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What causes the insight memory advantage?
Abstract
Prior research indicates that solutions accompanied by an Aha! experience are remembered better than those missing this feeling of epiphany. The question for the present studies was whether this insight memory advantage for problem solutions is modulated by the affective component of insight (the strong feelings that typically accompany the Aha! experience), or by the cognitive component (the restructuring or representational change that occurs during insightful problem solving). In both studies, participants viewed a set of magic trick videos to generate solutions for how each trick was done, and memory for the generated solutions was tested after a week delay. They also indicated the extent to which they experienced an Aha! moment at solution along with other perceptions of their experience. In the second study, they additionally rated the relevance of five action verbs for each trick (including one that implied the correct solution) multiple times during solution as a measure of restructuring the problem representation. The explanation for the insight memory advantage that was best supported by the results is that it is the joint consequence of finding correct solutions, the subjective feeling that one has found a correct solution (certainty), and experiencing an emotional pleasurable reaction during the problem solving process that all contribute to better memory for the solution. However, it did not seem to rely on having reached the solution via a sudden restructuring process.
... The positive experience of insight may have several practical consequences. such as motivating future problem-solving, increasing persistence, affecting a person's willingness to take a risk based on the solution (Yu et al., 2023;Salvi & Bowden, 2020), and making solutions more memorable (e.g., Danek et al., 2013;Danek & Wiley, 2020;)(see also Laukkonen and Danek & Wiley,Chapters 9 & 10,this volume) The Epilogue ...
... The Aha! experience could be an adaptive mechanism that reinforces the exploration of new problem-solving strategies . Most emotions have an adaptive function, and feelings of pleasure that accompany an insight seem to signal the probable utility of a solution because solutions via insight are more likely to be correct and are better remembered than those via analysis (Danek & Salvi, 2018;Danek & Wiley, 2020;Laukkonen et al., 2023;. Thus, the emotional response associated with insight may be evolutionally advantageous (Danek & Salvi, 2018;Laukkonen et al., 2023;Salvi, 2024). ...
... Later, they demonstrated how pleasure, enjoyment, and happiness, together with a strong certainty about the accuracy of the found solution, are distinctive landmarks of insight solutions (Danek & Wiley, 2017;Shen, Yuan, Liu, & Luo, 2016). Further, Danek and Wiley (2020) asked people to rate the intensity of the Aha!, and then asked participants to recall those solutions after one week. Solutions associated with more intense Aha! experiences were better remembered and more accurate than those without an Aha! or with a less intense Aha!, plus better memory was predicted by solution accuracy (replicating the results of Danek et al., 2013and Laukkonen et al., 2021, but also Kizilirmak et al., 2016. ...
In this chapter, we argue that differences in problem-solving experiences can be traced to differences in the activation of brain structures involved in the unconscious processing of information (what we refer to as “the backstage”). Scientists commonly distinguish between two major types of problem-solving experiences: via insight and via analysis. Three properties are often mentioned when describing how insight solutions differ from analytic solutions: (1) Solvers are unable to report much of the processing that leads to the solution which comes to mind in an off–on manner; (2) Solvers experience their solutions together with a feeling of pleasure and reward; (3) Solutions via insight feel correct and they actually are. This is captured by a distinctive response: the Aha! This chapter focuses on these three properties and argues that unconscious processes are important for problem-solving in general, but especially important for insight experiences because most of the processing that leads to the solution happens below awareness. It also argues that the positive affect associated with insight serves an adaptive function.
... These include intrinsically motivating events, such as novel or emotional experiences, as well as extrinsically motivating events, such as remembering information for reward or the risk of punishment for forgetting (Shohamy & Adcock, 2010;Murty & Adcock, 2014). Research on creative problem-solving shows that idea generation accompanied by a feeling of insight enhances memory for both the problem and the solution (Danek & Wiley 2020;Becker et al., 2022;Danek & Wiley, 2020;Kizilirmak & Becker, 2023;Danek et al., 2013;Kizilirmak et al., 2015;Shen et al., 2020). Solving a problem is an intrinsically pleasing and rewarding event (Danek & Wiley, 2017;Shen et al., 2016Shen et al., , 2018. ...
... These include intrinsically motivating events, such as novel or emotional experiences, as well as extrinsically motivating events, such as remembering information for reward or the risk of punishment for forgetting (Shohamy & Adcock, 2010;Murty & Adcock, 2014). Research on creative problem-solving shows that idea generation accompanied by a feeling of insight enhances memory for both the problem and the solution (Danek & Wiley 2020;Becker et al., 2022;Danek & Wiley, 2020;Kizilirmak & Becker, 2023;Danek et al., 2013;Kizilirmak et al., 2015;Shen et al., 2020). Solving a problem is an intrinsically pleasing and rewarding event (Danek & Wiley, 2017;Shen et al., 2016Shen et al., , 2018. ...
... Such an experience often is externalized by exclamations, such as Aha!, when the solver achieves a solution surprise and excitement or D-oh! when the solution is revealed to the solver after having a failure, indexing a feeling of obviousness but also satisfied curiosity. The memory enhancement for solutions reached via insight, versus solutions reached without insight, is referred to as the "insight memory advantage" (Danek & Wiley, 2020). Interestingly, affective experiences not only promote long-term memory for the target information but can extend to neutral incidental information that happened to be presented close in time to the salient aspects of the experience (Murphy et al., 2021). ...
Research on creative problem-solving finds that solutions achieved via spontaneous insight (i.e., Aha! moment) are better remembered than solutions reached without this sense of epiphany, referred to as an “insight memory advantage.” We hypothesized that the insight memory advantage can spread to incidental information encoded in the moments surrounding insight as well. Participants (N = 291) were first given Rebus puzzles. After they indicated that they had found a solution, but before they could submit this solution, they were presented with scholastic facts that were incidental and unrelated to the problem at hand. Participants indicated whether they reached the solution via either insight or a step-by-step analysis. Memory results showed better performance for incidental scholastic facts presented when problem solving was accompanied by a spontaneous (Aha! experience) and induced (D’oh! experience) insight compared with solutions reached with analysis. This finding suggests that the memory advantage for problems solved via insight spreads to other unrelated information encoded in close temporal proximity and has implications for novel techniques to enhance learning in educational settings.
... The generation effect entails that items actively generated by individuals such as forming associations, word-stem completion or drawings, are better retained compared to those passively processed [26], [27]. This effect appearing consistent across different insight tasks and subsequent memory assessment methods [3], [4], [10], [28], [29], [30] is believed to involve heightened cognitive effort leading to deeper processing levels [31]. However, this effect improves memory for solutions regardless of whether insight is involved or not, indicating it is not specific to insight. ...
... An important question is what aspects of the Aha! experience are primarily responsible for the IMA. find that affective aspects of the Aha!, such as pleasure, but also confidence in the solution's correctness predict enhanced subsequent memory [3]. The latter finding on confidence in the solution's correctness aligns with evidence indicating that newly generated information that fits well with existing semantic knowledge or schemas, tends to be better remembered [39]. ...
... Here, the solution's memorability depends on how well this new piece of information fits into the solver's prior knowledge base [109]. In insights, the new information seems to align particularly well with prior knowledge because insightful solutions are not only rated with greater confidence in their correctness [3], [18], [21], [40], [110], but they prove to be more frequently correct compared to solutions attained without insight [41], [49], [111], [112]. Importantly, this insight-related greater confidence and accuracy are associated with better subsequent memory [3]. ...
Creativity and memory are intertwined: memory accesses existing knowledge, while
creativity enhances it. Recent evidence links memory enhancement with insight or
"Aha!" moments, often accompanying creative solutions. Behavioral studies have
shown that solutions with accompanied insight are better remembered later.
While neuroscientific evidence regarding this insight memory advantage (IMA)
remains limited, we propose three underlying mechanisms: a noradrenergic arousal
circuitry involving the amygdala, dopaminergic reward-prediction pathways in
SN/VTA, ventral striatum and hippocampus, and efficient integration of novel
information into existing schemas mediated by medial prefrontal cortex.
These mechanisms likely synergistically enable rapid learning with insights.
Understanding the neural basis of the IMA holds implications for education and
problem-solving strategies. Further research is essential for leveraging this IMA in
practical contexts.
... Insight is usually measured via self-ratings of the AHA! experience which was previously quantified in a binary way as present or absent (Jung-Beeman et al. 42 ; for review Kounios and Beeman 43 ). However, recent studies have shown that the AHA! experience is a continuous phenomenon consisting of multiple components, in particular (1) positive emotional response upon solution finding, (2) perceived suddenness of the solution and (3) certainty about the correctness of solution 3,44 . For this reason, we assessed the AHA! experience on a continuous scale (from 1 to 7) and described the concept to the participants as follows: "Insight describes the sudden and certain understanding of a problem that often involves an AHA!-experience. ...
... Assessing insight. Similar to Study 1, insight was assessed via the AHA! experience on a continuous scale (1-4) but here split into its three main components (positive emotion, certainty and suddenness; see previous section: Mooney identification paradigm) in line with previous research 3,44 . For better comparability with Study 1, we summed up all three scales into one continuous compound insight measure ranging from 3 to 12. Similar to Study 1, the AHA! experience is analyzed as a continuous but also as a binary measure via median split into high (HI-I) and low (LO-I) insight. ...
... While insight is usually accompanied by correct ideas 45 , it can also bias the perceived truthfulness of an idea or fact, particularly when it arises in close temporal proximity to an AHA! experience making a false fact seem more true 7,8 . Furthermore, insight also increases memory for the solved problem and its content 6,44,67 . The behavioral impact of insight is thought to be related to the emotional component of insight 35,3644 . ...
During insightful problem solving, the solution appears unexpectedly and is accompanied by the feeling of an AHA!. Research suggests that this affective component of insight can have consequences beyond the solution itself by motivating future behavior, such as risky (high reward and high uncertainty) decision making. Here, we investigate the behavioral and neural support for the motivational role of AHA in decision making involving monetary choices. The positive affect of the AHA! experience has been linked to internal reward. Reward in turn has been linked to dopaminergic signal transmission in the Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc) and risky decision making. Therefore, we hypothesized that insight activates reward-related brain areas, modulating risky decision making. We tested this hypothesis in two studies. First, in a pre-registered online study (Study 1), we demonstrated the behavioral effect of insight-related increase in risky decision making using a visual Mooney identification paradigm. Participants were more likely to choose the riskier monetary payout when they had previously solved the Mooney image with high compared to low accompanied AHA!. Second, in an fMRI study (Study 2), we measured the effects of insight on NAcc activity using a similar Mooney identification paradigm to the one of Study 1. Greater NAcc activity was found when participants solved the Mooney image with high vs low AHA!. Taken together, our results link insight to enhanced NAcc activity and a preference for high but uncertain rewards, suggesting that insight enhances reward-related brain areas possibly via dopaminergic signal transmission, promoting risky decision making.
... Indeed, a series of recent studies have found a memory advantage for solutions accompanied by insight (Danek et al., 2013;Engelhard et al., 2019;Kizilirmak et al., 2016). Crucially, the feeling component of insight appears to specifically drive the memory advantage (Danek and Wiley, 2020). There is also growing evidence that feelings of insight can lead to attentional capture and interrupt ongoing trains of thought (Kounios et al., 2006(Kounios et al., , 2008Salvi et al., 2015). ...
... This framework integrates processes of the mind, brain, body, and behaviour, under a single process known as prediction-error minimization (Friston, 2010;Hohwy, 2013). As yet, the process of sudden discovery and 'Aha!' experiences that characterize insight (Bowden et al., 2005;Danek et al., 2020; have not been fully integrated under this Bayesian inferential view of mind (Clark, 2013;Friston et al., 2017;Hohwy, 2013). Here, we sketch the fundamentals of this framework because it shows promise as a context for understanding the dynamics and functions of the Aha! experience including the Eureka Heuristic. ...
... Although Friston et al. (2017) show that an artificial agent demonstrates the hallmarks of Aha!, they define this as a 'qualitative transition' in knowledge and understanding. However, not all solutions that appear suddenly are accompanied by an Aha! experience (Laukkonen and Tangen, 2018; and the relationship between restructuring and feelings of Aha!, although usually present, is rather modest (Cushen and Wiley, 2012;Danek et al., 2020;. Moreover, 'Aha!' moments can have recursive consequences beyond the emergence of an idea, by affecting belief, memory, and judgment (Danek and Wiley, 2020;Dougal and Schooler, 2007;Laukkonen et al., 2021b;Laukkonen et al., 2020). ...
Perhaps it is no accident that insight moments accompany some of humanity's most important discoveries in science, medicine, and art. Here we propose that feelings of insight play a central role in (heuristically) selecting an idea from the stream of consciousness by capturing attention and eliciting a sense of intuitive confidence permitting fast action under uncertainty. The mechanisms underlying this Eureka heuristic are explained within an active inference framework. First, implicit restructuring via Bayesian reduction leads to a higher-order prediction error (i.e., the content of insight). Second, dopaminergic precision-weighting of the prediction error accounts for the intuitive confidence, pleasure, and attentional capture (i.e., the feeling of insight). This insight as precision account is consistent with the phenomenology, accuracy, and neural unfolding of insight, as well as its effects on belief and decision-making. We conclude by reflecting on dangers of the Eureka Heuristic, including the arising and entrenchment of false beliefs and the vulnerability of insights under psychoactive substances and misinformation.
... To be specific, insight is a sudden understanding of a new relationship among known stimuli, accompanied by the Aha experience, which includes emotional and cognitive components (Kizilirmak et al. 2016a;Shen et al. 2018). Since Köhler (1917) first proposed the concept of insight, more and more researchers have carried out detailed studies from the perspectives of cognition and emotion (Danek and Wiley 2020;Kizilirmak et al. 2016a;Shen et al. 2017). On the one hand, during insightful problem solving, sudden changes in the problem representation and restructuring process occur, which are considered to be the cognitive components of insight (Bilalić et al. 2021;Danek and Wiley 2020;Knoblich et al. 1999;Ohlsson 1992Ohlsson , 2011. ...
... Since Köhler (1917) first proposed the concept of insight, more and more researchers have carried out detailed studies from the perspectives of cognition and emotion (Danek and Wiley 2020;Kizilirmak et al. 2016a;Shen et al. 2017). On the one hand, during insightful problem solving, sudden changes in the problem representation and restructuring process occur, which are considered to be the cognitive components of insight (Bilalić et al. 2021;Danek and Wiley 2020;Knoblich et al. 1999;Ohlsson 1992Ohlsson , 2011. On the other hand, the Aha experience is the key to distinguishing insight from non-insight, as well as from surprise, certainty, happiness and so on (Danek et al. 2014;Kaplan and Simon 1990;Shen et al. 2016;Sternberg and Davidson 1995;Topolinski and Reber 2010). ...
... They found that participants recognized ads with induced insight better than those with non-insight. In addition, Danek and Wiley (2020) used magic tricks as experimental materials and reported that, after a week, solutions with an Aha experience were recalled better than those without an Aha experience. ...
The insight memory advantage refers to the situation in which memory performance could be improved by solving a problem with an Aha experience. In re-solution tests and recognition tests, studies demonstrate an insight memory advantage by spontaneous insight or induced insight. For the re-solution test, the neural mechanisms of the effect of induced insight were studied by the fMRI technique. However, the neural mechanisms of the effect of insight on re-solution in the temporal dimension were not known. The neural mechanisms of the effect of spontaneous insight on re-solution were not known. In the present study, we use the compound remote-associated (CRA) task to reveal the neural mechanisms of the effect of spontaneous insight on re-solution by the event-related potentials (ERPs) technique. The 25 participants were asked to solve a series of Chinese verbal CRA tasks and then perform a re-solution test 1 day later. Our results indicated that the solution with the Aha experience evoked a larger N400 in the early solution phase and a more negative wave in the late solution phase than the solution with no Aha experience. In the re-solution phase, items with an Aha during the solution phase were re-solved better with higher Aha rates than items with no Aha. In the re-solution phase, compared with items with no Aha, items with an Aha during the solution phase evoked a larger positive ERP in the 250 to 350 ms time window in the early phase, and a more negative deflection before the response (−900 to −800 ms) in the later phase. In one word, spontaneous insight during the solution phase could promote re-solution and elicit ERP deflection in the re-solution phase.
... As an alternative and potentially complementary account, we note that Danek and Wiley (2020) have proposed that the so-called "insight memory advantage" in problem solving is a joint consequence of finding a correct solution, the subjective feeling that one has found a correct solution and the emotional experience of pleasure that manifests in the "Aha!" moment. The subjective feeling of certainty that arises with insight or "Aha!" moments (see also Threadgold et al., 2018) appears to originate in the unconscious system. ...
... The emotional component of the insight memory advantage that is discussed by Danek and Wiley (2020) has extensive support in the literature, with evidence demonstrating that insight is inherently rewarding (Oh et al., 2020) and is accompanied by positive emotional experiences such as pleasure (Chermahini & Hommel, 2010;Salvi et al., 2015;Shen et al., 2016Shen et al., , 2018. Indeed, evidence suggests that insight-induced positive emotional experiences arise from activation of the brain's dopamine-based reward system, which is itself known to strengthen memory consolidation (see Oh et al., 2020;Salvi et al., 2015;Tik et al., 2018). ...
... In addition, and as discussed above, once viewers suddenly understand what at first seemed to be incomprehensible, they will experience pleasure, which will further enhance their subsequent long-term memory of this understanding (cf. Danek & Wiley, 2020;Shen et al., 2016Shen et al., , 2018. As such, this process could engender an association between insight intensity and the intensity of emotion accompanying the insight induced by appreciating the creative advertisement. ...
To maximize marketing effectiveness many conscious and unconscious elements are simultaneously employed within campaign advertising. However, little is known about the individual contributions that conscious and unconscious processes make to the cognitive effectiveness of creative advertisements, some of which may also induce insight experiences. To quantify the roles of conscious and unconscious processes in memory effectiveness within commercial advertising, a dual-process, signal-detection technique was adopted to separate the contributions of conscious recollection and unconscious discrimination induced by 80 printed advertisements, among which half were considered standard and the other half creative. A total of 51 participants completed immediate (5 minutes later) and delayed (3 days later) memory recognition tests. In contrast to standard advertising, creative advertising was found to enhance recognition and to demonstrate advantages in both conscious and unconscious memory, which decreased across the test-time intervals. Further analyses showed that a moment of insight induced by an advertisement, regardless of whether it is standard or creative, can consolidate unconscious memory, whereas advertisements that do not induce insight improve conscious memory. The implications of these findings are discussed.
... We found that generation via insight, compared to analysis, was negatively associated with the memory of the presented base concepts. While this result is consistent with the deliberate processing benefit as discussed above, it highlights the difference between the current study and previous creativity research that evidenced an insight memory advantage (Danek et al., 2013;Danek & Wiley, 2020;Kizilirmak, Thuerich, et al., 2016;Ludmer et al., 2011). Prior insight memory research has mostly targeted the memory of the solution in a convergent task context and found that solutions generated via insight were better remembered. ...
... In convergent tasks, different emotional components: surprise, certainty, and pleasure, appear to be highly correlated in Aha! moments (Becker et al., 2023;Danek et al., 2014;Danek & Wiley, 2017;Hedne et al., 2016). The insight memory advantage has been particularly attributed to the feeling of certainty and pleasure (Danek & Wiley, 2020). ...
Metaphor generation is both a creative act and a means of learning. When learning a new concept, people often create a metaphor to connect the new concept to existing knowledge. Does the manner in which people generate a metaphor, via sudden insight (Aha! moment) or deliberate analysis, influence the quality of generation and subsequent learning outcomes? According to some research, deliberate processing enhances knowledge retention; hence generation via analysis likely leads to better concept learning. However, other research has shown that solutions generated via insight are better remembered. In the current study, participants were presented with science concepts and descriptions, then generated metaphors for the concepts. They also indicated how they generated each metaphor and rated their metaphor for novelty and aptness. We assessed participants’ learning outcomes with a memory test and evaluated the creative quality of the metaphors based on self- and crowd- sourced ratings. Consistent with the deliberate processing benefit, participants became more familiar with the target science concept if they previously generated a metaphor for the concept via analysis compared to via insight. We also found that metaphors generated via analysis did not differ from metaphors generated via insight in quality (aptness or novelty) nor in how well they were remembered. However, participants' self-evaluations of metaphors generated via insight showed more agreement with independent raters, suggesting the role of insight in modulating the creative ideation process. These preliminary findings have implications for understanding the nature of insight during idea generation and its impact on learning.
... Most research on aha-experiences has been conducted with experiments (Jarman, 2014), and several experimental methods have been developed to induce aha-experiences (Webb et al., 2018). Examples of tasks promoting insight and aha-experiences are magic tricks (e.g., Danek & Wiley, 2020), matchstick problems (Knoblich et al., 1999, Skaar & Reber, 2021, and the Compound Remote Associates Task (Kizilirmak et al., 2018, Laukkonen et al., 2021. No such experimental tasks have been developed for children and it is unknown whether problem-solving tasks developed for adults are suitable for inducing aha-experiences in children. ...
... Piaget's theory of cognitive development for not elaborating on which internal processes motivate cognitive development. The current study found that even infants can have ahaexperiences, and as aha-experiences have previously been shown to improve learning (Danek & Wiley, 2020;Kizilirmak et al., 2016) and enhance motivation (Liljedahl, 2005;Skaar & Reber, 2021), it may address Vygotsky's criticism. The observation that infants can have ahaexperiences suggests that aha-experiences may play a motivating role in cognitive development from an early age. ...
Previous research has revealed that aha-experiences improve learning and enhance motivation. Hence, knowledge about aha-experiences in children may enable educators to enhance learning experiences. The current study aims to provide a basic knowledge about aha-experiences in children, for example, at what age they appear and on which topics. To answer these questions, we collected parental reports from two different populations (a Norwegian sample and an international sample of English-speaking parents). A content analysis of more than 600 stories of children's aha-experiences yielded three main findings: (1) Parents reported that children have aha-experiences already as infants; (2) Children have aha-experiences on various topics related to action and cognition; (3) The focus of the aha-stories shifts from action to cognition with age. In addition to the main findings, there are indications that children's aha-experiences share qualities with aha-experiences in adults. Our findings provide first insights into aha-experiences in infancy and childhood and may have implications for understanding what motivates children's learning and cognitive development.
... Conversely, insight-colloquially called "Aha! moment" [25] or "Eureka moment" [30]-can have the opposite effect and is often identified as a form of creativity that can result in important innovations [30]. Past research has shown that users better remember solutions when accompanied by moments of insight than when missing this feeling of epiphany [11]. Identifying the reasons that lead to such "Aha! ...
... Insight increased participants' pupil diameter, led to variations over larger amplitudes (lower min, higher max) and stronger deviations from the mean (higher SD) compared to the baseline. Previous work found insight to improve memory and creativity [11] and our results are in line with previous results that found strong links between cognitive states (e.g., cognitive load, attention) and pupil diameter [34,44]. ...
Physiological sensing often complements studies of human behavior in virtual reality (VR) to detect users' affective and cognitive states. Some psychological states, such as fear and frustration, can be particularly hard to differentiate from a physiological perspective as they are close in the arousal and valence emotional space. Moreover, it is largely unclear how users' physiological reactions are expressed in response to
transient psychological states
such as fear, frustration, and insight—especially since these are rich indicators for characterizing users' responses to dynamic systems but are hard to capture in highly interactive settings. We conducted a study (
N
= 24) to analyze participants' pulmonary, electrodermal, cardiac, and pupillary responses to moments of fear, frustration, and insight in immersive settings. Participants interacted in five VR environments, throughout which we measured their physiological reactions and analyzed the patterns we observed. We also measured subjective fear and frustration using questionnaires. We found differences between fear and frustration pupillary, respiratory, and electrodermal responses, as well as between the pupillary changes that followed fear in a horror game and those that followed fear in a vertigo experiment. We present the relationships between fear levels, frustration levels, and their physiological responses. To detect these affective events and states, we introduce user-independent binary classification models that achieved an average micro
F
1
score of 71% for detecting fear in a horror game, 75% for fear of vertigo, 76% for frustration, and 75% for insight, showing the promise for detecting these states from passive and objective signals.
... The mechanisms for the benefits of memory in the process of insight, which are best supported by the results, are that these mechanisms are a joint consequence of finding the right solutions, the subjective feeling that the person has found the right solution (confidence), and the experience of an emotional pleasant reaction (reward) while solving the problem. This is the process that all contributes to better memory for the solution [13]. ...
... Other electrophysiological data suggest that even from two opposite ERP results, it is possible to trace the features of internal and external insight [13]. Internal insight is associated with positive ERP components after stimulus onset (P200-600) above the superior temporal gyrus [15]. ...
The line of insight research methods that have high temporal and surface resolution is not large—these are EEGs, EPs, and fMRI, as well as their combinations and various options for assessing temporal events of random understanding. The objective of this research was to study the classification of insight for visual illusory images consisting of several objects simultaneously according to the analysis of early, middle, late, and ultra-late components (up to 1000 ms) of event-related potentials (ERPs). ERP research on 42 healthy subjects (men) aged 20–28 years was performed. The stimuli were a line of visual images with an incomplete set of signs, as well as images-illusions, which, with different perceptions, represent different images. The results showed the similarity of the tests to correct recognition of fragments of unrecognition and double images. At the intermediate stage of perception (100–200 ms), in both cases, the activity of the central and frontal cortex decreased, mainly in the left hemisphere. At the later stages of information processing (300–500 ms), the temporal-parietal and occipital brain parts on the right were activated, with the difference that when double objects were perceived, this process expanded to 700–800 ms with the activation of the central and occipital fields of the right hemisphere. Outcomes allowed discussing two possible options for actualizing the mechanisms of long-term memory that ensure the formation of insight—the simultaneous perception of images as part of an illusion. The first of them is associated with the inhibition of the frontal cortex at the stage of synthesis of information flows, with the subsequent activation of the occipital brain parts. The second variant is traditional and manifests itself in the activation of the frontal brain areas, with the subsequent excitation of all brain fields by the mechanisms of exhaustive search.
... It has been shown that later memory performance can be increased for incidental encoding with insight compared to encoding without insight (Danek et al., 2013;Kizilirmak et al., 2016a). The neurocognitive basis of this memory advantage is a topic of ongoing investigation (Danek and Wiley, 2020). Current research suggests that it is based on a combination of cognitive and affective aspects. ...
... A cognitive aspect is the generation effect (Slamecka and Graf, 1978), which reflects a combination of a deep level-ofprocessing (Craik and Lockhart, 1972) and activation of prior knowledge which a novel piece of information (i.e., the solution) can be linked to van Kesteren et al. (2014). Affective components are, for example, intrinsic reward or the feeling of certainty for the solution being correct that are part of the subjective Aha! experience (Danek et al., 2014;Kizilirmak et al., 2016a,c;Danek and Wiley, 2020). ...
Several cognitive functions show a decline with advanced age, most prominently episodic memory. Problem-solving by insight represents a special associative form of problem-solving that has previously been shown to facilitate long-term memory formation. Recent neuroimaging evidence suggests that the encoding network involved in insight-based memory formation is largely hippocampus-independent. This may represent a potential advantage in older adults, as the hippocampus is one of the earliest brain structures to show age-related volume loss and functional impairment. Here, we investigated the potential beneficial effects of learning by insight in healthy older (60–79 years) compared to young adults (19–28 years). To this end, we compared later memory performance for verbal riddles encoded incidentally via induced insight-like sudden comprehension in both age groups. We employed a variant of the Compound Remote Associate Task (CRAT) for incidental encoding, during which participants were instructed to judge the solvability of items. In a 24-h delayed surprise memory test, participants attempted to solve previously encountered items and additionally performed a recognition memory test. During this test, older adults correctly solved an equal proportion of new CRA items compared to young adults and both age groups reported a similar frequency of Aha! experiences. While overall memory performance was better in young participants (higher proportion of correctly solved and correctly recognized old CRA items), older participants exhibited a stronger beneficial effect of insight-like sudden comprehension on later recognition memory for CRA items. Our results suggest that learning via insight might constitute a promising approach to improve memory function in old age.
... Previous research revealed that the reasons for insight's memory advantage are varied. The insight memory advantage is in part an affective advantage and in part a cognitive advantage (Danek & Wiley, 2020). Emotional experiences are associated with cognitive states (Danek et al., 2013;Kizilirmak, Galvao Gomes da Silva et al., 2016;Ludmer et al., 2011), compared with the lack of emotional response in noninsight problems, the high emotional involvement of an Aha! experience may produce a memory that is accurate and vivid, and promote insight-related memory retention (Seifert et al., 1994). ...
Insight during problem solving is beneficial to long-term memory formation. It has been shown to promote later memory for the solution; however, the reason for this memory effect is unclear. We used eye tracking to test the memory effect of insight on delayed recall (Experiment 1) and immediate recall (Experiment 2) when participants selected novel or normal answers to riddles. Both experiments adopted the learning-test paradigm of answer selection. In the learning phase, four alternative answers to a riddle were presented on screen. Eye tracking recorded the fixation duration time on each alternative answer to evaluate the competition of thoughts in the process of problem solving. Delayed and immediate recall were assessed by asking the participants to provide the same answers to the riddles as they had in the learning phase. The results showed that (a) Whether in immediate or delayed recall tasks, the accuracy was higher after selecting novel answers than normal answers, confirming the memory advantage of insight. This effect was more obvious in the delayed recall task. (b) There was a longer total fixation duration time when selecting a novel answer than a normal answer. This suggests that novel answers have an advantage in the competition of thoughts. (c) Compared with selecting normal answers, selecting novel answers involved significantly longer fixation on the target region of interest, and significantly less attention on the main interference region. The results of this research suggest that the competitive advantage of novel thinking in problem solving may be an important reason why insight promotes memory.
... With such insight problems, then, we see a clear causal link between processing fluency in the post-impasse phase and high confidence in response accuracy at the point of solution generation. Interestingly, too, problems that are solved via an insight process are objectively observed to be more likely to be correct than those solved in other ways such as by means of more step-by-step planning and systematic analysis (e.g., Becker et al., 2021;Danek & Wiley, 2020;Marsh et al., 2021;Rummel et al., 2021;Salvi et al., 2016;Threadgold et al., 2018;Webb et al., 2019). ...
Meta-reasoning refers to the metacognitive processes that monitor and control ongoing thinking, reasoning and problem-solving. These monitoring processes are usually experienced as feelings of “certainty” or “uncertainty” regarding how well a process is unfolding. The “meta-reasoning framework” advanced by Ackerman and Thompson (2017) captures many existing findings relating to meta-reasoning at an individual level, which raises questions about how the framework can be expanded to reflect collaborative meta-reasoning. This development is important given the multitude of real-world domains that involve collaborative thinking and reasoning, including those involving team-based creativity (e.g., design, innovation, entrepreneurship, advertising and scientific discovery). In such collaborative situations, monitoring processes need to be attuned to shifting uncertainty in team activities and communications, whereas control processes need to ensure coordinated and negotiated strategy selection. In this chapter we aim to progress the development of a collaborative meta-reasoning framework of relevance to creative contexts by drawing upon the limited existing research, which is primarily focused on meta-reasoning in design teams. We conclude our discussion by delineating a series of key questions to motivate future research.
... Insight could indeed be a manifestation of an adaptive mechanism for the reinforcement, given by pleasure, of exploration when solving problems ( Oh et al., 2020). Most feelings have an adaptive function, and feelings of pleasure that accompany an insight seem to be functional to accuracy since solutions obtained via insight are more likely to be correct and better remembered than those via step-by-step analysis ( Danek & Salvi, 2020;Danek & Wiley, 2020;Laukkonen, Webb, Salvi, Schooler, & Tangen, 2020;Salvi, Bricolo, Kounios, Bowden, & Beeman, 2016). ...
... surprise itself does not seem to predict later memory (Danek & Wiley, 2020). 460 ...
... divergent thinking creativity), and less on creative problem solving (viz. convergent thinking creativity)-tasks with correct solutions that are typically solved via mental reframing and sometimes involve subjective experiences of insight [77]-which has previously been studied in the context of metacognition of general problem solving and reasoning (e.g., [5,46,45,129,132]). In the following, we will use the term "creative metacognition" as a short form for metacognition in creativity. ...
Creative cognition does not just involve cognitive processes in direct service of the main task objective (e.g., idea generation), but also metacognitive processes that monitor and regulate cognition adaptively (e.g., evaluation of ideas and task performance, or development and selection of task strategies). Although metacognition is vital for creative performance, relevant work is sparse, which may be partly due to persistent ambiguities in the theoretical conceptualization of creative metacognition. Therefore, this article proposes a systematic framework of creative metacognition (CMC), which builds on recent advancements in metacognition theory and extends them to meet the specifics of creative cognition. The CMC framework consists of two dynamic components-monitoring and control-and a more static component of metacognitive knowledge, each subsuming metacognitive processes applying to the level of task, performance, and responses. We describe the presumed function of these metacognitive components in the creative process, present evidence in support of each, and discuss their association with related constructs, such as creative self-beliefs. We further highlight the dynamic interplay of metacognitive processes across task performance and identify promising avenues for future research.
... Several studies have reported an insight memory advantage wherein solutions that are generated with insight are remembered more accurately than those without a reported "aha moment" (Danek, Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, & Ö llinger, 2013;Kizilirmak et al., 2016a, b). Specifically, a study by Danek & Wiley (2020) highlighted the affective component of insight as the key factor in supporting better solution memory, as pleasure ratings predicted the memory advantage more than the cognitive component (i.e., restructuring of the problem). This effect is comparable to flashbulb memories, where strong emotions help to retain gist information about events in long-term memory (McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988;Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992). ...
Occasionally, a solution or idea arrives as a sudden understanding - an insight. Insight has been considered an "extra" ingredient of creative thinking and problem-solving. Here we propose that insight is central in seemingly distinct areas of research. Drawing on literature from a variety of fields, we show that besides being commonly studied in problem-solving literature, insight is also a core component in psychotherapy and meditation, a key process underlying the emergence of delusions in schizophrenia, and a factor in the therapeutic effects of psychedelics. In each case, we discuss the event of insight and its prerequisites and consequences. We review evidence for the commonalities and differences between the fields and discuss their relevance for capturing the essence of the insight phenomenon. The goal of this integrative review is to bridge the gap between the different views and inspire interdisciplinary research efforts for understanding this central process of human cognition.
... With such insight problems, then, we see a clear causal link between processing fluency in the post-impasse phase and high confidence in response accuracy at the point of solution generation. Interestingly, too, problems that are solved via an insight process are objectively observed to be more likely to be correct than those solved in other ways such as by means of more step-by-step planning and systematic analysis (e.g., Becker et al., 2021;Danek & Wiley, 2020;Marsh et al., 2021;Rummel et al., 2021;Salvi et al., 2016;Threadgold et al., 2018;Webb et al., 2019). ...
Meta-reasoning refers to the metacognitive processes that monitor and control ongoing thinking, reasoning and problem-solving. These monitoring processes are usually experienced as feelings of “certainty” or “uncertainty” regarding how well a process is unfolding. The “meta-reasoning framework” advanced by Ackerman and Thompson (2017) captures many existing findings relating to meta-reasoning at an individual level, which raises questions about how the framework can be expanded to reflect collaborative meta-reasoning. This development is important given the multitude of real-world domains that involve collaborative thinking and reasoning, including those involving team-based creativity (e.g., design, innovation, entrepreneurship, advertising and scientific discovery). In such collaborative situations, monitoring processes need to be attuned to shifting uncertainty in team activities and communications, whereas control processes need to ensure coordinated and negotiated strategy selection. In this chapter we aim to progress the development of a collaborative meta-reasoning framework of relevance to creative contexts by drawing upon the limited existing research, which is primarily focused on meta-reasoning in design teams. We conclude our discussion by delineating a series of key questions to motivate future research.
... Some researchers have suggested that the Aha! experience per se has independent functions in problem-solving. First of all, the Aha! experience contributes to better memory for the studied material (Auble et al., 1979) or insightful solutions (Danek et al., 2013;Kizilirmak et al., 2016a;Danek and Wiley, 2020). Secondly, the Aha! experience helps to maintain motivation in task performance (Liljedahl, 2005;Oh et al., 2020;Skaar and Reber, 2021). ...
The insight phenomenon is thought to comprise two components: cognitive and affective (the Aha! experience). The exact nature of the Aha! experience remains unclear; however, several explanations have been put forward. Based on the processing fluency account, the source of the Aha! experience is a sudden increase in processing fluency, associated with emerging of a solution. We hypothesized that in a situation which the Aha! experience accompanies the solution in, the problem would be judged as less difficult, regardless of the objective difficulty. We also planned to confirm previously discovered associations between the Aha! experience and accuracy, confidence, and pleasure. To test the proposed hypothesis, during the preliminary stage of the study, we developed a set of 100 remote associate problems in Russian (RAT-RUS) and asked 125 participants to solve problems and indicate the Aha! moment (after solution generation or solution presentation), confidence, difficulty, and likability of each problem. As expected, the Aha! experience often accompanied correct solutions and correlated with confidence judgments. We also found a positive correlation between the Aha! experience and problem likability. As for the main hypothesis, we confirmed that the Aha! experience after the presentation of the solution was associated with a decrease in subjective difficulty. When participants could not solve a problem but experienced the Aha! moment after the solution was presented to them, the problem was perceived as easier than one without the Aha! experience. We didn’t find the same effect for the Aha! after solution generation. Thus, our study partially supports the processing fluency account and demonstrates the association between the Aha! experience and metacognitive judgments about the accuracy and difficulty of problems.
... • Problem solutions comprehended suddenly after a previous state of incomprehension are associated with higher later recall rates (Auble and Franks, 1978;Auble et al., 1979; • Problems solved with a subjective Aha! experience are linked to a higher later recall rate (Danek et al., 2012;Kizilirmak, 2016 b) • Aha! rating predicts later memory performance (Danek & Wiley, 2020) The insight memory advantage • Young healthy adults showed higher activity in mPFC and hippocampus for induced insight > control. ...
My talk from 2022's (supposedly 2020's) International Conference on Cognitive Neuroscience in Helsinki, Finland. It was part of the symposium "Midline brain structures in explicit memory:
Is there a hippocampus-independent route to cortical engrams?" with Björn H. Schott and Svenja Brodt. (Sadly, Franziska Richter, who was part of the originally submitted symposium, could not attend after 2 years of postponing the conference.)
... Using a similar paradigm, another study showed that irrelevant aha moments can make mundane facts more believable 9,27 . And finally, ideas accompanied by Aha! experiences are more likely to be remembered 28 , and insights may make it harder to change one's mind 22 . ...
Our basic beliefs about reality can be impossible to prove and yet we can feel a strong intuitive conviction about them, as exemplified by insights that imbue an idea with immediate certainty. Here we presented participants with worldview beliefs such as “people’s core qualities are fixed” and simultaneously elicited an aha moment. In the first experiment (N = 3000, which included a direct replication), participants rated worldview beliefs as truer when they solved anagrams and also experienced aha moments. A second experiment (N = 1564) showed that the worldview statement and the aha moment must be perceived simultaneously for this ‘insight misattribution’ effect to occur. These results demonstrate that artificially induced aha moments can make worldview beliefs seem truer, possibly because humans partially rely on feelings of insight to appraise an idea’s veracity. Feelings of insight are therefore not epiphenomenal and should be investigated for their effects on decisions, beliefs, and delusions.
... ствует представлениям испытуемых о данной шкале (Danek, Wiley, 2020). Многие шкалы, часто используемые для детекции инсайтности решения, предлагаются экспериментаторами как бы «сверху», на основе их теоретической модели. ...
В данной статье представлены обзор существующих подходов к исследованию феномена инсайта и экспликация его критериев. Авторами выделено два исследовательских подхода к инсайту: детекция инсайтности до решения и после решения мыслительных задач. Первый подход основан преимущественно на использовании формально инсайтных задач, включающих необходимость изменения репрезентации; всякое решение этих задач квалифицируется как инсайтное. Второй подход основан на использовании самоотчетов решателей при оценке решения различного типа задач, которые могут решаться инсайтно и неинсайтно (анаграмм, ребусов, пазлов, тестов отдаленных ассоциаций). Рассмотрены примеры исследований в рамках каждого подхода, проанализированы их преимущества и ограничения. Описаны объективные и субъективные параметры инсайта. Под субъективными параметрами понимаются различные формы самоотчетов решателей об их опыте инсайтного решения. Под объективными параметрами понимаются различные виды поведенческих и физиологических паттернов, сопровождающих инсайтное решение, но не зависящих от самоотчетов решателей. Было показано, что использование только одной группы параметров не позволяет однозначно квалифицировать инсайтность решения. На сегодняшний день в исследованиях чаще используются смешанные форматы, включающие объективные и субъективные параметры инсайта. В качестве перспектив исследования инсайта авторы предлагают подход самостоятельного формулирования критериев инсайта решателем; учет индивидуальных особенностей решателя как фактора детекции инсайтности решения; обучение испытуемых детекции инсайта и выработка у них генерализованных представлений об инсайтности решения вне зависимости от конкретной процедуры измерения.
... surprise itself does not seem to predict later memory (Danek & Wiley, 2020). 460 ...
This is one of two chapters on "A cognitive neuroscience perspective on insight as a memory process" to be published in the "Routledge International Handbook of Creative Cognition" by L. J. Ball & F. Valleé-Tourangeau (Eds.). While the previous chapter discussed the role of long-term memory for solving problems by insight [https://psyarxiv.com/zv4dk], the current chapter focuses on the role of insight problem solving for long-term memory formation. Insight in problem solving has long been assumed to facilitate memory formation for the problem and its solution. Here, we discuss cognitive, affective, and neurocognitive candidate mechanisms that may underlie learning in insight problem solving. We conclude that insight appears to combine several beneficial effects that each on their own have been found to facilitate long-term memory formation: the generation effect, subjective importance of the discovery of the solution, intrinsic reward, schema congruence, and level-of-processing. A distributed set of brain regions is identified that is associated with these processes. On the one hand, the more affective response related to pleasure, surprise, and novelty detection is linked to amygdala, ventral striatum, and dopaminergic midbrain activity, supporting an important role of reward learning. On the other hand, insight as completing a schema is associated with prior knowledge dependent and medial prefrontal cortex mediated memory formation. Thus, learning by insight may reflect a fast route to cortical memory representations. However, many open questions remain, which we explicitly point out during this review.
... Insight indeed could be a manifestation of an adaptive mechanism for the reinforcement, given by pleasure, of exploration when solving problems (Oh et al., 2020). Most feelings have an adaptive function, and feelings of pleasure that accompany an insight seem to be functional to accuracy since solutions via insight are more likely to be correct and better remembered than those via step-bystep analysis (Danek & Salvi, 2018;Danek & Wiley, 2020;Laukkonen, Webb, Salvi, Schooler, & Tangen, 2020;Salvi, Bricolo, Kounios, Bowden, & Beeman, 2016). ...
Sometimes creative ideas come to mind following a step-by-step conscious reasoning, other times they rush into consciousness unexpectedly as sudden insights. Research on insight problem solving began about a century ago with a chimpanzee having an Aha! moment on how to pile up some boxes to reach a banana that was hanging from the ceiling (Köhler, 1917). Thanks to the development of neuroscientific techniques, researchers gained a better understanding of the physiology associated with insight, supplemented classic theories, and raised new questions about the cognitive processes involved in it. With the final goal of sketching a comprehensive understanding of the neurocognitive bases of insight, this chapter describes and updates the knowledge we gained about its functioning. A review of the last two decades of research on the 'markers of insight' revealed that: a) insights are paired with an internal attention allocation; b) the right anterior temporal lobe is a key node for insights, and if stimulated the frequency of insights increases; c) the feeling of pleasure and excitement that accompanies insights is warranted by the involvement of the reward-dopamine system; d) pupil dilation marks the switch into awareness of Aha! moments. Taken together these results indicate that insight below awareness processing might be explained by the involvement of subcortical areas responsible for learning, alertness, and emotions which are evolutionary more ancient than the cortex and it involves areas of the cortex responsible for information integration presumably together/after the switch into awareness. In conclusion, I summarize these points in terms of the defining characteristics of having an insight. 3
... Several studies have reported an insight memory advantage wherein solutions that are generated with insight are remembered more accurately than those without a reported "aha moment" (Danek, Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, & Ö llinger, 2013;Kizilirmak et al., 2016a, b). Specifically, a study by Danek & Wiley (2020) highlighted the affective component of insight as the key factor in supporting better solution memory, as pleasure ratings predicted the memory advantage more than the cognitive component (i.e., restructuring of the problem). This effect is comparable to flashbulb memories, where strong emotions help to retain gist information about events in long-term memory (McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988;Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992). ...
Occasionally a solution arrives as a sudden understanding - an insight. Insight has been considered as an “extra” ingredient of creative thinking and problem-solving. Here we propose that insight is a central process in seemingly distinct areas of research. Drawing on literature from a variety of fields, we show that besides being a common topic in problem-solving literature, insight is also a core component in psychotherapy, essential for some forms of meditation, a key process underlying the emergence of primary delusions in schizophrenia, and a factor that drives the positive outcomes of psychedelic therapy. Our goal is to bridge these different views and research traditions. In each case, we discuss the prerequisites and consequences of insight. We examine evidence for common prerequisites of insight experiences, comprising a tension within knowledge structures and a plastic state of mind. We discuss a framework for explaining insight across these fields and highlight the clinical relevance of studying insight. This integrative review provides a better understanding of insight, a central feature of our minds.
... More fundamentally, the reward value of 'mere' information gain (uncertainty resolution) is also well-supported (Bromberg-Martin & Monosov, 2020;Fiorillo et al., 2003;Fortes et al., 2016) and shown to be associated with activity in the same dopaminergic brain regions as conventional rewards (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2011). Indirect evidence for the link between positive affective experiences and learning comes from studies reporting that a pleasurable aha experience is associated with better memory (Danek & Wiley, 2020;Kizilirmak et al., 2016;see also, Sarasso et al., 2021;Van de Cruys et al., 2021). ...
More than 40 years ago, pioneering social psychologist Robert Zajonc (1980) published his seminal work titled “Preferences need no inferences” in which he argued for the primacy of affect over cognition. Affective evaluation (the preference) comes first, he claimed, and only then do cognitive processes (the inferences) kick in. The view is untenable in light of recent predictive processing accounts of the mind, which hold that all mental functioning is built from (approximate) Bayesian inference. It casts perception, action, and learning as inference but, perhaps counterintuitively, valuation too. We discuss how valuation —understood as the process of how we come to value, prefer or like things— emerges as a function of learning and inference, and how this conception may help us resolve traditional conundrums in the science of aesthetic experience, such as the nature of the "beholder's share", the link between curiosity and appreciation, Keats' "negative capability" and the tension between the mere exposure principle and the goldilocks (optimal level) principle.
We are all familiar with the feeling of being stuck when a problem we are faced with seems intractable and we are unable to find a solution. But sometimes, a new way of seeing the problem pops into the mind from out of the blue. The missing piece of the puzzle is found, the gap is filled, and the solution is now obvious. This is the insight experience - the Aha! Moment - which has been a source of fascination to those who study problem solving for centuries. Written by leading researchers from around the world, this volume explores cutting-edge perspectives on insight, the processes that underlie it, and the conditions that promote it. Chapters draw on key themes: from attention, to memory and learning, to evolutionary perspectives. Students and researchers in applied, cognitive, and educational psychology, as well as those studying creativity, insight, and cognitive neuroscience, will benefit from these perspectives.
Videos of magic tricks offer lots of opportunities to study the human mind. They violate the expectations of the viewer, causing prediction errors, misdirect attention, and elicit epistemic emotions. Herein we describe and share the Magic, Memory, and Curiosity (MMC) Dataset where 50 participants watched 36 magic tricks filmed and edited specifically for functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) experiments. The MMC Dataset includes a contextual incentive manipulation, curiosity ratings for the magic tricks, and incidental memory performance tested a week later. We additionally measured individual differences in working memory and constructs relevant to motivated learning. fMRI data were acquired before, during, and after learning. We show that both behavioural and fMRI data are of high quality, as indicated by basic validation analysis, i.e., variance decomposition as well as intersubject correlation and seed-based functional connectivity, respectively. The richness and complexity of the MMC Dataset will allow researchers to explore dynamic cognitive and motivational processes from various angles during task and rest.
Metaphor generation is both a creative act and a means of learning. When learning a new concept, people often create a metaphor to connect the new concept to existing knowledge. Does the manner in which people generate a metaphor, via sudden insight (Aha! moment) or deliberate analysis, influence the quality of generation and subsequent learning outcomes? According to some research, deliberate processing enhances knowledge retention; hence, generation via analysis likely leads to better concept learning. However, other research has shown that solutions generated via insight are better remembered. In the current study, participants were presented with science concepts and descriptions, then generated metaphors for the concepts. They also indicated how they generated each metaphor and rated their metaphor for novelty and aptness. We assessed participants’ learning outcomes with a memory test and evaluated the creative quality of the metaphors based on self‐ and crowd‐sourced ratings. Consistent with the deliberate processing benefit, participants became more familiar with the target science concept if they previously generated a metaphor for the concept via analysis compared to via insight. We also found that metaphors generated via analysis did not differ from metaphors generated via insight in quality (aptness or novelty) nor in how well they were remembered. However, participants’ self‐evaluations of metaphors generated via insight showed more agreement with independent raters, suggesting the role of insight in modulating the creative ideation process. These preliminary findings have implications for understanding the nature of insight during idea generation and its impact on learning.
Traditional insight studies assumed that there is a special class of problems called “insight problems” whose solution would cause feelings of insight. However, it has been previous shown that insight problems can be solved in both insightful (with Aha! experience) and step-by-step (without Aha! experience) ways, and exactly the same is observed for analytical problems. The present work addresses the question whether it is sufficient to use the problem types to detect insightful feelings or whether it is necessary to use the solution types. For this purpose we collected the dataset of previously published open data which used Danek and Wiley’s questionnaire for subjective ratings of insight phenomenology. Joint analysis showed that using solution types provided greater benefits for insight investigation than using problem types: insightful solutions were more pleasant, sudden, and relieving than step-by-step solutions, but insight and analytical problems differed from each other on only suddenness scale. We concluded that relying only on the problem type is not the best strategy for investigation of insight, because insight and analytical problems are quite similar in terms of the Aha! experience. The use of solution types is much more fruitful and distinguishes various situations in the process of problem solving. The obtain results were interpretated in the context of relationships between the Aha! experience and representational change.
The AHA experience, a moment of deep understanding during insightful problem-solving involving feelings of certainty, pleasure, and surprise, has captivated psychologists for more than a century. Recently, a new theoretical framework has proposed a link between the AHA experience and prediction error (PE), a popular concept in decision-making and reinforcement learning. This framework suggests that participants maintain a meta-cognitive prediction about the time it takes to solve a problem and the AHA experience arises when the problem is solved earlier than expected, resulting in a meta-cognitive PE. In our preregistered online study, we delved deeper into this idea, investigating whether prediction errors also pertain to participants' predictions regarding the solvability of the problem itself, and which dimension of the AHA experience aligns with the meta-cognitive PE. Utilizing verbal insight problems, we found a positive association between the AHA experience and the meta-cognitive PE, specifically in regards to problem solvability. Specifically, the element of surprise, a critical AHA dimension, emerged as a key indicator of the meta-cognitive PE, while other dimensions-such as pleasure, certainty, and suddenness-showed no signs for similar relationships, with suddenness exhibiting a negative correlation with meta-cognitive PE. This new finding provides further evidence that aspects of the AHA experience, surprise in particular, correspond to a meta-cognitive PE. The finding also underscores the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon, linking insights with learning theories and enhancing our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon.
This study provides first insights into aha-experiences in infancy and childhood. In two studies, a content analysis of parental reports from two different populations, a Norwegian sample and an international sample of English-speaking parents, was conducted. Parents described 606 aha-stories of their children (age 3 weeks to 16 years). Three main findings were replicated across two studies: (1) Even infants may have aha-experiences; (2) Children have aha-experiences on various topics related to action and cognition; (3) The focus of aha-experiences shifts from action to cognition with age (3 weeks-8 years, Odds Ratios > 1.567). These findings may have implications for understanding what motivates children's learning and cognitive development and for future research.
Research in information behavior has examined search difficulties and how people learn during searches but has not fully examined how searchers solve the difficulties on their own and gain new knowledge during this process. This study introduced the concept of insight learning during search to provide a new perspective for the studies in Search as Learning (SAL) and to optimize searchers' experiences in a more efficient, innovative, and joyful way to combine search and learning. As a preliminary study, we conducted self‐reported interviews with 30 participants to collect cases of insight learning during the search process. Based on thematic analysis of the data, we summarized the benefits of insight learning during search, described the process of how aha! occurred after impasse, and identified the antecedent, key, and consequence of insight during the search process. We aimed to help generate more insights by providing three dimensions of key factors to think about. A preliminary understanding of the insights formed in this study could contribute to further discussion about learning during the search and could help design new search tools that support effective learning.
Solving problems with insight culminates in an “Aha! moment”: a feeling of confidence and pleasure. In daily life, insights are often followed by important decisions, such as deciding what to do with a new idea. Here, we investigated whether having an Aha! moment affects subsequent decision-making. Because Aha! moments tend to elicit positive affect, which is generally associated with an increased risk-taking tendency, we hypothesized that people would favor a monetary payout with more upside despite greater uncertainty after solving a problem with insight. Participants were asked to solve verbal puzzles and report whether they solved them with insight or without insight. After each puzzle, they chose between two bonuses: a fixed payout or a risk payout with 50% chance of receiving a high or a low payout. Participants were more likely to choose the risk payout after they solved with insight compared to without, suggesting a temporarily higher risk preference. The study provided preliminary evidence of a carryover effect - the impact of an Aha! moment on the subsequent risk choice - that can have implications in everyday decision-making.
Despite the need for innovative solutions to contemporary challenges, the neural mechanisms driving creative problem-solving still remain largely unknown. We focused on the powerful creative process of insight, wherein rapid knowledge reorganization and integration-termed representational change-yield solutions that evoke suddenness, positive emotion, and enduring memory. We posit that this process manifests as abrupt shifts in activation patterns within brain regions housing solution-relevant information, including the visual cortex for visual problems, alongside regions linked to feelings of emotion, suddenness and subsequent memory. Our findings substantiate these hypotheses, revealing sudden representational changes in visual cortex, conjoined with activations in the amygdala and hippocampus-forming an interconnected network. Importantly, the representational change and hippocampal effects serve as predictive markers of subsequent memory. This study provides the foremost clear evidence of an integrated insight mechanism and its lasting memory influence. Implications extend to education, emphasising the significance of discovery-based learning approaches for boosting knowledge retention.
The AHA experience, a moment of deep understanding during insightful problem solving involving feelings of certainty, pleasure and surprise, has captivated psychologists for over a century. Recently, a new theoretical framework has proposed a link between the AHA experience and prediction error (PE), a popular concept in decision-making and reinforcement learning. This framework suggests that participants maintain a meta-cognitive prediction about the time it takes to solve a problem and the AHA experience arises when the problem is solved earlier than expected, resulting in a meta-cognitive PE. In our pre-registered online study, we delved deeper into this idea, investigating whether prediction errors also pertain to participants' predictions regarding the solvability of the problem itself, and which dimension of the AHA experience aligns with the meta-cognitive PE. Utilising verbal insight problems, we found a positive association between the AHA experience and the meta-cognitive PE, specifically in regards to problem solvability. Specifically, the element of surprise, a critical AHA dimension emerged as a key indicator of the meta-cognitive PE, while other dimensions, such as pleasure, certainty and suddenness showed no signs for similar relationships, with suddenness exhibiting a negative correlation with meta-cognitive PE. This new finding provides further evidence that aspects of the AHA experience, surprise in particular, correspond to a meta-cognitive PE. The finding underscores also the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon, linking insights with learning theories and enhancing our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon.
Insight problems are likely to trigger an initial, incorrect mental representation, which needs to be restructured in order to find the solution. Despite the widespread theoretical assumption that this restructuring process happens suddenly, leading to the typical “Aha!” experience, the evidence is inconclusive. Among the reasons for this lack of clarity is that many measures of insight rely solely on the solvers’ subjective experience of the solution process. In our previous paper, we used matchstick arithmetic problems to demonstrate that it is possible to objectively trace problem-solving processes by combining eye movements with new analytical and statistical approaches. Specifically, we divided the problem-solving process into ten (relative) temporal phases to better capture possible small changes in problem representation. Here, we go a step further to demonstrate that classical statistical procedures, such as ANOVA, cannot capture sudden representational change processes, which are typical for insight problems. Only nonlinear statistical models, such as generalized additive (mixed) models (GAMs) and change points analysis, correctly identified the abrupt representational change. Additionally, we demonstrate that explicit hints reorient participants’ focus in a qualitatively different manner, changing the dynamics of restructuring in insight problem solving. While insight problems may indeed require a sudden restructuring of the initial mental representation, more sophisticated analytical and statistical approaches are necessary to uncover their true nature.
Solving problems with insight culminates in an “Aha! moment”: a feeling of surprise and pleasure. In daily life, insights are often followed by important decisions, such as deciding what to do with a new idea. Here, we investigated how the manner of solving a problem affects subsequent decision-making. Because insights tend to elicit a pleasurable Aha! experience and positive arousal is generally associated with increased risk-taking tendency, we hypothesized that people would favor a monetary payout with more upside despite greater uncertainty after solving a problem with insight. Participants were asked to solve verbal puzzles and report whether they solved them with insight or without insight. After each puzzle, they chose between two bonus options: a fixed payout or a risk payout with an equal chance of receiving a high or a low payout. As predicted, participants were more likely to choose the risk payout after they solved with insight compared to without insight, demonstrating temporarily higher risk propensity. This carryover effect – the impact of an Aha! moment on the subsequent risk choice – has implications in everyday decision-making.
How do new ideas come about? The central hypothesis presented here states that insights might happen during mental navigation and correspond to rapid plasticity at the cellular level. We highlight the differences between neocortical and hippocampal mechanisms of insight. We argue that the suddenness of insight can be related to the sudden emergence of place fields in the hippocampus. According to our hypothesis, insights are supported by a state of mind-wandering that can be tied to the process of combining knowledge pieces during sharp-wave ripples (SWRs). Our framework connects the dots between research on creativity, mental navigation, and specific synaptic plasticity mechanisms in the hippocampus.
Insight interests researchers given its special cognitive mechanisms and phenomenology (an Aha! experience or Eureka moment). There is a considerable amount of research on the effect of hints on performance in insight problem solving. However, only a few studies address the effect of hints on the subjective experiences of solvers, and the picture their results provide is unclear. We analyze the effect of unreportable true and false hints on different dimensions of the Aha! experience (subjective suddenness, Aha! experience as an effect, and certainty). Using the processing fluency framework, we predict that true hints lead to more insights and stronger Aha! experience and certainty, while false hints lead to the opposite results due to the controlled inhibition of the inappropriate representation. The results showed that false hints decreased the chance of finding a correct solution. The true-hint condition did not lead to more correct solutions but made solutions feel sudden more often than the control condition. The ratings of the Aha! experience and certainty were higher for solutions obtained after true hints than after false hints. We obtained partial support for the effect of unreportable hints on “Eureka!” moments.
Insight problems—as a type of ill-defined problems—are often solved without an articulate plan, and finding their solution is accompanied by the Aha! experience (positive feeling from suddenly finding a solution). However, the solution of such problems can also be guided, for example, by expectations in terms of criteria for achieving the goal. We hypothesize that adjusting the expectation accuracy based on the reward prediction error (discrepancy between the reward and its prediction) affects the strength of affective components of the Aha! experience (pleasure and surprise), allowing to learn how to solve similar problems. We manipulated expectation accuracy by varying the similarity in problem solution principle and structure in a short learning set. Each set was followed by a critical problem where both the structure and solution principle were changed (except for control set). Subjective feelings, solution time, and expectation were measured after each problem. The results revealed that problems with similarities become more expected at the end of the set and their solution time is decreased. However, the critical problem featured a rapid increase in pleasure and surprise and decrease in expectedness only in the condition where both the solution principle and structure were expected, suggesting that problem structure is a key feature determining expectedness in insight problem solving. The Aha! experience is not an epiphenomenon; it plays a role in learning of problem solving through adjusting expectations.
Prior research indicates that boys show more interest in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) than girls do. Given that Aha‐experiences yield positive affect and increase interest, the question arises whether there are gender differences in Aha‐experiences that could help explain the gender differences in interest. Derived from social role theory, we hypothesized that men report having Aha‐experiences alone, whereas women report having Aha‐experiences together with others. In a retrospective survey study comprising three independent samples (N = 899), we conducted chi‐square analyses to explore the relationship of gender, social context (alone; not alone), domain, and situational interest. Across all participants, we found that men were more probably alone and women more probably together with others when they had an Aha‐experience. More fine‐grained analyses revealed that the effect was especially pronounced when the Aha‐experience increased situational interest within STEM or the personal domain. The study suggests that social context played a different role in the occurrence of Aha‐experiences in men and women. We discuss the implications of our findings for STEM instruction at school.
Creativity lies at the heart of effective advertising, pervading all aspects of the advertising process, including the planning, design and evaluation of advertisements right through to their execution as well as subsequent campaigning and communication. Most studies of creativity in advertising have assessed the stages though which creativity arises during the development of advertisements. A limited number of studies have also investigated the influence of creativity on advertising effectiveness in terms of the levels of attention capture and memorability that arise when an audience views an advertisement. In this chapter, we examine both the dynamic processes that arise during the creation of advertisements, from the initial stage of advertising planning to the final stage of marketing communication, as well as the efficacy of creative advertisements, particularly as assessed through an audience's understanding of them.
This article aims at a comparative analysis of modern methods of neuroimaging for studying cognitive processes in clinical practice and psychophysiology, taking into account the original experience and data – event-related potentials (ERP), EEG, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET). The main feature of neurophysiological diagnostics is time – spatial resolution. As a rule, these are fractions of a second (ERP), seconds (EEG), minutes (fMRI). Three groups of traditional neurophysiological research methods are used – EEG, fMRI and ERP based on the P300 component. The advantages of EEG include high temporal resolution, high gamma activity in the right temporal lobe, as an indicator of the mechanism of binding conscious information. The advantages of fMRI are high spatial resolution, increased blood flow in the right temporal lobe, hippocampus, striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, and dopamine region, nuclei adjacent to the ventral region. ERPs to some extent combine the advantages of EEG and fMRI. PET reflects the state of the brain over several days, which is associated with the life cycle of radioactive isotopes. The level of research corresponds to the entire brain. Microelectrodes, maps allow exploring individual neurons and nerve centers – nuclei.
Дискуссия вокруг феномена инсайта ведется на протяжении уже более 100 лет. При этом в последние годы наметился новый тренд в исследованиях, свидетельствующий о пересмотре самих критериев выделения инсайтного решения в качестве предмета исследования. Если ранее исследователи в основном концентрировали свое внимание на когнитивном компоненте этого феномена, то в последние годы интерес сместился к изучению аффективного компонента (ага-переживания). Однако большое разнообразие способов фиксации инсайта затрудняет сопоставление результатов экспериментальных исследований и не позволяет прийти к однозначным выводам о связи двух компонентов.
The insight experience (or ‘Aha moment’) generally evokes strong feelings of certainty and confidence. An ‘Aha’ experience for a false idea could underlie many false beliefs and delusions. However, for as long as insight experiences have been studied, false insights have remained difficult to elicit experimentally. That difficulty, in turn, highlights the fact that we know little about what causes people to experience a false insight. Across two experiments (total N = 300), we developed and tested a new paradigm to elicit false insights. In Experiment 1 we used a combination of semantic priming and visual similarity to elicit feelings of insight for incorrect solutions to anagrams. These false insights were relatively common but were experienced as weaker than correct ones. In Experiment 2 we replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and found that semantic priming and visual similarity interacted to produce false insights. These studies highlight the importance of misleading semantic processing and the feasibility of the solution in the generation of false insights.
Roger Dominowski made a very substantial and lasting contribution to the study of higher mental processes and particularly to the area of insight problem solving. This is a tribute to his work.
Insight problems are likely to trigger an initial, inappropriate mental representation, which needs to be restructured in order to find the solution. Despite the widespread theoretical assumption that this restructuring process happens suddenly, which leads to the typical Aha! experience, the evidence is inconclusive. Among the reasons for this lack of clarity is a reluctance to measure solvers’ subjective experience of the solution process. Here, we overcome previous methodological problems by measuring the dynamics of the solution process using eye movements in combination with the subjective Aha! experience. Our results demonstrate that in a problem that requires restructuring of the initial mental representation, paying progressively more attention to the crucial elements of the problem often preceded the finding of the solution. Most importantly, the sooner solvers started paying attention to the crucial elements, the less sudden and surprising the solution felt to them. The close link between the eye movement patterns and self-reported Aha! experience in the present study underlines the necessity of measuring both the cognitive and the affective components of insight to capture the essence of this phenomenon.
Danek and Salvi (The Journal of Creative Behavior, 1–3, 2018) provide a sound overview of research on the relationship between feelings of aha and the accuracy of problem‐solving solutions. However, there are reasons to be cautious in concluding that a characteristic of insightful solutions is their superior accuracy. A relationship between correct solutions and aha experiences clearly exists in the literature. However, the strength and frequency of aha experiences seem to be variable across individuals and can be manipulated. We provide a brief overview of some literature that challenges the claim that aha experience indicates accurate solutions, particularly, manipulations of aha experiences, metacognitive misattributions and erroneous insights, and dispositions toward insight.
Sudden comprehension—or insight—during problem-solving can enhance learning, but the underlying neural processes are largely unknown. We investigated neural correlates of learning from sudden comprehension using functional magnetic resonance imaging and a verbal problem-solving task. Solutions and “solutions” to solvable and unsolvable verbal problems, respectively, were presented to induce sudden comprehension or continued incomprehension. We found activations of the hippocampus, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), amygdala, and striatum during sudden comprehension. Notably, however, mPFC and temporo-parietal neocortical structures rather than the hippocampus were associated with later learning of suddenly comprehended solutions. Moreover, di!cult compared to easy sudden comprehension elicited midbrain activations and was associated with successful learning, pointing to learning via intrinsic reward. Sudden comprehension of novel semantic associations may constitute a special case of long-term memory formation primarily mediated by the mPFC, expanding our knowledge of its role in prior-knowledge-dependent memory.
Insight has been investigated under the assumption that participants solve insight problems with insight processes and/or experiences. A recent trend has involved presenting participants with the solution and analysing the resultant experience as if insight has taken place. We examined self-reports of the aha experience, a defining aspect of insight, before and after feedback, along with additional affective components of insight (e.g., pleasure, surprise, impasse). Classic insight problems, compound remote associates, and non-insight problems were randomly interleaved and presented to participants. Solution feedback increased ratings of aha experience in both insight and non-insight problems, with this result being driven by responses to solutions that were initially incorrectly generated. Ratings of aha for correctly generated solutions decreased after the correct solution was presented. These findings have implications for insight research paradigms as well as informing teaching methods.
Recent investigations have established the value of using rebus puzzles in studying the insight and analytic processes that underpin problem solving. The current study sought to validate a pool of 84 rebus puzzles in terms of their solution rates, solution times, error rates, solution confidence, self-reported solution strategies, and solution phrase familiarity. All of the puzzles relate to commonplace English sayings and phrases in the United Kingdom. Eighty-four rebus puzzles were selected from a larger stimulus set of 168 such puzzles and were categorized into six types in relation to the similarity of their structures. The 84 selected problems were thence divided into two sets of 42 items (Set A and Set B), with rebus structure evenly balanced between each set. Participants (N = 170; 85 for Set A and 85 for Set B) were given 30 s to solve each item, subsequently indicating their confidence in their solution and self-reporting the process used to solve the problem (analysis or insight), followed by the provision of ratings of the familiarity of the solution phrases. The resulting normative data yield solution rates, error rates, solution times, confidence ratings, self-reported strategies and familiarity ratings for 84 rebus puzzles, providing valuable information for the selection and matching of problems in future research.
Having a sudden insight is often associated with inherent confidence, enough for Archimedes to run nakedthrough the streets shouting “Eureka!”. Recent evidence demonstrates that public displays of enthusiasm, suchas the ancient polymath’s, are actually supported by a higher likelihood of being correct.
When we are confronted with a new problem, we typically try to apply strategies that have worked in the past and which usually lead closer to the solution incrementally. However, sometimes, either during a problem-solving attempt that does not seem to lead closer to the solution, or when we have given up on problem-solving for the moment, the solution seems to appear out of nowhere. This is often called a moment of insight. Whereas the cognitive processes of getting closer to the solution are still unknown for insight problem-solving, there are two diverging theories on the subjective feeling of getting closer to the solution: (1) One that states that an intuitive feeling of closeness to the solution increases slowly, but incrementally, before it surpasses the threshold to consciousness and becomes verbalizable (=insight) (continuous approach), and (2) another that proposes that the feeling of closeness to the solution does not increase before it exceeds the threshold to consciousness (discontinuous approach). Here, we investigated the subjective feeling of closeness to the solution, assessed as feeling-of-warmth (FoW), its relationship to solving the problem versus being presented with it and whether a feeling of Aha! was experienced. Additionally, we tested whether Aha! experiences are more likely when the problem is solved actively by the participant or presented to the participant after an unsuccessful problem-solving attempt, and whether the frequency of Aha! experiences correlates with problem difficulty. To our knowledge, this is the first study combining the CRAT with FoW assessments for the named conditions (solved/unsolved, three difficulty levels, Aha!/no Aha!). We used a verbal problem-solving task, the Compound Remote Associates Task (CRAT). Our data revealed that Aha! experiences were more often reported for solutions generated by the participant compared to solutions presented after unsuccessful problem-solving. Moreover, FoW curves showed a steeper increase for the last two FoW ratings when problems were solved with Aha! in contrast to without Aha!. Based on this observation, we provide a preliminary explanation for the underlying cognitive process of solving CRA problems via insight.
Experience:
Although a number of studies have explored the Aha! experience, few studies have attempted to measure representational change. Following the lead of Durso et al. (Psychol Sci 5(2):94-97, 1994) and Cushen and Wiley (Conscious Cognit 21(3):1166-1175, 2012), in this study, participants made importance-to-solution ratings throughout their solution attempts as a way to assess representational change. Participants viewed a set of magic trick videos with the task of finding out how each trick worked, and rated six action verbs for each trick (including one that implied the correct solution) multiple times during solution. They were also asked to indicate the extent to which they experienced an Aha! moment. Patterns of ratings that showed a sudden change towards a correct solution led to stronger Aha! experiences than patterns that showed a more incremental change towards a correct solution, or a change towards incorrect solutions. The results show a connection between sudden changes in problem representations (leading to correct solutions) and the subjective appraisal of solutions as an Aha!
Experience:
This offers the first empirical support for a close relationship between two theoretical constructs that have traditionally been assumed to be related to insightful problem solving.
Despite the presumed ability of insight problems to elicit the subjective feeling of insight, as well as the use of so-called insight problems to investigate this phenomenon for over 100 years, no research has collected normative data regarding the ability of insight problems to actually elicit the feeling of insight in a given individual. The work described in this article provides an overview of both classic and contemporary problems used to examine the construct of insight and presents normative data on the success rate, mean time to solution, and mean rating of aha experience for each problem and task type. We suggest using these data in future work as a reference for selecting problems on the basis of their ability to elicit an aha experience.
The subjective Aha! experience that problem solvers often report when they find a solution has been taken as a marker for insight. If Aha! is closely linked to insightful solution processes, then theoretically, an Aha! should only be experienced when the correct solution is found. However, little work has explored whether the Aha! experience can also accompany incorrect solutions (“false insights”). Similarly, although the Aha! experience is not a unitary construct, little work has explored the different dimensions that have been proposed as its constituents. To address these gaps in the literature, 70 participants were presented with a set of difficult problems (37 magic tricks), and rated each of their solutions for Aha! as well as with regard to Suddenness in the emergence of the solution, Certainty of being correct, Surprise, Pleasure, Relief, and Drive. Solution times were also used as predictors for the Aha! experience. This study reports three main findings: First, false insights exist. Second, the Aha! experience is multidimensional and consists of the key components Pleasure, Suddenness and Certainty. Third, although Aha! experiences for correct and incorrect solutions share these three common dimensions, they are also experienced differently with regard to magnitude and quality, with correct solutions emerging faster, leading to stronger Aha! experiences, and higher ratings of Pleasure, Suddenness, and Certainty. Solution correctness proffered a slightly different emotional coloring to the Aha! experience, with the additional perception of Relief for correct solutions, and Surprise for incorrect ones. These results cast some doubt on the assumption that the occurrence of an Aha! experience can serve as a definitive signal that a true insight has taken place. On the other hand, the quantitative and qualitative differences in the experience of correct and incorrect solutions demonstrate that the Aha! experience is not a mere epiphenomenon. Strong Aha! experiences are clearly, but not exclusively linked to correct solutions.
The feeling of insight in problem solving is typically associated with the sudden realization of a solution that appears obviously correct (Kounios et al., 2006). Salvi et al. (2016) found that a solution accompanied with sudden insight is more likely to be correct than a problem solved through conscious and incremental steps. However, Metcalfe (1986) indicated that participants would often present an inelegant but plausible (wrong) answer as correct with a high feeling of warmth (a subjective measure of closeness to solution). This discrepancy may be due to the use of different tasks or due to different methods in the measurement of insight (i.e., using a binary vs. continuous scale). In three experiments, we investigated both findings, using many different problem tasks (e.g., Compound Remote Associates, so-called classic insight problems, and non-insight problems). Participants rated insight-related affect (feelings of Aha-experience, confidence, surprise, impasse, and pleasure) on continuous scales. As expected we found that, for problems designed to elicit insight, correct solutions elicited higher proportions of reported insight in the solution compared to non-insight solutions; further, correct solutions elicited stronger feelings of insight compared to incorrect solutions.
The focus of the current study is on intuitive feelings of insight during problem solving and the extent to which such feelings are predictive of successful problem solving. We report the results from an experiment (N = 51) that applied a procedure where the to-be-solved problems were 32 short (15 s) video recordings of magic tricks. The procedure included metacognitive ratings similar to the “warmth ratings” previously used by Metcalfe and colleagues, as well as confidence ratings. At regular intervals during problem solving, participants indicated the perceived closeness to the correct solution. Participants also indicated directly whether each problem was solved by insight or not. Problems that people claimed were solved by insight were characterized by higher accuracy and higher confidence than noninsight solutions. There was no difference between the two types of solution in warmth ratings, however. Confidence ratings were more strongly associated with solution accuracy for noninsight than insight trials. Moreover, for insight trials the participants were more likely to repeat their incorrect solutions on a subsequent recognition test. The results have implications for understanding people's metacognitive awareness of the cognitive processes involved in problem solving. They also have general implications for our understanding of how intuition and insight are related.
It has been proposed that sudden insight into the solutions of problems can enhance long-term memory for those solutions. However, the nature of insight has been operationalized differently across studies. Here, we examined two main aspects of insight problem-solving—the generation of a solution and the subjective “aha!” experience—and experimentally evaluated their respective relationships to long-term memory formation (encoding). Our results suggest that generation (generated solution vs. presented solution) and the “aha!” experience (“aha!” vs. no “aha!”) are independently related to learning from insight, as well as to the emotional response towards understanding the solution during encoding. Moreover, we analyzed the relationship between generation and the “aha!” experience and two different kinds of later memory tests, direct (intentional) and indirect (incidental). Here, we found that the generation effect was larger for indirect testing, reflecting more automatic retrieval processes, while the relationship with the occurrence of an “aha!” experience was somewhat larger for direct testing. Our results suggest that both the generation of a solution and the subjective experience of “aha!” indicate processes that benefit long-term memory formation, though differently. This beneficial effect is possibly due to the intrinsic reward associated with sudden comprehension and the detection of schema-consistency, i.e., that novel information can be easily integrated into existing knowledge.
The literature on insight lists four main characteristics of this experience: (a) suddenness (the experience is surprising and immediate), ease (the solution is processed without difficulty), positive affect (insights are gratifying), and the feeling of being right (after an insight, problem solvers judge the solution as being true and have confidence in this judgment). Although this phenomenology is well known, no theory has explained why insight feels the way it does. We propose a fluency account of insight: Positive affect and perceived truth and confidence in one's own judgment are triggered by the sudden appearance of the solution for a problem and the concomitant surprising fluency gain in processing. We relate earlier evidence on insight concerning the impact of sudden fluency variations on positive affect and perceived truth and confidence.
Magic tricks usually remain a mystery to the observer. For the sake of science, we offered participants the opportunity to discover the magician's secret method by repeatedly presenting the same trick and asking them to find out how the trick worked. In the context of insightful problem solving, the present work investigated the emotions that participants experience upon solving a magic trick. We assumed that these emotions form the typical “Aha! experience” that accompanies insightful solutions to difficult problems. We aimed to show that Aha! experiences can be triggered by magic tricks and to systematically explore the phenomenology of the Aha! experience by breaking it down into five previously postulated dimensions. 34 video clips of different magic tricks were presented up to three times to 50 participants who had to find out how the trick was accomplished, and to indicate whether they had experienced an Aha! during the solving process. Participants then performed a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessment of their Aha! experiences which was repeated after 14 days to control for its reliability. 41% of all suggested solutions were accompanied by an Aha! experience. The quantitative assessment remained stable across time in all five dimensions. Happiness was rated as the most important dimension. This primacy of positive emotions was also reflected in participants' qualitative self-reports which contained more emotional than cognitive aspects. Implementing magic tricks as problem solving task, we could show that strong Aha! experiences can be triggered if a trick is solved. We could at least partially capture the phenomenology of Aha! by identifying one prevailing aspect (positive emotions), a new aspect (release of tension upon gaining insight into a magic trick) and one less important aspect (impasse).
Research into creative insight has had a strong emphasis on the psychological processes underlying problem-solving situations as a standard model for the empirical study of this phenomenon. Although this model has produced significant advances in our scientific understanding of the nature of insight, we believe that a full comprehension of insight requires complementing cognitive and neuroscientific studies with a descriptive, first-person, phenomenological approach into how creative insight is experienced. Here we propose to take such first-person perspective while paying special attention to the temporal aspects of this experience. When this first-person perspective is taken into account, a dynamic past–future interplay can be identified at the core of the experience of creative insight, a structure that is compatible with both biological and biographical evidences. We believe this approach could complement and help bring together biological and psychological perspectives. Furthermore, we argue that because of its spontaneous but recurrent nature, creative insight could represent a relevant target for the phenomenological investigation of the flow of experience itself.
The literature on insight lists four main characteristics of this experience: (a) suddenness (the experience is surprising and immediate), ease (the solution is processed without difficulty), positive affect (insights are gratifying), and the feeling of being right (after an insight, problem solvers judge the solution as being true and have confidence in this judgment). Although this phenomenology is well known, no theory has explained why insight feels the way it does. We propose a fluency account of insight: Positive affect and perceived truth and confidence in one’s own judgment are triggered by the sudden appearance of the solution for a problem and the concomitant surprising fluency gain in processing. We relate earlier evidence on insight concerning the impact of sudden fluency variations on positive affect and perceived truth and confidence.
The present study investigates a possible memory advantage for solutions that were reached through insightful problem solving. We hypothesized that insight solutions (with Aha! experience) would be remembered better than noninsight solutions (without Aha! experience). 34 video clips of magic tricks were presented to 50 participants as a novel problem-solving task, asking them to find out how the trick was achieved. Upon discovering the solution, participants had to indicate whether they had experienced insight during the solving process. After a delay of 14 days, a recall of solutions was conducted. Overall, 55 % of previously solved tricks were recalled correctly. Comparing insight and noninsight solutions, 64.4 % of all insight solutions were recalled correctly, whereas only 52.4 % of all noninsight solutions were recalled correctly. We interpret this finding as a facilitating effect of previous insight experiences on the recall of solutions.
Gestalt psychologists proposed two distinct learning mechanisms. Associative learning occurs gradually through the repeated co-occurrence of external stimuli or memories. Insight learning occurs suddenly when people discover new relationships within their prior knowledge as a result of reasoning or problem solving processes that re-organize or restructure that knowledge. While there has been a considerable amount of research on the type of problem solving processes described by the Gestalt psychologists, less has focused on the learning that results from these processes. This paper begins with a historical review of the Gestalt theory of insight learning. Next, the core assumptions of Gestalt insight learning theory are empirically tested with a study that investigated the relationships among problem difficulty, impasse, initial problem representations, and resolution effects. Finally, Gestalt insight learning theory is discussed in relation to modern information processing theories of comprehension and memory formation.
Compound Remote Associate (CRA) problems have been used to investigate insight problem solving using both behavioral and neuroimaging techniques. However, it is unclear to what extent CRA problems exhibit characteristics of insight such as impasses and restructuring. CRA problem-solving characteristics were examined in a study in which participants solved CRA problems while providing concurrent verbal protocols. The results show that solutions subjectively judged as insight by participants do exhibit some characteristics of insight. However, the results also show that there are at least two different ways in which people experience insight when solving CRA problems. Sometimes problems are solved and judged as insight when the solution is the first thing considered, but these solutions do not exhibit any characteristics of insight aside from the "Aha!" experience. In other cases, the solution is derived after a longer period of problem solving, and the solution process more closely resembles insight as it is has been traditionally defined in the literature. The results show that separating these two types of solution processes may provide a better understanding of the behavioral and neuroanatomical correlates of insight solutions.
Investigated, in 2 experiments, whether judgments of happiness and satisfaction with one's life are influenced by mood at the time of judgment. In Exp I, moods were induced by asking 61 undergraduates for vivid descriptions of a recent happy or sad event in their lives. In Exp II, moods were induced by interviewing 84 participants on sunny or rainy days. In both experiments, Ss reported more happiness and satisfaction with their life as a whole when in a good mood than when in a bad mood. However, the negative impact of bad moods was eliminated when Ss were induced to attribute their present feelings to transient external sources irrelevant to the evaluation of their lives; but Ss who were in a good mood were not affected by misattribution manipulations. The data suggest that (a) people use their momentary affective states in making judgments of how happy and satisfied they are with their lives in general and (b) people in unpleasant affective states are more likely to search for and use information to explain their state than are people in pleasant affective states. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Five experiments with approximately 266 college students explored the dynamic metacognitions that accompany the problem- and anagram-solving processes. Ss repeatedly rated how warm or close they were to solution. High feelings of warmth before an answer indicated that the answer would be incorrect. Moderately low warmth ratings characterized correct responses. The data suggest that the high warmth ratings may result from a process wherein Ss convince themselves that an inelegant but plausible (wrong) answer is correct. No gradual rationalization process precedes the correct response to insight problems. The warmth-rating data also indicate that when the correct answer was given to the problems and anagrams used in this study, there was usually a subjectively catastrophic insight process. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Confidence in answers is known to be sensitive to the fluency with which answers come to mind. One aspect of fluency is response latency. Latency is often a valid cue for accuracy, showing an inverse relationship with both accuracy rates and confidence. The present study examined the independent latency-confidence association in problem-solving tasks. The tasks were ecologically valid situations in which latency showed no validity, moderate validity, and high validity as a predictor of accuracy. In Experiment 1, misleading problems, which often elicit initial wrong solutions, were answered in open-ended and multiple-choice test formats. Under the open-ended test format, latency was absolutely not valid in predicting accuracy: Quickly and slowly provided solutions had a similar chance of being correct. Under the multiple-choice test format, latency predicted accuracy better. In Experiment 2, nonmisleading problems were used; here, latency was highly valid in predicting accuracy. A breakdown into correct and incorrect solutions allowed examination of the independent latency-confidence relationship when latency necessarily had no validity in predicting accuracy. In all conditions, regardless of latency's validity in predicting accuracy, confidence was persistently sensitive to latency: The participants were more confident in solutions provided quickly than in those that involved lengthy thinking. The study suggests that the reliability of the latency-confidence association in problem solving depends on the strength of the inverse relationship between latency and accuracy in the particular task.
Auble and Franks (1978) found that a process termed “effort toward comprehension” was important in facilitating recall of
sentences. Four experiments were conducted to further elucidate the nature of this process. Two hypotheses were considered:
(1)Effort toward comprehension involves greater elaboration or deeper processing of the sentence; (2)effort toward comprehension
can be viewed as an “aha” experience (i.e., a state of noncomprehension followed by comprehension of the sentence). Results
indicated that recall was significantly greater for subjects in conditions producing “aha” reactions. No support was found
for the elaboration interpretation of effort toward comprehension.
Many kinds of creativity result from combination of mental representations. This paper provides a computational account of how creative thinking can arise from combining neural patterns into ones that are potentially novel and useful. We defend the hypothesis that such combinations arise from mechanisms that bind together neural activity by a process of convolution, a mathematical operation that interweaves structures. We describe computer simulations that show the feasibility of using convolution to produce emergent patterns of neural activity that can support cognitive and emotional processes underlying human creativity.
People’s metacognitions, both before and during problem solving, may be of importance in motivating and guiding problem-solving
behavior. These metacognitions could also be diagnostic for distinguishing among different classes of problems, each perhaps
controlled by different cognitive processes. In the present experiments, intuitions on classic insight problems were compared
with those on noninsight and algebra problems. The findings were as follows: (1) subjective feeling of knowing predicted performance
on algebra problems but not on insight problems; (2) subjects’ expectations of performance greatly exceeded their actual performance,
especially on insight problems; (3) normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did subjects’
own predictions, especially on the insight problems; and, most importantly, (4) the patterns-of-warmth ratings, which reflect
subjects’ feelings of approaching solution, differed for insight and noninsight problems. Algebra problems and noninsight
problems showed a more incremental pattern over the course of solving than did insight problems. In general, then, the data
indicated that noninsight problems were open to accurate predictions of performance, whereas insight problems were opaque
to such predictions. Also, the phenomenology of insight-problem solution was characterized by a sudden, unforeseen flash of
illumination. We propose that the difference in phenomenology accompanying insight and noninsight problem solving, as empirically
demonstrated here, be used to define insight.
The relation between people's confidence in the accuracy of an erroneous response and their later performance was investigated. Most models of human memory suggest that the higher a person's confidence, the stronger the item (in the context of the eliciting cue) that is retrieved from memory. In recall, stronger associates to a cue interfere with competing associates more than do weaker associates. This state of affairs implies that errors endorsed with high, rather than low, confidence should be more difficult to correct by learning the correct response feedback. In contrast to the authors' expectations, highly confident errors were the most likely to be corrected in a subsequent retest. Participants nearly always endorsed the correct response in cases in which both the correct response and the original erroneous response were generated at retest, suggesting that people possess a refined metacognitive ability to know what is correct and incorrect.
The Nature of Insight brings together diverse perspectives, including recent theories and discoveries, to examine the nature and origins of insightful thinking, as well as the history of theory and research on the topic and the methods used to study it. There are chapters by the leading experts in this field, including Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Ronald Finke, Howard Gruber, Marcel Just, David Meyer, David Perkins, Dean Simonton, and Robert Weisberg, among others.
The Nature of Insight is divided into five main parts. Following an introduction that reviews the history and methods of the field, part II looks at how people solve challenging puzzles whose answers cannot be obtained through ordinary means. Part III focuses on how people come up with ideas for new inventions, while part IV explores the thinking of some of the most insightful people in the history of civilization. Part V considers metaphors such as evolution and investment as bases for understanding insight. An epilogue integrates all these approaches.
Contributors R.E. Mayer, R.L. Dominowsk, P. Dallob, C.M. Seifert, D.E. Meyer, N. Davidson, A.J. Patalano, I. Yaniv, J.E. Davidson, R.W. Weisberg, M.L. Gick, R.S. Lockhart, S.M. Smith, R.A. Finke, M.I. Isaak, M.A. Just, M. Csikszentmihalyi, K. Sawyer, K. Dunbar, H.E. Gruber, M.F. Ippolito, R.D. Tweney, D.K. Simonton, D.N. Perkins, R.J. Sternberg, T.I. Lubart
Bradford Books imprint
Objective:
Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) is a widely used reliability index in test-retest, intrarater, and interrater reliability analyses. This article introduces the basic concept of ICC in the content of reliability analysis.
Discussion for researchers:
There are 10 forms of ICCs. Because each form involves distinct assumptions in their calculation and will lead to different interpretations, researchers should explicitly specify the ICC form they used in their calculation. A thorough review of the research design is needed in selecting the appropriate form of ICC to evaluate reliability. The best practice of reporting ICC should include software information, "model," "type," and "definition" selections.
Discussion for readers:
When coming across an article that includes ICC, readers should first check whether information about the ICC form has been reported and if an appropriate ICC form was used. Based on the 95% confident interval of the ICC estimate, values less than 0.5, between 0.5 and 0.75, between 0.75 and 0.9, and greater than 0.90 are indicative of poor, moderate, good, and excellent reliability, respectively.
Conclusion:
This article provides a practical guideline for clinical researchers to choose the correct form of ICC and suggests the best practice of reporting ICC parameters in scientific publications. This article also gives readers an appreciation for what to look for when coming across ICC while reading an article.
How accurate are insights compared to analytical solutions? In four experiments, we investigated how participants' solving strategies influenced their solution accuracies across different types of problems, including one that was linguistic, one that was visual and two that were mixed visual-linguistic. In each experiment, participants' self-judged insight solutions were, on average, more accurate than their analytic ones. We hypothesised that insight solutions have superior accuracy because they emerge into consciousness in an all-or-nothing fashion when the unconscious solving process is complete, whereas analytic solutions can be guesses based on conscious, prematurely terminated, processing. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that participants' analytic solutions included relatively more incorrect responses (i.e., errors of commission) than timeouts (i.e., errors of omission) compared to their insight responses.
To study productive thinking where it is most conspicuous in great achievements is certainly a temptation, and without a doubt, important information about the genesis of productive thought could be found in biographical material. A problem arises when a living creature has a goal but does not know how this goal is to be reached. Whenever one cannot go from the given situation to the desired situation simply by action, then there has to be recourse to thinking. The subjects ( S s), who were mostly students of universities or of colleges, were given various thinking problems, with the request that they think aloud. This instruction, "Think aloud", is not identical with the instruction to introspect which has been common in experiments on thought-processes. While the introspecter makes himself as thinking the object of his attention, the subject who is thinking aloud remains immediately directed to the problem, so to speak allowing his activity to become verbal. It is the shift of function of the components of a complex mathematical pattern—a shift which must so often occur if a certain structure is to be recognized in a given pattern—it is this restructuration, more precisely: this transformation of function within a system, which causes more or less difficulty for thinking, as one individual or another tries to find a mathematical proof.
We propose a new approach to differentiate between insight and noninsight problem solving, by introducing magic tricks as problem solving domain. We argue that magic tricks are ideally suited to investigate representational change, the key mechanism that yields sudden insight into the solution of a problem, because in order to gain insight into the magicians' secret method, observers must overcome implicit constraints and thus change their problem representation. In Experiment 1, 50 participants were exposed to 34 different magic tricks, asking them to find out how the trick was accomplished. Upon solving a trick, participants indicated if they had reached the solution either with or without insight. Insight was reported in 41.1% of solutions. The new task domain revealed differences in solution accuracy, time course and solution confidence with insight solutions being more likely to be true, reached earlier, and obtaining higher confidence ratings. In Experiment 2, we explored which role self-imposed constraints actually play in magic tricks. 62 participants were presented with 12 magic tricks. One group received verbal cues, providing solution relevant information without giving the solution away. The control group received no informative cue. Experiment 2 showed that participants' constraints were suggestible to verbal cues, resulting in higher solution rates. Thus, magic tricks provide more detailed information about the differences between insightful and noninsightful problem solving, and the underlying mechanisms that are necessary to have an insight.
The “flash of insight” someti