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Open Political Science, 2020; 3: 183191
Research Article
Aram Terzyan*
Towards Democratic Consolidation? Ukraine After
the Revolution of Dignity
Open Access. © 2020 Aram Terzyan, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/openps-2020-0015
received April 29, 2020; accepted June 2, 2020.
Abstract: This paper explores the challenges and opportunities of post-Maidan Ukraine’s democratic consolidation,
with a focus on its attitudinal, behavioral and institutional dimensions.
The study suggests that Ukraine’s transition from a hybrid regime to a consolidated democracy involves addressing
a series of societal and institutional issues, ranging from transformation of paternalistic culture to institutional
development of political parties and civil society organizations (CSO). Institutionalization is essential for shifting
from charismatic appeal or rule to well-established institutions that translate leader’s vision into policies sustained by
appropriate structures, rules, and procedures. The study enquires into the intricacies of democratic consolidation in
post-Soviet countries, amid constraining conditions stemming from deep-rooted authoritarian legacies.
Keywords: Ukraine; Democratic consolidation; Civil society; Democratic support; Institutionalization.
1 Introduction
This article analyses the process of democratization and democratic consolidation in post-Maidan (also known as
a Revolution of Dignity) Ukraine. In doing so, it presents a framework for exploring the attitudinal, behavioral and
institutional dimensions of democratic consolidation.
There has been a tendency among students of post-Soviet studies to treat the Ukrainian Maidan as the last anti-
Soviet or even first “postcolonial revolution,” that challenged nonconfrontational, conformist, and “emotionally
positive” approaches to the analysis of Soviet and post-Soviet society and culture.1 Gerasimov (2014) has framed the
Maidan as a “postcolonial revolution” “because it is all about the people acquiring their own voice, and in the process
of this self-assertive act forging a new Ukrainian nation…”2 Some observers go even further by claiming that “a new
Ukraine was born on the Maidan,” by means of demonstrations that not only brought a new government to power but
changed the people and their outlook.3
Shevtsova (2014) contends that the Ukrainian events of late 2013 and the first half of 2014 reflect the crisis of the
post-Soviet political model, resting on personalized power, with a decided tilt toward repressive rule.4 Meanwhile, it is
increasingly challenging to maintain autocratic rule in a country, where youth-driven, social media-powered society
refuses to abide by “post-Soviet rules” and craves for democracy.
As a matter of fact the Maidan Revolution is a demonstration of Ukraine’s strong resilience and persistence in asserting
its democratic and European orientation. Yet the “choice for Europe” does not smoothly translate into substantial
Europeanization and full-fledged democracy building. Clearly (2016) notes that the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine
would provide grounds for great optimism and would even be hailed as triumph of democracy over authoritarianism
– leading Ukraine to its rightful place as a free, democratic state in Europe.5 Yet, as a result of lingering authoritarian
malpractices, including rampant corruption and “invincible” oligarchy, Ukrainians would end up disappointed.
Some observers have pointed out a series of hindrances to post-Maidan democratic consolidation, ranging from the
constraining effects of authoritarian legacy to the residual influence of oligarchy.6 It is argued that a myriad of domestic
*Corresponding author: Aram Terzyan, Eurasia Institutes, Los Angeles, California, United States, E-mail: aramterzyan@gmail.com
184 Aram Terzyan
factors (the weakness of institutions and civic organizations) and external elements (the conflict with Russia) have been
considerably impeding post-revolution state building in Ukraine, thus leaving the key problems that hinder national
development unsolved.7
Nevertheless, Volodymyr Zelensky’s rise to power in 2019 seems to introduce a new model of democratic governance,
as opposed to the system, through which five consecutive presidents had come up. While his reform agenda has
provided grounds for optimism, the question remains as to whether it will make a significant difference, by defeating
systemic corruption, completing deoligarchisation and thus, transforming the country into a consolidated democracy.
Despite the fact that Ukraine’s post-Maidan state building has recently become a subject of analysis, there has
been little attention to the various aspects of country’s democratic consolidation. This article contributes to the debates
through exploring the attitudinal, behavioral and institutional dimensions of democratic consolidation. On the basis of
these observations, this article seeks to address the question: what are the core behavioral, attitudinal and institutional
challenges to Ukraine’s democratic consolidation?
This paper is an in-depth case analysis, that uses policy analysis and process tracing to examine the core dynamics
of post-revolution transformation and democratic consolidation in Ukraine.
2 Understanding democratic consolidation
While the end of the Cold War posed a tremendous challenge to authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Union and
beyond, the authoritarian legacy has been long interfering with their transition to democracy. In much of the former
Soviet Union, new regimes combined electoral competition with varying degrees of authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way
(2010) frame such regimes as competitive authoritarian - as a hybrid regime type.8 Terry Lynn Karl (1995) introduced the
term “hybrid regime” to refer to a state that contains both democratic and authoritarian forms of rule.9 Diamond (2015)
calls hybrid regimes as pseudo-democratic, ‘in that the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as
multiparty electoral competition, masks the reality of authoritarian domination’.10 Levitsky and Way (2002) note that
competitive authoritarian regimes fall short of both democracy, as well as of full-fledged authoritarianism. Although
elections are regularly held and for the most part are free of massive fraud, incumbents invariably abuse administrative
resources, creating an unlevel playing field between government and opposition. 11 As a result, the centralization of
power, weak rule of law, along with considerable limits on political freedoms and civil liberties are common in hybrid
regimes.
While Ukraine’s political system would be long falling into the category of hybrid regimes, the 2014 Maidan
Revolution in Ukraine sparked optimistic commentaries about country’s gradual transition from competitive
authoritarianism to a consolidated democracy.
Originally, the term “democratic consolidation” was narrowed down to describing the issues of making newborn
democracies stable and immune to the threat of authoritarian “reverse waves”.12
Linz and Stepan (1996) offer a middle-of-the-road definition of a consolidated democracy: Constitutionally, a
democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike throughout the territory of the
state become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of specific laws, procedures, and
institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.13 Behaviorally a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated
when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting
to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede
from the state.14 Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, holds the
belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society
such as theirs, and when support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from prodemocratic
forces.15
Given that mass level attitudes towards democracy are viewed as the building blocks of democratic stability and
fundamental elements of a functional democracy, much of the literature on democratic consolidation has centered
around the establishment and promotion of democratic values and attitudes.16
Gunther and Montero (2006) stress the necessity of clearly separating such attitudes into three different clusters,
which they call democratic support, political discontent, and political disaffection.17 These three sets of attitudes
Towards Democratic Consolidation? Ukraine After the Revolution of Dignity 185
have quite different behavioral correlates or consequences: a lack of fundamental support for democracy is strongly
associated with votes for anti-system parties; political discontent is clearly linked with votes against the incumbent
party or governing coalition; and political disaffection is part of a broader syndrome of alienation and disengagement
from active involvement in the political.18
Schedler (1998) notes that over time the “mission” of democratic consolidation has expanded, incorporating crucial
tasks, such as party building, neutralization of anti-system actors, decentralization of state power, promotion of civil
society organizations, judicial reforms, as well as alleviation of poverty and economic development.19
One of the key elements of democratic consolidation is institutionalization, aimed at translating individuals’
visions into policies sustained by appropriate structures, rules, and procedures.
This comes down to “transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms and contingent solutions . . .
into relationships that are reliably known, regularly practiced and normatively accepted”.20 Clearly, it is in this context
that the advancement of a vibrant civil society and competitive party politics with well-institutionalized political parties
and civil society organizations acquire critical relevance.
Building on the literature on democratic consolidation, this study specifically explores behavioral, attitudinal
aspects of democracy consolidation in post-Maidan Ukraine, focusing on the issues of institutionalization and civil
society consolidation.
3 Attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of democratic consolidation
Relevant attitudes towards democracy are of several different kinds and have differing but significant impacts on
democratic performance. In terms of democratic support, which is indeed critical to democratic consolidation, it is
noteworthy that positive attitudes towards democracy and integration with the West have remained robust in Ukraine
even amid the economic downturn facing the country from 2013 to 2015. Namely, the escalating crisis in Ukraine
inflicted immense economic suffering on the Ukrainian population, fraught with rising unemployment that rose from
over 8.5 to 11 percent21, as well as a sharp decline (12 percent) in GDP.22 Despite the economic slowdown and ensuing
discontent, over three quarters of respondents in the UNASIS July 2017 poll said that democracy was important to them
personally, while less than 15 percent did not find it important. 23 This level of democratic support is consistent with the
results of the surveys, conducted in 2012, 2014, and 2016. More importantly, democratic support is 5-10 percent higher
in these surveys, than it was in those conducted from 2002 to 2009.24
NDI Ukraine’s 2018 nationwide survey further confirms positive trends, by suggesting that demand for a fully-
functioning democracy remains high and stable (84 percent).25 Moreover, there is a growing support for gender equality
in political life, as more than half of Ukrainians (52 percent) support the equal participation of men and women – or
more women than men – in political life.26 Furthermore, NDI’s 2019 nationwide survey, completed in May 2019, shows a
considerable increase in optimism and positive attitudes, associated with the newly elected president in particular and
with the country in general.27 Most remarkably, demand for a fully functioning democracy has increased throughout
the whole country, including by ten percent both in the South and in the East. Similarly, there is a growing demand for
gender equality in political life (62 percent).28
These surveys show considerable consistency in terms of Ukrainians’ growing democratic support that positively
correlates with declining political discontent. It follows, that even in the midst of major economic problems and
considerable economic discontent, the Ukrainian public opinion firmly believes that democracy is the best path to step
down.
Essentially, the high demand for EU membership that is over 55 percent29 can be viewed as an indicator of democratic
support. More than 70% of Ukrainians recognize the EU’s fundamental values and identify with the values of human
rights, individual freedoms, rule of law, peace, economic prosperity, etc.30
Moreover, both the proponents and opponents of Ukraine’s European integration agree on the indispensability of
the European values and find them as guiding principles for state-building.31Not surprisingly the EU remains the most
desired partner in the Ukrainian public consciousness, deemed capable of transmitting a number of political values to
Ukraine.32
186 Aram Terzyan
Another remarkable indicator of the democratic support is low demand for far- right anti-system political parties.
This specifically applies to the activism of marginal far-right groups, including ‘the Right Sector, Svoboda’, the National
Corpus, along with extremist groupings such as Brotherhood, OUN Volunteer Movement and others, that would spark
concerns across the Ukrainian civil society and beyond. While their efforts at moving from margins to mainstream have
not struck a chord with the Ukrainian population, they have strenuously strived to disseminate their illiberal ideas, and
thus move their radical agenda forward.33 Motivated by the desire to “purge” the public space of everything that they
find detrimental or unfavorable to a nation at war, these extremist groups would target religious, ethnic and sexual
minorities, as well as liberal activists and human rights defenders.34 In effect, the conflict with Russia has allowed for
their rebranding as “patriots” with some legitimizing effects on their activities. Nevertheless, despite their “radicalizing
effect” on some nationalistic segments of Ukrainian society, none of the far-right parties managed to overcome the
passing barrier to enter the Parliament. The electoral alliance comprised of Svoboda the Right Sector and National
Corps won only 2.15 percent of the vote.35
While there has been negligible public support for far-rightists and they are highly unlikely to gain greater political
power, the advancement of robust civil society organizations is essential for making the Ukrainian society more immune
to such extremist groups and their illiberal ideas.
In terms of both attitudinal and behavioral dimensions, it is noteworthy that a major impediment to democracy
consolidation is lingering post-Soviet “informality” in the form of behavioral practices, such as tolerance towards
informal governance, the use of informal connections and networks in exchanges of favors, corruption, etc.36 The
latter has long inflicting huge suffering on the country by condemning it to underdevelopment and inability to
implement reforms. Even though it would be an exaggeration to regard graft as a lifestyle, the deep- rooted behavioral
practices do not tend to fade away smoothly and swiftly. Clearly, while passing laws and implementing reforms may
be straightforward, erasing historical mentalities and behavioral practices is more complex. Hence, it is impossible to
neglect the residual influence of informal institutions, cultural norms, values, and ethics.
The results of the 2018 USAID/ENGAGE Anti-Corruption Poll demonstrate that while citizens regard political
corruption of the highest echelons to be the most serious problem, everyday corruption that respondents themselves
come across in their daily lives is perceived as a less serious problem (81.6% of respondents named it a very serious
or rather serious problem).37 That said, citizens condemn high-level corruption but regard petty corruption as a
“justifiable evil.”38 While a great many respondents see a determination to defeat corruption among ordinary people
(72.7%), mass media (47.3%) and NGOs (41.9%), there is a series of barriers to people’s participation in anti-corruption
campaigns. The reasons include the disbelief in the possibility of major breakthroughs through such actions (71.8% of
respondents), lack of sufficient guarantees protecting personal safety of participants (70.9%) as well as low trust in the
ways that government copes with corruption.39
This picture is linked to the elements of political disaffection as a result of low trust in public institutions and civil
society organizations, compounded by the adverse effects of an authoritarian legacy. Meanwhile, breaking with the
“culture of corruption” and “informality” is essential for democracy consolidation.
One of the biggest challenges is overcoming the residual influence of oligarchy, given that oligarchs tend to
selectively support new laws and reform that seem conducive to maintaining and increasing their wealth and fiercely
oppose to those that may somehow jeopardize their positions.40
Even though there have been changes in the balance of power among the biggest oligarchs in Ukraine since the
Maidan Revolution, curbing its residual influence remains an urgent priority. Studies show that during Poroshenko’s
presidency, the sharing out of monopolies among leading business groups continued with slow progress on
de-monopolization.41 While Poroshenko was trying to balance various oligarchic interests, he continued to be one of
those he tried to manage. Meanwhile, Poroshenko’s perceived conflict of interest furthered fuelled public distrust of
the government.42 Some observers note that what describes the Ukrainian oligarchs is their tendency to apply the “rule
by law” rather than “rule of law.” Meanwhile, in conditions of systemic and in particular, judicial corruption, the law
becomes a purchasable commodity.43
Not surprisingly the EU has been giving great weight to defeating oligarchy, routinely emphasizing that there
could be no meaningful progress on the implementation of the Association Agreement if the oligarchy keeps exerting
tremendous influence over the Ukrainian economy, politics and media.44 While Zelensky’s government’s reform agenda
provides grounds for optimism, the process of deoligarchisation considerably depends on broader economic, political
and legal reforms, that would lead Ukraine down to the path to consolidated democracy.
Towards Democratic Consolidation? Ukraine After the Revolution of Dignity 187
Overall, while broad democratic support for post-Maidan political and economic transformation seems promising,
one of the biggest challenges involves eradicating the culture of corruption and “informality.” Clearly, the improvements
in attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of democratic consolidation are critical to completing the process of
overcoming the residual influence of oligarchy.
4 The Institutional dimension of democratic consolidation
It is hard to underestimate the importance of institutional resilience of democracy, with effective, well-established
political parties as essential institutions of a democratic society.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s party system does not seem stable enough to support the democratic consolidation of the
country. As a matter of fact, Ukraine’s post-Soviet institutional legacy, characterized by lack of legitimacy, stability and
durability, would be long unfit to serve societal interests, thus obstructing country’s democratic development.45
Studies show that despite the advances in democratization following the Maidan revolution, the essential features
of Ukraine’s party system have not undergone significant changes. As a result, the institutional bases of the Ukrainian
party-political landscape and parliamentary politics have not been solidified.46 The factors hindering institutionalization
of political parties, include their organizational weakness, characterized by uncertain ideological platforms, frequent
name changes, financing, lack of accountability and poor communication with their voters. Not surprisingly, there has
been low level of trust in and identification with political parties across the Ukrainian society.47
The lack of ideologically driven political parties has led to a situation where the political and ideological preferences
of Ukrainians are ambiguous and most people have a hard time identifying themselves either with left or right parties.
Moreover, an all-Ukrainian survey suggests that considerable part of respondents (nearly half of them) would be
willing to vote for a newly created political party, while a third of them find party members critical to determining what
party they would vote for.48 That said, when determining their political preferences, Ukrainians tend to focus more on
individuals rather than on ideologies or party programs.
Essentially, a low level of trust in political parties has not been uncommon in post-Soviet countries. Decades of
monopolization of the electoral arena by communist parties would be followed by the emergence of populist parties,
thus casting a negative light on political parties across post-Soviet societies.
According to the survey conducted by Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Studies, the most trusted
government and public institutions are the president of Ukraine (79% of respondents), the Armed Forces of Ukraine
(74%), the least trusted ones are the judicial system as a whole (72%), local courts (66%), political parties (63%), as
well as anti-corruption agencies.49 This survey suggests that there is a long way ahead to shift from charismatic appeal
or rule to well-established institutions that translate a leader’s vision into policies sustained by appropriate structures,
rules, and procedures.50
Essentially, like many other post-Soviet countries, Ukraine is faced with “party presidentialization” syndrome
– a remarkable indicator of an insufficient institutionalization of party politics. The inherent unsustainability and
instability of the Ukrainian regime has been vividly manifested in mass mobilizations against Leonid Kuchma regime
in the 2004 Orange Revolution, and similarly by the mass protests that led to the collapse of Viktor Yanukovych regime
in 2014.51
While, there is no denying that Ukraine is undergoing large-scale reforms during Zelensky’s presidency, Inna
Sovsun, a member of the Ukrainian opposition party Holos (Voice) notes that the centralization of power remains a
significant problem as it is unclear who the next president will be and how he or she will use or misuse that power.52
In effect, Ukraine finds itself in an unprecedented situation, where due to its overwhelming majority in the parliament,
the president’s party can put forward and pass any law with no compromise. Volodymyr Zelensky capitalized on his
huge popularity and through snap elections significantly consolidated his power. He is largely treated as a “savior”
capable of turning Ukraine’s plights around and putting it on the path to prosperity and democracy. Meanwhile, the
huge power in the hands of a charismatic leader is fraught with power abuses in the absence of powerful opposition.
There has been a strong tendency in Zelensky’s discourse to style his regime as the “people’s government” or the
“people’s servant” that introduce a new form hyper-democratic interaction between state and society.53 The Ukrainian
President has tended to distance himself from his predecessors and other presidents due to his resolve to bring people
188 Aram Terzyan
to power “who will serve the people.”54 Meanwhile, the success of democratic reforms in Ukraine significantly depends
on its shift from a charismatic leadership to functional democratic institutions. This, in turn, depends on Zelensky’s
government’s political will to further institutionalize state-building by subjecting it to institutional performance and
strength.
5 Civil society as an agent of democratic consolidation
While civic activism has been critical to the 2014 Maidan Revolution a question remains as to if the civil society has
evolved into a powerful agent of democracy in Ukraine. Clearly, a vibrant civil society has long been thought to be a
crucial instrument for political change in countries in transition and a key component of a democratic society. It is
hard to underestimate the role of a civil society in democratic consolidation. Diamond (1994), emphasizes the ways
in which a civil society can contribute to democracy consolidation: 1. Civil society “restrains” and monitors the state’s
power that may be misused or abused. 2. Civil society mobilizes citizens and stimulates their political participation.
3. It is an arena, within which reciprocity is learned and enforced, civic norms of tolerance, trust and compromise are
generated. As a result, it facilitates peaceful regulation of conflicts through the process of participation. 4. Civil society
enables to articulate and represent interests outside of political parties. 5. It mitigates conflict through cross-cutting or
overlapping interest. 6. Civil society recruits new leaders and equips them to participate in political life. 7. It improves
the quality of democracy through election-monitoring, human rights-monitoring and public corruption-monitoring.
Moreover, it disseminates alternative information, thus lowering the possibility of state censorship or state-controlled
biased information, especially in respect to human right violations. 8. Civil society reinforces democratic legitimacy
and governance, by making it accountable, inclusive and responsive.55
Therefore, all these functions of the civil society suggest that it is a powerful agent of democracy.
Studies show the Ukrainian civil society has been consistently standing up for its European choice even after
the Revolution of Dignity. More specifically, civil society organizations have been actively promoting and overseeing
reforms that would lead to the implementation of the Association Agreement with the European Union. The largest
and most influential reform network – the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR) has brought together NGOs, reform
groups and experts, who form, develop and promote a reform agenda, targeting anti-corruption, judiciary and economic
transformations. The core objective of the RPR is supporting implementation of reforms that lead to fundamental
political and economic transformations.56 Remarkably, on the eve of the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections
RPR prepared a “to do list” for the president’s reform agenda aimed to ensure the new government’s unshakeable
commitment to consistent implementation of the Association Agreement.57 Such initiatives suggest that the Ukrainian
civil society organizations move beyond the victory in the street and pursue victory in town halls and elections.58
The EU reports would emphasize Ukrainian civil society’s continuous positive role in in the promotion and
monitoring of reforms, focusing specifically on the areas of human rights, anti-corruption, healthcare, energy,
decentralization, etc.59
While the boosting actorness of civil society organizations creates an optimistic outlook on their potential
contribution to democratic consolidation, further development of their institutional capacities and networks to
influence policy making and reform implementation is essential.
Studies show that the path to a vibrant and consolidated civil society has two main dimensions. The first dimension
comes down to the changes in the very nature of civil society relations with the state and society and its potential and
ability to foster reform, or what is often referred to as “change on the outside.”60 This has a lot to do with increasing
their impact on public policy, through intensifying their interaction with public institutions and actors and most
importantly, through engaging more with their constituencies. It has not been uncommon for post-Soviet societies
to perceive civic associations as threat to the state’s power and stability, along with the belief that the state bears the
ultimate responsibility for the wellbeing of the society.61
A survey shows that most respondents welcome the state’s active involvement in issues like social guarantees and
display inclinations toward paternalism, while neglecting the responsibility of society members for addressing such
problems. Interestingly, despite their distrust of state institutions, Ukrainians still prefer to delegate the function of
wealth distribution to the state.62
Towards Democratic Consolidation? Ukraine After the Revolution of Dignity 189
Similarly, surveys show that there is a somewhat paternalistic attitude towards European values, in Central and
especially Southern and Eastern Ukraine. The respondents would often claim that it is the government’s duty to
ensure human rights and everyone’s equality before the law, as well as to create opportunities for self-realization, etc.
Overall, respondents in Eastern Ukraine are more inclined to believe that values shared by EU-Europeans and most
Ukrainians should be implemented from the outside and installed by the state.63 By contrast, respondents in Western
Ukraine have a better understanding of the values shared by the EU-Europeans and avoid reductionism to statism,
while acknowledging the duties of ordinary citizens.64 Clearly, greater engagement and effective communication with
various social groups is pivotal to squashing public misperceptions of CSOs and their activities. Thus, the “change on
the outside” is critical to reducing the apathy of the wider public and stimulating their political participation.
The second crucial dimension is “change on the inside,” pertaining to the nature of civil society per se i.e. with the
way it is organized and operates. This in turn, has much to do with the institutional and professional development of
CSOs that would equip them to influence policy making. At the organizational level institutional development includes
enhancing organizational capacities for governance, improving decision-making and conflict management skills, as
well as clarifying organizational mission, identity and values. This is particularly important as a great many CSOs in
Ukraine were established in response to certain narrow needs or funding priorities without a well-defined mission,
strategic plans and a strategy of impact.65 That said, they would largely fail to represent interests and address the
specific needs of their constituencies.
In conclusion, a well-informed observer aptly notes that “strong, autonomous societal organizations and networks
may not always be democracy’s allies, but their absence is almost always democracy’s enemy”.66 Therefore, it is hard to
underestimate the importance of robust CSOs in terms of Ukraine’s democratic consolidation.
6 Conclusion
This article contributes to the existing literature and ongoing debate regarding the anatomy of democratic consolidation
in former Soviet Union hybrid regimes, by examining the case of post-Maidan Ukraine. Based on the previous discussion,
there are three main concluding observations to make regarding the attitudinal, behavioral and institutional dimensions
of Ukraine’s democratic consolidation.
Firstly, and in terms of the attitudinal dimension of democratic consolidation, there has been broad public
support for democratic state-building across the Ukrainian society since the Maidan Revolution. One of the remarkable
indicators of democratic support is low demand for far- right radical political parties, as well as high demand for EU
membership. The EU has been largely viewed as a “role model” identified with the values of human rights, rule of law,
peace, economic prosperity, individual freedoms, etc.
Secondly, and in terms of behavioral dimension of democratic consolidation, a major impediment to democracy
consolidation is lingering post-Soviet “informality” in the form of behavioral practices, such as tolerance towards
informal governance, the use of informal connections and networks in exchanges of favors, corruption, etc. The latter
has long condemned the country to underdevelopment and inability to implement reforms. Even though it would
be an exaggeration to regard graft as a lifestyle, it takes a long time for deep rooted behavioral practices to change.
While passing laws and implementing reforms may be straightforward, erasing historical mentalities and behavioral
practices is more complex. Thus, fighting against the “culture of corruption” is an integral part of anti-corruption
policies. Arguably, the improvements in attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of democratic consolidation are critical
to completing the process of overcoming the residual influence of oligarchy.
Thirdly, and in terms of institutional foundations of democratic consolidation, one of the biggest challenges
involves increasing institutional capacities of political parties and civil society organizations. The factors hindering
institutionalization of political parties, include their organizational weakness, characterized by uncertain ideological
platforms, lack of accountability and poor communication with their voters. As a result, there has been low level of trust
in and identification with political parties across the Ukrainian society. This has led to “party presidentialization” – a
situation where the voters tend to pay more attention to leaders, rather than to principles of political parties. While
Zelensky remains immensely popular, the logic of democratic consolidation requires to shift from charismatic appeal
or rule to well-established institutions that translate leader’s vision into policies sustained by appropriate structures,
190 Aram Terzyan
rules, and procedures. As for civil society organizations, along with their institutional development, it is essential for
them to engage more with their constituencies, thus contributing to their democratic socialization. It has not been
uncommon for post-Soviet societies to perceive civic associations as threat to the state’s power and stability, along
with the belief that the state bears the ultimate responsibility for the wellbeing of the society. Not surprisingly, studies
show inclinations toward paternalism across the Ukrainian society, coupled with misconceptions about civil society
organizations. Therefore, CSOs have a critical mission of breaking down lingering misperceptions and transforming
citizens from spectators into actors.
Future research is essential to account for further dynamics of Ukraine’s democratic consolidation.
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Alexseev, ibid.
Ibid.
National Democratic Institute, “Opportunities and challenges facing Ukraine’s democratic transition,” September 18, 2018, Accessed on
April 17, 2020. https://www.ndi.org/publications/opportunities-and-challenges-facing-ukraine-s-democratic-transition .
Ibid.
NDI Poll: “Opportunities and challenges facing Ukraine’s democratic transition,” June 26, 2019, Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://www.
ndi.org/publications/ndi-poll-opportunities-and-challenges-facing-ukraine-s-democratic-transition .
Ibid.
“Almost 60 percent of Ukrainians ready to vote for Ukraine’s accession to EU at referendum,” January 1, 2019, Accessed on April 28,
2020. https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/almost-60-percent-of-ukrainians-ready-to-vote-for-ukraines-accession-to-eu-at-
referendum.html.
EU Neighbors opinion survey 2019: Ukraine, July 3, 2019, Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-
informed/publications/opinion-survey-2019-ukraine .
Towards Democratic Consolidation? Ukraine After the Revolution of Dignity 191
Buhbe, M., “How Ukrainians perceive European values: Main results of an empirical survey,” (2017), Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://
library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/13731.pdf .
Chaban, N. and B. O’loughlin “The EU’s crisis diplomacy in Ukraine: The matrix of possibilities,” (2018), Accessed on April 17, 2020, https://
jia.sipa.columbia.edu/eus-crisis-diplomacy-ukraine-matrix-possibilities.
Likhachev, V., “Far-right extremism as a threat to Ukrainian democracy.” Nations in Transit Brief, (2018), Accessed on April 17, 2020, https://
freedomhouse.org/report/analytical-brief/2018/far-right-extremism-threat-ukrainian-democracy .
Ibid.
Vorobiov, M, “Ukrainian voters upend their Parliament,” August 1, 2019, Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/
ukrainian-voters-upend-their-parliament/ .
Kakachia, K., Lebanidze, B. and V. Dubovyk. “Defying marginality: explaining Ukraine’s and Georgia’s drive towards Europe.” Journal of
Contemporary European Studies 27.4 (2019), 451-462.
Democratic Initiatives Foundation, “Corruption in Ukraine: Perception, Experience, Attitudes,” December 5, 2018, Accessed on April 17,
2020. https://dif.org.ua/en/article/one-out-of-three-ukrainians-ready-to-join-organized-counteraction-to-corruption .
Lough, J. and V. Dubrovskiy, “Are Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms working?Research Paper. Russia and Eurasia Programme, (2018), 2,
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corruption-reforms-lough-dubrovskiy.pdf .
Democratic Initiatives Foundation, ibid.
Bayramov and Marusyk, ibid, 80-81.
Lough and Dubrovskiy, ibid, 23.
European Parliament, “The state of implementation of the associations and free trade agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova with
a particular focus on Ukraine and systemic analysis of key sectors,” (2017), Accessed on April 17, 2020. http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603836/EXPO_STU(2017)603836_EN.pdf .
Bayramov and Marusyk, ibid, 80.
European Parliament “Report on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine (2017/2283(INI)),” (2018), Accessed on
April 17, 2020. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0369_EN.html .
Rybiy O., “Party system institutionalization in Ukraine.” Demokratizatsiya 21.3 (2013), 401.
Fedorenko K., Rybiy O. and A.Umland, “The Ukrainian party system before and after the 2013–2014 Euromaidan.” Europe-Asia Studies 68.4
(2016), 609-630.
Rybiy, ibid, 402.
Balyuk, S., Klauning, N., Koval, M., Röthig, M. and L. Chetvertukhin, “The Attitude of Ukrainians Toward Social Democracy Public opinion
poll results,” (2018). Accessed on April 17, 2020. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ukraine/14762.pdf .
Almost 80% of Ukrainians trust in Zelensky – poll, UNIAN, September 17, 2019, Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://www.unian.info/
politics/10688256-almost-80-of-ukrainians-trust-in-zelensky-poll.html .
Robinson, J. C. Institutionalizing charisma: Leadership, faith & rationality in three societies. Polity 18:2 (1985), 181.
Sedelius, T, “Party presidentialization in Ukraine.” The Presidentialization of Political Parties. Palgrave Macmillan, London, (2015), 124.
“Could Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposed reforms lead to centralised power in Ukraine?” Euronews, February 27, 2020, Accessed on April 17,
2020. https://www.euronews.com/2020/02/27/could-volodymyr-zelensky-s-proposed-reforms-lead-to-centralised-power-in-ukraine .
“Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s inaugural address,” May 20, 2019, Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/
inavguracijna-promova-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelensk-55489 .
Ibid.
Usul, ibid, 50.
Reanimation Package of Reforms (2019), Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://rpr.org.ua/en/about-us/ .
Khomei, O., “Increasing the power of civil society in Ukraine,” December 22, 2019, Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://neweasterneurope.
eu/2019/12/22/increasing-the-power-of-civil-society-in-ukraine/ .
Smagliy, K. “A wake up call for Ukraine’s civil society.”Kennan Cable, 25. (2017). Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
publication/kennan-cable-no25-wake-call-for-ukraines-civil-society .
European Commission, ibid, 4.
Shapovalova, N. and O. Burlyuk, “Civil Society and Change in Ukraine Post-Euromaidan: An Introduction.” In Civil Society in Post-
Euromaidan Ukraine: from Revolution to Consolidation, 193 (2018), 11-38.
Terzyan, A., “Towards a vibrant civil society in Ukraine and Armenia, Emerging Europe,” (2020), Accessed on April 28, 2020. https://
emerging-europe.com/voices/towards-a-vibrant-civil-society-in-ukraine-and-armenia/ .
Balyuk et al., ibid, 24.
Buhbe, ibid.
Ibid.
Terzyan, ibid.
Evans, A. B. The failure of democratization in Russia: A comparative perspective. Journal of Eurasian Studies 2:1(2011), 46.
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