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Introduction to Folk Psychology: Pluralistic Approaches

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Kristin Andrews
Kristin Andrews
Kristin Andrews
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Shannon Spaulding at Oklahoma State University
Shannon Spaulding
Evan Westra at Purdue University West Lafayette
Evan Westra
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Abstract

This introduction to the topical collection, Folk Psychology: Pluralistic Approaches reviews the origins and basic theoretical tenets of the framework of pluralistic folk psychology. It places special emphasis on pluralism about the variety folk psychological strategies that underlie behavioral prediction and explanation beyond belief-desire attribution, and on the diverse range of social goals that folk psychological reasoning supports beyond prediction and explanation. Pluralism is not presented as a single theory or model of social cognition, but rather as a big-tent research program encompassing both revisionary and more traditionally inspired approaches to folk psychology. After reviewing the origins of pluralistic folk psychology, the papers in the current issue are introduced. These papers fall into three thematic clusters: Folk-psychological strategies beyond propositional attitude attribution (Section 2.1); Enculturation and regulative folk psychology (Section 2.2); and Defenses of pluralism (Section 2.3).
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Synthese (2021) 199:1685–1700
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02837-3
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: PLURALISTIC APPROACHES
Introduction to Folk Psychology: Pluralistic Approaches
Kristin Andrews1·Shannon Spaulding2·Evan Westra1
Received: 11 August 2020 / Accepted: 17 August 2020 / Published online: 20 August 2020
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract
This introduction to the topical collection, Folk Psychology: Pluralistic Approaches
reviews the origins and basic theoretical tenets of the framework of pluralistic folk psy-
chology. It places special emphasis on pluralism about the variety folk psychological
strategies that underlie behavioral prediction and explanation beyond belief-desire
attribution, and on the diverse range of social goals that folk psychological rea-
soning supports beyond prediction and explanation. Pluralism is not presented as
a single theory or model of social cognition, but rather as a big-tent research pro-
gram encompassing both revisionary and more traditionally inspired approaches to
folk psychology. After reviewing the origins of pluralistic folk psychology, the papers
in the current issue are introduced. These papers fall into three thematic clusters:
Fo lk -psychological strategies beyond propositional attitude attribution (Section 2.1);
Enculturation and regulative folk psychology (Section 2.2); and Defenses of pluralism
(Section 2.3).
Keywords Folk psychology ·Pluralism ·Theory of mind ·Mindreading ·
Mindshaping ·Social cognition
Dedicated to Ron Giere (1938–2020), who forged the path.
BEvan Westra
ewestra@yorku.ca
Kristin Andrews
andrewsk@yorku.ca
Shannon Spaulding
Spaulding@okstate.edu
1Department of Philosophy, York University, S448 Ross Building, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto,
ON M3J 1P3, Canada
2Department of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, 246 Social Sciences & Humanities
Building, Stillwater, OK 74078, USA
123
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