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FromBabeltoBrussels
EuropeanIntegrationandtheImportanceof
TransnationalLinguisticCapital
JürgenGerhards
Author
JürgenGerhardsisprofessorofsociologyat the Freie UniversitätBerlin.His
main fields of interest are: comparative cultural sociology, European
integration, sociology of the public sphere. His most importantbook
publications include CulturalOverstretch?DifferencesBetweenOldandNew
MemberStatesoftheEUandTurkey (Routledge 2007); TheNameGame.
CulturalModernizationandFirstNames (Transaction Publishers 2005) and
ShapingAbortionDiscourse:DemocracyandthePublicSphereinGermanyand
theUnitedStates (Cambridge University Press 2003, together with Myra
MarxFerree,WilliamGamson,andDieterRucht).Hismostimportantarticles
includeEuropeanIntegration,EqualityRightsandPeople'sBeliefs(European
SociologicalReview2012, withHolgerLengfeld); WhynotTurkey?Attitudes
towardsTurkishMembershipintheEUamongCitizensin27European
countries (Journal of Common Market Studies 2011, with Silke Hans); Non
DiscriminationTowardsHomosexuality(InternationalSociology2010);From
HasantoHerbert:NameGivingPatternsofImmigrantParentsbetween
AcculturationandEthnicMaintenance(AmericanJournalofSociology2009,
with Silke Hans); FormsofCapitalandSocialStructureinCulturalFields:
ExaminingBourdieu'sSocialTopology(AmericanJournalofSociology1995,
with Helmut K. Anheier, and Frank P. Romo) as well as Mesomobilization.
OrganizingandFraminginTwoProtestCampaignsinWestGermany
(AmericanJournalofSociology1992,withDieterRucht).
Translation:ThemanuscriptwastranslatedfromGermanintoEnglishby
MaureenMetzger.
Layout&FinalEditing:IngaGanzer
FrontPicture:“TowerofBabel”(1563)byPieterBruegeltheElder
Citation: Gerhards, Jürgen (2012): From Babel to Brussels. European
Integration and the Importance of Transnational Linguistic Capital. Berlin
Studieson theSociology ofEurope (BSSE). No.28. Berlin:Freie Universität
Berlin.
Contact:JürgenGerhards,InstituteofSociology,FreeUniversityofBerlin,
Garystraße55,14195Berlin,j.gerhards@fu‐berlin.de.
FromBabeltoBrussels.EuropeanIntegrationandtheImportanceof
TransnationalLinguisticCapital
Summary
Globalisation and the political process of European integrationopenedthe
European Union member states to one another. As different EU member
stateshavedifferentlanguages,participationinglobalisationandtheprocess
of European integration is dependent on Europeans’ ability to speak the
languagesofothers.Thosewhospeakmultiplelanguagescanmore easily
come into contact with citizens of other countries, conduct business and
diplomacy, cooperate academically, organise protests across national
boundaries, or enter into romantic relations with them. In short, they can
socialise transnationally in a number of different dimensions. Those who
onlyspeaktheirnativelanguageare,incontrast,tiedto theirhomecountry
and can only take slight advantage of the perks of a united Europe and a
globalised world. Possessing transnational linguistic capital is a deciding
factorinwhetherornotsomeonecanparticipateinanemergingEuropean
society;it becomes a newmeasure of social inequality, a resource that can
eitherleadtosocietalinclusionorexclusion.
Thequestion central toour study is towhat degree citizensinthetwenty‐
sevenEUmemberstatespossesstransnationallinguisticcapitalandhowto
explain the differences in multilingualism both between and within the
memberstates.Wepresentageneralexplanatorymodelforforeignlanguage
proficiency, create hypotheses from this model and test them empirically.
Drawingonasurveyconductedintwenty‐sevenEuropeancountriesitcanbe
shownthatthepeoples’abilitytospeakdifferentlanguagescanbeverywell
predictedwiththehelpofthedifferentexplanatoryfactors.We find that
countrysize,theprevalenceofarespondent’snativelanguage,thelinguistic
differencebetweenone’smothertongueandtheforeignlanguage, and age
affectlanguageacquisitionnegatively,whereasacountry’slevelofeducation
hasapositiveinfluence.UsingBourdieu’stheoryofsocialclass,weshowthat
besides other factors a respondent’s social class position and the level of
educationareimportantmicro‐level factorsthathelp to increaseaperson’s
transnationallinguisticcapital.
Onemustputtheseresultsinthecontextofthestateoftheart.Theanalysis
ofmultilingualismisamajortopicinlinguistics,psychology,andeducation.
Thesocietalconditionsinwhichlanguagelearnersareembeddedarehardly
takenintoaccountinthesestudies.Thiswouldnotbeworthdiscussingany
furtherifsociologywasnotrelevanttomultilingualism;butthe contrary
seemsto be true. Our analysisshows that the neglected societal conditions
are actually of central importance in determining transnational linguistic
capital.
CONTENTS
Foreword:Whythisbookispublishedinopenaccess?.............................................. 6
Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................... 9
1.Settingthestage....................................................................................................................10
2.ConceptualFramework......................................................................................................21
2.1.WhatisLanguage?.......................................................................................................22
2.2LanguageProficiencyasHumanCapital.............................................................26
2.3TransnationalLinguisticCapitalanditsGrowingImportance.................47
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety................................................................53
3.1NationBuilding,andLanguageStandardisation,WorldSociety
andtheRiseofEnglishasaHegemoniclinguafranca .........................................54
3.2EuropeanisationandGlobalisationofNationStateSocieties
inEurope..................................................................................................................................78
3.3EuropeanUnion’sLanguagePolicy.......................................................................97
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital.........................................121
4.1WhoSpeaksHowManyLanguages?..................................................................122
4.2ExplainingDifferencesinTransnationalLinguisticCapital ....................133
4.3OutlookonHowtheCitizens’MultilingualismwillDevelop...................176
5.AnArgumentforanewLanguagePolicyintheEuropeanUnion ................182
AppendixA:TherelationshipbetweenLanguageandCulture ......................... 196
AppendixB:DescriptionofVariables............................................................................ 203
References.................................................................................................................................206
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
6
Foreword:WhythisBookisPublishedinOpenAccess?
ThisbookisanEnglishtranslationoftheGermanwork“Mehrsprachigkeitim
vereintenEuropa. Transnationales sprachliches Kapital als Ressource in ei‐
nerglobalisiertenWelt”(Multilingualismin Europe. Transnationallinguistic
capitalasaresourceinaglobalisedworld),publishedin2010bytheVerlag
für Sozialwissenschaften. Literature that has appeared since 2010hasnot
been systematically considered for this translation. This omission includes
the2011workbyPhilippevanParijs‚“LinguisticJusticeforEuropeandthe
World”.
The English version will not be published by a publishing house, but will
insteadbemadeavailableasanopenaccesspublication.Itisthefirstofmy
books to be published this way. While the number of open accessjournals
has grown significantly, the publication of open access books has not
followedthesamepattern.Inthisrespect,thepublicationof“FromBabelto
Brussels”isaninterestingpersonalexperiment.
Ihavebeenmotivatedtopursuethismodeofpublicationforthefollowing
reasons.Firstly,a bookpublishedby a socialsciencespublishing housewill
cost,inpaperback,around€25‐30,whiletheopenaccessversionisavailable
toreadersforfree.Itisself‐evidentthatreaderswouldratherreadabookfor
free than pay for it. The internet also makes it possible for anyone with a
computer to access the book instantly, meaning not only that the book is
available at no cost, but also that there is also no waiting period before a
readerisabletoreadthetext.Librariesgenerallyonlyhaveone available
copyofagivenbook.Ifthiscopyisloanedout,potentialreadersmustwait
until the book is returned. Open access availability means thatmany
potentialcustomershaveaccesstothebooksimultaneously.
Secondly,mostauthorsofscientificbooksdonotearnanyincomefrom the
publicationofabookbyapublishinghouse.Thismeansthatauthorsdonot
makeanysignificantfinanciallosswiththeopenaccesspublicationof their
work.Financial incentivesare, moreover,not the main reasonwhy authors
Foreword:WhythisBookisPublishedinOpenAccess?
7
fromacademiawritescholarlybooks.Theywanttheirworktobereadby
others,andespeciallytoinfluencetheirpeers,aninfluencethatismanifested
incitations ofthe published work.Since the potential reach ofopen access
booksavailableontheinternetismuchgreaterthanthereachoftraditionally
publishedbooks,authorshaveaninterestinopenaccesspublication.
Thirdly, publishers are not only sellers who mediate between authors and
potentialreaders,theyalsoperformacheckingandcorrectingfunction,
selectingworks from alist ofsubmittedmanuscripts, commentingon those
manuscriptsandmakingsuggestionsforimprovement(allowingthe author
to revise and improve the text), typesetting the books and creating an
attractive layout. It is my impression, however, that publishers are paying
lessandlessattentiontothesetasks.Goodeditingof texts is largelyabsent,
andauthorsareincreasinglyexpectedtoedittheirownbookmanuscriptsso
thatpublishershaveverylittleworktodo.Thiswillmakeitincreasinglyless
attractiveforauthorstopublishtheirbooksthroughpublishinghouses.
The above arguments imply that open access publication is a win‐win
situationforbothauthorsandreaders.Notwithstanding,therearesignificant
advantagesinpublishingbooksthroughapublishinghouse.Inparticular,the
well‐known English language scientific publishers have established strong
reputations and have accrued a large amount of symbolic capitalinthe
academicfield,and this capitalistransferred tothebooksand especiallyto
theauthorswhopublishwiththesepublishers.Bookswhicharepublishedby
renowned publishers are regarded as important and significant simply by
virtueofthefactthattheyarepublishedbytheserenownedpublishers.For
the potential reader, the publishers, in this way, provide guidance. They
dividethelistofpublishedbooksintoimportantandunimportantworks,and
playaroleinstructuringthescientificfieldhierarchically.Thisincreasesthe
likelihoodthatbookswhicharedeignedtobeimportantwillberead.While
therateofhorizontaldiffusionofopenaccessbooksiscertainlymuchlarger
thanthatofbookswhicharedistributedbypublishers,verygoodpublishers
aremore influentialin the verticaland hierarchicalstructuring ofscientific
fields than the democratic market of open access publication. Whether
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
8
publishingviaopenaccesscanoffsettheadvantagesofpublishinghousesis
difficulttosay.IamcurioustofindoutwhetherIhavemadethe right
decisionbypublishingthisbookinopenaccess.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
9
Acknowledgements
Severalpeopleandinstitutionshavecontributedsignificantlytothesuccess
ofthisstudy.Helpfulcommentsonindividualchaptersandhintstorelevant
referenceswere provided by the following (in alphabetical order): Peter A.
Berger,JuanDíezMedrano,ClaudiaFinger,DavidGlowsky,MonikaHufnagel,
HartmutKaelble,JulianeKlein,HubertKnoblauch,StanleyLieberson,Richard
Münch,SebastianNix,ThomasRisse,JörgRössel,JochenRoose,Mike S.
Schäfer,Jürgen Trabant andGeorg Vobruba. MikeS. Schäfer alsosuggested
thetitleforthebook.
SpecialthanksshouldgotoMaureenMetzger,SilkeHans,IngaGanzer and
PaulDiMaggio.MaureenMetzgerdidaterrificjobintranslatingmostpartsof
theGermanmanuscriptintoEnglishandinsmoothingouttheoverlycomplex
Germansentences.SilkeHansactivelysupportedmeintheempiricalanalysis
andcommentedin greatdetailonthecoreempiricalchapter.IngaGanzeris
responsibleforlayoutandfinalediting.PaulDiMaggioreadthe entire
manuscriptverythoroughlyandmademanyexcellentsuggestionsfor
improvements, even though I was not able to implement all of his
suggestions.
The research cluster “Languages ofEmotion”,fundedbytheDeutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation), granted mea
sabbaticaltoundertakethework.Aninvitationtothe“CenterforEuropean
Studies”atHarvardUniversity,whichprovedtobeanexcellentworking
environment,gavemetheopportunitytobringthesereflections to fruition
onpaperinarelativelyshorttime.Andaninvitationtothe
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (Social Science Research
CenterBerlin)gavemetheopportunitytoworkontheEnglishtranslationof
theGermanmanuscript.
Berlin,September2012
10
1.SETTINGTHESTAGE
Theworldtodayischaracterisedbyamultitudeofdifferentlanguagesandis
oftendepictedasaBabylonianconfusionoftongues,becauseitprevents
people from understanding those who speak a different language.This
attribution connects today’s multilingual world order back to theTowerof
Babel,oneoftheoldestmythsdescribinglinguisticdiversity.Themostwell‐
knownversionisfoundinanOldTestamentpassageinGenesis11:1‐9:
Nowthewholeworldhadonelanguageandacommonspeech.Asmen
movedeastward,theyfoundaplaininShinarandsettledthere.They
saidtoeachother,‘Come,let'smakebricksandbakethemthoroughly.’
Theyusedbrickinsteadofstone,andtarformortar.Thentheysaid,
‘Come,letusbuildourselvesacity,withatowerthatreachestothe
heavens,sothatwemaymakeanameforourselvesandnotbescattered
overthefaceofthewholeearth.’
ButtheLORDcamedowntoseethecityandthetowerthatthemen
werebuilding.TheLORDsaid,‘Ifasonepeoplespeakingthesame
languagetheyhavebeguntodothis,thennothingtheyplantodowillbe
impossibleforthem.Come,letusgodownandconfusetheirlanguageso
theywillnotunderstandeachother.’SotheLORDscatteredthemfrom
thereoveralltheearth,andtheystoppedbuildingthecity.Thatiswhyit
wascalledBabel–becausetheretheLORDconfusedthelanguageofthe
wholeworld.FromtheretheLORDscatteredthemoverthefaceofthe
wholeearth.
1.SettingtheStage
11
The Tower of Babel is but one of a number of tragic stories in the Old
Testament,suchastheexpulsionfromtheGardenofEden,fratricide,orthe
GreatFlood; thecause ofthese tragedies,however man’sstriving forGodly
power,issimilaracrossallstories.
TheTowerofBabelstorycontainsseveralinteresting sociological theorems
applicableto today’s linguisticconstellation. People whosettled in Babylon
wereacommunity,partiallysobecausetheyspokeacommontongue. The
importanceoflanguageintheprocessofidentityformationisunderlinedby
the consequences of God’s punishment: After their dispersal, the settlers
began to speak many languages; from one united people came many, and
eachspokeadifferentlanguage.Whereasacommonlanguageunifies and
strengthens communal identity, multiple languages divide and lead to a
segmentedstructureofdifferentcommunities.
Inadditiontolanguage’sidentity and community building function, it also
hasasocietybuildingfunction.Buildingacityandatowerthatreaches up
intotheheavensisonlypossiblepreciselybecausethepeoplespeakthesame
language.Theircommunallanguageallowsthem tocoordinatetheiractions
because they understand each other. Consequently, their plan for a large‐
scalesocietalprojectfailswhenGodtakesawaytheircapabilitytocoordinate
theiractionsbytakingawaytheirmeansofcommunication.Andindeed,one
canhardlyimaginehowalargeconstructionproject,suchascreating an
entiresociety,couldsucceedifthepeopleinvolvedcouldnotcommunicate
withoneanother.
OneofthethemesintheTowerofBabelstoryisthenaboutthesociologyof
language which reappears and is even further developed in the New
TestamentPentecostalstory.AfterthecrucifixionofJesusandfiftydaysafter
hisresurrectionatEaster,Jesus’followersaregatheredinJerusalemforthe
harvestfestival ofShavuot whenthe Holy Ghostdescends upon them,as is
told:
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
12
WhenthedayofPentecostcame,theywerealltogetherinoneplace.
Suddenlyasoundliketheblowingofaviolentwindcamefromheaven
andfilledthewholehousewheretheyweresitting.Theysawwhat
seemedtobetonguesoffirethatseparatedandcametorestoneachof
them.AllofthemwerefilledwiththeHolySpiritandbegantospeakin
othertonguesastheSpiritenabledthem.(Acts2:14)
ThemiracleofPentecostdoesnotundotheBabylonianconfusionoftongues;
peoplethusarestillspeakingdifferentlanguagesandarestill split into
different linguistic communities scattered across the Earth. Now it is the
followersofJesus whoaremultilingual andwho possess whatwewill later
calltransnationallinguisticcapital,meaningtheabilitytocommunicatewith
otherpeople in theirspecific native language.Because of thisability, Jesus’
followers were able to spread the word of God to different communities
aroundtheworld.Pentecostisthereforealsorightlycalledthe birthday of
theChurchasanorganisation,oneoftheearliestgloballyacting‘companies’.
TheabilityoftheLord’sfollowerstospeakforeignlanguagesallowedthemto
create a globalised society and to counteract its previously fractured and
scatteredstructure.
Eventhoughthepresentisveryfarremovedfrombiblicaltimes,wefindthe
sametension–thetensionbetweentheOldandtheNewTestamentsstories,
betweenaconfusionoftonguesandtheopportunitytocreateasocietythat
crosseslinguisticborders–whichformsthebasisofourpresentstudy.Our
analysisfocusesondevelopmentalprocessesthatbeganinthesecondhalfof
thetwentiethcentury.Politicalscientistsrefertoourcurrentworldorderas
oneof‘Westphaliansovereignty’,datingbacktothePeaceofWestphalia in
1648whichcreatednationstatesandestablishedinternalEuropeanborders.
The modern Westphalian political order consists of multiple internally as
wellasexternallysovereignstates,“containers”thatcoexistnext to one
another (Taylor 1994; Beck 1997). The Westphalian order has also
structuredtheinstitutionalisedlinguisticorderinsofarasmostnationstates
haveadifferentofficiallanguage;asarulenationalboundariesareatthe
1.SettingtheStage
13
same time language boundaries. Linguistic heterogeneity within a specific
country is rare whereas linguistic heterogeneity between nation states is
high as different countries usually speak different languages. This
constellationresemblesthepost‐Babylonianworldofpeoplescatteredacross
theEarth.Manypeopleinthisworldcannotunderstandeachotherbecause
theyliveintheirnational“container”andonlyspeaktheofficiallanguageof
theirhomecountry.
Withtheonsetofglobalisationtheconstellationbegantochange in a
fundamentalwayatthebeginningofthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.
Theextent,frequency,andspeedofexchangebetweendifferentnationstates
and different world regions haveincreasedenormouslyoverthelast sixty
years.Globalisationhasprofundlychangedsocieties,bothsoftening
international borders and creating more opportunities for economic,
communicational, cultural, and political exchange. Europe witnessed
fundamentalchangesandisthereforethefocusofourstudy.The political
process of European integration opened the twenty‐seven European Union
memberstatestooneanotherthroughthecreationofasingleEuropean
marketandthroughfreedomofmovementforgoods,services,workers,and
financialcapital.Thecreationofacommonmarkethasadvanced cross‐
boundary economic processes and promoted inter‐European trade, value‐
addedchains,andtransnationalisationoffinancialcapital.
BothglobalisationandEuropeanisationofformerlyisolatednation state
“containers”open newopportunities for theEuropean people.Yet, because
different EU member states have different languages, participation in
globalisation and Europeanisation is dependent on Europeans’ ability to
speak the languages of others. Possessing transnational linguistic capital is
therefore a deciding factor in whether or not someone can participate in
thesetransnationalprocesses.Thosewho,likethefollowersof Jesus,speak
multiplelanguagescan moreeasilycome into contactwithcitizens ofother
countries and also interact, convert, conduct business and diplomacy,
cooperate academically, organise protests across national boundaries, or
enter into romantic relations with them. In short, they can socialise
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
14
transnationallyin anumber ofdifferent dimensions.Those Europeanswith
transnational linguistic capital, meaning that they are multilingual, are
thereforeinthepositiontobuildtransnationalrelationshipsandtotakepart
inEuropeanisationprocesses.Thosewhoonlyspeaktheirnativetongueare,
incontrast,tiedtotheirhomecountryandcanonlytakeslightadvantageof
the benefits of a united Europe and a globalised world. Transnational
linguisticcapitalthereforebecomesanewmeasureofsocialinequality in
today’sincreasingly globalisedandEuropeansocietyandisaresource that
caneitherleadtosocietalinclusionorexclusion.
Inadditiontotheconsequencesofmono‐andmultilingualismonthe
individuallevel,therearealsocollectiveconsequences.Societiesthatsharea
commonlanguageusuallyhavemorevibranttradewithoneanotherthando
nation states that speak different languages, as the transaction costs are
muchhigher inthelatter case.Therefore,a multilingualEuropeancitizenry
wouldcertainlyincreasetheoveralleconomicgrowthinEurope.The
allocation of resources within the European market would also improve
markedly were its participants multilingual. Insufficient foreign language
proficiencyisoneofthemostimportantreasonsfortheratherlowlevelsof
geographic inter‐EU mobility. An increase in such mobility, furthered by
multilingualism,wouldleadtoabetterbalanceofsupplyanddemandwithin
theEUandwouldhaveapositiveeffectoneconomicgrowthbothin
countrieswithbothlabourshortageandsurpluses.Inaddition,anincreaseof
inter‐EU mobility would lead to a better match between the skills of
employees’and open job positionswith particular qualifications offered by
employers(seeForschungsinstitutzurZukunftderArbeit2008).
Theemergence ofa Europeanpublic spherewould also profit from a more
multilingual citizenry (see Gerhards 1993, 2000). Political decisions are
increasinglybeingmadebyEUinstitutions,ratherthanbynational
governments,butthemediaremainfocusedonthenationallevel.TheFrench
people still inform themselves about happenings in France in the French
language,theGermansreadaboutwhatisgoingoninBerlininGerman,etc.
The consequence is that citizens are not well‐informed about EU‐level
1.SettingtheStage
15
decisions.OneofthemostimportantreasonsforthislackofaEuropean
publicsphereisduetothelanguageconstellation.CreatingaEuropeanpublic
sphere and getting citizens to participate in the project of European
integrationwouldbemucheasierifitspeoplecouldunderstandoneanother.
Since multilingualism has both individual and collective benefits, we are
curiousto see the degree to whichEuropeans speak foreign languages and
canthusreapthesebenefits.Wedonotassumethattransnationallinguistic
capitalisliketheHolyGhostvisitingJesus’followersonPentecost;rather,we
assumethatmultilingualismhas societalcauses.Thequestioncentraltoour
study is to what degree citizens in the twenty‐seven EU member states
possesstransnationallinguisticcapitalandhowtoexplainthedifferencesin
multilingualismbothbetweenandwithinthememberstates.Insodoing,we
differentiate between two types of transnational linguistic capital: the
numberoflanguagesapersonspeaks,regardlessofwhichlanguages those
are,andalsotheabilitytospeakEnglishwhichisthelanguage with the
highestcommunicativeuseintheEU.Beforeanswering thesequestions,we
mustconsidersomeconceptualaspectsoftherelationshipbetweenlanguage
and society; additionally, we will analyse the societal conditions at the
macro‐level that necessitate multilingualism. Finally, we will consider the
normativequestionofwhatkindofEUlanguagepolicywouldbebothsound
andjust.
Ourargumentfollowsassuch:Thesecondchapterdevelopsatheoretical
frame for the subsequent empiricalanalysis.Inthischapter,we briefly
describehowweunderstandlanguageingeneralandbywhich
characteristicsdifferentlanguages are defined.We then discussthe societal
functions of language and differentiate between community building and
societybuildingfunctions:acommonlanguagenotonlyenablesmorehighly
concentratedinteractions,butcanalsoservetobuildcommunity and
collective identity. This dual function also applies to multilingualism. I will
explain our understanding of transnational linguistic capital in more detail
usingPierreBourdieu’stheory.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
16
The third chapter is an analysis of the institutionalised language system in
Europe.Describingbasicsocietalconditionshelpsustounderstand why
transnational linguistic capital came to be such an important resource for
participating in the process of European integration. Three factors are
importanthere:(a) Incontrastto theUSA,there isnocommon languagein
the United States of Europe, but rather twenty‐three different official
languages.Linguistic heterogeneitywithin aparticular countryisveryrare,
becausemostmemberstatesonlyhaveoneofficiallanguage.Incontrast,
linguistic heterogeneity between states is very high, because there are
twenty‐three different languages among twenty‐seven states. Thethird
chaptercontainsamoredetaileddescriptionandexplanationofhowthis
linguisticsegmentationalongnationalboundariesdevelopedinthe 19thand
20thcenturies. The consequencesof this historicallyestablished system are
thatmultilingualismisanecessarypreconditionforeverytransnationaland
Europeanactivity,asthepeopleineachEuropeancountryspeakadifferent
language. (b) Multilingualism is not a meaningful resource in isolated
societieswithlittlecontacttotheoutsideworld,becausetheskillcannotbe
used very often. By increasing exchanges between different European
countries,globalisationandEuropeanisationhavechangedtheimportanceof
multilingualism radically. We differentiate several dimensions of
Europeanisation and globalisation, using several data sources to describe
theirdevelopment.ThefindingsshowthatEuropeansocietieshavenotonly
become more strongly interlinked, but also the degree of worldwide
interdependence has increased sharply due to globalisation. This
interdependent world presents citizenswithnewdemands,butalso with
newpossibilitiesthattheycannottakeadvantageofunlesstheylearnforeign
languages.(c)Thecreationofnationstatesshowsushowformerlylinguistic
heterogeneousentitiesbecamehomogenisedthroughpoliticalprocesses.Itis
thereforeimportanttotake acloserlook at theEU’slanguage policy,which
wedointhethirdsectionofthischapter.Incontrasttonationstates’policy,
EU’s language policy supports linguistic diversity of its members and
supportsswellastheexistingminoritylanguages.Hence,Europe’slinguistic
1.SettingtheStage
17
heterogeneity will not change in the short‐term due to the EU’s language
policy. This is another reason why multilingualism is a deciding factor for
participationinEuropeanisation.
Thefourthchaptercomprisestheempiricalcoreofthisstudy:Usingasurvey
conducted in the twenty‐seven EU member states, we analyse the
respondents’proficienciesinforeignlanguages.Untilnow,onlyNeilFligstein
(2008)inhis pathbreakingstudy“Euroclash” hasstartedto analyseforeign
language proficiency of European citizens. We go beyond Fligstein’s study
insofar as (a) we present a more general explanatory model, which(b)in
additiontoindividualcharacteristicsalsotakesmacrocontextsintoaccount
and(c)extendsthenumberofcountrieswhichareanalysed.Theempirical
resultsof ouranalysis showsthat multilingualismamong EU citizens is not
veryfaralong:MorethanhalfofEUcitizensdonotspeakaforeignlanguage
andtheir chances toparticipate inEuropeanisation processes aretherefore
onlylimited.However,theresultsalsoshowthatforeignlanguage
proficiencyvariesdramaticallybothbetweenandwithincountries:Whereas
overninety percent of people in the Netherlandsspeak a foreign language,
onlythirtypercentofHungariansdoso.
Noteveryforeignlanguageopensupthesamenumberofcommunicational
doors:Themorepeoplepotentialstudentsofalanguagecanreach by
learning that language, the higherthereturnsontheirlinguistic capital.
Therefore,knowledgeofaprevalentandwidelyspokenforeignlanguageisa
moreimportantresourcethanisknowledgeofalanguageonlyspokenbya
few.Wetherefore measuredthe numberof respondents whoare proficient
inEurope’smost‐widelyspokenlanguagewhichisEnglish:Almosthalfofthe
EuropeansspeakEnglish,buttherearealsovastlydifferentlevelsofEnglish
proficiencybetweenandwithincountries.InBulgaria,forinstance,84.6%of
thepopulationdoesnotspeakEnglish;intheNetherlands,thisnumberdrops
toonly12.4%.
The second part of chapter four looks into the question of why people in
certain EU member states possess high levels of transnational linguistic
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
18
capital and are able to speak English and why this is not the case in other
countries.Wefirstpresentageneralexplanatorymodelforforeignlanguage
proficiency which goes beyond Fligstein’s (2008) attempt to explain
multilingualism: Opportunities for learning a foreign language,thecosts
associatedwithsuchlearning,andthemotivationtoacquireanewlanguage
arethe three central elements weuse toexplain foreign language learning.
The societal conditions in which people are embedded affect these three
dimensionsandoftendeterminewhohasaccesstoacquiretransnational
linguisticcapitalandwhodoesnot.Wederivehypothesesfromthis
explanatorymodelandsubsequentlytestthem empirically.Wefind thatthe
sizeofacountryandtheprevalenceofarespondent’snativelanguageaffect
themotivationandthenecessityoflearningaforeignlanguagenegatively.A
country’s level of modernisation, especially its development ofthe
educationalsystem,hasapositiveinfluenceonforeignlanguageproficiency.
UsingBourdieu’stheoryonsocialclass,wealsoshowthatarespondent’s
socio‐economicclasspositionandthelevelofeducationareimportantmicro‐
levelfactorsthat helptoincrease aperson’stransnational linguisticcapital.
We also look into the effect of the respondents’ age, immigrant status, and
possible emotional connection to their native language. Overall, the results
showthatmanyfactorsthatinfluencesocialinequalitybetweenandwithin
countriesarethesamefactorsthatinfluencetransnationallinguisticcapital.
OnlycertaingroupsofcitizensoftheEuropeanmemberstates,
predominantlythosewhoarealreadyprivilegedthroughclass,educationor
otherwise,willbeabletoprofitfromEuropeanisation,astheyhaveoneofthe
central resources at their disposal: transnational linguistic capital. The
Europeanprojectis,inadditiontoallofitsothergoals,alsoaproject about
socio‐economicclass.
Our empirical results must also be interpreted within the context of other
academicdisciplines;languageandmultilingualismaremajortopics in
linguistics, psychology, and education, and publications on bi‐and
multilingualismfillentirelibraries(seeforexampleoverviewsbyWei2000;
Bialystok2001;Bhatia&Ritchie2006;Auer&Wei2007).Thesepublications
1.SettingtheStage
19
are dominated, however, by ever‐smaller questions about multilingualism
and evermore elaborate methodology. For example, researchers can show
which neurological processes accompany second language learning, which
cognitiveconditionsmustbeinplacebeforeonecanstarttoacquiremultiple
languages and can prove the influence of multilingualism on cognitive
development. There are studies that attempt to decipher the ageatwhich
childrencanmostquicklylearnasecondlanguage,whichlanguageprograms
producethebestresults,etc.Thesocietalconditionsinwhichtheselanguage
learnersareembeddedarehardlytakenintoaccountatall.Andsociologists
haveby and large withdrawnfrom researching languageand analysing the
conditionsofmultilingualism.
Thiswouldnotbeworthdiscussinganyfurtherifsociologywasnotrelevant
to language research and multilingualism; but the contrary is true. Our
analysisshowsthattheseneglectedsocietalconditionsareactuallyofcentral
importance in determining multilingualism. Determining whether someone
speaksEnglishdependslessonsomeone’scognitiveabilitiesthanitdoeson,
forexample,whetherapersoncomesfroman upper classfamilyinasmall,
Westerncountryorfrom aworkingclass family inaformer Soviet country.
Suchfactorsaretheactualdeterminantsofmultilingualismbutwhichhave
not been taken into account in previous analyses. Our study shows that
research on bi‐ and multilingualism and on language in general,isin
desperateneedofexpansionfromasociologicalperspective.
Inthefifthandlastchapterwediscussthenormativequestionofwhetherthe
currentEUpolicyofsupportingtwenty‐threeofficiallanguagesandfostering
minoritylanguagesisfair.Wearguethatthecurrentlanguagepolicyof the
EUisactingtoperpetuateinequalitiesincitizens’accesstotransnational
linguisticcapital,evenifunintended.ItwouldbepreferableiftheEUdidnot
onlyrecognisethedominanceoftheEnglishlanguage,butalsosupported
English as the linguafrancaofEurope,evenatthelikelyexpenseofother
national and minority languages. This suggestion not only contradicts the
EU’slanguagepolicyandideologyof“unityindiversity”,butalsocontradicts
the dominant paradigm among linguists and anthropologists who support
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
20
linguistic diversity. Hence, this chapter (and the Appendix) goes into a
lengthierdiscussionofwhya policythatfosterslinguisticdiversityis based
onratherweakarguments.
SupportingEnglishasalinguafrancawouldundoubtedlyfavourcountriesin
which English is already the official language. To compensate for this
asymmetry,we suggestthat the twenty‐sevenmember statesfund theEU’s
newlanguagepolicyatvaryinglevels.Thoselanguagecommunities whose
mothertongueischosenasalinguafrancahavetosubsidisethoselanguage
communitiesthathavetostudythelinguafranca.Disproportionatefinancial
supportisalsoanunderlyingfeatureofEUregionalpoliciesandthereforefits
intoapreexistingpolicymodel.
21
2.CONCEPTUALFRAMEWORK
Theprimarypurposeofthefollowingdiscussionconsistsofthedevelopment
ofaconceptualframeworkwhichshouldserveasaguidelinetotheempirical
studyinthefollowingchapters.Upuntilnowsociologyhaspaid little
attentionto theanalysis ofmultilingualism. Themajor sociological theories
donotoffer much helpwhenone isdevelopingatheoreticalframeworkfor
organisingempiricalresearchaimed atansweringthequestions formulated
intheintroduction.Theresearcherhastousehisownlodestar.Assistancein
developingatheoreticalframeworkcanbefoundforthemostpart in
research on economic and social migration and integration whichhas
analysedthewaymigrantslearnanewlanguage.Therefore,Iwilltieinwith
thestateofartinthisresearchfield.Iwillstartoutbygivinga definitionof
languageandindividuallanguages.InasecondstepIwilldiscussthecentral
social functions a language fulfils, whilst differentiating between the
influence of language on society building and on community building. If
language is used for processes of society building, I will use the term
instrumentallinguisticcapital; if language is used for community building
processes, that is, the formation of a collective identity, I will use the term
symboliclinguisticcapital.Inathirdstep,theseconceptswillbeappliedto
the ability to speak several languages. Under certain societal conditions,
whicharedealtwithintheliteratureundertheheadingofglobalisationand
Europeanisation, multilingualism becomes a central resource. Those who
have acquired transnational linguistic capital, in other words are
multilingual, are in a position to participate in transnationalprocessesand
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
22
Europeanisation,whilethosewhocanonlyspeaktheirnativelanguage are
limitedtotheirowncountryandcanonlybenefitinalimitedwayfromthe
advantagesofaunitedEuropeandaglobalisedworld.Tohavetransnational
linguisticcapitalatone’sdisposalisthusanewsourceofsocial inequality
withinadevelopingEuropeansociety.
2.1WhatisLanguage?
Mostdefinitionsoflanguageexplainlanguageasasystemofsigns, which
servestotransferinformation.Suchabasicdefinitioncontains different
crucialelements.The conceptoftransmission suggeststhatthere isatleast
one speaker and one recipient and that there is an exchange taking place
between them. Information is being exchanged. Information can be
statementsabout the worldor astate ofmind andfeelings,plans, intended
purchases, declarations of love, political speeches, etc. This exchange of
informationisconveyedbysigns.As Ferdinand deSaussure(1967)pointed
out, signs consist of two components: the indicated and the indicator. The
indicator has a material substratum, it consists of sounds/sound waves or
letters/pictures.Thesoundsorletters and pictures signify that which is
beingindicated.Itis,however,notidenticalwiththeindicated.RenéMagritte
refers to precisely this difference in his most famous painting“Latrahison
desimages”.Inthispicturethereisapipeunderneathwhichthewords“Ceci
n’estpasunepipe”(“Thisisnotapipe“),pointoutthattherepresentationof
an object is not identical with the original object itself. Theallocationof
particularsoundsorsignstoparticularmeaningsisalwaysarbitrary.There
isnoreasoninherenttotheindicatedastowhytheallocationisasitis;
consequentlytheallocationvariesfromlanguagetolanguage.The
arrangementofthelettersT‐i‐s‐c‐hindicatesanobjectinGerman, which
usuallystandsonfourlegsandatwhichonecansitinordertoeatorwrite.
Whatwecall“Tisch”inGermaniscalled“mesa”inSpanish,“table”inEnglish
and“stół”inPolish.
2.ConceptualFramework
23
The meaningful sounds and signs are combined with one another in
accordancewithasystemofrules,thusproducinglargerunits,phrasesand
sentences.1Theserulesarelaiddowninthegrammarofalanguage.
Therefore, a language consists in essence of grammar and vocabulary. By
speakingorwritingsentences–createdtroughwordsandgrammar–people
describe ‘things in the world’: They formulate declarations of love, express
intentions to buy things or take other actions. Thus, every communication
containsatriadicstructure:EgoindicatestoAltersomethingintheworld
with the help of sounds and signs.2Alterunderstandsthemeaningofthe
messageandonthisbasiscanmakehisownstatementswhichinturn are
understoodbyEgo.Basedonthismutualexchangehumanbeingsareableto
coordinatetheiractionsandcooperatewithoneanother.
Theability ofhuman beings tospeak isconnected withone of anumberof
conditions which extend from the anatomical to preconditions inthebrain
(veryclearlydelineatedin,forexample,Friederici2002;Fischer2008a).The
ability to produce differentiated sounds is dependent on a particular
anatomyofthemouthandthroatinwhichthepositionofthelarynxplaysan
importantrole.Incomparisontochimpanzeesthelarynxinhumanbeingsis
positionedmuchlower,therebyproducingalargerbutatthesame time
morefinelytunedvibrancywhichenablestheproductionofverydifferent
sounds, especially vowels. This is an anatomical foundation which apes,
closely related to sapiens, do not possess. I will not further discuss the
differentpre‐conditions which make humanspeech and,ultimately, writing
possible. What the different preconditions enable, however, is that each
humanbeing–insofarastheyarenotdisabledinanyway–learnstospeak
1 Iwillnotdealherewiththedivisionoflinguisticunits–phonem, morphem, word,
phrase, sentence, text – and its respective the sub‐disciplines (phonetics, morphology,
etc.);thelinguisticexplanationswillremainfewandarekepttothenecessary.
2 Michael Tomasello (2008) concludes that the oral communication of human beings
developed from gestures. Communication with gestures also demonstrates a triadic
structure.Beforetheycanspeak,childrenusetheirforefingerinordertoshowsomeone
withwhomtheyarecommunicatingsomethingintheworld.Thisgesture of showing
indicatesanobject;thepeopleinvolvedimmediatelyadoptthelineofvisionaswellasthe
sightandintentionoftheotherperson,thussharingwithhima common meaning.
Precisely this ability, according to Tomasello (2008: 331), is not possessed by
chimpanzees.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
24
and,indeed,almostautomaticallywithouthavingtobeexplicitlyencouraged
todoso.Theabilitytospeakisinborn(cf.Pinker1994followingonafterthe
worksofNoamChomsky).
Even though the general disposition to learn every language is given to all
humansalike,eachhumanbeinglearnsonlythelanguagewhichisspokenin
theirsurroundings(mothertongue).Consequently,theabilityto be able to
communicatewith others dependson whether ornot onespeaks the same
languageasthepersonwho isbeingspokento. Speakingthesamelanguage
means,accordingtoourdefinitionoflanguage,thatthespeakers give the
samesignificancetothesoundsandsequenceofsoundsandthesigns and
sequenceofsigns aswellas beingincommand ofthesame systemofrules
governing the combinations of words and sentences, that is, thesame
grammar.Ifthisis the case,theycancommunicatewithone another;ifnot,
then direct communication is scarcely possible. This is a fairly simple
definition of individual languages. All the different languageswhichexist
differ from one another through different grammars, different vocabulary
and, in part, through a differentsignsystem.German,Swedish, Japanese,
Russianetc.areindividuallanguages.
Thedifferencesbetweenthevariouslanguageswithrespecttogrammarand
semantics and, consequently, with respect to mutual understanding are
relative.Inordertodescribetherelationshipofthevariouslanguagestoone
another and to analyse language change, comparative linguisticsuses
conceptsfromevolutionarybiology(cf.Dixon1997;Mufwene2001).Several
languages create a genetic unit if they derive from a common previous
language,meaningthattheycanbetracedbackinthefamilytree of
languages to a common node. A genetic unit does not have to consist of
relatedlanguages,asitcanalsobeonelanguageifthelanguage we are
dealingwithisanisolatedone.Languageswhichhavethesameorigins,that
is,derivefromacommonoriginallanguage,belongtothesamefamily of
languages(cf.Lewis2009).German,English,French,Russian,Bulgarianand
Latvian belong, in contrast to Arabian, Chinese, Turkish, Hungarian and
Basque,tothesamefamilyofIndo‐Germaniclanguages.Asinrealfamilies,
2.ConceptualFramework
25
within the same extended family different languages also possess different
degrees of closeness in descent and common genes, that is to say different
degreesof overlapingrammar andin lexis.The distancebetweendifferent
individual languages influences the effort that has to go into learning the
otherlanguage.Thesmaller the distancebetweentwoindividual languages,
theeasieritistolearntheotherone.Iwillreturntothispoint below when
discussingthehypothesesregardingthelearningofforeignlanguages.
Weareconcernedherehowtodefineanindividuallanguage.Theconceptof
individual languages becomes imprecise when the degree of overlapping
betweentwolanguagesisextensive,asitwouldbewithtwoeggorevenone
egg twins. In these cases, from the linguistic point of view, it is usually a
matter of largely artificial, mostly political decisions, as towhetherone
speaksoftwoindividuallanguagesoroftwodialectsofthesamelanguage.
ThisistrueofNorwegianandSwedishorCroatianandSerbian.Norwegians
andSwedesontheonehandandCroatiansandSerbsontheothercan
understandeachothereventhoughofficiallytheirlanguagesare different.
Thisisbecausesocialgroups,suchasethniconesornations,frequently
definethemselvesbymeansofacommonlanguage.Thedifferencebetween
twolanguages,whichis,fromalinguisticpointofviewmarginal,isdefinedin
suchcasesassubstantiveinordertobeabletodistinguishone nation or
ethnicgroup from another nation. Iwill return to this symbolicfunction of
language for the definition of communities in more detail.3 At this point,
however, we can determine that individual languages are usually
distinguished by different grammars and lexis. These differences manifest
themselvespragmaticallythroughthefactthattwospeakerswhospeak
differentlanguages,cannot,oronlybarely,understandeachother.
Thefactthat actorsdonot possessacommon languagedoesnotmean that
theycannotinteractwithoneanother.However,thetransactioncostsofthe
interactionare extremely high compared to speaking the same language. A
3 Inaddition,thedifferencebetweenSerbianandCroatianisemphasisedthroughtheuse
ofanotherscript– LatinandCyrillic(cf.thecommentsinNicCraith(2008:25ff.)on the
politicalconstructionofthedifferencebetweenthesetwolanguages).
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
26
translator is needed who speaks both languages. The transactioncosts
consistfirstlyinhavingtopayforthetranslation,secondlyin the time it
takesforthetranslation,whichslowsdowncommunication,andthirdly a
translation is always imprecise which in itself makes things more difficult
anddetractsfromcommunication.
Analternativetotranslationfortheparticipantsistotryto communicate
directlyandwithouttheuseoflanguage.Everyonewhohaseverbeenina
countrywherehe/shedoesnotspeakthelanguageandhastriedtofindout
thewaytothetrainstation,isawareofthehightransactioncostsinvolved.
Even a relatively simple communication, like asking for directions, is
practically impossible through mimicry and gestures, not only because the
subtletyofmimicryandgesturesislimited,butalsobecausethe
grammaticallycontrolledcombinationsofsignsareveryfew.PeterA.Kraus
(2004: 100) tells us of an occurrence in Belgium in 2001, in which a train
crash could not be avoided, because each of the railway employees
responsibleforsecurityspokeonlyeitherFlemishorFrench.
2.2LanguageProficiencyasHumanCapital
Whatisthesignificanceofknowledgeofoneorseverallanguages for a
society?Languageandlanguagecompetencecanbeunderstoodasaresource
orascapital whichcan be usedfor theorganisationof asocietyon theone
hand,andforcommunitybuildingontheother.Iflanguageisused for
processesofsocietybuilding,Ishallspeakofinstrumentallinguisticcapital,if
languageisusedforcommunitybuildingprocesses,Ishallspeakofsymbolic
linguistic capital. If competence in several languages is being discussed, I
shall refer to this as transnational linguistic capital and differentiate
analogously between an instrumental and a symbolic function of
transnational linguistic capital. These concepts are based on the work of
Pierre Bourdieu (1992; summarised in Loos 2000), who understands
2.ConceptualFramework
27
linguistic competence as capital and differentiates between the resource
functionontheoneandthesymbolicfunctionontheotherhand.4
However,neitherBourdieunorotherauthorsusetheconceptof
transnationallinguisticcapital.JustasalloftheworksofBourdieu adhere
largely to methodological nationalism(Beck&Grande2004)inthat they
analyseprimarilytheclassstructureofasocietyorganisedasanationstate,
sohisconceptoflinguisticcapitalalsorefersbyandlargetothenationstate.
Hence,Bourdieu’sconceptoflinguisticcapitalreferstofirstandforemostto
theelaborateknowledgeofthehigh,officiallanguageofacountry and the
ability to speak this language, which is usually dependent upon class
(Bourdieu1992). However, underthe condition of transnationalisation and
Europeanisation, new skills become important in order to be able to act
beyond the nation state “containers” (Taylor 1994; Beck 1997).
Multilingualismisoneofthese.
2.2.1LanguageasInstrumentalCapital
Asiswellknown,thebasicconceptofsociologyis,accordingtoMaxWeber,
theonecalledsocialaction.5Amutualreferenceofactorstoeachotherisan
interaction and leads to social relationships. Weber distinguishes between
twoformsofsocialrelationships:‘Vergesellschaftung’(societybuilding)and
‘Vergemeinschaftung’ (community building). Language fulfils a central
functionfortheprocessesofsocietybuildingaswellasforcommunity
building. I am adopting the two concepts, society building and community
building, from Weber, although he himself did not discuss the role of
languageineitheroftheseprocesses.
4 In the literature similar concepts can be found to indicate the same meaning. Peter A.
Kraus (2004) differentiates between an instrumental and an expressive function of
language.HartmutEsser(2006:52)describeslinguisticcompetenceinpartasaresource,
by means of which other socially relevant resources can be obtained. In addition, he
discusses the symbolic function of language. Language enables us to name things, to
createstereotypesandtodiscriminate.Finally,JochenRoose(2010:126) discusses the
practicalandthesymbolicmeaningoflanguage.
5 AccordingtoWeber“Actionis‘social’insofarasitssubjectivemeaningtakesaccountof
thebehaviourofothersandistherebyorientedinitscourse”(Weber1985:4).
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
28
Weber defines a social relationship as “‘associative’ (Vergesellschaftung) if
andinsofarastheorientationofsocialactionwithinitrestson a rationally
motivated adjustment of interests (...)” (Weber 1985: 40f.). With the
definition “rationally motivated adjustment of interests” Weberisthinking
primarily of interactions motivated by economic interests. The concept of
society building is, however, to be much more broadly understood, as it
includesallformsofexchangebetweenpeoplewhoareinteractingwithone
another,amongotherthings,theexchangeofinformation,goods, shares,
sexual“services”orscientificknowledge.
Thefact that language makesinteraction between people possible,without
havingveryhightransactioncosts,ensuresthatitismorethan likely that
societybuildingwilltakeplaceamongthosewhospeakthesame language
rather than among those who speak different languages. Anyone who has
beentointernationalconferencesorwhohasbeeninamultilingualsituation
knowsthis problem fromfirsthand experience.People whospeak the same
languagetendtostarttalkingtoeachotherratherthantothosewhodonot.
Thosewhospeakthesamelanguagesitdownatthesametableandconverse.
Otherpeople,whoaresittingatthesametableanddonotspeakthe same
languageastherest,aremoreorlessexcluded.Frequentlycommunicationin
thesamelanguagebecomesmoreintenseandforceful.Thespeakersdiscover
amutual interestin eachotherand thosewho speakthe samelanguage sit
downtogetheratthenextmeetingagain.Theymeetmoreoftenandthusthe
interaction becomes increasingly intense between the communication
partners,excludingthosewho speakanotherlanguage.This isthefirststep
inthedirectionofsocietybuildingamongthosespeakingthesamelanguage.
Onthis basis and dependingon interests, intellectual,amorous or business
relationshipsoccur.Inthisrespectlanguagecanberegardedameans,afund,
whichmakestheestablishmentofasocietypossible.Thisdoesnotmeanthat
there are no societies which are not bilingual or trilingual. On the level of
interactive systems (friendship, partnerships, marriage) as well as on the
levelof entire nationstates (for instance,Switzerland, Canada,India, South
Africa),wefindsocietiesorganisedbypeoplewhodonotspeakthesame
2.ConceptualFramework
29
language.However,their occurrencepresupposes manymorepreconditions
andisthuslesslikely.
Howpowerfultheeffectoflanguageorratherdifferentlanguagesis,evenif
people live in a common nation state, is shown by the example of
Switzerland.Switzerlandhasexisted as alooseconfederation sincethe13th
century.Itwasfoundedinthepresentformasafederalstatein 1848.
German, French, Italian and Rhaeto‐Romance are its official languages. In
spiteofalongnationalunificationthelinguisticdivisionofSwitzerlandstill
shapesthebehaviourofitscitizens.Asanillustration,agoodexampleisthe
wayinwhichtheSwissusethemedia.6ThenationaltelevisionofSwitzerland
consistsoftwochannels,eachwithtwocompleteprogrammesforthethree
largelanguageregions(SF1andSF2forGermanspeakingSwitzerland,
TSR1 and TSR2 for French speaking Switzerland, and TSI1 and TSI2 for
ItalianspeakingSwitzerland).Inaddition,therearethebroadcastswhichcan
be received from abroad, primarily the television programmes from
Germany, France and Italy. The foreign broadcasting stations haveavery
highshare of theSwiss market.This lies ataround sixty‐fivepercentof the
audienceviewingtime(cf.Hasebrink&Herzog2009).Themediabehaviour
ofthe Swiss absolutely complies withthe linguistic divisionof Switzerland.
The Swiss German watch the Swiss German programmes and the German
programmeswhichcomefromabroad,theFrenchspeakingSwissturnonthe
French, and the Swiss Italian the Italian programmes. Based on the Swiss
television programmes alone, Daniel Beck and Bertil Schwotzer (2006: 26)
cometothefollowingconclusion:“ThemarketshareofSRGtelevision
programmes from other language regions is fairly low. In 2005 it was 0.7
percentintheGermanspeakingpart,intheFrenchspeakingpartitwas1.8
percentandinTicino4.1percent”.Theterm“fairlylow”seemstometobea
definiteunderstatement.ThefactisthatSwitzerlandisdividedintodifferent
6 Unfortunatelythereisnootherevidenceavailableontheimpact of the division of
languagesin Switzerland on theway its societyis organised.It would beinteresting to
learntowhatextentthelanguageboundariesinfluencetheeconomicboundaries,for
example,howpronouncedtradebetweenthedifferentlanguageregionsis.Aninteresting
indicatorwouldalsobetoknowthenumberofmarriagesacrossthelanguageboundaries
inordertostudytheeffectofthelanguagesontheprivatesphere.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
30
societiesbasedonlanguage.Ifweassumethatthemediahaveaconsiderable
influenceontheperceptionoftheworldwhichpeoplehave,thenthe Swiss
live,inpartatanyrate,indifferentworlds.
Theideathatacommonlanguagesignificantlyinfluencestheformationofa
society is strikingly confirmed by findings from the macro‐economy. In
economics there has been a long drawn‐out discussion on the influence
which a common language has on trade between different countries. The
conclusionsoftheempiricalstudiesareunequivocal:Countrieswhichspeak
the same language trade much more intensively with one another than
countries who do not (summarised in Melitz 2008). This fact remains the
sameevenwhenanumberofotherfactorswhichinfluencetradebetween
countries (for instance, the existence of a free trade area, common
membership in a political union, a common currency, common history and
culture,geographicaldistance,GNP,etc.)areexamined.Economists see the
reasonforthesefindingsinthemuchreducedtransactioncostswhich
sharingacommonlanguageinvolve.Obtaininginformationaboutapossible
tradingpartnerismuchsimplerandtocarryoutbusinessismucheasier.7
The correlation which has been described between language and the
organisation of a society can also be described from the perspective of the
individual.Knowledgeofthelanguagewhichisspokeninagroupis,fromthe
perspectiveoftheindividual,acentralresourceforparticipationinasociety.
Sincemostpeopleliveinthesocietyinwhichtheygrewupandconsequently
speak the language of this society as their native language, the linguistic
prerequisite for the formation of a society is a given. The importance of
languageforallformsofsocietybuildingbecomesclear,however,whenthis
prerequisiteisnotmetandwhentheparticipantshavelittlelinguisticcapital.
Thisistrue,forexample,formigrants,whobymovingfromonecountryto
anotheroften have to learna new language. This means that the capital of
their mother tongue is to all extents and purposes devalued at one blow,
7 Thiscorrelationhasbeenfurtherspecifiedinresearch,inthat on the one hand a
differentiationismadebetweenthedifferentgoodswhicharetobeexchanged,whileon
the other hand different figurations of overlap between differentlanguagesare
differentiated(cf.Melitz2008;Felbermayr&Toubal2010).
2.ConceptualFramework
31
becausetheyareunabletocommunicateintheirnativetongue.8Researchon
integrationhasshownboththeoreticallyandempiricallywhat an enormous
role language plays in the social integration of migrants.9 What are the
centralfindings?Knowledge andthecompetent useof thelanguage spoken
inasocietyisaspecificformofhumancapital.
10Agoodcommandofthe
languagecanbeusedinvariousspheresofsocietyandcanbethe mean
successforthosewhohavethislanguageattheirdisposal.11
(a)Educationandeducationaldegrees:People’s incomeand therecognition
theyenjoy from societyare largelydeterminedby theirprofessionalstatus.
Achieving an attractive professional status largely depends on the
educationaldegreesandqualifications.Forinstance,onecanonlybecome a
universityprofessor,adoctororalawyerifonehaspassedthe respective
universityexams.Abasicprerequisiteforachievingeducationaldegrees,and
theattractiveprofessionalpositionswhichtheyimply,isknowledge of the
languagespokeninasociety.Insufficientorbadlanguagecompetenceleads
tolackofsuccessinschool.Thiscountsnotonlyforthesubjects in which
languageitselfisexamined,butforothersubjectsaswell.Mathematicsand
physicsarealsotaughtinthenativetongueoftherespectivecountry.Those
whoare notin commandof the language,or onlypoorly, willconsequently
8 Thisisvalidonlytoalimiteddegreeforthosecasesinwhichthehostcountryhasalarge
groupofmigrantswhospeakthesamelanguage.
9 Hartmut Esser (2006) has summarised the theoretical and empiricalstandofthe
literatureverywellbyintegratingitintoageneraltheoryoftheexplanationoftrade.
Esser himself stands on the shoulders of elaborate research which I do not wish to
retracehere, whose theoreticalpremisesandempiricalfindingsbroadlyagree(cf.many
others,summarisedChiswick2007).
10 Humancapitalmeanspeople’sabilities, knowledge,experiencesandmotiveswhichthey
useinordertoearnmoney(Becker1993).
11 Theuseoflinguisticcapitaldependsonthestructureofeachindividualsociety,in other
words, the particular circumstances of a society. Hence, in a society of hunters and
gathererstheabilitytousebowandarrowwellcanbefarmoreimportantandcontribute
moretowardsabetter“income”and more respect from the other members of society
thantheabilitytoexpressoneselfinelaboratelanguage.Inpost‐industrialsocietiesthe
“bowandarrowskills”willnotbringanyspecialadvantages.It is here that language
abilitythatcomesfromtheparticularstructureofthissocietyisespeciallyrelevant.Esser
(2006:39ff.),inagreementwithSiegwartLindenberg(1989)andothers, concludesthat
allhuman beingsareconcernedtomaintainorimprovetheirphysical well‐beingandto
receiverecognitionfromotherpeople.Theycanonlyachievetheseuniversalgoalswhen
they achieve specific goals as defined by a specific society, whichinturnleadtothe
universalgoals.Thespecificgoals,orintermediategoods,aredifferentdependingonthe
typeofsociety.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
32
learnless,willgetworseresultsinexamsaswellasinclass,lowermarkson
theirreportcards, andlower qualifications.Asthe qualityofschoolleaving
certificatesinfluencestheentrancetothelabourmarketand to professions,
poor language abilities reduce the chances of achieving an attractive
professionalposition.
(b)Integrationintheemploymentmarketandprofessionalpositions: Good
knowledge of the language increases the possibility of attainingrecognised
school leaving certificates and the well‐paid, prestigious professional
positions which they lead to. In addition, the quality of knowledge of the
language has a direct effect on the probability of obtaining attractive
professionalpositions(cf.Esser2006:399ff.).Thedifferentprofessionsdiffer
inthedegreetowhichknowledgeofthelanguageisnecessaryforcarrying
out said profession. With physical work, the need for language skills is
considerablylowerthanwithworkinwhichcommunicationisatits heart,
for example, in the service and advisory sector. “The highest possible L1
competence,12whetherinFinnishorinItalian,isofnouseataproduct
adviceandconsultationinabankintheNetherlandsorFrancewhen the
customers only understand the language of the receiving country” (Esser
2006: 402). This is still the case when the person has a high educational
degree.Thereisalsoanotherfactorwhichexplainswhyweakcompetencein
thelanguagecanleadtodisadvantagesontheemploymentmarket.Language
competenceis frequently interpretedby employersas anindirect indicator
forotherprofessionallyrequiredskills.Onthebasisofweaklanguage
competence,whichis“ascertained”duringeachjobinterview enpassant,as
itwere,withouttests,itwillbeconcludedthattheapplicantdoesnotentirely
possessotherimportantqualificationseither(cf.Esser2006:207).
(c)Integrationandsocialcapital:Thosewhodonotspeakthelanguageofthe
countrytheyarelivinginatall,oronlybadly,donothavemuch chance of
gettingtoknowpeoplefromthiscountry.Contact,however,isaprerequisite
forintenserelationships,forfriendship,loveormarriage.Therefore,itisnot
surprisingthatthosemigrantswhodonothaveaveryextensiveknowledge
12 WithL1competenceEssermeanscompetenceinthemothertongue.
2.ConceptualFramework
33
ofthelanguageofthehostcountryarealsothosewhoarenotvery well
integrated.Socialrelationshipsoftendonotexistfortheirownsake.Theyare
socialcapital,astheyserveasthebasisforobtainingusefulinformationand
togetsupportinemergencysituations, thus in turn facilitating access to
othersocietalspheres(employmentmarket,schools,ordoctors).
(d)Politicalparticipation:Thesocietieswhichare atthe centreofthisstudy
arealldemocracies.Democracymeansthatthemakingofcollectivelybinding
decisions is coupled with the interests and decision making processes of
citizens.Suchalinkprimarilyresults by meansofelections.Citizensvote at
periodicintervalsforrepresentativeswhothenassumethepositions of
power and are authorised to pass and enforce binding decisions for the
citizensliving in oneterritory. However,at the sametime they canalso be
dismissedfromtheirpositionsofpoweratthenextelection,ifthecitizensdo
not feel that they are being represented well enough. Apart from voting in
elections citizens can attempt to influence political decisions or decision
makersbyactivelyworkingforpoliticalparties,interestgroups or social
movementorganisations.
Inalmostallcountriesthefranchiseiscoupledwithcitizenshipandinseveral
countries,forexample, theUSA,one canonlybecome acitizenwhenoneis
ablespeakthelanguageofthecountry.Therefore,inthesecountries the
chancetoparticipateinelectionsiscoupledwithlanguagecompetence.Also
inthosecountrieswherethisisnotthecaseimperfectlanguagecompetence
limitsthechancesforpoliticalparticipation.Inorderthatcitizenscandecide
who to vote for and change their minds at the next election or become
involvedinvariousinterestgroups,socialmovementsandparties,theymust
beabletoinformthemselvesaboutpolitics,therepresentatives and their
competitors. The debates and the exchange of information in the political
arena – in the mass media, party conferences and in the internet – are all
conductedintheofficiallanguageofeachcountry.Participation in the
politicalarenaandthusinthedemocraticopinionbuildingprocessdefinitely
depends on the ability to be able to understand and speak the language in
whichtheinformationisconveyedandinwhichthedebatesareconducted.If
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
34
this is not the case then one is more or less excluded from thedemocratic
process.Thus,theknowledgeofthelanguageinthecountryofresidenceisa
prerequisiteforpoliticalparticipation.13
The previous discussion should have shown that the knowledge ofthe
languagewhichisspokeninagroupisaverycentralresourceforbecoming
partofasociety.Italleviatesaccesstootherimportantresources
considerablyandthusthechancetoimproveone’sincomeandachievesocial
recognition. I have discussed this interrelationship using the example of
migrants, who have left their original language community and thus are
confrontedwithsurroundingsinwhichanotherlanguageisspoken,because
itillustratesverywelltheconnectionbetweenlanguageandparticipationin
a society. However, the connection between language competence and
chances of participation is also valid for speakers in the same language
community.Theycanbeincommandoftheir(mother)tonguetoagreateror
lesserdegree.Thebetterpeoplecanreadandwritethelanguagecodifiedas
theofficial language,themore likelythey areto achievehigher educational
qualifications,to bemore successfully placed in theemployment hierarchy,
toestablishconnectionstohigherclasses,andtoparticipatebetter in
politicalprocesses(Bourdieu1992;Bourdieu&Passeron1977).Theworkof
Basil Bernstein in the 1960s has already demonstrated that having the
appropriatelanguage competence isdependent upon socialclass.Bernstein
(1960, 1973) has proved that there is class specific language development
anduseoflanguage(restrictedversuselaborate),whichhasastrongimpact
onsuccessatschoolandconsequentlyhelpstoreproducetheclassstructure
of societies.14 Empirical research into education of recent years has
consistentlyconfirmedthesefindings.
13 The fact that the various factors mutually influence each other has not been discussed
here.Henceformanyprofessionsbecomingacitizenisanecessaryprerequisite.When,
however,citizenshipiscoupledwithlanguagecompetence,thishasadirectandindirect
influence on chances in the employment market. The same thing applies to social
integration insofar as having a network also improves chances on the employment
market.
14 Bernstein’sideashavebeencriticisedbyWilliamLabov(1966).On the basis of hisown
research, above all on the language of Afro‐American youths, Labov concludes that
different class dialects with reference to the breadth and differentiation of their
expressionarefunctionallyequivalenttoStandardEnglish.Thelanguageofthelower
2.ConceptualFramework
35
Is the connection between language competence and the chances of
participation in different fields of society also valid for learning a foreign
languageandpossessingtransnationallinguisticcapital?Formigrants,who
wanttogainafootholdinalinguisticcommunity,thereisagreatincentiveto
learn the new language. For people who live in a homogeneous linguistic
community,separatedfromotherspeechcommunities,thereisnoutility–at
leastnotinasociologicalsense–inlearningaforeignlanguage.Theycannot
improve their chances of participation and getting access to relevant
resourcesbylearningaforeignlanguage,sinceduetotheirisolatedposition
they cannot establish any social relationships at all with foreign speakers.
Undertheseconditionstransnationalspeechcapitalisworthless.
Should, however, the circumstances of a society be different, should we be
dealing with a globalised world with many‐faceted exchange relationships
between different countries speaking different languages, then foreign
language skills become useful capital, because they can now be used for
transnationalinteractions.Itispreciselythissituationwhichhascomeabout
sincethemiddleofthelastcentury,atthelatestsincethe1970s.Therelevant
transformationprocessesaretreatedintheliteratureundertheheadingsof
“globalisation,transnationalismandEuropeanisation”.BeforeIdiscussthese
alteredcircumstancesandthe significanceoftransnationallinguistic capital
inmore detail,I wouldlike toexamine moreclosely the secondfunctionof
language,namelyitsroleinidentityformationandcommunitybuilding.
Severalexamplesillustratethatinspiteoflanguage’sextensive utility for
getting access to relevant resources many people are not prepared to put
theirnativelanguage‘onthebackburner’,eventhoughthiswould bevery
advantageous.Alsothemassiveconflictsbetweendifferentspeech groups,
classisindeeddifferentfromStandardEnglish,butitisnotdeficient(differenceversus
deficithypothesis).StevenPinkerarguesinasimilarvein(1994: 28f.). However,froma
sociological perspective it does not matter whether linguists like William Labov or
cognitivepsychologistslikeSteveParker,followingChomsky,assumethatdifferentclass
dialectsareofequalvalue,becausetheyareonlydifferentsuperficialmanifestationsofan
identicaldeepstructure.When,inasociety,differentlanguagesareevaluateddifferently
andthisevaluationleadstothefactthatpeoplearemoresuccessfulinthatsocietyusinga
certainlanguage–asarulethestandardlanguage–thanwithanotherlanguage,thenthis
isasocialfact.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
36
arguing about the hegemony or autonomy of their languages, are hard to
understandwhenthefunctionoflanguageisreducedtotheinstrumental
dimensiononly(fromtheeconomicperspectivecf.Grin1994:32).Language
can become and very often becomes a group identity characteristic and
obtainstherebyanidentitybuildingfunction.Ifthisisthecasethengivingup
yourownlanguageandadaptingtoanewlanguagecanbecomeaquestionof
identity.
2.2.2LanguageasSymbolicCapital
“Arelationshipwillbecalled‘communal’(Vergemeinschaftung)ifandsofar
astheorientationofsocialaction–whetherintheindividualcase,onthe
average,orinthepuretype–isbasedonasubjectivefeelingofthe parties,
eitheraffectionalortraditional,thattheybelongtogether”(Weber1985:40).
The feeling of belonging to a group,theidentificationwithagroup can be
“produced” by various characteristics. Communities can constitute
themselvesonthe basisofa commonskincolour, similardescent,a similar
lifestyle or on the basis of a common language. A common language is of
specialsignificancehere(Lieberson1970:5f.).FirstofallIwillexplain,with
reference to the pertinent social psychological research, the systematic
connectionbetweenlanguageand communitybuildingandgroup identity.I
willthenillustratebymeansofseveralexamples,therolelanguageplaysfor
identification within different communities.15Sincethemechanismwhich
makeslanguageuniquelysuitedforthecreationofasenseofidentity is
usuallyimplied,butnotmadeexplicitinsociologicalandhistoricalliterature,
itseemstometobeworthwhiledevotingmoreattentiontosocial
psychologicalresearch.
15 The sociological interest in an analysis of the conditions for the genesis of community
feelings follows from the premise that communities have consequences relevant to
action.Ontheonehandacommunitysupportsthesolidarityofthemembersofthegroup
betweeneachotherindifferentactsofsolidarity.Ontheother,communitiesaredefined
by borders to other groups; community building frequently goes hand in hand with
defensiveactionstowardsothergroups,extendingfromprejudicetowar.
2.ConceptualFramework
37
2.2.2.1LanguageandCommunityfromthePerspectiveofSocialPsychology
(1) The socio‐psychological discussion on the factors which lead to the
creationofgroupidentityisstronglyinfluencedbytheworkofHenri Tajfel
andJohnC.Turnerandtheconceptofthe“MinimalGroupTheory” (Tajfel
1981;Tajfel&Turner1986;Billig&Tajfel1973).IntheexperimentsofTajfel
et al. the probands were divided into two arbitrary groups, which were
previouslynon‐existent.Thegroupswerenamedafterpainters,sothatthere
wasa Klee Group and aKandinsky Group. Next, people inthe groups were
askedtogivecertainsumsofmoneytotwopeople.Oneofthetwocamefrom
theKleeGrouptheotherfromtheKandinskyGroup.Thepeoplethemselves
werenotknowntotheotherprobands.Theyonlyknewthatthepersonwas
either a member of the Klee or the Kandinsky Group. There had been no
previouscontactbetweentheprobandsandtheotherswhoweretoreceive
the money. The Klee and the Kandinsky Groups were, therefore, not real
groupsbutexistedassuchonlyinthemindsoftheprobands.Theresultsof
theexperiments demonstrated thatthe probands gave those people higher
sumsofmoneythatweremembersoftheirowngroup,andgavemembersof
the strange group significantly less. From these findings the authors of the
studyconcludedthatanyarrangementofpeopleingroups,regardlessofhow
artificialtheyare,leadstothefactthatgroupsareconstitutedsimplyonthe
basis of the categorical allocation to a group only and that they favour the
membersoftheirowngroupasopposedtothoseofastrangegroup.If this
circumstanceisvalidforallcriteriaofcategorisation,thenitisalsovalidfor
language(Giles&Johnson1987).However,aretherefindingswhich go
beyondthis,whichdemonstratethatacommonlanguagecontributes more
thanothercriteriatogroupbuilding?
(2) To answer this question the recent work of Katherine Kinzler et al.
(Kinzleret al. 2007,2009; cf. thereference to earlier works which is given
there)is relevant. The groupof authors around Kinzler carriedoutseveral
experimentaltestsinwhichtheyattemptedtodemonstrate,whetherandto
whatextentthenativelanguageisacriterionwhichdefinesgroupbelonging
andleadstothefactthatpeoplepreferthosewhospeaktheirnativetongue
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
38
asopposedtothosewhodonot.TheinnovativeaspectofKinzler and co‐
author’sstudies is that theyhave proved theconnection between language
andgroup belonging,even forthe new born. In addition,they wereable to
prove that language, in contrast to other criteria, has a very special
importanceforthedefinitionofgroupbelonging.
(a)FivetosixmontholdbabieswatchedafilminwhichanEnglishspeaking
womanspoketothem.Thetestwasorganisedinawaythatinthe first
showingthefilmwasplayednormally.Inthesecondshowingwithasecond
womanthelanguagewasrunbackwards,creatinganartificiallanguage.Then
bothwomenwereshownbeingsilent.Thelengthoftimethechildrenlooked
atthewomenwasmeasured.Thewomanwhospokeintheirnativetongue
waslookedatsignificantlymoreoftenandlongerthanthewomanwhospoke
intheartificiallanguage.Thenativelanguage,therefore,hasaninfluenceon
thedegreeofattentionwhichsomeonereceives.
TheexperimentwasrepeatedbyusingEnglishandFrenchinsteadofthe
artificiallanguage;EnglishforbabieswhosenativelanguagewasEnglishand
FrenchforthosewhosenativelanguagewasFrench.Itwasdemonstrated
thatthebabiesclearlypaidmoreattentiontothepersonwhospokeintheir
nativelanguage.Inordertoanalysetheeffectofthenativelanguagenotonly
on attention, but also on behaviour, the following experiment was carried
out.Thebabies–nowtenmonthsold–watchedafilminwhichfirst a
womanspoketothemintheirnativelanguage,andtheninanotherlanguage.
Attheendofthefilmeachwomanheldasmallplushtoyintheir hands.
Directlyafterthefilmtheseplushtoyswerestandingonatableinfrontofthe
children.Thechildrenwereabletotakeoneofthem.Theytooktheplushtoy
whichearlierhadbeenheldinthehandsofthewomanwhohadspokentheir
languagesignificantlymoreoften.Thesefindingwereconfirmedinafurther
experiment. Some children at five years of age were shown photos of two
unknown children, while at the same time hearing one child speaking in
English,the other in French. Afterwards they were asked which ofthetwo
childrenshowninthephotostheywouldratherhaveasafriend. The
children chose significantly more often the child who had spoken in their
2.ConceptualFramework
39
nativetongue.Theresultsshowthatlanguagehasaclearinfluence on the
choiceofotherpeople,onthedegreeofattentionwhichpeopleenjoy,aswell
asonthepreferenceforpeoplewhospeakthesamelanguage.
(b) This, however, still has not answered the question as to what degree
languagehasaspecial,incomparisontootherfactorsperhapseven a
strongerinfluenceon the buildingof groups. Kinzleretal. (2009)havealso
put forward findings to answer this question. Five year old white children
lookedatpictures of otherchildren.Half ofthechildrenin the photoswere
black, the others white. Afterwards the children were asked which of the
children shown they would like to have as a friend. The majority of the
childrenchoseawhitechildsignificantlymoreoften–thatis,someonewith
thesame skin colour as themselves. In the second experiment the children
wereshownthesamephotos,onlythistimethechildreninthephotosspoke.
The white children spoke French, the black children spoke English. The
nativelanguageofthechildren,withwhomtheexperimentwascarriedout,
wasEnglish.Againthechildrenwereallowedto pickafriend.Thistimethe
blackchildrenwerechosenmuchmorefrequently;those,therefore,whoalso
spokeEnglish,buthadadifferentskincolour.Theinterestingthingabout
both experiments and their findings is that the different strengths of two
differentcategoriesweretestedsimultaneously.Untilthattime,researchhad
assumed that above all it was visual criteria which were used for the
classificationof“in‐groups”and“out‐groups”,suchas,sex,raceandage.The
experiment, however, demonstrates that language is obviously more
importantthan,intheAmericancontext,suchanimportantcriterionasskin
colour.
(3)Whylanguageplaysasignificantroleintheestablishmentof group
identityisnotenteredintobytheauthorsoftheexperiments.Thefollowing
hypothesis can help to give a causal reason for the correlative connection.
The fact that language can be used so effectively for the creation of
communities probably goes back to the fact that all experiencesof
socialisation which we make after birth occur through the medium of
language.Thefirstwordsamotherspeaks,theattentionwhichwereceivein
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
40
ourparentalhome,theentireprocess of cognitive and emotional
socialisation occur in the medium of language. We begin to think and to
communicate in our native language. Language becomes an immediate
componentofourpersonalhistory,therebyallowingustoobtain a
relationshipof the deepestintimacy withour ownlanguage,with itswords
andwithitssounds.
Itisexactlythisfactwhichmakesournativetongueespeciallysuitedforthe
processesofcollectiveidentitybuilding. In contrasttoothercriteriausedto
create collective identities, our native language is interwoventoagreat
degreewithpersonalexperiences,withourownhistoryandpersonal
identity.Itsignalisesthebelongingtothegroup,whichistheprimarygroup
forevery humanbeing. Kinzleret al. (2009), with reference totherelevant
literature,suggest thatseen froman evolutionarypoint of viewthiscanbe
combined with advantages. While the variance of physiognomy among
differentgroupstendstobelow,thisisnotthecaseforlanguage and
differentaccentsbywhichonecanrecogniseone’sowngroupasopposedto
groups of strangers. In addition to this, language in comparison to other
identity criteria, like wearing certain clothes, body painting or cultural
practices,cannotsimplybechangedandisaconstantindicatorofbelonging
toagroup.Usuallyitisnotpossibletospeakanewlanguagewithout an
accent,ifonehasnotlearntitbytheendofyouth.Thenativelanguagethus
remainsarelativelyconstantidentitymarker(Lieberson1981).
(4) The findings discussed up to now from experimental social psychology
havereferredtothesignificanceoflanguageinthecategorisationofpeople,
withoutthe peoplehaving furthercontact withone anotheron the basis of
the classification made. When, however, a common language is a central
criterionforgroupbuilding,thenasaruleconsequencesderiveinday‐to‐day
situations from this group building. Once chosen, the persons will interact
withoneanotherandtheydothisinoneandthesamelanguage.The
community building process based on a common language leads to a
concentration of interactions between the members of the community and
henceleadstoasocietybuildingprocess:Thechildreninthegroupwhohave
2.ConceptualFramework
41
chosentheirfriends willplaywith them,planto meetagain,they playwith
each other again, etc. Since the choice of friends occurs on the basis of a
commonlanguage, society buildingalso takes placein a commonlanguage.
The growing society building process strengthens in turn the community
feeling of the group members. Language, therefore, in comparison to other
criterianotonlyhasaspecialmeaningforbringingagroupintoexistence,it
forcesthepaceofthesocietybuildingprocessofthegroupandimpacts in
turnonthecommunitybuildingofthegroup.
(5)Letusassumethatforvariousreasonsthegroupwhichhasbeenformed
decidestodescribethemselvesasagroup,thatis,tonamefeatureswhichare
typicalofthemselves.Hencea level ofreflectionandself‐descriptioncanbe
addedtotheprocessofnormalgroupinteraction.Thegroupknowsthatitis
agroup,thatallmembersofthegroupspeakthesamelanguageandthatitis
this which differentiates it from other groups. It is very probable that the
members of the group, in order to describe their group identity, will have
recourse to the common feature of a linguistic identity. In this way the
communityhasconstituteditselfreflexivelyasalanguagecommunity.Ithas
becomeagroupwhichgainsitsidentityfactuallyaswellasreflexivelyfroma
common language. Political entrepreneurs can build on the possibility of
making a group identity through self‐description. History, particularly
descriptionsoftheriseofnationstates,hasprovidedmanyexamplesofhow
nationsasimaginedcommunitiesarecreatedby politicalelitesonthebasis
oflanguage.Iwillreturntothisatalaterpointwhendiscussing the
importanceoflanguageinthecreationofnationstates.
The arguments which up to now have been formulated with reference to
socio‐psychological literature have tried to make plausible why language,
besideshavingasocietybuildingfunction,alsohasacommunity building
function.Thisobviouslydoesnotmeanthatlanguageistheonly
characteristic by which communities can be constituted. It alsodoesnot
mean that linguistically heterogeneous groups cannot develop a group
identity; the characteristics of identity building are just different in these
cases.However,theexplanationsshouldhaveshownthatacommon
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
42
languageisoneamongseveralcharacteristicsthatissuitablefor(a)forming
communities and that (b) language – for the abovementioned reasons – is
especiallywellsuitedforfacilitatingtheprocessesofcommunitybuilding.
Onecanalsoformulatetheabovementioned connection between language
and community building, similar to that between language and community
building,from theperspective of theindividual. Knowledgeof thelanguage
whichisspokeninagroupandagoodcommandofit,fromtheindividual’s
pointofview,isnotonlyaresource,aninstrumentalcapital,butcanalsobe
importantfortheidentitybuildingofasociety.
Wehavenotyetaddressedthetypeofcommunitylanguagecanbe“used”for.
Historyandthe presentshowus that languagecanbe usedfordefining the
identity of nations, regions and classes. This can be illustrated by several
examples.
2.2.2.2LanguageandtheIdentificationwithvariousCommunities
NationandLanguage: The establishment of nation states is probably the
mostprominentexampleinhistoryoftheuseofacommonlanguage as an
identity marker for establishing a community. In almost all cases the
establishment of a nation state goes hand in hand with a policyto
homogeniseacountrylinguisticallyandtoestablishonesingle language
whichthen becomes theofficial language.16Theprocess ofestablishing one
singleofficiallanguageisnotonlyaninstrumentofnationstate society
building,butalsoamediumofcommunitybuilding.Thesinglelanguage
becomes an official language, as well as a national language and, thus, the
centralfeatureofanation’sidentity.Almostallnationstateshavedeveloped
institutionsforthepreservationandnurtureoftheirlanguage.Theyregulate
theusagebythewritingofdictionariesandthroughinstitutionswhosejobit
istomaintainthelanguage.Theybegintocanonisetheirnationalliterature,
preservefolksongsandfolkcultureanddescribetheiridentitybymeansof
their national language. The reverse side of the process of linguistic
16 Some of the smaller states in Europe, for example, Belgium and Switzerland, are
exceptions to this general rule; here the internal linguistic division became socially
institutionalised.
2.ConceptualFramework
43
homogeneity and the establishment of a common language as an identity
markerof the nationis the exclusionand repression ofminority languages
(cf. Mann 2001). I will go into the connection of nation state building and
linguistichomogeneityinmoredetailinchapter3.
RegionandLanguage:However,therearealsomanyexamplesinhistoryof
thenationallanguagebeingrejectedinordertoexpresstheidentityofasub‐
nationalunit.ThedivisionofBelgiuminWalloonandFlemishpartsispurely
a linguistic division and has a long history. The supremacy of French
speakingWallonia,whichhadsupportedthefoundationofaBelgianstatein
1831, increasingly aroused the resistance of Flanders and the Flemish
movement, which step by step won cultural and linguistic rights(cf.Kern
1997).ThedevelopmentwhichhastakenplaceinseveralregionsofSpainin
theeraafterFranco,orthe BalticstatesafterindependencefromtheSoviet
Union are further examples in the present day. The Basque region, Galicia
and Catalonia rose up against the dominance of the Spanish central state
after Franco’s death and developed their own regional autonomy.This
emancipation manifested itself in a number of different dimensions. In all
threeregionsthelanguageofeachhasbecomethecentralfeatureofregional
identification.Castilian, as a quidpro quo,was regardedas thelanguage of
thecentralpower,whichhadrepressedregionalautonomyforcenturiesand
its symbolic capital was increasingly devalued. Catalonia has been
particularly successful with its autonomy and language policies(cf.forthe
followingBerneckeretal.2007).DuringtheFrancoeratheofficialuseofthe
Catalonianlanguagewasforbiddenandinstructioninschoolstookplaceonly
inSpanish. Today thishas beenradically changed.Inparliament andin the
civilservice,Catalonianisspokenandstreetsignsarewritteninit.Themost
importantmeansoftransmissionforpassingonCatalonianaretheschools.A
policyof“immersion”hasbeenintroducedintheprimaryschools,theaimof
whichistoteachCatalonianas quickly as possible to those childrenwho do
notknowthelanguage.Todaytheuniversitiesarealsobeingtaughtmainlyin
Catalonian,whilethe media broadcastandprint initforthe mostpart,too.
Manyjobs,especiallyinthecivilserviceoftheCatalonianregion,requirethat
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
44
thepersonwhofillsthepositioncanalsospeakCatalonian.Havingagood
command of the Catalonian language, and especially being able to speak it
instead of Castilian has become a central mark of Catalonian identity. For
those who speak the language the competence itself ensures recognition
from their linguistic community. Kathryn A. Woolard and Tae‐Joong Gahng
(1990) in their study on the status of Catalonian were able to prove this
correlation.17
Similar developments can be demonstrated in the Baltic states after their
independence from the Soviet Union. Take, for instance, Latvia.Duringthe
SecondWorldWarthecountrywasoccupiedbyRussiaandintegrated by
force into Soviet Union. Between 1940 and 1990 the composition of the
populationchangedthroughimmigrationandresettlementand thenumber
of Russians increased exponentially. After the restoration of sovereignty in
1990Latvianbecametheonlyofficiallanguage.ThenewLatviansovereignty
and identity revealed itself in a corresponding linguistic policy which
upgradedLatvianinallareasofsocietytothedetrimentofRussian(cf. Nic
Craith2008:31ff.).ManypeopleinLatviawhosufferedundertheruleofthe
SovietUnionwerenotmuchinclinedtospeakRussian,inspiteofknowing
thelanguage,simplybecauseitwasthelanguageoftheoppressor.
SocialClassandLanguage:Forsocietiesinwhichonelanguageisspokenand
everyonelearnsthislanguagewiththeirsocialisation,itisneverthelesstrue
thatasaruletherearedifferentdialects,classdialectsand accentsinthese
societies. Even though the dialects in regard to oral and written language
skillsandthechancetocommunicateareequal,thisisfrequentlynotthecase
with the symbolic recognition accorded to the dialects. Together with the
processoflinguistichomogeneity,manynationstatesdevelopedahighlevel
language which was canonised by linguists and other academics. Pierre
17 TherearesimilardevelopmentsinGalicia,which,withitsaround2.7millioninhabitants,
isoneofthepoorestregionsinSpain.InJune2007thefollowingresolutionswerepassed
regarding the Galician language. (1) All communication with thecivilservicemustbe
madeinGalician.(2)InstructioninschoolsmustbeatleastfiftypercentinGalician.This
appliedto pre‐schoolaswellasforprimary,secondaryandadulteducation.Allsubjects
were to be taught in Galician including Physics, Biology, etc. (3) The teachers had to
provideproofofcompetenceinGalician,which,ofcourse,excludedmanyapplicantsfrom
otherpartsofSpain.
2.ConceptualFramework
45
Bourdieu (1992) has reconstructed this process for France and has shown
how it was possible for the elites to establish a single languageandto
delegitimiseotherlanguagesanddialects(Bourdieu1992;cf.alsoLoos2000;
fromtheperspectiveofahistoriancf.Weber1976).Commandofthehigh
level language is paired with high social recognition. Those who know it,
distancethemselvesfromthosewhodonot.Theycapitaliseontheir ability
byusingitassymboliccapital,gainingdistinctionbydistancing themselves
fromthecommonlanguageofthelowerclasseswithallits“vulgarity”
(Bourdieu& Passeron 1977: 119; cf.also Bourdieu 1992:43‐65).Aboveall
the schools and institutes of learning classify those people being able to
articulatewellinthehighlevellanguagewithhighsocialrecognition.
Thecommandofthehighlevellanguagenotonlybringsadvantages in
respect to qualifications, better chances on the employment market and a
higherincome(seetheremarksonthesocietybuildingfunctionoflanguage),
but it also signalises membership in the upper classes and helps to create
classes,thatis,totransferaclasspositionintoclassconsciousnessandclass
identity(Bourdieu1992:62ff.).18Researchinthepsychologyoflanguagehas
showninmanystudies thathighlevellanguage, whichisusuallyspoken by
the upper classes, is valued considerably more than class dialects (cf. the
literature overview in Giles & Billings 2004). The different evaluations of
language lead to consequences for its speakers. Landlords prefer speakers
whospeakthehighlevellanguage;thesameistrueforteachersinevaluating
children’sschoolwork.Forthesamecrimesjudgesgivemildersentencesto
those who speak the high level language well than to those who do not.
Finally,ithas alsobeenshown thatemployers, all otherthings beingequal,
aremoreinclinedtohirepeoplewhospeakthehighlevellanguagethannot.
Theexamplesillustratethatlanguagecanbe,andisusedasacentralfactorin
themakingofvariouskindsof collectiveidentities.Muchhistoricalresearch
demonstrateshowimportantandhowrelevantlanguagecanbeforthe
18 Thesituationisthesameformigrantswhochangenotonlytheir country,but also the
languagecommunity.Thelearningandthespeakingofthelanguageofthehostcountryis
notonlycombinedwith advantages in the society,whichwehave described above,but
alsowithanincreaseinrecognitionandsymboliccapital.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
46
construction of “imagined communities”. Socio‐psychological findings
provide plausible reasons why language is especially suited to serve as a
factor in the creation of communities. If people identify with a linguistic
communitytheyareoftenpreparedtobearahigh“price”forthedefenceor
fortheexpansion oftheirlinguistic community. Forinstance,migrants who
haveahighidentificationwiththeirnativetongueandregarditasoneofthe
majorfactorsoftheiroriginalidentity,andforthisreasonrejectthelanguage
oftheirhostcountry,willhavetoacceptdrawbacksineducation, in
integrationintheemploymentmarket,increatingnetworkswiththenatives
and in the extent of their political involvement. The people ofGalicia,who
possessahighidentificationwiththeirregionandthereforesupportthestate
educationpolicyofinstructingthechildreninGalician,willlimitthechances
of their children to have international communication and relationships to
oneregion,becauseGalicianisspokenbyonlyaveryfewpeople.
These examples demonstrate that the society and community building
functionsofalanguagecancontradicteachother.Iflanguageisanimportant
identitymarkerofagroupthenrelinquishingtheirownlanguagecanmean
the loss of their collective identity. Under these conditions instrumental
advantageswhichmightfollowfromadaptingtoanewlanguagewillbepaid
forbydisadvantagesinthesymbolicdimensionofidentityformation.
Thissituationisalsotruefortheacquisitionofaforeignlanguage.Peoplecan
identify positively or negatively with a foreign language. The stronger a
positiveemotionalidentificationwithalanguage,thegreateris the
willingnesstolearnitandviceversa.Thelevelofidentification with a
languageis,inturn, primarilydeterminedbythe levelofidentificationwith
thegroupwho speaksthis language.19 Thelevel of intensitypeopleidentify
withlanguages isconsequently determined by the collectiveidentities they
feelconnectedto.
19 TherejectionofEnglishbyasectionofthepopulationinGermanyaftertheSecondWorld
War is explained by the rejection of the Americans and the British as victors and as
occupiers;therejectionof Spanish in Catalonian isanexpressionoftherejectionof the
dominanceoftheSpanishcentralgovernment.
2.ConceptualFramework
47
2.3TransnationalLinguisticCapitalanditsGrowingImportance
Whenpeopleliveinasocietywhichislinguisticallyhomogeneousandcutoff
fromothersocietieswhichspeakdifferentlanguages,thereisnotmuchsense
inlearningaforeignlanguage.Theycanimproveneithertheirsocialnortheir
communalchancesthroughlearninganotherlanguage.However,the more
societies are interconnected with other societies, whose members speak a
foreignlanguage, the more valuableit becomes to be able to speak several
languages.Iwilldealinmoredetailinchapter3withthechanged
circumstanceswhichcreatethepotentialfortheuseofforeign language
skills.Atthispointitwillsufficetogiveashortsketchofthechanged
circumstanceswhichsupporttheargumentthatunderglobalisation and
Europeanisationthepossessionoftransnationallinguisticcapitalhasbecome
particularlyimportant. Nation statesocieties aredescribed intheliterature
as “container societies” (Taylor 1994; Beck 1997). This means that the
institutionsofasocietyremainrestrictedtotheterritoryofeachnationstate.
Even the various forms of interaction (from the exchange of goods to
marriage) dominantly take place within the nation state. Globalisation and
transnationalisation have increasingly subjected the national states to
change.Thisistrueaboveallforthecountrieswhicharemembers of the
EuropeanUnion.ThememberstatesoftheEUhavebeendefinitely made
“porous”inthelastfortyyears,insofarastheyhavetransferred a part of
theirsovereigntytotheinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnion,whereby the
politicalareasforwhichtheEuropeanUnionandnotthenation states are
responsible have been expanded. This development, initiated by the EU
membercountriesthemselves,ofshiftinglegislativepowershasleadtoa
EuropeanisationofthesocietiesofthemembercountriesoftheEU,aswellas
toanincreaseinexchangeamongthem,thuscontributingtoaporosityofthe
nation state containers (cf. Münch 2001, 2008; Fligstein 2008; from the
historicalperspective cf. Kaelble 2005,2007). Above all the creation of the
Europeandomesticmarket,aswellasthefreedomofmovementof goods,
capital,servicesandlabourhasencouragedtrans‐bordereconomic
development,theincreaseandthegrowthofinnerEuropeantrade, the
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
48
growthofEuropeanvalueaddedchainsandthetransnationalisation of
capital(cf.Ambrosius1996;Hirst&Thompson1998;Fligstein&StoneSweet
2002; Fligstein & Merand 2002; Verwiebe 2004). However, European
societieshavebeen deeplyalterednot only byEuropeanisation,butalsoby
globalisation. Since the 1970s interregional economic, communication and
politicalexchangehasincreasedexponentially(seechapter3.2).
These structural changes have different consequences for the different
groupswithinasociety.Manyobservershavepointedoutthataboveallthe
upper class and especially high finance profit from globalisation and
Europeanisation (Beck 1997; Zürn 1998;Altvater&Mahnkopf1999;
Hartmann2007).Openbordersenablebusinessestowinnewmarketsandto
relocatetocountriesinwhichwagesandlabourcostsareconsiderably
cheaperthanintheirowncountry.Incomparisontobusiness,themobilityof
theworkforceismuchlower.Peoplearestronglyboundtotheirhome,their
family and their country. The differences in mobility lead to differences in
opportunitiesandincome.Whilecapitalitselfprofitsfromthechangedorder
ofthings,peopleveryoftenhavetobearthebruntofthedisadvantages,such
asreductionorstagnationinpay,adropintaxrevenueforthe state, or
higherunemployment.
Nevertheless, all work is not the same, as people are equipped in different
wayswithhumancapital;itdependsonadequatehumancapitalwhetherthe
process of transnationalisation and Europeanisation is connected with
advantagesordisadvantages.Multilingualismassumesanaddedimportance
underthe conditionsoftransnationalisation and Europeanisation.Sincethe
nationstatesusuallyspeakdifferentlanguages,trans‐borderexchangeisonly
madepossible,ormadeconsiderablyeasier,whenpeoplehavethenecessary
transnationallanguageskills.Havingthisresourcemakesitverymucheasier
tointeractwithpeoplefromothercountries,todobusiness,tocooperateon
scientific matters, to conduct political negotiations, to organise protests
beyondnationalborders,toenterintorelationships,etc.,inshort:tosocialise
transnationallyindifferentdimensions.Beinginpossessionoftransnational
languageskillsthusputsthosewhoaremultilingualinaposition to play a
2.ConceptualFramework
49
partintheprocessoftransnationalisationandEuropeanisationandtobuild
uptherequiredtransnationalrelationships.Thosewhoonlyspeak their
nativelanguage are confinedto their own country and cannot makeuseof
theadvantagesofaunitedEuropeandaglobalisedworld.Therefore,beingin
possession of transnational linguistic capital is a new source of social
inequalityinthecontextofadevelopingEuropeansociety.
IntheempiricalanalysesIwilldifferentiatebetweentwovariations of
transnationallinguisticcapital.Peoplepossesstransnationallinguisticcapital
when they speak various foreign languages regardless of which foreign
languagestheseare–alllanguageswillbetreatedequallyhere.However,the
usefulnessofalanguagevarieswiththeamountofcommunicationpartners
one can achieve through its knowledge. The number of potential
communication partners is calculated in turn from the sum of people who
speakthislanguageasamothertongueandthosewhospeakitasaforeign
language. Since this number of speakers is different depending on the
language,theutilityofdifferentlanguagesvaries.Theamount of people,for
instance, who speak Latvian or Finnish as a native or foreign language is
considerablylowerthanforthosewhospeakEnglish.Englishisthelanguage
withintheEU,aswewillsee,whichhasthehighestcommunicative value.
People possess – and this is the second variant – transnational linguistic
capitalwhentheyknowthelanguagewiththehighestlinguistic utility
(English).
Goodlinguisticcompetencecanbe,aswehaveseenabove,usefulforvarious
socialfields.Thisisalsovalid forpossessing transnationallinguistic capital
underthecircumstancesalreadyoutlined.
(a) Multilingualism opens up, first of all, educational possibilities and
providesthechancetoacquirequalificationswhichwillleadto better paid
work. The more and the better one knows different languages, so all the
better–ceterisparibus–themarkswillbethatonegetsinschool.Inaddition
andaboveall,multilingualismenablesentrancetoinstitutionsoflearningin
other countries, to pass exams there and to obtain qualifications, which,
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
50
when we think of American and British elite universities, have a better
reputation.
(b) Multilingualism improves access to better professional positions;
positions which are coupled with a high income and prestige. Ontheone
handaccesstotheemploymentmarketisfrequentlyconnectedwith the
acquisition of educational qualifications. If having transnational linguistic
capital leads to higher and better qualifications, then it is indirectly
connected to better access to better paid jobs. On the other hand
multilingualismisdirectlyconnectedtochancesontheemploymentmarket.
This is especially true in the European Union. The institutionalising of the
ruleonfreemovementhasgivenallcitizensoftheUnionthefreedomtoseek
work, to settle or to provide services in every member state. The rule on
freedom of movement is equally valid for the self‐employed (therightof
settlement).This legalexpansionof jobpossibilities caninfact onlybenefit
those who can speak several languages, because most foreign jobs require
knowledgeofthecountryofresidence’slanguage.Domesticfirmshavealso
internationalised their contacts, which has lead to a change ofthe
requirement profile for employees. International experience, intercultural
competenceandmultilingualismhavebecomecentralqualifications. The
sameis true forpolitics andthe politicalbureaucracy.“Even bureaucracies,
traditionally the stronghold of nation state self‐isolation, are today
incorporatedinnetworksofcommunicationandinformation.Manytechnical
committeesandadministrations(...)havetoconsultwithexpertsfromother
countriesinordertobeabletocorrectlyassesslegalaffairsandissues
resultingfrom this interweaving” (Mau2009: 69). It cannot be denied that
indeed their level of internationalisation has increased enormously (see
chapter 3.1). All in all one can assume that people who have transnational
competencesingeneralandtransnationallinguisticcapitalinparticularhave
bettercareerpossibilities.20
20Onthequestionastowhatextenttheelitesinvariouscountries are already
EuropeanisedseeMichaelHartmann(2007:195‐213,2009).
2.ConceptualFramework
51
(c)Thirdly,multilingualismimprovesthepossibilityofexpandingone’sown
network and hence the chance to internationalise social relations.
International networks are themselves in turn social capital, whichcanbe
usedtoexpandbusinessconnections,politicalcontactsandasaninformation
stockexchange.
(d) Finally, having transnational linguistic capital improves the chances for
political participation. Knowing foreign languages enables participation in
thepoliticallifeofanothercountry;onecanfollowthereportsinthemedia
better and get involved by joining parties and civil organisations. The
transnationalisationofpoliticalparticipationisespeciallyrelevantwithinthe
context of European integration. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 the
citizensoftheEUposses,besidestheirownnationality,citizenship of the
Union,andtherebyobtaintherighttovoteinlocalelectionsintheEuropean
country where they are resident. However, they can only make use of this
legalrightwhentheyunderstandthelanguageofthecountryandcaninform
themselvesaboutthepoliticaldebateinthecountryconcerned.
(e)Apartfromtheinstrumentaluse,multilingualismhasasymbolicuse. As
we have seen, the symbolic use of language refers to identification with a
community,wherebythelanguagecanbeusedtoconstructvarious
communities(nation, region,class,etc.). Isuspect thathaving transnational
linguisticcapitalcanbeusedtocreateanewclassconsciousness.Peoplewho
are multilingual and can therefore be active in different countriesandin
differentlanguagesarerespectedbytheirfellowsforhavingthiscompetence.
Inthesamewayastheculturaleliteinthecountriesstage‐manages their
highlycultured wayof lifeas aneducated classthrough publicappearance,
distancing themselves from the middle classes, so the possession of
transnational linguistic capital enables people to present themselves as a
transnationalclassandtodistancethemselvesnotonlyfromthemiddleand
lower classes but also from the upper classes in their own countries, who
haveremainedpurelynational.Thusonecancapitaliseontheabilitytospeak
manylanguagesbycreatingsymboliccapitalandbydistancingoneselffrom
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
52
the “locals”.21 It is not difficult to imagine that the strategies to gaining
distinctiononthebasisofforeignlanguageskillsaremuchthesameasthose
which Pierre Bourdieu has described for the highly cultured life style. The
fact, that foreign language competence is a result of a learning process is
coveredandmultilingualismispresentedasasupposedlynaturalskill.Those
whodonotspeakanyforeignlanguageareregardedasbeingbackward.
Besides having a new class consciousness the new multilingual elite might
standout ashavingan alteredsolidarity withthe nation state.Adam Smith
formulatedasimilaridea150yearsagoinhisbook‘WealthofNations’:“The
proprietoroflandis necessarilyacitizenof theparticularcountryin which
hisestatelies(...).Theproprietorofastockisproperlyacitizenoftheworld,
andisnotnecessarilyattachedtoanyparticularcountry”(Smith1864:358).
Itispreciselythosepeoplewhoareoperatingtransnationally,integratedin
transnationalnetworks,whodissolvetheirtiestothenationstate.22Steffen
Mau, Jan Mewes and Ann Zimmermann (2008a/b) show, for example, that
people who have many foreign connections, who are embedded in
transnationalnetworks,aremorelikelytobecosmopolitanintheirattitudes
andhave positive attitudes towardsforeigners (Mau et al.2008a/b).23One
can assume that a transnational positionwillalsoleadtoanew tie to and
identificationwithinternationalorganisations,suchastheEuropeanUnion.I
willreturntothissubjectinchapter5againwithmyownbriefanalysis.
21 Empiricallywe know verylittle about thenewly developing transnationalclass, even if
therearesomepopularscientificspeculationsonthissubject.
22 SamuelP. Huntington(2004) describes inhis book on the changeinAmericanidentity
thereductioninthetiesoftheinternationalelitetotheUSAandseesinitadangerforthe
futureoftheUSA.
23 Beingcosmopolitanisdefinedbytheauthorsasfollows:“Cosmopolitanism,incontrast,is
conceived as a particular worldview characterised by the capacity to mediate between
different cultures, the recognition of increasing interconnectedness of political
communitiesandtheapprovalofpoliticalresponsibilityatthesupranationalandglobal
level”(Mauetal.2008b:2).
53
3.FROMNATIONSTATESTOAEUROPEANSOCIETY
IntheprecedingchapterIhaveemphasisedthatitisonlyunder certain
contextual circumstances that foreign language proficiency becomes an
important human resource. Three factors are significant here, whichIwill
describeinmoredetailinthischapter.Thesefactorsaredeterminedbythe
macro‐structuralbackgroundconditionswhichmaketransnationallinguistic
capitalarelevantresourceinthefirstplace.
ThenecessitytospeakvariouslanguagesinordertointeractwithinEurope
isdependentupontherespectiveinstitutionalisedlanguageconstellation.In
theUnitedStates,forexample,Englishistheofficiallanguageinallthestates.
ItisnotnecessaryforthecitizensofMaineandIdahotospeak a foreign
languageinordertobeabletocommunicatewitheachother,asidefromthe
possibledifficultiesincommunicatingwith immigrants. IntheUnitedStates
ofEurope,however,thesituationisentirelydifferent.TheEUisamergerof
twenty‐sevensovereignstates.Asarulethereisonlyoneofficiallanguagein
each nation. A linguistically segmented structure organised according to
nationstatesisaconstitutivecharacteristicofEurope’slinguistic
constellation.A descriptionof thegenesis ofthis basicconstellation will be
thetopicofthefirstsection.
Aslongasthemajorityofinteractionandcommunicationoccurswithinthe
bordersofaparticularnationthereisnoneedtolearnaforeign language.
However,themoresocietiesinteractwithotherswhichspeakdifferent
languages, the more valuable it becomestospeakaforeignlanguage. In a
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
54
second step I will explain how the processes of Europeanisationand
globalisation have weakened and internationalised the borders of the
encapsulated societies of the EU – known as container societies–sothat
possessingtransnationallinguisticcapitalhasbecomearelevantresource.
The emergence of nation states is a perfect example of how formerly
linguisticallyheterogeneousstructuresbecamehomogeneousduetopolitical
decisions. It is for this reason that it is important to analyse the language
policiesoftheEuropeanUnionmoreclosely,whichIwilldointhethird
section.ThelanguagepoliciesoftheEUarecharacterisedbytwosignificant
features:ontheonehandtheacceptanceofthelinguisticheterogeneityofthe
EuropeanUnionandtherejectionofapolicyoflinguistichomogenisation,
andontheotherconsiderablesupportforEuropeancitizens’multilingualism.
InathirdstepIwillanalyseinmoredetailthepoliticaland ideological
backgroundofthesepolicies.
There is a general argument which underlies this chapter: The linguistic
orderisaparasiteonthesocialorder;ifthehost(socialstructure of the
world)changes, thenthe parasite(constellation oflanguages) changes.The
socialorderisinturnanorderwhichisstructuredhierarchically with a
centreandaperiphery;thestrengthsandweaknessesofindividuallanguages
reflectthehierarchicallystructureoftheworldorder.
3.1NationBuilding,andLanguageStandardisation,WorldSociety
andtheRiseofEnglishasaHegemoniclinguafranca
The need for people to speak different languages so that they can interact
with one another across Europe, and beyond, arises from the specific
institutionalisedlanguage constellation.If all theEuropean countries spoke
the same language, then the problem of mutual understanding would not
arise. This, however, is not the case, since the institutionalised order of
languages,thatis,theregimeoflanguagesinEurope,isorganisedaccording
tonationstatesand ishencelinguisticallysegmented.Within theindividual
nation states themselves, though, there is only very limited linguistic
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
55
heterogeneity,sincemostofthememberstatesrecogniseonlyonelanguage;
inter‐state heterogeneity, in contrast, is virtually one hundred percent,
because the twenty‐seven member countries have twenty‐three official
languages. In Section 3.1.2 I will explain precisely how this linguistic
constellationinEuropecameaboutasthenationstatesemerged.
Nationstatesthemselvesareembeddedinaninternationalorder,inaworld
society which allots to the various nation states very different statuses.
Inevitably, the varying levels of importance between the nationstatesgo
hand in hand with the varying importance of their languages. The factors
which are responsible for the worldwide dominance of English will be
discussedinasecondstep(chapter3.1.3).ThefactthatEnglishtodayisthe
languagemost widely disseminatedis the reasonwhy it isnot only a good
ideatolearnforeignlanguagesingeneral,butEnglishinparticular.Theideas
concerning the relationship between the global society and the status of
languagesarebasedprimarilyontheworkofAbramdeSwaan(deSwaan
1993,2001b).
3.1.1GeneralMechanismsofLanguageChange
Recentcomparativelinguisticshasemployedconceptsandtheories from
evolutionarybiology(cf.Dixon1997;Mufwene2001)toanalysenotonlythe
relationshipofdifferentlanguagestooneanotherbutalsotheir linguistic
changes.Inprincipal,threeconstellationscanbedistinguishedregardingthe
developmentofthevariouslanguagesinrelationtooneanother.
(1)Thejumpingoffpointofthedevelopment of languagesisaconstellation
inwhichthereareseveraldifferentlanguagegroupsspeakingdifferent
languagesinonearea,butwhicharenot,oronlytosomeextent,
interconnectedwithoneanother.Inthissituationthelanguagedevelopment
of the individual languages is influenced primarily by endogenous factors.
Theevolutionoflanguageisbasedontheconcretespokenlanguageandnot
ontheabstractsystemofrules,whichlinguistssupposetobethe common
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
56
elementsofalanguage,or,inotherwordsitsdeeperstructure.Languagesare
not spoken in a uniform manner by their speakers; there are constant
deviationsfromthestandardlanguage,becausetherearescarcely any
speakerswhospeakalanguageperfectly.Thismechanismofthe“imperfect
replication” of a language (Mufwene 2001: 193) leads to the constant
productionoflinguisticdeviations(poolofvariations).Thesevariationslead
totheemergenceofdialectsandoverseveralthousandyearsthisleadstoa
changeinthelanguage,somuchsothattheultimatechangedeviatestosuch
anextentthattheoriginallanguageanditsmutationhaveverylittleleftin
common.
(2) The development of languages is different when different groups of
speakersofvariouslanguagesareincontactwithoneanother.Dixon(1997)
distinguishes a special sub‐caseforthisconstellation.Withinaparticular
territory there exist several language groups with a similar size. If these
differentgroupsareincontactwithoneanotherthenchangesin the
languagescanbeputdowntointernalmutationsontheonehandandmutual
linguistic influences between the groups on the other; the changes are,
however,ofamoderatenature.Iftheconstellationsurvivesfor alongtime,
for instance, over several thousand years, and if exchange between the
(different)language groupscontinues, then thisleads toa slowadaption of
the languages to one another, so that they converge into a common
prototype. Dixon (1997) has demonstrated that the development of
languagesinAustraliauptoitsdiscoveryandcolonisationfollowed this
model.
(3) The constellation between various languages changes dramatically,
though,whenasituationofpunctuatedequilibriumoccurs.Theconcept of
punctuated equilibriums is a theory published by the American
palaeontologistsNilesEldredgeandStephenJayGouldin1972,whichstates
that biological development normally occurs slowly and through small
variationsinparticularphases.Changes,ontheotherhand,occur in an
explosive manner when the process is “punctuated” by exogenous events.
Dixonappliedthisideatotheanalysisofchangesinlanguages.Eventswhich
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
57
leadto a rapid change inthe language constellation are generally speaking
societal events, which alter the power and prestige between different
languagegroups.Thus,naturalcatastrophesorepidemicscandecimate the
numberofspeakersofaparticularlanguage,causingtherelativepowerof
otherlanguagegroupstoincrease,whichthenexpandatthecostoftheother
languages.Therefore,thechangesintherelativepowerofdifferentgroupsof
speakersareresponsibleforthefactthatsomelanguagesgainwhileothers
losesignificance.Thelanguages themselves react to social changes like
parasitestotheirhosts.Withtheexpansionordisappearanceofsocialgroups
(hosts),languages also expandor disappear (Mufwene2001: 192ff.). There
are many reasons for the power of a specific group, for example, military
might, conquest and the suppression of formerly foreign territories,
economicpowerthroughtheexpansionoftrade,aswellasreligious or
ideologicallymotivatedexpansion,constitutethemajordrivingforces.
Linguisticresearch onthe evolution of languages formsthe foundationand
pointofdepartureforsociologicalanalysis.Thetwofollowingdevelopments
areparticularlyimportantforourresearchquestion.Theriseofnationstates
inEurope and theirworldwide expansion as a type and a modelof how to
organiseasocietycanbeunderstoodasapunctuation,whichhas
fundamentallyalteredthehierarchyoflanguages,sothatontheonehandin
almostallnationstatesaprocessoflinguistichomogenisationwastriggered,
while on the other hand linguistic segmentation between the nation states
was institutionalised insofar as different nation states speak different
languages.
Atthesametimethenationstatesareembeddedinaworldsociety whose
structure gives varying positions of power to the different nation states.
Powerfulnationstates,orratherthosewhichwereinfluentialinthepastand
havelefttracesoftheirpowerbehindthem,suchasthecolonial powers,
determinetheinternationalhierarchyoflanguagesbecausetheirpositionof
world hegemony bestowed upon their individual languages a hegemonic
position.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
58
Forbothdevelopmentsitistruetosaythatsocietalinstitutionsprecedesand
determinesthelanguageconstellationandthehierarchyamongthe
languages. The number of individual languages which are spoken on this
earth, the dominance of some languages and the insignificance of others is
undoubtedly determined by the powerstructuresandthesocialorder of
institutions,whichdeterminethehierarchyoflanguageslikeapunctation.
3.1.2NationStateBuildingandLanguageStandardisation
Whensociologistsand,indeed,laypeopletalkaboutsocietytheyareusually
thinking of societies as nation states, for example, the societiesoftheUSA,
Ghana,FranceorPeru.Evenincaseswherenonationstateexists, the
problemofthenon‐existenceofasocietyisdealtwithintermsofnationstate
categories.Themostprominentexample,whichwehear about onthenews
almostdaily,isthatofthePalestinians,whoarestrivingtoachievetheirown
nationstate.Eveninareasoflimitedstatehood,asinAfghanistan,theprocess
ofdisintegrationis discussedwith referenceto thenation state(cf.Risse&
Lehmkuhl2007). According toJohn W.Meyer,world societyconsists ofthe
structural isomorphism of different nation states (Meyer et al. 1997). To
understand societies as nation state societies is not an invention of
sociologists blinded by constructivism, and therefore not the result of a
methodological nationalism, but it has real substantive content. The world
societyisinrealitydividedinto,amongotherthings,nationstates.Atpresent
thereare193differentnationsstates(asrecognisedbythe United Nations)
intheworld.
Historicalresearchontheemergenceofnationstatesissoextensivethatan
overviewisnolongerpossible.Thefollowingshortsummarycannot do
justicetotheamountofscholarlyliteratureavailable,nortothediversityof
the different routes to nationhood. However, this is not our aim. From a
sociologicalpointofviewourpurposehereistodescribeasanidealtypethe
general relationship between nation building and language constellation
primarilywithreferencetotheEuropeannationstates.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
59
From an historical point of view organising societies as nationstatesisa
relativelyrecentdevelopment.Theprocessbeganinthe18
thcenturyand
acceleratedinthe19thand20thcenturies.Whatarethecentralcharacteristics
ofanationstate?Accordingtotheclassicaldefinitionofthe stateby Georg
Jellinek(“TheThreeElementsTheory”cf.Jellinek1905;cf.Hobsbawm1996:
516f.),astaterequirespoliticalpoweronthebasisofhavingthemonopolyof
physicalpower,aswellasexerciseofthispowerwithintheborders of a
territory and over the citizens inhabiting that territory. According to Max
Weber the state has “Anstaltscharakter” (institutional character) (Weber
1985:516f.):Firstly,it securesanddefinesthe borderswiththehelp ofthe
militaryandassumescontroloverallincomingandoutgoinggoods and
people(withreferencetothefollowingseeaboveallRokkan1999, 2000).
Tollbarriers,passportcontrolsandcustomsembodystateborder policies.
Secondly,thecreationofanationstateisconcurrentwiththeinstallationofa
systemofinstitutionsconfinedonlytothatterritoryaswellasthecreationof
aunifiedsystemoflawsandregulations.Thisincludesthecreation of a
nationwideadministration,whosewritrunstothefurthestcorner of the
nation,meaning the introductionof aunified system of registration (births,
deaths, etc.), as well as a national currency and a national legal system, a
nationaltaxsystem,thecreationandmaintainingofanationwidetransport
system (roads and rail), and a countrywide system of schools and
universities. A national territory is pervaded and unified by these
institutions,whilelocaland regional peculiaritiesareusuallysmoothed out.
At a later historical date, state rule reconnects to the will of the people it
governs through the establishment of democratic forms of government
withinthe national territoryand theemergence of an interventionist state,
which intervenes in the nationalsocietytoestablishfavourable conditions
forthemarketeconomyandtoensuresocialequalitythroughawelfarestate
(cf.Leibfried&Zürn2006).
The inclusion of the people who live within the territory of a state occurs
paralleltotheemergenceofnationalinstitutions.Thepeoplebecomecitizens
of their state, they allow themselves to be registered, recorded and
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
60
administeredascitizensoftheircountry.Theyhavetobeeducated
(compulsoryschoolattendance),areobligedtodefendtheircountryintime
ofwar,mustpaytaxes andexciseduties,inreturnfor whichtheyenjoythe
protectionofthe stateand freedomofmovement withinitsborders. Above
all,if it isa democratic state, they have the rightto elect theirgovernment
andcanclaimsocialwelfarebenefitsfromtheir(andonlytheir)country.
The unique nature of a nation state consists in the fact that the different
dimensions of the modern state overlap at the national level (Leibfried &
Zürn2007:10).Thecongruenceofterritory,populationandstatehoodinthe
abovementioned dimensions is, therefore, the constitutive characteristic of
the creation of nation states (Held 1995; Zürn 1998). In this respect the
descriptionofnationstatesascontainersocietiesencompassinganincrease
ininteractionisacorrectone(Taylor1994;Beck1997).
However, nation states are not only characterised by specific institutional
features, nation states are also characterised by a new type ofsenseof
community,byaspecificfeelingorsenseofbelongingfeltbyitscitizens.The
nationbecomesadominantobjectofidentificationforitscitizens and
competes with alternative objects of identification, such as religion, region,
ethnicity,orsocialclass(Anderson1991).
Historically and analytically two different combinations of state and nation
can be distinguished. In the first case the process of building a state takes
placeinitiallyandthenationcomeslater.CharlesTillyspeaksinthiseventof
“statelednationalism”.Inthesecondcase,anationalsocialmovement
precedes the state building process. Tilly describes this process as a “state
seeking”process.Theemergenceofastatecanfollowfromtheseparationof
aterritoryfromalargeroneorthroughtheintegrationofseveralterritories
intoanewnationstate(cf.Tilly1994:133f.).
The importance of some features for the collective identity of a specific
nationstateandthestatusgiventoonefeatureinfavourofanother varies
considerablyamongthenationstates(Weber1985: 242f.,528f.;Hobsbawm
1990). Many nation states put institutional characteristics at the heart of
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
61
their sense of identity. The rightswonwithcitizenship,thevalues of the
constitution, become the elements which are described as the special
characteristicsofthenationofwhichoneisproud(statenation).Asarulewe
aredealingherewithnationstatesinwhichthestateandtheapparatus of
power have already been established before the process of nation building
began(cf.here Hroch2005).Typical representativesofthe statenationare
the USA and France at the end of the 18thandthebeginningofthe19
th
centuries. Other nation states emphasise a common descent, a common
religionorcommonculturalvaluesatthecentreoftheirpersonalnarratives
(culturalnation).Veryoftenthesearenationswhichhavenotyetdeveloped
astate,and inwhichtheprocess ofcreatinga statefollowedthe processof
nationbuilding.24GermanyandItalyarefrequentlycitedastheidealtypesof
a cultural nation. Nevertheless, it is equally true that the so‐called state
nationsseektoestablishanumberofculturalelementsinorder to create
their identity. The USA, for example, sees itself as a nation within the
Protestanttradition;Americanscelebratetheirownhistory extensively asa
symbolofnationalunityaswellasreferringtotheEnglishlanguageasoneof
thecentralfeaturesoftheiridentity(cf.formanyothersHuntington2004).
Dramatic consequences for the linguistic order are bound up with the
emergence and expansion of nation states as the dominant form of society
andcommunity.InpracticallyallEuropeannationstates,butnotonlyhere,a
linguistichomogeneityisestablishedwhen onelanguageisdistinguishedas
theobligatorynationalandofficiallanguage.Otherlanguages,dialectsorthe
languagesofmigrantswhichhaveexisteduptothenaremarginalised and
24 Historical research has shown that according to each nation state and historical
constellation considerably different identity markers were used, so that possible
generalisationshavetobe treated withcaution(seeHobsbawm1990forthefollowing).
Inmanycountriesethnicityplaysanimportantroleasanidentitymarker (China,Japan
andKorea),inothersverylittle.InPolandandIrelandtheCatholic religion is an
important criterion for national identity, not, however, in France.Therearemany
countrieswhichlooktoalong(partiallyinvented)historyasacriterionfortheiridentity,
whileontheothertherearejustasmanyethniccommunitieswhichhavealonghistory,
liketheMapucheandtheAymaraIndians, that do not use it as a criterion for their
identityconstruction.Finally,inmanynationstatesacommonlanguageassumestherole
ofdefiningthenation,not,however,inSwitzerland,BelgiumorCanada.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
62
oftenrigorouslyrepressed(cf.thecomprehensivestudybyKamusella2009
onthedevelopmentofCentralEurope).25
SeveralofthesmallerEuropeanstates,forexampleBelgiumandSwitzerland,
areexceptionstothegeneralrule,sinceinthesecasestheinternallinguistic
cleavages were institutionalised, which has lead to a federal system of
institutions(Rokkan1999;Rokkan&Urwin1983).Inspiteofstateunitythe
internal linguistic cleavages of both countries define to a great degree the
behaviourofitscitizens,aswehaveseenfromtheexampleofSwitzerlandin
chapter2.Inthiscasewithinoneandthesamecountrythepossibilities of
mutual understanding are limited.ForBelgium,whichparticipated in the
Eurobarometer survey upon which our empirical analysis in chapter4is
based,thefollowingdistributionbecameevident.Fromthosewho speak
Flemishastheirmothertongue,70%alsospeakFrench,althoughonly27%
ofWalloonsspeakFlemish(owncalculations),whichmeansthat73%ofthe
WalloonscannotcommunicatewiththeFlemishintheirnativelanguage.
InSwitzerlandwhereasidefromRhaeto‐Romance,whichisspokenby very
fewpeople,therearethreemorelanguages.IwarWerlen(2008)reportsthe
followingdistribution.FromamongthosewhospeakGermanastheirmother
tongue,71%speakFrenchand32%Italian.OfthosewhospeakItalian as
theirnativelanguage,74%speakFrenchand65%German.IftheSwiss or
Belgianswanttocommunicatewitheachothertheyoftenhaveto resortto
thelanguagewhichthemajorityofthemspeakmostfrequentlybutwhichis
notoneofthenationallanguages,namelyEnglish.26
Thereasonwhyinmostcasestheprocessofnationstatebuildingwenthand
inhandwiththeprocessofestablishingonlyoneofficiallanguagecanbe
25Thetermofficiallanguageishereandinthefollowingnotto be understood as being
definedexplicitlyinthe constitution as theofficiallanguage. This is neither trueforthe
UKnorfortheUSA.ItisonlyintheconstitutionsofsomeUSfederalstatesthatEnglishis
expresslystatedastheofficiallanguageintheUSA.
26 For example, more Walloons speak English than Flemish. In the course of time the
numberofWalloonswhospeakFlemishhasevendeclined,whereasthenumberofthose
whospeakEnglishhasincreased.CommunicationbetweenWalloonsandtheFlemishby
meansofathird,foreign,languageisbecomingincreasinglylikely.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
63
tracedbacktothetwocentralfunctionsoflanguage:itssociety(a)andits
communitybuildingfunction(b).
(a)Thecreationofanationalsystemofinstitutions,thepermeationofsociety
with these institutions and the integration of citizens into this process are
made much easier, if the people living in the territory speak the same
language. The striving towards linguistic homogeneity had its origins in
Absolutism (Hroch 2005: 62ff.), since bureaucracy, legislation,andall
regulationscanbeverymuchmoreeasilyenforcedwhenthepeoplewhoare
subject to them speak the same language. The process of linguistic
homogeneitywascontinuedwiththeemergenceofnationstates.A school
and university system can be more easily founded when the language of
instructionisthesame.Transportsystemscanbebetterco‐ordinated when
thecoordinationcanrefertoaunifiedsystemofsigns,andtheintegrationof
the citizens into the democratic process is more easily achieved with
monolingualism. The enormous reduction of transaction costs which goes
handinhandwithmonolingualismisthemostimportantreasonwhy
processesofnationstatebuildingalmostalwayscoincidewiththeattemptto
determine,standardiseandimposeonelanguage(Hobsbawm1996:88).Put
another way, in those countries in which the emergence of a state and
societal integration were very advanced, the pressure to achieve linguistic
homogeneitywasverygreat,whereasinthosecountrieswhichwere less
socially integrated the level of linguistic segregation was higher. Miroslav
Hroch (2005: 65ff.) has used this argumentinanattempttoexplain why
Westernsocietiesweremorehighlylinguisticallyhomogenisedthanthoseof
theAustro‐HungarianEmpire.
(b)Atthesametime,andtoavaryingdegreeinthedifferentnationstates,
thesinglelanguagewhichhadbeendeclaredthenationallanguagebecamea
distinguishing marker of national identity. In chapter 2, I have already
pointedoutwhilereferringtosocial‐psychologicalliteraturethatlanguageis
particularlysuitedforthedevelopmentofacollectiveidentity.Infact,many
nationstatesdefinetheiridentity,althoughnotalone,throughtheirnational
language. To this end, they generally create institutions whichstandardise
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
64
andguardlinguisticusagebyimposingobligatorydictionariesandgrammar
books.Mythsabouttheoriginsofthelanguageare“invented”,thehistoryof
thelanguageiscanonisedanditsspecialqualitiesareadjured,furthermorea
national literature written in that language is considered as something
special. As historical research has demonstrated in detail, many of the
processesinthevariousnationstatesofEuropehavedevelopedinthis
manner.Thefusionofnationalidentityisalsoexpressedinthe names of
manynationstates(England/English,German/Germany,French/France,and
Spain/Spanish).Inthesecasestheverynomenclature indicatesthe factthat
language is a central distinguishing feature in the designationofnational
identity.
Europeisthecontinentinwhichtheemergenceofnationstatesnotonly
started,butwhereitwasalsotakentothefurthestdegree.Thisisshownin
the structure of the languages. Today Europe is the largest region in the
worldwiththefewestnumberofregionallanguages(cf.thedata in
Haarmann2006:326ff.).Thetimespaninwhichandthespeedatwhichthe
processofhomogeneitywasaccomplishedvariesconsiderablyfromcountry
tocountry.Unfortunately,itisquitedifficulttoobtainconcrete empirical
informationontheprocessoflinguisticchange.
27Iwould,however,liketo
mention at least one example from the extensive literature, even if it’s not
possible to draw conclusions for other countries from the case described.
LanguagechangeisrelativelywellresearchedinFrance.
The systematisation used by Dennis Ager (1996) to describe the rise of an
official language, which he applied to the developments in France and
England, is useful. Ager distinguishes four different phases, “Selection,
Codification,ElabourationandAcceptance”(Ager1996:29‐39,1997).
27 Thishastworeasons.Firstly,thesourcesforearlyperiodsaremuchworsethanfor the
present;secondly,therearedifferentdefinitionsofwhatconstitutesdeferentlanguages.
Forinstance,whenvariousauthorsassertthatinonecountryat aspecific timeonly a
percentageofthepopulationspokethelanguageoftheelitethenitisfrequentlynotclear
whether the population spoke another language from the elite or just a dialect. If the
latterwasthecasethencommunicationbetweentheeliteandthepopulacewould have
beenpossible.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
65
Thefirststepisthechoiceofonelanguageasastandardlanguagefromoutof
thenumberofspokenlanguagesinoneterritory.InFranceitisthedialectof
the Ile de France, Francien. The reasons for the rise of this and no other
languagearemany,buttheyareallassociatedwithfactorsofsocial power.
UndertheCapetians,ParisandtheIledeFrancegraduallyemerged as the
politicalcentreofFrance.Itwasheavilypopulatedandwealthy, and in
additionPariswastheculturalcentre,withtheroyalcourtasamagnetfor
literarypersonalitiesandwith the Sorbonneas a centreoflearning. In rural
areasofFrancethe regionallanguagesanddialectscontinuedto bespoken.
The regional elites, however, frequently assumed the prestigious dialect of
the Ile de France and functioned as intermediaries. The second step in the
establishment of a standard language consists in the codification of the
chosenlanguage. The codification ofthe French language is bound up with
thefoundationoftheAcademieFrancaiseintheyear1634.Itsmainfunction
wasthecodificationandthesafeguardingoftheFrenchlanguage by
publishingdictionariesandgrammarbooks.Thethirdstepinthe
establishment of an official language Ager calls “Elabouration”. This means
theadaptabilityofthelanguagetonew(technological)developmentsandthe
changesindictionariesand grammar.Finally,thefourth stepcomprisesthe
expansionandriseofthestandardlanguageatthecostofother spoken
languages.ThecomprehensiveriseofthestandardlanguageoccursinFrance
intheperiodbetweentheFrenchRevolutionandthebeginningof the 20th
century. Ager refers to various sources and concludes that the non‐French
speaking part of the population in France was forty‐six percent in 1764,
which decreases to twenty‐five percent in 1863 and disappears almost
entirelyinthefirstthirdofthe20thcentury(Ager1996:37).28
OneofthemainreasonswhytheriseofFrenchwaselevatedtoand carried
out as a political programme in the French Revolution lies in the political
28 The figures Ager presents deviate somewhat from the estimatesofEugenWeber.He
surmises that at the beginning of the Third French Republic (1871) half of the French
populationdidnotspeakFrenchatallor,ifso,toalimiteddegree(cf.Weber1976:70f.).
IncomparisontoItalythatwasstillahighquota.EricHobsbawm(1996: 88) mentions
thatatthetimeoftheunificationofItalyin1860onlyaround2.5%oftheItaliansspoke
Italianonadailybasis.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
66
ideasoftheFrenchRevolutionitself.Nexttotheintentionalcreation of a
national consciousness, the idea took hold that political enlightenment and
participation of the entire population was only possible when everyone
spokethesamelanguage.Theimplementationoftheprogrammetoeducate
the French citizens in a single language followed the establishment of a
mandatoryschoolsystem.WhiletheschoolsystemundertheAncienRégime
forthemostpartwasinthehandsofthechurchandwascarriedoutinthe
regional languages, in the Republic it became a matter of state. French
speakingteachersweresentintotheprovincesin order to teachtheofficial
language(Grillo1989;cf.alsoOakes2001:53‐64).
The reverse side of the coin of nation state homogeneity is the
marginalisation and repression of minority languages. They are banned to
the private sphere of life; there is no institutionalisation through
standardisation through dictionaries, safeguarding of the language, school
instructionofthepopulationintheminoritylanguages,useasanofficialform
ofcommunication,etc.Historyis,inaddition,richinexamples which
demonstrate with what rigour and brutality minority languages were
repressedin orderto establishthe conceptof asingle language.Duetothe
divisionofPolandattheendofthe18
th century, for example, 1.5 million
Poleswere annexed to Prussia.At first Prussiatried to integrate them in a
peacefulmannerandgavethemfarreachingrights(bilingualdecrees,Polish
parityasanofficialandlegallanguage,Polishschools).Thispolicywas
altered after the foundation of the German Reich in 1871 under Bismarck.
Among the language policy measures,werethegermanisationofPolish
names,the transfer of Polish teachers,the prohibitionof Polish asa school
subjectas well asPolish newspapers,and thefinalabolition ofPolish asan
official and legal language. Thus, language policy became “all the more
repressive,themoreevidentlyGermannationalismgrew”(Puschmann1996:
20).
After1922the South TyroleansinItalywerenottreatedmuchbetterunder
therisetopoweroftheFascists.InSouthTyrolItalianwasintroducedasthe
officiallanguage,Germanwasforbiddenasthelanguageofinstruction,place
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
67
namesandsometimesfamilynameswereItalianated,resettlementofItalians
wasenforced(Puschmann1996:22).
On other continents many examples can also be found which demonstrate
theconnectionbetweennationbuildingandtheoppressionofminoritiesand
their languages.29Taiwan,forexample,whichbelongedtoChina,was
secededtoJapanaftertheChinesedefeatintheChinese‐Japanese war. The
Japanesegovernment then introducedJapanese asthe officiallanguage and
severely suppressed Chinese. This policy was successful, for when Taiwan
wasreturnedtoChinain1945seventy‐onepercentofthepopulationspoke
Japanese.After 1945Chinese was reintroducedas theofficial languageand
thependulumswungintheotherdirection(cf.Chen1999:30ff.).
Examples of the oppression of linguistic minorities for the sake of the
creationofa nationalidentityextend intothepresent andaffectEurope, as
theconflictoverthelinguistrightsoftheKurdsinTurkeydemonstrates.The
emergenceofTurkishnationalismwithKemalismformedthemostimportant
foundationforthenewstatefoundedinthe1920s.Fromtheverybeginning;
a single Turkish language was the central element in the formation of an
identity.ThespecialnatureofTurkishwaslegitimatisedbytheso‐calledsun
linguistic theory. It was attempted to prove that Turkish was the original
language from which all other languages sprung (cf. Laut 2000).This
evidentlyabsurdtheorywastaughtatuniversities.ThestylisationofTurkish
intoanationallanguagemeantconverselythedelegitimisingand repressing
oftheexistingminoritylanguages.ThemassiveattemptoftheTurkishstate
tointegratetheKurdsintoTurkishsocietywenthandinhandwith the
suppressionoftheKurdishlanguage.TheofficialuseoftheKurdishlanguage
was forbidden for a long time and Turkish was the only language allowed.
Kurdishsurnamesandplace nameswereexchangedforTurkish names and
place names. Resettlements involving the deportation of Kurds and the
resettlementof Turkswere intendedto destroythe connectionof language
29 Cf.,forexample,theanalysisoftheconnectionbetweennationbuildingandthelinguistic
homogenisationin the four Latin AmericancountriesofArgentina,Brazil,Paraguayand
UruguaybyRainerEnriqueHamel(2003).
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
68
andterritory.ItisonlyrecentlyandunderpressurefromtheEuropeanUnion
withinthenegotiationsforTurkishentrancetotheEUthatthishaschanged.
The cultural freedoms of the Kurdish minority have been somewhat
strengthenedbyallowingsomeuseoftheKurdishlanguage,Kurdishlessons
in private schools and Kurdish radio and television channels, although the
latterareveryrestrictedandhaveonlylimitedbroadcastingtime.
Theinstitutionalisedlinguisticconstellationexistinginthememberstatesof
theEuropeanUniontodayistheresultofthisbrieflyoutlined process of
nation state organisation of society and identity building. TheEuropean
Unionisamergeroftwenty‐sevenstateswhichsoonerorlaterhaveallgone
throughtheprocessofbuildinganationstate.Theresultsareasfollows:
Ineighteenoutoftwenty‐sevenEUcountriesthereisonlyone
officiallanguage.
Inafurthersixcountriesonlyoneofficiallanguageispermittedfor
the whole territory, in certain small regions, however, a second
officiallanguageisallowed.Thesecountriesare:Austria,Spain,
Italy,Finland,Slovakia,andtheNetherlands.
The third group is made up of the few countries which have all
permittedtheuseoftwoorseveralofficiallanguages.Luxemburg,
Belgium,andMaltaareinthisgroup.
Thereforethetwenty‐sevennationstatecontainersoftheEUwhichareeach
characterisedbyaspecificinstitutionalorderhaveinmostcasesone single
language. The borders of the nation state institutional order are usually
identicalwiththoseofadiscretelanguage,which,onthewhole, gives the
languageorderaveryparticularstability.
Thenationstateasthedominantformofsocietalorganisationinthe19thand
20thcenturiescharacterisesgenerallyspeakingnotonlytheriseof a single
language to be spoken by all and the marginalisation and oppression of
minority languages, but also the relationship towards the languages of
migrants.Whilethenationallanguageand the minoritylanguagesformtwo
sidesofthesamecoinwithinanationstate,migrantsandtheirlanguagesdo
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
69
notmeritanyattentionatallwithinthehorizonofthisbinarycodification.
Thereare,forinstance,moreTurkishspeakinginhabitantsinthecountriesof
the EU than there are Luxemburgish, Maltese, Danish or Latish speaking
citizens (cf. Nic Craith 2008: 57f.), yet Turkish does not enjoy any official
status,neitherinthenationstatesnorontheEuropeanlevel.
3.1.3WorldsocietyandtheHegemonyofEnglish
Nationstateshavedifferentlevelsofimportancewithintheframeworkofthe
world society. Depending on size, military, economic and political power
someoccupyahegemonicposition,whileothersfindthemselveson the
periphery.The position of power of the differentnation stateshasadirect
influenceonthepowerpositionoftheirlanguagesintheinternationalorder.
Since the language constellation which has been institutionalised in a
territory can only be replaced by another at the expanse of enormous
difficultiesandtransactioncosts,itisnotonlythepresentdistribution of
powerbetweennationstateswhichisrelevant,butalsothatofthepast.
Theshadowofhistoryonthedominantrelationshipsbetweenlanguagesisa
particularly long one. Among other things this explains why the colonial
periodandthedistributionofpowerbetweenthecountriesduringthattime
affectsthe order oflanguages today. In the broadest sense of theword the
colonialperiodbeganwiththeconquestofPortugalandSpain,atthat time
knownasCastile,atthebeginningofthe15thcenturyandendedattheclose
oftheSecondWorldWar.ThefactthatSpanish30andPortuguese31arestill
theofficiallanguages in manycountries of theworldoriginatesintheearly
30 AsidefromSpainitself,Spanishistheofficiallanguageinthefollowingcountries:Central
and South America: Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua,CostaRica,
Panama,Venezuela,Colombia,Ecuador,Peru,Bolivia,Paraguay,Argentina,Uruguayand
Chile;NorthAmerica:theFederalStateofNew Mexico; the Caribbean:Cuba,Dominican
RepublicandPuertoRico;Africa:WestSahara(theofficiallanguagetogetherwithArabic)
andEquatorialGuinea.Moreover,SpanishisspokeninTrinidadandTobagoaswellasin
Morocco.
31 Apart from its country of origin Portuguese is the official language in the following
countries:SouthAmerica:Brazil;Africa:Angola,CapeVerde,GuineaBissau,Mozambique,
SaoTomeandPrincipe;Asia:EastTimorandMacau.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
70
days of European conquest. France had to cede all their colonies in North
AmericaandIndiatoBritainaftertheirdefeatintheSevenYearsWar(1763).
SubsequentlythecolonialactivitiesofFrancetookplaceprimarily in Africa
and Asia. Many of France’s former colonies have retained Frenchastheir
officiallanguageevenafterindependence.32
The success of British colonial policy (for the following Crystal 2003) has
beenparticularlyinfluentialonthepresentorderoflanguages. The British
Empirewascreatedinatimespanofoverthreehundredyears.Expansionist
phases of conquest alternated with peaceful periods in which trade and
diplomacy predominated. The rise of the British Empire began with the
settlement of the east coast of America in the early 17th century. The
inhabitantsofthethirteencolonies,whodeclaredthemselvesindependentin
1776,foundedtheUSAandextendedtheirterritoryatthecostofFrance,the
NetherlandsandSpaininthefollowingcentury,wereofBritishdescent.They
consequentlykeptEnglishastheirofficiallanguageafterindependencefrom
GreatBritain.ThefactthattodayCanadais predominantlyEnglish speaking
canalsobetracedbacktothepoweroftheBritishEmpire.Afterthedefeatof
France in the Seven Years War France had to cede its colonies in Eastern
CanadatoGreatBritain.33
In1770JamesCookreachedtheeastcoastofAustraliaandclaimed the
countryasaBritishcolony,callingit“NewSouthWales”.Inthecomingyears
theBritish continued toextend theirareaof influenceandsettled Australia
forthemostpartwithBritishconvicts,who,naturally,spokeEnglish. New
Zealand,althoughindependentatthebeginningofthe19thcentury,becamea
32 AsidefromFrance,Frenchistodaytheofficiallanguageinthefollowingcountries:Africa:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Cameroon, Republic of Congo,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Ruanda, Senegal,
Seychelles,Togo,Chad,andintheCentralAfricanRepublic;Europe:Belgium,Luxemburg,
Monaco,Switzerland; NorthAmerica:Canada;Asia, AustraliaandOceania:Comorosand
Vanuatu.Frenchisnottheofficiallanguageinallcases.Insome countries French is
common as the language of bureaucracy, above all in Africa: Equatorial Guinea, Ivory
Coast,Mauritius,Tunesia,AlgeriaandMauretania,inCentralAmerica(Haiti)aswellasin
AsiainLaosandinLebanon.
33 Englandallowedthe FrenchCanadiansinQuebecfreedomof religioninordertoensure
theirneutrality intheconflictwith thecoloniesinthefuture USAwhichwasdemanding
independence. It is this decision which leads to the fact that today Canada is partially
Frenchspeaking.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
71
colonyof the BritishEmpire in 1840, mainlyto forestall Frenchexpansion.
ThiswasfollowedbyalargemigrationofBritonstoNewZealand. Papua‐
NewGuineausedtobecalledBritish‐NewGuineaandat the endofthe19th
century was declared a British protectorate and then annexed. The small
islandsofOceaniasufferedasimilarfate.
British colonial influence also extended to Asia. The English had already
establishedtradingpostsontheIndiansub‐continentandinthe18thcentury
the British East India Company became the dominant power. British India,
whichtodayconstitutes India,Pakistan,Bangladesh andBurma(Myanmar),
wasthemostimportantcolonyofall.Theregionwasunderdirect British
colonialrulefrom 1858 to1947.Africa, whichwaslargelyunoccupied until
around1880,thenbecamethemainobjectofexpansionfortheEuropean
greatpowers.AfterlosingtheFirstWorldWar,Germanylostits African
colonies, so that together with France and Portugal Great Britain was the
dominantAfricancolonialpower.ManyoftheAfricanstateshave retained
Englishastheofficial language,evenaftertheir independence followingthe
SecondWorldWar.
In 1921, at the zenith of colonialism, the sovereign area of the United
Kingdomwasthirty‐sevenmillionsquarekilometres,roughlyaquarterofthe
earth’s surface. The total population was about 500 million, constituting
aroundaquarterofthepopulationaliveatthetime(Crystal2003:78). The
hegemonyoftheUnitedKingdomledtothehegemonyofitslanguage.Added
to this were the lost children of the British, the former colonies, who had
already made themselves independent, like the USA and Canada, who
continuedtospeakEnglish.Theconsequencesofthehistoricaldevelopment
forthehegemonicpositionofEnglisharestillwithustoday.Inthefollowing
countries, English is still the official language or in some cases the official
languagetogether with others:Africa: Nigeria,South Africa, Kenya,Uganda,
Botswana,Gambia,Mauritius,SwazilandandtheSeychelles;Asia: India,
Pakistan, the Philippines and Singapore; Australia and Oceania:Australia,
Papua‐New Guinea, New Zealand together with the island of Fiji,the
Solomon’s, Vanuatu, Samoa, Kiribati, Micronesia, Tonga, Marshall Islands,
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
72
Palau,NauruandTuvalu;Europe:UnitedKingdom,IrelandandMalta;
CentralAmerica: Bahamas,Belize, Barbados, Jamaica,Trinidad andTobago,
St.Lucia,St.VincentandtheGrenadine,Granada,AntiguaandBarbuda,
Dominicaaswell as St.KittsandNevis;North America:theUnitedStates of
AmericaandCanadaaswellasGuyanainSouthAmerica.Moreover,English
togetherwithotherlanguagesistheofficiallanguageofvariousinternational
institutions and organisations: the African Union (AU), the Organisation of
American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (USAN), the
EuropeanUnion(EU)andtheUnitedNations(UN).34
ThehegemonyofEnglishnotonlygoesbacktothecolonialdominanceofthe
UnitedKingdom,butalsototheriseoftheUSAasaworldpower and the
extension of its sphere of influence. The inevitable export of the English
languageinrelationtothisoccursnotonlyinoccasionalcasesthrough the
militaryoccupationofforeignareasandthroughforce,butthrough
mechanismswhichcanbecategorisedas“softpower”(Nye2004).Thereare
very many societal areas in which the USA plays a leading role and hence
determines communication in these areas with its language (cf. Crystal
2003).TheUSAisthecountryonEarthwhichfarandawayimportsthemost
goods,anditisoneofthethreecountrieswiththehighestvolumeofexports
worldwide. Other, above all smaller countries, which want to do business
with the USA, have an incentive to accommodate themselves to the USA’s
dominancebydoingbusinessinEnglish.
Furthermore,thefactthattheUSAistheleadingscientificnationisindicated
bythenumberofNobelprizeswhichhavebeenawardedtoAmerican
scientists,especiallyinthe periodfrom1945 to thepresent,or bythegood
ratingofAmericanuniversitiesintheworldwiderankings.Thisresultsinthe
fact that in many scientific areas the most important publications are in
English.Scientistsinothercountriesmust,iftheyaretoremaincompetitive,
34 Furthercountrieshaveanotherofficiallanguage,althoughtheyuseEnglishasameansof
communication:SomalilandinAfrica,Malaysia,IsraelandHongKonginAsia,Cyprusand
GibraltarinEuropeaswellasSt.MartininCentralAmerica.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
73
adapttothehegemonyoftheEnglishlanguage.ThedominanceofEnglishcan
besubstantiatedwithdatafromtwofieldsofscientificresearch.
Astable3.1illustratesthenumberofarticlesinchemistrypublished in
Englishwasalreadyhighattheendofthe1970s(62%);butthepercentage
ofarticleswritteninEnglishstillincreasedinthefollowingyearsandsumup
to82.5%in1998.
Table3.1:Scientific articlesin thefield ofchemistry indifferent languages
(1978to1998,in%)
19781982198719921998
English 62.3 67.6 73.0 79.3 82.5
Russian 19.5 16.5 12.0 7.6 3.1
Japanese 4.7 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.5
German 5.0 3.8 2.9 2.3 1.6
Chinese 0.3 1.7 2.7 3.2 5.9
French 2.4 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.5
Polish 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3
Others 4.7 4.0 3.2 1.9 1.6
N363.196382.257384.141430.247559.009
Source:Laponce(2003):Basisofanalysis:“ChemicalAbstracts“
Figure3.1: Scientific articles in the field of sociology published in English
(1960to2007,in%)
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Source:Ownsurveyandcalculation.Basis:“SociologicalAbstracts“;includedarearticlesof
„PeerReviewJournals“only.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
74
ThedominanceofEnglishisnotonlyacharacteristicfeatureofthesciences,
but also of the social sciences and the humanities. As Figure 3.1
demonstrates,thenumber ofEnglishwritten articles insociologyincreased
steadilyovertime.
The USA and the UK also the culture industry (books, periodicals, music,
audio‐visualmediaandart)dominates:in2002thegreatestexporterwasthe
UKwith8.5billiondollars,followedbytheUSAwith7.6billion.Thelargest
importer in 2002 was the USA with 15.3 billion dollars, twice the second
largestimportertheUK(7.8billion),followedbyGermanyinthirdplacewith
4.1billiondollars(UnescoInstitute forStatistics2005).Addedtothisis the
dominanceofEnglishinthe“WorldWideWeb”;inordertobewellinformed
itmakessensetounderstandEnglish.
ThedominanceofEnglishinmanyareasofsociety,ofwhichIhavegivenonly
a few examples, has no influence on the official languages chosen by the
nationstates,althoughitdoeshaveaninfluenceonthechoice of foreign
languageswhich are learnedby people inthese countries, orrather, which
areoffered and taughtby theinstitutes oflearning. One of thelast barriers
againstthe“softpower”of Anglo‐American poweranditslanguagewas the
Soviet Union. The member countries of the Soviet Union and the socialist
stateswhich werein its sphereof influencewere subject tothe hegemonic
positionoftheRussianlanguage.Thecitizensoftheso‐calledEasternBloc
generallylearned Russian as their firstforeign language,be it,becausethis
waswhattheschoolcurriculumoffered,orbeit,becausetheyhoped to
benefit from it. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its influence, the
independence of the Central and East European countries and their
increasing orientation towards Western Europe are reflected in a
reorientationintheirchoiceofforeignlanguages.Thefollowingtable,which
showsthepercentofpupilsinHungarywholearnvariousforeignlanguages,
illustrates this dramatically. Within seven years starting from 1989 the
numberofpupilslearningRussianhadsunkfrom81.3%to3.7%.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
75
Table3.2: Number of students studying different foreign languages in
Hungary(1989to1997,in%)
89/9090/9191/9292/9393/9494/9595/9696/97
ENG 34.2 41.2 47.4 53.0 56.3 58.1 60.2 61.8
GER 28.0 34.5 41.5 46.1 48.7 50.5 51.9 53.4
FRE 6.9 8.3 9.0 9.1 8.8 8.3 8.0 7.7
RUS 81.3 57.1 32.8 17.6 10.7 7.2 5.2 3.7
N 273.392291.779309.289322.912330.586337.301349.29936.395
Source:Fodor &Peluau(2003:85‐98). ThenumbersapplytoHighSchools;thecolumns do
notaddupto100%asthestudentscanchoosebetweenseveralforeignlanguages.
Theaboveeffectisanotherstrikingexampleofthe generalargumentwhich
underliesthischapter,whichisthatthelinguisticorder–expressed in the
terminologyofevolutionarytheory–is aparasiteonthesocial order;ifthe
hostchanges,thentheparasitechanges.Thesocialorderisinturnanorder
which is structured hierarchically with a centre and a periphery; the
strengths and weaknesses of individual languages reflect the hierarchically
structureoftheworldorder.
Thedominantpositionof Englishgoesbackto thedominantpositionof the
BritishEmpire,whichhasresultedinsomanynationstatesusingEnglishas
theirofficiallanguageandspeakingEnglishastheirnativetongue.Duetothe
veryhightransactioncostsofachangeoncealanguagehasbeen
institutionalised, the former colonies have generally kept the language of
their one time colonial rulers as their official language, even after their
independence. In India, for example, in which both Hindi and English are
officiallydesignatedintheconstitutionasthenationalofficiallanguages,the
plan was that English should lose its equal status with Hindi after 1965.
Primarily,theintendeddemotionofEnglishhadasymbolicfunctionandwas
supposedtoexpresstherejectionoftheoldcolonialorder.Sinceitwasclear,
however,thatgivingupEnglish would cost a very great deal, it was decided
torefrainfromcarryingouttheoriginalplan.
Secondly,thehegemonyofEnglishiscloselylinkedtothesuper power
positionoftheUSAsincetheSecondWorldWarandthepowerwhichithas
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
76
acquiredin many otherareas ofsociety.The dominanceof the USAhas the
effectof“softpower”,whichmakesitappropriateformanycountriestohave
Englishasthefirstforeignlanguage.Ifwelookatthetwotrains of
developmenttogether–nationstatebuildingandlinguistichomogeneity on
theonehand,thestructureoftheworldsocietyandthehegemonyofEnglish
ontheother,theysuggestthepictureofa“GlobalLanguageSystem” as
outlinedbyAbramdeSwaan(2001b).Thishasfourlevels:
(1)Therearemanylanguagesintheperipheryofthesystem usuallyspoken
byafewpeople,andwhichareinstitutionalisedtoalimiteddegree.Theyare
frequently not written languages, and are generally minority languages in
nationstates.Thenumberofperipherallanguagesisverygreat,eventhough
thenumberofspeakersisfairlylow(cf.thedatainCrystal2000:15). Asa
rulecommunicationbetweenthedifferentperipherallanguagesisnotdirect,
butoccursviatherelaystationofthecentralorsuper‐centrallanguages.
(2)Inthemiddleofthesystem,sotospeak,arethe official languagesofthe
nationstates,whichdeSwaantermsascentrallanguages.Thesedevelopedin
theprocessof nationalstatebuilding,are institutionalisedtoahighdegree,
andinsofar asthey are writtenlanguages, arecultivated andsupervised by
the nation states and in which education and public communication (the
media,literature)occur.Centrallanguagesareatthesameandinmostcases
a central characteristic of a nation state’s identity. In most cases the
establishmentofthecentrallanguageshasdisplacedtheminoritylanguages
to the periphery. The number of central languages is put by de Swaan at
aroundonehundred,henceincomparisontotheperipherallanguagesvery
few;however,thenumberofspeakersoftheselanguagesisataboutninety‐
fivepercentofthepopulation(cf.Crystal2000:15).
(3)DeSwann termsassupercentrallanguagesthecentrallanguageswhich
are the native languages in several nation states and are spoken in other
countriesbymanycitizensasforeignlanguages.Thenumberofsupercentral
languages is very low (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Hindi,
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
77
Japanese,Malay,Portuguese,SpanishandSwahili),thenumberof speakers,
however,veryhigh.
(4)Onelanguagestandsoutfromthegroupofsupercentrallanguageseven
furtherandistermedbydeSwaanasahypercentrallanguage.Thelanguage
isEnglishandthisisbasedonthefactthatnotonlysomanypeople speak
Englishastheirfirstlanguage,buttherearealsomanywhofor the
abovementionedreasonshavelearnedEnglishastheirfirstsecondlanguage.
Englishisnotthemostwidelyspokennativelanguage.ItisChinese,orrather
Mandarin,with1.2billionspeakers.If,however,oneaddsupallthe people
whoeitherhaveEnglishastheirnativetongue,orwhoareabletospeakitas
eitherasecondlanguageoraforeignlanguage,thenonearrivesworldwideat
anestimatedfigureof1.5billionEnglishspeakingpeople,thatis,roughlyone
quarteroftheworld’spopulationin2000(Crystal2003:6).
Let us sum up briefly the conclusions of this chapter. The institutionalised
linguisticorderinEuropeconsistsofastructuredividedinto nation states
which are linguistically segmented. The inner‐nation state heterogeneity is
verylow,sincemostofthememberstateshavepermittedonlyone official
language, whereas the inter‐state heterogeneity is virtually atamaximum.
Thisstructureistheresultofanhistoricalprocess,whichiscloselylinkedto
the emergence and stabilisation of the European nation states.
Communication beyond the nation state containers is thus only possible
when people speak a foreign language that is spoken in the other member
countries.
Atthesametimewehaveseenthatnoteverylanguageisequallyimportant.
Powerfulnationstates,orthosewhichinthepasthadgreatinfluence,
determinetheinternationallinguisticorderinsofarastheirworldhegemonic
positiongrantstheirlanguagesahegemonicposition.Thedominantposition
oftheBritishEmpireandthatoftheUSAinthe20thcenturyhaveleadtothe
fact that a special predominance belongs to the English language.It istrue
thatinEuropeEnglishistheofficiallanguageinonlytheUK,Irelandand
Malta;theworldwideprominenceofEnglish,however,makesitthelanguage
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
78
whoseutility as a meansof communication is thehighest (de Swaan 1993,
2001a/b). People who want to communicate with other people in other
countries are well advised under these circumstances not only to increase
theirtransnationallinguisticcapitalingeneral,butabovealltolearnEnglish.
Thethesisthattheanticipatedutilityofcommunicationofaforeignlanguage
influencestheacquisitionofaforeignlanguagehasbeenputforward by
Abram de Swaan (1993, 2001/b). Peoplelearntheforeignlanguage with
whichtheycanreachthegreatestnumberofpartnerswithwhomtheywish
tocommunicate.
3.2EuropeanisationandGlobalisationofNationStateSocietiesin
Europe
Aslongasthenationstatesaresotospeakself‐sufficientcontainers,inwhich
thegreatestpartofexchangeisinternal,thereislittleincentivetolearnthe
languages of other countries. The more, however, societies are linked to
other societies which speak other languages, the more worthwhile it
becomestospeakseverallanguages.InthefollowingIwilldemonstratehow
European unification has affected the degree of interconnectedness of
EuropeanmemberstatesandhowEuropeansocietieshavebecome
transnational in the context of globalisation. In this account wereferto
numerous empirical findings and surveys and concentrate on a
systematisationofthefindings(e.g.Fligstein2008;Fligstein&Merand2002;
Fligstein&StoneSweet2002).
TheprocessoftheEuropeanisation of nationstatesocietieshastaken place
in four different dimensions whichareinterlinkedwitheachother: the
emergence of a European polity, territorial expansion of the EU, the
emergence of a single European social space, and Europeanisation of the
twenty‐seven EU member societies. In all of the dimensions an increase in
Europeanisation has taken place, even when this process has notbeen
straightforward. Time and again there were discontinuities, delays and
fallingsoff.Theshort‐termfluctuationscannotdisguisethefactthatthelong‐
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
79
termdevelopmentisinthedirectionofanincreaseinEuropeanisation(from
thehistoricalperspectiveseeKaelble2007).
3.2.1TheEmergenceofaEuropeanPolity
European integration manifests itself first of all in the establishment and
expansionofthedifferentpoliticalinstitutionsoftheEU,which have been
equippedwith sovereignauthority andhave assumedpart ofthe sovereign
rights of the nation states. Europeanisation on this level means that the
competences of the European institutions and their organisational power
wereextendedovertimeatthecostoftheparallelnationalinstitutions.This
processcanbeseeninalltheEuropeaninstitutionsandhasbeenextensively
delineatedinbooks on politicalscience(forothersKohler‐Koch etal.2004;
Wessels2008;Börzel&Risse2002).Iwouldliketogiveashortsummaryof
thefindingsforthemostimportantinstitutions.
TheEuropeanCouncil: The European Council is the committee of the EU
heads of state and government. Up until 1969 the heads of stateand
governmentonlymetonceremonialoccasions.In1969atasummitmeeting
inDenHaagconcretetopicswerediscussedforthefirsttime.Since this
meetingwas asuccess, similar ones were arrangedat irregularintervals in
thesubsequentyears.In1974itwasagreedthattheywouldmeeteveryfour
months.TheEuropeanCouncilwasfirstadmittedasaninstitutionoftheEU
in1987withtheSingleEuropeanAct.ThecentraltaskoftheEuropean
Councilconsistsintheformulationofgeneralpoliticalaims,initiativesforthe
furtherdevelopmentoftheEU,andinthesolvingofconflicts,whichatthe
ministeriallevel,thatistheCounciloftheEuropeanUnion,cannotbesolved.
Inactual fact,the European Council has becomeincreasingly aninitiatorof
impulsesforthefurtherdevelopmentoftheEU.Induecourse“theEuropean
Council developed from being a ‘Debating Club’ into an initiator of policy
programmeswithalastingeffectontheformationofseveralcentralpolicies
oftheEU”(Wessels2008:163).TheTreatyofLisbonrulesthattheEuropean
CouncilshouldnowofficiallybeanorganoftheEUmeetingfourtimesayear.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
80
CounciloftheEuropeanUnion:TheCounciloftheEuropeanUnion(councilof
ministers) is the most important decision making organ in the European
Union. It is composed of the representatives of each member state at the
ministerial level. One of its central tasks is to pass (together with the
Parliament)Europeanlegislation,tovoteontheprinciplesofeconomic
policy in the member states, to pass international agreements with other
statesoutsidetheEUandwithinternationalorganisations,toapprovetheEU
budget(togetherwiththeParliament)andtocooperate inthedevelopment
ofcommonforeignandsecuritypolicies.
Ifwelookatthedevelopmentofthecouncilovertheyearsthenweseethat
themember states havecontinuously expanded the legally fixed rightsand
dutiesofthecouncilandthepolicyfieldsforwhichitisresponsible(Wessels
2008:191).Theincreaseinimportanceofthecouncilbasicallytookplacein
theperiod from the foundationof the EU until 1990 and is to be seenin a
seriesof indicators:The numberof thecouncil formationshas increasedin
thetimementionedandtodaythereareninedifferentcouncilformations.35
Thenumber of meetings per yearand thoseof the various working groups
hasalsoincreased.Thenumberofpolicyareasinwhichindividualmembers
canbeoutvotedhasalsoincreased(cf.datainWessels2008:199,212).
TheEuropeanCommission:The presentEuropean Commission goes back to
the High Authority which was created within the framework of the
foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. Its
dutywastoenforcetheresolutionsoftheECSC.TheHighAuthorityconsisted
ofeightmemberswhowereappointedbythemembercountriesandaninth
member which was elected by the Authority. With the founding ofthe
EuropeanEconomicCommunity(EEC)andofEURATOMin1958twonew
commissionswere established.In 1967the High Authority of theECSC and
EURATOM were combined to form the European Commission within the
35 Inordertopreventthenumberfromgettingoutofhand,theEuropeanCouncilofSeville
in2002decidedtorestrictthenumberofcouncilformationstonine.Atthesametimean
internaldifferentiationofthecouncilstookplace.Onecouncilformationincludesseveral
departmentalministerswhoareresponsiblefordifferentpolicyareas.Insofarthesheer
numberofcouncilformationsisstillnotagoodindicatorfortheexpansionoftheareasof
policyforwhichthecouncilisresponsible(cf.Wessels2008:199).
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
81
framework of the European Community treaty. The responsibilities of the
Commissionwereenlargedinthe AmsterdamTreaty(1999).Ithasthesole
righttointroducenewlegislation;itisresponsibleforupholdingthetreaties,
worksontheimplementationoftheresolutionsoftheCouncilof the
EuropeanUnionandtheEuropean Parliament andrepresentstheEUto the
outsideworld.Inaddition,theCommissionformulatesintheso‐calledWhite
andGreenBooksrecommendationsforactionstobetakenbytheCommunity
inparticularpolicyareas.Thenumberofrecommendationspassedhasrisen
considerably over the years (cf. the figures in Wessels 2008: 233). The
responsibilitiesoftheEUhavealsoprogressivelyincreasedovertime,while
theinstitutionitselfhasgrowntogetherwiththenumberofdirectors,
commissionersandcommitteesaswellastheadministrativepersonnelofthe
Commissionasawhole.
TheEuropeanParliament: At the founding of the ECSC in 1952 a
parliamentaryassemblyatEuropeanlevelalsomet,whichconsisted of
representativesofthenationalparliaments,butwhichonlyhadanadvisory
function.WiththefoundingoftheEECandEURATOMtheparliamentary
assembly of the ECSC was responsible for all three communities and was
enlargedto142members,althoughitwasnotgivenanynewresponsibilities.
WhentheEuropeanCommunityreceiveditsownfinancialresourcesin1971,
theparliamentaryassemblyparticipatedinthepreparationandadoptionof
thebudget,althoughnotinthesubsidiesforagriculture.Sincetheendofthe
1970stheEuropeanParliamenthasbecomeincreasinglyimportant.In1979
thefirst direct European electionstook place. In 1987 the Single European
Act brought an important expansion of responsibilities for the Parliament.
Fromthenonitwasinvolvedinthegenerallegislationandwasabletomake
officialamendmentstobills,evenwhenthefinaldecisionstill lay with the
EuropeanCouncil.This was changed,atleastin somepolicyfields, with the
MaastrichtTreatyin1992.Herethecodecisionprocedurewasintroducedfor
someareas.Finally,throughtheTreatiesofAmsterdamin1997andNicein
2001thecodecisionprocedurewasbroadened,sothatnowitwasapplicable
toamajorityofpolicyareaswithintheEuropeanUnion.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
82
EuropeanCourtofJustice:TheEuropeanCourtofJusticewasfoundedin1952
bytheTreatyfoundingtheECSC.Initially,itwasresponsiblefor disputes
withintheECSC’streaty.AfterthefoundingoftheEECandtheEURATOMin
1957theEuropean CourtofJusticewas responsible forsettlingalldisputes
onthebasisofthethreetreaties.ThedutiesoftheEuropeanCourtofJustice
haveincreasedwitheachexpansionofEuropeanlaw,sincetheunified
interpretationofEuropeanlawisthecentraltaskofthecourt.Inaddition,the
organisationofthecourthasbeenenlarged.In1989,theEuropeanCourtof
FirstInstancewasestablishedinordertoeasetheburdenonthe court.
Furthermore, since 2005 there also exists the court for the public sector,
which is responsible for disputes between the community and its officials
and employees. The institution, as well as the amount of jurisdiction, has
continuallyexpandedfromyeartoyear.
Withinthepolitical sciencesthere are twodifferent positionsregardingthe
interpretation of EU institutions. Intergovernmentalists emphasise that the
institutionsoftheEUareunderthecontrolofthegovernmentsofthenation
states,hencethatthenationstatesstillhavethelastwordinthecoreareasof
politics(Moravcsik 1993). Supranationalistsand Neofunctionalists have, on
the other hand, attempted to show that the institutions of the EU have
become independent powers, which have replaced the sovereignty of the
nationstates(StoneSweet&Sandholtz1998).Lookingatthedevelopmentof
the EU institutions over the years an Intergovernmentalist would certainly
agreethatthepoweroftheEuropeaninstitutionshasexpanded
exponentially. Even when some of the institutions, like the European
CommissionandtheCouncilofMinistershaveanintergovernmental
structure, it is still true for these institutions that the number of decisions
whereindividualcountriescouldbeoutvotedhasincreased.
Thefollowingfiguremakesthisclear.IntheCouncilofMinisters,initselfthe
prototypicalintergovernmentalinstitutionintheEU,therearedifferentrules
forvoting.Ifonelooksatthedifferentvotingrulesovertheyears,one sees
thattheshareofresolutionswhichhadtobecarriedunanimouslyisonthe
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
83
decrease.Thevetopowerofthemembercountriesis,therefore,increasingly
beingrestrictedinfavourofmajoritydecisions.
Figure3.2:DevelopmentoftheDecisionMakingProcedureintheCouncilof
Ministers36
Source:Wessels(2008:195)
3.2.2TerritorialExpansionoftheEU
Alongside the creation of supranational European institutions
Europeanisationmanifestsitselfinastep‐by‐stepterritorialexpansionofthe
EU’ssphereofcontrol,byenlargingthenumberofmemberstates. The
countries of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg and the
Netherlandswere,asiswellknown,thefoundingcountries.In1973 Great
Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the community; Greece followed in
1981,PortugalandSpainin1986,in1990afterthereunificationofGermany
36 EuropeanCommunityforCoalandSteel,EEC–EuropeanEconomicCommunity, Single
EuropeanAct,TreatyontheEuropeanUnion,EuropeanConstitution.Everymemberstate
hasavotewiththesimplemajority.AccordingtotheSingleEuropeanActaqualified
majorityisachievedwiththemajorityofthemembers(14memberstates)or255(74%)
oftheweightedvotes(orientatedaccordingtothepopulationsofthememberstatesin
question)andon request, if 62%ofthe population in the EUarerepresented. With the
speciallyqualifiedmajoritydecision several sets ofrulesarecounted:qualifiedmajority
with72% ofthe members and65% of thepopulation, if decisionsarenotmadeatthe
proposaloftheCommissionortheForeignMinister(accordingtoArt.I‐25Treatyonthe
EuropeanUnion),qualifiedmajoritydecisions,withtheexceptionofthememberstatein
question(Quorum‐1),qualifiedmajoritydecisions,inwhichonlyagroupofcertainstates
areinvolved,as,forexample,theEuroGroup.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
84
theformerGDR,finally,in1995,Austria,SwedenandFinland.Atthecollapse
of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence the chance for the EU to
expandintoEasternEuropearose.TheEUhasusedthischancetoexpandits
hegemonyatthecostof Russia.14yearslateron May1st,2004,ten,mostly
Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU (Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and
Cyprus).In2007BulgariaandRumaniafollowed.
Therefore, since its foundation, the territory of the EU institutions has
continuallyexpanded.Forallthesecountriesitholdstruethat they are
subjecttothesamelawsandresolutionsoftheinstitutionsoftheEU.AllEU
legislation,whichisbindingforallmembercountries–Acquis
communautaire–,mustbeacceptedbyallcountrieswhichwanttobecomea
memberoftheEU,meaningthattheexpansionoftheEUrepresentsnotonly
aterritorialexpansion,butalsoanexpansionofthepowerofthe European
institutions.
3.2.3TheEmergenceofaSingleEuropeanSocialSpace
The newly created European institutions are not just there for their own
sakes.Their policieshave aneffect onthe memberstates andover time on
increasinglymorememberstates.Theyhaveanimpactonevermorepolicy
fieldswiththeaimofcreatingacommonEuropeansocialspace,whichisless
andlesslimitedbythenationstates.ThethenEECwasfoundedbytheTreaty
ofRomewiththepurposeofcreatingacommonEuropeanmarket.Moreover,
the creation of a common market is still the central goal of the EU. In this
respect most of the measures refer to the establishment of a common
economyof “Europe”.It would go beyond thescope ofthis bookto discuss
thisthirdareaofEuropeanisationadequately.Thefollowinglegislationisof
particular importance for the creation of a unified European social space,
whichthenelevates thequestion of knowinga foreignlanguageintoavery
importantone.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
85
Tariffreduction: The gradual reduction in tariffs begins within the EEC in
1959.The CustomsUnion cameinto powerin 1968,thereby abolishingthe
customsintradingwithinintheEECforgood.Acommoncustomstariffwas
establishedfortradewiththirdcountries.Theabolitionoftariffsreducedthe
transactioncostsfortradewithintheEU,whileatthesametimemakingthe
costoftrademorereadilycalculable.
SingleEuropeanMarket:Theabolition oftariffsleads toanimprovement in
theEuropeanexchangeofgoods,althoughnumerousnon‐customstrade
restrictions,suchasthedifferentproductionnormsorapprovalprocedures,
restricted free trade. A Single European Market was implemented with the
SingleEuropeanActin1987.Attheheartofthetreatyaretheso‐calledfour
freedoms:persons,goods,servicesandcapitalweretomoveasfreelywithin
theEUashadbeenthecaseuptothenwithinthenationaleconomies.
The freedom of movement of persons is of particular interest for our
researchquestion.AllcitizensoftheEUhavethefreedomtolookforworkin
everymemberstate,towork,tosettleortoprovideaservice.Thisregulation
includes, apart from the immigrant employee, marriage partners,children
undertheageoftwenty‐one aswellasfurtherrelatives in theascendingor
descending line, whom the employee is supporting. The freedom of
movementruleisalsovalidforself‐employedpeople(therighttoestablisha
business). Within the context of creating a common market, freedom of
movementwasextendedtothosewhowerenotgainfullyemployed,suchas
studentsandpensioners.Inaddition,themutualrecognition of professional
qualifications and the transference of rights to social benefits earned in
anothercountrywereagreedupon.Allthesemeasureshaveoneaim,which
istomakethenationstatecontainersmorepermeableforthecitizensandto
Europeanisethem.
Commoncurrency:WiththeintroductionoftheEuropean“currencysnake”in
1972 currency exchange rates in the EU were restricted, which wasafirst
step towards a common currency. In 1999 the Euro was introducedasthe
officialcurrencyforthenon‐cashpaymentsonthestockexchangeandin
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
86
2002ashardcashinelevenEUstates.TodaytheEuroistheofficialcurrency
in seventeen EU countries. It is also true to say that the common currency
makeseconomictransactionscheaperandmorereliable,becausetheyareno
longerdependentonchangesinthecurrencyexchangeratesandit thus
facilitatesEuropeantradeandmobility.
Removalofcontrolsonthemovementofpeople:Intheso‐calledSchengen
Agreement (1985) five European states decided to abolish controls on the
movementofpeopleatthecommonborders.Inthemeantime,twenty‐eight
countries have gradually joined this agreement. From among the EU
countriesonlytheUnitedKingdomandIrelandhavenotfullyjoined the
Schengen Agreement. For Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus only certain
regulationsfromtheagreementarevalid,butremovalofthebordercontrols
for these three countries has been delayed to a later date. In addition, the
agreementisvalidforthenon‐EUstatesofIceland,NorwayandSwitzerland.
WhilewithintheSchengenareasecuritycheckshaveceasedtoexist,people
atthebordersofnon‐EUstatesarecheckedintheusualway.
Commoncitizenship:WiththeTreatyofMaastrichtof1992eachcitizenofa
EU member country is at the same time a citizen of their country and the
EuropeanUnion.Apartfromtherighttofreedomofmovementintheentire
areaoftheEU,alreadydiscussedabove,citizenshavetheactiveandpassive
franchiseinlocal andEuropewideelectionsand therightto diplomaticand
consularprotection. Thesemeasures are alsointended toimprove mobility
withinEurope.Addedtothisisthesymbolicsignificancewhichisassociated
withcitizenshipintheUnion,inthatthedifferencesbetweenthenationstate
citizenshipsareEuropeanised.
Ifwelookatthedifferentlegislationsasawhole,weperceivethattheyareall
pointing in one direction. They are aiming at the possibility of a European
spaceofinteractionandcommunication,whichtranscendsandEuropeanises
thenationstates.Thisdoesnotmeanthattherearenomoreintra‐European
hindrances to Europeanisation. There are different taxation rates in the
memberstates,differentsocialstandards and implementing provisions for
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
87
the large amount of legislations. Problems with the recognition of pension
claimswhenmovingfromoneEUcountrytoanothershow,forexample,that
thenationstate containeris stillveryinfluential. Itis onlythat overtime it
has become less important through the process of Europeanisation. The
expansionsofthetreaties,legislationsandpolicyareashaveleadatthesame
timetoastrengtheningoftheEuropeaninstitutionsandtheirpower.
3.2.4Europeanisationofthetwenty‐sevenEUMemberSocieties
ThecreationofasystemofEuropeaninstitutions,theterritorialexpansionof
the sphere of control and the increase in jurisdiction to create a European
spaceofinteractionandcommunicationhashadanimpactonthe societies,
whichisthefourthdimensionofEuropeanisationthatwehavedistinguished
here.OurknowledgeaboutthelevelofEuropeanisationinthisdimensionis
considerablyless.Thishastworeasons.Firstofall,wearenotdealinghere
withtheorganisationofinstitutionsandcontractualresolutions,butwiththe
effects of the institutions and resolutions on societies and these are very
difficultto measure empirically. Secondly, the analysis of this dimensionof
Europeanisationisnotsomethingpoliticalscientistsareconcernedwithbut
fallswithintheareaofsociology.AndsociologyofEuropeanintegrationisin
comparison to political science research on the same topic much less
comprehensive. It has only recently taken off in the last few yearsandis
increasinglyputtingthehorizontalaspectofEuropeanisationinthecentreof
the discussion (cf. Bach 2000, 2008; Bartolini 2005; Crouch 1999; Delhey
2005; Díez‐Medrano 2003, 2008; Favell 2008; Fligstein 2008; Fligstein &
Merand2002;Gerhards1993,2007;Haller2008;Heidenreich2006;Hettlage
& Müller 2006; Lepsius 1990, 1991; Mau 2010; Mau & Verwiebe 2010;
Münch&Büttner2006;Vobruba2005,2008).
IhavetriedtocollectdatatomeasuretheEuropeanisationprocessinseveral
societalfieldsandhavefollowupotherauthorsandstudies(cf.Gerhards &
Rössel 1999; Fligstein & Merand 2002; Fligstein & Stone Sweet 2002;
Fligstein2008).
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
88
Letusbeginwiththeareaoflaw.Oneindicatorformeasuringtheincreasein
importanceofEuropeanlaw,whichisoftenreferredtointheliterature
(Beckfield2006), is the so‐called preliminaryruling of the European Court.
The European Court is, among other things, responsible for the
interpretationoftheEUtreaties.Ifinoneofthemembercountries an
interpretationofEUlawisrequiredinacourtcase,thenthenationalcourt
cansubmitthedecisiontotheEuropeanCourt.Thenumberofthe
preliminary rulings indicates indirectly the amount of EU rulings, for the
morethereare,allthemorecantheycollidewiththenationallawofthe
membercountries.
Figure3.3:NumberofproceedingsforapreliminaryrulingoftheEuropean
courtofJusticeovertime(1961to2006)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Source:OwnsurveyonthebasisoftheEuropeanCourtofJustice(EuropäischerGerichtshof
2008).
Thecurveshowsclearlythatthenumberofpreliminaryrulingshasincreased
over time and thus also the degree of juridical pervasion of EUmember
countriesbyEuropeanLaw.
Withtheshiftofpoliticaldecisionmakingpowerfromthe member countries
totheinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUniontheconditionsforlobbying for
interestgroups and civil society activistshave changed. Ifthey wantto put
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
89
forwardtheirinterests,theyhavetolooktoBrusselsinsteadoftheirnation
states.And,infact,withthepassingoftimeaEuropeanisation of interest
groupshastakenplace(Fligstein2008:173).Figure3.4showsthenumberof
interestgroupswhichareregisteredwiththeEU.
Figure3.4:NumberofspecialinterestgroupsrepresentedinBrussels(1990
to2005)
0
500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
1990 1995 2000 2005
Source:Wessels(2008:281)
Intherelativelyshorttimespanoffifteenyearsthenumberof interest
groupsrosefrom1,954to2,843,anindicationfortheEuropeanisationofthe
pre‐politicalsphere.
Aswehaveseen,oneofthecentral goalsofEuropean politics istocreatea
Europeaneconomicspace.Thesuccessofthispolicycanbeseeninanumber
of indicators (cf. above all Fligstein 2008: 62‐88). A simple indicator for
measuring the level of Europeanisation in the economies of the member
countriesistheshareoftheinter‐EUexportsfromthetotalexportsoftheEU
countries. The following figure 3.5 shows the development for the period
from1980to2006.In1980theshareofinter‐EUexportswasalready56%;
thisincreased upuntil 2006 againto nearly69%. Almost 70%ofthetrade
withforeigncountriesundertakenbytheEUcountriesremainedwithin the
bordersofthemembercountriesoftheEU.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
90
Figure3.5:Shareofinter‐EUexportsinthetotalexportoftheEUMember
States(1980to2006,in%)
50
60
70
80
1980 1990 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Source:OwncalculationonthebasisofEurostat(2002,2006,2009a).
WhetherandtowhatextenttheEuropeanisationofthemembercountriesof
theEUhasalsoaddedtotheintraEuropeanmobilityofpersonsisdifficultto
establish empirically and for several reasons (cf. Verwiebe 2008).37We
know, however, that the number of EU citizens who live in another EU
countryisquitelow,amountingtoabout1.5%forallEuropeancountriesand
varyingbetween0.5%inPortugalandFinlandontheonehand,and 5%in
BelgiumandCyprusontheother.InGermany2.5%ofthepopulationareEU
foreigners(Mau & Verwiebe 2010).Based on available data I have triedto
measurethe intra‐European mobilityfor eightcountriesin theEU (Austria,
Germany,Belgium,Ireland,theNetherlands,Portugal,SwedenandtheUnited
Kingdom)fortheperiodof1999to2006.Thefollowingfiguresaretheresult.
37 FormanyEUcountriestherearenoreliablefiguresonimmigrationoremigration.Ifdata
isavailablethenveryfrequentlyitisnotforaverylongperiodoftime,sothatlongterm
trends are difficult to determine. Additionally we are not interestedinmobilityasa
whole,butratherinintra‐Europeanmigration.Thismeansthatthecountryoforiginof
the immigrants has to be known in order toclassify them as European migrants, but
unfortunatelytheoriginsoftheimmigrantsarefrequentlynotgiven in the official
statistics. In spite of these limitations the following findings can be entered into the
balance.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
91
Figure3.6:ShareofNon‐EUCitizensProportionallytotheTotalPopulation
(1999to2006,in%)38
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Source:OwncalculationonthebasisofdatafromEurostat(2009b)andOECD.Stat(2009).
TheshareoftheEUforeignersinthechoseneightcountriesisonthewhole
verylow.Itevensoutinitially,only toriseagainin2004totheprior,albeit
verylow,average.However,wealsoknowthatmobilityinothercountriesin
theEUisconsiderablyhigher than intheeightcountriesfor whichwehave
systematicdataforafairlylongperiodoftime.AftertheexpansionoftheEU
toEastern Europe there was amigration ofworkers aboveall from Poland
andtheBalticstatesprimarilytoEngland,IrelandandSweden,becausethese
countrieshadstipulatedatransitionalperiodfortheFreedomofMovement
Act(cf.Mau&Verwiebe2010:287).39
38 Included is the share of immigrants from EU‐15 in the total population of the target
countriesAustria,Belgium,Germany,Ireland,theNetherlands,Portugal,Swedenandthe
UnitedKingdom.ThedataislimitedtothechosencountriesasthedatafortheotherEU
memberstatesisincompleteornotavailableatall.
39 Steffen Mau and Roland Verwiebe (2010) have, due to the poor datasituationonthe
developmentofintra‐Europeanmobility,evaluatedthemobilitywillingnessofcitizenson
thebasisof aEurobarometersurvey.In2001/02as wellasin2005citizenswereasked
whethertheyintendedto movetoanotherEuropeancountryinthenextfive years. The
share of those questioned in EU‐15 countries was 1.5% in 2001 and 2.7% in 2005,
whereby people from the Baltic states, Poland, France, Ireland, Sweden and Finland
expressedanover‐averagewillingnesstomove.Inallthecountries(apartfromItaly)the
shareofthosewhoweremoremobilerosewithinthefouryearswhichlaybetweendates
ofthesurveys.
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Theresultdemonstratingveryweakintra‐Europeanmobilityislessvalidfor
onepart of the population,the students. However,even for thisgroup it is
not easy to obtain reliable data for the development of intra‐European
mobility.ManystudentsgotoanothercountrywiththeErasmusProgramme.
Figure3.7:NumberofErasmusstudents(1987/1988to2006/2007)
0
40.000
80.000
120.000
160.000
87/88
89/90
91/92
93/94
95/96
97/98
00/01
02/03
04/05
06/07
Source:OwncalculationonthebasisofdataoftheEuropeanCommission(2008).
Astheabovefigureshows,thenumberofErasmusstudentshasrisen in
barely 20 years from around 3,000 to almost 150,000 students per year.
However,thecurveexaggeratesthenumberofstudentsinaforeigncountry,
becausethenumber ofErasmus students isnot weighted bythenumber of
all students. It is not easy to obtain reliable figures on the relation of the
numberofstudentsabroadinEuropetothetotalnumberofstudentsovera
longerperiodoftimeandforseveralEuropeancountries.ForthreeEuropean
countries–Denmark,GermanyandSpain–Ihavedeterminedthenumberof
Erasmusstudentsinrelationtothetotalnumberofstudentsfromtheperiod
1998to2007.TheresultsareseeninFigure3.8.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
93
Figure3.8: Number of students in foreign countries of Europe (Erasmus)
proportionally to the number of students for countries Denmark,Germany
andSpain(1998to2007,in%).
0,8
0,85
0,9
0,95
1
1,05
1,1
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Source: Own calculation on the basis of data of the European Commission (2009) and
Eurostat(2009c).
Thenumberofstudentswhoarenotstudyingintheirowncountry but in
anotherEuropeancountrywiththehelpoftheErasmusprogrammeis,allin
all,verylow.Nevertheless,ithasrisenwithinnineyearsby20%,from0.84%
to 1.04%. Not taken into account here are students who have notgoneto
another European country with the Erasmus programme, as well asthose
who are abroad but not in a European country. The number of students
abroad,regardlessinwhichcountryorwhichprogrammehasorganisedtheir
stay,ishigherthanthefiguresshowninFigure3.8.In2005,2.9%ofGerman
studentsstudiedabroad,inFranceitwas2.5%andinEngland1.0% (cf.
Isserstedt&Link2008).
Ifwedrawupabalanceofalltheempiricalresultsthenitappearsthatintra‐
Europeanmobilityisverylow,anditappearsnottohavechangedverymuch,
exceptwithstudents.MobilityinEuropeis,therefore,muchlowerthan, for
instance,intheUSA.OneofthereasonsforthelowmobilitywithintheEUis
certainlythelanguagedifferencesbetweenthecountries.Iwillreturntothis
subjectlater.
BeforeIsumuptheresultsofouranalysisoftheprocessofEuropeanisation,
I would like to discuss briefly a second development, which has
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
94
fundamentallyalteredEuropeansocietiesandhaspromotedthenecessityof
learningforeignlanguages.
3.2.5GlobalisationoftheMemberStatesoftheEU
Europeansocietiesarenotonlymuchmorestronglyinterconnectedthrough
the process of European unification, but also have been transnationalised
beyondthebordersofEuropebyglobalisation.Underglobalisation we
understandtheprocessoftheincreasinglyworldwideintegrationindifferent
fieldsofsociety,forinstance,theeconomy,communication, culture,politics,
etc. (cf. Held et al. 1999). Europeanisation is a subsidiary oftheprocessof
globalisation, insofar as it concerns a transnationalisation process, which,
however,stopsatthebordersofEurope,whereastheglobalisation process
comprisestheincreaseofinterconnectionbeyondEurope.
There are countless publicationsnowavailableonglobalisation, a process
whichbeganinthe70softhelastcentury.Forthepurposesofanempirical
illustrationofthechangewhichhastakenplace,Iwillrestrictmyselfhereto
theanalysisofanindexonthedescriptionoftheprocessesofglobalisation,
which is frequently used in the literature, namely the KOF Index of
Globalisation(cf.Dreher2006).From1970to2006,theworkinggroupatthe
ETHZurichcollectedaconsiderableamountofempiricalinformationfroma
numberofcountriesmeasuringtheopeningorclosingofthedifferent
countriesintheworld.Theindicatorsareallocatedtothreesub‐dimensions
ofglobalisation:40
Politicalglobalisation:thenumberofembassiesacountryhas,thenumberof
memberships in international organisations, frequency of participation on
UNmissions,frequencyofco‐signingofinternationaltreaties
Socialglobalisation:number of foreigncontacts (telephone,letters,tourism,
foreignersinacountry),levelofinternationalinformation(Internetusers,TV
40 Cf.http://globalisation.kof.ethz.cg
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
95
users,newspapers),culturalproximity(numberofMcDonalds,number of
Ikeas,strengthofthebooksellingindustry)
Economicglobalisation: strength of economic exchange (exports, direct
investments,etc.),restrictionsonfreetrade(tax,hiddenobstacles,
restrictionsforforeigncapital)
Thedifferentindicatorsareenteredintothecalculationsofeachglobalisation
dimensionwith a different weighting(cf. Dreher 2006). Inaddition, on the
basisofthethreesub‐dimensionstheauthorshaveconstructedanaggregate
indexwhichamalgamatesallthreedimensions,thusattemptingtoshowthe
globalisation processes in total. The three sub‐dimensions are entered into
the calculations of the aggregate index with a different weighting. On the
basisofthedataavailableonlinetheprocessofglobalisationwascalculated
for nine member states (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and
theNetherlands,UnitedKingdom,DenmarkandIreland)fortheperiodfrom
1973to2006.Wehaverestrictedourselvestoninemembercountriesofthe
EU,becausethesehavebeenmembersoftheEUsincethesurveyoftheKOF
Index,andthuswehavearelativelylongperiodoftimeatourdisposal.
As the following figure shows in the period from 1973 to 2006 adramatic
globalisation process took place in all the nine member states.Thisistrue
above all for the areas of economical and social globalisation.Theareaof
politicshadalreadyreachedquiteahighlevelatthetimeofthefirstsurvey,
dipsintheperiodfromthemiddleofthe1980stothebeginningofthe1990s
duetotheterminationofthebipolarconstellationbetweenthe capitalist
WestandthesocialistEast,onlytoincreaseoverthebaselevelin theearly
yearsofthe1990s.
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Figure3.9:GlobalizationofnineEUMemberStates(1973to2006)
50
60
70
80
90
100
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
tota l globalisation
economicglobalisation
socialglobalisation
politicalglobalisation
Source:OwncalculationonthebasisofKOFIndexofGlobalization(ETHZ2009).
Letussummarisetheconclusionsofthischapter.Aslongasthe national
statesofEuropewiththeirsegmentedorderoflanguageswere closedunits,
therewaslittleattractiontolearnthelanguagesofothercountries.AsIhave
shown in this chapter, these conditions have changed. First of all,Ihave
attemptedtodemonstratehowthememberstateshaveEuropeanised,
therebydifferentiatingfourdifferent,althoughinterconnecteddimensionsof
Europeanisation, which are: the establishment of a European system of
institutions,theterritorialexpansionofthe sphere ofinfluenceandthereby
thenumberoflanguages,theincreaseinlegislationinorderto establish a
Europeanspaceofcommunicationandinteraction,andtheincrease in the
degreeofinterconnectednessoftheEuropeansocieties.Wesawfurtherthat
Europeansocietiesbecamenotonlymorecloselylinkedthroughthe
Europeanintegrationprocess,butthatalsothedegreeofworldwide
interconnectedness in the areas of economy, politics, communication and
culturehasincreasedthroughglobalisation.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
97
These developments result in the fact that entirely new demandsand
opportunitiesareavailabletopeople,ofwhichtheymakeonlyverylittleuse
though.ThemobilityofthecitizensofEuropeisverylowandconsiderably
lowerthan,forexample,thatoftheUSA,andovertheyearsithasnotrisen
verymuch.Thismayhaveseveralreasons.Firstofall,inspiteofaformal
righttofreedomofmovement,mobilityinEuropeinvolvesmany
disadvantagesandcosts,whichdonotexistintheUSA.Amongthesecostsis
thefactthatqualificationsacquiredinonecountry,whichshouldbeformally
recognisedinanother,are,inactualfact,frequentlytreatedasbeinginferior,
whichoftenleadstoareductioninincomeandalowerplaceinthelabour
market.Moreover,thissituationalsoappliestopensionsandsocialbenefits,
for,althoughthishasbeenlegallyregulated,theycanfrequently only be
transferredfromonecountrytoanotherwithdifficulties(cf.Mau&Verwiebe
2010). Finally, language skills are important. In order to workinanother
country,onegenerallyhastospeakthelanguageofthatcountryfluently.Itis
preciselythisprerequisitewhichmanypeopledonotpossess,aswillbeseen
inthe empirical analyses.Therefore, the chanceswhich have resultedfrom
thedevelopmentofEuropeanisationandglobalisationcanonlybeusedtoa
limiteddegree.
3.3EuropeanUnion’sLanguagePolicy
As we have seen in chapter 1, in the creation of their nation states the
membercountriesoftheEUhavegonethroughaprocessoflinguistic
homogenisation. The divided and segmented linguistic structure of Europe
results from this historical, still institutionalised inheritance organised
according to national states. At the same time the nation states of Europe
havebeenopenedupthroughtheprocessofEuropeanisationand
globalisation. Participation of the people in the areas which have newly
become transnational will be made easier, when they speak the languages
which are spoken in other countries. The emergence of the nation states
teaches us that politics has a decisive influence on the question of which
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languagespeoplelearnandspeak.ConsequentlyIwillanalysemore closely
thelanguagepolicyoftheEuropeanUnioninthefollowing.
The language policy of the European Union is characterised by three
distinctive features (cf. Phillipson 2003: 105‐138; Castiglione&Longman
2007).IncontrasttothenationstatestheEuropeanUniondoesnotpursuea
policy of linguistic homogenisation by supporting a single linguafranca,
whichwouldbebindingfortheEuropeanUnion.TheEUacceptstheofficial
languagesofitsmembercountriesasitsownofficiallanguages. The
multilingualismof the EU is thereby a constitutive featureof the European
Union(1).TheEUnotonlyacceptstheofficiallanguagesofits member
countriesasitsownlanguages,butitalsoprotectsandsupportstheminority
languages spoken in the member countries, thereby supporting once more
the linguistic heterogeneity of Europe (2). At the same time, the European
Union supports the multilingualism of its citizens through a number of
programmes(3).IwilldescribeeachofthethreeaspectsoftheEUlanguage
policyandtrytoretracethereasonsastowhythelanguagepolicyhasturned
outthewayithas.
3.3.1TheLegitimacyoftwenty‐threeOfficialLanguages
WhiletheEUinmanypolicyareasstrivesforaunityandconvergenceofthe
memberstates–asinglemarket,asinglecurrency,asinglejurisprudence–
thisisnotthecasewhenitcomestolanguagepolicy.Theacceptance of
multilingualismwithintheEUisindisputablycontractuallydocumented.This
goesbackontheonehandtotheTreatyofRome,andontheother to a
Regulationfrom1958(cf.summarisedbyTruchot2003;Kraus2004:134ff.;
Ammon2006).Theprocedure for decidingonthelanguage question within
theEUisstatedintheTreatiesofRome.TheCouncilofEuropedecidesonthe
languagesunanimously.Thequestionofregulatingthelanguages,therefore,
belongstotheareaswhichmustbedecidedconcurrentlybetween all the
governments.Achangeinthepresentregulationsispractically impossible,
becauseeachofthetwenty‐sevenmembercountrieshastherightofveto.In
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addition,mostofthemembercountriesplacegreatvalueonmaintainingthe
multilingual constellation. Consequently it is unimaginable that any one of
the member countries would voluntarily relinquish the right to have “its”
languageasanofficiallanguageoftheEU.
While the procedure for stipulating the official languages is codified in the
TreatiesofRome,sofarasregulationsdealingwithcontentareconcerned,
suchaswhichlanguagesareallowedinwhichcontexts,theseweredecidedin
RegulationNo.1fortheRegulationoftheLanguageQuestionfor the
EuropeanEconomicUnionbytheCouncilin1958.Originallyonlyfourofficial
languageswerementionedintheregulation.However,withtheexpansionof
the EU other official languages were included in the regulation. The
regulation consists of eight articles (Council of the European Economic
Community2007).
Article1 The official languages and the working languages of the
institutions of the Union shall be Bulgarian, Czech, Danish,
Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek,
Hungarian,Irish,Italian,Latvian,Lithuanian,Maltese,Polish,
Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and
Swedish.
Article2 DocumentswhichaMemberStateorapersonsubjecttothe
jurisdiction of a Member State sends to institutions of the
Communitymaybedraftedinanyoneoftheofficial
languagesselectedbythesender.Thereplyshallbedrafted
inthesamelanguage.
Article3 DocumentswhichaninstitutionoftheCommunitysendstoa
MemberStateortoapersonsubjecttothejurisdictionofa
MemberStateshallbedraftedinthelanguageofsuchState.
Article4 Regulations and other documents of general application
shallbedraftedintheofficiallanguages.
Article5 TheOfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnionshallbepublished
intheofficiallanguages.
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Article6 The institutions of the Community may stipulate in their
rulesofprocedurewhichofthelanguagesaretobeusedin
specificcases.
Article7 Thelanguagesto be used in theproceedingsoftheCourtof
Justiceshallbelaiddowninitsrulesofprocedure.
Article8 IfaMemberStatehasmorethanoneofficiallanguage, the
languagetobeusedshall,attherequestofsuchState,be
governed by the general rules of its law. This Regulation
shallbe binding inits entirety anddirectly applicableinall
MemberStates.
The language regulation of 1958 is still valid today. Therefore, the equal
treatmentofallEuropean(official)languagesisthefirstandcentralpurpose
oftheEUlanguagepolicy.Allthenationalofficiallanguagesofthemember
countriesaresimultaneouslytheofficial languages oftheEU.Oneexception
tothisisLuxembourgish,thegovernmentofthecountryhavingrelinquished
itsuseasan officiallanguageofthe EU. Toldtherearetwenty‐three official
languages for the twenty‐seven member countries: Bulgarian, Danish,
German, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, Greek, Irish, Italian, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Maltese, Dutch, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Swedish, Slovak,
Slovenian,Spanish,Czech,andHungarian.AsIhavealreadymentionedinthe
introduction, some languages are official languages in two countries at the
sametime(FlemishintheNetherlandsandinBelgium,FrenchinFranceand
inBelgium,GermaninAustriaandinGermany,GreekinCyprusand in
Greece); that is why the number of official languages (23) is not identical
withthatofthemembercountries(27).Hence,theEUremainswithregardto
itslanguageconfigurationsegmentedtoahighdegree.
PeterA.Kraus(2004:137)haspointedoutthattheEUpolicyofrecognition
of the official languages of its member countries differs from other
internationalorganisations.TheASEANstatesuse,forexample,onlyEnglish
as their official language, NATO, English and French. Although the United
Nationsisaworldorganisation,meanwhilewith193membercountries,only
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sixlanguages are allowedas officiallanguages.TheseareArabian, Chinese,
English,French,RussianandSpanish.Thisregulationwaspassed by the
General Assemby in 1946. An official Language means that all documents
(draftresolutions,minutes,reports)arewrittenintheofficiallanguagesand
thatallmeetingsmustbetranslatedfromandintotheofficiallanguages.Two
ofthesixofficiallanguages–EnglishandFrench–arepermittedasworking
languages.Thismeans thatallinternal organisationalworkmust takeplace
(inoralaswellasinwrittenform)inbothoftheselanguages.
Theacceptance ofthe officiallanguages ofthe membercountries asofficial
languagesoftheEUandtherejectionofapolicypromotingalinguafrancais
connected with consequences for communication within EU institutions, as
the regulation of 1958 stipulates that all laws, documents and regulations
mustbewritteninallthetwenty‐threeofficiallanguages.Furthermore,
citizensandthenationalstatescanallturntotheEUintheir languageand
havetherighttoreceiveananswerintheirownlanguage.Theinformation
sheetsoftheEUarealsowritteninalltheofficiallanguages.
The rules of procedure decide the working language which the institutions
useinternally(Schumann‐Hitlzer&Ostarek2005:21).InthefollowingIwill
brieflydescribehow theindividual institutionsdealwith themultiplicity of
languages.Thisgivesusagoodideaoftheenormoustransactioncostswhich
areconnectedwiththeprincipleofmultilingualism.Thelanguageservicesof
theEUinstitutionscosttheEUaround1.1billionEurosperyear(Websiteof
theTranslationHeadOffice2007).
EUCommission: Since 2001 the Commission has used German, English and
Frenchasinternalworkinglanguages(Peterson&Shackleton2006: 61),
wherebyEnglish and Frenchare preferred(Ozvalda 2005: 66f.;Schumann‐
Hitzler&Ostarek2005:21).Itisonlyafterthedecisionmakingiscompleted
that translation into the other official languages occurs. The Directorate‐
GeneralforTranslationisresponsiblefortheCommissionandthe other
organsoftheEU,apartfromtheParliamentandtheEuropeanCourt(Mickel
& Bergmann 2005: 33). The Directorate‐General for Translation alone
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employs 2,350 employees and has a yearly budget of around 280 million
Euros(Soriano2007).Itisthusthelargesttranslationservicein theworld.
RoundfifteenpercentofallthoseworkingfortheCommissionareemployed
bythelanguageservices(Michel & Bergmann2005:33).In ordertorelieve
the institutions’ translation services, the translation Centre for the
OrganisationsoftheEuropeanUnion(CdT)wasestablished.
TheEuropeanCouncil:Translationsaremadefromandintoallofficial
languages at all meetings of the European Council. All documents are
moreover presented to the Council in all official languages (Mickel &
Bergmann2005:32).
TheCounciloftheEuropeanUnion:AlldocumentsaboutwhichtheCouncilof
theEuropeanUnionconsultsaretranslatedintotheofficiallanguagesofthe
EU.AttheCouncil’smeetingstranslationsaremadefromandinto all
languages(cf.homepageoftheCounciloftheEuropeanUnion).However,at
all informal meetings it appears thatthe“3+1solution”(English, French,
Germanandthelanguageofthepresidencyofthecouncil)hasprevailed
(Ozvalda 2005). In the Committee of the Permanent Representatives
(COREPER) the three language regime is employed (English, French,
German).IntheCouncil’sworkinggroupstranslationsinallofficiallanguages
are made when a law is being prepared. In the majority of the groups
translationsaremadeinonlyfiveEUlanguages(English,French, German,
Spanish and Italian). In forty‐five groups nothing is translated and only
Englishand/orFrenchisspoken.IntheCouncilsworkinggroupsaso‐called
“market model” is employed, which means that the member states in
individualcasesdecidefororagainsttheirowntranslation,butshareinthe
costs (Mickel & Bergmann 2005: 32). While the Council of the European
UnioncanrelyfortranslationsontheDirectorate‐GeneralforTranslation,it
alsohasatitsdisposalitsownLanguageServicesoftheGeneralSecretariatof
theCouncilwithmorethan700translators.
TheEuropeanCourt: In cases to the European Court the language of the
complaintisthelanguageofthelawsuit,ifit’soneoftheEUofficiallanguages.
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Incasesdealingwithpreliminaryrulings,thelanguageofthenational court
invokedbytheCourtisthelanguageofthelawsuit.Inthesessions, the
hearings,ifrequired,aresimultaneouslytranslatedintothedifferentofficial
languagesoftheEuropeanUnion(WebsiteoftheEuropeanCourt). The
working language is only French (Weidenfeld 2006: 408). The European
Court has an Interpretation Directorate at its disposal. At the beginning of
2006 the Court’s Interpretation Directorate employed 796 people, who all
spokeaminimumofthreelanguagesandwerefullyqualifiedlawyers. This
constitutesroughlyforty‐fivepercentoftheCourt’spersonnel.
TheEuropeanParliament: The standing orders of the European Parliament
stipulate that all parliamentary documents must be written in all of the
officiallanguages.Furthermore,alloftheMEPshavetheright to speak in
theirofficiallanguageandtohave all the other official languages
simultaneously translated into this language. This is also the caseforthe
officiallanguagesofallthose presentincommitteeanddelegationsessions;
this,however,canbebypassedinexceptionalcaseswiththeagreementofall
thosepresent(Art.138RulesofProcedureoftheEuropeanParliament).The
EuropeanParliamenthasahighcommitmenttobeingpolyglot,forinstance,a
statement on the homepage explains that “As regards interpreting, the
EuropeanParliament differs from theother EU institutionsin so far as the
principle of ‘controlled full multilingualism’ is observed in its day‐to‐day
work“.Inordertoavoidbottlenecksinthetranslating,theEuropean
Parliamenthasintroducedasystemof“relaylanguages”,whichmeans„atext
isfirsttranslatedintooneofthemostwidelyusedlanguages(English,French
orGerman)andfromthereintotheminorlanguages.Othermajor
Communitylanguages (Italian, Polishand Spanish)could alsobecome relay
languagesinduecourse.”Theparliamentemploysitsowntranslationservice
withabout700translators.
Theaboveshortaccountsshouldbeenoughtomakeclearthattheprinciple
ofmultilingualismcomesatahighcost.Aboveall,thesecostsarefinancial,
buttheyarealsotemporal,sinceeverytranslationinvolvesdelays.Especially
inthecomposingofdrafts,whicharesupposedtobetabledintheparliament
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byseveralMEPs,atranslationisdemonstrablytoocomplicatedandsluggish.
Thedraftsareconstantlychangingandtheresultofacloseinteractive
process (cf. Wright 2007: 161). The same is true for attempts to convince
other members of a particular position prior to a debate. This requires a
personalconversationwhichisobviouslymucheasierifthesamelanguageis
spoken. In addition to this, in parliamentary debates the liveliness of the
immediate exchange of arguments suffers greatly from being translated.
Finally, every translation carries the risk of mistakes being made. The
mistakeswhichariseandwhichareoftenfunnyarethenworthreportingin
the newspapers. In an article in the German weekly DIE ZEIT of June 17th,
1999,theauthorDanielaWeingärtnerreportedthefollowingexamples:“The
transports internationals routiers, abbreviated on the lorries to T.I.R. was
translated by a German MEP as Tir Transport. In the cabins thisbecame
Tiertransport(animaltransportsortransports des animaux).ABritishMEP
comparedthetempoinaheateddebatewithraftingonwildrivers,shooting
rapids.However,the Germantranslatorheard “rabbits”,atwhich aGerman
MEP, to the confusion of the speaker, wished “Waidmannsheil!” (Hunters’
Greeting!). And when the parliament wanted to appoint “A Commission of
Wisemen”(French:sages)inordertoinvestigateabusesintheCommission,
the “Drei Weisen” (“Three Wisemen” (trois sages) became the “Three
Monkeys”(troissinges)(Weingärtner1999).41
Excursus:LegalRegulationsandEmpiricalPractice
(1)EvenifdejurealltheofficiallanguagesofthemembercountriesoftheEU
enjoy equal status and only three working languages are permitted, in the
day‐to‐day practice of interaction within the institutions of the EU an
41 That the attempt to manage without translation and to communicate in English, even
whenEnglishisnotthespeaker’snativelanguage,alsodoesnotfunctionwithoutmishap
and can lead to amusing misunderstandings is illustrated by the following example. A
female,newlyappointedDanishminister,whowasparticipatinginaCouncilmeetingfor
thefirsttimeandhadtotaketheChairrightaway,openedthemeeting in English with
the remark that she was “not fully in command of things becauseshewasjustatthe
beginningofherperiod”(quoteinPhillipson2003:140).“Atthebeginningofherperiod”
meansthatshehadjustbeguntomenstruate.
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asymmetryin the useof differentlanguages has emerged.In thebeginning
phaseoftheEGcommunicationprincipallywasinFrenchandthat for the
following reasons (cf. Truchot 2003): French was the language which was
mostspokeninthesixfoundingcountriesandwastheofficiallanguage in
three countries (France, Belgium and Luxembourg), and the most widely
spoken foreign language in the other countries. The most important
institutions in the EU were and are located in Brussels and Luxembourg;
countriesinwhich Frenchisthe officiallanguage.The United Kingdomwas
notyetamemberoftheEU,henceEnglishwasnotanofficiallanguage.
Withtheadmissionofnewmembers English has increasingly become the
dominantlanguage(cf.Kraus2004:141ff.;Ammon2006).Inasurveycarried
outin1990among(high)officialsanddelegatesoftheEuropeanCommunity
(EC),MichaelSchloßmachercomestotheconclusion,that“Thelanguagesof
theofficialsintheECorgansareinallfunctionsEnglishandFrench,allthe
othersplayonlyamarginalrole”(Schloßmacher1994:112).Onthebasisof
different available data Claude Truchot (2003: 104) has retraced the
development of the languages in which the documents written by the
Commissionhavebeenformulated.Inthe periodfrom1986to1999aclear
increaseintheimportanceoftheEnglishlanguagecanbeseen.
Table3.3:LanguagesusedintextsbytheEuropeanCommission(in%)
Year French English German others
1986 58 26 11 5
1989 49 30 9 12
1991 48 35 6 11
1996 39 45 5 12
1997 40 45 5 12
1998 37 48 5 10
1999 35 52 5 8
Source:Truchot2003
ThedominanceofEnglishininternalcommunicationwillhaveincreased
enormouslysincetheadmissionoftwelveCentralandEasternEuropean
countriesin theyears from2004 to2007, whoselanguages becameofficial
languages.Atleastthiscanbeconcluded,ifAbramdeSwaan’s“Q‐Value
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Theory”is takenas a basis.With themembership of thenew countriesthe
numberofthose who speakEnglishas theirnativetonguedid notincrease,
but the number of those who speak English and no other foreign language
increasedexponentially.Thisleadstothesimpleconclusionthat“The more
languages,themoreEnglish”(deSwaan2001b).
(2)Theconsequenceswhicharelinkedtothedominanceofcertainlanguages
withintheinstitutionsoftheEUhavenotbeenwellenoughresearched to
date.However,wecanassumethefollowingoutcomes.
(a) The dominance of certain languages disadvantages those persons and
interest groups as regards determining the political agenda, who do not
speaktheselanguageswellenough. In 1996astudyofthe networksamong
theMEPsrevealedthat“relationshipsweredictatedbylanguagecompetence,
that informal information flows were truncated by language barriers, and
thatnegotiationsinunofficial settingswasconstrainedforMEPswithnoor
little knowledge of English or French” (Wright 2000; quoted from Wright
2007: 151). The translation of working papers into minor languages takes
longer,comeslaterandthereby hinders preparation(Wright2007:157).In
additionithindersinformalnetworkingandthusinfluencesthechanceMEPs
haveto push their own interests through.This is true, for example, for the
Italian MEPs. “The Italians punch below their weight” (Wright 2007: 160)
becauseoftheirinabilitytospeakforeignlanguages.
(b)Thedominanceofcertainlanguagescanhaveaselectiveinfluenceonthe
recruitmentoftheMEPs.Thefactthatverygoodlanguageskillsincreasethe
chancesofachievingyouraimsleadstothefactthatinanticipation of this
fact MEPs, who have these skills, are nominated in the nation states. The
consequenceofthisisthatcertainpersons,forthemostpartthosewhoare
moreeducated,haveamuchbetterchanceofbecomingMEPs.Thisinturn
strengthens the “bias” which already exists at the level of national
parliaments so that the upper classes are clearly over‐represented in the
European Parliament. Seen from the democratic point of view, this is a
problematicalover‐representationofcertainclassesinasociety.
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
107
EndofExcursus
The fact that the principle of the equality between official languages, or
ratherthethreeworkinglanguages,isbeingcontravenedonthequiet,hasin
thepastledtofrequentprotestsbythenationalgovernments.For many
membercountriesoftheEU,aboveallforthecountrieswhoselanguagesare
relativelywidelyspoken(German,French,ItalianandSpanish),examplescan
befoundwhichshowthatthenationalgovernmentsinsistthattheirlanguage
is not at a disadvantage (Ammon 2006). In 1999, the former Chancellor of
Germany,GerhardSchröder,sparkedoffamassiveconflictwiththeFinnish
Council Presidency at the time, because the latter did not want to allow
Germanastheworkinglanguageatameetingwiththeheadsofgovernment.
Schröderhadthreatenedtostayaway(Forsberg2000:14).
In 1999 the former President of France, Jacques Chirac, left theroomata
meeting of the heads of government of the EU in a fury, becauseaFrench
corporaterepresentativeaskedhimaquestioninEnglishandnotinFrench.
Chiraclater explained thathe hadbeen deeplyshocked thathiscompatriot
had spoken to him in a foreign language (cf. BBC 2006). The corporate
representativedefendedhischoiceoflanguagewiththefactthatmostofthe
peopleintheroomspokeEnglishandnotFrench.Onecanassumethat
Chirac‘sreactionwasbasedonhisconcerntoassertthesovereignty of
FrenchandnotbecausehepersonallydidnotunderstandEnglish,sinceasa
formerstudentatHarvardUniversityhemusthavebeenableto.
The German Bundesrat and Bundestag have repeatedly, and recently quite
sharply, reminded the Commission that German is to be treated on parity
withEnglishandFrench.ThelastrequestbytheBundestagin2008
regarding this matter was made by the Christian Democrats, the Social
Democrats,theGreensandtheLiberalstogether,soallthepartiesareunited
onthispoint.OnNovember17th, 2008a similar demand bythe Bundestag
addressedtotheCommissionwaspassedbyallitsmembers.
Animpressiveexampleofthesymbolicsignificanceofthelanguagequestion
inregardtonationalidentityisthatoftheIrish.AlthoughIrelandhasbeena
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memberoftheEUsince1973,Irish(Gaelic)hasbeenanofficiallanguageof
theEUonlysince2007.ThenumberofIrishwhospeakGaelicineverydaylife
is low. The resuscitation of Gaelic as their own language can be regarded
moreasaprojectoftheeliteinanattempttodiscovertheirown history,as
distinctfromthatofGreatBritain’s.The“madness”whichisconnectedwith
thismightbestbeillustratedbythefollowing.OfthethirteenIrishMEPsonly
fourspeakIrishatall,andtheyusetheirlanguageinParliamenttosymbolise
their national uniqueness. The other Irish members have to learn their so‐
calledmothertongue.TheEuropeanParliamentoffersspecialcoursesinthis
subject(cf.Borovsky&Hartig2008).
Theseexamplesillustratehow importantitisto thenationstatesthat their
officiallanguageisrecognisedasanofficiallanguageoftheEU.Atthispoint
the question arises as to how the adherence to the principle of
multilingualism in the EU can be explained. The EU policy of treating all
existingofficiallanguagesofthemembercountriesasequalofficiallanguages
oftheEUcanbeexplainedbythefactthatthememberstatesoftheEUare
not prepared to give up their linguistic sovereignty. Why they are not
preparedtodoso?PoliticalSciencedifferentiatesbetweentheso‐called“high
politics”and“lowpolitics”(Hoffmann1966).Theareaswhichdirectlytouch
upontheheartofnationalsovereignty,forexample,foreignand defence
policy,countas“highpolitics”.Intheseareas,itholdstrue that the nation
statesarenot,oronlytoasmalldegree,preparedtodelegatesovereign
rights to supra‐national institutions. If they do this regardless, then they
usuallyretain the right ofveto for themselves, so as not to be outvoted by
othercountries. Theareas of “low politics” arethose policyareaswhichdo
notbelongtothecoreareasofnationstatepoliticsandwherethenation
statesaremoreinclined togiveupsovereignrights. Theintergovernmental
theoryofEuropeanintegrationinterpretstheestablishmentoftheEUbythe
distinction which I have outlinedaboveasprimarilyaprocessof the
integration of areas of “low politics” (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1993,
1998).
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
109
The fact that any attempt to evenperhapsreducetheofficialor working
languagesoftheEUmeetsmassiveresistancefromthenationstatesandthat
thenation stateshave kept forthemselves the right to vetoany attempt to
changethelanguageorder,indicatesthatlanguagepoliticsisanareaof“high
politics”,ormoreprecisely,anareaofinterpreted“highpolitics”. In the
language question we are not dealing with a subject which
intergovernmentaliststhinkofwhentheydiscussthecoreareasofthestate.
These areas are primarily the areas of policy concerned with security,
interests,resources,power,etc.,thatistosay,“hard”interests.Thelanguage
question is concerned, and here I refer back to the concepts explained in
chapter 2, not with the building of society but with the identity building
functionoflanguage,thatistosaythesymbolicdimension.Thenationstates
interpret their own national language as a central feature of their identity
and they attribute a very high significance to this interpretation, thereby
elevating the subject of linguistic sovereignty to one of interpreted “high
politics”.Andthemembercountriesarepreparedtoletthissymbolismcost
themsomething,astheenormouslyhightransactioncostscausedby
multilingualismdemonstrate.
3.3.2ProtectionandSupportofMinorityLanguages
NotonlydoestheEUaccepttheofficiallanguagesofthemembercountriesas
itsownlanguages,butitalso,evenifonlytoalimiteddegree, fosters the
minoritylanguageswhichexistinitsmembercountries,thussupportingthe
linguistic heterogeneity of Europe. The policy of protecting and supporting
the minority languages has, however, markedly less legal importance than
the policy of accepting the official languages, since minority languages are
neither official nor working languages of the EU. The protection of the
minoritylanguagesis,moreover,muchmorecontroversial.Whilethe
institutions of the EU and above all the European Parliament within the
contextofaworldwidedebateontheprotectionofminoritiestrytosupport
the rights of the minorities in the member countries, the member states,
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especiallythosewhichhavelargelinguisticminoritieswithintheirterritorial
boundaries, are much more low‐key when it comes to fostering minority
languages.Theyinterpretsupportfortherightsofminoritiesas anattempt
toundermine thenational linguisticidentity. Thisconflict explainswhy the
supportforminoritylanguageswithintheEUendsupbeingsoambivalent.
However,ifwelookatthedevelopmentovertime,weseethattherehasbeen
adefiniteincreaseinthesignificanceoftheprotectionofminoritylanguages.
Thequestionsariseastohowtheprotectionofminoritylanguagesisbound
inlawandbywhatmeanstheminoritylanguagesarefosteredbytheEU(1)
andhowwecanexplaintheincreasingimportanceofsupportforthe
minoritylanguages(2)?
(1)Therearepointsinseveraltreatiesandlaws,whichcanbeinterpretedas
asummonstoactivelyprotectminoritylanguages.Onestatutorybasisupon
whichthepolicyof protecting minoritylanguagesrestsisArticle151 ofthe
MaastrichtTreatywhichmakesthepromotionof culture oneofthetasksof
theEuropeanUnion(Vizi2003:53).Itremainsopen,however,astowhether
the minority languages fall under the heading of culture. The Charter of
HumanRightsoftheEUin2000issomewhatmoreprecise.InArticle22 it
states,“TheUnionshallrespectcultural, religious and linguistic diversity”
(European Community 2000). Nevertheless, in the anti‐discrimination
regulations, languages as subjects of discrimination are not explicitly
mentioned,butonlyreligion,opinions,disability,ageandsexualorientation.
The legal lack of clarity opens up a leeway for interpretationswhichhave
beenmadedifferentuseofbythepoliticalplayersintheEU.
DuetotheinclusionofEasternEuropetheprotectionofminoritiesand the
minoritylanguagehasgainedincreasinglyinimportance(Heidbreder2004:
480). In this regard the EU has been accused of having a doublestandard,
particularly because the European Charta for Regional and Minority
LanguagesoftheCouncilofEuropeortheFrameworkConventionfor the
Protection of National Minorites were not signed or ratified by several
memberstates(Heidbreder2004a;Vizi2003:50),whileatthesametimethe
3.FromNationStatestoaEuropeanSociety
111
new member countries were being put under pressure to protect the
minoritiesandtheirlanguagesmoreenergetically.
The “key player” (Shuibhne 2007: 129) in minority language politics is the
European Parliament. In the 1980s the Parliament called upon the
Commissioninthreeresolutions(Arfe‐Resolutions1981and1983;Kuijpers‐
Resolution 1987) to protect minority languages (Shuibhne 2007: 129).
Obviouslysuchresolutionsarenotbinding,butneverthelessthefoundingof
the European Bureau for Lesser‐Used Languages (EBLUL) in 1981 (which
however was closed down some years later) and the report on linguistic
minoritiesbytheIstituto dellaEnciclopediaItaliana (1986)canbeascribed
totheseinitiatives(Shuibhne2007:129).Moreimportantly,though,asearly
as1988onemillionECUforthepromotionofminoritylanguageswere
includedinthebudgetbytheParliament(Vizi2003:56).However,theyearly
budgetofuptofourmillionEuroswasaxedbytheEuropeanCourtin2000
becauseofitsunclearlegalbasis,althoughalowersumunderanother
budgetary item still stands the minority languages in good stead (Strubell
2007:171).AsareactiontoMaastrichtandattheendoftheEuropeanYear
of Languages in 1994 and 2001 the Parliament repeated in further
resolutions the call for more protection for the minority languages, and
financial support as well as legislative initiatives in this matter (Shuibhne
2007: 130). The so‐called Ebner Report in 2003, in which the Parliament
calledyet again forpermanent financing andthe inclusion of “regional and
lesser‐usedlanguagesinlanguageeducationprogrammes”(Shuibhne2008:
127)isonesuchinitiative.
Primarily the Commission restricts itself to supporting projects and
organisations for the protection of minority languages. EBLUL, support for
minoritylanguagesduringtheEuropeanYearofLanguages,supportforthe
onlinenewsagencyEurolang,whichspecialisesinminoritylanguages,orthe
publicationofvariousstudieslikeEUROMOSAIC(1996)canbementionedin
thisconnection(Vize2003;cf.Grin&Moring2002;NicCraith2008).Inthe
“ActionPlan onLanguage Learning andLanguage Diversity”for 2004‐2006
theCommission explicitly includesthe minoritylanguagesfor thefirsttime
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(Shuibhne 2008: 127). This is a very big step, because it means that the
CommissionistreatingtheofficiallanguagesoftheEUandthe minority
languages spoken within the EU on an equal basis in their supportforthe
multilingualismofthecitizens.
Atthesametimetherearereservationsfromseveralmembercountries
regarding a strengthening of the rights of the minority languages. This
manifestsitselfintherefusaltosupportthelegaldocumentwhichlaysdown
the most far‐reaching protection of the minority languages, the“European
CharterforRegionalorMinorityLanguages”oftheCouncilofEurope.Outof
thetwenty‐sevenmembersoftheEU,whichatthesametimearemembersof
theCouncilofEurope,eight(Belgium,Bulgaria,Estonia,Greece, Ireland,
Latvia, Lithuania and Portugal) have not signed the charter, seven have
signed the charter, but up to now have not ratified it (France,Bulgaria,
Luxembourg,Malta,Poland,RomaniaandtheCzechRepublic)andonly
twelve have signed and ratified it (Denmark, Germany, Finland, the
Netherlands,Austria,Sweden,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,Hungary,theUnited
KingdomandCyprus).As we haveseeninthelast section,thenationstates
interpret their national language as a central feature of theiridentity,thus
making the language question a sphere of “high politics”. This framework
alsoinfluencestheinterpretationofthelegitimacyofminoritylanguagesand
becomes contentious for those countries which have large linguistic
minoritieswithintheirterritory.Countrieswhichhavenotsignedorratified
thecharterareafraidthatbyrecognisingtheminoritiesorminority
languages in their territory they will endanger their national unity. These
fearsarecertainly the mostimportantreasonwhy supportforthe minority
languagesintheEUissomoderate.However,ifweregardthedevelopment
inretrospectthenthetopicgainsmuchmoresignificance.Howcan we
explainthisdevelopment?
(2) The discovery of the topic of protection of minority languages is
embedded in a worldwide change in the perception and interpretation of
minorities and their languages. The changes are dealt with in academic
literatureandinpoliticsundertheheadingof“multiculturalism”.Supporters
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113
ofamulticulturalpositiondepartfromtheideathatmostsocietiesconsistof
differentculturesandthatthedifferentculturesshouldberegardedasequal
bythepoliticiansincharge,recognisedandfostered,andthatitisnot
legitimatetoworktowardsasocietyinwhichtheculturesaresubsumedbya
majorityculture.Cultural differenceisexemplified by skincolour, ethnicity,
sex, religion, sexual orientation but also language (cf. for many others
Gutmann 2001 and the contributions in Joppke & Lukes 1999). Howthe
change in the perception of minorities and minority languages has come
aboutisdifficulttoexplain.Thatithashappenedthough,cannotbedisputed.
Will Kymlicka (2007) and Douglas A. Kibbee (2008) have delineated the
developmentoflawtowardsanincreaseintheprotectionofminorities.
While earlier efforts to institutionalise universal rights worldwide are
attemptstocodifyandenforcetherightsoftheindividual,for instance,
humanrights,achangehasoccurredsincethe80softhelastcentury. The
definitionoftherightsofminoritiesasgrouprightsisbecomingincreasingly
important;moreoverwearenotjusttalkingaboutthedefenceof minority
languages(defensiverights),butabouttheirsupportandpromotion.In1992
the UN passed the “Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
NationalorEthnicReligiousandLinguisticMinorities”,whichsupplementary
totheHumanRightsdealswiththerightsofminorities.Thestates declare
thattheywillprotecttheexistenceandthenational,ethnic,cultural,religious
and linguistic identity of the minorities in their territory. In 2001 UNESCO
passedthe“UniversalDeclarationonCulturalDiversity”.Thisgoesaboveand
beyondthepreviouslegislationinsofarastheminoritylanguagesarenotjust
concededdefensiverights,rightsthatis,whicharesupposedto protect the
speakersofminoritylanguagesfromoppression.
Bothagreementsaimtoprotecttheexistenceofnationalminoritiesandtheir
languages within the signatory states and to codify their equality. Minority
languages are interpreted as a cultural asset whose use should be
encouraged.Forexample,instructionfrompre‐schooltouniversityshouldbe
offeredintheminoritylanguages,justiceandpublicadministration should
authorisethem,andthemediashouldgivethemadequatespace.
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Intotalitcanbesaidthatovertimetheprotectionofminoritylanguageshas
beenextended inmany respects:(1) The subject has receivedconsiderably
morelegalandpoliticalattention,(2)theprotectionofminority languages
has developed from an individual right to a collective one, (3) minority
languages are not only protected, but they have also been actively
encouraged.Minorityrightshave developedfrompurelydefensive rights to
entitlements.42
Thelegislativedevelopments,ofwhichIhavegivenonlyabriefdescription,
areaccompaniedbyapublicdebateinwhichreasonsfortheprotectionand
nurture of minority languages are discussed. The spokesmen in the debate
arepoliticallyliberallegalexperts,sociologists,anthropologistsandlinguists
(cf. Krauss 1992; Hale 1998; Skutnabb‐Kanga & Phillipson 1995; Crystal
2000;Phillipson 2003; Kymlicka 2007; Nic Craith 2008).Those leading the
discussiononminorities,canbeinterpretedintermsofJohnW.Meyer’sneo‐
institutional theory as a “cultural otherhood”, who see themselves to be
‘disinterested’ actors, stemming from civic society and science, who advise
theactiveparticipantssuchastheUN,UNESCOandtheEU.These“cultural
others”arenotthemselvespoliticallyactive,butactinanadvisorycapacity.
“Thisisthepostureofthedisinterestedconsultant,moreconcernedwiththe
truththanhisowninterests”(Meyer2001:234).43
42Thedramaticincreaseintheimportanceoftheprotectionofminorities and their
encouragementisshownnotonlyinthestatutesquoted,butalsointheorganisationofa
numberofinternationalinstitutionsandfoundations,whodealwithminoritiesandtheir
languages.Monitoring systems weredeveloped, the endangeredlanguages,whichoften
havenowrittenform,arelistedaccordingtolinguisticcriteria,statisticsarecollectedon
theirdissemination andthe number oftheir speakers, etc. (cf. Crystal 2000: 91ff.).The
purposeofallthisistoinformthepublicandpoliticiansabouttheextentofthethreatto
minoritylanguagesandthenmovethemtointervene.
43Mostoftheauthorswhohavepublishedonthissubjectare,however, themselves
protagonists, who support the extension of the rights of minorities. The self
understandingoftheseauthorsisthattheirarticlesarescientificandanalyticalinnature,
whereas I would classify them as political and normative texts (cf. the critical
commentary on the literature by Kibbee 2003 and de Swaan 2004).Theacademic
backgroundwhichtheauthorsbringwiththemattractsaspecificaudience.Ironically,the
authors argue for the preservation and cultivation of exotic languages whereas they
themselvespublishintheworldhegemoniallanguageofEnglishinordertomaximizethe
receptionoftheirtextsandhencetheirownreputationintheacademic world (cf. the
cynicalremarksbydeSwaan2004onthismatter).
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There are two central arguments put forward by the “the others”forthe
encouragement and nurture of minority languages. I will presentthe
argumentswhileatthesametimecommentingonthemcritically.
Linguisticandbiologicaldiversity: The protection of diverse languages is
equatedtobiologicaldiversity.Article1of“TheDeclarationon Cultural
Diversity”adoptedbyUNESCOstates,forexample,that,“[a]sa source of
exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for
humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common
heritageofhumanityandshouldberecognisedandaffirmedforthebenefitof
present and future generations”. This fundamental idea, that diversity of
languages is an asset to society and can have a positive effectonits
productiveness is formulated in various different ways. Douglas Kibbee
(2003)describesthispositionasthe“greentheoryofecologicalprotection”.
Thosewhosupportthedemandforlinguisticpluralitythinkthat the
protectionand supportof minorities and minority languagesis notonly an
ethicalimperativebutalsoanecologicalone.Thejustification for this
reasoningresultsfromtheassumptioninevolutionarytheorythatthereisan
advantage to the diversity of species. This suggests that under altered
environmentalconditions(forexample,anewdisease)diversityensuresthat
althoughmanyorganismswilldieout,otherswillsurvivepurelyonthebasis
of a different genetic make‐up. The genetic variation is, as it were, a
safeguard against risk, which under altered environmental conditions can
helptoensuresurvival.
Isthisargument,however,alsovalidforlanguages?Onlyifitcanbeproven
thatthevariousculturesarebasedondifferentlanguages,sothatadiversity
oflanguagesishencecausallyconnectedtoadiversityofcultures (which
then provides a variation pool of different forms of society) does linguistic
diversityconstituteanadvantage.However,ifitistruethatmoreorlessthe
same things can be expressed by all languages, then there is noactual
evolutionaryadvantageinhavingadiversityoflanguages.Theloss of a
particularlanguagedoesnotleadtothelossofculturaladvantages. This
bringsustothenextpoint.
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Linguisticdiversityasculturaldiversity: Language is interpreted as an
expression of culture. Different languages lead to differences in cultural
appropriation. Consequently the protection of minority languages is an
imperative,ifonewantstoprotectnotonlythelanguagesbutalso the
cultureswhicharecreatedbythelanguages.Thesupportersofanexpansion
oftheprotectionforminoritylanguagesconcludethattheprotection of
minoritylanguagesis,therefore,anethicalimperative(cf.Arzoz2008a).
However,literaturefromthefieldofcognitivepsychologydemonstratesthat
the influence of language on thought is very limited (for a more extensive
discussionofthisargumentseeappendix).Two conclusions resultfromthis
research:(a)Becausethoughtstakeplaceinaninnerlanguage,theinfluence
ofnaturalspeechonthoughtislow.(b)Everythingwhichpeopleexpressina
particular natural language can essentially be translated into another
language (Hunt 2001: 8320). What follows from this research is that it is
possibletoretain one’sownculture andwayof life, whileatthe sametime
notspeakingone’sownlanguage.Cultureandlanguagearesubstantially
decoupledfrom oneanother. Hence,cultural diversityis possiblewithouta
correspondinglinguisticdiversity(cf.Ladefoged1992).44Iwilldiscussthese
argumentsinmoredetailintheappendix.
WehaveseenthattheEuropeanpolicyofencouragingminoritylanguagesis
embeddednotonlyinthechangesininternationaljurisdiction,butalsointhe
hegemonial discourse on minorities, which I have outlined briefly. These
developmentsform,amongotherthings,theessentiallegitimacyforthelegal
developmentwithintheEU,whichIhavedescribedinmyfirstpoint, and
whichexplainswhytheprotectionofminoritylanguageshasbecome an
increasinglyimportantelementinEUpolicymaking.Ihaverestrictedmyself
primarily to presenting and interpreting EU policy. Whether or not such a
policymakesanysenseandwhichnormativestandardscanbeemployedin
44 There is a third argument that is important for the changed discussion on minorities
whichconcentrates on the issue of who isresponsible for the protectionof minorities.
Thesovereignrightsofthenationstatesarebeingincreasinglyquestionedinthisregard;
a shift of responsibility to international organisations is occurring; international
organisations are increasingly seen as being responsible to protect the rights of
minorities,evenagainsttheinterestsofthenationstates.
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assessing language policies will bediscussedinthefinalchapter in more
detail.Thefew hintsIhave givenshouldhowever havemadeclear thatI’m
notconvincedthattheEUisfollowingtherightlanguagepolicy.
3.3.3SupportforMultilingualism
Iftheacceptanceandsupportformultilingualismandtheprotection and
nurturing of the minority languages are the first two primary goals of EU
language policies, then the principle of encouraging the multilingualism of
thepeopleofEuropeisthethirdcentralgoal.Accordingtothisplancitizens
should speak two of the languages spoken in the EU besides their native
languagewhereby allthe languagesare treatedequally. Whichfar reaching
goalstheEUispursuingwithitspolicyofencouragingthemultilingualism(a)
andwhatmeasuresisittakingtorealisethem(b)?
(a)Asintheencouragementoftheminoritylanguages,theencouragementof
multilingualism has an ideological underpinning. The following quote from
the former Commissioner for Multilingualism (this policy field has had its
own commissariat since 2007, but the post has been abolished later)
expressesverywellthegoalsoftheEU,whichcanalsobefound similarly
formulatedinmany other EUlegaldocuments: “The abilitytocommunicate
in several languages is a great benefit for individuals, organisations and
companies alike. It enhances creativity, breaks cultural stereotypes,
encouragesthinking‘outsidethebox’,andcanhelpdevelopinnovative
productsandservices.Theseareallqualitiesandactivitiesthat have real
economic value. Multilingualism alsohelpstomakepeoplemoremobile to
pursue learning opportunities or job vacancies abroad countries. It is
beneficial for individuals, business and competitiveness. By extension, it is
crucialforachievingtheover‐archingpolicyaimfortheEuropeanUnion:the
Lisbon strategy to create more jobs and growth. (…) The Commission’s
multilingualism policy aims to draw these various strengths together. In
particular, its objective is to encourage language learning andpromoting
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linguisticdiversityinsociety,promoteahealthymultilingualeconomy,and
give citizens access to European Union legislation in their ownlanguages”
(Orban2007).
Thelegitimacyofapolicywhichencouragesmultilingualismisfuelled,asthe
quotationshows,bytwomotives,aculturalandaneconomicone.Through
themultilingualismofitspeoplefirstofalltheUnionwouldliketocontribute
to an improvement in mutual understanding and to the reduction of
prejudice. Secondly it understands multilingualism as an investment in the
improvementofthehumancapital ofitscitizens,whichwill enablethemto
bemobilewithintheEuropeanmarketandtoworkoutsideofthenation
states,thuscontributingtotheeconomicgrowthofEuropeasawhole(cf.
also Linsenmann 2006: 355; Mickel & Bergmann 2005: 100). Regarding
multilingualismitbehavesinthesamemannerasinmanyotherpolicyfields:
InthefirstinstancetheEUisaneconomicunion,andobtaininglegitimacyfor
non‐economic policies is usually achieved by economic arguments(cf.for
equality of the sexes and family policies Gerhards et al. 2009,for
environmentalpoliciesGerhards&Lengfeld2008).
(b)ThemeasureswhichtheEUhastakentoencouragethemultilingualismof
itscitizensarevariousandusuallyembeddedintheeducationpoliciesofthe
EUasawhole.Inthisconnection“Socrates”and“LeonardodaVinci” were
the most important programmes integrated into the “Life Long Learning
Programme”in2007.Thisisaproactiveprogrammeforencouraging
transnationalcooperation inthe field ofeducation. The EU hasgrantedthe
programmefrom2007to2013aroundsevenbillionEuros.Itintegratesfour
different,individual programmes (cf.Directorate Generalfor Educationand
Culture2008).
COMENIUSisaimed atvariouspre‐school institutionsandschoolsup tothe
endofsecondaryschoolaswellasatschooladministration,teachertraining
and in‐service training. Comenius supports the mobility of school children,
student teachers and teachers, thereby supporting the learning of modern
foreignlanguages.Schoolpartnershipsaresupportedandthemobility of
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school children, assistant teacher situations for student teachers abroad as
wellasin‐servicetrainingcoursesforteachersabroad.
ERASMUSisdirectedatuniversitiesandsupportsthemobilityofstudents,
lecturersandotherteachersinhigher education. Universitystudyabroadis
supported,internshipsabroad, guestlecturers, theorganisationof mobility,
orintensiveprogrammesandpreparatoryvisits.
LEONARDODAVINCI is the programme for cooperation in vocational
education and training. Stays abroad in vocational education and training
institutionsaresupported,projectsforthetransferandforthedevelopment
of innovations, partnerships, networks, preparatory visits and contact
seminars. The target groups are vocational education institutions, such as
vocationalschools,externalandindustry‐wideeducationalinstitutions,
companies, management and labour and their organisations, professional
associationsandchambersofcommerce.
GRUNDTVIGistheprogrammeforgeneraladulteducation.Theprogrammeis
opentoallinstitutionsofadulteducationinthe member states.Thiscanbe
publicinstitutions,suchasauthorities,administrationandgovernment
offices or institutions under public or private sponsorship, like initiatives,
clubs,furthereducationcolleges or non‐governmental organisations. The
mobility of those employed in adult education is supported in the form of
individual further training, study partnerships for the cooperation of
institutions from different partner states, projects for the development,
testing and distribution of projects and networks for the further
developmentofspecificsubjectsandthemesinadulteducation.
All these programmes not only deal with the acquisition of a foreign
language,butneverthelesslearningaforeignlanguageisoneoftheircentral
goals.45 The concrete programmes are enlarged upon by other, more
45 Anevaluationoftheprogramme“LifelongLearning”establishedin2007withreference
totheaimedforsuccessisnotavailabletodate.However,thereareseveralfindingson
thesuccessof the pilot programmesintegratedintotheprogramme (cf. on thissubject
McCoshanetal.2008).
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
120
symbolic initiatives for the encouragement of multilingualism. Hence, for
example, 2001 was declared the year of languages; yearly the 26th
SeptemberiscelebratedaslanguagedayandtheEuropeanLanguageSealis
given for innovative projects in connection with the learning of languages
andtheirteaching(Lutjeharms2007:113).
InalloftheeffortsoftheEUtoimproveforeignlanguagecompetence, all
member states languages are treated equally, including the minority
languages.TheEUdoesnotsupportanypolicyforthesupportof a lingua
francainEurope,ithasnopreferenceforaparticularforeignlanguage.
LearningoneofthesmallerlanguagesissupportedbytheEUjustasmuchas
thelearning of the morewidely spread languages. Once againthe question
must be posed here, as to whether this is a meaningful policy. Abram de
Swaan(2004)doubtsthisandinthelastchapterofthepresentwork,in
whichthenormativequestionofanappropriatelanguagepolicyisdiscussed,
Iwillagreewithhisargument.DeSwaansuggeststhatequalsupportforall
languageshasinthelong‐termpreciselythereverse,non‐intended effectof
supporting one language, namely English. “The more languages the better
remains the battle‐cry. But this multiplicity of languages actually subverts
diversity:themorelanguagesthatcompete,themoreEnglishwilltakehold.
Inthegeneralconfusionoftongue,inwhichnoindigenouslanguage can
predominate, English automatically imposes itself as the sold, obvious
solution.ThatiswhathashappenedinIndiaandSouthAfrica,inNigeria,and
in the European Union. The hegemony of English is being hastened and
consolidated by the promotion of a multiplicity of languages – the by
EuropeanCommission,forinstance”(deSwaan2004:475).
121
4.EUROPEANCITIZENS’TRANSNATIONALLINGUISTIC
CAPITAL
The processes of Europeanisation and globalisation taking placeinthe
membercountriesoftheEuropeanUnionentailnumerousopportunities as
wellaschallengesforthepeopleofEurope.Inordertoparticipate in the
processofEuropeanisation,toworkinanothermemberstate,tostudythere,
tospendholidaysthere, to establishnewcontactsandto becomepolitically
involved,theyhavetobeproficientinthelanguageofthecountrytheylivein.
Transnationallinguistic capital, as measuredby theability tospeakforeign
languages, is therefore a deciding factor in whether or not a person can
participate in the process of Europeanisation. With this resource at one‘s
command, new options become available; those speaking their native
languageonly,aretiedtotheirhomecountryandcannottakeadvantageofa
unitedEurope.
InthefirstsubchapterIwilladdresstheissueofwhetherandtowhatdegree
the citizens in the twenty‐seven EU countries have transnational linguistic
capital available and to what degree they speak English, the most widely‐
spokenlanguageinEuropewiththehighestlevelofcommunicativeuse.For
this, I will analyse the 2005 Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 63.4).
The results reveal wide‐ranging differences in the extent people posses
transnational linguistic capital not only among the twenty‐seven countries
butalsowithinthecountriesaswell.Therefore,inasecondstepIamgoingto
tacklethequestionofhowthesedifferencescanbeexplained.Thereto I
enunciateatheoreticalexplanatorymodelandtestitfirstwithbivariateand
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
122
then with multivariate analysis’. Until now, only Neil Fligstein (2008) has
analysed foreign language proficiency of European citizens. We will go
beyondFligstein’sstudyinsofaraswewillpresentamoregeneral
explanatory model which takes micro as well as macro contexts into
consideration.
4.1WhoSpeaksHowManyLanguages?
ThesurveyformingthebasisofthefollowinganalyseswasconductedinMay
and June 2005 by the Institute TNS Infratest on behalf of the European
Commission.Includedwerepeoplefifteenyearsandabovewhowere
surveyedinface‐to‐faceinterviews.Thesamplesizeamountstoabout500
persons in smaller (i.e. Malta, Luxembourg), and 1,000 persons in larger
countries.Aweightingofthedataaccordingtoage,gender,regionandsizeof
the place of residence ensures the representativeness for a country’s
population.Astheweightingalsoaccountsforthepopulationof the
respective states, the Eurobarometer results are representative for all
twenty‐seven member states. Such a weighting has been used in all the
followinganalyses.
Beforeturningtowardsthefindingsoftheanalysis,Iintendto define the
termoftransnationallinguisticcapitalanditsoperationalisation more
precisely. Up to now I have referred to transnational linguistic capital in
general.Multilingualismismanifestinfourdifferentabilitiesthatarejointly
connected:inunderstanding,speaking,readingandwritingalanguage.Both
ofthepassiveabilities(understandingandreading)areeasiertolearnthan
the two active ones (speaking and writing); writing a foreign language is
definitively the most difficult aspect of foreign language proficiency. The
empiricalanalysesreferonlytothespeakingofaforeignlanguage. Among
otherquestions the intervieweeswere asked inthe Eurobarometer survey,
“Whichlanguagesdoyouspeakwellenoughtohaveaconversationin?”The
answers to this question constitute the central dependent variable of our
study.Eventhoughthereisnoempiricalinformationavailableon the
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
123
abilitiestounderstand,readandwrite,onecanassumethatthosespeakinga
foreign language are also better able to understand, read and write the
respectivelanguagethanthoseforwhomthisdoesnotapply.
AscanbeseenfromthequestionnaireoftheEurobarometerforeign
languageabilityisnotmeasuredbyalanguagetest,butrather–asisthecase
formostlarge‐scalesurveys–byrespondents’ownsubjectiveself‐
evaluation. The question then arises as to whether self‐evaluation is an
adequatetooltomeasuretherespondents’“actual”linguisticcapabilityorto
whatdegreepeoplewronglyestimatetheirabilities.Severalstudiesindicate
thatself‐evaluationisagoodmeasureoflanguageproficiency.
Inhisstudyonmigrants’foreignlanguageacquisition,HartmutEsser(2006)
hasdedicated a wholesubchapter to this methodological question(chapter
7.6)andevaluatedallrelevantreferencesanddatasources,sothatIcanrely
onEsser’s argumentation. All inall Esser arrivesat the conclusionthat the
subjective self‐evaluation of language competence can indeed be used as a
replacementindicatorforanobjectivemeasurementofcompetence.
Thereare several studiesavailable in whichboth subjective self‐evaluation
and concrete language tests wereconductedformeasuringlanguage
proficiency. Although the correlation between the two measures deviates
acrossdifferentstudies,thefactthatthecorrelationliesbetween.58and.46
(Esser2006:527f.)showsthatthereisarobustcorrelationbetweenfactual
andperceivedlinguisticability.46
In his study Esser is interested in explaining migrants’ foreign language
competence.Hedevelopedamodeltoexplainforeignlanguagecapabilityand
appliedittoboth subjectiveself‐evaluationsofforeignlanguage proficiency
andthe results oflanguage tests. Bothmodel calculations showexactlythe
samecausalstructure,eventhoughtheexplainedvariancevaries in both
models.Withregardtoourquestionthisfindingmeansthatthesubjective
46 Christian Dustmann and Arthur van Soest (2001) have shown that the subjective self‐
evaluation can entail systematical false estimations. Especially beginners often
overestimatetheirfactual abilities; over time theself‐evaluationadaptstotheobjective
competence.Onthisbasistheauthorstriedtocalculateastatist ic correction that they
usedintheanalysis.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
124
evaluation of one’s own foreign language competence can by all means be
used as replacement measurement of the objective command of foreign
languages.Nomistakeisbeingmadeintermsofthestructureofthecausal
explanation when one uses self‐evaluation of language proficiency to
measure real language competence. Moreover, we assume that the self‐
evaluationmeasurementasitisusedinouranalysiswillnotleadtoanybias
inrespect to differences between countries, since it is implausible that, for
example Swedes overvalue their command of foreign languages, whereas
Polesundervalueit.
Table4.1showsthenumberofforeignlanguagesEuropeancitizensspeak.In
additiontothecategories“none”,“one”,“two”and“threeormore”,wehave
calculatedeachcountry’smeanandstandarddeviation(cf.forananalysisof
the foreign language competence in fifteen EU countries in Fligstein 2008:
147ff.). The term foreign language proficiency used in the table and the
followingexplanations requires somecomments. Includedare personswho
haveacquiredfurther languagesduringtheirlife,in additiontotheir native
languageandpersonswhohavegrownupwithtwoorevenmorenative
languages, due to the fact that two or more languages were spoken in the
familyorthedirectenvironment.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
125
Table4.1: Transnational linguistic capital in 27 countries of the European
Union(in%)
ForeignLanguages
none one two
three Mean S
EU2751.327.115.16.60.770.93
Hungary 70.6 18.4 9.0 2.0 0.42 0.74
UnitedKingdom 70.0 20.4 7.5 2.1 0.42 0.72
Portugal 64.1 16.3 13.9 5.7 0.61 0.92
Spain 63.9 23.7 9.2 3.3 0.52 0.79
Italy 63.7 24.3 9.4 2.6 0.51 0.77
Romania 59.4 21.4 14.2 5.0 0.65 0.90
Ireland 59.2 24.9 12.9 3.0 0.59 0.82
France 55.5 27.8 12.8 3.9 0.65 0.85
Bulgaria 54.6 28.9 12.4 4.1 0.66 0.85
Poland 50.9 26.1 12.8 10.2 0.82 1.01
Greece 50.6 32.7 13.5 3.2 0.69 0.82
Austria 41.6 33.6 15.2 9.7 0.93 0.98
Germany 40.6 36.7 18.7 4.0 0.86 0.86
CzechRepublic 40.0 32.3 19.2 8.6 0.97 0.97
Finland 33.7 24.4 22.6 19.4 1.28 1.13
Slovakia 31.1 26.8 22.9 19.3 1.31 1.11
Belgium 28.9 22.5 25.5 23.0 1.43 1.13
Cyprus 27.8 52.8 13.9 5.6 0.96 0.81
Estonia 13.8 37.9 31.0 17.2 1.54 0.94
Denmark 12.6 25.2 35.3 26.9 1.77 0.99
Sweden 12.3 40.7 28.1 18.9 1.54 0.94
Slovenia 11.1 27.8 33.3 27.8 1.77 0.98
Lithuania 9.8 43.5 32.6 14.1 1.51 0.85
Netherlands 8.6 22.5 43.5 25.5 1.86 0.90
Latvia 6.6 49.5 34.1 9.9 1.47 0.76
Malta 4.8 33.3 42.9 19.0 1.74 0.86
Luxembourg 0.0 4.3 26.1 69.6 2.61 0.64
N=26,520
(1)OneoftheEuropeanUnion’sstatedgoalsisthatitscitizensshouldspeak
two foreign languages or more; however, the EU is far from reaching this
goal.OverhalfofEUcitizenscannotspeakanyforeignlanguageatall,about
one‐quarter speak at least one foreign language, and only fifteen percent
speaktwoormore.Forthemthenationstateisindeedacontainer, the
leavingofwhichinvolvesmanydifficultiesinunderstanding.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
126
(2) The results also show considerable differences between countries;
whereasalmosteverycitizeninLuxembourgandoverninetypercent of
citizensinLatvia,Malta,andtheNetherlandsspeakaforeignlanguage,this
percentageshrinkstoonlyone‐thirdincountrieslikeHungary,Portugal,
GreatBritain,and Spain.Because a numberof factorsact simultaneously to
reinforceorcontradictoneanother,itisnoteasytoexplaintherankingofthe
countries.PeoplelivingincountriesthatuseEnglishastheirnativelanguage
(like Great Britain and Ireland) have very low levels of transnational
linguisticcapital,whereascitizensofverysmallcountries (like Luxembourg
and Malta) have especially high levels. Higher levels of modernisation also
seemtopromotefluencyinmultiplelanguages,whichwillbediscussedlater
oninmoredetail.
(3)Finally,theresultsshowhighlevelsofvariancewithinanygivencountry.
Theaveragestandarddeviationis0.93ona0‐3scale.Thismeansthatthere
are citizens with high levels of transnational linguistic capital as well as
peoplewithoutanyineverygivenEUmemberstate.Theinternal variance
canbetracedbacktoeducational,class,andcohortdifferences, as we will
discussinthefollowingsections.
Iftheability tospeakseveral languagesisinterpreted asacentral resource
allowing participation in processes of transnationalisation and
Europeanisation, then the first empirical results show that this resource is
distributedveryunequally.AsIhaveexplainedinchapter2.1multilingualism
is connected with a multitude of advantages: It facilitates studying in
different countries and improves educational options, it enhances the
opportunitiesatthelabourmarketandmakesiteasierforcompanies, or
rathertheirmembersofstafftodevelopnewmarkets.Scholars’possibilities
toavailthemselvesofotherresearchers’findingsandtomakeavailabletheir
own in order to improve their reputation, is enhanced by having
transnational linguistic capital. Furthermore, multilingualism increases the
possibilities to mingle with potential acquaintances, friends and partners.
Additionallyitimproveschancesofpoliticalinvolvementinaworldwhichis
intheprocessofglobalisationandEuropeanisation.Finally,multilingualism
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
127
is connected with symbolic gratifications, since presenting oneself as a
multilingualspeakerindifferentsettingscanbeinterpretedasastrategyfor
defininganew,emergingtransnationalelite.Multilingualismisacapitalable
toincreaseone’sincomeandatthesametimeameansofdistinctionfrom
thosewhodonothavethesameresources.
Uptonowwehaveunderstoodtransnationallinguisticcapitalasreferringto
the number of foreign languages one speaks, fully independent of the
question of which concrete foreign languages these are. If however,
transnational linguistic capital is taken as a resource to communicate with
other people, this resource’s usability will be essentially dependent on the
numberofspeakerswhocanbereachedwiththatforeignlanguage. The
numberofcommunicationpartnerswithinreachiscalculatedfromthesum
ofalanguage’snativespeakersand the number of persons speaking this
languageasaforeignlanguage.Everylanguagestudiedbyapersonasforeign
language has a communicative value, a so‐called Q‐value (cf. deSwaan
2001a/b).
Luxembourgish, for example, is only spoken by about 300,000 native
speakersandveryfewnon‐nativespeakers,ascomparedtoGerman,whichis
spokenbyoveronehundredmillionEuropeans.LearningLuxembourgish,
therefore, has a much smaller effect on one’s ability to communicate with
other people than learning German would have. The following table shows
themost‐widelyspokenlanguagesintheEU.
Table4.2: Most widely spoken languages in 27 countries of the European
Union(in%)
ForeignornativelanguageOnlyforeignlanguage
English 45.9 33.8
German 28.7 1.4
French 22.4 10.8
Italian 14.9 2.4
Spanish 12.7 4.4
Russian 5.9 5.4
N26,47626,469
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
128
Evenwhenthecitizens’nativeandforeignlanguageproficiencyisdistributed
across many languages, there are only five languages, be it as a native or
foreignlanguage,spokenbyovertenpercentofEUcitizens.Theselanguages
havethehighestcommunicativevalue(Q‐value),withEnglishbeingthemost
widely‐spokeninEurope,asistobeexpectedfollowingthelineofargument
inthelastchapter.Afterall,43.1%ofEuropeansareabletocommunicate
with one another in that language. Therefore, for EU citizens who begin
learningaforeignlanguageinordertocommunicatewithasmany other
peopleas possible it makes sense to choose English first.This is especially
truetakingintoconsiderationnotonlytheEuropeanlanguageconstellation,
butthenumberofpeoplewhospeakEnglishbeyondEurope.Aswehave
seeninchapter3.1Englishisthemostwidelyspokenlanguageintheworld,
either as native or foreign language. Compared to Chinese whichisthe
language that has the most native speakers, English is more widely spread
acrossdifferent regions of theworld. Moreover, it iseasier for most ofthe
speakers to study English rather than Chinese due to the fact that the
linguisticdistancebetweenmostlanguagesandEnglishislessthanbetween
theselanguagesandChinese.
IfpeopleoreducationalinstitutionsinEuropedecidetolearn, teach or
promoteaforeignlanguageandindoingsofollowtheprincipleofgainingthe
greatestpossiblebenefitintheformofthe reaching ofasmanyspeakersas
possible, they will probably decide in favour of English because this is the
predominant language in Europe. The degree to which the citizens of the
twenty‐seven EU member states speak Europe’s dominant language can be
seenintable4.3.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
129
Table4.3:Englishproficiencyin27countriesoftheEuropeanUnion(in%)
NoEnglish
proficiency
Englishas
foreignor
nativelanguage
Englishas
foreign
language
EU2754.145.933.8
UnitedKingdom 0.5 99.5 7.4
Ireland 0.5 99.5 6.0
Malta 4.8 95.2 90.5
Netherlands 12.4 87.6 87.3
Sweden 15.0 85.0 85.0
Denmark 15.8 84.2 83.5
Cyprus 27.8 72.2 72.2
Luxembourg 33.3 66.7 66.7
Finland 39.6 60.4 59.9
Slovenia 44.0 56.0 55.6
Austria 45.1 54.9 53.3
Belgium 48.2 51.8 51.7
Germany 48.9 51.1 50.8
Greece 56.1 43.9 43.5
Estonia 58.6 41.4 41.4
France 65.7 34.3 33.8
Latvia 65.9 34.1 34.1
Italy 70.7 29.3 28.6
Portugal 72.8 27.2 26.4
Romania 73.4 26.6 26.5
Poland 74.1 25.9 25.4
Lithuania 74.3 25.7 25.7
Slovakia 75.8 24.2 24.2
CzechRepublic 76.2 23.8 23.7
Spain 79.3 20.7 19.8
Hungary 83.8 16.2 15.9
Bulgaria 84.6 15.4 15.1
Atfirstglancethetableisnoteasytointerpret,becausethecountrieswhich
aresimilarintermsoftheircommandofEnglishdosofordifferentreasons.
Altogether, four groups emerge which differ in their level of English
competence (reference point of the interpretation is the central column
showingthepercentageofpersonswhospeakEnglisheitherasnativeoras
foreignlanguage):
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
130
ThefirstgroupconsistsofcountriesinwhichEnglishistheofficiallanguage
oroneofthem.Englishlanguageproficiencyisalmostonehundredpercent
inthesecountries(UnitedKingdom,Ireland,andMalta).
The secondgroupismadeupofsmall,highlymodernisedcountrieslike
Denmark,Sweden,Luxembourg,andFinland.Between60and87%ofpeople
inthesecountriesspeaksEnglish.
The thirdgroup contains countries in which 34 to 60% of the population
speaksEnglish.Therearehighlydevelopedcountries like Germany,Austria,
andBelgiuminthisgroup,aswellassmallerandlessmodernisedcountries
likeGreece,Estonia,andSlovenia.
Thefourthgroup,forwhichEnglishlanguageproficiencyliesbetween15and
35%,consists ofRomanic countries (France, Spain, Italy,and Portugal) and
manyEasternEuropeancountries(Latvia,Romania,Poland,Lithuania,
Slovakia,TheCzechRepublic,Hungary,andBulgaria).
Dividingthecountriesintothesegroupsgivesusseveralhintsastothe
causalfactorsthatmayhaveaninfluenceonEnglishlanguageproficiency,
likecountry sizeorlevel ofmodernisation, etc.Before turningtowardsthis
issue in the following chapter, I would like to analyse what people think
about the relevance of foreign languages. The fact that about half of the
citizens do not speak any foreign language might correspond to their own
wishes.IntheEurobarometersurveypeoplewereaskedhowmany
languagesoneshouldbeabletospeakintheEU.Table4.4presents the
percentageof interviewees sayingthat EUcitizens shouldhave atleastone
foreignlanguageattheircommand.
AstheresultsshowthereisaEurope‐wideconsensusthatpeopleshouldbe
proficientinatleastoneforeignlanguage.Allinall,ninetypercentofthe
respondentsagree tothat idea; thevariance betweenthe countriesis quite
small.ThefactthathalfofthecitizensofEuropedonotspeakasingleforeign
languageobviouslyderivesonlytoaminordegreefromtheirmotivationand
hencemusthavedifferentcauses.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
131
Table4.4:Numberofforeignlanguagesoneshouldlearn(in%)
Atleastone
foreign
language
Noforeign
language
N
EU2789.610.425,357
Cyprus 97.2 2.8 496
Greece 97.1 2.9 996
Poland 95.7 4.3 981
Lithuania 95.5 4.5 982
Latvia 95.5 4.5 979
Estonia 94.7 5.3 984
Denmark 94.7 5.3 1,017
Belgium 92.8 7.2 997
CzechRepublic 92.5 7.5 1,017
Sweden 92.3 7.7 1,038
Luxembourg 91.7 8.3 496
Netherlands 91.5 8.5 1,026
Spain 91.3 8.7 933
Hungary 90.5 9.5 980
Italy 90.3 9.7 971
Malta 90.0 10.0 478
Germany 89.4 10.6 1,522
Slovakia 88.6 11.4 1,015
Bulgaria 88.1 11.9 833
France 87.9 12.1 994
Slovenia 87.6 12.4 1,004
Portugal 86.6 13.4 919
Ireland 85.7 14.3 910
Romania 85.0 15.0 856
UnitedKingdom 84.5 15.5 984
Finland 84.1 15.9 1,011
Austria 82.7 17.3 938
In addition, citizens were asked which languages children should learn
besidestheownnativelanguage.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
132
Table4.5:Foreignlanguageschildrenshouldlearn
Mostoften
mentioned
Secondmost
oftenmentioned
Thirdmostoften
mentioned
EU27EnglishFrenchGerman
Belgium English French Dutch
Bulgaria English German Russian
Denmark English German Spanish,French
Germany English French Spanish
Estonia English Russian German
Finland English Swedish German
France English Spanish German
Greece English German French
UnitedKingdom French Spanish German
Ireland French German Spanish
Italy English French Spanish,German
Latvia English Russian German
Lithuania English Russian German
Luxembourg French English German
Malta English Italian French
Netherlands English German French
Austria English French Italian
Poland English German Russian
Portugal English French German
Romania English French German
Sweden English German Spanish
Slovakia English German French
Slovenia English German Italian
Spain English French German
CzechRepublic English German Russian,French
Hungary English German French
Cyprus English French German
Asthe resultsintable 4.5show, inall countriesin whichEnglish isnot the
nativelanguage,itisthelanguagethatisstatedmostoften.Luxembourgisan
exception. The reason for that might be that here the benefits from being
proficientinFrenchareindeedhigherthanbeingproficientinEnglish,since
alargepartofthepopulationspeaksFrenchandthecommandofFrenchis
especially useful taking into account the neighbourhood to, andtheclose
relationswith France. Thedistribution of languages being statedas second
andthirdforeignlanguagescomplieswiththeexpectationsthatderivefrom
thetheoryofcommunicativevalue.Ontheonehandpeopleprefer to learn
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
133
thoselanguagesthatarewidelyspreadacrossEuropeandtheworld.Onthe
otherhandtherearecharacteristicsspecifictocountriesaffectingtheforeign
language’s expected communication benefit. Thus, the large Swedish
minorityinFinlandmightbethecauseofthefactthatFinnsnameSwedishas
the second most important language. Similar reasons might explain why
peopleoftheBalticstatesgivehighprioritytoRussian.
4.2ExplainingDifferencesinTransnationalLinguisticCapital
Wehaveseenthatmultilingualismvariesconsiderablybetweenthecountries
as well as within the countries; the same applies to English asaforeign
language.InthefollowingIwill firstlypresenta generalexplanatorymodel
thatcanhelpusexplainthedifferencesinmultilingualism(chapter 4.2.1).
Second,wewillformulateconcretehypothesesthatstemfromthe
explanatory model and test them withabivariateanalysis.Thethird step
testsourhypotheseswithamultivariateanalysis.AsIaminterestedinboth
theexplanationofthelevel oftransnationallinguisticcapitalingeneral and
theexplanationofEnglishlanguageproficiency,thiswillbefollowedbytwo
separatesubchapters.Chapter4.2.2focusesontheexplanationofthelevelof
transnationallinguisticcapitalandchapter4.2.3ontheexplanation of
English.
4.2.1AGeneralModeltoExplainTransnationalLinguisticCapital
There are different theoretical approaches which have tried to explain
language acquisition. Hartmut Esser (2006: 65‐73) has recently presented
and summarised different approaches from linguistics, economics, and
sociology. He comes to the conclusion that most theories have avarietyof
commonalitiesamongeachother,bothintermsofthestatedfactors which
could explain foreign language proficiency as well as in terms of the
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
134
postulated causal mechanisms.47 Esser himself synthesises the different
theoreticalapproachesandlinkstheexplanationofforeignlanguage
acquisition with a general theory of social behaviour. Thereby he follows
other scientists who have tried to explain language and foreign language
acquisition and have proposed and tested similar explanatory models (e.g.
Lieberson1970,1981;Selten&Pool1991;Espenshade&Fu1997;Chiswick
& Miller 2001; van Tubergen & Kalmijn 2005; Van Parijs 2004, 2011;
Chiswick2007;Braun2010; Hans 2010).Iwillbase myownexplanationin
the following on Esser’s considerations. However, Esser is interested in
explainingtheconditionsofacquiringaforeignlanguagebymigrantsandnot
bynatives. Firstof all I will explainEsser’s generalmodel and nextdiscuss
thespecialconditionsofmultilingualismofnon‐migrants.
Esser’s explanatory model of foreign language acquisition by migrants
consistsfirstofallofanexplanatorycoremodellingthedecisiontostudy a
foreignlanguageasaninvestmentdecision,secondlyasthedeterminationof
those societal conditions which impact on the different dimensions of the
coremodeltherebyinfluencingthedecisiontoacquireaforeignlanguage.
(a)Generalexplanatorymodel:foreignlanguageacquisitionasinvestment
decision
(1)AccordingtoEsser,migrantswhoenteranewsocietybasicallyhavetwo
options in terms of the acquisition of the language of the immigration
country:Theycaneitherdecidetostudythenewlanguageortheycanstick
totheirmothertongueandnottrytoacquiretheforeignlanguage.Both of
thetwo alternatives form twopoles of a scale;between the poles different
degreesofinvestmentintheforeignlanguageacquisitioncanbelocated.
(2) If and to which degree actors invest in acquiring a foreign language
dependsonthequestionwhetherthe outcomeof theinvestmentminus the
costsarisingishigherthantheoutcomeoccurringwithoutinvestingin the
47 While the economic theories explain exactly the mechanisms and partly model them
mathematically, the other approaches remain to agreater extentimplicitlyformulated;
however,Esserbarelydetectssubstantialdifferences.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
135
acquisitionofaforeignlanguage. BeingfluentinEnglishmight,for example
helppeopletoachievebetterpositionsinthelabourmarketthanpeoplewho
donothavethiscompetence.ScholarswritinginEnglishandaccordingly
being able to publish in English journals achieve, for example,abroader
readership;thiscanleadtoamorefrequentcitationoftheirworkandthusa
higher reputation in the respective “scientific community”. Moreover, this
mightbringwithitbetterchancesformoreattractivejobpositionsincluding
ahighersalary.Ananalogicalsituationapplies,forinstance,totheprofession
ofsecretaries.InthepublicsectorinGermanysecretariesspeaking several
languagesareratedatahigherpaygroupthanthosenotfulfilling this
condition.Atthesametimetherearecosts,especiallytimecostsconnectedto
theacquisitionofforeign languages.Inorderto being abletowritewithout
mistakesinaforeignlanguagealongtimemustbespentonstudying this
language.Itishardtocalculatehowhighthesecostsareexactly.Referringto
the relevant literature Philippe Van Parijs (2004: 132), who has dealt
extensivelywiththeanalysisofforeignlanguages,statesthefigureof10,000
hoursasbeingneededinordertolearnalanguage(seealsoGrin2004;van
Parijs2011).Asspeculativeassuchanumbermightbeandaslittleaccounts
forindividualdifferencesinlearningaforeignlanguage,itexpressesthefact
thatacquiringaforeignlanguage is relatedtoconsiderablecosts.According
tothisassumption,investmentintheacquisitionofaforeignlanguagetakes
placeonlyiftheoutcomeoftheinvestment,minusthecostsarising,paysof
incomparisonnotdoingso.
(3)Whethertheinvestmentintheacquisitionofaforeignlanguageisworth
it, now depends on three general conditions: (a) on the opportunities, the
accesstofacilitiesforlearningalanguage,(b)onthemotivationtomakean
investmentinaforeignlanguageandfinally(c)onthecoststhemselves
(Esser 2006: 41; Chiswick & Miller 2001; van Tubergen & Kalmijn 2005;
summarisingChiswick2007;cf.alsoalreadySelten&Pool1991).48
48 Thethreefactorsarerootedinotherpropositionsofdimensioning.BarryR.Chiswikand
Paul W. Miller (2001) and later Frank van Tubergen and Matthijs Kalmijn (2005)
differentiatethe following factors:„Exposure“,being identical to the term used here of
opportunity,“efficiency”meaningcosts,and „incentives”referringtothetermusedhere
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
136
Access,orrathertheopportunitystructure,constitutesacentralprecondition
ofacquiringaforeignlanguage.If,forexamplethereexistscompulsory
schoolinginacountryandEnglishasfirstforeignlanguageisobligatoryfor
allstudents,amorefavourableopportunitystructureforstudyingEnglishis
available than if there is no obligation to learn a foreign language or if
Russianisthefirstcompulsoryforeignlanguage.
Even if the opportunities to acquire a foreign language are favourable, the
individualcanstillrefusetostudyaforeignlanguage.Motivationforlearning
aforeignlanguageisanotherfactorthatinfluencesacquisitionandcan,in
turn,beinfluencedbyanumberofotherfactors.Sociologistsare not only
interested in idiosyncratic, individual motives, but also in collective
preferences.Somecountriesandlanguagesareviewedashighlyprestigious;
somearenot.SeparatistCatalonians,forexample,maybemoremotivatedto
improve their Catalan rather than their Castilian Spanish; similarly, Iraqis
whoviewAmericantroopsasanoccupying force maybeaversetolearning
English,thelanguageoftheiroccupiers.
Lastly,the costsattached tolearning aforeign languageare important.The
lower the monetaryandnonmonetarycostsoflearning, the more likely
someone is to acquire a foreign language. For highly‐educated people with
previous learning experience, the cost required to learn a foreign language
would be less than for people with little education and few study skills.49
Moreover,thedifferentforeignlanguagesvaryintermsoftheeffortneeded
tostudythem.IfaSwedeoraGermanwantstolearnChinese,hewouldhave
tolearnanewsystemofcharacters,butnotifhedecidestolearnSpanish.
ThecostsoflearningSpanishforaGermanoraSwedearethereforesmaller
thanthecostsoflearningChinese.
of motivation. Later on Esser (2006: 73ff.) differentiates four factors decisive for the
acquisitionoflanguage:motivation,opportunity,costsandefficiency.Efficiencydescribes
the pace of learning a language. To me this seems to be a subsetofcosts–thefaster
someonelearns,thesmallerarehistimecosts;accordingly,thefactorisdiscountedhere.
49 Ofcourse,therespondent’seducationdoesnotonlyaffectthecostsofacquiringaforeign
language, but is above all connected with the opportunity structure as the foreign
languagetrainingispartoftheacademiccurriculum.Themorehighlyeducatedsomeone
is,themoretimeheorshehasspentineducationalinstitutions,thelongerheorshehas
beentaughtforeignlanguages.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
137
(b)Societalconditionsinfluencingforeignlanguageacquisition
This explanatory model only describes the general dimensions and
mechanisms of learning a foreign language. The opportunity structures,
motivation,andcostsofforeignlanguageacquisitionare,however,allfactors
whichindividualsonlyhavelimitedinfluenceover.Somepeoplegrowupin
post‐industrialsocietiesthatrequirestudentstolearntwoforeignlanguages;
othersfromlessmodernisedsocietiesattendschoolswhereforeignlanguage
education is still underdeveloped. Social class is also a factor that matters;
upper class or upper middle class parents who value foreign languages
impartthisvaluetotheirchildrenandcanalsobackuptheirconvictionwith
financial resources and by sending their children to an English language
boardingschoolsothattheycanlearnEnglishproperly.Incontrast,working
classfamiliesoftendo notvalueeducationand foreign languagelearningto
thesameextentasupperandmiddleclassparentsdo;andmayalsonothave
thefinancialresourcesto facilitatesuchlearning.Theseexamplesshowthat
opportunities, motivation, and costs are highly influenced by societal
conditions. However, these societal conditions which impact on foreign
languageacquisitionplayadifferentroleformigrantsthantheydofornon‐
migrants.
Migrantsofthefirstgenerationusuallystudythelanguageoftheimmigration
countryasadults andareable tospendmore orless effort onlearningthis
language.Sofarwearetalkingaboutpeoples’decisionseithertoinvestinthe
acquisitionofaforeignlanguageornot.Thesituationfornon‐migrantswho
learnaforeignlanguageisusuallydifferent.Theystudyforeignlanguagesin
the educational institutions of their countries. In some countries it is
obligatorytostartaforeignlanguageinthefirst,thirdorfifthgradeandtwo
years later another one. Partly also the choice of a specific language is
prescribed,inGermany,forexampleEnglish.Ofcourse,adultsalsostilllearn
foreign languages by attending adult evening classes, language courses
abroadorprivatelanguageschoolsathome;thepercentageofthosewhodo
so is small in comparison. Hence, for foreign language acquisition by non‐
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
138
migrantstheleewayformakingindividualdecisionsseemstobeessentially
smallerthanformigrantslearninganewlanguageasadults.Hence, the
assumption that language learning is an investment decision is not
completely appropriate. To a great extent the decision of the individual is
determinedbystructural factors.This,though, altersnothingabout thefact
thattheopportunities,thecostsandthemotivations affect foreignlanguage
acquisition.
In the following I will attempt to explain the probable effects of societal
conditionson the opportunities,motivation, and costs of learninga foreign
language. The differences in transnational linguistic capital between EU
memberstatesshownintable4.1,canbetracedbacktovarying societal
conditionsineachcountryaffecting opportunities,costsand/ormotivations
tostudyaforeignlanguage.Therefore,memberstatesstandasaplaceholder
forvaryingconstellationsofsocietalconditionsthatexistincertainsocieties
andthatinfluenceforeignlanguageproficiency.
Byrelatingsocietalconditionstothetheory’sexplanatorycore,forinstance
to the costs, opportunities and the motivation, we follow the Hempel‐
Oppenheimmodelofexplanationastheexplanandumisdeducedfrommore
general hypotheses and antecedent conditions. Thus, the accusation of
practicingsociologylimitedonlytotheformulationofad‐hochypothesescan
beavoided.Atthesametime,linkingsocietalconditionstoatheoreticalcore
makesahighergeneralisationofthefindingspossible.
Before I deduce different hypotheses and then test them empirically, two
preliminaryremarksareneeded.
(1) The empirical analyses are based on a secondary analysis of
Eurobarometerdata.Thiscanleadto either alackofappropriateindicators
for testing one’s own explanatory assumptions or the impossibility for
preciselyoperationalisingtherespectivetheories,meaningthatoneand the
same variable can be assigned to several theoretical constructs. These
general limitations of secondary analyses also partially apply toourown
analysis.Admittedly,mostoftherelevantvariablesareavailableinthedata
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
139
set,thoughinsomecasesthevariablescannotbeassignedpreciselytooneof
the three relevant factors of the general explanatory model only –
opportunity,motivation,costs–butcanaffectseveralofthesefactors.
(2)There aretwo potential waysof presentingand testingthe hypotheses.
Usually, the presentation is structured according to the core model of the
explanation by dealing with the three hypotheses one after the other and
subsumingtherespectivesocietalconditions under thesethreedimensions;
this is the theoretically “correct” approach since it complies toagreater
extent with the logic of theoretical deduction. An alternative presentation
deals with the societal conditions one after the other and explains to what
extent which societal parameter condition affects which dimension of the
explanatorymodel. Asin thiscase we are analysing some of the conditions
having an impact on different dimensions of the explanatory model at the
sametime,itseemstome,tobemorereaderfriendlyandcleartofollowthe
secondmethod.
4.2.2ExplainingTransnationalLinguisticCapital
Every EU citizen is a member of a particular nation state with particular
institutionalstructures,oneormoreofficiallanguages,anationalmedia,and
acertain population size.These macro‐contexts which are quitesimilarfor
everycitizenofanindividualnation,butdifferbetweennations, affect the
chancesofbeingmultilingual.Atthesametime,citizensofanygivencountry
differfromoneanotherintermsoftheirsocialclass,theirlevelofeducation,
and their age. These “individual” characteristics in turn influence the
probabilityofbeingmultilingual.Accordingly, the societalconditions,which
are able to explain the level of transnational linguistic capital, can be
arranged in macro‐level factors on the one hand and individual
characteristicsontheotherhand.Wewillfocusfirstonmacro‐levelfactors
that affect transnational linguistic capital and then discuss individual‐level
factors.Table4.6givesanoverviewoftheconditionsandtheireffectonthe
threedimensionsofourexplanatorymodel.Thetablereferstoaproposition
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
140
byHartmutEsser(2006:93f.),though,thecontentofthetable is different.
Thisisduetotworeasons.Firstofall,Esserfocusesontheexplanationofthe
acquisition of a foreign language by migrants; different conditions apply in
partthantothegroupofcitizensstudyingaforeignlanguageintheirnative
country. Secondly, Esser’s study is not internationally comparative.
Correspondingly,disparitiesbetweendifferentmacro‐contextsareirrelevant
tohim.50
I will discuss and test the differenthypothesesinorder.Soas to
operationalisetheexplanatoryfactors,newvariableswereformed,partially
relyingontootherdatasets.Theprecisedescriptionofthedifferent
variablesistobefoundintheappendixattheveryendofthisbook.
Table4.6:Theoreticalmodelexplainingtransnationallinguisticcapital
Opportunities
CostsMotivation
Macrolevelfactors
Multipleofficiallanguages + +
Prevalenceofnative
language
–
Countrysize – –
Levelofmodernityand
education
+ –
Individuallevelfactors
Respondent’sage – + –
Respondent’ssocialclass + +
Respondent’slevelof
education(institutional
culturalcapital)
+ – +
Foreignbirthofthe
respondentandhis/her
parents
+
Identificationwithnative
language
–
50Moststudieswhichhaveanalysedthelanguageproficiencyofmigrantsfocusonone
countryandthuscannotanalysetheeffectofdifferentmacro‐contexts.Exceptionsarethe
survey by Barry R. Chiswik and Paul W. Miller (1995) and the verygoodanalysesby
FrankvanTubergenandMatthijsKalmijn(2005).
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
141
(a)Institutionalisedlanguageconstellationandnumberofofficiallanguages
As we had seen in the last chapter, most European countries became
linguisticallyhomogenisedasaresultofnationstatebuildinganddesignated
onelanguageastheofficiallanguage; Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, and
Ireland,however,havetwoofficiallanguages,andcitizensofthesecountries
aresometimesrequiredtolearnbothnationallanguages,eitherinschoolor
inotherenvironments.Theopportunitiesforlearningaforeignlanguageare
thereforemuch morepronounced in these countries thanin countrieswith
only one national language. Additionally, institutionally bilingual societies
mayhaveapositiveeffectonthemotivationofcitizenstolearnthesecond
language, because knowledge of both official languages would improve
accesstoabroaderlabourmarket,andincreasesocialandpoliticalnetworks,
etc.51
Table4.7: Number of official languages in a country and citizens’
transnationallinguisticcapital(in%)
Oneofficial
language
Twoormoreofficial
languages
Noforeignlanguage 51.8 25.1
Oneforeignlanguage 27.2 22.8
Twoforeignlanguages 14.8 22.8
Threeforeignlanguages 6.1 19.3
N23,5103,010
r=0,10***;Spearman’sRho=0,08***;Tau‐b=0,08***
Theresultsoftable4.7confirmourhypothesis,thatthepercentageofpeople
who speak multiple languages is higher in countries with institutionalised
multilingualismthanincountrieswithonlyoneofficiallanguage.
51 In Ireland bilingualism is indeed legally codified but is factuallynotpractisedbythe
population;onlyasmallpercentageoftheIrishspeaksGaelic;ifIrelandisclassifiedasa
monolingualcountrythestatisticcorrelationbecomesclearlystrongerinthetable.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
142
(b)Prevalenceofanativelanguageandthecommunicativevalueofaforeign
language
AsIhaveshowninchapter2.1,theprimaryfunctionoflanguageistoallow
people to communicate with one another; speaking the same language
increases the opportunities of cooperation and identification with other
people.Peoplewholiveinasocietywherealargenumberofpeople speak
thesamelanguagehavemoreopportunitiestocommunicatethandopeople
wholiveinsocietieswhereonlyasmallnumberofpeoplespeak their
language. This second group of people is therefore more likely tolearna
foreignlanguageinordertoincreasetheirabilitytocommunicatewithmore
people.52Inotherwords,thecommunicationalvalueofaforeignlanguageis
lowerforpeoplewhospeak(eitherasanativeorforeignlanguage) a
languagespokenbymanyandishigherforpeoplewhodonot.Thisislikely
tohaveaneffectonthemotivationtolearnaforeignlanguage(cf.deSwaan
1993;2001/b).53
Totestthishypothesis,thedifferentcountrieswereclassified into two
groups: countries whose language is spoken by either more than or fewer
than ten percent of the EU population (as either a native or a foreign
language).Ithenanalysedwhetherbothofthegroupsdiffersignificantlydue
totheirtransnationallinguisticcapital.Secondly,Icalculatedthemean
betweenthedegreeofprevalenceoftherespectivelanguageandthecitizens’
foreignlanguagecompetence.Theresultsofbothofthecalculations are
summarisedinthefollowingtable.
52 JochenRoose (2010: 129f.)shows thatinborder regions morepeopleareproficientin
thelanguage of the neighbouringcountrythanintherestofthecountry. He attributes
this to the higher benefit that is connected to the command of the language of the
neighbouringcountry.
53 Indoingsotheso‐called “Q value” of eachlanguageiscalculatedaccordingto acertain
formula:QiS=pi•ci=Pi/Ns•Ci/Ms.QiS:Communicationalutilityofthelanguageiin
theconstellationS.pi:Prevalenceofi,forinstance,thepercentageofthespeakersPofiof
thetotalnumberofthespeakersNintheconstellationS.Theprevalenceinformsabout
thenumberofspeakerswithwhomadirectcommunicationinthelanguageiispossible.
ci:Centralityofi,i.e.thepercentageofmultilingualspeakersChavingiintheirrepertoire
oflanguagesinrelationtoallmultilingualspeakersintheconstellationS. Centrality isa
measurefortheconnectionofIwithotherlanguagesintheconstellationS.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
143
Table4.8: Prevalence of a language and transnational linguistic capital(in
%)
Upto10%Over10%Mean
prevalence
Noforeign
language
37.4 59.4 20.8
Oneforeign
language
28.0 26.1 17.4
Twoforeign
languages
21.5 11.5 14.8
Threeforeign
languages
13.1 3.0 10.5
N17,3467,79825,144
r=‐0,27***;Spearman’sRho=‐0,25***;Tau‐b=‐0,24***;Eta=0,22***
Theresultsconfirmthehypothesis:Peoplewhoselanguageisprevalenthave
muchlowerlevelsoftransnationallinguisticcapitalthandopeople whose
languageisspokenbyfewerthantenpercentoftheEuropeanpopulation.
The mean values are to be interpreted as follows: The language of those
speaking three foreign languages is on average spoken by 10.5% of the
peopleintheEU(asforeignornativelanguage).Incontrast,thelanguageof
thosespeakingnoforeignlanguageisspokenby20.8%.Etacoefficientrefers
to the association between the mean values and transnational linguistic
capital,whereastheothermeasuresofassociationrefertothe relation
betweenthegroupingofthecountriesandmultilingualism.
(c)Countrysizeandforeignlanguagecompetence
A language‘s degree of prevalence is often connected with the size of a
country,insofarasthelanguagesofsmallercountrieshavealowandthoseof
biggercountriesahighdegreeofprevalence.Butthesizeofacountrycan
also affect the level of transnational linguistic capital in another way. The
smalleracountryisthebroaderisitsinternationalinterconnectedness.This
hasanimpactontheopportunitystructureaswellasonthemotivation to
acquire a foreign language. There are several arguments available in
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
144
literaturewhichmakethiscorrelationplausible(cf.tothefollowing
particularlyGeser1992).
Geometricallyspeaking,thecircumferenceofasurfaceincreasesmoreslowly
than does its interior area. This means that a small country (with a small
interiorarea)hasahigherthanaverageboundarylength(circumference)
withitsneighbours.Thisfactalonealreadyincreasestheprobability of
externalcontacts.AsisusuallythecaseinEurope,whenanational border
alsomarksachangeinlanguage,countrysizehasapositiveeffectonforeign
languageacquisition.Thusthesizeofacountryaffectstheopportunity
structureofacquiringaforeignlanguage.Thisisespeciallytrue for small,
economically modern societies. The probability of finding trading and
communicationpartnersinone’sown(linguisticallyhomogeneous)societyis
muchlowerinsmallcountriesthanitisinlargecountries.Thesmallcountry
size motivates internationalisation. That is why small countries’ economies
tendtobemoreinternationallylinkedthanlargercountries(cf.Katzenstein
1985). In turn the exchange with other countries becomes easierwhen
peoplespeaktheothercountry’slanguage(cf.vanTubergen&Kalmijn2005:
1419).
Thereisanotherreasonwhythesizeofthecountryprobablyhasanimpact
onthecitizens’commandofforeignlanguages.Peopledonotonly learn a
foreign language at educational institutions and via the directcontactto
peoplespeakingthat language.People also tendto learnlanguages through
themedia,andthetranslationandthedubbingofforeignmediaisonlyworth
theexpenseif theaudienceis of acertainsize. Iftheaudience size issmall,
thenforeignmediatendstobeleftinitsoriginallanguageandisdistributed
with subtitles. The cost for the dubbing of movies is about eleven times
higherthanthecostof subtitling (VanParijs2004:128,2011).Accordingly,
the share of media products distributedintheoriginallanguage is
considerably higher in small countries compared to that in big countries
(Kilborn1993;Hasebrink&Herzog2009).Peoplereceivingforeign‐language
mediaproducts willthereby improvetheir foreignlanguageproficiency (cf.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
145
Mitterer & McQueen 2009). The size of the country therefore affects the
opportunitystructureforforeignlanguagelearning.
Inordertotestthehypothesisoftherelationbetweenthesizeofacountry–
operationalisedbythenumberofinhabitants–andtheleveloftransnational
linguisticcapital,Icarriedouttwocalculations.Ontheonehand the
countrieswereclassifiedintodifferentgroupsaccordingtotheirsizeandthe
percentagedrelation with the foreignlanguage competence wascalculated.
Ontheotherhandthemeanvalueofthepopulationwasrelatedto the
foreign language proficiency. The results of both of the calculations are
summarisedinTable4.9.
Table4.9:Countrysizeandtransnationallinguisticcapital(in%)
Upto5
Mio.
5to11
Mio.
11to35
Mio.
Over35
Mio.
Mean
popu
lation
Noforeign
language
26.5 41.2 39.5 56.5 47.4Mio.
Oneforeign
language
36.3 26.8 24.3 27.3 46.8Mio.
Twoforeign
languages
25.2 19.4 24.2 12.2 40.7Mio.
Threeforeign
languages
11.9 12.6 12.0 4.0 30.4Mio.
N5,53410,3274,0556,6042,6520
r=‐0,20***;Spearman’sRho=‐0,20***;Tau‐b=‐0,18***;Eta=0,18***
Againtheresultsconfirmthehypothesis.Thelargeracountryisthehigheris
thepercentageofpeoplewhodonotspeakaforeignlanguage.56.5%ofthe
citizens in countries with more than 35 million inhabitants do not speak a
foreign language, whereas the percentage in countries of up to 5 million
inhabitants is only 26.5%. The average population of a country of those
speakingthreelanguagesamountsto30.4millioninhabitants.In contrast,
the size of the population in countries where no one is speaking a foreign
languageis47.4million.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
146
(d)Modernityandtransnationallinguisticcapital
The twenty‐seven EU member states differ in their levels of modernity.
AccordingtotheHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI),ameasureoftenusedin
literatureformeasuringacountry’sdegreeofmodernity,Bulgaria and
Romania are the least modernised EU societies, as compared to Sweden,
Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands which have the highest scores.54Up
untilthe presentday we do not knowexactly whichfactors haveadvanced
modernisation and how the causal relations between different factors are
determined.Theoutcomeoftheprocessofmodernisationisthedevelopment
ofasocietythatcanbedescribedbyasetofcharacteristics,whichtogether
formasyndrome(cf.Norris2002:20ff.).DanielBell(1973)distinguishestwo
phases of the modernisation process. Modernisation in the senseof
industrialisationimpliesthattheindustrialproductionofgoodsbecomesthe
dominant field of production with factories and formal organisations
becoming the dominant units of production. Goods and services are
distributedviamarkets,thedegreeoftheproduction’smechanisationishigh,
thelevel of educationrises, as doesurbanisation. Bell (1973) identifies the
second phase of modernisation as post‐industrialisation. Post‐
industrialisation is connected with an increasing importance oftheservice
sector, which hence becomes the dominant field of production. Technology
and scientific development increasingly gain relevance, a society’s level of
education rises significantly. Above all the increasing importance of
educationduringthemodernisation processrepresentsanimportant factor
for explaining the level of transnational linguistic capital. In the context of
modernisationitbecomesmanifestinavarietyofindicators:
First of all, the percentage of people included in the educational system
increases while the illiteracy rate and the percentage of thosenothaving
attended school become marginal. Secondly, the length of training is
graduallylengthened andthirdly – interrelatedwith that– theshareofthe
population attending higher institutions of learning increases continuously.
54 The HDI involves the real GNP per capita, the level of education and the average life
expectancy.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
147
Part of the improvement of education within the context of processes of
modernisationistheimprovementofforeignlanguageproficiency.Themore
andthe longer peopleremain intheircountries’ institutionsof learning the
better their education should be (ceteris paribus). Since foreign language
learningis apart of institutionalisededucation inall EUcountries, one can
expect that a country’s level of modernisation affects the foreign language
proficiency of its citizens. The educational system therefore creates
opportunities for foreign language acquisition: People living in a country
with a highly developed educational system will have more and longer
opportunitiestoacquireknowledgeinforeignlanguagesthanpeoplelivingin
acountrywithalessdevelopededucationalsystem.55
Inaddition,educationallevelscanimpactthecostsassociatedwithlearninga
foreignlanguage.Aspeoplebecomegenerallybettereducated,theyaremore
inclinedtolearnanewsubjectarea(suchasaforeignlanguage)andtodoso
morequickly.Thedurationandintensityoftheeducationiscloselyrelatedto
ageneralimprovementofstudytechniqueswhichthenreducethetime one
hastospendonacquiringanewlanguage.
In order to measure a country’s modernity the HDI can be used. A more
specific and therewith better operationalisation of the hypothesis is to
directlymeasurethelevelofdevelopmentofthedifferenteducational
systems of the twenty‐seven EU countries. For that purpose different
measurescanbeused.Weusedthemeasureof“yearlyexpenditureonpublic
and private institutions per full time pupil”, as measured in Euros PPS
(Purchasing Power Standard). This measure considers two reasonable
assignments of absolute measures of educational expenditures: on the one
hand the relation of expenditures to the number of trainees, ontheother
hand differences concerning the price level in the different countries by
taking into consideration purchasing power parities. With the help of
55 Frankvan Tubergenand Matthijs Kalmijn (2005) aswell asHarmut Esser (2006:114)
argueinasimilarwayintermsoftheacquisitionofthelanguage of that country into
whichmigrantshaveimmigrated.Peoplefromcountriesoforiginorregionswithahigh
levelofmodernityhaveadvantagesinacquiringanewlanguagecomparedtopeoplefrom
countrieswithalowlevelofmodernity.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
148
purchasing power parities the educational expenditures expressed in
nationalcurrencies are convertedinto a common artificial currency, the so
calledPPS.
Accordingtothiscalculation,DenmarkandAustriaspentover8,000 Euros
oneducationperpupilannually,andGreatBritain,Sweden,andthe
Netherlandsinvestedover7,000Euros.These countriesformthetopofthe
listintheEU.BulgariaandRomania,incomparison,investedlessthan2,000
EurosperpupilandthusbringuptherearwithintheEU.
Ihavecarriedouttwocalculationsinordertotestthecorrelationbetweena
country’slevelofmodernity,respectivelyitsinvestmentineducationandthe
levelof transnational linguisticcapital. Ontheone handthe countrieswere
divided into three groups of modernity, with regard to educational
expenditures. Then the percentage of people who speak none, one, two or
three foreign languages was calculated. Secondly, the mean value between
the degree of modernity or the educational expenditures and theforeign
languagecompetencewasassessed.
Table4.10:Levelofmodernization(HDI)andtransnationallinguisticcapital
(in%)
LowMiddleHighMeanHDI
Noforeign
language
51.6 48.7 53.0 0.918
Oneforeign
language
25.6 31.1 24.9 0.919
Twoforeign
languages
14.6 15.7 14.8 0.919
Threeforeign
languages
8.2 4.5 7.3 0.917
N8,1637,68210,67526,520
r=‐0,01;Spearman’sRho=‐0,02*;Tau‐b=‐0,01*;Eta=0,02
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
149
Table4.11:Expenditureoneducationandtransnationallinguisticcapital(in
%)
Low
MiddleHighMean
Expendit.
inEuro
Noforeign
language
49.1 58.7 43.9 5,554
Oneforeign
language
26.5 25.3 29.4 5,660
Twoforeign
languages
15.4 11.8 18.6 5,721
Threeforeign
languages
9.0 4.2 8.0 5,632
N7,14910,7178,15026,016
r=0,06***;Spearman’sRho=0,08***;Tau‐b=0,07***;Eta=0,04***
Theresultsinbothofthetablescometosimilarfindings:Thereisnostrong
correlationbetweenacountry’sdegreeofmodernitywithrespect to the
amountofeducationalexpenditureontheonehand and itscitizens’foreign
languageproficiencyontheotherhand.Althoughtheassociation measures
for the correlation of educational expenditures and transnational linguistic
capital point into the right direction, thus supporting the hypothesis, the
correlationisratherweak(evenifitissignificantbasedonthehighnumber
ofcases).
Whatcouldbethereasonsfortheweakrelationshipbetweenmodernisation
and educational expenditure on the one hand and transnational linguistic
capitalontheother?Modernisationlevelsandeducationalexpendituresare
probablycounteractedbyotherfactorsthataffectforeignlanguage
acquisition.Forexample,theUnitedKingdomisoneofthetopfourcountries
intermsofeducationalexpenditures,butEnglishisalsoitsofficiallanguage
(sothe communicational valueof aforeign language is comparatively low).
TheoppositeistrueinRomania,Bulgaria,andtheBalticcountries: these
countriesspendtheleastoneducation,butthelanguagesspokenthere are
notparticularlywide‐spread(sothecommunicationalvalueofaforeign
languageisespeciallyhigh).
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
150
(e)Ageandtransnationallinguisticcapital
ThememberstatesoftheEUhaveexperiencedaprocessofsocial change
since its founding in the 1950s. Two aspects of social change are of great
importanceformultilingualism.Ontheonehand,tyinginwithwhat was
discussedabove, the level of modernity has risen in all societies,especially
the population’s level of education insofar as the duration of training was
extendedandthequotaofpersonswithhighereducationalachievementhas
gradually increased. To give an example: The school system of the Federal
RepublicofGermanyisstructuredinatripartiteway.Allchildrenenterinthe
sameprogram,butattheageoften,theygotooneofthreetypesofschools
(secondarygeneralschool,intermediateschool,grammar school).Thetrack
thattheyenterdetermineswhichtypeofschooltheycangonext, and
whether they will go to a university. The percentage of thirteen year old
pupils attending the highest level (grammar school = Gymnasium)was
twelvepercentatthebeginningofthe1950s,twentypercentatthebeginning
of the 1970s and thirty‐three percent in 2004. The percentage of pupils
attendingthelowestlevel(secondarygeneralschool=Hauptschule)
decreasedrapidlyfromeightypercentatthebeginningofthe1950stoabit
morethantwentypercentin2004(StatistischesBundesamt/FederalStatistic
Office2008).56Thequotaoffirst‐yearstudents(percentageofanagecohort
beginning its studies at a university) has increased enormously during the
same period. Similar developments can be observed in the other European
countries.
Notonlytheduration of studyandtraininghas extended overtimeandthe
level of education has risen, European societies also have become more
Europeanisedandglobalisedaswehaveseeninchapter3.2;thenumberof
political,social,andeconomictiestoothersocietieshasrisenovertime.Both
changes of the macro‐structural context should have an effect on the
multilingualismofdifferentagecohorts.Onaverage, oldergenerationshave
56 http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/
Publikationen/Querschnittsveroeffentlichugen/Datenreport/Downloads/
Datenreport2008,property=file.pdf
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
151
had lower levels of education, less transnational experience, and fewer
opportunities to learn foreign languages than have younger cohorts.
Moreover, the increasing processes of Europeanisation and globalisation
mightaffectthemotivationtoacquireaforeignlanguage.Younger
generations,incontrast,see both thenecessityof and the advantageswhich
learningaforeignlanguagebringswithit.
Inadditiontothiscohorteffect,wealsoassumethatthereisalife‐longeffect
onforeignlanguageproficiency.Thosewhostudyaforeignlanguage as a
studentmayforgetthatlanguageduringtheirlifetime,especiallyiftheyhave
noopportunitytouseitastheyage.Additionally,theexpenditure of time
(cost)oflearninganewlanguageincreaseswithageasthepaceoflearning,
theabilitytoimitateandmemorydeclineswithage.Forallthesereasonswe
assume that younger people have a higher level of transnational linguistic
capitalthanolderpeople.
I have grouped respondents into six age groups and analysed whether the
youngercohortshaveahigherlevelofforeignlanguageproficiencythanthe
oldergenerations.Inadditionameancomparisontestwasconductedandthe
averageageofthosewasanalysedwhohavenone,one,twoorthreeforeign
languages at their command. The findings reveal clearly: Younger
generations have higher levels of transnational linguistic capital than have
oldergenerations.Thepercentageofthosewhospeakatleastone foreign
languagehasmorethandoubledfrom33.5%ofthoseabove55yearsoldto
68.7%ofthe15‐24yearsold.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
152
Table4.12:Ageandtransnationallinguisticcapital(in%)
15
24
25
34
35
44
45
54
55
64
65+Mean
age
Noforeign
language
31.3 39.1 49.6 54.4 59.3 71.3 50,3
Oneforeign
language
33.6 34.2 28.1 25.8 24.0 17.9 41,5
Twoforeign
languages
25.8 19.1 14.8 13.8 11.3 6.9 38,3
Threeforeign
languages
9.3 7.5 7.5 6.0 5.4 4.0 40,8
N3,4474,1584,6744,4734,2235,53526,510
r=‐0,24***;Spearman’sRho=‐0,26***;Tau‐b=‐0,22***;Eta=0,28***
(f)Socialclass,classfractions,occupationsandmultilingualism
The descriptive findings show that transnational linguistic capital levels
differnotonlybetweenthetwenty‐sevencountries,butalsowithin
individualcountries.AllEUsocietiesareclasssocieties, andweassumethat
the economic class of a person’s parents and of the person him or herself
influence that person’s levels of transnational linguistic capital.57
Unfortunately,thedatasetdoesnotcontainanyinformationabout the
respondents’parents.Thusthepossibilitiestotestthehypothesiswhichwill
bespecifiedfurtheron,arequietlimited.However,ifoneaccepts the
followingassumptiontheimpactoftheparents’economicclasspositionon
the respondents’ foreign language competence can be operationalised in a
valid way at least rudimentarily. Sociological class analysis emanates from
theassumptionthattheparents’classpositiongreatlyaffectstheirchildren’s
chances in terms of education, the future income, the occupation and life
style. Hence, a permanent reproduction of a society’s class structure takes
placemediatedbytheparentalhome.Thestrengthofthereproductionofthe
classesvariesbetweenthedifferentcountries(cf.Erikson&Goldthorpe
1992).If classpositions are, however,at leastpartially passedonfromone
57 TheinfluenceofeconomicclasscanhelpexplainnotonlydifferinglevelsofTLCwithina
particularcountry,butalsobetweendifferentcountries.Ifthe upper class in a society
tendstospeakmoreforeignlanguagesthandolowerclasses,andiftheupperclassin
CountryAislargerthaninCountryB,thenthenumberofmultilingualpeopleinCountry
AwillbelargerthaninCountryB.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
153
generation to the next, then information concerning the respondents’ class
affiliationcanbeinterpretedasanapproximatemeasurementoftheparents’
classposition.
Differenttypologiesdescribingtheclassstructureofa society are discussed
intheliterature.IwillrefertoPierreBourdieu’stypology,asIhavealready
defined the term transnational linguistic capital by referring to Bourdieu’s
work. A society’s class structure results from the aggregation of capitals
ownedbypersonsandtheassignmentofpersonswiththesameendowment
ofcapitaltothesameclass.Asiswell‐known,Bourdieudistinguishesthree
classesthatdifferfromeachotherduetotheamountofcapital (the upper
class,themiddleclass andthelowerclass).Within thesethreeclassesclass
fractionsareplaced thatareidentifiedby differentcompositionsof cultural
and economic capital (Bourdieu 1984, 1983). Bourdieu not only names
classes and class fractions in an abstract way, but describes them in detail
indicatingconcreteoccupations.Thisisimportantforourempiricalanalysis,
asthedatasetcontainstheoccupationsoftherespondents.Theupperclass
dividesintoaclassfractionwithalotofculturalcapitaland a group with
littleculturalcapital.Thepropertyowningclass composed ofself‐employed
posseseshigheconomicbutarelativelylowculturalcapital.Thiscontraststo
the educated class, where the cultural capital dominates the economic.
According to Bourdieu, the educated class consists of professors and other
academic occupations. The middle class or the petite bourgeoisie is
composedofthoseinthemiddleoccupationalpositions,primarilyinmiddle
management. The petite bourgeoisie is divided further into the declining
petite bourgeoisie with little or shrinking economic and cultural capital,
whileamiddlevolumeofbothcapitalformscanbeheldbytheexecutive
petite bourgeoisie. The new petite bourgeoisie endowed with middle
volumesofcapitalexistsasacomplementaryclasstothenewbourgeoisie.
ThelowerclassisnotfurtherdifferentiatedbyBourdieubutiscomposedof
lowskilledandmanualworkers.
Thedata set doesnot include informationon income and property, sothat
the operationalisation of economic capital is not immediately possible. The
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
154
interviewees were asked for their occupation which was also used by
Bourdieuinordertodescribetheclassesandclassfractions.58Thefollowing
occupationalgroupswereformedfromthedifferentcategories:
Professionals (either employed or self‐employed) including
doctors,architects,lawyers,etc.
Higher and middle management including directors, managers,
departmentchiefs,engineers,teachers,etc.
Entrepreneurs,theself‐employedincludingshopandbusiness
owners,self‐employedcraftsmen,etc.
Skilledwhitecollarandskilledworkers
Unskilledwhitecollarandunskilledworkers
Iexpectthatalloccupationalgroupshaveahigherleveloflinguisticcapital
thanthereferencegroupofunskilledwhiteandbluecollarworkers.
Secondly, I assume that the middle class of skilled white collar and skilled
workers have a lower level of linguistic capital than the entrepreneurs,
higherandmiddlemanagementandtheprofessionals.Finally,Iact on the
assumption that there is a difference between the professionalsandthe
higherandmiddlemanagersonthe onehandandtheentrepreneurson the
otherhand.Allthreegroupsbelongtotheupperclass,butformtwodifferent
fractions within this upper class.Theentrepreneursarethosewithahigh
levelofeconomicbut arelativelylowlevelofculturalcapital.59Thereverse
capitalstructureappliestotheothertwogroups.AccordinglyIassume that
the entrepreneurs have a lower level of transnational linguistic capital
comparedtotheprofessionalsandmanagers.
58 Ifintervieweeswerenotemployedatthattime–becausetheykept house, wereretired
orunemployed–theywereaskedfortheirformeroccupation.Inafirststeptheanswers
concerningthecurrentandtheformeroccupationwerecombined.
59 Due to the fact that the category does not only include entrepreneurs but also “small”
self‐employed, people like craftsmen, who Bourdieu would assign to the petite
bourgeoisie,theoperationalisationisabitdiffuse.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
155
Iactontheassumptionthattheclasspositionoftherespondents’parents(1)
aswellastheirownclassposition(2)impactsontheleveloftransnational
linguisticcapital.
(1) The higher the class of the respondent’s parental home, the more the
parentswillhaveprobablyinvestedinthechild’seducation.Educational
investmentsincludethecreationofopportunitiesforeducationaswellasthe
instilling of the belief that education is an important aim in life. Foreign
languagesarepartoftheseeducationalinvestments.Inthisrespectitcanbe
assumed that the parents’ class position affects the endowment of the
children with transnational linguistic capital. Charlotte Büchner (2004)
showsinheranalysisoftheSocio‐EconomicPaneldatathatstudentshaving
attendedschoolabroadorhavingstudiedtheremainlycomefromparental
homesoftheupperclassanduppermiddleclass.Furthermore,theexpected
differences concerning the endowment with transnational linguistic capital
between the class fractions of the upper class can be influenced by the
parentalhome.Whiletheself‐employedtendtopromotetheirchildren’s
practical, technical and scientific competences, the educated class tend to
invest in a humanistic education including foreign languages. The symbolic
useoftransnationallinguisticcapitalmightplayanadditionalrolehere(see
theretochapter 2.1).Multilingualpeople receiveother peoples’respect due
to this competence. Similar to the cultural elites in the countries who
celebratethemselvesbydemonstratingtheirhighculturallifestylesinpublic
settings,thusseparatingthemselvesfromlowerclassesandtheclassfraction
ofthose who havemuch economic but littlecultural capital, ahigh level of
transnational linguistic capital enables to present oneself as part of an
emergingtransnationalclassthusachievingahigherlevelofrecognitionand
distinction.
Having different transnational linguistic capital due to the parental class
affiliation affects in turn the chances to achieve a certain class position, as
multilingualism increases the possibility of achieving better occupational
positionsinahigherclass.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
156
(2) The class position reached by the respondent opens up different
opportunities of practising foreign language competence. If unskilled
workersandwhitecollarworkershave learned foreignlanguagesatall,the
probabilityofthemhavingtheopportunitytouseandpractisetheseismuch
lower than that of executive managers and professionals. Moreover, we
assumethattheclassfractionoftheself‐employedhavefewerpossibilitiesto
useand improvean existingknowledgeof foreignlanguages thaneducated
classes.
The empirical results (Table 4.13) confirm our expectation that all
professionalgroupsincomparisontothereferencegroupofunskilledwhite
andbluecollarworkershavehigherlevelsoftransnationallinguisticcapital.
Furthermore,themiddleclassislessmultilingualthanarealltypesofupper
classrespondentswhich alsoconforms toBourdieu’shypothesis.Thereisa
cleardifferencebetweentheprofessionalandmanagerialclassontheone
handandtheself‐employedontheother.ThisresultsupportsBourdieu’s
notion that there are different class fractions in the upper class.
Entrepreneursandself‐employedareagoodexampleoftheclasswithmore
economiccapitalbutlessculturalandlinguisticcapital.
Table4.13:Socialclassandtransnationallinguisticcapital(in%)
UpperClassMiddleClassLower
Class
Professio‐
nals,Aca‐
demics
Higherand
middle
manage‐
ment
Self‐
employed
orentre‐
pre‐neurs
Skilled
blueand
white
collar
workers
Unskilled
blueand
whitecollar
workers
Noforeign
language
29.3 32.8 52.8 55.5 70.6
Oneforeign
language
31.1 34.7 25.6 26.6 19.7
Twoforeign
languages
25.2 22.2 13.2 12.5 6.7
Threeforeign
languages
14.4 10.3 8.5 5.4 2.9
N1,6893,3461,59012,9222,960
r=‐0,11***;Spearman’sRho=‐0,14***;Tau‐b=‐0,12***
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
157
(g)Institutionalisedculturalcapital(education)andmultilingualism
AccordingtoBourdieuasociety’sclassstructureresultsfromtheaggregation
ofcapitalsholdbypeople.Theeconomicandtheculturalcapital are the
centralresources forthe formationofthe classstructure. Unfortunatelywe
donothaveanyinformationonthepeoples’incomeandproperty,butwedo
have some on their institutionalised cultural capital. This is composed of
educationoreducationalqualificationsawardedtoapersonbya society’s
educational institutions. As foreign languages are usually imparted via
educationalinstitutionsit can beassumedthat theinstitutionalisedcultural
capitalhasapositiveimpactonone’sleveloftransnationallinguistic
capital.60 There are three arguments in favour of this assumption. Higher
education means a longer period spent in educational institutions. As
languageteachingispartofschooleducation,onecanassumethatthelonger
arespondentattendsschool,themoreexposureshe/hehastobothalengthy
anddemandingforeignlanguagecurriculum.Notonlydoeseducationaffect
theopportunitystructureforlearningaforeignlanguage,butalsomotivation
todoso(Esser2006:110).Institutesofhighereducationinparticularconvey
themessagethatlearningaforeignlanguageisculturallyvaluable inandof
itself. Finally, education can also influence the cost of learning a foreign
language, in that general study techniques improve with the length of a
person’s education; this is reducing the time investment necessary for
learninganewlanguage.
Itisnoteasytosurveyeducationalachievementsintwenty‐sevencountries
withdifferenteducationalsystemsinacomparativeway.However, the
Eurobarometercontainsa variablewhich makes arough comparisonofthe
educational achievements possible in spite of the different educational
systems.Theintervieweeswereaskedfortheirageatthetimetheyfinished
theireducation.Theolderarespondentwas attheendof hiseducation,the
higherhis educationalachievement, thehigher his institutionalisedcultural
capitalandthebetterhistransnationallinguisticcapital.
60 The foreign language proficiency gained at the educational institutions can then again
lead to the increase of institutionalised cultural capital in the form of educational
qualifications.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
158
Atfirsttherespondentsweredividedintothreeeducationalgroupsinorder
toanalysewhetherthosewithhigherlevelsofeducationweremore
proficient in foreign languages than those with lower levels ofeducation.
Secondly, the average age at the end of the education of those who speak
none,one,twoorthreeforeignlanguageswascalculated.
Thehypothesisisconfirmedbyouranalysis.Moreover,acomparisonofthe
findingsofthe differentbivariateanalyses thathavebeen carriedoutupto
now shows that institutionalised cultural capital has the strongest effect of
thevariablessofaronmultilingualism.
Table4.14: Institutionalized cultural capital (education) and transnational
linguisticcapital(in%)
LowMiddleHighMean
education
inyears
Noforeign
language
80.7 54.0 25.6 16.6
Oneforeign
language
14.9 28.6 34.1 18.9
Twoforeign
languages
3.2 12.3 26.4 20.4
Threeforeign
languages
1.2 5.1 13.9 21.0
N5,66212,0315,86923,562
r=0,40***;Spearman’sRho=0,41***;Tau‐b=0,37***;Eta=0,43***
(h)Respondents’ortherespondents’parents’internationalheritageand
transnationallinguisticcapital
Uptonow,wehaveassumedthatcitizensoftheEUmemberstateswereborn
andraisedinthecountrywheretheycurrentlyliveandthattheylearnedthe
languageofthatcountryastheirnativelanguage.Suchanassumption
ignoresthefactthatsomecitizenshavetransnationalexperience, such as
beingborninonecountryandlatermovingtoanother.Duetothesegmented
languagestructure,migrationtoanothercountryusuallymeansmoving to
anotherlanguage,andpeoplewhomovetoanewcountryareoften
confrontedwiththenecessityoflearninganewlanguage.Onecantherefore
expectthatpeoplewhohavemovedtoanothercountryspeakmore
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
159
languagesthanthosewhohavenot.Thefollowingtabledividesrespondents
intotwogroups:thosewhowereborninthecountrytheycurrentlylive in
andthosewhowereborninanothercountry.
Table4.15:Respondents’countryofbirthandtransnationallinguisticcapital
(in%)
BorninlandBornabroad
Noforeignlanguage 53.1 19.5
Oneforeignlanguage 26.1 44.2
Twoforeignlanguages 14.6 23.3
Threeforeignlanguages 6.2 13.0
N 25,1571,333
r=0,14***;Spearman’sRho=0,15***;Tau‐b=0,14***
Theresultsconfirm thehypothesisthat respondentswhohave moved from
one country to another speak more foreign languages than do those who
havenotlefttheirnationalcontainer.Thisistruenotonlyfor the
respondents themselves, but their parents’ transnational experience
probably also has a positive effect on speaking several languages. Parents
whoemigratedfromanothercountryusuallyspeaktheirnativelanguage at
homeinthenewcountryandalsoencouragetheirchildrentolearn their
nativelanguageasalinktotheirheritage.
Children whose parents have not migrated have to a lesser degree the
opportunityto be brought up bilingually.This hypothesis is also confirmed
bythedatadisplayedinthefollowingtable.Personshavingatleastone
parentwhowasbornabroadspeaksignificantlymoreoftenoneor several
foreignlanguagesthanpersonswhoseparentsarebothnatives.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
160
Table4.16:Parents’countryofbirthandtransnationallinguistic capital(in
%)
Bothparentsborn
inland
Atleastoneparent
bornabroad
Noforeignlanguage 54.0 27.6
Oneforeignlanguage 25.9 37.2
Twoforeignlanguages 14.1 23.6
Threeforeign
languages 6.0 11.5
N23,7052,742
r=0,15***;Spearman’sRho=0,16***;Tau‐b=0,15***
(i)Identificationwithcountryoforiginandtransnationallinguisticcapital
As I have discussed in chapter 2.1, language not only impacts on society
buildingprocesses but alsoon identityformation. Languageisquite oftena
group’smostimportantfeatureofidentity.Iftherespectivenativelanguage
isafeatureofidentityofagrouptheinfluenceandthestudyingofaforeign
languagemaybeinterpretedasadetractionorevenlossoftheir own
collectiveidentity.Inthiscasethemotivationtoacquireaforeignlanguageis
low.Theoppositemayalsobetrue;thestrongerone’spositiveemotional
identificationwithaforeignlanguage,thehigherthatperson’smotivationto
learnitandviceversa.Thedegreeofidentificationwithalanguageisagain
cruciallydeterminedbytheextentofidentificationwiththegroupspeaking
thatlanguage.
Duetothedataavailableatestofthecorrelationbetweenidentificationand
multilingualism is possible only to a limited degree. In terms of the
dependent variable we do not have any information on the degreeof
motivationforlearningaforeignlanguage.ThoughIassumethat foreign
languageproficiencyitselfcanpartiallybetracedbacktothemotivationfor
acquiringtheforeignlanguageinthefirstplace.Furthermore,wearelacking
information on the identificationwiththedifferentforeignlanguages.
However, information on the identification with the native language is
indirectly available. The interviewees were asked to what degree they
identifiedwiththeirhometown,theirregionandtheircountry.Theresponse
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
161
optionsrangedfrom“verystrong”and“fairlystrong”to“notverystrong”and
“not strong”. The three different objects of identification form together a
syndromeofattitudes.Thosewhofeltstronglyattachedtotheircountryalso
feelstronglyattachedtotheirhometownand their region.Duetothat,ina
firststepIhaveformedanadditivescaleoutoftheresponses to the three
questions(Crombachsalpha=.79).Thenewvariablemeasuresthedegreeof
national and sub‐national identification. Indeed therewith we have not
operationalisedtheidentificationwithacountry’slanguage.Asthelanguage
inquestionveryoftenisacentralfeatureoftheregionorthe country, I
assume that the identification with the country or a sub‐national unit also
measuresidentificationwiththelanguagespokenthere.Takingthisbridging
assumptionasgiven,we can nowtesttheexpectedcorrelation between the
degreeofnationalandsub‐nationalidentificationandthecitizens’
multilingualism. Table 4.17 shows the results in terms of the correlation
betweenthedegreeof identificationwiththecountry andmultilingualism61
ontheonehand,andthedifferencesbetweenthemeanvaluesinthedegree
ofidentificationwiththecountry/theregion/thehometownbetweenthose
peoplespeakingnone,one,twoorthreeforeignlanguagesontheotherhand.
Table4.17:Identificationwithcountryoforiginandtransnationallinguistic
capital(in%)
Very
strong
Fairly
strong
Notvery
strong
Not
strongMean
Noforeign
language
55.6 47.9 39.3 35.5 8.43
Oneforeign
language
25.7 28.6 30.5 26.1 8.04
Twoforeign
languages
13.2 16.6 19.0 26.4 7.82
Threeforeign
languages
5.6 6.9 11.2 12.0 7.54
N 15,8138,6781,65926426,273
r=0,11***;Spearman’sRho=0,11***;Tau‐b=0,10***;Eta=0,16***
61 The findings in terms of the correlation between the degree of identification with the
placeofresidence,ortheregionandmultilingualismlookquietsimilar.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
162
Corresponding to our theoretical expectation it emerges that those
respondentswhoidentify stronglywiththeircountryoforiginandthe sub‐
nationalunitsoftheircountrygenerallyspeakfewerlanguagesthandothose
whohaveaweakeridentificationwiththeircountryoforigin.
(j)Multivariateanalysis
InthefollowingIwilltesttowhichdegreethebivariateresultsbearupunder
a multivariate testing. Multivariateanalysisallowsustocompare the
differing strengths of individual factors that help explain transnational
linguisticcapital. In additionwe can prove if certain independentvariables
affectothers.Thusitcanbeassumedforexamplethatapartofthe effects
stemming from the respondents’ class position can be traced back to
education as education affects class position. Table 4.18 showstheresults
fromsevendifferentlinearregressionmodels.
Additionallythreemorecalculationswereconductedforallmodels.(1)The
dependent variable is strictly speaking not a metric, but an ordinal one.
Correspondingly “ordered logit” regressions were calculated. (2) As the
dependent variable is skewed to the right, we have conducted additional
logistic regression analyses questioning whether someone speaksaforeign
language at all or not as dichotomous dependent variable. The findings of
bothcalculationsare identicalto thoseofthe linearregressionanalyses. As
the linear regression analyses are a bit easier to interpret I decided to
presentonly those. (3) Furthermore, we have estimated multilevelmodels.
Also here the results do not differ from the simple regression models. We
therefore decided to represent only the results of the linear regression
analysis,whichareeasiertounderstand.
Iwill discuss onlywhether andtowhat extentthedifferent hypothesesare
confirmed and will not repeat the explanation of the causal mechanism
accounting for the correlation between independent and dependent
variables,asthishasalreadybeencoveredwithinthediscussion of the
bivariatefindings.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
163
Thefirstmodel(Table4.18)takesseveralcontextvariablesintoaccountthat
could explain the level of transnational linguistic capital: the size of the
country,thedegreeofprevalenceofthenativelanguageandthe question
whetherthereareseveralofficiallanguagesinacountryornot.Asthebeta‐
coefficients show, all theoretical expectations are confirmed. Respondents
fromsmallercountries,countrieswithmultipleofficiallanguages, and
countrieswith non‐prevalent languages speak moreforeign languagesthan
dorespondentsforwhomtheseconditionsdonotapply.
Table4.18:Explainingtransnationallinguisticcapital(linearregressions)
Model1
Model2
Model3
Model4
Model5
Model6
Final
Model
Multipleofficial
languages
0.088**
*
0.054**
*
Countrysize 0.032**
*
‐
0.085**
*
Prevalenceof
Language
0.220**
*
‐
0.275**
*
Professionals,
academics
0.242**
*
0.234**
*
0.078**
*
0.108**
*
Higherand
middle
management
0.294**
*
0.294**
*
0.105**
*
0.143**
*
Entrepreneurs,
self‐employed
0.122**
*
0.120**
*
0.050**
*
0.048**
*
Skilledworkers 0.162**
*
0.145**
*
0.041**
*
0.054**
*
Age 0.166**
*
0.066**
*
‐
0.059**
*
Institutional
culturalcapital
0.359**
*
0.301**
*
Educational
expenditures
0.039**
*
0.204**
*
Bornabroad
(respondent)
0.070**
*
0.049**
*
Bornabroad
(parents)
0.097**
*
0.080**
*
Identification
withcountryof
origin
‐0.135‐
0.051**
*
R² 0.067 0.067 0.094 0.186 0.022 0.018 0.285
N19,70819,70819,70819,70819,70819,70819,708
*p<0,05;**p<0,01;*** p<0,001,(a)Standardisedregressioncoefficients,(b)Reference
group:unskilledworkers.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
164
The second model looks at respondents’ occupational position and as
expected,allgroupshavehigherlevelsoftransnationallinguisticcapitalthan
dounskilledworkers.Also,peoplefromthemiddleclassarelesslikelytobe
multilingualcomparedtothetwosectionsoftheupperclass.Acomparison
ofthedifferentclasssectionsoftheupperclassrevealsthat professionals
andmanagement are moremultilingual than theself‐employed and middle
managementwhichconformstoBourdieu’shypothesis.Theself‐employed
arethose withmore economic butless culturaland transnational linguistic
capital.
The third model includes age, and the fourth includes institutional cultural
capital(education) and nationaleducational expenditures.62 As signs ofthe
coefficents indicate all hypotheses are confirmed: Countries with higher
national educational expenditurestendtohaverespondentswithhigher
levels of education and better foreign language proficiency. Younger
respondents also have more transnational linguistic capital. A comparison
betweenModels3and4showsthattheageeffectalmostdisappearswhen
one takes education into account, because younger respondents tend to be
bettereducated.Includingeducationalsoreducestheexplanatorystrengthof
occupationontransnationallinguisticcapital(compareModels2and4).This
alsoconformstoBourdieu’sunderstandingofeducationasadetermining
factorin class position. Finally,education increases the overall explanatory
power of the model from nine to eighteen percent and therefore has the
strongest effect on multilingualism. All in all Bourdieu’s assumptions are
confirmedbytheanalysesverywell.Theleveloflinguisticcapital is
essentially determined by the respondents’ class position and their
endowmentwithcapital.
Model 5 shows that respondents who or whose parents were born abroad
havehigher levels of transnationallinguistic capital.The expected negative
effectof identificationwith one’s country of origin isalso confirmedby the
62 Inthebivariateanalysis,weusedtwoindicatorsformodernity:theHumanDevelopment
Indexandthenationaleducationalexpenditures.Becausethesetwoindicatorsarehighly
correlatedwithoneanother,welimitedouranalysisheretonational educational
expendituresalone.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
165
multivariate analysis in Model 6. Finally, the last model accounts for all
theoreticallybasedinfluencingfactors.TheR2 value is28.5%,whichproves
thatthesevariablespredictmultilingualismverywell.Moreover,Model7
alsoshowsthatallofourtheoreticalassumptionswereconfirmed.
Institutional cultural capital, national educational expenditure, and the
prevalenceofthecountry’sofficiallanguagehavethestrongestinfluenceon
transnationallinguisticcapital.63
4.2.3ExplainingEnglishProficiency
Inaddition to being interested intransnational linguistic capital ingeneral,
wearealsospecificallyinterestedinexplainingtheascertaineddifferencesin
citizens’English language proficiency,because Englishis the language most
widelyspokenamongEuropeans,beitasnativeorforeignlanguage. Since
the ability to speak a certain foreign language is a special case of foreign
languageproficiencyingeneral,manyoftheaforementionedhypothesescan
alsobeused toexplainEnglish languageproficiency.64Hence,Iamgoingto
discussonlyverybrieflythosehypothesesthatcanbetransferredandtotest
them not in a bivariate but only in a multivariate analysis. I will pay more
attentiontothenewhypotheseswhichrefertoEnglishinparticular.Table
4.19givesanoverviewofthedifferenthypothesesforexplainingEnglishasa
foreignlanguage.Thenewlyaddedhypothesesarehighlighted.
63 Comparing the results of Model 4 with those of the comprehensive model it becomes
obvious that the impact of the educational expenditures becomes stronger in the
comprehensivemodel.Thisisduetothefactthatthenationaleducationalexpenditures
correlate positively with the country size and the prevalence of the language; thust he
effectoftheeducationalexpendituresisunderestimatedinModel4.
64 Here we can abandon a testing of the correlation between the number of official
languages and multilingualism.With regard toEnglish thisapplies only toMalta. Malta
used to be a British colony from 1800 to 1964; at Malta English is the second official
languagebesideMaltese.Accordingly,almost allMaltesespeakEnglish,asisalsoshown
intable4.3.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
166
Table4.19:TheoreticalmodelexplainingEnglishproficiency
OpportunitiesCostsMotivation
Macrolevelfactors
Prevalenceoflanguage –
Countrysize – –
Levelofmodernizationand
education
+ –
Exsocialistcountry– –
Linguisticdistancebetween
nativelanguageandEnglish
+
Selfperpetuatingdynamicinthe
useofEnglish
+ +
Individuallevelfactors
Respondent’sage – + –
Respondent’ssocialclass + +
Respondent’seducation
(institutionalculturalcapital)
+ – +
Foreignbirthoftherespondent
andhis/herparents
+
Identification with originative
language
–
Ihaveassumedthatthecommunicativevalueofaforeignlanguage one
wantstolearnislowerforthosewhosemothertonguehasahighdegreeof
prevalencethanforpeoplewhoselanguageisonlyrarelyspoken. This
hypothesis should also apply to English as foreign language. Those whose
languageisspokenbymanyarelessmotivatedtostudyEnglishthan
speakersofsmalllanguages.AsimilareffectonEnglishproficiencyislikelyto
stem from a country’s size. I have discussed several causal mechanisms
whichcouldmakeplausiblewhyin smaller countries not only the
opportunitystructurebutalsothemotivationtolearnaforeignlanguageare
morefavourableinsmallerthaninbiggercountries.Thiscorrelationshould
alsoandaboveallapplytothelearningofEnglishwhenoneconsidersthat
manymoviesaremadeinEnglishandthatinsmallcountriestheseareoften
shownintheoriginalversionduetohighdubbingcosts.Ihaveassumedthat
a country‘s degree of modernity and especially the development of its
educational system affects its citizens’ foreign language proficiency. The
moremodernandthebroaderandbetterdevelopedtheeducationalsystem,
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
167
the better is the education in foreign languages including English and the
morecitizensareabletospeakEnglish.
Englishproficiency is a specific transnationallinguistic capital.Insofarasit
can be assumed that the hypotheses I have deduced from Bourdieu’s class
theoryalsoapplytotheEnglishproficiencywecansaythatpeoplefromthe
upperclasseswillmoreoftenbeabletospeakEnglishthanpeoplefromthe
lower classes and that within the upper class the class fraction of the
educated class will more often be proficient in English than the self‐
employed.Andalsotheinstitutionalisedculturalcapitalshouldhaveastrong
impact on the citizens’ command of English, as those who have enjoyed a
longerandbettereducationareasarulemorelikelytohavestudiedEnglish.
TheprobableinfluenceofageonEnglishproficiencycanagainbeinterpreted
asacohorteffect.Ontheonehandtheschoolleavingagehasbeenraisedand
thelevelofeducationhasbeenimprovedintheEuropeancountries over
time;on theother handthe degreeof international interconnectedness has
clearly increased. For the different generations this means that they have
experienced different levels of education and faced different international
experiencesandchallenges.Accordingly,theoldergenerationswillhavehad
feweropportunitiestostudyEnglishcomparedtotheyoungercohorts.
Furthermore,itmaybeassumedthatthosewhowerebornorwhoseparents
wereborninanEnglishspeakingcountryandtodayliveinanothercountry
speakbetterEnglishthanthosenotsharingthisimmigrantbackground.Asin
thesurveyrespondentswerenotaskedinwhichspecificforeigncountrythey
oroneoftheirparentswereborn,thecorrelationcannotdirectlybe tested.
ButasthegroupofpersonsborninanEnglishspeakingcountryisasubsetof
thosebornabroadalltogether(andthatiswhathasbeensurveyed), the
information as to whether the interviewee or one of his parentswasborn
abroadcanbeusedasanapproximationmeasureofthetheoreticalconstruct.
The correlation between the respondent’s, or the respondent’s parents’
immigrantbackgroundandEnglishproficiencyshouldbeweakerthan the
onebetweenimmigrantbackgroundandgeneralmultilingualism.Andfinally
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
168
I assume that the readiness to study English is rather held back than
stimulatedby astrong identification withnational andlocal units and with
therespectivenativelanguage.
Themultivariateanalyseswillallowustotestwhetheralltheseassumptions
can be confirmed empirically. Beside these general hypotheses there are
three additional theoretical expectations that are particularly relevant for
explainingcompetenceintheEnglishlanguage.
(a)BipolarworldorderandEnglishproficiency
Weassumethatacountry’spositionduringtheworldorderoftheColdWar
(as either East or West) will influence the degree to which its citizens are
proficientinEnglish.SocialistEasternandCentralEuropeanmemberstates
were,until1989,undertheinfluenceoftheSovietUnion,wheretheRussian
languageheldhegemonicpower.Russianwasoftenamandatoryforeign
language(cf.theexplanationinchapter3.1).TheRussianEmpirewasmeant
toprotectpeoplefromtheadvanceofEnglish.Therefore,Iassume that
peoplelivinginacountrywhichusedtobelongtotheSovietsphere of
influence speak less English than people living in a country which used to
belongtotheWesternsphereofinfluence.Wedonotthinkthatthisbipolar
world order influenced transnational linguistic capital as such, but rather
thatitaffectedthechoiceofaparticularforeignlanguage.Wethereforelimit
thefollowinganalysistorespondentswhospeakatleastoneforeign
language.
Table4.20:Ex‐SocialistcountryundEnglishproficiency(in%)
EnglishproficiencyNonexsocialistcountryExsocialistcountry
No 17.8 46.7
Yes 82.2 53.3
N8,6656,749
r = ‐0,30***; Spearman’s Rho = ‐0,30***; Tau‐b = ‐0,30***. The analysisislimited to those
whospeakatleastoneforeignlanguage.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
169
The findings in the table confirm our theoretical expectation. English
proficiencyofthosespeakingatleastoneforeignlanguageisalmost thirty
percent higher in the Western countries than in the socialist countries
formerlyinthe Soviet sphereofinfluence. The correlationshouldnot apply
anymoreoratleasttoalesserdegreeafterthecollapseofthebipolarworld
order.CentralandEasternEuropeancountriesquicklyorientedandopened
themselveswestwardafter1990andmanybecamefullmembersoftheEUin
2004 and 2007. This hypothesis can be tested by analysing the English
proficiencyofdifferentagecohortsseparately.Wedividetherespondents
intotwoagecohorts: thosewho,in 2005,wereundertwenty‐fiveyears old
and those twenty‐five and over. Again I limit the analysis here to those
speakinganyforeignlanguage.
Table4.21:Ex‐SocialistcountryandEnglishproficiencyfortwoagecohorts
(in%)
Youngerthan25years
Englishproficiency Nonex‐socialist
country
Ex‐socialistcountry
No 8.3 16.9
Yes 91.7 83.1
N1,3801,198
r = ‐0,13***; Spearman’s Rho = ‐0,13***; Tau‐b = ‐0,13***. The analysisislimited to those
whospeakatleastoneforeignlanguage.
25yearsorolder
Englishproficiency Nonex‐socialistcountry Ex‐socialistcountry
No 20.1 57.6
Yes 79.9 42.4
N7,2855,548
r = ‐0,36; Spearman’s Rho = ‐0,36; Tau‐b = ‐0,36***. The analysis is limited to those who
speakatleastoneforeignlanguage.
ThedifferenceinEnglishlanguageproficiencybetweenWesternandformer
Soviet countries is notably smaller among respondents twenty‐five and
younger.Thisfindingagainconfirmsthethesisoftheimpactof thebipolar
worldorderonthepopulation’sEnglishproficiency.Whereasthedifference
between citizens from Eastern and Western societies is 37% for the older
cohort,itisonly8.6%intheyoungergroup.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
170
(b)LinguisticdistanceandtherespectivecostofEnglishlanguageacquisition
AsIhavediscussedinchapter2.1,comparativelinguisticsdividesindividual
languagesintolanguagefamilies.Withinandbetweenlanguagefamiliesthere
are different degrees of proximitymeasuredbytheoverlapinlexicon,
phoneticsandgrammar,etc.Thedistancebetweenanativelanguagethatone
alreadyspeaksandanewlanguageonewantstolearnaffectstheeffortone
hastoputintostudyingtheforeignlanguage.Thesmallerthedistance
between two individual languages, the higher therefore the interference
betweenthe nativelanguage, oran alreadylearned language, anda foreign
language one intends to learn, the easier it is to study the new language.
Linguistic distance therefore influences the costs involved in learning a
foreign language. And the higher the costs of acquiring a language are, the
smalleristheprobabilitythatforeignlanguageacquisitionwilloccur or be
successful. This anticipated relationship between linguistic distance, the
costsandtheprobabilityoflanguageacquisition has been proven inseveral
studies which have analysed migrants’ language acquisition (cf.Carliner
2000; Chiswick & Miller 2001, 2004; van Tubergen & Kalmijn 2005;
concerninglanguageacquisitioninborderareasoftheEUcf.Roose2010).
InafirststepthedistancebetweenthedifferentlanguagesspokenbytheEU
citizensandEnglishwasdeterminedusingaclassificationthathasalsobeen
used by other scholars (van Tubergen & Kalmijn 2005; Roose 2010). The
respectivelanguageclassificationshavebeenpublishedinbookform,butare
alsoavailableonline(cf.Lewis2009).65EnglishisanIndo‐Europeanlanguage
andbelongstothegroupoftheGermanicandthesub‐groupoftheWestern
Germaniclanguages.AllotherlanguagesthanEnglishhavebeendividedinto
twogroups,onegroupwithalargeandtheotherwithasmalldistancetothe
Englishlanguage.66Thefindingsofthefollowingtable(theanalysisisagain
65 http://www.ethnologue.com
66 PeoplespeakinganativelanguagethateitherdoesnotbelongtothemaingroupofIndo‐
GermaniclanguagesorthatbelongstothemaingroupofIndo‐Germanicbutnottothe
sub‐groupofGermaniclanguageswereassignedthevalue“1”.People speaking a native
languagethatbelongstothegroupofIndo‐Germaniclanguagesandeithertothegroupof
Germaniclanguagesor to thesub‐group of WesternGermaniclanguages have received
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
171
limitedtothosespeakingatleastoneforeignlanguage)confirm our
hypothesis:People speakinga languageas nativelanguage whoselinguistic
distance to English is smaller are significantly more often able to speak
EnglishthanpeoplespeakinganativelanguagewhosedistancetoEnglishis
larger.
Table4.22: Linguistic distance between native language and English and
Englishproficiency(in%)
CloseFar
No 8.1 36.2
Yes 91.9 63.8
N4,97210,253
r=‐0,31***;Spearman’sRho=‐0,31***;Tau‐b=‐0,31***
(c)InherentmomentumintheriseofEnglish
Foreveryonecurrentlybeginningtolearnaforeignlanguage,itisrationalto
chooseEnglish, because English,being the mostwidely‐spoken languagein
Europe,hasthehighestcommunicativevalue.Thisdecision to learnEnglish
leadstoanincreaseinthenumberofEnglishspeakers.Forthosewhodecide
tolearn a foreignlanguage in thefuture, it becomeseven more sensibleto
chooseEnglish,becausethenumberofEnglishspeakerswillhave grown
evenmore.Thisprocess explainswhysmall differencesbecomelargerover
time. Similar phenomena are discussed in economics under the keyword
“network externalities” (cf. Katz & Shapiro 1985). Computer users have to
decidebetweenthesystemsoftwarebyAppleandtheonebyMicrosoft.The
decisiononcemadeincreasesordecreasesthenetworkofusersofaspecific
system,therebyinfluencingthesubsequentdecisionsoffutureusers.
WecangetanideaofthedynamicofthegrowthofEnglishwhenwecompare
thedifferentgenerationsofourrespondents.Aswesawabove,thenumberof
citizenswhospeakaforeignlanguageatallhasincreasedwithevery
generation,so this analysis onlytakes into account those respondents who
thevalue“0”.ForthefirstgroupthedistanceoftheirnativelanguagetoEnglishisbigger
thanforthesecondgroupandthereforealsotheeffortforstudyingEnglish.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
172
speakatleastoneforeignlanguage.Thatway,wecanseehowintimeEnglish
hasdisplacedotherforeignlanguages.
Table4.23:Age and Englishproficiency (%; onlythose who speakat least
oneforeignlanguageareincluded)
1524253435444554556465+
No 11.2 18.1 21.5 33.9 39.7 49.5
Yes 88.8 81.9 78.5 66.1 60.3 50.5
N2,5782,8172,9302,6092,2182,259
r=0,28;Spearman’sRho=0,28***;Taub=0,25***;Eta=0,31***
The changes between age groups are considerable: Within forty years, the
percentage of English speakers (among those who speak any foreign
languages)hasrisenbyovertwenty‐eightpercent.
(d)MultivariateAnalysis
Similar to our explanation of transnational linguistic capital in general, we
willnowtestifourhypothesesaboutEnglishinparticularwithstand a
multivariateanalysis.Iwilllimitthefirstanalysistothosepersonsspeaking
at least one foreign language and analyse the impact of the three factors
influencingpeoples’Englishproficiencydiscussedabove.ThusIwillfocuson
theexplanationwhyEUcitizensspeakEnglishandnootherforeignlanguage.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
173
Table4.24:ExplainingEnglishproficiency(logisticregressions)
Model1
Model2Model3Model4Total
Model5
Ex‐Socialist
country
0,245*** 1,059
Ex‐Socialist
country*
Age>25
0,149*** 0,264***
Linguistic
Distance
0,435*** 0,414***
Age 0,962*** 0,956***
Constant 4,663*** 4,663*** 10,651*** 15,058*** 111,153***
Nagelkerke
R²
0,117 0,169 0,137 0,114 0,338
N15,22215,22215,222 15,222 15,222
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001 (a) Excluded are those whospeakEnglishastheir
mother tongue and those who do not speak a foreign language. (b) Depicted are
unstandardisedeffectcoefficients(oddsratios):>1:positiveeffect,<1:negativeeffect,=1:no
effect.
Inordertoanswerthesequestionsfivelogisticregressionswere calculated.
InafirststepIhaveconsideredwhetherarespondentcomesfrom an ex‐
Socialist or Western country. Because this variable’s effect is only valid for
older generations, we did a second calculation with a dichotomous age
variable(ofwhethertherespondentwasolderoryoungerthantwenty‐five
years).Comparing theresults inModel 1with thosein Model2 shows that
thepoliticalsystemoneusedtobelongtoaffectstheprobabilityofspeaking
English,butthiscorrelationonlyappliestooldergenerations. The third
model analyses the impact of the linguistic difference between his/her
country’s native language and English and the probability that the
interviewee speaks English. Those speaking a native language withabig
distancetoEnglishhave onlyforty‐threepercenttimes as greatachance of
beingproficientinEnglishas thosespeakinganativelanguage withasmall
distancetoEnglish.Inthefourthmodeltherespondent’sagewastakeninto
consideration. Each year a respondent ages decreases the chance of being
abletospeakEnglishbythefactorof0.96.Thelastmodelincludes all
independent variables. The effect of the theoretically derived variables
persistsforallfactors,anexplainedvarianceofalmostthirty‐fourpercentis
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
174
morethansatisfying,andthethreeindependentvariablescaneasilyexplain
theEnglishproficiencyofthoseinterviewed.
English is one foreign language among others; accordingly, those factors
whichexplaintheleveloftransnationallinguisticcapitalshouldalsohavean
impact on the specific language of English. The following analyses include
thosefactorsabletoexplaingeneralforeignlanguagecompetence,aswellas
thoseabletoexplainthespecificcompetenceofspeakingEnglish.Ilimitthe
analyses to the calculation of three different models. In addition, we have
estimated multilevel models. Also here the results do not differ from the
simplelogisticregressionmodels.Wethereforedecidedtorepresentonlythe
resultsofthelogisiticregressionanalysis,whichareeasiertounderstand.
Model 1 in Table 4.25 includes all variables from the regression analysis
whichwereusedtoexplainthegeneraltransnationallinguistic capital
(excludingthenumber ofofficial languages).Theresults areverysimilar to
thosefromtable4.18.Allvariablesthatinfluencelevelsoftransnational
linguisticcapitalare alsohelpful inexplainingEnglish languageproficiency.
Theexplanatorypowerofthedifferentvariablesisalsosimilarbutwithone
exception. The respondent’s foreign heritage has the opposite effect than
expected.Thoserespondentswhowereborninadifferentcountryfromthe
onetheycurrentlyliveinarelesslikelytospeakEnglishthanarethosewho
werebornandstillliveinthesamecountry.Inanothercalculation (not
shownhere)we foundthateducationallevel neutralise theeffect of foreign
heritage. Respondents born abroad are generally from less‐modernised
countrieswithless‐developededucationalsystems.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
175
Table4.25:ExplainingEnglishproficiency(logisticregressions)
Model1Model2TotalModel
Countrysize 0.994*** 0.998
Prevalenceoflanguage 0.979*** 0.938***
Professionals,
academics
5.607*** 5.478***
Higherandmiddle
management
5.838*** 5.943***
Entrepreneurs,self‐
employed
2.349*** 2.695***
Skilledworkers 2.275*** 2.473***
Age 0.966*** 0.961***
Institutionalised
culturalcapital
(education)
1.233*** 1.269***
Nationaleducational
expenditures
1.791*** 1.302***
Bornabroad
(respondent)
0.772* 0.777*
Bornabroad(parents) 1.019 1.112
Identificationwith
countryoforigin
0.959*** 0.963***
Linguisticdistance 0.581*** 0.382***
Ex‐socialistcountry 1.786***
Ex‐socialist
country*Age>25
0.240*** 0.431***
Constant 0.002*** 1.457*** 0.058***
NagelkerkeR² 0.401 0.124 0.462
N18,08318,08318,083
*p<0,05,**p<0,01,***p<0,001
(a)ExcludedarethosewhospeakEnglishasmothertongue.(b)Depicted are
unstandardisedeffectcoefficients(oddsratios):>1:positiveeffect,<1:negativeeffect,=1:no
effectc)Referentialcategoryfortheprofessionalgroupsisthegroupofunskilledworkers.
Model2considersthevariablesreferringonlytotheexplanationofEnglish.
Persons whose native language has a higher linguistic distance to English,
havea0.38timesgreaterchanceofspeakingEnglishthanpersons whose
native language has a low distance to English. The same applies to older
personsfromtheformersocialistcountries.
Finally, Model 3 includes all variables at the same time. The effects of the
variablesfromModel1and2persistsothatalmostallofourhypothesesare
confirmed.Lookingatthecontextvariables,weseethatrespondents are
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
176
morelikelytospeakEnglishiftheycomefrom(a)smallercountries, (b)
countrieswith a non‐prevalentlanguage, (c) countries that highly investin
education,(d) countrieswith anofficial languageclosely relatedto English,
and (e) countries that were not part of the Soviet Union. However, the
countrysizevariableisnotsignificant.Furthermore,respondentswhohavea
weakidentificationwiththeirhomecountryaremorelikelytospeakEnglish
thanarethosewhoarestillstronglylinkedtotheircountryof origin, and
also,presumably,theirnativelanguage.
Our expectation about social class and English is also confirmed, since in
comparisonto thereference groupof unskilled bluecollar andwhite collar
worker,all other groups are significantly more likelyto speakEnglish.The
difference between professionals and managers as compared to the self‐
employedshows the differencebetween twosub‐groupsof theupper class.
Finally,ourhypothesisthatyoungerand more educatedrespondentswould
bemorelikelytospeakEnglishthantheelderlyandthelesseducatedisalso
confirmed. The total model explains forty‐six percent of the variance in
Englishlanguageproficiencyandthereforehasoutstandingexplanatory
power.
4.3OutlookonHowtheCitizens’MultilingualismwillDevelop
Onthebasisofasurveyanalysisintwenty‐sevencountriesoftheEUIhave
analysedthepeoples’foreignlanguagecompetence.Theanalysisshowsthat
thecitizens’foreignlanguageproficiencyisfarfromgood.More than fifty
percent of the citizens do not speak any foreign language at all; for this
reasontheirchancesoftakingpartintheprocessofEuropeanisationarevery
limited.Moreover,theanalysesrevealthecompetencesofmultilingualism
varysignificantlybetweenandwithinthecountries.InHungary70.5%ofthe
populationdoesnotspeakasingleforeignlanguage,intheNetherlandsonly
8.6%donot.
Not every language enables the same communicative chances. The more
peoplecanbereachedwithaforeignlanguage,thehigheristherateofreturn
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
177
ofthecorrespondinglinguisticcapital.ThatiswhyIhavedetermined the
number of speakers proficient in English throughout the twenty‐seven EU
countries, as English is the most frequently spoken language inEurope:
ScarcelyhalfoftheEUcitizensareabletocommunicateinEnglish. Again,
herehugedifferencesarisewithinthe countriesandbetweenthecountries.
In Bulgaria 84.6% of the population does not speak English, in the
Netherlandsthereareonly12.4%.
Why do people in some countries of the EU have such a very good
endowmentoftransnationallinguisticcapitalandareabletocommunicatein
Englishandwhyisthatnotthe case inothercountries?Inordertorespond
tothatquestion,Ihavefirstdevelopedageneralmodeltoexplain foreign
languageproficiency.Theopportunitiesforacquiringaforeignlanguage,the
coststhatareconnectedwithstudyingaforeignlanguageandthemotivation
tolearnaforeignlanguagearethethreecentralelementsofthe core
explanatorymodel. The societalconditions people areembedded in impact
on these three dimensions and determine who has transnational linguistic
capital,orwhospeaksEnglishandwhodoesnot.Thehypotheses deduced
from the explanatory model have then been empirically tested. It appeares
thatboththepeoples’multilingualismandtheabilitytospeakEnglishcanbe
verywellpredictedwiththehelpofthedifferentexplanatoryfactors.
Thesefindings have to be interpreted in thecontext of the generallevel of
research. Analysing peoples’ multilingualism is the domain of linguists,
psychologists and educationalists(cf.thesummarizingoverviewinWei
2000; Bialystok 2001; Bhatia & Ritchie 2006; Auer & Wei 2007). In their
analyses they focus above all on the cognitive, partially neuro‐mental pre‐
conditions of multilingualism, on the analyses of the impact of
multilingualismonthecognitivedevelopmentandtheanalysisofthefamily
andschoolconditionsandconsequencesofmultilingualism.Onlythebroader
societal conditions people are embedded in are not considered in these
analyses. In contrast, our findings show that it is exactly these neglected
societal conditions which essentially affect multilingualism. It is therefore
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
178
urgent that research on bilingualism and multilingualism must be
supplementedbyasociologicalperspective.
Every explanation always implies a prognosis. If the societal conditions
change,thiswillhavetheanticipatedeffectson the independent variable,in
thiscasetransnationallinguisticcapital.Inwhichdirectionswillthesocietal
conditions change and how will this impact on the level of transnational
linguisticcapital?Adiscussionofpossiblechangesoftheexplanatoryfactors
indirectly summarises again the most important findings of the causal
analysis.
(a)Iftheuseofaforeignlanguageincreases,sodoesthemotivationtolearn
that language. Since the 1970s nation state societies have increasingly
openedtheirbordersduetotheprocessoftransnationalisation.Wehadalso
seen that the process of transnationalisation manifests itself above all as a
process of increasing Europeanisation. The level of interconnectivity
betweenthedifferentmember statesoftheEU hasincreasedtremendously
over time. The increasing interconnectedness of interactions becomes
apparent in quiet different dimensions, ranging from the increase of the
exchange of goods and services to collegiate exchange to the increase of
politicalinterdependence.Astherearedifferentlanguagesspokeninthe EU
member states, participation in this process of transnationalisation and
Europeanisationisonlypossiblewiththeabilitytospeakotherlanguages.As
the process of transnationalisation progresses, transnational linguistic
capitalwillbecomemoreimportantandalsoincreasesthemotivationofEU
citizens to learn foreign languages.AllEuropeancountrieswill,
metaphoricallyspeaking,becomesmallerastheybecomemoreandmore
linked with other nations. This increases the pressure to acquireaforeign
languageproficiently.ThisprocessofintegrationthroughoutEuropeandthe
worldinmanysocietalfields–economy,culture,communication,andpolitics
–will continuein thefuture as thecauses ofthis processremain powerful.
Technological innovations having enormously facilitated worldwide
communication and transport continue as do also the politics oftrade
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
179
liberalisation and global trade. This will be accompanied by anincreasing
needofforeignlanguageproficiencyingeneral,andofEnglishinparticular.
(b)GlobalisationandEuropeanisationpositivelyinfluencepeople’smigration
patterns.Weassumethatinthefutureintra‐Europeanmigrationandalso
immigrationintoEuropewillincreaseratherthandecrease.Thismeansthat
childrenaremorelikelytogrowupinfamilieswithparentswhowereborn
in another country. Our empirical analysis shows that this often leads to
childrengrowingupbilingually.
(c)The process ofimproving educationin theEU is alsofar fromover and
hasbeenatthe forefront ofthepoliticalagenda at boththecountryand EU
level.PartofthemeasuresintermsofeducationpolicyistheLisbonAgenda
of the European Union that was adopted at the special summit ofthe
European Heads of State and of Government in the year 2000 in Lisbon. It
was the declared aim of the differentmeasurestomaketheEUthe most
competitive and most dynamic economic region in the world within ten
years. The EU emphasised that knowledge and the innovations emanating
from it are the EU’s most important advantages in global competition.
Accordingly,education policy as a meansof thepromotion ofa knowledge‐
based society is given special relevance (Münch & Bernhard 2009). An
increaseininvestmentineducation,theimprovementandlengthening of
mandatory schooling and an increase in the number of people obtaining a
highereducationalqualificationaretheEU’scentraleducational goals.
Becauseofthisfocus,therehasbeenanoticeablechangeoverthelastseveral
years in terms of educational levels, data is available for nine European
countries (Denmark, Germany, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Austria,
Poland,Slovakia, and Sweden)from 1995to 2007regarding the numberof
people,who,afterfinishingtheirsecondaryeducation,wentontobegina
universitydegree.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
180
Figure4.1:ShareofpersonshavingstartedstudyingafterschoolinnineEU
countries(in%)
20
30
40
50
60
1995 2001 2003 2005 2007
Source:OECD(2009)
Thepercentageofpeopleininstitutionsofhighereducationrosefromthirty‐
fiveto fifty‐nine percent.Because education hasa positiveeffect onforeign
languages (and specifically English),weexpectthatlevelsoftransnational
linguisticcapital andof English languageproficiency haveincreased during
thelastfewyearsandthattheywillcontinuetodoso.
(d)Thestructureoftheworld societyhas–atleastinEurope–changedso
dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the integration of
Eastern and Central European countries in the post‐Cold War world order
that there is hardly any foreseeable alternative to continuing market
liberalisationandwesternisation.Anewbipolarworldorder–asinthetimes
oftheColdWar–isunlikely.Anewcleavagestructuremightdevelopthough,
orhasalreadydeveloped,inrudimentalformsbetweenWesternandIslamic
countries, as well as between Western countries and China. However, it
cannotbepredictedthatitwilldivideEurope.Insofaraswecan see the
demandformultilingualismwillincreasefurtherandEnglishwillremainthe
unchallenged hegemonic language. The exponential growing increase in
China’s economic and political significance and the fact that Chinese is the
nativelanguagewiththehighestprevalencewillcertainlyincrease the
communicative value of Chinese for communication outside of Europe, but
notforcommunicationwithinEurope.
4.EuropeanCitizens’TransnationalLinguisticCapital
181
(e) In addition, there is the inherent momentum in the rise of a foreign
languageandaboveallthespreadofEnglish.ThedominanceofEnglishhas
motivatedmanyEuropeanstolearnEnglish,thelanguagewiththe highest
communication value, thereby furtherraisingboththenumberofEnglish
speakersanditscommunicativeuse.This processseems unlikelyto stopin
thenearfuture.
(f)ItisalsounlikelythatthecurrentclassstructureinEuropean societies
willdisappear.Thus,theinequalitiesintermsofthelevelof transnational
linguisticcapitalwithinthesocietieswillsurvive. Thismeansthatmembers
oftheupperclasseswillbemoreproficientinmoreforeignlanguagesthan
willbe thosein themiddle andlower classes, and within a particular class,
thosesub‐groupswithhigherculturalcapitalwillhaveespeciallyhighlevels
oftransnationallinguisticcapital.
Iftheseexpectationsprovetobecorrect,wecanexpectan“elevator effect”
for transnational linguistic capital, whereby foreign language and English
proficiency will improve across Europe, even though differences between
classes,educationallevels,agegroups,countrysize,andlinguisticprevalence
willremainconstant.
182
5.AN ARGUMENT FOR A NEW LANGUAGE POLICY IN
THEEUROPEANUNION
AsIhavesummarisedtheargumentandtheempiricalfindingsinthe
introductionaswellasattheendofeachrespectivechapter,thereisnoneed
todrawanotherbalanceattheendofthebook.Instead,intheconcluding
remarksIwillfocusonthepoliticalimplicationsofourresultsbyaskingwhat
asoundandatthesametimejustlanguagepolicyforEuropecanlooklike.
According to John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” (1971), justice isthefirst
virtueofsocialinstitutions.OneofRawl’sessentialtheoreticalassumptionsis
the maxim of equal opportunities: Everybody should have the same
opportunitiestoachievesocialstatusinasociety.Forthispurpose,asociety
needsrulesandregulationsensuringthatpeoplewiththesameabilitiesand
talentscanindeedachievethesamepositions.AlthoughRawlshasmadethis
claimprimarilytoinstalljusticewithinanationstate,onecanalsoapplyhis
argumentstoEuropeandthelanguagepolicyoftheEuropeanUnion.
TheprocessofEuropeanintegrationhasopenedupthememberstatesofthe
EUtoeachother andsetsthefoundations fortheemergenceofa European
society.ForeignlanguageskillsandespeciallyEnglishproficiencyarecentral
resourcesofthepeoples’participationinaEuropeansociety.Thosespeaking
severallanguagescanbenefitfromtheEuropeaneconomicmarket;theycan
improvetheirjobopportunitiesaswellastheirincome;itiseasierforthem
togetintocontactwithcitizensofothercountries,tocooperateeconomically
orscientifically,toconductpoliticalnegotiations,to organiseprotestevents
orto enter romanticrelationships beyondnationalborders, etc.Those only
5.AnArgumentforaNewLanguagePolicyintheEU
183
speakingtheirmothertongueareconfinedtotheircountries,unabletotake
advantage of a united Europe and a globalised world. Possessing
transnationallinguisticcapitalisthusasourceofsocialinequality in the
contextofadevelopingglobalisedandEuropeansociety.
Inturn,theabilitytospeakdifferentlanguageslargelydependsonthesocial
positionapersonhasattainedandis,asourempiricalanalysis has shown,
ratherunequallydistributed.Particularlypeoplefromlargercountries,from
lessdevelopedsocietiesandfromthe lowerclasseswithlittleeducationare
significantly less well‐endowed with transnational linguistic capital. This
contradictsthe idea of equal opportunities for allEuropean citizens. If itis
notdesirablethatonlytheupperclasses,thecitizensfromwealthycountries,
andthe big companiesthat can afford translators areable to participatein
the process of Europeanisation, then the people from lower classes and
persons from the less developed countries will have to be provided with
adequatelanguageproficiency,sothattheyhavethesameopportunitiesto
participateinaEuropeanisedandglobalisedsociety.
Thislack of fairness,due to differentforeign languageskillsalsoappliesto
the different fields of science and scholarship. From my point of view,
research in German humanities and social sciences are quite often
qualitatively on the same level as American research in many respects.
However,thefactthatthefindingsaremostlypublishedinGermanprevents
themfrombeingrecognisedthroughouttheworld.Thelanguagedifferences
manifest themselves in the extent of distribution of the research results,
whichthenisreflectedinthemostfrequentlyusedperformanceandranking
indicatorsforresearch,thecitationindices.Theplaceofbirthandhencea
scientist’s or scholar’s mother tongue thus determine the evaluation of the
quality of his or her research, although the language of publication reveals
nothing about the quality of a historicalstudy,apoetryanalysis or a
methodologicallyelaboratedanalysisofsurveydata.Inorderto make the
sameconditionsofcompetitionpossibleforallresearchandtherebyachieve
equalopportunitiesasapreconditionforajustsocietyitself,peoplemustbe
enabledtocommunicateinoneandthesamelanguage.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
184
Toachievethisaimtherearetwodifferentoptionswhichonecan choose
from: the promotion of the citizens’ multilingualism in generalorthe
promotion of a linguafrancainEurope.AsEnglishisthelanguagethatis
mostdistributedworldwideitistheonlylanguageunderconsideration.Iwill
argue that it is reasonable not only to enforce the acceptance of the
dominance of English as linguafranca, but also to actively promote it
politically,evenatthecostofotherlanguagesandoftheminoritylanguages
spokeninEurope.InsodoingIwillpartlyleavethefieldofempiricalanalysis
andmoveintothefieldofnormativedeliberation.Hereempiricalevidenceis
lessimportantthangoodargumentsthatmustbededucedandsubstantiated
inanormativelyplausibleway.
(1)Asbecameobviousinchapter3.3,theEuropeannationstates,althoughto
a different degree, pay keen attention to the maintenance of the status of
theirrespectivelanguageas an officiallanguageinsidetheEuropean Union.
Theyareonguardagainstanydisadvantagetotheirownlanguageandeven
try to foster the growing influence of this language. The European Union
acceptsinitslanguagepolicytwenty‐three official languages and does not
pursueapolicyoflinguistichomogenisation.Onthecontrary,besides the
officiallanguagesitsupportstheminoritylanguagesin Europe.Atthesame
timetheEUisawareofthefactthataunitedEuropewillonly become a
united Europe of all its citizens, if they are able to communicate across
nationalborders.Thatiswhyitpromotesthemultilingualismofitscitizens.
Itwantseverycitizentobeabletospeaktwoforeignlanguages.Therebyall
Europeanlanguagesaretreatedandsupportedequally.Forthepromotionof
multilingualism, the EU has taken a variety of measures as we have seen
above. Will this policy contribute to the improvement of communication
throughout Europe, thereby increasing the citizens’ opportunities for
participatingintheirEurope?
ActinguponthelanguagepolicyoftheEU,peopleinthetwenty‐seven
countries will study different foreign languages at one time, by means of
which the bilateral communication opportunities should improve
significantly. But a Europe without linguistic boundaries will not be
5.AnArgumentforaNewLanguagePolicyintheEU
185
attainable in this way. A German studying Flemish, a French speaking
Spanish and a Pole being able to speak Latvian have each increased their
transnational linguistic capital, but that does not mean that they can
communicate with each other. Themorelanguagesexist,thegreater is the
varietyof possible languagecombinations people canchoose from,andthe
smalleristhelikelihoodoftwopeoplewhomeetwillhavechosenthesame
foreign language. Philippe Van Parijs (2004: 122f.) has calculated possible
combinationsfordifferentnumbersofmothertonguesandhasshownthatin
aEuropeoftwenty‐threeofficiallanguagesthefreechoiceoftwo foreign
languages cannot materially increase the probability that Europeans can
communicatewitheachother.Thevarietyoflanguageswhicharespokenin
theEuropeanParliamentillustratesthisconstellationandthesetofproblems
connected with it, as we have seen in chapter 3.3. Van Parijs (2004, 2011)
concludesthatpoliticsshouldfurtherenforceandfosterthetrend that has
alreadybeenempiricallydeterminedanyway,namelythatEnglishhastaken
holdaslinguafranca.67
WhataretheadvantagesofacommonforeignlanguageinEuropeandwhich
counterargumentshavetobeconsidered?Inordertofindananswertothat
question,wehavetakenargumentsbyVanParijs(2011)andhaveadded
somefurtherpoints.
(2)Sincethesocalledfreedomofmovementrulehasbeeninforcethelegal
preconditions have been in place for all EU citizens to settle with their
spousesandchildreninanymembercountryandtoworkthere.Thisoption
israrelyexercised.Aswehaveseeninchapter3.2,intra‐Europeanmobilityis
verylow.Oneofthemainreasonsforthislowmobilityisinsufficientforeign
languageskills.AgoodproficiencyofthelanguagespokenbymostoftheEU
citizensisapreconditionforbeingabletomakeuseoftheoptionsofmobility
inEuropeandthroughouttheworld.Inchapter2.1wehavediscussed
severaladvantageswhichareconnectedwiththepossessionoftransnational
67 VanParijs(2004, 2011)discussestwomorealternatives toEnglishaslinguafranca:the
introduction of Esperanto as a commonlanguage and the improvement of translations
withthehelpofmodernsoftwaredevelopment.Hearrivesattheconvincingconclusion
thatnoneofthemcanbeapracticablepossibility.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
186
capitalingeneralandEnglishproficiencyinparticular.Multilingualism,and
especiallythecommandofEnglish,allowsstudyinginothercountries, the
taking of exams there and the acquiring of respective certificates of
education. Secondly, English proficiency improves the chances of getting a
better job. The Europeanisation and globalisation of economy and politics
havealteredtheprofileofrequirementsforjobs.International experience
and the command of English have become pivotal aspects in one’s
qualifications. Persons having this competence can benefit fromthe
opportunitiesofaninternationallabourmarket.Thirdly,Englishproficiency
improvestheextensionofone’ssocialnetworkandinternational social
capital. In turn, international social capital itself is a resourcethat,among
otherthings,can beused fortheextension ofbusinessconnectionsand the
exerciseofpoliticalinfluence.Finally,goodEnglishproficiencyalsoimproves
the chances for political participation, involvement in the political life in
anothercountryandinatransnationalpublic.Thetransnationalisation of
politicalparticipationisespeciallyimportantinthe context oftheEuropean
integration.SincetheTreatyofMaastrichtin1992thecitizensoftheEUhold
notonlytheirnational,butalsoEUcitizenship.However,theycanonlyutilise
the associated legal possibilities, if they are able to communicate Europe‐
wide.
(3)Animprovementofthecitizens’commandofEnglishwouldnot only
entailadvantagesforindividualsinthedescribeddimensions,butwouldalso
have positive collective effects. Based on the possibility to communicate in
onelanguageandthetherebyreducedtransactioncosts,theinternal and
externalEuropeantradewouldbeconsiderablyfacilitated.Thisagainwould
raise European economic growth significantly. Geographical mobility being
facilitatedbytheproficiencyofEnglishwouldresultinabetter balance of
laboursupplyanddemandforlabourwithintheEUandagainwouldhavea
positiveeffectoneconomicgrowth(cf.ForschungsinstitutzurZukunft der
Arbeit2008).
Moreover,theemergenceofaEuropeanpublicwouldprofittremendouslyby
oneforeignlanguagebeingsharedbyallEuropeancitizens.Aswehaveseen
5.AnArgumentforaNewLanguagePolicyintheEU
187
inchapter3.2,the political decisionmakingprocesseshavebeen constantly
Europeanised;collectivelybindingdecisionsarebeingmademorefrequently
byEUinstitutionsinsteadofnationalgovernmentsandparliaments. The
development of a European public is lagging behind this process,since the
mediacoveragecontinuestobewidelyattachedtothenationstates.Thus,for
example,thePolesinformthemselvesmostlyinPolishabouttheircountry’s
politics,theFrenchconcentratetheirattentiononwhatishappeningintheir
countryusingtheFrenchlanguage.Asaconsequence,thecitizensofEurope
arenotsufficientlyinformedaboutdecisionsmadebytheinstitutionsofthe
EU,althoughtheyaredirectlysubjecttothesedecisions.Oneof the most
importantreasonsforthisdeficitofaEuropeanpublicsphereistobefound
in the language problem (Gerhards 1993; Kielmannsegg 1996: 55; Grimm
1994: 44; Scharpf 1999: 674; Pérez‐Diaz 1998: 221; Schlesinger 1999).
Consequently,the emergence ofa European public sphere and the citizens’
participation in the European integration process would become
considerably easier, if the peopleofEuropecouldcommunicatewith each
otherandifthenewscoverageas well as discussions about theEuropean
integrationprocesscouldtakeplaceinacommonlanguage.68
68 ThethesisthattheexistenceofaEuropeanpublicsphere’sdeficitcaninthefirstplacebe
ascribedtothelanguageproblemhasnotremainedunchallenged.ReferringtoGadamer’s
hermeneutics Cathleen Kantner (2004) has tried to show in her analysis that
communication is also possible between two people not speaking a common language.
NicoleDoerr(2008,2009)showsinheranalysesofdiscussionsofgroupswhoprepared
the European Social Forum and the World Social Forum, that despite multilingualism
deliberativeprocesseshavebeenpossible.Analysingtheconditionsoftheemergenceofa
European public Thomas Risse (2010) references Cathleen Kantner’s thesis and alike
concludesthatthediversityoflanguagesdoes not hinder the emergenceof a European
public.However,theconclusionstheauthorshavedrawnunderestimatethefundamental
significance of a common language for every form of communication. Of course
communicationalsoworksviagestures and facial expressionsandcertainlytranslators
canbehired.Yet,takingintoaccountthetwenty‐threelanguagesoftheEU,thisturnsout
toberathercomplicated.Thetransactioncostsofcommunicationthatisnotconductedin
one language are tremendously high. Insofar we do not have to discusswhethera
commonlanguageisanessentialpreconditionforaEuropeanpublicsphere.Butwhatin
myopinion isundeniableisthe factthatitwould tremendouslyfacilitateand accelerate
theemergenceof a European publicsphere.And this precisely isthepivotalargument:
Startingfromtheassumption derived from theories ofdemocracythatan expansion of
theEuropeanpublicsphereisdesirable,thisaimwillbemoreeasilyachievedifEuropeis
linguisticallyunitedinacommon foreign language. Every citizen studying a different
foreign language will not dissolve the Babylonian confusion of languages in Europe.
Thereby the bilateralcommunication will improve, but not the chance of a uniform
communicationinsidethewholeofEurope.Thiswillonlybepossible, if everybody
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
188
There is one additional argument which brings the idea of a Europe being
linguistically united through the English language even closer to the
Habermasian idea of a European public sphere (Habermas 2004a/b). The
unifiedlanguagecommunityofEuropehasthechancetodevelopa“demos”
withoutbeingan“ethnos”atthesametime(VanParijs2004:118).Formost
ofthecitizensofEurope,theEnglishlanguageisnotafeatureofahistorically
grown community with a clear territorial reference, but a medium of
communication being widely exempt from historical ballast that is often
connectedwithnationallanguages.Inadditiontothat,theimplementationof
English as a dominant foreign language that has occurred until today is, at
leastinEurope,nottheresultofanexpansivelanguagepolicybytheBritish
ortheAmericanswantingtoimposetheirmothertongueonothercountries.
Itistheresultofa“soft‐power”constellationandmanysmall decisions of
individualsmutuallyenforcingeachother.Thisallowsfortheassumption
thattherewillbelittleresentmenttowardsEnglishaslinguafranca,as the
languageitselfisnotassociatedwithclaimstothepowerofacountry,
therebyprovokingfearofheteronomy.However,onecanassumethat the
institutionalisation of English as linguafranca would symbolically enhance
those who speak English as a mother tongue. The way in which this
inequalityregardingthereputationoflanguagescanbecompensatedfor,will
bediscussedbelow.
(4) As I have argued in chapter 1 and as we can learn from the processof
nationbuilding,acommonlanguagenotonlyfacilitatesastructural
integrationofsociety,butalsocontributestoidentityformationandidentity
building.Thisalsoappliesforhavingdifferentlanguagesatone’scommand.
Proficiency in foreign languages enables people to make transnational
experiences,to interact with people of differentcultures and thus to get to
knowdifferentwaysoflifeandsocieties.
69Thisleadstothecognitive
speaksthesameforeignlanguage;andthiscanunderthegivencircumstancesand the
dynamicofthedevelopmentonlybetheEnglishlanguage.
69 Thebroadeningofhorizonbygettingintouchwithotherculturescanalsobeinfluenced
bymedia usage.PippaNorrisandRonald Inglehart(2009:171ff.)foundout,thatpeople
followingthenewsshowhighertrustratesinpeoplefromothercountriesandother
religions.
5.AnArgumentforaNewLanguagePolicyintheEU
189
broadeningofone’shorizon.Thus, the peoples’bondstotheir ownnational
“container” and the sub‐national units soften and openness for new bonds
developsbeyondthenationstate.
Robert Putnam (2007) has shown in a deliberative and methodologically
sound analysis, that there is a negative relationship between the level of
ethnicheterogeneityofasocietyandthelevelof trustbetweenthecitizens.
Thecorrelationbetweenthetwofactorsisrobustandstatisticallysignificant,
evenwhenone controlsfor many otherfactors whichinfluencethe levelof
trust (cf. also Newton & Delhey 2005). In contrast, people living in ethnic
homogeneous societies are more trustful and more open minded. Trust is
insofarimportantfortheintegrationofasocietyasitisapreconditionforthe
development of social capital, people’s involvement in the civil society and
thesolidaritybetweenthepeople(cf.alsoVanParijs2008:29).70
Quite often ethnic heterogeneity goes hand in hand with linguistic
heterogeneity. Hence, one can conclude that the relationship between
ethnicity and trust also holds true for the relationship between linguistic
heterogeneityandtrust.Tobeabletospeakthelanguagesofother people
willincreasetheprobabilityoftheemergenceoftrust,solidaritybetweenthe
peopleandtheidentificationwithone’ssociety.
Thesupposedeffectofforeignlanguagesonthebroadeningofhorizonsand
the development of trust and transnational identification is a relevant
question,especiallyfortheEU.Surveyresearchhasshownquiteoften, that
European citizens identify themselves first and foremost with their nation
state,theirregionandtheirtownandthatidentificationwithEuropehasnot
increasedovertime,althoughtheEuropeanintegrationprocesshasspeeded
uptremendously(cf.Noll&Scheuer2006;Roose2007).
70TheresultsofPutnam’sanalysisarediscussedcontroversiallyintheliterature.More
recentlyWillKymlicka(2009)hassummarisedthedebateandsupplementeditwiththe
resultsof hisownresearch.Thenegativerelationshipbetweenethnicheterogeneityand
trustissupportedbyotherstudies.However,thereseemstobenostatisticallysignificant
correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and the level of solidarity measured by the
amountofsocialexpenditure,whereasthegrowthofethnicheterogeneityhasanegative
impactonsocialexpenditure(cf.Kymlicka2009).
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
190
Ourdataallowsustotestatleastrudimentarilywhetherhaving
transnational linguistic capital has an impact on the citizens’ identification
with Europe and the support of theEuropeanunificationprocess. In the
surveyanalysedbyus,thecitizensinthetwenty‐sevenEUcountries were
askedwhetherandtowhichdegreetheyfeltattachedtoEurope.
Table5.1:TransnationallinguisticcapitalandidentificationwithEurope(in
%)
AttachmenttoEurope Proficiencyinforeignlanguages
none one two three
Notatall 9.3 6.3 4.9 3.1
Notthatmuch 26.5 23.2 20.7 19.5
Fairly 42.0 46.5 47.3 48.1
Strongly 22.2 24.1 27.0 29.3
N10,1577,4375,2293,122
r=0.10***,Rho=0.10***,Tau‐b=0.08***(p<0.001)
Asdisplayedintable5.1,thosespeakingseverallanguagesalsofeelattached
toahigherdegreetoEurope.Thesamecorrelationappliestothosespeaking
English.TheyalsofeelmorestronglyattachedtoEuropethanthosewhodo
not speak English as a foreign language. These findings persistina
multivariateanalysisaswell.Besidestheproficiencyinforeignlanguagesand
in English we included a variety of other variables influencingthe
identificationwithEurope(cf.Fuchsetal.2009).
Infurtheranalysesweconsideredtheimpactofforeignlanguageproficiency,
orratherEnglishproficiency,onthesupportoftheEuropeanunification
processandonthefearsofthelossofanationalidentity(tablesarenot
presented here). The results show that those who are multilingual are in
favouroftheEUasaninstitution,andsupportafurtherdeepeningoftheEU,
andareatthesametimeculturallyopen‐mindedandshowlowtendenciesto
excludeforeigners.Theseresultsareconfirmedinamultivariateanalysis.In
addition,thesefindings correspondto thoseof Steffen Mau,Jan Mewesand
AnnZimmermann(2008a/b)whocouldshowthattransnationalexperiences
can foster cosmopolitan orientations. As a result, multilingualism and the
5.AnArgumentforaNewLanguagePolicyintheEU
191
proficiencyinEnglishnotonlybringaboutadvantagesinintegratingcitizens
structurallyintoanemergingEuropeansociety,butalsosymbolically.
(5)The factual implementationof Englishas linguafrancaandthepleadto
politically support this process also leads to inequalities between the
differentlanguages.Languagesare,accordingtoAbramdeSwaan (2001b)
publicgoods.Andasinanypublicgood,thequestionremainshowtomanage
itsproductionwithouthavingsomeparticipantspayingallthecosts for it,
while others, even if unintentionally, profit from it as free riders without
takingashareinthecosts.InthecaseoftheintroductionofEnglishasa
linguafrancathosespeakingEnglishasamothertonguewouldbethefree
riders,astheydonothavetostudyanewlanguagethemselves.
Consequently,thosehavingtostudyEnglish asaforeignlanguagewould be
thosehavingtopaythecoststoproduceacommongood.71
Inaddition,English nativespeakers would becomeprivileged whenEnglish
becomes the official linguafranca of the European Union. They will have
advantagesonthelabourmarket,astheyspeakthelinguafrancabetterthan
thosewhohavestudieditasaforeignlanguage;theycanbetterexpresstheir
position in political and public debates and therefore become more
influential;theywillmoreeasilybuildupinternationalnetworksandwillbe
abletotransferthissocialcapitalintootherformsofcapital,etc.72
How can these anticipated inequalities be compensated for? Different
solutionsarediscussedintheliterature.JonathanPool(1991)cameforward
withthebestknownproposalthathemodelledmathematically.The basic
71 Ontheotherhand,investmentsinanewforeignlanguagearealsoofadvantageforthose
havingmadetheinvestment,astheynowhavetwolanguagesattheircommandandcan
capitalisethisbilingualism.
72 Van Parijs (2004) points out another inequality that would beconnectedwiththe
preferential treatment of English (see also Grin 2004). The preferential treatment of a
language does not only lead to better chances for the speakers of that language to
transform their language proficiency into other capitals. It also allows for the
enhancement of their symbolic capital, insofar their language’s prestige obtains more
acceptance.VanParijsmakessomesuggestionshowtoreducetheseexpectedeffects:(a)
“Demystification”: It should be noted that English is nothing butthedialectofsome
Germanicbarbarianshavingsettledacrossthecanal,sothereisnothingspecialaboutthe
Englishlanguage.(b)“Ritualaffirmation”:InthewaythePopeissuestheEasterblessing
in all languages of the world, the European Union should take care that in all public
ritualsmultilingualismissupportedsymbolically.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
192
ideaisthattheintroductionofalinguafranca is connected with costs and
benefitswhicharedispersedtodifferentdegreesamongthedifferent
language groups. In order to achieve an equitable solution those language
communities whose mother tongue is chosen as a linguafrancashould
subsidisethose language communities that have to studythe linguafranca,
uptothepointatwhichcostsandbenefitsoftheforeignlanguageacquisition
evenout(VanParijs 2007:74,2011).The exactamountthat wouldhaveto
bepaidascompensationpaymentishardtodefineasforthispurpose a
multitudeofparametershavetobeincluded(morepreciselyVanParijs2007,
2011;Grin2004:199).
However,thefundamentalideaisextremelyappealing,asitpresentsa way
torefutetheargumentthattheintroductionofalinguafrancawillleadtoan
unequalandthusunjustburdenforthedifferentlanguagecommunities.And
itshowsthatanefficientandatthesametimefairlanguagepolicy in a
multilingualunionisinprincipalpossible.TheEuropeanUnionasapolitical
institution has the power and the possibilities for implementing such a
policy.Toadifferentdegreethetwenty‐sevencountrieswouldhavetotakea
shareinfinancingthislanguagepolicyoftheEUandrespectively the
resources would have to be distributed disproportionally to the countries.
ThosecountriesinwhichEnglishproficiencyisthelowestwouldhavetoget
thegreatestsupport.Thisideaofadisproportionalsupportisthereby
absolutelycompatiblewiththeEU’sfundamentalphilosophyofanintegrated
Europeandotherpoliticalmeasurements.
Regional policy could act as an example for the language policy. With
structural funds the EU aims at the adjustment of economically weaker
regions in order to contribute to the convergence of regions and member
countries.Inthefirstinstance,convergencemeansthesupportofgrowthand
employmentinregionsandmemberstateswiththebiggestbackwardness.
Growthandemploymentshouldbeachievedbyanimprovementofhuman
resources,innovationandtheadvancementoftheknowledgebasedsociety.
AEuropeanlanguagepolicycouldbelegitimisedbasedexactlyonthesegoals.
Itisaninvestmentinthehumancapitalofpreciselythosecitizens who
5.AnArgumentforaNewLanguagePolicyintheEU
193
cannotadequatelyparticipateintheprocessofEuropeanisationduetoalack
ofproficiencyinEnglish.
VanParijs(2004:129)furthersuggestsameasurementthatwouldprobably
enhance the command of English in the population without any input of
resources. We have seen in the empirical analyses, that people in smaller
countries speak better English than people in countries with a large
population; this difference partially depends on the fact that in smaller
countries many movies and TV programmes are shown in the original
languagewhichinmanycasesisEnglish,whereasinlargercountriesnearly
allofthefilmsaredubbed.Thisisduetothefactthatthecostsfora
translationwould betoo high consideringthe relativelysmall demand.The
reception of movies in the original version supports the acquisition of the
languageinwhichthemovieisshown.SincemostofthemoviesareofAnglo‐
Americanorigin,subtitlingleadstotheimprovementoftheEnglishlanguage
proficiency. Though, Van Parijs’ (2004) proposal to ban the translation of
movies by law will neither be politically possible, nor is it legal, as such a
directionwouldcontradicttheprinciplesofafreemarket,which are
extensivelyprotectedbythelawsoftheEU.However,almostallcountriesin
theEUeitherhavepublicorstate‐runbroadcastingservices.Hence,member
states of the EU could mutually commit themselves to ensure, that their
publicbroadcastingservicesshowapartoftheirprogrammesandespecially
theyouthprogrammesintheoriginalversionsandlanguages.Thatwouldbe
ameasureinfavouroftheimprovementofforeignlanguageandEnglish
proficiency,asnotonlywoulditcostnothing,butevensavethe dubbing
costs.
(6)Theargumentsgivensofarshouldhavemadeclearthatacommonlingua
francawouldcertainlyacceleratetheEuropeanisationofthesocieties of
Europe, positively influence the economic growth, abet the emergence of a
European public sphere, improve the peoples’ equal opportunities to
participateintheprocessofEuropeanisationandenhancethecitizens’
identification with the European project. At the same time policiescanbe
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
194
found in order to balance inequalities connected with the choice of a
languageaslinguafranca,asthelastparagraphhasshown.
TheweightiestargumentagainstthesupportofEnglishaslinguafrancaofa
unitedEuropeisraisedbythosewhoregardthedominanceofonelanguage
notonlyasadangertotheotherlanguages,butalsototheircultures,asthey
think languages and cultures are strongly interwoven. Thus, critics of a
dominanceofEnglishinterpretashiftinthediversityoflanguagesasashift
of dominance in the cultures. According to them the dominance of English
wouldatthesametimebeconnectedwiththedominanceofAnglo‐American
world views and values, as languages impose limits on the ways in which
speakersconceptualisetheworld.Everylanguageleadstoaunique
interpretationandconceptionalisationoftheworld;hence,different
languagesleadtodifferentcultures(cf.forexamplePhillipson2003).Richard
Münch(2004)particularlyregardsthefunction‐specificEnglishspokenbya
transnationalelitelikeofficialsinindustry,bybureaucratsandmanagement
consultantstobeathreat.Accordingtohimthislanguageconveysaspecific
ideologyofEuropeasaneo‐liberalproject.
Thisideaofthelinguisticfoundationofculturesrepresentsthe hegemonic
viewamonglinguistsandanthropologiststhatmanyinternational
organisationsaswellastheEUhaveadopted(cf.forexampleCrystal 2000;
Phillipson2003; Nic Craith2008). That does not necessarily meanthat the
hypothesisisplausible.
Firstly,thepromotion of Englishas a linguafrancaforallEuropeanswould
not mean that the linguistic sovereignty of the nation states inside the
countriesisbeingattacked.Thecountries’mothertongueswillbepreserved;
they will only be complemented by an accelerated promotion of aforeign
language.
Secondly,thecurrentresearchhardlysupportsthethesisoflanguagehaving
animpactonthinkingandtheconceptionalisationoftheworld.Iwilldiscuss
therelationship betweenlanguage and worldviewsmore extensivelyin the
appendix (in addition see Gerhards 2011; Nunner‐Winkler 2011). Modern
5.AnArgumentforaNewLanguagePolicyintheEU
195
cognitive psychology (Fodor 1975; Pinker 1994) states that thinking takes
placeinaspecialmentallanguage.Becauseofthat,theimpactofnatural
languagesonthinkingislowsothateverythingpeopleexpressinacertain
naturallanguagecaninprincipalbetranslatedintoanotherlanguage.Butif
languageandculturearenotthatintimatelyconnectedwitheachotherasis
often implied in the literature, this has consequences for eventual political
conclusions.Thus, one key argumentagainst a uniform foreign language in
Europeisrefuted,oratleastreduced.PhilippeVanParijsbrieflysummarizss
asfollows:“Thereisnothingintrinsically ‘pro‐capitalist’, or ‘anti‐poor’, or
‘market‐imperialist’abouttheEnglishlanguage,justasitisnotbecauseMarx
wroteinGermanthatthereissomethingintrinsically‘anti‐capitalist’or‘pro‐
proletarian’ or ‘state‐fetishist’ about the German language. Like all other
languagesintheworld,EnglishandGermanhavethemeansofexpressing
negation, so that whatever Marx wrote in German you can also deny in
GermanandwhateverBushsaidinEnglishyoucanalsodenyinEnglish”
(VanParijs2004:138).
Almost all arguments we have discussed support the idea of not only
enforcingacceptanceofthedominanceofEnglishaslinguafrancainEurope,
butpromotingitinapoliticallyactiveway,evenatthecostsofthesupportof
otherlanguages.ThestoryoftheTowerofBabelfromtheOldTestament
withwhichwestartedourstudyteachesuswhatgreatadvantagesacommon
languageprovides.TheEuropeansshouldnotbeafraidofthejudgement
fromabovewhensettingaboutthefurtherdevelopmentoftheEuropean
project.AcommonforeignlanguagewouldtremendouslyaccelerateEurope’s
developmentondifferentlevelsandwouldbringthepeopleinEuropecloser
together.
196
AppendixA:TherelationshipbetweenLanguageandCulture
Inchapter3.3wehaveseenthattheprotectionoflanguageshas received
considerablymorelegalandpoliticalattentioninthelastthirtyyears.Andin
thelastchapterwehaveseenthatthereisalargegroupofscholars and
politicianswhocriticisethedominanceofEnglishasalinguafranca.Thereis
a central argument put forward for the encouragement and nurture of
different languages and against the dominance of one language: The
protection of diverse languages is equated to biological diversity. Different
languages lead to differences in cultural appropriation. Consequently the
protectionoflanguagesisanimperativeifonewantstoprotectnotonlythe
languagesbutalsothecultureswhicharecreatedbythelanguages.
Thisideaispoliticallyofgreatsignificance.Thoseauthorswhothinkthatthe
culture of a society is mediated largely by language are also those who
complainaboutthedeclineofindividuallanguages,especiallythe smaller
languagesandopposeagainstthedominanceofonehegemoniclanguage.To
themthelossofalanguageisalsothelossofacultureandforthisreasonis
interpretedasaveryspecialsacrifice(seeCrystal2000;foracriticalviewde
Swaan2004).Aswehaveseeninchapter3.3theEuropeanUnionhasmade
thispositionitsown. Itis,therefore,worthwhiledealing alittlelongerwith
thethesisthatlanguageshapestheconstructionofrealitywhileconsidering
atthesametimethecurrentresearchinthisarea.AsafirststepIwillbriefly
discuss the central arguments and examples which speak for the thesis
followedbythecriticalobjectionstoit.
(1) In 1770, the influential writer and philosopher of Weimar Classicism,
Johann Gottfried Herder, submitted a treatise “On the Origins of Human
Speech”tothe“ElectoralBrandenburgSocietyofSciencesandHumanties”in
replytoaninvitationbytheacademyitself,bymeansofwhichanargument
withintheacademywassupposedtobereconciled.Theargumentwasabout
whetherlanguagewaseitherofhumanorofgodlyorigin.Inthesecondpart
Appendix
197
of the treatise Herder deals with the question of the relationship between
history,societyandlanguage. AccordingtoHerdera specific languageleads
toaspecificworldview.Andbecausetherearemanylanguagesintheworld
thishasledtodifferentcultures.“Eachnationhasitsownstore of such
thoughtswhichhavebecomesigns,thisisitsnationallanguage: a store to
whichfor centuriesthey havecarried (...) the thoughts ofan entirepeople”
(Herder1984:76).WilhelmvonHumboldtfollowedHerder’sidea:“Through
the mutual dependence of thoughts and words on one another it becomes
absolutelyclearthatlanguagesarenotactuallyameanforshowingthetruth
whichhasalreadybeenrecognised,butfarmore,todiscoverthatwhichhas
notyetbeenrecognised.Thedifferenceisnotoneofsoundandsignsbutofa
diversityofworldviews”(Humboldt1963:262;seealsoTrabant2007).73
ThisideaofHerderandHumboldtisthenlaterdevelopedfurtherbyEdward
Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf (cf. summarised Hunt & Agnoli 1991; Hunt
73 The idea that language is crucial for the worldviews people hold seems also to be the
basic assumption in sociological thinking. AlfredSchütz, Peter L. Berger and Thomas
LuckmannhavetakenHumboldt’sideathathumanbeings’perceptionofandadaptionto
the world is conveyed by language and have developed a theory of language‐based
constructionofsociety.Everyoneisbornintoaworldwhichalreadyexists.He/shelearns
inthiscommunityhowtomasteramultitudeofsituations.Schützcallsthisunquestioned
knowledge as “recipe knowledge” (Schütz 1955/2003a: 122). At the same term each
personisbornintoaspecificlanguagecommunity.Theexistinglanguageisnotaneutral
mediumofcommunication.Itstructurestheknowledgeaboutsociety,thusaffectingthe
construction of social reality. “The existent languageis a system of existing experience
schemasthatderivefromtheidealisationandanonymisationoftheimmediatesubjective
experience. These typifications of experience which are removed from subjectivity are
sociallyobjective, wherebythey become asocietal given‘apriori’”(Schütz&Luckmann
2003:318). These typifications of experienceare largely mediatedbylanguage (Schütz
1972: 63f.). Thus, for example, the “Du” and the “Sie” in German mark the difference
betweentheprivateandthepublicspheres.Forexample,thejargon of the individual
sciencesrepresentsa linguistic objectivity which prescribestothepersonsactingin the
fieldhowtheyshouldbehave.Therefore,languagehasapowerwhichendowsknowledge
andreality(Berger&Luckmann1969/1987:163).Itispreciselythisideathatknowledge
about society is substantially knowledge which is mediated by language and that
typifications are linguistic normalisationswhich the authors express repeatedly. Alfred
Schütz has illustrated the great effectiveness of the typification of experience and its
dependenceonlanguageforthepurposesofcopingwithdailylifewith theexample of
strangers(Schütz1972).Forthosepeoplewhohavemovedfromonesocietytoanother,
thetypifiedexperienceswhichtheyhavealreadylearnednolongercount.Theynolonger
havethe knowledge which allowthem to typify situations.Theyno longer either know
thehorizonofmeaningconnectedtocertainwordsandsentencesnortheconnotationsof
wordsinwhichpastexperiencesarestored(Schütz1972:64).Preciselythispervasionof
languageandworldlyexperiencemakesitsodifficultforthestrangers to get their
bearingsin thenewsociety,simplybecausejustlearningthe newwordsandsyntaxofa
new language is never enough. To this day the theory of the linguistic construction of
realityisthedominantideainphenomenologicalsociology.
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
198
2001).Thebasicthesisstatesthatthenativelanguagewhichwehavelearned
byspeakingdeterminesourthoughtandthecognitiverepresentationofthe
world.Accordingly,itisassumedthatdifferentlanguageslead to different
viewsof the world.Edward Sapir (1921)departed fromthe thesis thatthe
linguistic categories were a necessary prerequisite of the world view.
Somethingthatcannotbeprovidedforbylanguagecannotbeperceived.
Thisradicalviewoftherelationshipoflanguageandcognitiverepresentation
hasbeen,accordingtoHunt(2001:8320),falsifiedbypsychologicalresearch,
since there are more than enough examples which show that people even
without the appropriate linguistic categories are able to categorise in a
differentiatedmanner.Apopularexampleintheresearchisthe analysisof
colour perception (cf. Berlin & Kay 1999). Hunt (2001) reports onastudy
whichwascarriedoutwithanethnicgroupinNewGuinea,theDani. The
members of this group possess onlytwolinguisticcategoriesto describe
colour,namelylightanddark.Nevertheless,thepeopleareabletodiscerna
numberofdifferentcolours.
IncomparisontohisteacherSapir,BenjaminLeeWhorf(1956)developeda
more moderate thesis on the relation between language and cognitive
representation,inasmuchashestartsfromthepremisethatlanguage
influences but not determines thought. His examples refer, among other
things,toFranzBoas’example,whichhasbeentakenoverandfrequently
quotedintheliteratureofthemanywordswhichtheEskimos use for snow
andtheanalysisoftheideasoftheHopiIndiansregardingspaceandtime.74
There is now much empirical evidence to support the correctnessofthis
moderate thesis. Three examples should be mentioned very briefly (cf. the
presentation in Hunt & Agnoli 1991; Hunt 2001; for further examples cf.
Werlen 2002; Boroditsky 2003, 2011; Nunner‐Winkler 2011; cf. also the
contributionsinGumperz&Levinson1996):
74 OfficiallyEskimoshavefourwordsforsnow:aput(snowonthe ground), qana (falling
snow),piqsirpoq(driftingsnow)andqimuqsuq(snowdrift)(cf.Werlen2002:385).
Appendix
199
(a)InSpanishtherearetwodifferentversionsoftheverb“tobe”.Whilethe
verb“ser”isusedtodescribethingswhichonealwayshas,theverb“estar”is
usedforthose thingswhichonehas temporarily. Onesays,for example“Yo
soyunhombre”(Iamaman),but“Estoyenmiofficinal”(Iaminmyoffice).
Thiswayofexpressingdifferentiationslinguistically,whichexistsneitherin
GermannorinEnglish,enablesSpanishchildrentodifferentiatebetweenthe
permanentandthetemporaryqualitiesofobjects;anabilitywhichchildren,
inwhoselanguagesthiswayofdifferentiatinglinguisticallydoesnotexist,do
nothavetothesamedegree.
(b)Therearelanguagesinwhichthewordsfornumbersareconsecutively
conjugated. This is not true for German and English, for instance. The
numbers“eleven”and“twelve”haveaspecialstatusinasmuchastheyarenot
compoundwordsof“ten”plus“one”or“ten”plus“two”.Onlyafter the
numbersthirteenandfourteenthenamesofnumbersarecompoundwords.
Mandarinisdifferent.Studieshaveshownthatpupilsinwhoselanguagethe
laynumbersdonotfollowinaconsecutivelylogicallinguisticmannerhave
moreproblemsinmathswiththenumericalorderwiththe“non‐logically
derived” names of numbers than pupils in whose language the numerical
sequenceiscompletelylogical.HuntandAgnoli(1991)interpret these
findingsasanexampleofthefactthatthelinguisticcategoriesofthoughtare
hereinfluencingtheonesthatareoperatingmathematically.
(c)Inmanylanguagesthere isadifferencebetweenstateand nation.While
the concept of the state denotes the political administration and the
governmentofacountry,theconceptofnationreferstoculturalunityofa
society.InChinesethereisnolinguisticdifferencebetweenstateandnation.
This non‐existent differentiation in the language has led to considerable
misunderstandingsbetweenthePeople’sRepublicofChinaandTaiwan.The
People’s Republic of China accepts the existence of two states and the fact
thatcooperationexistsbetweenthetwostates.Chinaclaims,however, that
thereisonlyoneChinesenationandthatTaiwanisapartofthatnation.The
fact that in Chinese there is no way to distinguish linguisticially between
state and nation has led to conflicts between the two countries. Hence the
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
200
People’s Republic reacted aggressively to Taiwan’s request thattherebea
twostatesolution,thinkingtheyweresuggestingatwonationsolution(Hunt
2001).
(2) Let us now look at the contra‐arguments to the idea of the linguistic
constructionofreality.TheWhorfhypothesishasbeencriticisedbyscholars
from the field of cognitive psychology. Accepting Noam Chomsky’s work,
JerryFodor(1975),inhismuchquotedmonograph,startsfromthepremise
that thought takes place in a special mental language (“mentalese”). This
mentallanguageisauniversalone,whichallpeoplepossess.Everyoperation
inthismentallanguagecanbetranslatedintoanaturallanguage.Afewyears
later Steven Pinker put forward arguments in a similar vein (1994) in his
essay “The Language Instinct”, which is based on a great deal of empirical
research.75Twoconclusionsresultfromthebasicassumptions:(a)Because
thoughtstakeplaceinaninnerlanguage, the influenceofnaturalspeechon
thoughtislow.(b)Everythingwhichpeopleexpressinaparticularnatural
language can essentially be translated into another language. In this
connection Hunt speaks of an “intertranslatability hypothesis” (Hunt 2001:
8320).Thisdoesnotmeanthattranslationiseasy.Frequently,onelanguage
doesnotpossessthewordwhichanotherlanguagegivestothesamethought.
Atthispointagreatdealofeffortgoesintowritingaroundthe idea or
describingit.Thegreateffortwhichtranslatinginvolvesshouldnot,however,
disabuseusoftheideathattranslationisnotinprinciplepossible.
If we interpret the abovementioned three examples in the light of this
assumptionfromcognitive psychologythen one canassumethat thereis in
factalanguageinfluence onthought,however, thisinfluenceis limited.The
difference between “ser” and “estar” in Spanish can be expressed by other
languages,even ifit isa bitmore complicatedand involvescircumlocution.
Thelinguisticallyillogical laynumbersinmany languagesmayhaveasmall
impactonnumeracy, thisimpact,however, willnotbe verygreat.The non‐
existenceofthedifferencebetweenstateandnationinMandarinmayleadto
75 Pinker(1994:55‐82)dealswithWhorf’sideasatmorelength.Inthelightofmorerecent
researchhecomestotheconclusionthatWhorf’sthesiscanberegardedasfalse.
Appendix
201
political irritations should the difference between the two concepts be
important. However, once the linguistic source of the irritation has been
realisedtheproblemcaneasilybesortedoutthroughcircumlocution.
EvenHunt,whoinactualfactisasupporterofWhorf’shypothesis,saysatthe
endofhissurveyoftheliteratureontheeffectoflanguageonperceptionsof
theworld:“Theeffectsaregenerallyrathersmall,buttheyoccureverydaya
speakeruseslanguage.Whetherornotlanguageexertsanimportantcontrol
onthoughtdependsuponhowonedefines‘important’”(Hunt2001:8324).If
onetriestospecify“important”moreclosely,onecomestotheconclusion
thattheinfluenceoflanguageontheconstructionofrealityisnotverylarge.
(a)Itmayberightthatinthedifferentlanguagestherearedifferentterms
whichlead todifferencesin cognitiverepresentation. Onecannot, however,
conclude from examples that world views are fundamentally different in
different languages. The linguistic differences must be compared to the
linguisticsimilarities.Ifonedoesthisbyusingadictionaryonewillseethat
therearewordsfor mostthingsin theworldinthe differentlanguages,the
overlapbetweenlanguage andtheworld indifferentlanguages istherefore
relativelyhigh.
(b)Inthosecasesforwhichthisisnottruethesamecontentcanusuallybe
describedbycircumlocution.If in onelanguagethereisnospecial wordfor
thedifferenttypesofsnow,thenonecandescribethesnowwithotherwords
(“dry”, “wet”, etc.). The differencesinvocabularyonlymeanthat in one
languagetherearehigherlinguistictransactionscosts–meaningthatonehas
tousemorecircumlocutions–not,however,thatitistotallyimpossible.
(c)Thefeasibledifferencesbetweendistinctlanguagesdependonthefamily
similarityofthelanguages.Themoresimilarthelanguagesare,thelesslikely
itisthattherewillbedifferencesinworldviews.Whorfhimselfhasindicated
thatthe“standardaverageEuropeanlanguages”haveamoreorlesssimilar
history and therefore will not be very much different from one another in
theircognitiverepresentationofthe world (cf.inthiscontextWerlen2002:
384).Thiswasoneofthereasonswhyhechoselanguageswhichbelongedto
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
202
anentirelydifferentlanguagefamily,forinstance,theHopilanguage,inorder
tosupporthisthesis.Thelanguageswhichareatthecentreofouranalysisall
belongtothesamelanguagefamily.Inaworldinwhichweareincreasingly
interwoven with each other the experiences of human beings will become
ever more similar and the differences between different language
communitieseverless.
(d)Finally, onecan assumethat the differencesbetween variouslanguages
depend on the field which the languages are referring to. Mathematical
derivatives can probably be translated into all the languages in the world,
becausetheorderofthesymbolsandthemeaningassociatedwiththemare
perfectlyclear.Inprivatelifeorinliterature(inparticularpoetry),whichdo
not allow a speaker to use long circumscriptions in order to express
something for which there is no word in one of the languages, it might be
moredifficult.Ifthereisnowordforspecialfactsandcircumstances (like
“Heimat” or “Weltschmerz” in German) then this cannot be said directly,
maybenotevenfeltorthought.
Allinall,theseremarkswereintendedtoshowthattheassumptionthatthe
constructionofsocialrealityisalinguisticoneandalsodifferentaccordingto
each language is not sustainable. It may be the right way to describe the
exception,butnottherule.Thispointisimportantwhenitcomes to the
normativequestionofwhatagoodlanguagepolicyshouldbelike.Oneofthe
central arguments brought forward against the introduction of acentral
language or a linguafranca, emphasises the point that not only the other
languages,butalsothecultureofthespeakersoftheselanguages,wouldbe
threatened.If,however,languageandculturearenotascloselyboundtoone
anotherastheliteratureassumes,thenthishasconsequencesforthepolitical
conclusionsinregardtolanguage.
Appendix
203
AppendixB:DescriptionofVariables
Variable Values Description Datasource
Foreign
language
proficiency
0=none
1=one
2=two
3=threeor
more
numberofforeign
languagesin
whichapersonis
abletohavea
conversation,due
toself‐
assessment
EB63.4
English
proficiency
0=no
1=yes
abilitytohavea
conversationin
English–self‐
assessment
EB63.4
Multilingual
country
0=no
1=yes
countrywith
morethanone
officiallanguage
Prevalenceof
nativelanguage
0%to100%
shareofEU
population
speakingthe
languageas
foreignoras
nativelanguage
EB63.4
Linguistic
distance
0=verylow
1=low
2=high
3=veryhigh
linguisticdistance
betweennative
languageand
Englishaccording
totheaffiliation
tothesame
familyof
languages
http://www.ethnol
ogue.com
Countrysize 0,399to82,5
populationin
million
Eurostat
Acountry’s
levelof
modernization
0,805to0,956
<0.87=low
0,87‐0,939=
middle
≥0,94=high
Human
Development
Index2004:gross
domesticproduct,
lifeexpectancy,
literacyrate,
enrolmentratio;
metricallyand
categoricallyused
http://hdr.undp.org
/en/statistics
FROMBABELTOBRUSSELS
204
National
educational
expenditure
1436to8093
<3700=low
3700‐6299=
middle
≥6300=high
educational
expenditureper
yearandstudent
inEuroPPS;
metricallyand
categorically
used;for
multivariate
analysisin1000
EuroPPS
Eurostat
Ex‐socialist
country
0=no
1=yes
country
classification
accordingtothe
situationof1989
Age 15to97 ageoftheperson
inyears
EB63.4
Classfractions ineachcase
0=no
1=yes
dummyvariables
for(a)
professionals,(b)
higherand
middle
management,(c)
entrepreneurs,
self‐employed,
(d)skilled
workers,white
collar(e)
unskilledworkers
EB63.4
Institutionalize
dcultural
capital
14‐25
≤15=low
16–20=
middle
≥21=high
ageattheendof
theeducationin
years,max.25
years;metrically
andcategorically
used
EB63.4
Identification
withcountry
1=verystrong
2=fairly
strong
3=notvery
strong
4=notstrong
aperson’s
identification
withthecountry
ofresidence
EB63.4
Identification
withcountry,
regionandcity
1to10
1=notstrong
10=very
strong
additiveindex–
theperson’s
identification
withcity,region
andcountryof
EB63.4
Appendix
205
residence;
metricallyand
categoricallyused
Countryof
birth
0=inthe
countrywhere
respondentis
nowliving
1=different
country
thepersons’
countryofbirth
EB63.4
Parents‘
countryof
birth
0=bothinthe
countrythe
respondentis
nowliving
1=atleastone
parentin
another
country
theparents’
countryofbirth
EB63.4
206
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