i.e. the United States
(NATO) and the Russian Federation (CSTO) is the most important (Table
1&2).
The United States and the Russian Federation belong to ten top world
power countries (Table 3). The United States plays the role of the second
economic power (together with the leading China) and the leader of the military
and geopolitical global systems. Additionally four NATO countries, Germany,
France, the United Kingdom and Canada belong to this power ranking. The
Russian Federation is the seventh economic power and fourth military and
geopolitical world power. Other CSTO countries occupy further positions in the
world power ranking.
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
- 38 -
Figure 1. The powermetric formal model indicators of the NATO and CSTO in 2018
(world=100%) and the percentage share of CSTO/NATO rate
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Sułek powermetric formal model and data from: The
World Bank (2019) and The Military Balance (2019).
Table 1. The ranking of CSTO countries related to the indicators of the powermetric
formal model in 2018 (world=100%)
Rank Country
Name
EP
[%]
Country
Name
MP
[%]
Country
Name
GP
[%]
1 Russian Federation 2.582 Russian Federation 3.910 Russian Federation 3.468
2 Kazakhstan 0.307 Kazakhstan 0.183 Kazakhstan 0.224
3 Belarus 0.101 Belarus 0.076 Belarus 0.084
4 Kyrgyz Republic 0.025 Tajikistan 0.026 Tajikistan 0.026
5 Tajikistan 0.025 Armenia N/A Kyrgyz Republic 0.008
6 Armenia N/A Kyrgyz Republic N/A Armenia N/A
Total 3.073 Total 4.294 Total 3.887
Rank Country
Name
GDP
[%]
Country
Name
L
[%] Country Name a
[%]
1 Russian Federation 1.932 Russian Federation 1.902 Russian Federation 12.860
2 Kazakhstan 0.199 Kazakhstan 0.241 Kazakhstan 2.120
3 Belarus 0.070 Belarus 0.125 Belarus 0.159
4 Armenia 0.014 Tajikistan 0.120 Kyrgyz Republic 0.151
5 Kyrgyz Republic 0.009 Kyrgyz Republic 0.083 Tajikistan 0.109
6 Tajikistan 0.009 Armenia 0.039 Armenia N/A
Total 2.233 Total 2.510 Total 15.399
Rank Country Name MEX [%] Country Name S [%]
1 Russian Federation 2.722 Russian Federation 4.597
2 Kazakhstan 0.095 Belarus 0.230
3 Belarus 0.036 Armenia 0.230
4 Armenia 0.030 Kazakhstan 0.199
5 Tajikistan 0.013 Kyrgyz Republic 0.056
6 Kyrgyz Republic N/A Tajikistan 0.046
Total 2.897 Total 5.358
Legend: N/A – no data available for formula calculation;
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Sułek powermetric formal model and data from: The
World Bank (2019) and The Military Balance (2019).
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
- 39 -
Table 2. The ranking of NATO countries related to the indicators of the powermetric
formal model in 2018 (world=100%)
Rank Country
Name
EP
[%]
Country
Name
MP
[%] Country Name GP
[%]
1 United States 14.911 United States 22.618 United States 20.049
2 Germany 2.671 France 2.175 France 2.155
3 France 2.113 United Kingdom 1.918 Germany 2.105
4 United Kingdom 1.951 Germany 1.822 United Kingdom 1.929
5 Canada 1.841 Italy 1.189 Canada 1.382
6 Italy 1.596 Canada 1.152 Italy 1.325
7 Spain 1.253 Spain 0.843 Spain 0.980
8 Turkey 0.990 Turkey 0.733 Turkey 0.819
9 Poland 0.636 Poland 0.640 Poland 0.639
10 Netherlands 0.562 Netherlands 0.398 Netherlands 0.453
11 Belgium 0.357 Greece 0.362 Norway 0.342
12 Norway 0.348 Norway 0.338 Greece 0.318
13 Romania 0.297 Romania 0.318 Romania 0.311
14 Denmark 0.244 Belgium 0.218 Belgium 0.264
15 Czech Republic 0.235 Denmark 0.179 Denmark 0.201
16 Portugal 0.233 Portugal 0.160 Portugal 0.185
17 Greece 0.231 Czech Republic 0.158 Czech Republic 0.184
18 Hungary 0.175 Hungary 0.120 Hungary 0.138
19 Slovak Republic 0.112 Slovak Republic 0.085 Slovak Republic 0.094
20 Bulgaria 0.094 Lithuania 0.080 Bulgaria 0.080
21 Croatia 0.074 Bulgaria 0.073 Lithuania 0.075
22 Lithuania 0.064 Croatia 0.060 Croatia 0.065
23 Slovenia 0.053 Latvia 0.047 Latvia 0.046
24 Latvia 0.044 Estonia 0.043 Slovenia 0.042
25 Luxembourg 0.038 Slovenia 0.036 Estonia 0.041
26 Estonia 0.036 Luxembourg 0.016 Luxembourg 0.023
27 Iceland 0.027 Albania 0.015 Albania 0.019
28 Albania 0.026 Montenegro 0.008 Iceland 0.009
29 Montenegro 0.009 Iceland N/A Montenegro 0.008
Total 32.292 Total 38.217 Total 36.242
Rank Country
Name
GDP
[%]
Country
Name
L
[%]
Country
Name
a
[%]
1 United States 23.885 United States 4.308 United States 7.183
2 Germany 4.658 Germany 1.092 Canada 7.141
3 United Kingdom 3.293 Turkey 1.084 Turkey 0.604
4 France 3.237 France 0.882 France 0.430
5 Italy 2.417 United Kingdom 0.876 Spain 0.392
6 Canada 1.996 Italy 0.796 Norway 0.287
7 Spain 1.662 Spain 0.615 Germany 0.274
8 Netherlands 1.065 Poland 0.500 Poland 0.240
9 Turkey 0.893 Canada 0.488 Italy 0.231
10 Poland 0.683 Romania 0.256 United Kingdom 0.190
11 Belgium 0.620 Netherlands 0.227 Romania 0.181
12 Norway 0.507 Belgium 0.150 Greece 0.101
13 Denmark 0.410 Greece 0.141 Bulgaria 0.085
14 Czech Republic 0.286 Czech Republic 0.140 Iceland 0.079
15 Romania 0.279 Portugal 0.135 Portugal 0.072
16 Portugal 0.277 Hungary 0.129 Hungary 0.071
17 Greece 0.254 Bulgaria 0.092 Czech Republic 0.061
18 Hungary 0.181 Denmark 0.076 Lithuania 0.049
19 Slovak Republic 0.124 Slovak Republic 0.072 Latvia 0.049
20 Luxembourg 0.081 Norway 0.070 Croatia 0.044
21 Bulgaria 0.076 Croatia 0.054 Slovak Republic 0.038
22 Croatia 0.071 Albania 0.038 Estonia 0.034
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
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23 Slovenia 0.063 Lithuania 0.037 Denmark 0.033
24 Lithuania 0.062 Slovenia 0.027 Netherlands 0.026
25 Latvia 0.041 Latvia 0.025 Belgium 0.024
26 Estonia 0.035 Estonia 0.017 Albania 0.022
27 Iceland 0.030 Montenegro 0.008 Slovenia 0.016
28 Albania 0.018 Luxembourg 0.008 Montenegro 0.011
29 Montenegro 0.006 Iceland 0.005 Luxembourg 0.002
Total 47.210 Total 12.349 Total 17.970
Rank Country Name MEX [%] Country Name S
[%]
1 United States 38.610 United States 6.941
2 United Kingdom 3.368 Turkey 1.813
3 France 3.203 France 1.042
4 Germany 2.742 Germany 0.919
5 Italy 1.493 Italy 0.873
6 Canada 1.095 United Kingdom 0.756
7 Spain 0.907 Greece 0.725
8 Netherlands 0.678 Spain 0.613
9 Poland 0.649 Poland 0.603
10 Turkey 0.474 Romania 0.352
11 Norway 0.408 Canada 0.342
12 Belgium 0.299 Netherlands 0.179
13 Greece 0.294 Bulgaria 0.158
14 Romania 0.278 Hungary 0.143
15 Denmark 0.255 Belgium 0.138
16 Czech Republic 0.165 Portugal 0.138
17 Portugal 0.155 Norway 0.117
18 Hungary 0.098 Czech Republic 0.117
19 Slovak Republic 0.077 Lithuania 0.102
20 Lithuania 0.063 Slovak Republic 0.082
21 Croatia 0.045 Denmark 0.077
22 Bulgaria 0.043 Croatia 0.077
23 Latvia 0.041 Albania 0.041
24 Estonia 0.038 Slovenia 0.036
25 Slovenia 0.032 Latvia 0.031
26 Luxembourg 0.024 Estonia 0.031
27 Albania 0.008 Montenegro 0.010
28 Montenegro 0.005 Luxembourg 0.005
29 Iceland 0.002 Iceland N/A
Total 55.551 Total 16.462
Legend: N/A – no data available for formula calculation;
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Sułek powermetric formal model and data from: The
World Bank (2019) and The Military Balance (2019).
The quantitative indicator of the difference in the number of the alliance
permanent member states gives NATOadvantage (the NATO - 29 and the
CSTO 6), but the qualitative indicators ultimately determine the balance of
power. Qualitatively, the Russian economic, military and geopolitical power is
the only 17% of the American power (Białoskórski, 2020).
The United States is the leader of NATO's total power. It covers as
much as 46% of economic power, 59% of military power and 55% of
geopolitical power of the alliance. The EU countries of NATO (22 countries)
cover 41% of economic power, 30% of military power and 33% of geopolitical
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
- 41 -
power (Figure 2).This EU’s power indicators will significantly decrease after the
complete Brexit implementation. The accession of the Northern Macedonia to
NATO on March 27, 2020 as the 30th member state does not significantly
affect the balance of the total alliance's power.
Table 3. The world ranking of ten top economic, military and geopolitical power in 2018
(world=100%)
Economic Power Military Power Geopolitical Power
Rank
State EP [%] State MP [%] State GP [%]
1 China 15.679 United States 22.618 United States 20.049
2 United States 14.911 China 10.326 China 12.110
3 India 4.818 India 4.218 India 4.418
4 Japan 3.391 Russian Federation 3.910 Russian Federation 3.468
5 Brazil 2.812 Saudi Arabia 3.445 Saudi Arabia 2.605
6 Germany 2.671 France 2.175 Japan 2.466
7 Russian Federation 2.582 Brazil 2.139 Brazil 2.363
8 France 2.113 Japan 2.004 France 2.155
9 United Kingdom 1.951 United Kingdom 1.918 Germany 2.105
10 Canada 1.841 Korea, Rep. 1.880 United Kingdom 1.929
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Sułek formal model and data from:
The World Bank (2019) and The Military Balance (2019).
Figure 2. The percentage share of the indicators of the powermetric formal model for
NATO in 2018
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Sułek formal model and data from:
The World Bank (2019) and The Military Balance (2019).
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
- 42 -
The Russian Federation is the CSTO’s political-military hegemonic state.
It covers as much as 84% of economic power, 91% of military power and 89%
of geopolitical power of the alliance. Russia provides CSTO the conventional as
well as the nuclear military power. The share of Russia's military expenditure in
CSTO is up to 94% (Figure 3). In practice, CSTO’s military power is the military
power of the Russian Federation.
Figure 3. The percentage share of the indicators of the powermetric formal model for the
CSTO in 2018
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Sułek formal model and data from:
The World Bank (2019) and The Military Balance (2019).
The game of the political-military interests
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) geostrategic goals are
focused on the collective defence and protection of peace and security of all
member states. It is supported by the Western political-military alliance of the
Australian, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) and the European
Union (EU), economic regional organization with the common security and
defence ambitions. NATO is strong of the joined economic, military and
geopolitical power of their member states capable of implement its geostrategic
interests, but it has to be released by the political will, readiness and strong
cooperation of all allies. Due to the top world power status, the United States
has a privileged political position in NATO, often disputed by the top European
NATO’s countries, France and Germany.
The Russia's aggression against Ukraine (armed annexation of Crimea
and military operations in eastern Ukraine) has influenced the NATO's
decisions to strengthen the defence of the Eastern Flank. In 2014, the Alliance
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
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has decided to create a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and two
years later to install a permanent military presence in the Central and Eastern
Europe. At the same time, the United States has decided to deploy an armoured
brigade and return to development of the ballistic missile defence project in this
region. In December 2017, the United States in strategy ‘preserve peace through
strength’ has identified revisionist power of Russia as well as China, the rogue
states of Iran and North Korea and transnational threat organizations as one of
three main sets of security challengers. The Russia's geopolitical challenge to the
West has intensified NATO-CSTO struggle in the international system. There
are also some internal NATO’s challenges: (1) the differing narratives on the
future of trans-Atlantic relations; France and Germany focus on the U.S. rivalry
with China and claim that Washington is gradually withdrawing politically and
militarily from Europe, while the eastern flank countries (with Poland for the
forefront) emphasise the return of the U.S. to Europe and the unprecedented
political and military engagement in the region, (2) the varying threat
perceptions; since 2014, NATO has started to strengthen the collective defence
on the eastern flank countries by increasing allied military presence in Poland,
the Baltic states and Romania; Washington wants to direct the NATO attention
to China’s increasingly assertive and growing economic and military power, also
(or above all) relates to Chinese activity in Europe affecting broader security
(5G civilian telecommunication network discussion); France and Germany
present the different political-military attitude to the Russian threat than Middle
and Eastern Europe countries, (3) insufficient consultations on strategic issues,
like operations in northern Syria (e.g. the U.S. decision to withdrawal of troops;
Turkish uncoordinated military offensive targeted against Kurdish groups allied
with the U.S.; a German proposal to set up a security zone and French
concerning reopening a strategic dialogue with Russia without consulting the
Allies), (4) disagreements over defence spending; the 2% of GDP defence
investment pledge to be fulfilled by 2024 is inalterably on NATO’s agenda,
however, twelve Allies (including Germany and Italy) still allocate less than 1.4%
of their military expenditures and (5) the imbalance of power as the question of
leadership inside the Alliance, especially between U.S. and the European
countries (Gotkowska, 2019).
NATO is still in transformation process and faces the challenge how to
better manage Europe’s collective defence on the eastern flank and crisis
response in the southern neighbourhood. The European pillar of NATO has to
be strengthened and an intra-European unity and consensus in European
security and defence policy, taking into account various perspectives i.a.
between France, Germany and Poland, has to be found. The political-military
agreement on the European military capabilities and policy coordination should
be developed to strengthen the Alliance and relations with the United States
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
- 44 -
without adversely affecting the NATO and trans-Atlantic ties. It is still the best
political-military option for all NATO allies (Gotkowska, 2019).
CSTO plays the role of the Collective Forces of the Commonwealth of
Independent States created with the political-military ambitions as the NATO
equivalent (so called ‘East NATO’).There are the following geostrategic goals of
CSTO: strengthening peace, international and regional security and stability,
ensuring the collective defense of independence, territorial integrity and
sovereignty of the member states, in attainment of which the member states
shall give priority to political measures. The Allies shall also coordinate and
harmonize their efforts in combating international terrorism and extremism, the
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and arms, organized
transnational crime, illegal migration and other threats. CSTO has been created
by the Russian Federation to keep its geopolitical interests in the CIS zone.
After 17 years of development, CSTO is still far away from full operational
readiness with many problems and disappointments. The CSTO Collective
Forces consist of the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces (CSTO PF) created in
October 2007 to conduct peacekeeping operations (ca. 4-5 thous.), the CSTO
Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CSTO CRRF) created in Febrauary 2009 (ca.
5-6 thous.) to repel military aggression, conduct anti-terrorist operations, fight
transnational crime and drug trafficking and neutralize the effects of natural
disasters (the reaction to interstate conflicts is not within the range of their
responsibility; they are located in Russia, under one command) and the CSTO
Collectvie Operational Reaction Forces (CSTO CORF) created in June 2009
composed of the special forces and airborne troops to conduct the rapid
military operations in any area. The structures of the CSTO Collective Air
Forces (CSTO CAF) and the CSTO Crisis Response Center (CSTO CRC) are
under development. The future and the international role of the CSTO depends
on the geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation. This leads also to
internal conflicts in the Alliance because not all members agree with the Russia’s
hegemonic policy (Nikitina, 2013), (de Hass, 2016), (Mrvaljevic, 2015),
(Dąbrowski, 2019). The CSTO Allies of Russia are divided into insignificant and
loyal and significant, whose loyalty is questionable (Makijenko, 2020). The
geostrategic ambitions of the CSTO to get a political-military balance relative to
NATO military power is unreal from powermetric research, because the
economic, geopolitical and conventional military power of CSTO is much lower
(the only ca. 11%) than the power of NATO (Figure 1). Of course, the Russian
Nuclear Forces provide the CSTO nuclear power, but this problem is beyond
this study. The CSTO political efforts expended towards securing international
recognition as a regional security organization and getting acknowledged by
NATO as an equal and legitimate partner are ineffective. Even interaction with
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is limited due to Chinese
reservations and fears that a closer relationship between CSTO and SCO might
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
- 45 -
give the impression to the outside world that SCO endeavoured to become a
‘NATO of the East’ preferring political and economic cooperation (de Hass,
2016, p. 37) and NATO has consistently refused to enter into any contacts with
the quasi alliance. On the other side, Russia is building ties with China in SCO
and keeping it away by strengthening CSTO (Baev, 2014, p. 42; 46).
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is Eurasian political,
economic, and military organization based on group of states ‘Shanghai Five’
with the participation of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
After accession of Uzbekistan, this formula has been changed to SCO in 2001.
It is open for enlargement now, although the initial positions of parties were
quite different. The largest members (China and Russia) claimed that it was
premature and undesirable (Douhan, 2013, p. 6). Finally India and Pakistan have
joined SCO in 2017. SCO aims to strengthen mutual security, fight terrorism,
extremism and separatism (‘three evil forces’), promote trade and, in practice, to
resist Western-type democratic changes and NATO enlargement and serves as a
counterpoise to Western organizations (Oldberg, 2010, p. 9) (Oldberg, 2016, p.
5). To achieve these goals, SCO has adopted the Shanghai Convention on
Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism and created the Regional
Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of SCO with headquarters in Tashkent in 2001
(operating since 2003). To build anti-drug zone around Afghanistan the
Agreement on cooperation in combating illicit trafficking of drugs, psychotropic
substances and their precursors was accepted in 2004 (Rozanov, 2013, pp. 43–
45). SCO is an organization with two political-military leaders - China and
Russia, in contrast to CSTO with the only one leader – Russia (De Hass, 2016).
The future role of SCO depends mainly on two factors: (1) relations between
Russia and China; the degree of compatibility of their interests and priorities in
the Eurasian region, (2) American foreign and security policy in the Central Asia
(Rozanov, 2013, pp. 48–49). The SCO development may have negative
consequences for the broader American interests in the Eurasian region
(Boland, 2011, p. 50). From other side, SCO can play an important role in axis
of power – the US, Europe and Japan – not be seen as a threat but a vehicle for
increasing economic and social prosperity in the region (Prajakti&Siddharth,
2007).
Conclusions
The balance of power of two regional security organizations, NATO and
CSTO in the context of their political and military interests (goals) has been
examined. NATO has the largest global economic, military and geopolitical
power to implement its security interests. The power of NATO is the power of
the United States supported by the power of the European and non-European
member states. The United States demands European allies to increase their
military power. The top American position in NATO is often disputed by the
Białoskórski, R., 2020. NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests,
Przegląd Geopolityczny, 33, s. 33-49.
- 46 -
top European members - France and Germany. The Russia’s imperial political
and military aspirations and its aggressive foreign policy are among the major
challenges and threats of NATO, which decided to strengthen the eastern flank
militarily. The NATO's weakness is the complicated political-military decision-
making process and the transfer of armed forces into the operational region.
The political-military aspirations of CSTO under the Russian hegemony to play
NATO’s equivalent role (so called ‘East NATO’) must be assessed as unreal.
The powermetric research prove a powerful advantage of economic, military
and geopolitical power of NATO. The future and the international role of
CSTO fully depends on the geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation to
maintain political and military control over the part of the former post-Soviet
area. Compared to NATO, the CSTO decision-making process based on the
Russia's political and military supremacy allows for rapid use and deployment of
armed forces in the operational area. To strengthen the political and military
position of CSTO, Russia is seeking cooperation with Central and East Asian
countries, especially China, India and Pakistan under SCO and ASEAN. As the
economic world power and the military great power, China rivalling the United
States on the domination in the international system is potentially very attractive
partner for the Russian Federation. However, the Chinese-Russian relations are
complicated for historical and geopolitical reasons.
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NATO and CSTO: the Game of Power and Interests
The paper examines the balance of power in relation to the security interests of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). The economic, military (conventional) and geopolitical power of
these two military alliances as well as their permanent member states are calculated
according to the powermetric methodology and actually available data. It refers to a
powermetrics as the applied science dealing with measurements, assessments and
evaluation of public life participant’s (actors) power, particularly of states, and the
modeling, simulation and forecast of relationship between them in global, regional and
local dimension. Studying the ratio of power it has been estimated the abilities of the
alliances to achieve their security interests.
Key words: NATO, CIS, CSTO, ODKB, geopolitics, powermetrics, economic
power, military power, geopolitical power.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
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Putin's Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program
  • P Baev
Baev, P., 2014. The CSTO: Military Dimensions of the Russian Reintegration Effort. In S.F. Starr & S.E. Cornell (ed.), Putin's Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.
The Geostrategic Position of the Russian Federation. A Powermetric Study (Siedlce: Scientific Publishing House of the Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities)
  • R Białoskórski
Białoskórski, R., 2018. The Geostrategic Position of the Russian Federation. A Powermetric Study (Siedlce: Scientific Publishing House of the Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities). Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/.
Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the
  • J Boland
Boland, J., 2011. Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S.? Retrieved from