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Middle Class at a Crossroads
Lucie Tungul et al.
Printed by ©Jutty, Přerov, 2019.
This is a joint publication of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Konrad-Adenauer-
-Stiftung, and TOPAZ. This publication receives funding from the European Parliament. The Wilfried
Martens Centre for European Studies, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, TOPAZ and the European Parliament
assume no responsibility for facts or opinions expressed in this publication or any subsequent use of the
information contained therein. Sole responsibility lies on the author of the publication.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known to or hereafter invented, including photocopying
and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without the permission in writing of the
copyright owner except for personal use.
Contact:
©TOPAZ
Opletalova 1603/57
11000 Praha 1
Czechia
For more information please visit: http://www.top-az.eu/home/
The processing of the publication was concluded in September 2019.
Authors: ©Alena Zemplinerová, Aleš Kudrnáč, Eoin Drea, Jakub Charvát, Jana Šimanová,
Jaroslav Poláček, Lenka Sojková, Lucie Tungul, Markéta Škodová, Pavel Maškarinec,
Tomáš Dvořák
Reviewed by: Ladislav Cabada, Metropolitan University Prague
Arjen Siegmann, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
ISBN 978-80-88350-01-9
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Contents
Project partners.......................................................................................................................................4
Contributors ............................................................................................................................................ 5
Abstracts .................................................................................................................................................. 8
Foreword ................................................................................................................................................ 10
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................12
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 14
Social Class, Political Attitudes and Media Consumption ................................................................24
Entrepreneurs as Members of the Middle Class ................................................................................43
The Middle Class and Changes in Voting Behaviour ........................................................................61
A Life Less Ordinary? The Middle in This Age of Discontent ..........................................................73
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................79
Literature ............................................................................................................................................... 89
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Project partners
TOPAZ was established in 2012 as an educational platform and think tank associated with the
political party TOP 09. Its goal is to open up discussion with the public concerning conservative ideas.
Its main activities are focused on social debates with independent experts, cooperation with TOP 09
expert committees, fundraising, presentation of alternative views on the work of public authorities and
preparation of analytical and conceptual policy documents suggesting alternative answers.
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) is a German political foundation closely associated with the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU). At home as well as abroad, the civic education and dialogue
programs aim at promoting freedom and liberty, peace and justice. Primary concerns are strengthening
representative democracy, promoting European integration, expanding transatlantic relations and
increasing development cooperation.
The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (WMCES) was established in 2007 as the
political foundation and ofcial think tank of the European People’s Party (EPP). The Martens Centre
has four main goals: advancing centre-right thought, contributing to the formulation of EU and national
policies, serving as a framework for national political foundations and academics and stimulating public
debate about the EU. It promotes a pan-European mind-set based on centre-right, Christian-Democrat,
conservative and like-minded political values.
- 4 - - 5 -
Contributors
Alena Zemplinerová is professor of economics at Anglo American University. She studied at Princeton
University, WWS of Public and International Affairs. She has managed and participated in projects
funded by the OECD, the EU, the World Bank and Czech Science Foundation (GAČR), which focused
on the restructuralisation of businesses, FDI and small entrepreneurship. She wrote and co-authored
numerous academic publications, articles and books. She is a member of the editorial board of Politická
ekonomie (Political economy) and the magazine Transfer.
Aleš Kudrnáč is a political scientist currently working at the Department of Sociology at Umeå
University in Sweden, where his research focuses on political attitudes and behaviour of young people.
He has published academic articles in Czech and international indexed journals (e.g. Party Politics,
Political Studies, Journal of Youth Studies, Sociologický časopis). During his work at the Sociological
Institute of the Czech Academy of Science, he participated in a Czech household panel survey entitled
Proměny české společnosti 2015–2018 [Changes in Czech Society 2015-2018].
Dr. Eoin Drea is senior research ofcer at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies in Brussels,
Belgium. He is currently working on a pan-European middle class project focused on issues related to
gender equality, childcare and tax reform. His opinion pieces have appeared in media outlets such as The
Guardian, Politico and The Irish Times.
Jakub Charvát works at the Metropolitan University Prague and Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in
Ústí nad Labem. His research interests include election analyses, politics of electoral reforms, political
communication, and analysis of Central European contemporary politics and history. He has published
a number of academic articles in these areas; he wrote several monographs including Politika volebních
reforem v eské republice po roce 1989 [The Politics of Electoral Reform in Czechia after 1989] (2013)
and Evropské volby v proměnách času: politika volebních reforem EU [European Elections over Time:
Politics of EU Electoral Reforms] (2018); and has co-authored several anthologies.
Jana Šimanová is currently assistant professor at the Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics
at Technical University of Liberec. She is a member of several applied research project teams processing
data from public authorities. Her areas of research include regional development, international trade and
application of mathematical and statistical methods in economics. She has written four monographs and
over 20 academic articles in these areas.
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Jaroslav Poláček graduated in journalism and mass communication at the Faculty of Social Sciences of
Charles University, Prague. He worked for KDU-ČSL from 2001 and as TOP 09 election manager (until
2016) and as deputy secretary general (until 2018). He works as senior analyst at TOPAZ and founded
PRodukujeme agency, which focuses on political marketing. As the chairman of the TOP 09 expert
committee on information and communication technologies, he was responsible for its IT programme
and published several articles in this area. He was a member of the Czech Government Council
for Information Society and co-authored the books Internet nejen pro historiky [The Internet, Not Only
for Historians] and Mezinárodní marketing a informační technologie: vybrané kapitoly [International
Marketing and Information Technologies: Selected Topics].
Lenka Sojková graduated from University of Economics, Prague, and completed her PhD at the Faculty
of Arts of Charles University, Prague. She is assistant professor at the Department of Economics,
Faculty of Economics at Technical University of Liberec. Her research areas include economic theory,
European integration, economic policy, and regional disparities with a special emphasis on their impact
on the labour market. She has co-authored a number of academic monographs, e.g. Hospodářský rozvoj
regionů [Economic Development of Regions] (2013), Vliv decentralizace na ekonomickou výkonnost a
efektivnost v regionech EU [The Impact of Decentralisation on Economic Performance and Efciency in
the EU regions] (2012), Hospodářská krize [The Economic Crisis] (2010), Východiska z krize [Emerging
from the Crisis] (2011).
Lucie Tungul graduated from Miami University, Ohio (international relations), and Palacky University
in Olomouc (politics and European studies). Her areas of interest are European integration with a special
focus on Europeanization, democratization, EU decision-making processes, Euroscepticism, migration
processes and identity discourses. She is currently the Head of Research at TOPAZ and assistant professor
at the Department of Politics and Social Sciences, at the Faculty of Law, Palacky University, Olomouc.
Markéta Škodová graduated from media studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University,
Prague. She worked at the Sociological Institute of the Czech Academy of Science and the Institute of
Czech Language and Theory of Communication at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University. She was
editor-in-chief of the magazine Naše společnost [Our Society] and editor of the magazine Mediální studia
[Media Studies]. Her main areas of interest are sociology of the media, public opinion, and political and
persuasive communication; she has also published in these areas. She taught at the Faculty of Arts of
Charles University, Academy of Performing Arts in Prague, and Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles
University. She is currently working at the Department of Media Studies at Metropolitan University
Prague.
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Pavel Maškarinec works at the Faculty of Arts of Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem.
His areas of research include electoral behaviour, spatial analysis of voting, political representation of
women and quality of democracy. He has published many academic articles on these topics in both
Czech and international indexed journals. He is the author of the monographs Kvalita demokracie v
Mongolsku [The Quality of Democracy in Mongolia] (2019), Volební geograe Libereckého kraje 1992–
2010: Voličské chování z pohledu explorační prostorové analýzy dat (ESDA) [The Electoral Geography
of the Liberec Region 1992-2010: Electoral Behaviour in Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis] (2014) and
co-authored several anthologies.
Tomáš Dvořák majored in sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, where
he is currently employed. His focuses on political sociology and methodology of empirical research. His
research areas include direct democracy, changes in political values, populism, and development of the
party systems in Czechia and abroad.
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Abstracts
Social Class, Political Attitudes and Media Consumption
The objective of the chapter is to introduce the concept of the middle class and determine if there is a link
between unequal living conditions, selected social world-views and media consumption. The chapter
is primarily concerned with the position of the middle class as a fundamental section of society. We
used a questionnaire survey (TOPAZ, WMCES and KAS 2019) to compare the attitudes and behaviour.
The results indicate that attitudes to political topics are very similar for the middle and upper classes.
The lower class is, in comparison, more dissatised, suspicious and sceptical. The lower class is also
less interested in politics and less likely to vote. The interest in politics is the only attitude where the
middle class and lower class are more alike. Another exception is the attitude to election turnout, which
increases with class. Our media consumption analysis found no signicant differences across classes in
frequency of watching TV and surng the Internet. We found differences in watching of news coverage,
which is most often consumed by the upper class, signicantly more so than by the lower and middle
classes.
Entrepreneurs as Members of the Middle Class
Small entrepreneurs are a signicant and growing segment of the middle class in Czechia. The chapter
rst describes the structure, the role and evolutional tendencies of entrepreneurs and the small and
middle-sized enterprises in the economy and society including their attitude towards the single market of
the European Union. It also analyses the relationship between entrepreneur earnings and electoral results
at the level of municipalities and city districts. Apart from the fact that there is a positive relationship
between the revenues of individuals and the electoral results of centre-right parties, and a negative
correlation between the revenues from entrepreneurship and the electoral results of centre-left parties,
the analysis comes to rather surprising conclusions. The last part of the chapter discusses the labour
market changes in the context of digitalization and industry 4.0. While the employment rate of highly
qualied professions has increased, the employment rate of the traditional middle class, where a range
of professions are routine and therefore replaceable by computers or robots, has decreased. Creative
and dynamic individuals capable of independent and critical thinking will assert themselves even more
which will lead to higher demands on education levels. At the end of the chapter, the recommendations
of the relevant policy leading to the development of entrepreneurship and the development of the middle
class in Czech society are described.
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The Middle Class and Changes in Voting Behaviour
The last three parliamentary elections have been interpreted as electoral or political earthquakes. The
chapter focuses on the question of how these earthquakes changed Czech politics with a special emphasis
on the changing electoral behaviour of the middle class. The most striking manifestations of this change
have been the erosion of established parties and the emergence of new parties, whose success has had
a signicant link to their ability to mobilize economic, ethnic and political grievances. ANO 2011
beneted the most from the changes in electoral support because it managed to effectively mobilize the
economic, political and partially also ethnic grievances. The successful strategy of ANO 2011 led to its
highest electoral support among a large section of middle class voters, which can be observed across its
individual segments as dened in the TOPAZ, WMCES and KAS survey (2019). The only exception is
the liberal young digital elite that has a preference for the Pirates over ANO 2011.
A Life Less Ordinary? The Middle in This Age of Discontent
The early decades of the twentieth century were primed as a golden age for Europe’s middle classes.
Higher levels of education, rapid technological advance and increased globalisation should have
delivered an economic environment based on long term growth. However, the global crises since 2007
have amplied a feeling of discontent among the “middle” sections of society. In this context, the case of
Czechia is consistent with the broader sentiment of middle class disenchantment evident around Europe.
However, Czechia, as a newer member of the EU with strong economic growth, also highlights that this
age of insecurity is not driven solely by economics, or by a perceived East versus West divide. Rather, it
reects an increased polarisation between perceived “winners” and “losers” in society. For centre-right
political parties the key challenge is to re-establish the aspirational nature of a middle class lifestyle.
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Foreword
Mikuláš Dzurinda, President of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies
and Prime Minister of Slovakia (1998-2006)
Two years ago, the European Union commemorated the sixtieth anniversary of the successful European
integration and cooperation project. This year, we will commemorate the thirtieth anniversary following
the events that led to the collapse of communism and made it possible for the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe to be included in the European Community. These milestones undoubtedly conrm the
uniqueness of European integration and the successful transformation of nearly half of the continent
from communism to a market economy, democracy and rule of law. In the European Union, we have
become richer and freer, living in a world safer than ever before in our history.
Since we are no longer isolated from the rest of the world, as we were during the time of communism, the
turbulent development outside Europe touches us inherently and affects our daily lives. While writing
this introduction, we still do not know how the United Kingdom will leave the EU, and we are preparing
for the worst scenario. It is the rst time that a member state has left the EU, and we suspect that it can
have disastrous consequences, especially economically, if no agreement is reached. In addition, after a
long-term transatlantic alliance with the United Stated, the EU now faces politics of protectionism and
isolationism as reected in trade wars. Additional geopolitical challenges, such as the permanent threat
of Russia, this time much more sophisticated than during the Cold War, and long-term instability in the
Middle East, require our permanent vigilance. Finally, climate change and the massive refugee crisis
have suddenly provided new challenges that change our lives and which will shape the consequent
nature of the EU.
All these current developments create societal pressures and have some impact on the middle class,
the backbone of our economies. Whether it is globalization and rapid development of technologies that
replace human labour with articial intelligence, uneven social conditions, or the degree of digitalization
and job opportunities within the EU, these factors often burden the most the middle class. We often hear
about the end of the middle class caused by the widening gap between the poor and the rich. While the
OECD still conrms the presence of the large middle class in the Central and Eastern European region,
the dynamics are changing as a result of the fact that our countries are already included in the larger
union and the trends of the western world are quickly entering our market. As with any other problem,
there are solutions for preventing this trend.
Based on my own experience, I consider creating and maintaining a motivated business environment
and supporting education, science and research as key issues. The main tools for achieving such an
environment, in my view, include low direct taxes, a exible labour market and a fair social system.
Obviously, creating such an environment is not an isolated process that can be torn out of the context of
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complex structural reforms. This process is directly linked to a number of other reforms in the sectors
of health care, education and social welfare, which are important for the nal success. Only such an
environment will be able to provide suitable conditions for work, education and raising children.
I believe that this book will contribute to our better understanding of the trends affecting the middle class,
but it will also encourage politicians to undertake the necessary changes. It will require cooperation on
all levels, and it is also an opportunity for each member state to contribute to the prosperous home
environment and ultimately to motivate the EU as a whole. Additionally, the announcement of a
designated President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, can accelerate the changes
because her main priorities for the upcoming period include support for small businesses, equal job
opportunities for men and women as well as a fair tax system.
- 12 -
Abbreviations
AfD Alternative for Germany
CE Corporate Entities
CMT Critical Media Theory
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index
CR Czech Republic
CVVM Public Opinion Research Centre
ČSP Czech Pirate Party
ČSSD Czech Social Democratic Party
ČSSZ Czech Social Security Administration
ČSP Czech Pirate Party
ČSÚ Czech Statistical Ofce
EC European Commission
EP European Parliament
EPP European People’s Party
EU European Union
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFŘ General Financial Directorate
GDP Gross National Product
GNI Gross National Income
KDU-ČSL Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party
KSČM Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
LCA Latent Class Analysis
LFS Labour Force Survey
MCD Multidimensional Correspondence Analysis
MPO Ministry of Industry and Trade
ODA Civic Democratic Alliance
ODS Civic Democratic Party
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS Ordinary Least Squares Regression
PI Private Individuals
PE Private Entrepreneurs
PNS Party System Nationalization Score
SEP Self-Employed Persons
SMEs Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SPD Freedom and Direct Democracy
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STAN Mayors and Independents
TL Trade Licenses
UK United Kingdom
US Freedom Union
US-DEU Freedom Union – Democratic Union
VV Public Affairs
- 14 -
Introduction
Lucie Tungul and Tomáš Dvořák
The middle class and its connection with various different social phenomena and their impact on our
society is a very complex topic that requires an interdisciplinary approach when attempting to capture
the individual aspects and inuences. The term “middle class” is used in everyday speech by many
politicians and journalists and is traditionally associated with centre-right politics, the assumption
being that the middle class, as the guarantee of stability and prosperity, lies at the very heart of liberal
democracy. The denition has changed over time, however, due to social and economic developments,
this being reected, among other things, by the changing political map. The technological development
of past decades, the introduction of Industry 4.0, European integration and new global challenges such
as migration and climate change modify the way people engage in the world around. There is an increase
in individualism, while condence in the ability of national and supranational democratic institutions
to solve their problems effectively is decreasing. Young people and their parents feel that education and
stable employment may not guarantee better lifestyle than previous generations. There is a growing
willingness, however, to engage in public life outside established institutions, with new technologies
bringing people together online all over the world, increasing the possibility of global democratic
participation.
Being in the virtual world brings numerous threats and opportunities to redene own identity and
understand own culture. Active citizenship, often associated with the middle class, is an instrument of
the possible struggle against the democratic decit and low transparency of the decision-making process,
this being the issue dealt with in the post-socialist countries whose middle class was forcibly liquidated by
the socialist regime. A gradual process of recovery occurred after the non-democratic regimes collapsed.
The recovery process should have been relatively fast. Prior to its stabilization, the societies undergoing
a turbulent transformation and Europeanization had to cope with the new challenges of a technological
information revolution which changed the economic and social indicators of the middle class but also
had a major impact on the media environment. This resulted in the destabilization of the political and
party-based systems which have not yet managed to establish themselves properly.
This book aims to dene the concept of the Czech middle class. It also intends to analyse and evaluate its
economic, social and political aspects in the local as well as wider European contexts. The class structure
of the Czech society was determined based on data obtained in a questionnaire survey followed by a
sociological, economic and political analysis of selected phenomena associated with the current Czech
middle class. The ndings were subsequently placed into the context of the development of the middle
class in the European Union. In the following section, we will introduce the design and methodology of
the survey, as well as its main ndings.
- 15 -
Design of the Analysis
Data collection and analysis were performed by NMS Market Research. The process of data collection
took place between 6 and 17 March 2019, using the sample of the on-line population in the Czech
National Panel (N=980), and in the form of personal interviews with those who do not use Internet
(N=291). The total size of the sample was N=1271. We addressed a representative sample according to
gender, age (over 18), size of place of residence and region. The sample was weighted according to the
representative structure of gender, age, education, region, size of place of residence, electoral behaviour
in the 2017 parliamentary elections and according to Internet usage. The detailed structure of the sample
is provided in Annex 1.
Methodology of the Analysis
The analysis is aimed at describing the class structure in Czechia in terms of different types of capital:
economic, social and cultural. The size and structure of the individual types of capital then made it
possible to describe the positions in the class hierarchy at the level of individuals. Working with three
dimensions of capital was a key element of the analysis, meaning that the position in the class hierarchy
is not determined by a single dimension, but may be somewhat ambiguous.
The methodology used in the analysis was based on the approach of Mike Savage (Savage et al. 2013)
who analysed the class structure of the United Kingdom (UK). Savage worked with three dimensions
of capital: economic, social and cultural. Savage operationalized economic capital on the basis of total
household income, total household savings and the value of owned real estate (or properties). He viewed
these three variable-indicators as manifestations of economic capital. Social capital was measured on
the basis of the amount of contacts people have in different professions with varying prestige. Mike
Savage et al. (2013) measured it according to the scale comparing the prestige of individual occupations
with which people had active contacts. The total social capital thus expressed the degree of prestige of
the network of social contacts related to individual respondents. Mike Savage also took into account the
total number of social contacts. The measurement of cultural capital was inspired by Pierre Bourdieu
(1984) and by distinction between “high” and “popular” culture (Bourdieu 1984). Mike Savage et al.
(2013) investigated the different dimensions of cultural capital using a multidimensional correspondence
analysis (MCD). They inductively identied the factor corresponding to the ndings of Bourdieu (1984):
classical cultural capital distinguishing between high and low culture. They also identied the second
dimension that described the emerging digital capital. Cultural capital was thus measured on the basis of
these two factors. All of the above-mentioned variables were then used as the foundation for the analysis
of latent classes, on the basis of which the authors described the class structure of the UK.
The analysis for Czechia was consistent with the procedures of Savage et al. (2013). As with the authors of
the British study, we worked with three types of capital: social, economic and cultural. The methodology
- 16 -
has been simplied, however, due to limitation in the scope of research. In the case of social capital, we
worked with the amount/intensity of contacts, meaning the width of social networks. Mike Savage et
al. (2013) distinguished between the prestige of the contacts and examined more than 30 contacts. Our
analysis used - due to scope limitation - only 5 professions with high prestige, and the examination of the
scope of social capital in this segment is equal to Savage’s dimension of contact quality.
Regarding cultural capital, the factor analysis was used to reduce the battery of questions that measured
interest in a variety of cultural and leisure activities. These were the rst two factors used for further
analysis. The rst one was called traditional, the second digital. The results thus generally correspond to
those of the British research (Savage et al. 2013: 226-227). In comparison with the results from the UK,
the difference is that the rst factor captures cultural capital in general, not only high cultural capital. This
difference can be attributed to the fact that the cultural capital in the Czech environment did not seem
to be as strongly differentiated as in other Western European countries (France, United Kingdom, etc.).
The second factor was clearly associated with the digital environment. Regarding the economic capital,
our analysis evaluated the income and total wealth of the households. To reduce the amount of missing
values, the missing incomes were supplemented according to the educational level, while the missing
values related to wealth were recoded to the middle category. All the variables were distinguished to low,
medium and high levels, meaning the low, medium and high levels of a particular type of capital.
The latent class analysis (LCA) method was used to describe the class structure. This is an inductive and
explorative method. Thus, the form of the resulting latent classes is based on the nature of the data, not
on a predetermined deductive scheme. The aim is to nd unobserved latent classes that can be identied
according to the variables observed (Muthén and Muthén 2009). Latent classes are identied on the
basis of manifest variables, meaning the basis of the above-mentioned indicators of economic, cultural
and social capitals. When applying the latent class method, one should rst determine the number of
classes. Therefore, the model for one latent class was calculated rst and then other classes were added.
For models with various number of latent classes, we compared their quality and adequacy based on the
data used. According to information criteria, there was a preference for models with 6 or 7 classes. The
LCA analysis was performed in poLCA package (2013) in R software (see Annex 2).
Denition of the Middle Class1
The denition of the middle class was also a key part of the analysis. It is not easily dened in the
multidimensional view of the class structure. Pure economic delimitations, using the boundaries as 75-
200% of median income (Vaughan-Whitehead 2016), are unusable in Czechia, because they include into
the middle class respondents with very low cultural and social capital and people with net income of
1 Similar class structure methodology but with more detailed descriptions of social, human, and cultural capital was used
by Daniel Prokop, Tomáš Dvořák, Martin Buchtík, Paulína Tabery and Matouš Pilnáček in a survey titled eská společnost
po 30 letech [Czech Society 30 Years Later] (N=4039) prepared for the Czech Radio Broadcasting Service in 2019.
- 17 -
about CZK 23 thousand per month whose household may suffer from poverty, especially if facing high
mandatory housing costs. Mike Savage (2013) found two segments in British society that he directly
called the middle class - i.e., the traditional middle class (25% of the UK population) and the technical
middle class (6% of the UK population). Both segments were characterized by above-average amounts
of all types of capital, although unlike the elite, they did not reach the highest values for all capital types
combined (Savage et al. 2013). Our denition of the middle class was based on this narrower denition
of a group sharing above-average capital type scores. Respondents who were in the 50 to 90 percentile
of the average social, economic and cultural capital and who were also not in the lower quantile of
population in any of the capital types have been dened herein. This denition leads to designation of
34% of the population which can be described as middle class (see Annex 3).2 This book is based on this
denition unless otherwise stated.3
Status and Attitude Segmentation
It was therefore possible to divide the population according to the standard of living (status segmentation)
and social status (attitude segmentation), knowing that these variables were interconnected. It was
also possible to subsequently measure the proportion of the middle class in individual segments. Both
segmentations are discussed in more detail below.4
Status Segmentation
Status segmentation depends on position in the social structure, based on the division of society by
status. This latent class model is based on the social, economic and cultural dimensions. The status
segmentation consists of seven groups: Young digital elite, Wealthy professionals, Traditional middle
class, Skilled workers, Urban poor, Working class and Low class (for the proportion of all ve types of
capital for all groups, see Graph 1).
2 An alternative denition considered was that respondents must be in the 40 to 90 percentile of all capitals. This denition
is also disadvantageous, however, as it is more sensitive to operationalization of the measurement of the capitals examined. It
limits the respondents who have one of the capitals temporarily lower but can soon acquire/exchange it due to the signicant
amount of other capitals (students from wealthy families). It is the exchange and mutual transformation of capital that is at
the core of the Bourdieu theory (1984) on which Savage’s analysis and our analysis are based.
3 In the chapter called “Entrepreneurs as Members of the Middle Class” Zemplinerová et al. discuss among other issues the
electoral preferences of small entrepreneurs. Their analysis at the municipal level presents the results of their own correlation
data analysis based on data from the Czech Statistical Ofce and the Czech Social Security Administration. The planned
analysis of the Czech household incomes could not be performed because the available data are from the years 2011-2013
and are now of limited relevance. The current data will not be available until autumn 2019, that is after the completion of
this book. It was therefore not possible to carry out an overall economic analysis of the middle class. It will be dealt with in
a separate book in our future research.
4 Status and attitude segmentations in this book were primarily dealt with in the chapter by Jakub Charvát and Pavel
Maškarinec, in the section dealing with party-like preferences and middle-class electoral behaviour.
- 18 -
Graph 1: Division of Classes According to the Total Size of Capital and Its Structure
Source: TOPAZ, WMCES and KAS 2019.
The upper class consists of the Young digital elite and Wealthy professionals. The middle class is
represented by the Traditional middle class, while Urban poor and Working class are on the border line
between the middle and lower classes, depending on the type of capital (see Table 1).
- 19 -
Table 1: Class Structure in Czechia Divided into Seven Classes (% of Population)
Source: TOPAZ, WMCES and KAS 2019.
The Young digital elite typically has a university degree, is younger (especially 25 to 34 years old) and
represents an emerging group. It achieves high social and digital capital, but also attains high results in
economic capital (while its traditional cultural capital is rather low). Although the Young digital elite has
high incomes, its members tend to be less wealthy. In contrast, the Wealthy professionals are wealthy
and represent the traditional elite. They have high incomes and possess high cultural capital, and also
attain high values in other types of capital, apart from that digital capital. Representatives of this group
are spread evenly across all generations, more frequently receiving a university education.
The Upper middle class, which achieves lower values of economic capital compared to the elite, is
represented by the traditional middle class which manifests reasonable values of economic, social and
digital capital, and which also displays the highest values of cultural capital among all the classes.
Members of the Traditional middle class are moderately wealthy, mostly middle-aged (35-44) with a
secondary education. Skilled workers have high social capital and are relatively nancially secured,
- 20 -
although they have rather low incomes. They are close to the Traditional middle class regarding the
amount of social contacts and property but have a much lower cultural capital and similarly have a very
low digital capital. This group mainly includes people over 45 years of age living in medium-sized or
small towns, with the vast majority of the Skilled workers having achieved a secondary level of education
(more than half of them without the school leaving exam). The Urban poor has an average digital capital
and income, they are not wealthy, and their social capital is low. They mostly live in Prague or in large
cities, tend to be young (25 to 44 years old), are often families with children and have mostly attained a
completed secondary education.
The Working class has very low income, often due to economic inactivity. Despite the low income,
however, Working class has relatively good assets and their social capital is also at average levels
(manifesting below-average values for other capitals). These are mostly older people (65+ years) living
in towns, but also younger people living in villages, typically with a secondary education. Finally, the
Low class typically has above-average digital capital, but is below the average values in other capitals,
having only little chance of improvement in the future. They are spread across all age groups and are
characterized by the lowest level of education (primary or secondary without the school leaving exam),
compared to other classes.
Attitude Segmentation
Attitude segmentation is based on the opinions and attitudes of the Czech population (worldview, public
life, international politics and globalization, electoral behaviour, electoral preferences and experience
with economic stressors). There are 6 segments identied in the attitude segmentation: Politically passive,
Young liberals, Ageing authoritarians, Defenders, Tested workers and the Ambivalent. Each segment
differs in political attitudes, electoral activity, and economic stressors but also in age and education
levels (for methodology, see Annex 4). The middle-class representatives can be found in all segments,
but most among the Ambivalent, Young liberals, Tested workers and Defenders (see Graph 2).
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Graph 2: Attitude Segmentation and the Middle Class
Source: TOPAZ, WMCES and KAS 2019.
The Politically passive are not satised with social development but feel endangered by migrants;
they have nationalistic and anti-European attitudes. Only 39% of them believe that Czechia belongs
to the West and only 21% of them consider the EU benecial. They do not trust politicians, show little
interest in politics and do not vote regularly. Women predominate in this group and representatives
of the youngest generation of 18 to 24 years are missing. Tested workers are the most affected by
economic stressors yet are fairly satised with the post-1989 development; they trust politicians and
are politically active. They do not tend to support authoritarianism, oppose nationalism and they also do
not perceive migration as a threat. They are interested in international events and believe that Czechia
belongs with the western countries (67%) and most of them consider the EU benecial (59%). Ageing
authoritarians are interested in politics but see it rather critically and tend not to trust politicians; their
willingness to vote is not particularly high. This group mostly includes the older generation (55+ years
of age) who are rather conservative, materialistic and nationalistic, and therefore against migrants. They
nevertheless consider the EU benecial (69%) and think that Czechia belongs with western countries
(78%). Defenders attain a lower education and are affected by economic stressors, being less wealthy
and having a lower social status. They are most often middle-aged (35 to 54 years), are characterized
by strong nationalistic feelings, are anti-European and strongly against migration. They do not trust
politicians, are not very active in elections and are inclined to populism. Their attitudes to the benets
of EU membership (18%) and to the question of whether Czechia belongs with western countries (41%)
are closest to the Politically passive, but they fear migration and migrants much more.
- 22 -
The Ambivalent are quite satised with social development, are politically active and therefore interested
in voting. They are represented the most in the middle-aged group (35 to 44 years), with the generation
of the youngest voters (18 to 24 years) also signicantly represented here. The Ambivalent are relatively
well secured by property, identify themselves with the centre-right and perceive migrants as a potential
threat to their way of life. Regarding other opinions, however, they are very ambivalent. They believe that
Czechia belongs with western countries (57%) and a thin majority perceive the EU as positive (51%).
Young liberals are rather young (18 to 34 years), hold university degrees and mostly live in Prague. They
earn higher incomes than people from the other segments, are satised with the social development of
the last 30 years and although they do not have positive views of politicians, they follow on domestic
and foreign political developments. Their attitudes are strongly liberal and pro-European, supporting aid
to migrants, rejecting authoritarianism, populism and nationalism. Their support for the statement that
the EU is benecial is the highest of all segments (84%), similarly to their belief that Czechia belongs
with western countries (79%).
Structure of the Book
Apart from the introduction and conclusion, the book is divided into four chapters. The rst three of
them gradually address the sociological, economic and political aspects of the middle class as dened by
the above-described survey. The fourth chapter puts these ndings into the European context of middle-
class research and its impact on the centre-right politics.
In the rst chapter “Social Class, Political Attitudes and Media Consumption”, Aleš Kudrnáč and
Markéta Škodová deal with the concept of the middle class and social stratication in their historical
and theoretical contexts, as related to the political and social attitudes. They deal with the position of the
middle class in the Czech society since the establishment of independent Czechoslovakia in 1918 up to the
present, its current state, ongoing changes, their reasons and consequences. They explain the complexity
of classifying the society into classes, including the strengths and weaknesses and further explain the
method of Mike Savage (2013) (see above). The authors describe the classication of opinions and
behaviour of the population according to social class in relation to social attitudes, economy, satisfaction
with life and political attitudes. They also address the issues of media use according to social classes and
the impact on media consumption.
In the following chapter “Entrepreneurs as Members of the Middle Class”, the authors Alena
Zemplinerová, Lenka Sojková and Jana Šimanová analyse the specic segment of small and medium-
sized enterprises in terms of their number, structure of activities and importance for the Czech economy.
They also focus on their perception of the European unied market, their political preferences and the
future challenges mainly to be brought about by digitalisation, including automation and robotization. In
the conclusion, they deal with policies that would help in the development of the middle class in business
and thus stabilize the Czech economy.
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In Chapter 3 entitled “Middle Class and Changes in Electoral Behaviour”, Jakub Charvát and Pavel
Maškarinec deal with the middle class from the perspective of political party system and the electoral
behaviour of the middle class segments, with a particular emphasis on the changes in the Czech party
system since 2010 and how it reected the changes in the Czech middle class structure. The chapter also
presents the electoral behaviour of the Czech middle class and places it in the context of mobilization of
economic, ethnic and political grievances that signicantly contributed to the accession of new party-
based entities after 2010.
Chapter 4 “Life Less Ordinary? The Middle in this Age of Discontent” by Eoin Drea puts the above-
mentioned ndings in the European context of discontent which, since 2007 has had a profound impact
on the middle class. The middle class has felt that it had lost much of its traditional certainty. The
chapter deals with the causes and consequences of increasing polarization between winners and losers
which corresponds to economic changes and also political and security factors. As shown in the previous
chapters, we witness the same development in Czechia. Drea discusses the problem of middle-class
dissatisfaction and its mistrust of the current system within the EU’s East-West division debate and in
the context of economic liberalization in the new member states, which failed to meet the expectations of
a speedy convergence between the lifestyles in the West and the East. Drea nally analyses the abilities
and possibilities of the centre-right parties to adequately respond to these feelings of dissatisfaction and
the risk of their voters moving over to the populists.
Our book identies the common problems but also acknowledges specic national trends that need to
be known and respected when designing and implementing individual specic short-term and long-
term strategies that would strengthen the political, economic and social stability of Czech society.
The presentation of this phenomenon in the European context also provides an opportunity to work
together at the EU level looking for appropriate answers and solutions that would support the stability
of the national and European political institutions, the economic order and society as a whole without
sacricing individual prosperity and satisfaction.
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Social Class, Political Attitudes and Media Consumption
Aleš Kudrnáč and Markéta Škodová
Introduction
In every age and society, there are inequalities between people. Inequalities are mainly due to people’s
differences in their property, acquaintances, or cultural background. This issue is mainly dealt with
by economists and social scientists within the framework of social stratication research. Their main
theme in this area is the emergence of inequalities and their impact on society. A large degree of social
stratication is perceived as an undesirable phenomenon, which causes tensions in society. In order to
talk about inequalities in society more easily, the social class concept is used.
The basic idea of a social class is that people belonging to the same group (class) are more similar in their
resources than people from other groups. Resources are not only economic but also social, cultural and
symbolic. Social stratication can be simply dened as inequalities in life chances and living conditions
between different social classes. These inequalities are closely related and often complementary. They
are differentiated, however, in their analyses. The analysis of social mobility deals with the research of
inequality of life chances, while the class analysis is focused on inequality of living conditions. In this
chapter, we deal with the question of how unequal living conditions are related to people’s social and
political attitudes. As the title of the paper suggests, the focus will be on the middle class. We have to
deal with the middle class, however, in the context of the other classes, and for this reason we need to
rst clarify the concept of social class and the way of measuring it.
In sociology, few concepts have received as much attention and discussion about its meaning and way
of measurement as the concept of social class. There is still no agreement on its denition or on the
method of its measurement. Certain authors (e.g. Beck 1986; Bourdieu 1998) consider social class to be
an articially created concept which is detached from reality and rejects the notion that the division of
society, according to social classes, signicantly affects the way of life and people’s opinions. For other
authors (Matějů 1998; Večerník 2010; Savage 2015), the social class concept was and still is a very useful
way of explaining differences in society, for instance, as concerns life satisfaction, electoral behaviour,
choice of media, health, etc. “The discussion can be basically characterised as a dispute over whether
classes in advanced capitalism are at least potential collectivities (if their representatives have a common
interest which they may or may not be aware of), or if classical classes today are rather social categories”
(Šanderová 1995: 62).
It was Karl Marx who, with his idea of class struggle, in all probability contributed the most to the
general knowledge of the term social class. Marx identied the poor proletariat without resources, on
the one hand, and the bourgeoisie abounding with resources, on the other, as the main classes. His ideal
was a classless society, and this was what the Czechoslovak Communist Party sought to achieve through
the equalisation of the middle class. Be it for political or economic reasons, the strength and role of the
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middle class in Czech society has changed over time. Today, the middle class is considered a vital part of
society and the engine of the economy and is therefore the central theme of this book.
After a brief introduction to the middle- class concept, this chapter will focus on the values and political
attitudes of the current Czech middle class and whether these attitudes differ across other classes of
society. We will also deal with the question of what attention this part of society pays to the media and
political reports.
The Position of the Middle Class in Society
Most reections on the history of the middle class, its importance, and position in society begin
with Aristotle. In his Politics (Book 4), Aristotle states that there are three classes of citizens in all
municipalities – very afuent, very poor and the middle class. Aristotle is a supporter of a strong middle
class, because “the [middle class representative] is the most likely to listen to reason, while a beautiful
or extremely strong or very rich man and a man who is very poor or extremely weak, or one who has
absolutely no honour, does not listen to reason for they become somewhat rebellious and bad people in
important things” (Kříž 1998: 153). Aristotle argues for the middle class as a group that is hardworking
and does not want to hold ofces. The middle class is not pampered and disobedient like the rich or as
subdued as the poor, and this makes the middle class most suitable for the municipality administration.
According to Aristotle, a strong middle class is a guarantee of democracy because it has the greatest
interest in democracy. Where one has very much and the other has nothing, disagreements arise and
there is a risk of tyranny (Kříž 1998).
If we look shortly at Czech history, it is apparent that, since the eighteenth century, Czech society has had
a relatively strong middle class. This was due to a strong layer of peasants and city bourgeoisie, as well
as the decline of the aristocracy after the battle of White Mountain. The middle class remained strong
during the First Republic. Although Tomáš G. Masaryk emphasised the role of the workers in particular,
he meant the attributes of the middle class (Večerník 2010). The decline of the middle class began
during World War II. Occupying Germany was not interested in a strong middle class full of domestic
intelligence, but in a mass of workers who would keep the war industry running and blindly serve the
needs of the Third Reich.
After 1945, the fascists were replaced by communists, but the trend of suppression of the middle class
continued. The communists put promising (ideologically correct) careerists in higher and managerial
positions, not the intelligentsia. Since 1948, one can speak of a targeted effort to destroy the middle class
in the spirit of Soviet social engineering. Tradesmen, farmers, intelligentsia, and other middle-class
leaders were to become part of the working class, which would be dominated by career communists,
whose middle-class origins were only to a disadvantage. While in Czechoslovakia, the emphasis was
on heavy industry, in Western countries, business and services developed to support the growth of
the middle class. For Czechoslovak Communists, however, the existence of the middle class was not
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desirable. The property of its representatives was conscated, and they were often forced to change
their jobs from qualied to unqualied ones. An equally important goal was not to talk about the middle
class positively. The middle class was described as bourgeoisie and thus stigmatised as an enemy of the
socialist system.
The change in the situation of the middle class came about along with the change of the regime in 1989.
Its renewal was due to the end of the persecution of the original middle-class representatives (the so-
called “old middle class”) and the transition to a market economy, which allowed private business and a
focus on services. Another important factor was the opening up of Czechoslovakia and later the Czechia
to the Western world. Access to new information, processes, and technologies allowed people with
higher qualications to develop. Due to the fall of the communist regime, values in both the economy
and society shifted (Večerník 1997).
After 1989, there was an awakening of the middle class, which had been suppressed by the previous
regime, and efforts of other Czech inhabitants to become part of the middle class become apparent.
Conditions for the emergence and development of the middle class were far from ideal, however, in the
1990s. The transformation policy focused primarily on privatisation and ensuring favourable conditions
for business development was not a priority. The old middle-class property restitution and transformation
was slow in some areas. Priority was given to the nancial sector over public services (Večerník 2010).
Looking at the current state of affairs, it seems that we would also agree with Aristotle at present. The
middle class is essential for economic growth and social reconciliation. According to the OECD report,
business activities in countries with more middle-class households have a positive effect on the growth of
GDP. In this respect, a strong middle class is an appropriate environment to support SMEs and to develop
a strong business sector (OECD 2010). The economic argument is unambiguous – economic growth is
stronger in countries where the middle class is strongly represented (Brueckner et al. 2018). The middle class
invests in their education and in the education of their children, thereby providing society with sufcient
human capital (Brown and Hunter 2004). It is not just, however, the motivation to educate themselves and
their children. The middle class also invests in health, housing, quality public services, is less tolerant of
corruption, and generally contributes to the development of society through its activities (OECD 2019).
Who Is the Middle Class?
We have been talking thus far about the middle class as a relatively vague part of society that is “in the
middle”, i.e., neither poor nor rich. This was possible mainly because the overall organisation of society
was clearer in the past. Nevertheless, there was a change over time. The reasons can be found in the
differences in the orientation of the economy, the labour market, technology and access to education.
Today, many jobs, such as plumbers who have traditionally been part of the working (lower) class,
despite reaching a lower level of education, have higher incomes than, for example, teachers, who we
would call traditional middle-class representatives.
- 27 -
The basic question is: Who is the representative of the middle class today? If we ask the people themselves,
about two thirds of people in the OECD countries identify themselves as part of the middle class (OECD
2019). People who should not fall there by objective standards also often identify themselves as belonging
to the middle class. This is partly because low-income people perceive the middle class lower and wealthier
people higher (Reeves 2017). According to the ndings of Petr Matějů from the 1990s, subjective social
class membership is more important for political attitudes and electoral preferences than the objective
inclusion in this group. Matějů (1998) argues that people become members of a given class only when
they subjectively identify with it. Večerník (2010) also views the middle class as a “state of mind”, which
predetermines the self-classication of the individual in the imaginary social hierarchy.
When speaking about the objective aspects of belonging to the middle class, the question is, of course,
what these objective aspects are. There are many approaches to the denition of the middle class, which
often vary by subject, but the focus will only be on two approaches – income and sociological. Income
is crucial for class determination, and many economic analyses use income to determine a social class
exclusively. The OECD prefers, for example, to talk about lower, middle, and higher income classes
rather than marking a particular class directly. It denes the middle class, or middle-income class, as
households with income ranging from 75% to 200% of the median income. People with income below
75% of the median belong to the low-income class, and people with income above 200% of the median
are considered as belonging to the higher-income class. Recent OECD data show that, for a Czech family
of four members to be included in the middle-income category, the family’s net income would have
to be between CZK 28,686 and CZK 76,495 (OECD 2019). This category includes 71% of the Czech
population.5 Such a large scale is due to the fact that a comparable standard of living in smaller municipalities
is possible with lower incomes than in larger cities, but also because the middle class is dened so broadly.
Nevertheless, the question is whether we can still talk about the same group of population.
While income is not only important for the determination of social class for economists but also for
professionals in other elds, additional approaches take into account that income is not everything, and
that the prestige of the profession, cultural capital, and acquaintances are also important. As a rule,
sociologists do not determine class based on observed data, but determine the membership of the social
class on the basis of a theory (e.g. Bláha 1937; Havelka 2002; Večerník 2010). The basic assumption is
that resources and constraints in society are not a coincidence but are related to the class structure of the
society. For this reason, similar behaviour and similar views on politics and life within particular social
classes should be observed.
How do sociologists classify somebody, however, as belonging to a certain class? First, they dene
class structure based on sociological theories and then create empirically measurable criteria that divide
people into respective classes. Tomáš Katrňák (2005: 35) states that two questions are essential for class
5 23% belong to the category of the low-income class and 6% belong to the high-income class according to the data and
method of the OECD.
- 28 -
analysis: 1) Which criteria will be used to determine the class positions? And why exactly are these
criteria chosen?; and 2) Who belongs to which social class? And why to this one? It sounds relatively
simple, but because different sociologists answer these questions differently, there are more possibilities
for dening classes and assigning people to them. This chapter does not intend to discuss critically and
in detail the concept and measurement of a social class, as it would be necessary to write an entire book
on this. We want, however, to provide the reader with a brief explanation of how people are assigned to
classes and why it is possible to observe some inconsistencies in the number of classes and even in their
different numbers or names in various publications.
In this section, we work with an approach described in detail in the introduction to this publication, based
on the work of the popular sociologist Michael Savage. He based his method of operationalisation on a
large questionnaire survey and a large number of in-depth interviews with the British. His method of
operationalisation is described in detail in his publications (Savage et al. 2013, 2015). In our chapter, we do
not follow his seven groups (classes), but we do adhere to his logic and method of measurement to delimit
the classical hierarchy of the lower, middle and upper classes. The basic principle of his measurement is
that, in addition to income, i.e., economic capital, he takes into account social and cultural capital, which
is closest to the original concept of Pierre Bourdieu (1986), according to whom the position of a person
in the social space is given by his or her economic, social, and cultural or symbolic capital. In terms
of having these capitals, some authors classify as the middle class, for example, those individuals who
have either only cultural capital (routine experts and “white collars”) or have economic capital but lack
cultural (independent small entrepreneurs, self-employed) (quoted according to Večerník 2010).
In this regard, the role of the mass media, which is related to cultural capital, cannot be overlooked.
Like the modern theory of social stratication, the theory and research of mass media goes back to the
late nineteenth century, when the importance of the media as a social and political actor had grown
signicantly and where the adjective “mass” had become a reality for this area of communication. It was
the very existence of modern society and all its characteristics and manifestations that enabled it to spread
information to a large, disparate, widely dispersed – thus mass – audience. Since then, researchers have
focused on describing media effects, audiences, systems and content. Numerous media surveys or public
opinion surveys mainly include audience development of individual media types (press, television, radio,
Internet) or citizens’ trust in specic channels/titles or their content (news).
Among the most important roles of the media in modern societies is their position as a mediator between
political power and citizens. The media provide their audiences with information on what is happening
in various spheres of politics, help to shape public opinion, the ideological setting of individuals and their
electoral behaviour. The most important and sometimes the only source of information is communication
through the media since it often mediates events that are beyond the direct experience of the majority of
society members (Škodová 2013) and is therefore one of the key platforms of shared social and political
knowledge as it (re)constructs and determines the public sphere of the national state (Curran et al. 2009).
- 29 -
Therefore, media audiences can always be understood as political audiences and a way of perceiving and
reading (especially political) news as one of the indicators of a more general relation to politics (Macek
2015). This relationship also lies in the research focus of social stratication, which, however, as will be
shown below, does not work with the knowledge of media communication theory in more detail.
In the following empirical subchapters, we will focus on the relationship between the social class and
political attitudes and media monitoring. Using data from the spring 2019 questionnaire survey, our aim
is to demonstrate, based on several charts and pivot tables, whether classifying opinions and behaviour
in society according to social class is still a useful way of thinking about Czech society.
Social Class and Social Attitudes
The main assumption is that class positions are related to attitudes and values. Just as people in the
same group are similar in their position in society, they can be expected to share the same concerns and
preferences. These concerns or preferences may be affected by domestic and global events, and people
in the same class are expected to be affected by these events in a similar way. One of the visible recent
examples is the situation of the housing market.
Home ownership was one of the main features of the middle class. The economic crisis and rising
property prices have led to a situation when achieving home ownership and thus middle-class status is
often an unattainable goal for today’s 30s and younger generations. Housing is crucial in this respect as
it represents the largest part of middle-class expenditure. The rising cost of housing, services and goods
mean that the middle class have difculty saving money and often spend more than they earn (OECD
2019: 25). Another factor is potential job insecurity due to upcoming automation and robotization.
According to OECD (2019), automation in Czechia is not only a threat to the low-income group, which
is the most vulnerable, but also to 15% of the middle class.
For younger generations, it is and will be much more difcult to attain the middle-class level than it was
for their parents. It is almost unthinkable at present that a middle-class household would sufce with the
income of one of the household members, as it was before. Even with the employment of both partners,
the middle-class level is difcult to be attained for a large part of society. The economic stagnation of the
middle class subsequently inuences social attitudes and politics.
The dissatisfaction of the middle class or of those who would like to belong to the middle class encourages
the emergence of populist and nationalist movements. Discontent, disillusionment from political
developments, distrust of political gures and polarisation are often the unpleasant consequences of a
problematic middle-class situation.
The economic situation is only one of the possible causes of changes and differences in middle class
political attitudes and behaviour. In this chapter, our goal is not to investigate the causes of the differences
in attitudes, but to discover whether the differences in attitudes and media consumption still exist with
regard to social class membership.
- 30 -
Firstly, we are interested in the extent to which a social class, based on the theory described in the
introduction of the book, coincides with the subjective position of the respondents. Overall, 43% of
respondents chose the mean value (4) in the survey. 38% of respondents chose the value 1–3, i.e., lower
than the center, and 19% of respondents identify with a higher position in society. Graph 1 demonstrates
the difference between self-identication with social status and objectively determined social class
according to theory.
Graph 1 Social Class (Subjective Position of the Respondents)
“Think about yourself - where on a scale from 1 to 7 would
you place yourself according to your social status“
5% 12% 31% 40% 10% 1%1%
1% 7% 20% 46% 23% 3%1%
2% 11% 51% 26% 8% 2%
1 = lowest rank 2 3 4 5 6 7 = highest rank
Note: N= 1271, weighted data.
In all classes, the strongest identication with the centre of society can be observed. Although the positive
link between self-determination of status and the identied social class is evident, disagreements can
be observed such as 13% of the upper-class respondents who feel part of the lower-class, and the same
proportion of the lower-class respondents identied as part of the higher-class.
- 31 -
Attitudes to the Economy
The connection between social class and attitudes to the economy has been known for a long time. This
is due, among other things, to the fact that income is one of the important indicators of measuring social
status. Higher taxes and stronger redistribution of funds would mostly affect the higher class, which is
most often in opposition to these state policies. This conclusion can also be drawn from the available
data. While over 72% of the lower-class representatives agree with progressive taxation, in the upper
class it is only 58% of respondents and a lower proportion of positive answers (53%) can be found in
the middle class. The structure of the middle-class responses is more similar to the upper-class responses
than to the ones of the lower class. Of particular importance is the fact that almost the same proportion
of middle class (41%) and higher class (40%) disagree with progressive taxes.
Graph 2 Agreement with Property Redistribution by Social Class
“The rich should pay more taxes from their income and possessions.“
Agree Tend to agree Tend to disagree Disagree
41% 31% 15% 7%
27% 26% 30% 11%
27% 31% 2 7% 13%
Note: N= 1271, weighted data.
Attitudes to economic issues also include labour market insecurity. Specically, concern about the
emerging automation industry was identied. 61% of all respondents feel the threat of job loss due to
- 32 -
the advent of higher automation and robotics. Although half of the middle-class representatives (52%)
are seriously concerned about their employment due to automation, 45% do not consider the risk to
be serious, and 4% have no opinion on this issue. Although according to OECD (2019: 29), the lower
class (19%) is the most vulnerable with regard to automation in Czechia, followed by the middle class
(15%) and then by the upper class (9%), these data do not match the perceived threat. The middle class
together with the upper class can be described as having the least perceived fear of losing their jobs
due to automation because 44% of the upper class, 52% of middle class and 70% of the lower-class
respondents are seriously concerned. Approximately half of middle and upper class but only one fourth
of lower-class respondents expressed disagreement with the fear of losing work due to automation.
Graph 3 Perceived Fear of Losing Employment by Social Class
“How relevant to you is the loss of work posions due to rise
of higher automaon and robocs?“
17% 27% 43% 9%
34% 36% 20% 5%
19% 33% 35% 10 %
Very relevant Quite relevan t Quite irrelevan t Very irrelevan t
Note: N= 1271, weighted data.
The lower level of concern about automation in the middle class is in all probability due to the higher
proportion of sole traders in this class. Table 1 presents the proportions of consent that automation
- 33 -
is denitely or rather a serious threat to employment according to social class classication by three
selected employee groups. The greatest concern is among private sector employees. In the middle class,
a decrease of more than 20% can be observed if the respondent is a public sector employee or sole trader.
Table 1 Perceived Fear of Losing Employment by Selected Employment Categories and Social Class
Lower class Middle class Upper class
Employee in private sector 75% 61% 44%
Employee in public sector 76% 40% 37%
Self-employed 65% 38% 50%
Note: N=738, weighted data. Other employment status types not presented here: Temporary job; Working without a labour
agreement; Student; Stay-at-home, Parental leave; Unemployed; Other)“.
Satisfaction with Life and Society
Belonging to a social class is related to living standards. The theoretical assumption that higher economic,
social, cultural and symbolic capital will be related to higher satisfaction with life and state of society is
also conrmed in Czechia. Given the history of the middle class before 1989 and the rapid development
of the market economy after 1989, it can be assumed that the representatives of the “old” middle class
may not be satised with the development of the society after the fall of communism in November 1989.
Again, satisfaction can be expected by the upper class as they have probably been mostly successful over
the past 30 years.
- 34 -
Graph 4 Life Satisfaction by Social Class
“I am sasfied with my state of life“
Note: N= 1271, weighted data.
As regards the level of satisfaction with life and satisfaction with the development of society after
November 1989, a link can be observed between social class and expressed satisfaction (see Graph 5).
- 35 -
Graph 5 Satisfaction with Societal Developments after 1989, by Social Class
“I am sasfied with society‘s evoluon aer November 1989“
Note: N= 1271, weighted data.
Although the differences are not particularly big, a lower level of satisfaction is evident in the lower
class. It also appears that the middle and upper classes are very similar in these respects. If we count
together the categories I decisively and somewhat agree that I am satised, then, in the aspect of life, the
upper and middle class have expressed satisfaction in 86% of cases. Among the lower-class respondents,
79% of the respondents are satised. The same can be said about satisfaction with the development of
society after 1989. Satisfaction was expressed by 45% of the upper class and 43% of the middle-class
respondents. In the lower class, 36% of respondents expressed being satised with the development of
society after the fall of communism.
Political Attitudes
The link between political attitudes and social class is a very traditional way of explaining the differences
in behaviour and attitudes in society. In his book from 1981, Lipset describes how the middle class tends
- 36 -
to be more conservative and likely to hold centre-right views but rejects extreme opinions. The dataset
we are working with in this chapter included questions on different attitudes: authoritarianism, political
condence, fear of cultural threats of immigration, fear of economic threats of immigration, attitude to
the EU, interest in politics and attitude to voter turnout. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, Table 2
presents only the degree of agreement with the particular statements. Consent is measured as the sum of
“denitely yes” and “rather yes” answers.
Table 2: Agreement with Statements by Social Class
Lower
class
Middle
class
Upper
class
O1 –authoritarianism
A strong leader is crucial for Czechia
- even if he/she does not always act
according to the established rules.
64% 51% 48%
O2 – trust
I do not trust the majority of political
institutions such as the Government or the
Parliament.
75% 64% 65%
O3 – immigration The Czech culture is strongly endangered
by immigrants. 63% 42% 48%
O4 – immigration Immigrants can endanger Czech economy
and welfare state. 81% 64% 63%
O5 – foreign countries I deem the European Union as benecial. 45% 59% 59%
O6 – interest in politics I follow our political scene and events
almost every day. 48% 53% 69%
O7 – behaviour Would you take part in the parliamentary
election if it were held today? 69% 87% 93%
O8 – behaviour Will you take part in the European
Parliament elections (May 24 - 25)? 57% 71% 82%
Note: N= 1271 for all questions, weighted data.
- 37 -
The rst question concerns the inclination to authoritarianism. About half of the middle- and upper-class
respondents would prefer a strong leader who will not always follow the established rules. In the lower
class, the proportion of positive answers is close to two thirds (66%). This position is likely to be related
to the distrust in existing political institutions such as the government and parliament. Political mistrust
is expressed by three quarters of the lower class and approximately two thirds of the upper and middle
class.
The other two questions concerned attitudes to immigration. Two questions were deliberately used since
one measure the fear of its threat to Czech culture and the other the fear of immigrants’ impact on
the Czech economy. The middle class (42%) is afraid of immigration as a threat to culture the least,
even 6 percentage points less than the upper class (48%). The lower class is worried about immigrants’
threat to culture to a higher degree (63%). Immigrants are perceived as an economic threat to a similar
extent by the middle and upper classes (63 and 64% respectively) while the lower class is again much
more sensitive (81% agree). The survey results also demonstrate that Czechs are more concerned about
the economic rather than the cultural impact of immigration. Irrespective of social class, their fear of
economic threat is 20 percent higher.
The fth question identied the differences in class attitudes towards the European Union; 6 out of 10
middle-class and upper-class respondents perceived the EU as benecial. The lower class was slightly
more sceptical, given that less than half (45%) of the respondents were in favour of the EU. The last
three questions dealt with interest in politics. The rst measured the interest in politics expressed by the
frequency of following the domestic political developments, and the other two focused on voter turnout
in parliamentary elections and the 2019 European Parliament elections.
Although the middle class has been similar in its attitudes to the upper class thus far, it is not so as
concerns the interest in politics. When it comes to following the Czech political scene, the middle class
is more similar to the lower class (48% and 53%). The upper-class respondents are interested in the
current political situation almost daily, 7 out of 10. A comparison of classes, according to potential
and upcoming voter turnout, conrms the assumption that willingness to participate in elections will
increase with the higher social classes. If the elections to the Chamber of Deputies were held tomorrow,
the election turnout would be 69% for the lower class, 87% for the middle class and 93% for the upper
class. The upcoming EP elections (the survey was conducted in March 2019) demonstrated the same
pattern of behaviour, with the only difference that the general interest in voting in the EP elections was
considerably lower than in national elections. 57% of the lower class, 71% of the middle class and 82%
of the upper class were expected to vote in the EP elections. In general, the announced voter turnout is
overestimated, and the attitude to the turnout differs by about 20 percentage points from the actual voter
turnout.
- 38 -
The Middle Class and Media
For most Czechs, television is currently the main and primary source of information (about politics).
If they are interested or looking for other sources, they frequently turn to the Internet (Eurobarometer
2018). Radio (62%) and television (52%) are regarded as most trustworthy by Czech citizens. In this
respect, according to the Eurobarometer, we are not all that different from the EU28 average. More than
three fths (64%) of Czechs believe that the media is inuenced by political or commercial pressures,
while only a quarter (compared to 42% of the EU average) disagree with this statement. There is a broad
consensus on the sufcient diversity and plurality of views (60% agree), but there is still a large group of
those who consider that the Czech media do not provide a variety of views of speakers (Eurobarometer
2018). A somewhat different picture of the condence of Czech citizens in the media is provided by
ongoing public opinion research by the Public Opinion Research Centre. Although its analysts recorded a
rise in condence in television and radio and a decrease in condence in the Internet and press compared
to their previous survey in November 2018, 52% of respondents trust the radio, 44% trust television,
42% trust the Internet and 41% of Czechs trust printed media (Hanzlová 2019). The differences in the
surveys by the Public Opinion Research Centre and Eurobarometer can be due of course to different
formulation of questions and their placement in questionnaires.
There is no ongoing research on the differences in the evaluation and use of media and its content across
social classes in Czechia as social scientists do not work with the concept of social classes in their studies
devoted to mass media. We ignore the research inspired by critical media theory (CMT), which views the
media as a tool for realising the power interests of the ruling class: this includes texts framed by (critical)
political economy, cultural studies, (post)structuralism and critical social theory (see Taylor and Harris
2008).
In the eld of social stratication, contemporary Czech authors deal with selected and generally dened
types and contents of mass media most often within the saturation of the category of mass, or rather
low culture. “[...] a mass culture, which is close to a low culture, is represented by the products which
are produced for the widest possible consumer market. They are characterised by standardisation of
production and mass behaviour in their consumption” (Bayer et al. 2007: 28). In addition, “the afliation
to upper or middle class [...], together with high and university education, partially reduces the tendency
towards mass/low culture and increases participation in high culture” (Šafr 2008: 80). In Czechia, these
ideas are based on the concept of socio-economic status as multidimensional (Machonin 1970; Machonin,
Tuček et al. 1996; Tuček et al. 2003), in which one of its ve dimensions is a scale derived from the
individual’s leisure activities, related especially to high culture. Very marginally, the role of the media in
the theory and practice of social inequality and mobility is also noted by a contemporary representative
of the subject of class stratication Tomáš Katrňák (2004a, 2004b). Consequently, the conclusions of
important studies generally only suggest that the lower social classes tend to so-called low, mass culture
- 39 -
more often than the higher classes, but we do not take into account the problematic nature and variability
of the terms mass, low, and popular culture, and their different conceptualisations, especially by the
Birmingham School (Jansová 2016), which is dominant in the above-mentioned cultural studies.
A recent exception that works with the term “middle class” in describing the way in which media is
consumed – given only with regard to the specic content of the term itself, as it does not work with
“classic” social stratication conceptualisation – is one of the outputs of the Media Map project, which
is the result of cooperation between the Endowment Fund for Independent Journalism, the Department
of Media Studies and Journalism at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno, and the
subject of New Media Studies at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague. In their survey Czechs
and News (2018), the authors identied two basic groups of consumers of news content in their sample
of respondents (approx. 14 thousand respondents aged 15–79 years, year of data collection: 2016). In the
rst group, which was represented by a third of the research participants, there were people who did not
watch the news at all or minimally. The remaining two-thirds were divided into four groups: Grannies
with glasses, Mainstream satised parent, Tabloid readers and Consumers and Educated middle class.
According to the study, the latter group represents just a little over 20 percent of the Czech population
over 15 years of age, which has the highest incomes, a high level of education and lives mainly in large
cities. They are strong consumers of the Internet and the so-called reputable press, with a strong focus on
news. They tend to read all serious and news printed titles such as Lidové noviny, Hospodářské noviny,
Mladá fronta DNES, Deník, etc. and similarly prefer the public service media to the commercial media.
With the exception of tabloid themes, they are interested in all the topics above average.
As has already been mentioned, the data presented works with a different and predened denition of the
“middle class” category. The research only focused on how often people in the upper, middle, and lower
classes watch news and selected media types. Graph 6 shows that, as concerns news coverage from any
media source, the upper class is “a signicant leader” compared to the other two classes – nearly eight
out of ten members watch or read news on a daily basis. The differences between the middle and lower
classes in the daily consumption of news are not all that signicant; 65% and 64% watch news daily. In
a rough comparison, the research entitled Old and New Media in the Everyday Life of Czech Audiences
(Macek et al. 2015) indicated that 66% of Czechs read or watch the daily news, 90% of news consumers
watch (non-local) news on television, 46% read the news on the Internet, 28% read printed newspapers,
35% of people declare that they are interested in political news while watching, listening or reading the
news, 91% of them obtain information about politics from television and 51% from the Internet.
In our research, the most frequent television viewers can be found among the lower class, with 78% of
its representatives watching it daily, 11% several times a week. The differences in the declared television
viewers of the middle and upper classes are not so signicant: 67% and 66% watch television every day,
and 15% and 20% watch television several times a week. A similar situation exists in the answers to the
- 40 -
question about the time spent on the Internet; the upper and middle classes show similar values: 69% and
67% are online daily, 15% and 18% several times a week. In the lower class, the research found (with the
sum of “I watch daily” answers) a difference of about ten percentage points: 57% of its representatives
reported watching the Internet daily, 14% several times a week. Regarding the time spent specically on
social networks, there are no signicant differences between their regular/frequent users (daily or several
times a week) across classes. Differences can only be observed in the option “not watching at all” chosen
by more than a quarter (28%) of the lower class but compared to “only” 16% and 18% of upper- and
middle-class representatives.
Compared to other classes, the frequency of radio listening is higher with the upper class, with 57% of
people listening to the radio daily and 23% several times a week. The 46% of the middle class and 44%
of the lower class listen to the radio daily, while 22% and 16% listen several times a week.
- 41 -
Graph 6 Frequency of Using Media Sources by Social Class
Note: N= 1269, weighted data.
The results of the questionnaire survey demonstrate that the members of the Czech middle class are
relatively active consumers of news and mostly watch television and the Internet. At the same time,
however, there are no signicant differences in the frequency of television and Internet audience gures
across classes, but these appear in news coverage, in which the upper class “wins” over both others.
- 42 -
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to describe the concept of social class and compare the attitudes and behaviour
of people according to their class membership. A particular emphasis was placed on the position of the
middle class, which is historically regarded as an essential part of society. The denition of the middle
class involves not only income distribution or wealth, but also social and cultural capital, lifestyle,
chances and perspectives, and nally that the person declares himself or herself as belonging to the
middle class. The denition of the middle class is described well by Večerník’s (2010: 491) statement:
“Despite its schematic obviousness, the concept of the middle class is rather dim”.
Although the method of class determination varies according to the used theory, the available data, and the
researcher’s approach, class differences are still present in many aspects. Being born into a family with a
lower social status means a lower probability of reaching a middle or higher standard of living compared to
those who were lucky enough to grow up in a family with a middle or higher social status. What is changing,
however, are the clear differences in attitudes and behaviour according to class. Simply speaking, while
during the First Republic workers mostly voted social democracy and read Právo lidu and Večerní Právo
lidu (or Rudé právo issued by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), farmers voted for the Agrarian
party and read Venkov, there are no such obvious borderlines between these groups (classes) and no such
differences in attitudes and behaviour. Regarding the historical example, it is important to point out that
today, with some exceptions, political parties do not publish their own daily newspapers. Nevertheless, one
can say that, at present, all the classes follow media on a large scale (mainly television and the Internet),
with news being much more favoured by the upper class, which corresponds to their higher interest in
politics. About two-thirds of the middle and lower classes admit, however, daily news consumption. In the
other media topics studied, there is a mutual proximity of the upper and middle classes.
As regards their attitudes to political themes, the upper and middle classes showed similar response
patterns. Their attitudes were in slight contrast to the more dissatised, distrustful, and sceptical lower
class, who were less interested in politics and displayed less willingness to vote. Interest in politics
measured by following political events was the only question where the middle-class representatives
were more similar to the lower-class members. An exception to this was the attitude to voter turnout. The
percentage of afrmative responses to the question of voter turnout increased with class.
Especially in the case of the higher and middle classes, major differences cannot be found in their
view and evaluation of the world. Its existence, but at the same time the unclear outlines of this social
formation, which are reected in the attitudes and opinions of its members, is conrmed by the current
questionnaire survey. The question is to what extent the political sphere should treat the concept of
the middle class when formulating actual policies. Class stratication, however, is denitely one of
the cornerstones of the knowledge about the differences and inequalities between individual members
of society, which is basic for current reections in social sciences and in many debates in the public
(political and media) sphere.
- 43 -
Entrepreneurs as Members of the Middle Class
Alena Zemplinerová, Lenka Sojková and Jana Šimanová
Introduction
An important and growing segment of the middle class in Czechia consists of small entrepreneurs. They
are characterized by the fact that the source of their income and the income of their families and wealth
come from their own company. A key feature is that the entrepreneurs do not rely on the state and/or
large, multinational companies as employers but build on personal responsibility and a willingness to take
entrepreneurial risks which makes them independent in their decision-making (including voter preferences)
to a substantial degree. The middle class is primarily formed by small and medium enterprises and the
self-employed known as the “small and medium-sized” (SMEs) in the economic literature. In the rst
part of this chapter, we will describe the entrepreneurs from the point of view of their number, structure
and development tendencies. We will summarize the ndings in the economic literature concerning the
role of SMEs in the economy and their attitudes to the European single market. The objective of the next
part of this chapter is to contribute to the debate on middle class voter preferences represented by small
entrepreneurs and sole traders from the regional point of view. The third part of this chapter describes the
current changes in the structure of work and entrepreneurship in the context of ongoing digitalization.6
Finally, we will try to suggest recommendations concerning the relevant policy leading to the development
of entrepreneurship and the middle class in Czech society resulting in the stable growth of the economy.
The Importance, Structure and Role of the Entrepreneurial Sector in the Economy
Details on small enterprises and entrepreneurs are inevitably imprecise and their analysis difcult due to
their large numbers and relative instability – on average, only each third attempt to enter the market by the
new enterprise is successful. Moreover, the crisis or recession strikes the small enterprises most as large
companies usually survive the external shocks and are more stable. There is also a problem with their
statistical data; the distinction between the registered companies and the companies that are truly active is
essential. While an economist would talk about a company, even if such is formed by a single man being
the manager, owner and the one who works in it, legally, companies in Czechia are divided into private
entrepreneurs (PE) and corporate entities (CE).7 In addition, the self-employed persons (SEP) monitored
due to tax obligations, payments of social and pension security may carry on business as their full-time
employment or may carry out the business activities together with other employment. If one is to obtain,
6 The chapter was prepared within an institutional support of the long-term conceptual development of the Faculty
of Economics, Technical University of Liberec, in the framework of the project Excellent Research Teams – Regional
Development of the Czech Republic in the Context of the Onset of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
7 One can carry out business as a corporate entity or private individual (self-employed), this being regulated by the Trade
Licensing Act, which they are liable with all their assets. A corporate entity – regulated by the Commercial Code, ltd. or jsc.,
are liable up to an amount of the company assets only
- 44 -
however, a clear picture as to the number of the small entrepreneurs in the country and their structure, we
need to combine more statistical sources.
The Czech Statistical Ofce (ČSÚ) registered 2.86 million economic entities (companies – private individuals
and corporate entities) at the beginning of 2018. Only 51% of this number were active (ČSÚ 2018),8 i.e.,
half of the registered companies terminated their activities and some other never really started (the registry
is not updated). The vast majority of the registered companies are private entrepreneurs. According to the
Ministry of Industry and Trade (MPO), approximately 2 million entrepreneurs carrying on business as private
individuals called “sole traders”, were registered in the half of 2019 (see Table 1). Private individuals (PI)
or entrepreneurs who actually carry out the business activities, account for a mere half of the number total
of the registered entrepreneurs, i.e., around 1 million. In addition, slightly more than half of these active
entrepreneurs operate “full-time”, with the business activities as the main source of income. The second half
carries on business as well but, at the same time, they are employed with the state or with other companies
where they pay their social and pension insurance.
The Czech Social Security Administration (ČSSZ), which keeps the records of the self-employed to implement
the social insurance law and the employment policy, recorded an increase in actual self- employed entrepreneurs
by 20 thousand to 1.01 million in 2018. There is a need, however, to once again distinguish between those self-
employed “full-time” – 590 thousand entrepreneurs, i.e., “our” entrepreneurs or the small enterprises. Their
number grew by 8 thousand only while the “part-time” entrepreneurs amounted to 421 thousand (their number
grew much more – by 12 thousand) (Idnes.cz 2019). The number of sole traders has been growing for the
third year in a row in spite of the fact that Czechia has the highest number of self-employed per number of
inhabitants. The number of new corporate entities has been growing as well approaching 500 thousand.
Table 1 Number of Individual Entrepreneurs (Sole Traders) and Trade Licenses (TL)9
Sex Entrepreneurs Trade Licenses
Men 1,300,027 1,962,082
Women 740,720 973,258
Total in CZ 2,040,747 2,935,340
Source: MPO, data as of 2Q 2019
Note: Active and non-active entrepreneurs; some entrepreneurs (private individuals and corporate entities have multiple trade licenses)
Based on the EU denition, and according to the information of the Ministry of Industry and
Trade (MPO), the SMEs represent around 1 million economic entities in Czechia of which
8 Or Český statistický úřad, 2017. Statistická ročenka České republiky – 2017. 22 November 2017. [online]. Available at:
https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/12-organizacni-struktura-narodniho-hospodarstvi-pn1k17sw8m (4 September 2019).
9 As of the same date, 2.9 million trade licenses were issued – some entrepreneurs have multiple Tls.
- 45 -
more than half a million are the self-employed private individuals and nearly a half million
are corporate businesses. SMEs account for 99.8% of all the active taxable companies.
Growth of the entrepreneurial sector is conrmed by the Labour Force Survey of the Czech Statistical
Ofce. From 1993 to 2014, the overall number of entrepreneurs, including the helping family members,
increased by more than 440 thousand persons (see Table 2). This is two times more than in the rst
year of the Labour Force Survey. In contrast, the number of employees decreased by 340 thousand. The
number of people working on their account, i.e., the entrepreneurs without employees grew 2.3 times
against 1993 (by 385 thousand). Most entrepreneurs in Czechia (almost 60%) work in the construction
industry, commerce including motor vehicle repairs, professional, scientic and technical branches and
the processing industry. In the eld of real estate, for example, the entrepreneurs represent more than half
of the labour force, with every second person having the position of an entrepreneur in the professional,
scientic and technical branch or in the construction industry.
The Standard Labour Force Survey - LFS allows us to compare the structure of working people
based on their position in employment among all the member countries of the European Union.
If we compare the age group of 15 – 64-year-old entrepreneurs with and without employees (the
self-employed), not taking into account the number of helping family members, then certain
features specic for Czechia will manifest themselves: the share of the self-employed below 65 in
Czechia was one of the highest in the European Union; in 2014, it amounted to 14.4% total in the
EU while the share was 17% in Czechia. In contrast, the share of entrepreneurs with employees is
below average in Czechia. The difference, however, in relation to other countries is not all that big.
The fact that the involvement of the Czech population in entrepreneurship and self-employment is
higher is also conrmed by other studies (Dvouletý 2019). From the point of view of the labour market,
it is important to distinguish between the self-employed as private individuals having and not having
employees (see e.g. Večerník 2011). As is apparent in the following table, their development differs
substantially. While the share of entrepreneurs without employees continues to grow, the share of those
with employees has been decreasing.
- 46 -
Graph 1: Change in the Number of Entrepreneurs by Type of Employment (In Thousands, 1993-
2014).
Source: Czech Statistical Ofce, Labour Force Survey
As far as the role of the SMEs and/or entrepreneurs in the economy is concerned, the substantial thing
is that beginning entrepreneurs and small enterprises are exible and able to swiftly react to changes
on the market in contrast to large bureaucratic companies and they play a key role in the restructuring
of the economy and in the creation of added value. They play a major importance in the creation of
innovations and productivity growth. Thanks to the Internet and development of technologies, more and
more companies fall into the category of small and medium enterprises being important exporters. Small
and medium enterprises substantially participate in foreign trade with approximately 51% for the export
and approximately 56% for the import (MPO 2012).10 Most of the export goes to the single European
market. The objective of the European Union is free movement of goods, services, capital and persons
on the single internal market of the EU by removing technical, legal and administrative obstacles. Some
10 Another potential source of information might be the information of the Financial Administration of the Czech Republic
(FS ČR) (www.nancnisprava.cz) or the Customs Administration of the Czech Republic (CS ČR) (www.celnisprava.cz).
Entrepreneurs (with and without employees incl. helping family members
Entrepreneurs with employees
Entrepreneurs without employees
- 47 -
obstacles will still be present, however, on the single market, i.e., the standards and procedures in the
electronic trading in the respective EU countries or the rules of recognition of expert qualications. The
national markets of the EU member countries are far from being open to the competition in contrast to
what has been declared.
SMEs are important employers and new job creators. From the point of view of the entrepreneurs’
role on the labour market and from the point of view of the unemployment issues, the division into
the companies formed by individuals not with employees (who nevertheless often employ other self-
employed based on invoicing) and those with employees and addressing the obligations and regulations
related thereto is important. According to MPO data, SMEs have more than 1.8 million employees.
It is apparent that those two groups have differing expectations concerning the role of the state in the
economy. Only some of the entrepreneurs may benet from the European single market. We discuss the
labour market in more detail in the second part of the chapter.
New starting enterprises and growing small enterprises represent real or potential competition for large
companies dominating the market and having big market power. Over the last few decades, the market
concentration has been growing in the sense that a few large enterprises have an ever-increasing share in
the market (OECD 2018). In addition, the large enterprises, banks and/or multinational corporations are
connected to the public budget and ruling political parties, thanks to their political power and successful
lobbying, in the form of support, subsidies, tax reliefs, public contracts and regulatory legislation.
Multinational corporations, thanks to transfer prices and other policies, do not tax in the place where
they produce or provide services. The SMEs often end up subsidizing the small number of SMEs - their
competitors, which receive funding from the government’s SME support schemes - but also the large
corporations (Zemplinerová 2008).
The political choices of the entrepreneurs – including the voter preferences – are inuenced by state
policies (tax, regulatory, subsidies, etc.) and by strategies of large corporations trying to limit competition
using e.g. state subsidies or lobbying in the governmental and political structures in the sense of creating
obstacles for the entry of new competitors on the market. When considering the effects of subsidy
policies, we should remember that state subsidies and subventions are provided to only a limited number
of businesses and they distort the information and signals of the market, which could otherwise lead to
right business decisions. The one who got the calculation right loses. The one who received a subsidy
usually wins. The failure of the one who got the calculation right was not expected by many and the
intervention of the state in the form of free competition distortion spreads in a chain reaction to very far
areas of the economy. The market turns into a game played while knowing that an unexpected intervention
from above may come at any time and the cards of the market players shall suddenly be redistributed.
The reactions of the players include disgust from the game, withdrawal from the game, change of the
sports eld or acceptance of the game of subsidies (Zemplinerová 2006).
- 48 -
In spite of EU efforts to support SMEs, the programmes are often counter-productive. On the one hand,
the market opening may have an adverse effect on some traditional entrepreneurs, members of middle-
class society, while, on the other hand, it provides opportunities for entrepreneurs to use their knowledge,
capabilities and innovative approaches. In any case, the winners should be decided by the market and not
by state agencies and their programmes and subsidies.
Voter Preferences of Small Entrepreneurs – Analysis on the Municipality Level11
In addition to its importance for the state economy, small enterprises play an important role from the
social point of view, i.e., in the sense of positive external effects – a strong middle class with an important
entrepreneurial core contributes to the long-term stability of the political system and preservation and/
or enhancement of democracy. This view is based on empirical monitoring and scholarly works which
suggest that middle class members tend to have attitudes typical of the centre-right and reject extreme
political opinions both from the left and right wings of the political spectrum (Matějů 1998; Glassman
1997). The election result in stable developed economies is decided specically by the middle class
formed by a large part of the population in these countries.
Small sole traders, who actively carry on their trade full-time or part-time, account for approximately
12.1% of registered voters. The highest sole traders electoral base is in Prague with 16.84% followed by
the Central Bohemia Region with 12.88%. The lowest number of sole traders in relation to the number of
registered voters is recorded by the Karlovy Vary Region (5.56%), the Ústí nad Labem Region (8.82%)
and the Moravian-Silesian Region (9.21%). For more details, see Graph 2, ČSSZ (2019).
11 The analysis used in this part was performed in cooperation with Mgr. Jiří Šmída, Ph.D. and Ing. Aleš Kocourek, Ph.D.
from the Technical University of Liberec.
- 49 -
Graph 2: Share of Active Individual Entrepreneurs (Sole Traders ) in the Czech Regions (Registered
Voters, %)
0246810 12 14 16 18
CapitalCityofPrague
CentralBohemia
HradecKralové
Sout hBohemia
SouhtMoravian
Zlín
Liberec
Vy sočina
Pardubice
Pilsen
Olomouc
Moravian-Silesian
ÚstínadLabem
KarlovyVary
Source: Own calculations based on ČSÚ (2019) and ČSSZ (2019) data.
For the purposes of further analysis whose aim is to predict relationships between the intensity of the
entrepreneurial activity of small sole traders and the results of the Parliamentary election in municipalities
and city districts of statutory cities, two data les were used:12
- data coming from tax returns, specically the tax bases of the private individual income tax pursuant
to Section 7 of Act No. 586/1992 Coll. on Private Individuals Income Tax for years 2014-2016 in
division by respective municipalities and city districts of statutory cities.
- data on registered voters, valid votes, election participation and number of votes for respective
candidate parties in the Parliamentary election in 2017 for respective municipalities, cities and city
districts of statutory cities and the results of the 2017 Czech parliamentary election.
12 Data were obtained during the work on project TAČR TL01000303: “Big Data Exploitation to Evaluate the Social and
Economic Position of Inhabitants in the Types of Territories Dened by Regional Development Strategy 2021+”.
- 50 -
A positive correlation was found in these data based on the correlation analysis, i.e., direct linear dependence
when the higher entrepreneurial income of the self-employed improves the election result in the case
of the following parliamentary parties: Civic Democratic Party (ODS) (the strongest dependence), TOP
09, Czech Pirate Party (ČPS), Majors and the Independent (STAN). Out of nine parliamentary parties,
a negative linear dependence between the entrepreneurial income of the self-employed and the election
result was found in the case of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), Czech Social
Democratic Party (ČSSD), Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD) and ANO 2011. The election
result of KDU-ČSL cannot be deemed dependent on the entrepreneurial income in the municipality.
The correlation analysis results were supported by the analysis of the voting characteristics development
for the respective quartiles. The average tax bases of the self-employed for 6,388 municipalities were
ranked in descendant order and divided into 4 quartiles where Quartile 1 represents 25% of voters, the
inhabitants of the municipalities and city districts with the highest average entrepreneurial income of
the self-employed and Quartile 4 represents 25% of voters, the inhabitants of the municipalities with the
lowest average entrepreneurial income of the self-employed. The outputs of the analysis in the respective
quartiles are summarized in Table 3 and Graph 3.
Table 3 Voting Characteristics by Income Quartiles of the Self-Employed (Income by
Municipalities/City Districts)
Voters and election participation by income quartiles
(descendent) Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Share of votes according to the list of voters (%) 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Election participation (%) 66.12 61.73 58.13 55.67
Valid votes total 1,382,134 1,290,005 1,214,806 1,163,320
Number of municipalities/cities/city districts in the
given quartile 1,521 983 1,318 2,573
Source: Own calculations based on ČSÚ (2019) and GFŘ (2019) data.
- 51 -
Graph 3 indicates that election participation decreases relatively fast with the decreasing income of the
self-employed (social status of the inhabitants of the municipalities).
Graph 3: Election Results in % by Income Quartiles of the Self-employed (Bases of the Private
Individual Income Tax Pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 586/1992 Sb. on Private Individual
Income Tax)
14,7
6,1 5,8 5,7
14,0
8,9
24,6
5,4 8,0
7,8 8,2
4,4
10,0 8,2
2,6
34,1
5,9
13,0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Q uartile 1 Q uartile 2 Qua rtile 3 Q uartile 4
Source: Own calculations based on ČSÚ (2019) and GFŘ (2019)
As expected, the analysis of the entrepreneurial income in the respective quartiles indicated a positive
relationship between the level of the entrepreneurial income of the self-employed and the election result
for the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), TOP 09 and Czech Pirate Party (ČPS) and then for the Majors
and Independents (STAN). A negative correlation was found in contrast between the entrepreneurial
income and the election result in the case of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM),
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD) and ANO 2011
Movement – for more details, see Graph 3.
- 52 -
In consideration of the discovered territorial context and direct linear dependence of entrepreneurial
income and the election result of the centre and centre-right parties (i.e., ODS, TOP 09, ČPS and STAN),
a map output was prepared drawing attention to the expected and unexpected results for respective
municipalities/city districts and taking into account the status of the sole traders by their entrepreneurial
income. The basic presumption is that the election results (i.e., the CZ municipalities divided into
quartiles according to the sum of election results of ODS, TOP 09, ČPS and STAN) correspond to the
income quartile into which the municipality has been included. This means that the municipality where
the entrepreneurial income, recalculated to a registered voter reaches 25% of the highest values, should
rank similarly within the overall election result of centre and centre-right parties (i.e., the sum of the
election results of ODS, TOP 09, ČPS and STAN). In other words, a municipality in Quartile 1 by
income should reach Quartile 1 of the best election results as the sum of the parties which may be dened
as centre and centre-right parties. According to the analysis, such cities, city districts and municipalities
represent 59% of all the voters (see also Table 3).
Municipalities with an election result which is not expected in the context of the entrepreneurial income for
the parliamentary parties, where the level of the entrepreneurial income of the self-employed statistically
importantly correlates positively with the election result of the party, may be stratied according to
the matrix in Table 4. Data in the matrix body mean the share of all the registered votes in the given
category. The quadrant axis indicates the expected results where the election result quartile corresponds
to the income quartile; this group is formed by 59% of all the voters. The upper right-hand part of the
matrix above the axis means that the centre-right parties achieved a worse result in the municipality than
the matching income quartile. The lower left-hand part of the matrix includes the municipalities where
the election result was better (i.e., corresponding to the higher quartile than the income status of the
municipality).
- 53 -
Table 4. Election Result Matrix in the Context of the Self-employed Income by Quartiles
Election Quartile
1 2 3 4
Income Quartile
117.57 % 4.38 % 2.16 % 0.89 %
26.02 % 12.42 % 5.16 % 1.39 %
30.93 % 5.73 % 12.32 % 6.02 %
40.49 % 2.47 % 5.33 % 16.70 %
Source: Own calculations based on ČSÚ (2019) and GFŘ (2019)
The cartogram in Figure 1 describes the north-west part of Bohemia (represented by the Karlovy Vary
and Ústí nad Labem Regions, a major part of the Pilsen Region and the west part of the Liberec Region)
and Moravia as the territories conrming the correlation of the lower entrepreneurial income and the
lower election results of the centre and centre-right parties. The central part of Czechia represented by
Prague and Central Bohemia, Liberec, the South Bohemia regions and the western parts of the Vysočina
Region and Pardubice Region represent mainly examples of municipalities with a varying positive level
of correlation between the higher income and higher election results of the centre and centre-right parties.
The most obvious concordance of the income category (Quartiles 1 and 2) and voter preferences category
(Quartiles 1 and 2) is demonstrated in large regional centres represented by Prague and its surroundings
reaching to the Central Bohemia Region, in Liberec and its surroundings southwards (following speedway
E442), Hradec Králové-Pardubice, Brno, České Budějovice, Pilsen, Zlín, Karlovy Vary and Olomouc.
The distinctive groupings of municipalities in a combination of higher income and higher election
quartiles may be found in the north of Bohemia in the Krkonoše Mountains (and southwards in the
foothills of the Krkonoše Mountains) and in the south-west – Šumava (Bohemian Forest). Municipalities
of this nature are also present along the axis Prague-České Budějovice. The regional cities Ostrava and
Ústí nad Labem (and their surroundings) represent examples of large regional centres with low income
(Quartiles 3 and 4) and low voter preferences for centre- right parties (Quartiles 3 and 4), as expected.
Municipalities with lower income but higher voter preferences are present in the larger surroundings of
- 54 -
large regional centres, i.e., the entire Central Bohemia Region or the large surroundings of the regional
city of Liberec and both in the south-east direction (Turnov and Semily areas) and westwards. The
opposite combination, i.e., the higher income but lower election results of the monitored parties (926
CZ municipalities in total) appeared in the municipalities scattered around the entire Czechia. The most
signicant differences in the quartile classication of the municipalities (i.e., Income Quartile 1 and
Election Result Quartile 4) were recorded in 194 municipalities often located in regions with a minor
effect of the near regional or national border (i.e., Novohradsko and Bruntál).
This fact impacts the degree of certainty in the results interpretation. All the income and election results
were therefore related to the smallest possible administrative units for which data may be obtained. These
are the municipalities and city districts of the statutory cities divided into such districts. Entrepreneurial
income was recalculated according to the electoral base of the given territorial unit. It is probable that a
small number of entrepreneurs in smaller municipalities may generate, for example, a high income and
then the average per one voter distorts the inclusion of such a municipality into the respective category
(quartile). It would therefore be necessary to complete the use of the results of the analysis performed in
real life by a detailed analysis of the overall social and economic situation of the inhabitants using more
data sources and a local survey in the specic cases which were marked as unexpected election results
in relation to the income quartile.
- 55 -
Figure 1 Results of the 2017 Parliamentary Election from the Point of Centre and Centre-Right
Parties (ODS, TOP09, ČPS and STAN) in the Context of Sole-Trader Income
- 56 -
Changes in the Entrepreneurship Structure in the Context of Digitalization and Industry 4.013
The current so-called post-industrial age has brought to life the “new” middle class described by their effort
to capitalize on human capital on the labour market, i.e., top education, specic knowledge, talent and
capabilities. This is the main difference from the so-called “old” middle class, which have been trying to
capitalize on its own economic capital and production facilities in private ownership. There are two main
economic features that may be viewed as features of belonging to the new middle class, i.e., the economic
status of the “entrepreneur” or possibly being self-employed and with a higher education, with a secondary
school leaving exam as a minimum, but usually with a Bachelor degree and higher, capitalized on in
the profession where the professional or creative activity dominates. In spite of the “new” middle class
arising in Czechia, the “old” middle class dominates, often performing activities endangered by ongoing
digitalization and other features of the current technological changes which will result in signicant
polarization of the labour market and higher wage differentiation. There is consequently a need to monitor
the situation and react with adequate measures.
Changes on the labour market have been on the way since the massive expansion of computers; some authors
call this phenomenon directly “the computer revolution” (Frey and Osborne 2013: 12). This results in the
strong polarization of the labour market. On the one hand, the employment rate is rising in low-qualication
and low-income professions, while on the other hand, in the high-qualication and high-income professions,
the employment rate decreases in the middle-class sphere where many professions are routine ones and
therefore, prone to be substituted by computers. It can be said that the most endangered professions are
those consisting of repeating and well describable activities. This means routine administrative activities or
activities described by clear rules, e.g. bookkeeping, statistical processing of numerical data, administrative
work, real estate, public administration and defence. Repetition and low creativity are typical features.
Professions requiring solutions of new situations and a creative approach, in contrast, are endangered by
digitalization the least. The professions which require a specic human approach, e.g. physicians, nurses,
managers, retail and wholesale shop assistants, people working in social services, culture, environment
protection also belong to those with low risk (Mařík et al. 2016: 141-146). The growing digitalization will
bring a demand for system developers, will bring a demand for the creators of all the systems on the labour
market in order to secure user comfort, intuitive control and data safety for the consumers. The after-sale
support shall grow as well, i.e., the technical and advisory services, etc. The following tendencies may be
expected on the labour market in the near future:
13 Industry 4.0 is a term designating the initiative of managers of large European (mainly German and French), American,
Japanese and Chinese companies and government ofcials which should increase demand in society for new, up-to-date
consumer and industrial technologies and thus speed the development of robotization and modern, fully automated control
systems with maximum independence from human operations. According to the ofcial statements, this is the so-called
fourth industrial revolution which has already started and which should include comprehensive digitalization, robotization
and automation of most of the current human activities to secure more speed and efciency of production of more precise,
distinctive, reliable and cheaper products, more efcient use of materials and more ecological industry.
- 57 -
Removal of routine and physically hard work – new technologies will bring the removal of physically
hard and often life-threatening work endangering health long-term and provoking occupational diseases.
Self-employment – in the near future, a more frequent form of the work which should result in higher
dynamics of the employment. It will bring a brand-new rhythm of work; people can work for more
employers at the same time. Shorter or part-time work shall increase.
Work at any place – it will no longer be necessary for the employee to be physically present directly in
the employer’s workplace, work at home or abroad. This will open up opportunities for people who would
otherwise have problems commuting to work due to a health disability, living in more isolated localities or
taking care of family members.
Decentralization – employees will work within a atter organizational structure where the management
and decision-making are not held in the hands of the head ofce. This will bring more opportunities for
professional development and space for innovative thinking. Such a feature convenes mainly with the
young generation’s attitude about having a similar notion of work; however, older workers may feel
increased pressure on more exibility as growing mental stress.
Work in project teams – people will work in temporary teams created in order to solve a problem or
reach a certain objective. People will cooperate within one and/or more companies and very often with
companies located abroad. Relationships between colleagues will be mostly virtual due to the international
nature of the teams. The ability to overcome language and culture barriers will become a very important
part of qualications.
The authors did not arrive at the same conclusions in the question of disappearing and newly created jobs.
While some sources claim that digitalization and Industry 4.0 will create more jobs than those which would
cease to exist, other sources arrived at the conclusion that up to 47% jobs are endangered. This gure
arises from the study of Frey and Osborne (2013) who came up with a new methodology to forecast the
probability of computerization of occupations in the sense of automation of the occupation with the use of
a computer. The disadvantage of this and other similar studies based on occupations (an occupation-based
approach) is that they expect that a certain occupation would or would not cease to exist as a whole. They do
not investigate, however, the automation of the respective work tasks. This approach may therefore result
in overrating of the occupation automation because even the occupations marked as highly endangered
contain a wide range of tasks difcult to automate and the need for human work would thus be preserved.
A certain reaction to this study is the study of the German economists, Melanie Arntze, Terry Gregor and
Ulrich Zierahn (2016), on the impacts of automation and robotization on the labour market. The authors
- 58 -
do not work with occupations in the study but use respective work tasks (a task-based approach) and arrive
at the conclusion that work tasks are endangered by automation more than jobs. A study prepared by the
Ofce of the Government of the Czech Republic (OSTEU 2015) provides relatively adverse conclusions
for the Czech economy as it is based on a methodology investigating the impact on jobs as a whole (the
ratio of endangered and newly created jobs - 5:2). The OECD study (Employment Outlook 2016) is more
favourable, in contrast, estimating that the automation will strongly endanger 10% of jobs and bring
substantial changes in the activities performed in 35% of the jobs in Czechia in the next 20 years. If such
an estimate is related to the number of employees, approximately 408 thousand jobs will be in danger and
1.4 million jobs will witness substantial changes. This needs to be considered, as well, as it is impossible to
ignore a number of obstacles hindering the dissemination and application of technologies, i.e., insufcient
investment, insufcient capital, investment trends in the areas of research and development, governmental
regulations, insufcient capabilities or social resistance which means that the impact on the labour market
would be lower in reality over the next few years.
Most of the sources agree that digitalization and Industry 4.0 will lead to strong polarization of the labour
market and higher wage differentiation. The result will be further weakening of the middle class. This
tendency may be enhanced by the transfer of the medium qualied labour force from the industrial
branches to equally qualied jobs created in the services sector which are typically related to lower wages.
In practice, the far extremes of the labour market will grow stronger – low-income occupations with very
low qualications for various auxiliary work and, on the other hand, high-income and high-qualication
creative occupations where the income will continue to grow signicantly. There is the possibility that the
summary of the changes will result in a decreasing wage amount total in the economy. Today’s group of
low-income workers will be forced to nd jobs in still lower occupations or be pushed out of the labour
market completely. In contrast, high-income groups will witness a signicant growth in wages due to the
demand for such workers exceeding the offerings (Mařík et al. 2016).
It is obvious that people need to prepare for new roles in their work lives. Massive customization,
high autonomy of manufacturing, logistic, sale and after-sale processes will push humans out of direct
participation in the manufacturing process. The role of humans is changing from direct participation in the
manufacturing process to the role of a supervisor (Mařík et al. 2016). This is not a simple replacement of
people by machines, although it will nally come about up to a certain level. It will be important to nd new
positions in the new conditions provided by the use of scientic and technical progress for a large part of
the labour force which currently forms the largest part – the core of the middle class. Thus, suitable support
should be established for self-employment mentioned above, which will spread into a growing range of
activities and occupations in comparison with today. There will be a great deal of space for creative and
dynamic people in small cooperating units, i.e., in small and medium enterprises interconnected into the
cooperating networks, etc.
- 59 -
Conclusion
Entrepreneurship is the key to economic growth, political stability and the prosperity of society. Each
government and party should support entrepreneurship and pursue the removal of barriers for entrepreneurial
activities. The growing SMEs sector requires the fullment of certain prerequisites: free pricing, free access
to goods and services, space for entrepreneurship, the existence of basic services for the company such
as accountants and lawyers and possibly qualied and competent advisory services for small enterprises,
a good infrastructure including well-functioning telecommunications, information channels, functional
courts and a banking system. Economic barriers include the tax burden, possibilities of prot reinvestment,
availability of loans and a qualied labour force. Taxes which need to be paid by the entrepreneur affect the
immediate short-term motivation to carry out business because they reduce prot and long-term possibilities
of funding growth by reinvesting revenues.
In spite of a certain efciency of scal and nancial tools to support the companies, one cannot clearly
demonstrate whether discrimination arising from preferring certain segments of the economy results in
damage (lost opportunities, necessary redistribution of funds, etc.) exceeding the possible benet from the
support tools in relation to the preferred segment of the economy. What is an absolutely key factor, however,
for decisions of any investor, big or small, domestic or foreign, is macroeconomic stability. Small and weak
enterprises suffer during uctuations of the economy and ination more than large and strong enterprises.
The impact of the crisis on the SMEs is always more signicant than in the case of large monopoly and/or
oligopoly corporations. A stable environment and a lack of support for the big is sufcient motivation for
good performance of entrepreneurs (Zemplinerová 2000).
As a result of technological development, it is expected that self-employment will grow in more and
more activities and professions. It is important to think about a way of providing suitable support for
this tendency or removing obstacles which might hinder such development. There will be great space
for creative and dynamic people in small cooperating units, i.e., in the small and medium enterprises
interconnected in the cooperating networks, etc. The system of education should be ready to support
creativity and the entrepreneurial spirit of individuals. There is a need to increase quality of education and
support critical thinking skills; new technologies are only used by some entrepreneurs, secondary vocational
education (small sole traders and craftsmen do not use digital tools) (Asociace malých a středních podniků
a živnostníků ČR 2019). This support should be on the level of the single European market, domestic
market and also on the level of the self-government units – municipalities. In the same manner in which the
entrepreneurial sector of small and medium enterprises fullled its role in transformation from the centrally
planned economy to the market economy, it may play a similar role in the age of commencement and
progress of digitalization and Industry 4.0. Small and medium enterprises are considered the main force
in reconstruction as they are able to react swiftly to changes in internal and external economic conditions.
Entrepreneurship in its new form will maintain a substantial share in the employment rate, manufacturing,
taxes, offerings of consumer goods and mainly in innovations and/or introduction of new technologies.
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New technologies have only been used, however, by part of the entrepreneurs in this country as only
some of them had the opportunity to receive an adequate education. The role of the state in the economy
(measured by tax-to-GDP ratio, share in the GDP, etc) continues to grow hand in hand with growing
demands on the income side of public budgets and pressure to increase taxes. An important requirement
therefore involves reducing the role of the state in the economy over a short time span at the expense of
other middle-class segments, namely bureaucracy (reform). There is also a need to reduce bureaucratic
procedures and legislation in the new legislation prepared in improved quality and the verication and
evaluation of current laws to make them more friendly to the SMEs (MPO 2017).
When considering suitable policy toward small entrepreneurs, it is important to distinguish between
the types of entrepreneurial activity. There is a major difference between the traditional entrepreneurial
activities with local markets and the fast growing so-called “knowledge” entrepreneurial entities expanding
on the foreign markets. The latter companies are the fastest growing area of developed economies; they are
important for the creation of added value, jobs and productivity growth. Growth is related to a demand for
special knowledge, outsourcing and internationalization of services. Recognition of this segment is key for
the preparation of policies.
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The Middle Class and Changes in Voting Behaviour14
Jakub Charvát and Pavel Maškarinec
Introduction
Modern democracies are inconceivable without of political parties. This is because political parties are
among the most signicant participants in political representation in modern representative democracies.
In addition, several authors agree that the current politics cannot be comprehended without understanding
party politics, as the quality of democracy is in many aspects dependent on the very characteristics of
the political party system. Political party systems are not static institutions; in fact, they are in a state
of constant variability (Norris and Evans 1999: xvi), which is why they continue to change in various
extents and directions. The political partisanship as such has been going through a signicant qualitative
transformation over the recent years (Krouwel 2012), whereas altered dynamics in its development have
been monitored since 2010 in Czechia (see Charvát and Just 2016).
It therefore seems important to focus on an analysis of the transformation of the voting behaviour of
Czech voters (in terms of discontinuity) in the last decade. Regarding the central topic of this publication,
the presented chapter preferentially aims at the voting behaviour of the middle class and its segments.
This is because the members of the middle class are among the politically most active citizens, including
their participation in (all types of) elections, and have the most signicant impact on election results and
the determination of their winners and losers (cf. Linek and Lyons 2007; Vlachová and Řeháková 2007).
A brief introduction to the transformation of the Czech political party system after 2010 is followed
by an analysis of the changing middle-class voting behaviour. We then argue that the mobilisation of
economic, ethnic and political grievances signicantly contributed to the rise of new Czech political
parties.
Changes in the Czech Political Party System since 2010
Many domestic and foreign experts in the rst decade of the twenty-rst century have described the
Czech party system as more or less structured, settled, relatively stable and manifesting a low degree of
electoral volatility, and consequently, one of the most stable areas in post-communist Europe. However,
the 2010 and 2013 parliamentary elections and the subsequent political development indicated that it was
“only” a kind of fragile stability (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2010) and temporary stability (Linek
and Lyons 2013). And thus, some authors even talk about an electoral or political earthquake (Haughton,
Novotná and Deegan-Krause 2011; Hanley 2012; Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015; Klíma 2015).
The Czech party system appeared to be structured and largely stabilized prior to 2010, at least in terms
14 This study was prepared as part of a grant project supported by the Internal Grant Agency of Jan Evangelista Purkyně
University in Ústí nad Labem, Grant No. UJEP-IGA-TC-2019-63-03-2, “Euroscepticism and Populism in the 2019 European
Parliament Elections”.
- 62 -
of the continuity and stability of the main political parties and their identities, while demonstrating
a high degree of nationalization of their electoral support (Stauber 2017). The “core” of the party
system was formed by Občanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic Party, ODS), Česká strana
sociálně demokratická (Czech Social Democratic Party, ČSSD), Křesťanská a demokratická unie –
Československá strana lidová (Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party, KDU-
ČSL) and Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, KSČM).
Some aspects of instability also appeared in the background, mainly in the area of the so-called “liberal
centre” where several smaller parties were alternating, that is, Občanská demokratická aliance (Civic
Democratic Alliance, ODA), Unie svobody (Union of Freedom, US), Unie svobody – Demokratická
unie (Union of Freedom – Democratic Union, US-DEU), Strana zelených (Green Party, SZ) and TOP 09
as of 2010. The ideological afnity of their programs and similarity of voters were also a certain aspect
of stability (Haughton, Novotná and Deegan-Krause 2011). The established parties have been losing
their former voters, however, since the 2010 parliamentary elections (see Graph 1).
Graph 1 Overall Electoral Support for the Established Political Parties in the Parliamentary
Elections since 1996
0
20
40
60
80
100
1996
1998
2002
2006
2010
2013
2017
Votes (%)
overall support of parliamentary
parties
overall support of original “core”
parties
overall support ODS and ČSSD
Data source: volby.cz.
While some authors talk about the electoral (political) earthquake in connection with the 2010 parliamentary
elections, the concept of electoral volatility, i.e., the approach to analyse the party system stability at
the aggregate level (in terms of stability of electoral support), may be considered a seismograph of
any election changes. The overall electoral volatility consists of two components: intra-system (within-
system) volatility to be used to measure shifts in electoral support between ongoing political parties,
and inter-system (extra-system) volatility to capture transfers of support resulting from new parties
entering the voting arena and, in contrast, some of the old parties leaving the voting area (for more
details see Powell and Tucker 2014; Mainwaring, Gervasoni and España-Najera 2017; Charvát and Just
- 63 -
2016: 20–31). The occurrence of an adequate level of intra-system volatility can be considered healthy
for democratic systems as shifting of electoral support between established parties is a prerequisite
for government alternation. An increase in intra-system volatility values reects temporary shifts of
votes within the existing party system, while not necessarily signalling its transformation. Conversely,
a higher level of inter-system volatility is linked to instability as it reects voter dissatisfaction with the
composition and functioning of the original party system as well as their decision to shift their support to
new candidates. The entry of a new actor(s) into the system, sometimes even intensied by the departure
of the established party(ies), then necessarily changes the existing interactions among political actors
and distorts the existing balance.
There were no signicant uctuations in the electoral volatility values in Czechia before 2010. The
overall volatility was mainly caused by “an overow” of voters among the established parties (intra-
system volatility) which has steadily increased since 1998, but not very dynamically. The inuence of
the new parties, however, on the overall volatility was rather small. Before 2010, the Czech party system
can consequently be referred to as more or less stable, especially in terms of organizational stability, the
electoral support of each party and the patterns of electoral behaviour. The breaking point in the trends
came about the 2010 elections. Although intra-system volatility continually increased in 2010, the rapid
increase in inter-system volatility seems to be much more substantial in the systemic point of view; the
inter-system volatility increased more than ve times in comparison with the 2002 and 2006 elections
which means it surpassed the values of intra-system volatility.
Graph 2 Electoral Volatility in Parliamentary Elections since 1998
0
10
20
30
40
1998
2002
2006
2010
2013
2017
Elec t or al volatilit y
ove r a ll vola tility
inter-syste m volatility
intra-syste m volatility
Data source: volby.cz.
The former voters of established parties began to look for new alternatives outside the original “core”.
Thus, new political parties and movements emerged, especially TOP 09 and Věci veřejné (Public Affairs)
- 64 -
in 2010, and ANO 2011 and Úsvit přímé demokracie Tomia Okamury (Dawn of Direct Democracy
of Tomio Okamura)15 in 2013. As a result, the overall volatility doubles up as compared to 1998 and
2006. Some “normalisation” can only be seen in the most recent in the 2017 parliamentary elections
when the inter-system volatility decreased, although the values were still rather high. There was also a
signicant increase of the intra-system volatility reaching unusually high values. The electoral support
thus continually regroups, while being stronger within the established political parties (see Graph 2).
The Middle Class and Its Voting Behaviour
In modern Czech history, class-oriented interests traditionally played an important role in electoral
behaviour, both in relation to turnout and to electoral support. It was possible to observe the tendencies of
higher voter turnout and support for centre-right parties in case of increasing education and professional
skills up until 2010. The main centre-right party (ODS) was mostly elected by the upper middle-
class. As regards citizens with lower education and professional qualications, both lower interest in
political affairs, as well as lower participation in the elections, were generally observed; if these citizens
participated in the elections, they supported the left-wing political parties much more (Vlachová and
Řeháková 2007; Vlachová 2009; Linek and Lyons 2013). Even in the 2010 parliamentary elections, the
middle class and the Czech electorate were generally relatively clearly divided along the socio-economic
axis into two basic political groups, i.e., the centre-left and centre-right voters.
The transformation of the Czech party politics since 2010 was caused by the electoral volatility of the
middle-class voters. In the rst stage around the 2013 parliamentary elections, dissatisfaction with the
political elites was manifested by some centre-right voters moving from ODS and partly from TOP 09 to
ANO 2011 (Gregor 2014). In the 2017 parliamentary elections, they were followed by leftist voters who
also moved their support to the same political party (ANO 2011). ANO 2011’s ability to attract voters
both on the right and left side of the political centre is conrmed by the results of our survey Study of
Middle Class’ Attitudes towards the EU and its Inuence on European Issues (2019) as described in
the introductory chapter of this publication. The middle class was divided into six attitudinal segments
(Politically passive, Tested workers, Ageing authoritarians, Defenders, Ambivalent and Young liberals)
who differed in their political attitudes, electoral activities and economic situation, as well as in their
age and education. Yet, only one of these segments, e.g. the Young liberals, did not perceive the ANO
2011 party among the parties with the strongest electoral support. The highest electoral support among
the Young liberals is given to Pirates, followed by ODS, TOP 09 and STAN. The two small centre-right
parties received the highest support in this segment, unlike ODS and the third small centre-right party,
KDU-ČSL, which drew most support from the Ambivalent. In other segments, ANO 2011 was among
the most popular parties with the support of more than a quarter of the voters from each segment.
15 In 2015, two Members of the Parliament, Tomio Okamura and Radim Fiala (Úsvit přímé demokracie), founded the
political movement entitled Svoboda a přímá demokracie (Freedom and Direct Democracy).
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Regarding the Ageing authoritarians, ANO 2011 had the support of 41% of those who declared their
willingness to vote. Only in the segment of Defenders, ANO 2011 was passed over by SPD (Freedom
and Direct Democracy) with the support of 24% of those who wanted to vote. ANO 2011 was supported
by about a fth of voters from this segment.
While converting the results of the analysis into the social class structure, it is apparent that ANO 2011
has the greatest support in six out of seven classes (Wealthy professionals, Traditional middle class,
Skilled workers, Urban poor, Working class and Lower class). Only the Young digital elite prefers
Pirates over ANO 2011, with its proportion in Czechia being relatively small, accounting for about 5% of
the population. The centre-right pro-European parties (KDU-ČSL, STAN and TOP 09) had the highest
support among Wealthy professionals and Traditional middle class, similar to eurosceptic ODS, which
though had more support in these segments than the three smaller parties.
Mobilization of Grievance as a Factor of Success for New Political Parties
Such fundamental changes in voter behaviour which resulted in the signicant transformation of
the Czech party system usually do not arise without any external cause. They often arise from more
fundamental social changes that cause voters feelings of dissatisfaction or grievance (cf. Ivarsaten
2008). The existing literature deals with grievance mobilization. The grievance theory distinguishes
between three separate models used by political parties to mobilize their electorate: (1) grievances as a
result of economic change; (2) grievances caused by increase in immigration (and ethnic grievances);
(3) grievances resulting from political elitism and corruption (see Snow 2004; Ivarsaten 2008; Crossley
2012; Kriesi 2012; Beissinger and Sasse 2014; Maškarinec and Bláha 2014). It is believed that any harm
or injustice becomes a grievance in the eyes of voters once perceived as such; economic or statistical
indicators alone are not enough to identify grievances.
Regarding the model of grievances that are directly related to economic changes (which is in all
probability the most commonly used model of grievances), saving measures and reform efforts of the
ruling government are often taken as a signicant impulse for public outrage and voter mobilization (but
also purely protest mobilization). The most important impulse to mobilize economic grievance is (rising)
unemployment, or government steps resulting in a rise in unemployment and are understood as such by
voters (Kriesi 2012).
In the Czech environment, economic grievances are closely related to the transition from a centrally
planned economy to a free market and the related privatization in the early 1990s. Among other things,
these processes resulted in the emergence of a new structure of society, an increase in social inequalities
and division of society into so-called winners who proted from the transformation and others, so-
called losers (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008). As it is apparent from the survey data, a clearly negative
trend in the assessment of the economic situation by citizens can be seen, which started approximately
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in 2009. The economic situation of the country was assessed as the worst in 2010 and 2013 when the
assessment of the economic situation was signicantly more negative compared to the elections of 2006
and 2002. Analogically, citizens negatively assessed the expected development of the economic situation
and material living conditions of households. A certain turn-over toward more a positive assessment has
been observed, however, since the end of 2015. Before the 2017 parliamentary elections, most people
(51.9%) believed that the living standard of their households is good, which means an increase of about
10 percentage points compared to the situation before the 2013 elections (CVVM 2014, 2017).
Another model of grievance mobilization is related to the issue of immigration. The rise of the new
political parties (especially those of extreme right populists) in Western Europe occurred at a time when
there was signicant immigration or a signicant rise in terms of its timing. It was additionally quite
difcult to employ the immigrants in most Western countries, with their unemployment rate being much
higher than that in the rest of the population. This resulted in the emergence of antagonism between
the immigrants and the original inhabitants. This was further intensied by cultural conicts and the
unwillingness of the “old inhabitants” to accept the newly arrived minority (Ivarsaten 2008).
However, the application of this model of grievance mobilization is problematic in the Czech
environment. The issue of immigration was a rather marginal problem (due to only a limited number
of foreigners in Czechia compared to Western Europe).16 Most established parties did not use it in their
election campaigns for a long time. Mobilization of this issue is more visibly linked to the activities
of Úsvit přímé demokracie and its leader Tomio Okamura. The issue of immigration was one of the
main topics in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, including the issue of taking motifs from
the campaigns of Western European populist extreme right parties (Hynčica, Maškarinec and Novotný
2016: 62–64), followed by the 2017 parliamentary elections (Krčál and Naxera 2018). Although the
number of immigrants in Czechia was marginal in comparison with other countries, the entire situation
helped those parties who emphasized the national issues.
The mobilization of immigration is thus associated with a rather smaller number of foreigners in Czechia,
which was not even changed by the recent migration crisis. It is possible to apply in Czechia the original
model of grievance mobilization but another dimension should be added, which is the relationship of the
Czech population to the Roma, towards which the Czech population has much more negative attitudes
than towards most foreigners (perhaps except for the Muslims which are of only a limited number in
the country).17 The Roma are not foreigners, therefore we talk (in this case) about the mobilization of
an ethnic grievance rather than the mobilization of immigration. In the context of ignoring the Roma
16 As of 31 August 2018, 5.15% of foreigners lived in Czechia, of which the largest groups were Ukrainians (23.27%),
Slovaks (20.70%), Vietnamese (10.83%), Russians (6.74%), Poles and Germans (3.77%); no other group formed more than
3% of the population (Czech Statistical Ofce 2019).
17 The number of Muslims in Czechia reached the approximate level of 0.2%, compared to the EU where approximately
4.9% of Muslims live on average (PRC 2017).
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issues by established parties, one can assume that dissatised voters began to look for an alternative in
new parties that work much more openly with anti-immigration or ethnic rhetoric. This was particularly
apparent in the structurally affected regions where the gains of these parties were above average (Havlík
and Voda 2016; Maškarinec 2017).
The last model of grievance is the resentment of citizens to political elitism and corruption. In the conditions
of Czech society, the common denominator of the rst decade of post-Communist development, i.e., the
so-called “era of innocence” (Kopeček 2010), is an illusion of new, clean and unspoiled politics and self-
saving democracy as a awless political order replacing real socialism. “Betrayal” of this dream, caused
mainly by the events of 1997 and 1998 and by the subsequent development (especially the so-called
Sarajevo assassination in ODS in autumn 1997,18 the nancial scandals of the government parties, the
opposition treaty period in 1998–2002). The term “Opposition Treaty” became known for the “Treaty
to Establish a Stable Political Environment in the Czech Republic Concluded between the Czech Social
Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Party” after early elections in 1998 where ODS pledged to
support the establishment of the minority government of ČSSD led by Miloš Zeman, the chairman of
ČSSD. ODS received, in exchange, the positions of chairmen of both parliamentary chambers, other
important positions in parliamentary bodies and a share in the decision-making process. According to
the Treaty, the stability of the political system was to be achieved by a combination of constitutional
and political reforms (especially electoral reform) which were intended to weaken the importance of
other political actors outside ODS and ČSSD, whether it was for other political parties or the President
of the Republic; as well as by party patronage controlled by these two parties and related elimination of
political competition at the parliamentary level, etc., however, led the citizens to lose interest in politics
and also resulted in the belief that this is only a tangle of backstage intrigue. Even after the end of the
Opposition Treaty, however, this view of politics has not been fully corrected (Linek 2010).
Leaving aside the political grievances, it has to be said that the effort to explain the success of new parties
in Czechia after 2010 by analysing economic and ethnic grievances, which implies a direct link between
protest behaviour and dissatisfaction and grievance perceived by citizens, displayed an interesting
development.19 While the hypotheses related to the effect of mobilization theories of grievances were not
18 The phrase “Sarajevo Assassination” is used to designate the unsuccessful attempt at a putsch in the ODS party in
autumn 1997. During 1997, there was increasing tension in ODS between the party’s management and its critics, culminating
in November 1997 when Václav Klaus (the party’s chairman), who was on a business trip in Sarajevo at that time, was urged
by the media together with Ivan Pilip and Jan Ruml to resign from his political functions. President Havel also joined this
call, indirectly calling on the government to resign. In response, the ministers of KDU–ČSL party also resigned, which started
the disintegration of the government. They were subsequently followed by the ministers of ODA and even chairman Klaus
announced his resignation. As a response to these events, an extraordinary ODS congress was convened and Václav Klaus
was conrmed as party chairman (for more details see Charvát 2012: 283–284).
19 The data aggregated to the level of 205 administrative districts of municipalities with extended powers and the City of
Prague. Multiple linear regression (OLS) method was chosen for analysis. The proportion of votes of political parties at the
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very successful in the 2010 and 2013 elections, both in terms of the direction of the individual variables
and the explanatory capacities of regression models (more by Maškarinec and Bláha 2014), the 2017
elections brought about a signicant breaking-point where the explanatory capacity of the regression
models increased signicantly (see Table 1).
Table 1 Determinants of Electoral Support for Selected New Parties (OLS)
VV (2010) Úsvit (2013) SPD (2017) ANO 2011
(2013)
ANO 2011
(2017)
Unemployed -0.065 (0.060) 0.167 (0.069) 0.336 (0.079) 0.028 (0.104) 0.333 (0.126)
Entrepreneurs 0.024 (0.010) 0.031 (0.010) -0.050 (0.011) 0.059 (0.015) -0.092 (0.018)
Foreigners -0.075 (0.061) -0.300 (0.065) -0.205 (0.071) 0.261 (0.098) 0.140 (0.113)
Roma population 0.489 (0.132) -0.057 (0.144) -0.104 (0.164) 0.611 (0.217) 0.224 (0.260)
University graduates -0.118 (0.048) -0.132 (0.051) -0.025 (0.054) -0.138 (0.076) -0.590 (0.085)
Post-productive persons -0.287 (0.080) -0.181 (0.086) –0.311 (0.095) -0.255 (0.129) -0.226 (0.151)
Urbanization 0.017 (0.006) 0.018 (0.007) 0.006 (0.007) 0.013 (0.010) 0.042 (0.011)
Constant 14.142 (1.622) 7.570 (1.700) 19.707 (1.784) 16.775 (2.561) 44.837 (2.838)
N206 206 206 206 206
Adjusted R20.161 0.193 0.399 0.158 0.552
Data source: ČSÚ (Czech Statistical Ofce) – Public Database, GAC 2006, SLDB 2011; own calculation.
Note: non-standardized regression coefcients, standard deviations in parentheses; coefcients statistically signicant at
p<0.05 are highlighted in bold.
selected level of aggregation is a dependent variable. Unemployment (the registered unemployment rate) and entrepreneurs
(the number of private entrepreneurs per 1 thousand inhabitants) entered the model of economic grievance mobilization. The
variables of foreigners (proportion of foreigners with a long-term stay) and Roma population (proportion of Roma population
living in socially excluded localities) are part of the model of immigration mobilization. Several control variables were used
to assess other effects. The educational structure is represented by the variable of university graduates (proportion of the
population with completed university education). The inuence of age is linked to the variable of post-productive persons
(proportion of the population at the age of 65+) and the contextual variable characterizing the status of regional populations
is urbanization (proportion of inhabitants in municipalities with 5 thousand + inhabitants).
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Both successes, i.e., ANO 2011 and SPD, were strongly linked to regions with higher rates of
unemployment and a lower number of entrepreneurs, which, coupled with the persisting lower support
among the university-educated population, suggests the conrmation of the mobilization of the
population perceiving economic grievances, associated with increased social inequalities and division of
society into those who feel an inability to sufciently prot from the economic and social transformation
of the Czech society after 1990 and its benets. Indicators of ethnic and immigration grievances were
signicantly different in the case of the ANO 2011 and SPD. Lower support for the SPD (as was the case
of its predecessor, Úsvit) can be seen in regions with a higher number of the Roma and foreigners. The
opposite applies to ANO 2011 even though the strength of these two variables has declined compared
with 2013. The strongest determinants of ANO 2011 electoral support are the variables university
graduates and the unemployed, i.e., the socio-economic variables. We observe a positive but a relatively
weak relationship between the success of ANO 2011 and the more urbanized regions (Maškarinec and
Novotný 2019).
The 2017 parliamentary elections meant a return to the period before reconstruction of the Czech party
system which began at the latest in the 2010 elections, when the structural characteristics of regions
were largely explaining the interregional support of individual parties (cf. Kouba 2007; Pink and Voda
2012; Bernard and Kostelecký 2014; Maškarinec 2017). There is still the question, however, of whether
the entry of SPD and ANO 2011 into the areas, characterized by previously higher support for leftist
parties, would be long-lasting, and at the same time, what were the main reasons why voters largely
abandoned ČSSD and KSČM as the historically strongest left-wing parties and whether the reason was
the “populist” appeal of ANO 2011 and SPD. This would require, however, working with individual
survey data. This would also help answer the question of whether the votes for VV, ANO 2011, Úsvit or
SPD could be attributed to the dimension of political grievances.
It is also interesting to note that, despite a signicant change in the number and strength of the
individual parties, a relatively high level of nationalization of spatial electoral support of Czech parties
was maintained after three electoral earthquakes. Established and new political parties did not differ
signicantly in this aspect, whereas the level of nationalization of support for ANO 2011 and Úsvit or
SPD was one of the highest (see Table 2).
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Table 2: Score of Party-Based Nationalization (PNS) for Major Political Parties, 2006-2017
2006 2010 2013 2017
ČSSD 0.931 0.909 0.910 0.888
ODS 0.897 0.903 0.853 0.864
KSČM 0.871 0.868 0.877 0.866
KDU–ČSL 0.703 0.616 0.683 0.652
SZ 0.867 0.842 0.843 0.859
TOP 09 0.854 0.799 0.785
VV 0.922
Piráti 0.859 0.882 0.887
ANO 2011 0.924 0.927
Úsvit/SPD 0.881 0.891
STAN 0.716
Note: The PNS rates are to be measured using the Gini coefcient (see Jones and Mainwaring 2003). The data are to be
aggregated to the level of 205 administrative districts of municipalities with extended powers and the City of Prague.
Finally, the grievances arising from political elitism and corruption, the dissatisfaction with established
parties and elites also led to the rise of new parties in (not only) Czech politics (Klíma 2015; Hanley
and Sikk 2016; Charvát and Just 2016). According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), published
annually by Transparency International NGO, the CPI began to increase in Czechia from 2009 (the
situation was improving around 2013); the index shows relatively high values in 2010, being comparable
to the situation in developing countries.
Shortly before 2010, topics such as corruption, clientelism or party patronage came to the forefront of
Czech political discourse and the general media agenda. This topic was often linked to the activities of
established parties and the existing political elites. Strong anti-corruption and anti-clientelistic rhetoric
was also strengthened by the emancipation of the police and prosecutor’s ofces, as well as by intensied
activity of investigative journalists and by the emergence of various civic activities and initiatives, such
as “Rekonstrukce státu” [Reconstruction of the State], “Nadační fond proti korupci” [Endowment Fund
Against Corruption], “Oživení” [Recovery], “Vraťte nám stát” [Give the State back to us], “Protikorupční
akademický klub transparentnosti” [Anti-Corruption Academic Transparency Club] etc. (Charvát and
Just 2016). All of this contributed to detection and media coverage of a number of corruption cases
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closely related to political parties that were in power in previous periods. These are not only the political
parties that were in power in the period immediately preceding 2010 but in general, it concerns all parties
that have been in the government since 1990.
In addition to the frequent association of corruption with established parties and the existing political
elites, the negative perception of politics was further intensied by the chronic inefciency of the Czech
governments (Havlík and Hloušek 2014). The premature collapse of Topolánek’s government due to a
vote of no condence during the Czech EU presidency in March 2009, deepened voter frustration arising
from established parties. Moreover, the newly established Fischer government (Hloušek and Kopeček
2014; Brunclík 2016) was much more popular than the previous party governments, which generated
the impression that politics may be different from what has been done thus far by the established parties
and that it can be done without conicts and confrontations. The above-mentioned facts signicantly
contributed to a sharp increase in civic dissatisfaction and a loss of condence of the Czech public in
political institutions, including political parties, and democracy in general (Linek 2010; Štefek 2012).
It is no coincidence that most of the new successful parties proled themselves as anti-corruption
(Bågenholm 2013) and/or anti-establishment reform parties (Hanley and Sikk 2016; cf. Abedi 2004),
which resulted in the onset of centrist technocratic populism (Havlík 2019). It is worth mentioning
that the so-called third generation of parties (Kopeček and Svačinová 2015) is characterized by an
effort to underline its anti-establishment prole. These were the entities established shortly before the
2013 parliamentary elections (especially ANO 2011 and Úsvit).20 These are also characterized by their
anti-party sentiment. Both ANO 2011 and Úsvit decided to make the most of the general criticism of
party politics, so the leaders of both parties emphasized that they were not political parties but political
movements, and this despite the fact that they do not correspond to the classical model of a social
movement in terms of their organisation, and despite the fact that they resemble a political party in many
aspects.21
20 According to Kopeček and Svačinová (2015), the rst generation is represented by the parties whose roots date back
to the times of mass parties KSČM or KDU-ČSL. Although ČSSD has deep historical roots, its modern face goes back
to the 1990s, similarly to ODS. Both parties could be considered typical representatives of the second generation. The
intergenerational case (between the second and third generations) is represented by TOP 09; this party is distinguished from
the third generation mainly by the fact that the party included in its structures a group of regional Christian-democratic
politicians who left KDU-ČSL to become members of TOP 09
21 ANO 2011 and Úsvit took advantage of the specicity of the legal regulation of organising political parties in Czechia
which allows political entities to formally register as political movements while operating under the same conditions as the
parties. In the case of Úsvit, in particular, the term “movement” was paradoxical indeed; Úsvit had nine members in total,
creating a unique situation where Úsvit had a higher number of parliamentary seats (14 seats in 2013) than members (ANO
2011 has thousands of members).
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Conclusion
Whereas the 2010 to 2017 parliamentary elections are interpreted as an earthquake and whereas the
consequences of the earthquake include long-term or permanent changes in the shape and nature of the
surrounding landscape, there arises the question of how these electoral earthquakes changed the Czech
party landscape. The present chapter attempted to answer this question paying attention to changes
in voter behaviour. Their most signicant manifestations included erosion of electoral support for the
established parties which formed the core of the party system before 2010. The increase in overall
electoral volatility was primarily caused by the increasing rate of inter-system volatility where the voters
inclined more towards new political parties. ANO 2011 took the greatest advantage of these shifts in
electoral support, it has been the political party being able to effectively mobilize economic, political
and (partly) ethnic grievances. Due to this successful strategy, ANO 2011 was able to obtain the highest
electoral support among a large number of middle-class voters across individual segments. The only
exception in this sense was the liberal-minded Young digital elite who showed a preference for the
Pirates over ANO 2011.
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A Life Less Ordinary? The Middle in This Age of Discontent
Eoin Drea
Why Middle Class Discontent Matters
Traditionally, the concept of the middle class has been viewed solely through the lens of income levels.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) denes a middle class of
households with income between 75% and 200% of the median national level (OECD 2019).22 However,
across most OECD member states middle class incomes have stagnated over the past three decades.
Within the United States, the median income of middle class households in 2016 was the same as in
2000, a reection of the lingering effects of the Great Recession and an earlier recession in 2001 (Pew
2018).
Within Europe, the situation is a little more nuanced. While countries such as Ireland and Poland have
continued to increase the proportion of the middle class relative to their total population, the issue of
stagnant income growth remains a signicant issue. For example, a major study covering nine European
countries highlighted that only in Bulgaria and Poland did median disposable income rise between 2007
and 2015 (Siegmann and Schafer 2018). In most Western European countries, including Germany, the
increase in median incomes has been close to zero over this period.
Why does this matter? Put simply, the middle classes are essential in providing the underpinnings of
stable social and political institutions (Fukuyama 2011). The middle classes are a key economic driver
of the global economy and an underlying pool of both consumption and demand (Pressman 2007).
Within a political context, the rise of greater instability – such as the rise of populist parties in Europe
– can be viewed as a symptom of middle class decline (OECD 2016). The increase in the appeal of
anti-immigration or anti-globalisation parties can arise as a result of a stagnant or shrinking middle
class. This in turn creates a sense of disillusionment which turns voters towards more radical, anti-
establishment parties (Bettiza 2010).
The middle class lifestyle is a framework for societal and political stability. This model - based generally
on the goals of a good education, stable job, secure property rights, decent pension – is underpinned by
an aspiration of a better life, particularly for the next generation (Drea 2018). It is the model that has
been the bedrock of the appeal of centrist political parties since the beginnings of the current European
integration process in the 1950s. It is “a middle-class lifestyle sustaining a middle ground politics”
(O’Toole 2019). However, as politics in countries as diverse as Italy, the Netherlands and Czechia
demonstrate, middle class dissatisfaction can have a direct impact on parliamentary democracies. This
can, at least in part, be viewed as representing the alienation of middle class voters from traditional
22 A median household income refers to the income level earned by a given household where half of the homes earn more
and half earn less. It’s used instead of the average or mean household income because it can give a more accurate picture of
actual economic status.
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political parties. This, in turn, forms an important part of the even wider process whereby new political
movements are explicitly seeking to challenge the existing status quo in political affairs.
Such middle class discontent also brings into focus clear societal divisions which have emerged over the
past decade. In terms of geography (urban v rural), technology (savvy v lacking skills), demographics
(generational inequality), employment status (permanent contract v more precarious work) and societal
values (open v closed). It is impossible to discuss any of these issues, or to attempt to identify prevailing
European trends, without rst acknowledging the centrality of the middle classes to the cleavages
increasingly being witnessed in this age of discontent.
New Members, Old Problems?
In the aftermath of the past decade of crises, it has become commonplace to label national differences
at EU level as representing an East versus West divide. However, at least when it comes to the middle
classes, the research from Czechia indicates no fundamental geographical division. Rather, there exists
a similar pattern of middle class unease resulting from a shared disappointment on multiple levels.
Disappointments that differ in their focus depending both on the unique national characteristics of the
state involved and its relative level of economic and social development.
For example, in France, the emergence of the gilets jaunes (yellow vest) movement highlights how
long held concerns regarding the rural-urban divide, taxation and the provision (or lack of) of local
services can give rise to a much deeper groundswell of discontent. In part, the well-established post-war
social models of most Western European countries have mitigated the worst impacts of the recent crises
(Darvos and Wolff 2016). But, in the long term, these socio-economic safety nets have also contributed
to the current malaise. Combined with issues such as marginal income growth, lingering unemployment
and a feeling of insecurity caused by both technological change and global trade, a pervasive sense
of frustration has seeped both upwards (into the middle class) and downwards (towards lower paid
families).
Such feelings are not limited to France. Ireland, the UK, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands and many other
countries have experienced movements protesting the perceived stagnation of the middle classes. This
in turn, if given the correct political conditions, can fuel a surge in support for more populist political
parties from both sides of the political spectrum. From a macro perspective, at least three common
characteristics across all these countries are evident.
First, a feeling that inequalities are increasing at all levels, but particularly in an economic, geographical
and age-related context. Second, is the belief that middle class families are having to work harder and
harder just to stand still. In effect, highlighting that it is getting more and more difcult to achieve social
mobility and to ensure a higher standard of living for the next generation. This issue shows how the
aspirational element of traditional middle class families is decreasing. Third, is the increased feeling of
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insecurity, particularly with regard to economic circumstances. For example, in the UK, research has
shown that nearly two thirds of professional, junior managerial and administrative workers would nd it
hard to pay an unexpected bill of £500 or more (YouGov/Times 2016). This issue is generally associated
with issues such as technological change, housing and globalisation.
Within Czechia, the economic context remains strong and will likely remain so in the medium term.
Notwithstanding fears of a wider global slowdown, growth in Czechia will remain close to 3% in 2020
with the economy at full employment (European Commission 2019). This strong economic performance
highlights that the issue of middle-class dissatisfaction, particularly with more traditional, centre-right
political parties, is not solely an economic issue.
Interestingly, the past two decades have seen much of Central and Eastern Europe adopt a distinctly
pro-market, liberal economic model supported by the EU. However, this economic liberalisation – as
welcome as it is needed – has not answered the fundamental questions about what kind of society should
this prosperity give rise to. In the West, with a longer history of market growth, this issue emerges as
a middle class malaise, a dissatisfaction with declining mobility and a growing acceptance that our
children’s generation will lack the income, occupational and property security enjoyed by all post-war
generations. In a sense, the expectations of a better life for our children (the “expectations dilemma”)
has been replaced by a fear of the future, underpinned by outdated social market economic models from
the 1950s.
This history of Central and Eastern Europe dictates a differing focus. Here, unresolved societal questions
have again given rise to an expectation’s dilemma, albeit with a different tenor. Here a strong economic
context provides a level of discontent based on the perception of falling behind other sections of society.
A feeling that Czechia should be converging quicker with older EU member states. A perception that EU
membership has not delivered the societal benets that many initially hoped for. In fact, one could argue
that the rapid economic progress enjoyed by countries such as Czechia has brought into sharper focus
longer-standing divisions in society. Clear divisions between those you have benetted from economic
growth (“winners”) and those perceived as having missed out (“losers”).
The context of middle class dissatisfaction can appear very different in, for example, France and
Czechia. However, a more subtle analysis highlights that underpinning both examples is a deep sense of
insecurity. A perception that we should be doing better. A belief that overall inequalities are increasing
(aided by technological change and globalisation). A view that traditional political parties, particularly
on the centre-right and centre-left, have forgotten large sections of society and have lost the ability to
deliver the ingredients necessary for a middle class lifestyle. These are problems viewed by many who
see the challenges facing their children in establishing successful lives today.
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Can the Centre Deliver a Middle-Class Lifestyle?
All across Europe centrist political parties are searching for the means to hold the middle-ground against
populists on both the left and right. In reality many centrist parties have sought to tack towards the
direction of the populist gale in order to attempt to maintain their position with the electorate. But such
an approach misreads the real motivations behind voters attracted to populist parties. It is not rational
economic arguments that sway voters towards embracing populist rhetoric, but rather it is more emotive,
and perception driven policies which places “their” worries as an important national question.
Here it is important to understand that populist parties are uid in their interpretation of national
challenges. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) was initially established out of opposition to the Germany
governments position on the Eurozone crisis. It subsequently embraced the issue of migration as a tool
to increase its popularity. Similarly, Marine Le Pen’s (National Rally) policy to hold a referendum on
leaving the Euro before the 2014 European elections was subsequently dropped as public support for the
single currency remained relatively constant during the Greek crisis.
In this context, the embrace of populist positions by traditional centre-right parties will have no long-
term benet. The populists will subsequently pivot to other issues in which they see greater electoral
benet, while more centrist voters will feel alienated by the embrace of more extreme positions. In either
outcome, traditional political parties will be exposed.
For those centrist politicians, the key question should be about how to re-establish a pathway towards
an aspirational middle class lifestyle. The objective must be to deliver on: “The great promise was that,
if you can just get a good education, you will enjoy a secure middle-class lifestyle and be better off than
your parents. Broadly, our hyper capitalist societies have managed the rst part but failed on the second”
(O’Toole 2019).
Restoring an Aspirational Middle Class
So, what should centre-right political parties focus on in order to strengthen and rejuvenate the middle
classes? Firstly, it is important to acknowledge that there is no one size ts all policy that can easily
remedy the obvious challenges. Each member state is characterised by specic national priorities which
largely determines the policy options available. Secondly, and here is where the East-West debate
becomes relevant, the appropriate response in older member states should be different from that required
in countries such as Czechia.
Older member states are largely dened by low (and slowing) economic growth and a broad sense of
middle class stagnation. These states generally possess well developed social security support systems.
However, these are structures developed in the 1950s and do not reect the realities of the 21st century
in terms of worker mobility, non-standard working and pension portability. Member states, such as Italy,
France and Spain, are also burdened by relatively high public debt levels and often do not have the
required scal space to undertake wholesale structural reforms programmes.
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For countries such as these the primary response of centre-right parties should be economic in the short-
term. The purpose should be to reduce the burden of taxation on working families, to reinvigorate the
economic base and to ensure that middle-class workers feel a pathway to increased social mobility and
job security. This is a multi-faceted challenge which requires, among other policies, signicant tax and
social security reform, educational modernisation and a signicantly greater focus on issues such as
gender equality and childcare.
In a way the challenge is twofold. In the short term the goal should be to provide solutions to the every
day problems facing working families. In this context, lowering the tax burden for average earnings,
ensuring affordable, accessible and high-quality childcare provision and providing sufcient educational
and retraining opportunities for all those seeking employment. However, in the longer term the much
more signicant challenge relates to recalibrating the taxation, social security and education models to
better t the realities of working life today. It is only through a fundamental deep reform process can the
levels of discontent evidenced in France, and other countries, be truly addressed. In both periods a focus
on mainstreaming policies that combat climate change are an absolute prerequisite.
In newer EU member states, such as Czechia the challenge is of a much more socio-economic type. In
this context, the objective is not to pursue economic growth to the detriment of social cohesion. Rather,
the focus should be on delivering on middle-class expectations of a healthy, inclusive society. Centre-
right parties must utilise the positive economic climate to support middle class families in their everyday
lives. Issues such as childcare, gender equality (due to the prevalence of the dual earner model), property
security and occupational equality are essential in helping to stabilise working families in this age of
huge technological change.
In every EU member state centre-right political parties also need to combat the expectations dilemma
at both ends of the demographic spectrum. Italy provides a clear example of how this problem is
fuelling discontent with mainstream political parties. For the young, there is a clear understanding
of how serious the problems are due to the difculty in nding secure employment and the resultant
delays in establishing independent family units. They understand that they will probably not enjoy the
employment or retirement security available to their parents. However, their parents’ generation nd it
hard to understand that those privileges (which they take from granted) and now impossible to sustain
for younger generations (Bitetti and Morganti 2018).
Conclusion
For the centre-right, the key challenge is to ensure that the traditional aspirations of the middle class
– job, children’s education, property rights and secure retirement – can continue to be achieved in a
landscape increasingly pockmarked by employment and nancial uncertainty.
As Czechia shows, this concept of middle class unrest, is not just a Western, or Southern European
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phenomenon. In reality, it represents a much deeper distrust of the traditional political system owing to
a widening of inequalities in society. These inequalities are often based on age, location, gender and
occupational status. The example of Czechia is also important because it highlights that the restoration
of middle class mobility relates to more than just income levels and economics. Ultimately, it is about
building a society which can foster a better, more stable environment for our children’s generation and
beyond.
For centre-right political parties there are no easy answers. There is not one single policy that can
immediately return stability and security to the middle sections of society. However, as this chapter
has highlighted, a mixture of economic and social changes are required to enable hard working middle
class families to maintain and improve their position in society. Although the type of policy mix should
be based at a national level reecting domestic preferences and priorities there is a political imperative
to initially focus on policies that can bring clear benets to working families. Therefore, issues such as
childcare, education, gender equality, access to affordable property and tax reform should play a central
role in developing a new middle class narrative.
In a way, the middle class discontent in countries such as Czechia highlight its impressive economic
performance over the past two decades. It is hard to develop an economy that can grow sustainably.
But it is even harder to develop a society in which the dividend of that economic growth are distributed
effectively. That is the much harder challenge for Czechia in the longer term. For it is only in building
both a strong economy and a strong society that citizens will really have the condence to live a life less
ordinary.
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Conclusion
Lucie Tungul and Jaroslav Poláček
The process of European integration has considerably accelerated in the last thirty years, as Czechia
has embarked on the path of democratisation. Europe is a civilisation phenomenon, an interdependent
society, but also a place of great political, cultural and economic differences. The EU is a symbol of
trying to nd common solutions to various problems in order to create an inclusive society based on
solidarity instead of conict. The EU seeks long-term economic and political stability by increasing
cohesion and reducing economic and social poverty at the time when the gap between the rich and the
poor23 is widening. Part of this process is a growing awareness that the traditional concept of the middle
class, which has been the basis of the national political and economic system since the end of World War
II as well as the backbone of European integration, has changed. The middle class was a bearer of the
concept of responsible citizenship, of a strong local and European identity based on shared values of a
liberal democracy, a responsible market economy, and of a sense of belonging to the local community,
the national state and the European project.
Despite many national specic features, the European middle class is facing many identical problems.
It is forced to cope with different cultures, history and traditions. Human society and coexistence are
governed by rules which have been mostly created by previous generations, which provide stability
and predictability, but which can also be problematic with regard to the adaptation to new challenges
and the search for a balance between the stability of traditions and values and the exible response to
new problems. The European Union addresses a wide range of issues that directly affect the middle
class, such as the single market, education, employment, information technology and environmental
protection. All these issues are crucial for the contemporary middle class although its traditional leaders
often differ in their attitudes towards how to respond to these problems adequately. There is also a strong
polarisation and, according to some, even a middle class disintegration.
The developments after 1989 inuenced the values of Czech society and also signicantly inuenced the
direction of the Czech middle class. When it was renewed, there were more possibilities for becoming a
part of the middle class, new opportunities, greater application of higher qualications, new technologies,
but also problems such as those of adjusting to the changes in the labour market. Due to the boom of
private entrepreneurship and thanks to their increased focus on services in the economy, small business
entrepreneurs played a crucial role in the transformation of the Czech middle class after 1989. Small
23 The distribution of capital slowly changes from a normal distribution (bell-shaped curve) to an exponential curve -
the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer. New technologies brought changes, which increase prots and
productivity but many people are excluded from this process by the nature of their profession. They will face lower standards
of living and unemployment in the future. For more, see for example Brynjolfsson, E., McAfee, A., 2014. The Second
Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of b‘Brilliant Technologies. New York: W W Norton.
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and medium-sized enterprises are an example of how the denition of the middle class has become
more dynamic, with income being one of the key variables but including other important factors such as
occupational prestige and cultural capital.
Our publication demonstrates why the middle class is important today, pointing out its inuence and
impact on the country’s economic and political structure, in spite of the changes it has undergone and
is still going through. We were interested in the denition of the middle class and in the question as to
whether signicant differences can be seen within the middle class and between its individual segments
according to political mentality, their concerns and motivation. We were interested in attitudes to
political engagement and European integration. Despite the problematic denition of the middle class,
this concept has proved to be useful for a better understanding of Czech society and helps us grasp the
nature and sources of inequality in Czech society that have an impact on all three spheres: political,
economic and social.
The economic dimension of our analysis focused on small entrepreneurs as major participants in the
Czech economy, who played an important role in the restructuring of the economy but who are also crucial
for its growth and further development, including foreign trade, where they focus most on the European
single market. According to Zemplinerová et al., the middle class with a strong business core is an
important component of a stable political system.24 Similarly to Charvát and Maškarinec, who concluded
in this publication that municipalities with a lower number of entrepreneurs and higher unemployment
show higher successes of the populist parties ANO 2011 and SPD, the authors Zemplinerová et al. have
demonstrated that centre and centre-right democratic parties have the greatest support in the regions
with a higher proportion of self-employed people with higher incomes. They draw attention, however,
to the weaknesses of the income-oriented approach and conrm the need for a more comprehensive
assessment of the socio-economic situation of the population, as it is shown in the next part of their
chapter on digitalisation.
With regard to the challenges of digitalisation and industry 4.0,25 the authors mention the advent of a
new middle class that enhances human capital and is characterised by higher education, entrepreneurship
and engagement in specialised or creative activities. Although its number is not small within the middle
class and is gradually increasing (its importance is also demonstrated by our segmentation), Czechia is
still dominated by the old middle class focused mainly on economic capital. It is also most endangered
by digitalisation in its broad sense and, according to the authors, there will be a need to monitor this
situation (labour market polarisation and higher wage differentiation) and prepare for it in the form of
adequate responses, especially with regard to the fact that the middle class is not subjectively aware
24 In his chapter, Drea also combined a strong middle class with economic growth and political stability.
25 For the reection on the future of working in the digital age, see Turk, Ž, 2019. A Conservative or a Progressive Future
of Work? In: Tungul, L., ed. The Czech Centre-Right Solutions to the Political Challenges of 2019. [online]. Available at:
http://www.top-az.eu/les/downloads/topaz-pravicova-reseni-politickych-vyzev-pro-rok-2019.pdf (4 September 2019).
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of this threat as the chapter by Kudrnáč and Škodová indicates. The new possibilities presented by the
authors, such as self-employment, “work from anywhere”, decentralisation, and work in project teams,
must be better reected in the legislative and working environment of Czechia, which requires sufcient
political will. In the case of adequate and timely responses, the political representation could prepare
for the Czech middle class an environment that responds to its main concerns by strengthening social
mobility, labour market exibility, facilitating the way to homeownership, and by a modern family
policy that enables a balance between family and working life, thereby increasing the quality of life of
the middle class.26 For the needs of the middle class, the authors primarily propose the support of self-
employment and the support of small and medium-sized companies, which requires a stable economic
(and political) environment and an appropriate education system.
A large part of the Czech middle class engages in public affairs and participates in shaping policies that
affect their present and future life. It is also essential as regards investing in human capital, including
education and housing. The political dimension of the middle class is crucial for the political stability
of the system since “combating further downsizing and polarisation of the middle class is essential
for combating the rise of nationalism, protectionism, and populism in the next European elections”
(Movarelli 2019). A growing number of people with a good level of education and belonging to the so-
called middle class share populist views, as was discussed in the chapter by Charvát and Maškarinec in
the context of intra-system and extra-system volatility that increased in Czechia after 2010; the intra-
system volatility also maintained its high level after 2017. They have shown that, as almost everywhere
else in Europe (see Drea), the middle class is divided and that people belonging to the middle and
upper classes often choose those political groups that move on the edge of populism. As was apparent
in Charvát and Maškarinec, ANO 2011 did not have the highest electoral support only in the segments
of Young liberals/Young digital elite (dominant in these sectors were the Pirates, ODS, TOP 09, and
STAN). The left-right division seems to be losing its importance as concerns understanding the electoral
behaviour of the Czech middle class, which was historically closest to the moderate right. According
to Charvát and Maškarinec, these developments are associated with the mobilisation of grievances:
economic (privatisation, austerity, reforms), migration, ethnic injustice (Roma), and political elitism
and corruption. The autors argue that the dissatisfaction is related to the poor perfomance of the
Czech governments, the impression that caretaker governments are less conicting, and to a loss of
condence in political institutions. All these factors resulted in the rise of technocratic populism as it is
best represented by ANO 2011. The authors claim that this party best managed to mobilise the above-
mentioned grievances across almost all segments, including the middle class.
As in other countries, part of the middle class in Czechia has a prevalent feeling of losing identity with
26 For example, see Kalíšková, K., 2019. The Current Structure of the Czech Family Policy and Its Impact on Families and
Employment. In: Tungul, L. ed., 2019. The Czech Centre-Right Solutions to the Political Challenges of 2019. [online]. Available
at: http://www.top-az.eu/les/downloads/topaz-pravicova-reseni-politickych-vyzev-pro-rok-2019.pdf (5 September 2019).
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the elite social stratum. The emotion was compounded by the migration crisis, which only escalated
the latent feeling of injustice and incomprehensibility of politics. It can be argued that the feeling of
job security (stable and sufcient income) continues to diminish and the cost of living increases. In his
chapter, Eoin Drea also mentions the dangers of advancing antisystemic parties as a result of the growing
disillusion of the middle class. He claims that the stability of