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Definitional Foundations for Intelligent Systems, Part I: Quality Criteria for Definitions of Intelligence

Authors:

Abstract

We posit that the lack of consensus definitions of (machine or artificial) intelligence might be affected by the lack of knowledge of conceptual analysis and other well-investigated theories. Acute contextualization of the concepts that are defined may also be an issue. Accordingly, in this two-part paper, we review some basic concepts from across research fields on how to explicate a definition. In Part I we propose 30 quality criteria for definitions that shall serve as guidelines for well-defined definitions of any concept. The quality criteria may allow for both better insights into definitions and a wider understanding of the current discourse on AI. In Part II we provide basic terminology on definitions and an iterative process to guide the construction of robust definitions by considering the quality criteria introduced in Part I. Our central goal is twofold: we want to facilitate understanding across fields and inform different stakeholders from industry, academia, legal and governments, among others, by contributing to the formal foundations on elucidating "good and robust definitions" for AI.
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Definitional Foundations for Intelligent Systems,
Part I: Quality Criteria for Definitions of Intelligence
Dagmar Monett1 and Colin W. P. Lewis2
1 Computer Science Dept., Berlin School of Economics and Law, Germany, and AGISI.org
2 AGISI.org
1 dagmar.monett@agisi.org, 2 colin.lewis@agisi.org
Abstract
We posit that the lack of consensus definitions of (machine or artificial) intelligence might be
affected by the lack of knowledge of conceptual analysis and other well-investigated theories.
Acute contextualization of the concepts that are defined may also be an issue. Accordingly, in
this two-part paper, we review some basic concepts from across research fields on how to
explicate a definition. In Part I we propose 30 quality criteria for definitions that shall serve as
guidelines for well-defined definitions of any concept. The quality criteria may allow for both
better insights into definitions and a wider understanding of the current discourse on AI. In Part
II we provide basic terminology on definitions and an iterative process to guide the construction
of robust definitions by considering the quality criteria introduced in Part I. Our central goal is
twofold: we want to facilitate understanding across fields and inform different stakeholders
from industry, academia, legal and governments, among others, by contributing to the formal
foundations on elucidating “good and robust definitions” for AI.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, definitions, intelligence, quality criteria
Main Conference Topic: Robotization, Engineering and Artificial Intelligence
Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a term that has been used more loosely than defined.
Moreover, intelligence is a fundamental concept that does not have a consensus definition in
any of the concerned fields of study. This is true of disciplines such as Computer Science,
Psychology, Education and the relevant Cognitive Science domains, to say nothing of
intersecting or cross domain research fields where a consensus definition may be even more
pressing. This is also true of concepts like fairness, transparency, model interpretability,
privacy, and other related terminology used around intelligent systems. As a direct
consequence, the lack of overarching definitions is having both positive and negative
implications for the design, development, use, and regulation of those systems. If a concept is
defined well, there is ground for a better understanding and further use of the concept. Yet,
laypeople and concerned parties are being presented with an overwhelming variety of
definitions for the same concept that propitiate more confusion than clarification.
Defining a concept might be a very complex problem. Although recent work has tried to
bring clarity on defining the most important concept of the AI field (for instance, see [18]),
still, there is currently no overarching definition of machine or artificial intelligence.
Furthermore, other equally important concepts that are essential for AI systems remain ill-
defined. This is true of the concepts of model interpretability [13], fairness [5, 27], privacy,
transparency, and many others for which multiple definitions have been provided that, far from
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clarify, add to a plethora of misinterpretations and misunderstandings about their nature.
Whilst, in Pei Wang’s words [30], “[i]t is just normal for every researcher to believe they have
the best idea [on defining a concept], so we cannot expect some consensus to be achieved
soon,” some possible reasons for not having convincing definitions could be traced back to a
lack of knowledge of conceptual analysis and other well-investigated theories. Acute
contextualization of the concepts that are defined may also be a big issue. We want to change
this unfortunate situation. If we truly want to address fundamental questions concerning the
design, development, deployment, use, and even regulation of AI systems, then we need to
consider definitional foundations regarding the concepts these systems deal with.
Most works on defining a definition are limited to a very general understanding of what
a definition is, thereby providing basic criteria it should fulfill in a certain context, but fail to
consider other criteria that might be equally (or more) relevant in other contexts, i.e., some
works focus on very specific fields and shortlist some criteria but don’t refer to other criteria
that might be of importance. Similarly as it has been the case for engineers when writing
definitions of terms [26], there is a general neglect among computer scientists in general and
AI practitioners in particular of a thorough consideration of conceptual analysis for definitions
of intelligence and other related terms. The common stance is either an acute contextualization
of the new definition that is suggested depending on the concrete application at hand, or the
diminishing of the importance to define the concept at all, two extremes that should actually
be avoided, as called out by Aaron Sloman [23] more than three decades ago. More on
conceptual analysis will be introduced in Part II of this paper.
It is the central goal of the authors of this paper to raise awareness of the role well-defined
definitions play in the study and understanding of any concept. This should be of special
interest in government, legal, and social issues that deal with intelligent systems and the
consequences of their use, deployment, and regulation, for instance. In particular, basic
terminology and quality criteria for definitions are addressed here, with the hope they will
finally find the place they should permanently belong to: the AI and other concerned fields and
audiences dedicated to the conceptualization, development, validation, evaluation, and use of
systems that simulate or show any intelligent thinking or behavior. Only after a theoretical
framework of intelligence is thoroughly defined and understood, well-defined definitions
included, will we be able to move into the next phase: in other words, the acceptance that, and
paraphrasing Raworth [21], as humanity’s context, values, and aims continually evolve, so too
might be the way we define AI and advance the field.1
Our thesis is that a determining step in any attempt to understand intelligent systems
better must start with defining intelligence well. After all, how can we build truly artificially
intelligent machines and understand their behavior if we cannot accurately define what
intelligent abilities should be considered, and how they should be implemented and measured?
Furthermore, defining intelligence, especially machine or artificial intelligence, is not an
exclusive task done by AI and other related practitioners anymore: it turns out that even news
agencies are looking for “their” sound definitions of AI [2]. Unfortunately, there is no
widespread agreed consensus on a definition of intelligence nor of AI.
1 To support this, we have also created the Defintly App, available at http://defintly.com and with provisional
password agisiorg. In its initial version, it contains most of the content presented in this two-part paper and
assists users when defining concepts in any field.
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Sometimes researchers and practitioners deal with concepts that have previously been
defined in the literature or that are common knowledge in a certain domain. Other times they
find themselves in situations where they are the ones that define new concepts. However,
questions like “What is a definition?” “How should a definition be defined?” “What should be
considered when defining a definition?” or “What is a good definition?” remain unanswered in
most situations. This is the case in intelligence research in other disciplines: several definitions
of intelligence have been proposed over the years, but, as indicated by Hunt and Jaeggi in [8],
“after 100 years of research, the definition of the field is still inadequate.” Furthermore,
questions such as: “What is a good definition of intelligence?” or “How should a definition of
(machine) intelligence be defined?” are almost never examined in the scientific literature nor a
systematic conceptual analysis has been performed.
We want to bridge topics from non-technical areas that have been neglected by the AI
community for too long, topics that are not taught in Computer Science courses, and that AI
researchers and practitioners do not consider (as they should, in our opinion) before providing
a new definition of a concept, say a working definition, a dictionary definition, or of any other
type. We are living in a time where defining what AI is and what it is not, for example, is
becoming a crucial concern of stakeholders outside the AI community, but part of the AI
community prefers to avoid that discussion. We are of the opinion this must change.
With this two-part paper we intend to give answers to these and other related questions
and to help bridge diverse research fields on defining definitions. Along with previous work
that analyzes cognitive biases in experts’ written opinions about definitions of intelligence [16],
we also seek to understand why finding a “concordant” definition might be difficult to
accomplish although not impossible. Paraphrasing Kate Raworth’s approach [21] when she
calls for rethinking economics as a science, defining machine intelligence is not about finding
the perfect definition,2 because it does not exist yet and maybe will not; it’s about establishing
a definition that reflects the context we face, the values we hold, and the aims we have in the
field.
Quality Criteria for Definitions
The quality criteria that are introduced in what follows focus on the main characteristics
or properties a definition should entail in order to be considered a good definition. The purport
originates from quality criteria that are crucial for both software specifications and individual
software requirements and what they should meet in order to be considered “of high quality”
[22]. Those are very particular to the field of Software Engineering, but similar high-quality
descriptions are desirable for definitions.
Some of the quality criteria for definitions presented in this paper were collected after an
exhaustive examination of the literature on definitions. Legg and Hutter [12] and Wang [29],
for example, analyze the different properties or requirements a definition of intelligence should
have or fulfill. Other quality criteria are developed by the authors of this paper. And others are
the result of a thorough, qualitative analysis of the responses to the AGISI research survey on
defining machine intelligence [17]. Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement
with definitions of human and machine intelligence, as well as to justify their decisions. This
resulted in a corpus with more than four thousands opinions or arguments for and against
2 However, sloppy definitions mislead the public’s understanding and make cooperation difficult among different
groups of researchers [29], this also being a topic of discussion in other fields [9].
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definitions.3 Furthermore, respondents were asked to provide their suggested definitions of
human and machine intelligence. Both the particular characteristics of the most agreed upon
definitions from the literature and the respondents’ suggested definitions were also analyzed
and informed the quality criteria presented here.
The majority of the quality criteria that are listed in what follows could be applied to the
definition of any term: with a few exceptions, these quality criteria are not specific to a
definition of intelligence alone; they can be easily adapted to the definition of other concepts.
The quality criteria are intended to serve as guidelines when defining the definition of a
concept. This is why, in searching for a definition of a new concept, or when using or adapting
a definition from other authors to a concrete context, it might be desirable, or even convenient,
to consider the quality criteria presented here. Paraphrasing Chris Rupp [22], if one knows how
a definition is to be defined from the beginning, writing a good definition becomes a more
realistic goal.
Whenever possible, we provide a short explanation of what each criterion means,
together with the corresponding, original literature references that may lead to more
information about that criterion.4 Some important, last clarifications though: not all criteria are
necessary nor sufficient for a definition to be well-defined. In some contexts, contradictions
among criteria might arise or some of the criteria might never be satisfied at all. However, this
doesn’t undermine the importance of establishing sound quality measures for defining
concepts. Furthermore, the fulfillment of some criteria should not be seen as a dichotomy but
as a continuum, a degree of satisfaction that may depend on the context or the field, for
example.
What is a Good Definition?
A good definition of machine, artificial, or human intelligence,5 in the following just
intelligence ...
1. ... is complete. It defines the “what,” the “how,” and the “why,” of intelligence.
2. ... defines the “what,” the thing to be defined. It defines intelligence.
3. ... defines the “how,” the means to reach the thing to be defined. It defines the means
or the ways to reach intelligence.
4. ... defines the “why,” the purpose of the thing to be defined. It defines the purpose of
intelligence.
5. ... is ostensive. It includes (examples of) characteristic properties of intelligence. It
exemplifies the “what,” i.e. it exemplifies cognitive abilities or cognitive functions that
indicate intelligence [7].
6. ... is operational. It includes (examples of) characteristic operations or processes related
to intelligence. It exemplifies the “how,” i.e. it exemplifies behavioral characteristics for
reaching intelligence [7].
7. ... is useful [19]. It has utility [14], e.g. for the society, for the development of systems.
It expresses meaning [10]. It is fruitful [29]. It exemplifies the “why,” i.e. it exemplifies
the purpose of intelligence.
8. ... is unbiased towards any particular culture, species, etc. [12].
3 Other details about the survey, the results obtained, and their analysis are not in the scope of this paper. We
refer the interested reader to the already indicated work [17] for more.
4 Some quality criteria are self-explained. We don’t dive into deep explanations for space reasons.
5 For the purposes of focusing, we refer here to the concept of intelligence for being an essential concept to AI.
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9. ... is clear, in that it avoids metaphorical, ambiguous language [1], and obscure terms
[15]. It is not defined in terms of other vague concepts [29]. It is clearly written; it is
perspicuous.
10. ... is consistent, it includes no contradictory statements.
11. ... is affirmative [1].
12. ... is easy to understand [14]. It is understandable [1] by the general public [19].
13. ... is objective, in that it is a definition that does not include subjective opinions [12].
14. ... is exclusive, in that it includes nothing which is not a part of intelligence [20].
15. ... is comprehensive, in that it omits no essential attribute of the thing to be defined [1];
it omits nothing which is a part of intelligence [20].
16. ... is simple [14, 29]. It is grammatically simple [25].
17. ... is short (perceived and relative to other definitions). It defines the essential with fewer
words as possible.
18. ... is formal. The definition is specified with a high degree of precision and, ideally,
using formal mathematics [12].
19. ... does not repeat the name of the thing to be defined [15]. There is “no vicious circle”
in the definition [25]. I.e. it does not repeat or uses intelligence as part of the definition to
define intelligence.6
20. ... is scientifically valid [19]. It reflects current scientific knowledge [14].
21. ... is original. If googled, for instance, it does not “exist,” it is not a definition “from
someone else” (unless its author explicitly indicates that it is a definition from the
literature). In other words, if it exists, there is no need to re-define it the same way; it
should be cited instead.
22. ... is an intellectually elegant definition [28], a very specially formulated one.
23. ... is measurable [4, 14]. It can be measured.
24. ... is functional, in that the wording used to state what the thing to be defined is is a
function of the language in which it is stated [1, 3]. I.e. it uses the concepts and language
that are common knowledge in the discipline where intelligence is defined.
25. ... is fundamental, in that it does not need to be changed from time to time due to
changing technology and knowledge [12].
26. ... is specific [14] to what it is being defined.
27. ... is general, it can be applied “to everything” [12], e.g. it does not distinguish between
machine, artificial, or human intelligence.
28. ... is widely accepted in the discipline [6].
29. ... has a universal application [1], in that it is not anthropocentric [12] unless its goal is
to define human intelligence explicitly.
30. ... defines intelligence “as a field.”
As stated above, not all these quality criteria are necessary nor sufficient; such a
distinction should be considered and is not addressed in this paper. For example, that a
definition should be intellectually elegant could be thought of as secondary in importance.
However, intellectually elegant definitions shape the common imagination like no others. Why
not aim at an appealing, elegantly written way of using the language to define a concept?
Any importance, or priority, or ranking of some criteria over others is not addressed here
either, for space reasons. Determining their necessity or sufficiency could help. It is probably
better to reflect on these aspects once the context, where the definition of the concept should
6 In the case of the concept of intelligence, though, it could be very difficult to define it withou t generating
definitional circles [24].
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be applied, is specified. As one respondent writes in her feedback after answering the questions
from the survey on defining intelligence introduced above, “any definition of [artificial
intelligence] is necessarily contextual.” We believe that assessing the quality of a definition is
better done when, ideally, the “what,” the “how,” and the “why” of a definition (see criteria 1
to 4 above) are clear for a particular context. The 30 quality criteria for definitions could guide
the process of searching for a definition in any context.
Some of the quality criteria refer to characteristics or properties that have a common
origin. They could be grouped into more general categories. For example, there are quality
criteria that refer to grammatical aspects of a definition; others, to their meaning or value.
Figure 1 shows a possible hierarchy containing five main categories and their relationships that
group the first 29 quality criteria introduced above.
Figure 1: Quality criteria for definitions of intelligence grouped into five main categories
Other categorizations might be more convenient depending on the concrete application
or context at hand. A single quality criterion could belong to more than one category, as is the
case of a definition being formal (see the category Structure in Figure 1). This quality criterion
could also be grouped under the general category Semantic, when neither the form nor the
structure of the definition is meant but that is formal for example with respect to the
mathematical language that is used. This might be the case of different formal definitions for
the concept of fairness, for instance.
Conclusion
Part I of this paper presented 30 quality criteria for definitions. The list encompasses
different properties that are desirable for a definition to be considered of high quality or well-
defined. The proposed list of quality criteria is not exhaustive. Yet it should serve as a basis for
defining and evaluating definitions of concepts that can support academics and practitioners in
their work.
Quality criteria for definitions allow for a better comparison between definitions. For
example, well-defined definitions of a concept could assist in the creation of tests that measure
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that concept, help to reach a common understanding about what it means, and, hopefully, avoid
propagating false and misleading information about its relations to other concepts and how do
artificial systems consider it when interacting with humans. It all starts by understanding the
appropriate meaning of the concept and, for doing that, well-defined definitions are essential.
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Brief biographies of the authors
Dagmar Monett
Prof. Dr. Computer Science (Artificial Intelligence, Software Engineering) with 30+
years of research and teaching experience. Co-founder of the AGI Sentinel Initiative,
AGISI.org, dedicated to understanding intelligence in order to build beneficial AI and to
educate society’s stakeholders across disciplines. AI expert at Ms.AI, “Artificial Intelligence
for and with Women.”
Colin W. P. Lewis
Adjunct Professor and international business and policy advisor, specialized in the
social and economic impact of technological change. With specific knowledge of the evolving
conditions of technology for productivity growth, development, labor, (in)equality, and
competitiveness. Part of his work focuses on understanding human intelligence and creating
solutions for Artificial Intelligence.
... Delineating the boundaries of the discourse on intelligence may help in defining and understanding its most discussed concept, as suggested in [11]. Furthermore, better insights into definitions and how to define them has proven to be essential for a better understanding of concepts, intelligence and AI included (see for example [12], [13] and [14] for more on properties of good definitions). Knowing those concepts and related cognitive abilities (like defining, analyzing, understanding, discussing, and comparing definitions of intelligence, among others) is expected for AI researchers and practitioners in the first place. ...
... The annotation scheme referred to in this paper builds upon different works on properties of good definitions some of which were referenced to in Section 1. It uses most of the properties or quality criteria for definitions suggested in [14], which includes a compendium and thorough analysis of the literature on definitions together with their most desirable properties. ...
... From the 30 quality criteria for definitions introduced in [14], 21 were considered for annotating each definition from the Intelligence Corpus. ...
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THE SUNDAY TIMES BESTSELLER'I see [Raworth] as the John Maynard Keynes of the 21st Century: by reframing the economy, she allows us to change our view of who we are, where we stand, and what we want to be.' George Monbiot, Guardian'This is sharp, significant scholarship . . . Thrilling.' Times Higher Education'[A] really important economic and political thinker.' Andrew MarrEconomics is broken. It has failed to predict, let alone prevent, financial crises that have shaken the foundations of our societies. Its outdated theories have permitted a world in which extreme poverty persists while the wealth of the super-rich grows year on year. And its blind spots have led to policies that are degrading the living world on a scale that threatens all of our futures.Can it be fixed? In Doughnut Economics, Oxford academic Kate Raworth identifies seven critical ways in which mainstream economics has led us astray, and sets out a roadmap for bringing humanity into a sweet spot that meets the needs of all within the means of the planet. En route, she deconstructs the character of ‘rational economic man’ and explains what really makes us tick. She reveals how an obsession with equilibrium has left economists helpless when facing the boom and bust of the real-world economy. She highlights the dangers of ignoring the role of energy and nature’s resources – and the far-reaching implications for economic growth when we take them into account. And in the process, she creates a new, cutting-edge economic model that is fit for the 21st century – one in which a doughnut-shaped compass points the way to human progress.Ambitious, radical and rigorously argued, Doughnut Economics promises to reframe and redraw the future of economics for a new generation.'An innovative vision about how we could refocus away from growth to thriving.' Daily Mail'Doughnut Economics shows how to ensure dignity and prosperity for all people.' Huffington Post