No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
The terrorist and the mercenary: Private warriors against Nigeria’s Boko Haram
Abstract
This article analyses the 2015 intervention of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP International Ltd), a South African private military company (PMC), against Boko Haram, the Islamic terrorist group in Nigeria. The origins of PMCs are highlighted before an in-depth analysis of the mercenary intervention against Boko Haram is performed, with an eye on previous major PMC interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, the paper emphasises the unprecedented use of PMCs against Islamic extremist groups but on the other reveals that PMC interventions have not changed much. Finally, the article assesses STTEP’s intervention in light of the current debate on private security involving those who advocate its use and regulation and those who question the legitimacy of PMCs as a tool of conflict resolution.
... Forest (2007), Comolli (2017), Solomon (2017), Adamo (2020), and Njoku (2020) discuss counter-terrorism in their intellectual spaces. Solomon (2017) listed traditional and critical (Solomon, 2017). ...
This paper examined the effectiveness and efficiency of the Nigeria counter-terrorism approach in the North Eastern region of Nigeria from 2009-2021. The Nigeria counter-terrorism strategies have not effectively eradicated the Boko Haram sect; they have strategically continued the wanton destruction of lives and properties, resulting in an unprecedented threat to Nigeria's national security. Nigerian counter-terrorism strategies have depended heavily on the kinetic approach. The discussion applied Sir Gerald Templer's Heart and Mind counter-insurgency theory. The paper employed a quantitative approach to data collection and analysis. The paper, therefore, discovered that the Nigeria counter-terrorism strategies in the northeast have been ineffective and inefficient, as evidenced by the responses of 32% of respondents. The paper concludes that reliance on the kinetic approach, disconnection between policy and implementation, poor utilization of modern technology, poor inter-agency collaboration, and lack of morality and motivation are the major factors that have impinged the effectiveness and efficiency of Nigeria counter-terrorism approach in the NorthEast. The paper recommends winning the heart and minds of the general population and a less kinetic approach in addition to providing modern equipment, inter-agency collaboration, and feedback on policy implementation as the panacea for Boko Haram terrorism.
Insecurity and terrorism pose significant concerns in Nigeria. Yet, there is a paucity of research on citizens’ and private security providers’ (PSP) perceptions of Nigeria’s response to insecurity and the use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). The study adopts a qualitative approach, and data was collected using semi-structured interviews with 63 participants, including PSP, non-governmental organisations and lay participants from the public and private sectors in Nigeria. Thematic analysis from a social constructionist theoretical lens was used to analyse the data. The study found a lack of confidence in the Nigerian security forces, scepticism towards the perceived government’s insincere politicisation of military victory, positive reinforcement of the use of private military companies devoid of identity, ‘othering’, and perceived short-term use of private military security. It also found a perceived mistrust for government approaches in handling insecurity and a positive outlook towards involving PMSCs and mercenaries in combating terrorism regardless of the participants’ identities as Nigerians. In conclusion, the study recommends the need for policies to strengthen Nigerian security agencies to avoid a perceived trust for PMSCs instead of state security.
Despite the military campaign against the Boko Haram insurgency, the extremists’ activities and violent crimes in form of adductions, deadly suicide bombings, ambushes continue. The continued perpetration of the above-highlighted activities exposes the limitation of military strategies in tackling violent crimes in Nigeria. The threats posed by the sect nonetheless, the government of Nigeria introduced a soft approach policy to reintegrate them back to society. The study for this reason assesses the extent to which the soft approach policy of the government is capable of deradicalizing, rehabilitating, and reintegrating repentant Boko Haram extremists back into Nigerian society. Using analysis of Operation Safe Corridor programmes and the content analysis of the various events relating to the deradicalization exercise, the study concluded that the programme lacks a clear reintegration strategy, and its implementation, if care is not taken, will only compound extremists’ activities in the country.
This article undertakes a retrospective appraisal of Nigeria’s widely acclaimed, yet contentious, success in its interventionist role in Liberia and its seeming inability to contain the threats posed by members of the dreaded Islamist militant: Jamaa’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad/al-Wilāyat al-Islāmiyya Gharb Afrīqiyyah, also known as Boko Haram. Drawing references from scholarly articles, electronic channels, and other commissioned reports, the article explains why Nigeria appears to be losing the war against Boko Haram, in contrast to its modest strides in Liberia between 1990 and 1997. We argue that Nigeria’s inability to contain the Boko Haram insurgency can be located within the context of its home-grown systemic challenges; particularly, its ineffectual political leadership and the politicisation of its national security under the Goodluck Jonathan Presidency.
There is an extensive literature on the ramifications of corruption for economic growth, as well as for democracy. Largely unexplored, however, is how corruption works to lessen government legitimacy and empower violent anti-state movements. In this article, the perception of corruption in Nigeria is considered. Noting that Nigeria must suppress the violent extremist group Boko Haram in order to continue to govern the nation, the connections between Nigerian perceptions of corruption and support for the movement are treated. Until this research, however, there existed no empirical evaluation of this relationship. Using analysis of a survey of over 10,000 Nigerians accomplished in 2012 and 2013, we show that issues of state illegitimacy and endemic corruption have contributed to Nigeria’s present security crisis by fomenting support for non-state violent actors.
Boko Haram insurgency has caused the death and displacement of thousands of Nigerians. Its means of terror has evolved from the use of crude weapons to bombs, kidnappings and the use of children as suicide bombers. Its reach has expanded beyond Nigeria into neighbouring West African countries and it has pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida and Islamic State. To address this security concern, its cause should first be ascertained. This paper argues that to do this, Boko Haram should be located in northern Nigerian historical context/environment. This paper reviews economic greed and grievance, extreme religious ideology and political opportunity in historic insurgencies in northern Nigeria. It finds that while the interplay of different factors shaped these insurgencies; it was political opportunity that ignited their onsets. Finally, the article submits that as long as these factors remain the same, military quelling of Boko Haram will not prevent a re-emergence of its likes.
This article examines the failure of the Nigerian government to exercise its responsibility to protect (R2P) populations from mass atrocities in the wake of Boko Haram's violent and persistent attacks against civilians in northeast Nigeria. After the abduction of 276 schoolgirls on 14 April 2014, the affected communities engaged directly in protecting their villages and families. Another murderous and devastating attack on Baga in January 2015 and the abduction of over 400 women in Damasak in March 2015 continued to expose the governmental failure to protect people at risk of losing their lives. This article examines the dynamics of the people's response to the crisis and investigates whether this response could be conceptually defined as a 'fourth pillar' of R2P, when a state – even in collaboration with the international community – is unable to live up to its R2P. Certainly, such a phantom 'fourth pillar' is symbolic and should not be used in any way by governments to re-delegate their first pillar primary R2P.
The ousting of Dr Goodluck Jonathan marked the first time in Nigerian history that a member of the opposition unseated an incumbent in fair and peaceful elections. The smooth transition of power, uncharacteristic of Nigeria, was hailed by the international community as a victory. However, did Muhammadu Buhari win because Jonathan lost or did Jonathan lose because Buhari won? This article argues that Jonathan's growing unpopularity gave Buhari the win, and that Boko Haram played a major role in the president's sinking support. The 2015 presidential election was thus a win for both democracy and Boko Haram.
Over the past two decades, governments have increasingly contracted private military and security companies (PMSCs) to support military operations in conflicts. However, many observers have argued that such companies are ‘greedy market actors’ or ‘reckless mercenaries’ and their level of performance very poor. A minority has defended them as security professionals. If market competition is present, the level of performance is high and positive contributions to the client’s military operation can be expected. However, neither PMSC opponents nor proponents can account for the variance in the level of performance in three crucial cases - Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This article argues that different market structures explain this variance. At least three ideal configurations exist: collaborative, competitive, and rival structures. These structures influence the level of performance. PMSC performance levels are expected to decrease from the first configuration, being positive, to the last, being negative.
Since the July 2009 Boko Haram terrorist outburst in Nigeria, there have been increasing questions on the phenomenon in the country. There has not been any substantial analysis on the emergence of the Boko Haram group and its terrorist activities in Nigeria as the out-rage continues. This study is advanced to explain the phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. It employs the levels of analysis framework popular in the field of international relations to explain the terrorism at three major levels: individual, state and international. The study relies on dependable news reports, which include interviews with key actors relevant to the subject matter, and finds that Boko Haram terrorism has its roots in the ideology and motivations of its founder and members, the failures and deficiencies of the Nigerian state, and the modern trend of religious terrorism in the international system.
Ideological factors help to define the evolution of terrorist organisations, influenced by the domestic and global political context. Jacob Zenn, Atta Barkindo and Nicholas A Heras examine the ideological motivations that influenced the transformation of Boko Haram from local salafism to international jihadism. They seek to analyse the extent to which, in addition to local grievances and its own internal politics, the ideology of other transnational extremist organisations and Nigerian history and politics have influenced the ideological development of Boko Haram.
The article analyzes the impact of private military companies (PMCs) on the duration of civil wars in Africa from 1990 to 2008. We develop an “opportunity structure” theory to argue that while PMCs are profit-oriented entities, the prevalent opportunities in conflicts will determine how they behave in war zones. Empirical findings for civil wars with at least 1,000 battle deaths show that as level of competition among government-hired PMCs increases, they are more likely to deliver optimal services and help bring an end to violence. In the absence of competition, the prevalent structure creates opportunities for PMCs to underperform in order to maximize profits by staying in conflicts longer. The authors also show that swift cessation of hostilities could benefit those profit-seeking PMCs that are compensated with contracts to extract natural resources because resource extraction generates more wealth in peace time. In such cases, the prevalent opportunities in conflict create an incentive for companies to deliver optimal service and terminate hostilities.
This article explains how it is possible to arrive at the paradoxical conclusion that an increased reliance on private actors (in the guise of private military companies) could consolidate public peace and security in the weakest African states. It argues that this conclusion can only be reached if the dynamics of the market for force are neglected. The basic claim is that the market as a whole has effects that cannot be captured by focussing on single cases. The article analyses these effects, departing from the empirical functioning of supply, demand and externalities in the market for force in order to spell out the implications for public security. More specifically, the article shows that supply in the market for force tends to self-perpetuate, as PMCs turn out a new caste of security experts striving to fashion security understandings to defend and conquer market shares. The process leads to an expansion of the numbers and kinds of threats the firms provide protection against. Moreover, demand does not penalize firms that service ‘illegitimate’ clients in general. Consequently, the number of actors who can wield control over the use force is limited mainly by their ability to pay. Finally, an externality of the market is to weaken existing security institutions by draining resources and worsening the security coverage. This gives further reasons to contest the legitimacy of existing security orders. In other words, the development of a market for force increases the availability and perceived need for military services, the number of actors who have access to them and the reasons to contest existing security orders. This hardly augurs well for public security.
The structures of pre-conflict patronage politics in West Africa play a major role in shaping the organization and behavior of armed groups that have appeared in that region since the 1990s. Patronage networks provide the social context in which armed group leaders arise and influences how they obtain and use resources. It weighs heavily in influencing who they recruit and how fighters and leaders define their goals. Two general principles emerge out of this investigation. First, political leaders who enjoyed close ties to prewar capital-based patronage networks tend to organize predatory armed groups. Leaders who come from communities that were marginal to these networks organize armed groups that are more likely to benefit local communities and take community norms more seriously. Overall, the latter maintain more stable internal organizations and are less prone to commit extreme human rights violations, at least in comparison to their better connected rivals. Evidence indicates that leaders of these groups often are tempted to pursue more predatory strategies. They discover, however, that this social context in which they gather resources and recruit fighters inhibits the pursuit of such strategies.
This article examines the Boko Haram crisis of July 2009 in Nigeria. It probes the historical evolution of the radical sect, highlights the impact of the uprising, and reflects on the contentious issues stemming from the uprising. Although the general opinion is that radical sects in Nigeria are unlikely to turn into sleeper cells for global terrorism, this article contends that the fact that some of the sect's members had received training in far-away Afghanistan and Mauritania raises some serious questions.
Perhaps the most dramatic incursion of the private sector into public policy is in the realm of security. Though the legitimate use of force is presumed to be the realm of the state, during the 1990s and into the new century the private sector's role in security has mushroomed. When Sierra Leone faced an insurgency in 1995, Valentine Strasser's government hired Executive Outcomes, a South African security firm, to train and support its troops. When the 1995 Dayton Accords required that the Bosnian military be rebuilt, MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated), an American firm, was hired to advise and train the Bosnian military. When the World Wildlife Fund was faced with the possible extinction of the northern white rhino in a park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it solicited a bid from Saracen, a South African and Angolan security firm to train and protect the guards. And global corporations, like British Petroleum, Exxon, DeBeers, and others, contracted with private security companies for site security and security planning all over the globe.
A burgeoning transnational market for force now exists alongside the system of states. In this essay, I briefly describe this market and argue that it poses tradeoffs to the state control of violence—offering new tools for control even as it erodes others. Furthermore, the changes in the process of controlling violence that privatization brings with it pose tradeoffs to nonstate actors as well. Rather than simply shifting influence from governments to markets and civil society, the privatization of security is likely to engender changes in each, opening the way for new institutional innovations and the intensification of international change.
The presence of private companies providing military services is not entirely new. In the period before the rise of the modern state, military contractors were common. Even in the …
A comprehensive analysis of the rise of Boko Haram from a small religious cult to a major terrorist group, placing them within the context of Nigerian politics and the international War on Terror.
In 2009, Nigerian security forces stormed a religious cult by the name of Boko Haram, killing its leader and thousands of followers. Six years later, Boko Haram is an enemy to reckon with, boasting 15,000 members and taking credit for 20,000 deaths. This book looks at the successful rise of this terrorist group, probing the religious and political environment that enabled a relatively small cult to threaten a nation.
The study draws on the author's fieldwork in Nigeria, where she had access to officials, activists, psychologists, and military personnel. Written in a clear and accessible manner, it offers a micro-to-macro investigation of the Boko Haram as a phenomenon. It also provides readers with an understanding of the regional dynamics that obstructed political and military cooperation among neighboring countries, enabling Boko Haram's success. This book traces the group's religious origins in the early 2000s and documents its violent political claims in Nigeria and across the border in Northern Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. Finally, it examines the impact of the international War on Terror and presents a comparative study of other contemporary terrorism movements and their networks.
African independence launched into international politics a group of the world's poorest, weakest, and most artificial states. How have such states managed to survive? To what extent is their survival now threatened? Christopher Clapham shows how an initially supportive international environment has - as a result partly of political and economic mismanagement within African states themselves, partly of global developments over which they had no control - become increasingly threatening to African rulers and the states over which they preside. The author also reveals how international conventions designed to uphold state sovereignty have often been appropriated and subverted by rulers to enhance their domestic control, and how African states have been undermined by guerrilla insurgencies and the use of international relations to serve essentially private ends. He shows how awkward, how ambiguous, how unsatisfactory, and often how tragic, has been the encounter between Africa and Western conceptions of statehood.
The main aim of this book is to argue that the use of private force by states has been restricted by a norm against mercenary use. It traces the evolution of this norm, from mercenaries in medieval Europe through to private security companies in modern day Iraq, telling a story about how the mercenaries of yesterday have evolved into those of today in the process. The norm against mercenaries has two components. First, mercenaries are considered to be immoral because they use force outside legitimate, authoritative control. Second, mercenaries are considered to be morally problematic because they fight wars for selfish, financial reasons as opposed to fighting for some kind of larger conception of the common good. The book examines four puzzles about mercenary use, and argues that they can only be explained by understanding the norm against mercenaries. First, the book argues that moral disapproval of mercenaries led to the disappearance of independent mercenaries from medieval Europe. Second, the transition from armies composed of mercenaries to citizen armies in the 19th century can only be understood with attention to the norm against mercenaries. Third, it is impossible to understand why international law regarding mercenaries, created in the 1970s and 1980s, is so ineffective without understanding the norm. Finally, the disappearance of companies like Executive Outcomes and Sandline and the development of today's private security industry cannot be understood without the norm.
Neoliberalism--the doctrine that market exchange is an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide for all human action--has become dominant in both thought and practice throughout much of the world since 1970 or so. Writing for a wide audience, David Harvey, author of The New Imperialism and The Condition of Postmodernity, here tells the political-economic story of where neoliberalization came from and how it proliferated on the world stage. Through critical engagement with this history, he constructs a framework, not only for analyzing the political and economic dangers that now surround us, but also for assessing the prospects for the more socially just alternatives being advocated by many oppositional movements.
This study contends that an analysis of the nexus between leadership and security offers useful insights into explaining conflict by stating that the conceptualisation of these argots, especially through the definition of leadership as a process, helps to explain and address Nigeria’s security challenges. By arguing that leaders’ ability to establish mutuality with their followers in any situation and set collectively-generated means for attaining these set goals for societal security, the study shows how such a relationship creates a secured state. This is not the case in Nigeria, where leaders’ security decisions are influenced by external actors rather than by their followers. By showing that the Nigerian ruling elite’s security agendas intersect with dominant global notions of security while neglecting genuine security interests of ordinary Nigerians, the study contextualises the complex global and local security interests in Nigeria. The lack of an intersection at home, however, has contributed to the emergence of extremists such as the Boko Haram sect, as well as the escalation of the acts of violence they perpetrate. As national insecurities become complex and intractable, ‘elegant’ or unilinear solutions – such as a military approach – lack the capacity to address these problems.
Confronted with myriad security challenges, African states and the much-vaunted peace and security architecture of the African Union (AU) has proven not to be up to the challenge. Indeed, this is implicitly acknowledged by the AU itself if one considers the creation of such security structures as the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which exists outside its peace and security architecture. This paper argues for a radical rethink of security structures on the African continent – one in which state structures of security coexist with newer forms of security actors, including private military companies (PMCs), community movements and the business sector. Whilst this shift in security actors is already happening on the ground, policymakers need to embrace this new reality.
This article attempts to explain the apparent failure of Nigeria's military action against the Boko Haram (roughly translated as ‘Western education is prohibited’) insurgency in the north-east of the country. Until the involvement of troops from Chad and Niger in January 2015, the Boko Haram insurgents were succeeding in their effort to establish, or rather consolidate, an extreme version of the ‘Islamic state’ in parts of north-east Nigeria. For over five years, the military struggled to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria against Boko Haram, with little success. The war opened a Pandora's box, exposing a deep crisis in the military and the civilian leadership in Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgents were able to fly the flag of their ‘state’ in the territory of Nigeria. This article argues that the failure of the military action can be attributed to three factors: the erosion of military professionalism under civilian administrations since 1999; the poor handling of the war by the top military officers; and a lack of decisiveness in the leadership of President Jonathan and the military to end the insurgency.
Attacks on oil and gas infrastructures by terrorists and criminals in places like Nigeria, Colombia, Iraq and Russia have amplified the vulnerability of critical energy infrastructures (CEIs) to deliberate physical attacks. Being unable or unwilling to protect CEIs, many national governments have made attempts to alleviate these vulnerabilities through outsourcing of security, i.e. contracting the responsibility to protect CEIs out to non-state actors. This article advocates the need to conceptualize security outsourcing in the domain of critical energy infrastructure protection (CEIP) in order to explain a variety of regulatory choices made by governments in this domain. Based on a qualitative analysis of four case studies, the article discusses various types of security outsourcing in the protection of CEIs, including the militarization of national oil companies, public–private partnerships and the involvement of international organizations and local social groups. The typology may serve as a tool of describing, classifying and evaluating various forms of security outsourcing. The findings of the article help to deconstruct the complexity of security outsourcing and capture some of the major contemporary trends in energy security. Keywords Critical energy infrastructure, oil theft, private military and security companies, public–private partnership, security outsourcing
Nigeria cannot defeat Boko Haram by itself; it needs the help of its neighbours. But the regional fight will not be easy.
The African Union is preparing for its enhanced role in the maintenance of peace and security by establishing a Peace and Security Council that is tasked with identifying threats and breaches of the peace. To this end, the AU has recommended the development of a common security policy and, by 2010, the establishment of an African Standby Force capable of rapid deployment to keep, or enforce, the peace. The ASF would comprise of standby brigades in each of the five regions, and incorporate a police and civilian expert capacity. G8 leaders have pledged support for the AU proposal through funding, training, and enhanced co-ordination of activities. For its part, the AU will need to undertake a realistic assessment of member capabilities, to clearly articulate its needs, and to set realistic and achievable goals. The latest plan for establishing a rapidly deployable African peacekeeping force will require something that similar proposals have lacked: the political will to fund and implement a long list of recommendations. Success will ultimately be judged by the AU's future responses to situations of armed conflict. Even if such responses are largely symbolic in the short term, a sufficient display of political will among African leaders could inspire the confidence needed to galvanise international support.
Mercenaries are back in business, but they have a new look. Nowadays, your average soldier of fortune wears a suit and tie and works out of corporate offices in Great Britain or South Africa. Are "private military companies" murderous profiteers, or do they represent the future of peacekeeping?
UN peacekeeping continues to confront qualitative and quantitative difficulties. Arguments in favour of using private military and security companies (PMSCs), particularly those referring to the 1990s-era when Executive Outcomes was operating, have been aired. The article examines earlier operational arguments for PMSC participation in UN peacekeeping, which at times have been reintroduced in more recent assertions: (1) PMSCs have better organization, training, and equipment; (2) they have a heightened willingness to apply force to serve UN mandates; and (3) they enjoy enhanced readiness to respond. The article argues, however, that it would be difficult for contemporary PMSCs to respond effectively, quickly, and robustly should the UN turn to them for enforcement operations. State and market pressures have conditioned PMSCs to operate in a manner dissimilar to that in the 1990s.
The emergence of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, and its transformation into a terrorist organisation has dominated recent discourse in the fields of political science and security studies, both within and without the socio-politico enclave known as Nigeria. Much of the discussion has centred on the extra-judicial execution of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, which purportedly intensified the radicalisation of the group, and whether or not the sect receives operational and/or financial support from foreign terrorist associations. The interest of others has been to forecast the possibility of the internationalisation of the group's activities. This paper aligns with those whose interest is to identify and proffer ways of resolving factors that predisposed the Nigerian state to the levels of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, with a view to averting much greater crises in the future. It adopts some historicism in demonstrating that the responsibility for the deepening insecurity in the country resides in the Nigerian state structure, which has often been seen as willing to sacrifice the well-being of the many for the benefit of a few. On the whole, the paper utilises state fragility as the framework of analysis by identifying the incapacity of the state in effective service delivery, which has as a result created a situation of mass unemployment and extreme poverty that has fanned the Boko Haram uprising. It concludes that a sustainable solution to the crisis lies in addressing the root causes of inequality, unemployment and poverty, with which most Nigerians, particularly in the north, subsist.
mpirical data1 and theoretical reflections on the evolution of warfare 2 suggest that the outbreak of large-scale interstate wars are unlikely in the future. The sudden demise of the Cold War - clearly an interstate configuration - has reinforced this trend and provoked a widespread downsizing of military postures. The end of modern interstate wars has not only resulted in military downsizing, but also in the development of forms of military proliferation beyond the geographical area of the battlefield. One of the most important examples of this proliferation is the current growth in the private security industry. In order to contextualise this development, certain trends which occurred before, during and after the Cold War need to be highlighted. Historical context Military downsizing is not a 20th century phenomenon and has mostly been associated with the end of a war. As such, the Napoleonic wars saw the transfer of military personnel of losing parties to other theatres. Hundreds of aristocratic Polish officers who had placed their hopes on Napoleon to resurrect the Polish state, ended up fighting a slave rebellion in Haiti on behalf of France. The demise of Napoleon further marked the first large demobilisations in modern times. The new order designed by the Congress of Vienna reduced the demand for the military profession in Europe. Not surprisingly, the military histories of the newly independent Latin American states reflect a corresponding influx of military officers from Europe who sought and found employment in the New World.3 The failed revolutions of 1848 and the subsequent repression led to the emigration of democratically-oriented military personnel, many of whom ended up in the US fighting in the Civil War. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 pushed the defeated French into concentrating their military efforts on the conquest of what became the French colonial empire. It was only after the two World Wars, however, that the full proliferation of military expertise, personnel, and hardware became evident in the aftermath of a conflict. As the losing party in both wars, Germany became a major source of legal and illegal, governmental and private proliferation. Most of Germany's military hardware was confiscated and either destroyed or distributed as reparation among the members of the extensive winning alliance. After World War I, strict limitations were imposed upon force strengths and equipment, which resulted in large-scale demobilisations, including that of an outsized officer corps. After World War II, Germany was totally demilitarised, a policy that was only reversed after the Korean War gave rise to the intensification of the Cold War.
Executive Outcomes is an army for hire. A sophisticated force, the ‘company’ will not work for rebel movements but contracts with ‘democratic’ governments. ‘Executive Outcomes is the small wave of the future in terms of defence and security, because the international community has abdicated that role’ (Barlow, 1997). Rather than being seen as mercenaries, they prefer the label of ‘corporate troubleshooters’, a niche which incorporates a huge unmet demand for security in Africa.
In light of the need for humanitarian organizations to have adequate security for their operations, private security companies are now filling the void left by state forces. Little analysis, however, has been made of the impact of private security companies on the delivery of post‐Cold War humanitarian assistance. To make this analysis, the article considers the changes in humanitarian activity, the relevant services offered by private security providers, the differing issues relating to legitimacy factors and financial and political implications, and the state of the mechanisms capable of bringing about positive change in the relationship between private security companies and humanitarian organizations. In the main, the article asserts that reliance on the private security option as currently endowed, organized, and managed, while pragmatic and not without its benefits, is a highly problematic solution for humanitarians.
The states of the ‘South’, although diverse, tend to be underdeveloped in the political sense: neither authoritative and effective nor legitimate and accountable to citizens. The conventional response of aid donors is institutional transfer : trying to align the institutional configurations of Southern states even more closely with those of Northern polities. This may not be the best approach. The political underdevelopment of much of the South largely results from the ways in which Southern states have been created and political authority shaped through economic and political interactions with the wealthier countries of the North. Political underdevelopment is an outcome of uneven (economic) development. A better appreciation of the nature of these processes could lead to more appropriate policy. History cannot be reversed. But more attention could be paid to the ways in which Northern states currently help sustain political underdevelopment in the South, notably by perpetuating the conditions under which state elites in the South can remain too independent of their own citizens.
This article critically examines the privatisation of security in the West African state of Sierra Leone. The focus on Sierra Leone brings to the fore the post-Cold War debate about the strategic impact of private military or mercenary companies in intra-state conflicts in Africa. It also raises the crucial issue of the link between low-intensity conflicts and strategic minerals and how neo-liberal globalisation forces have provided market opportunity for mercenary companies to fill the security vacuum created by collapsed states in Africa.
Private security firms are growing in influence throughout Africa and other regions of the world; generally composed of former special forces personnel from Western or Southern African countries, they increasingly include strong capabilities in combat firepower and support. While most often they are involved in the re‐training and re‐equipping of national armies in these countries, they have also been involved in combat operations to secure and stabilize strategic mineral or oil‐producing regions from rebel movements, or have assisted rebel movements in overthrowing the national government in order to ensure a better deal for the mining and oil firms with which they cooperate. The increasing activity of these private military‐advisory groups in regional security has raised the issue of whether such firms could replace the role of the international community in regional peacekeeping operations, or whether they are evocative of the continuing evolution of the mercenary.
The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title.
The end of the Cold War has had contradictory effects on African
security. Southern Africa and Ethiopia clearly benefitted from the end
of superpower rivalry, whereas central and western Africa have seen an
upswing of violence during the 1990s. The withdrawal of foreign
patronage, the post-Somalia reluctance of the West and the UN to
intervene militarily, heightened external demands for economic and
political reform, and the changing nature of African insurgencies, have
placed additional pressure on already weak governments. Many
African states have only weak militaries to defend their security, the
collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko's Armed Forces of Zaïre providing
the
most recent example.