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It’s Not Just About the Mafia! Conceptualizing Business–Society Relations of Organized Violence

July 2020
Academy of Management Perspectives 34(4)

DOI:10.5465/amp.2019.0029

Authors:

Steffen Böhm

University of Exeter

Stefano Pascucci

University of Exeter

While there is some scholarship in management and organization studies on forms of organized violence, it has rarely focused on the role of organized violence within wider business-society and governance relations. In this article, we argue that conceptualizing the role and capacity of the state is still paramount, precisely because it is normally the state that holds a monopoly on violence. Yet, this state monopoly has continuously been eroded as private firms and civil society actors are increasingly involved in paramilitaries, trafficking, mafia-like and terrorist organizing and other forms of organized violence. To help management and organization scholars appreciate and make sense of these dynamics in contemporary economic affairs, this article puts forward a conceptualization of business-society relations of organized violence. We develop six propositions that seek to understand organized violence within, what we call, the ‘governance triangle’ of state-firm-civil society relations. These propositions give rise to three ‘doomsday scenarios’: 1) Rise of military dictatorships; 2) Rise of private security monopolies and oligopolies; 3) Rise of civil wars. We conclude the article by outlining the implications of such a violence-based view for management and organization scholars.

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It’s not just about the Mafia! Conceptualizing business-

society relations of organized violence

Journal:

Academy of Management Perspectives

Manuscript ID

AMP-2019-0029.R2

Document Type:

Article

Research Methods:

Qualitative Methods, Systematic review < Qualitative Methods

Theoretical Perspectives:

Systems theory, Discourse and rhetoric, Stakeholder theory

Disciplinary Domains:

Business Policy and Strategy, Stakeholder management < Business

Policy and Strategy, Business, Society and Ethics, Policy and regulation

< Business, Society and Ethics, Societal impact < Business, Society and

Ethics, Power and politics < Macro-Organization Behavior, Sustainability

< Organizational Development and Change, Continuous and radical

change processes < Organizational Development and Change

Academy of Management Perspectives

It’s not just about the Mafia!

Conceptualizing business-society relations of organized violence

Academy of Management Perspectives

Special Call ‘Doomsday Scenarios’

Steffen Böhm and Stefano Pascucci

University of Exeter, United Kingdom

Corresponding author

Steffen Böhm, Professor in Organisation & Sustainability

University of Exeter Business School, G11, SERSF, Penryn Campus, Cornwall, TR10 9EZ, UK

Contact: +44 (0)1326 259090; s.boehm@exeter.ac.uk

Biographical Notes:

Steffen Böhm is Professor of Organisation and Sustainability at the Department of Science, Innovation,

Technology and Entrepreneurship (SITE) at the Business School, University of Exeter, UK. His research

focuses on studying grand social and planetary challenges, interrogating the role of management and

organization within business-society-ecology dynamics. He has published five books: Repositioning

Organization Theory (Palgrave), Against Automobility (Blackwell), Upsetting the Offset: The Political Economy of

Carbon Markets (Mayfly), The Atmosphere Business (Mayfly), and Ecocultures: Blueprints for Sustainable

Communities (Routledge). A new book, Climate Activism, is forthcoming with Cambridge.

Stefano Pascucci is Professor in Sustainability and Circular Economy at the Department of Science,

Innovation, Technology and Entrepreneurship (SITE) at the Business School, University of Exeter, UK.

He is a research associate at the Environment and Sustainability Institute and Exeter Centre for the

Circular Economy, University of Exeter, UK. He holds a part-time position at the University of Auckland

Business School, NZ, and a visiting position at the Business Management and Organization Group,

Wageningen University, NL. His current research focuses on sustainability as connected to

entrepreneurship, organization studies, innovation and value chain management. His research focuses

on alternative food networks, agribusiness, sustainability and circular economy.

ABSTRACT

While there is some scholarship in management and organization studies on forms of organized violence,

it has rarely focused on the role of organized violence within wider business-society and governance

relations. In this article, we argue that conceptualizing the role and capacity of the state is still paramount,

precisely because it is normally the state that holds a monopoly on violence. Yet, this state monopoly has

continuously been eroded as private firms and civil society actors are increasingly involved in

paramilitaries, trafficking, mafia-like and terrorist organizing and other forms of organized violence. To

help management and organization scholars appreciate and make sense of these dynamics in

contemporary economic affairs, this article puts forward a conceptualization of business-society relations

Page 1 of 34 Academy of Management Perspectives

of organized violence. We develop six propositions that seek to understand organized violence within,

what we call, the ‘governance triangle’ of state-firm-civil society relations. These propositions give rise

to three ‘doomsday scenarios’: 1) Rise of military dictatorships; 2) Rise of private security monopolies

and oligopolies; 3) Rise of civil wars. We conclude the article by outlining the implications of such a

violence-based view for management and organization scholars.

Keywords: organized violence, monopoly of violence, business-society relations, state-firm

dynamics

INTRODUCTION

Some analysts argue that we have been witnessing a steady decline of wars and armed conflict since

World War II, which is largely thanks to a stable global geo-political order and the relative strength of

political and state institutional setups associated with the global rise of parliamentary democracies and

liberal capitalist regimes (Goldstein, 2011; Bloomfield et al., 2017). Indeed, homicide rates in many

countries seem to be at the lowest level since official statistics began (Roser, 2018). Others are not so

sure. Malešević (2017) emphatically argues that organized military violence is ripe even in the 21st century,

although the nature of armed conflict has changed. He argues that, on the one hand, national states and

their armed forces now have more organizational and technological capacity and capabilities than ever

before. On the other hand, however, the rise of liberal trade regimes, benefiting globally operating

economic actors, have undermined “the sovereignty of many states, which ultimately can lead to the loss

of the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and the emergence of paramilitary warlords capable

of privatizing coercive power” (Malešević, 2017, p. 458).

While there is some appreciation of the role of organized violence in contemporary regimes of

management and organization (Costas & Grey, 2018; Wood & Wright, 2015; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015;

Crane, 2013; Harrington et al., 2015; Stokes & Gabriel, 2010; Doh et al., 2003), these have rarely taken

wider business-society and governance relations into account. In this article, we develop six propositions

that point to the changing governance relations between state, firm and civil society actors, showing that

dynamics of organized violence are at their center. Given the fast-paced changes and contemporary

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social, economic and environmental challenges faced worldwide - political violence, terrorist activism,

rapid climate change, breakdown of liberal-democratic values, rise of authoritarianism, to name but a few

(Dryzek, 2013; Dannreuther, 2014; Giroux, 2018) - we argue it to be of extreme importance for

management and organizational scholars to understand these dynamics of organized violence, being

aware of possible violent ‘doomsday scenarios’ that may become reality in the not too distant future, if

they do not exist in some parts of the world already. Based on our analysis, we develop three such

‘doomsday scenarios’ that represent extreme versions of the firm-state-civil society governance dynamics

of organized violence.

This article contributes to our understanding of business-society relations by highlighting the need

for a governance of organized violence perspective. All too often firm-state-civil society relations are

dominated by CSR and other ‘win-win’ perspectives (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 1984; McWilliams & Siegel,

2001), neglecting the often violent nature of governance relations. In times of rapid social, economic and

environmental changes, we argue that such a violence-based view may be important if we appreciate that

there might be increased struggles for natural resources, political recognition and legitimacy of business

activity (McFate, 2017). This article also aims to contribute to the debate of the role of the state and

private actors to protect and enhance fundamental human, economic, political and environmental rights.

Often neglected in management and organization studies, we put forward a violence-based view of

business-society relations, which, we argue, is of importance and significance for businesses,

policymakers and civil society in a world that is seemingly becoming more polarized, disorganized and

violent.

THE STATE MONOPOLY OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE AND ITS PRIVATIZATION

Violence is a long-lived, pervasive, ubiquitous and multifaceted way of organizing and managing

economic and social activities (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015). Violence in organizational settings is often

associated with the use of actual or potential physical or symbolic force and coercive power by an

individual or an organization (Costas & Grey, 2018). The use of violence in organizations can be

legitimate or not, be perpetrated explicitly or implicitly, and it can be physical, symbolic or structural

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(Kilby, 2013). Organizational and managerial practices relying on the use of violence - which can simply

be defined as ‘organized violence’ - may take various forms, such as victimizing, corrupting, intimidating,

bullying, extorting, coercing, abusing and threatening, among others (Kilby, 2013). As such, organized

violence is manifested at various interpersonal, organizational or structural/societal levels, for example

regulating social and economic activities among and between peers, competitors, customers, and being

shaped by specific institutions (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015) and social relations (Costas & Grey, 2018).

Regardless of its specific definition or manifestation, organized violence can be understood as a

strategic resource for any actor aiming at organizing and managing economic and social activities. In modern

states the use of organized violence by private actors, like firms or civil society, is not allowed nor

tolerated: political, social and economic violence is considered as an illicit and illegal practice which ought

to be persecuted and eradicated (Wulf, 2011). State persecution of all forms of illegitimate violence

constitutes one of the elements of the social contract between the state and its citizens (Acemoglu et al.,

2013). The key word is ‘legitimate’, as the state has a monopoly over deciding what constitutes legitimate

and illegitimate forms of violence (Fukuyama, 2007). The state, in fact, uses the law and its legal apparatus

to legitimize its own use of organized violence in the form of armies, police and state security forces. For

example, a state government can legitimately deploy police forces to disperse street protesters if the

security of the wider population is in jeopardy. A private firm or NGO cannot. From a historical

perspective, it can be argued that the process of establishing, supporting and maintain a ‘monopoly of

violence’ legitimates the presence of the state and its very existence (Weber, 1946).

Yet, this monopoly can be under threat. The state can fail to establish or maintain its monopoly of

violence due to its geography. For example, some regions are difficult to access and control and different

ethnic groups may claim the legitimate use of violence. There may also be socio-economic reasons, such

as the lack of resources to organize an army/police force and the presence of income inequality, which

can all challenge the state’s legitimacy to the use of violence (Acemoglu et al., 2013). Moreover, the state

can fail to establish or maintain its monopoly of violence as part of a political process in which non-state

(e.g. firm-based) organized violence is tolerated, allowed or even encouraged, for example by

authoritarian or corrupted elites, and/or ethnic groups (Acemoglu et al., 2013).

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Wulf (2011) has identified the ‘privatization of violence’, i.e. the process of outsourcing the control

of organized violence, as a key element that has shaped state-firm dynamics over the last few decades.

Particularly two main dynamics of the privatization of violence seem to prevail (Wulf, 2011; Acemoglu

et al., 2013): on the one hand, bottom-up privatization mechanisms, often related to ‘weak and fragile

capabilities’ to defend the state monopoly; on the other hand, top-down privatization mechanisms in which

the state has developed ‘new capabilities’ and consequently outsourced the control of organized violence

to other actors, particularly private firms. Wulf (2011, p. 138) argues that a bottom-up privatization of

organized violence can be due to the state’s failure to guarantee law and order at the advantage of

organized crime, warlords, militias and criminal gangs. This is becoming an increasing challenge in a

world that is facing continuous and unprecedented political, socio-economic and environmental crises

(Enamorado et al., 2016). For example, organizations such as Russian mobsters, Eastern European crime

rings, African drug trafficking and financial scamming groups, Chinese Tongs, Japanese Yakuza and

Boryokuda, and Middle Eastern organizations connected with declared jihadist groups have all become

prominent actors today (Kleemans, 2007; FBI, 2015). These groups profit from the manipulation and

monopolization of legitimate markets, institutions and industries as well as from black markets and

illegitimate practices, e.g. illicit drug trade and human trafficking. They rely on tools of violence,

corruption, bribes, graft, extortion, intimidation, and murder to maintain their respective operations and

control their market profits (Kleemans, 2007; Costa, 2010; FBI, 2015).

Top-down privatization mechanisms, on the other hand, are characterized by the proactive

reorganization of the state and the emergence of private armies, security corps, and pro-government

militias (Carey et al., 2013; Heinisch & Mandel, 2002; Wood & Wright, 2015). Resources that are seen to

be of strategic importance for states, such as large mining operations, power stations and other key

infrastructure, are increasingly secured by private armies and police forces. Private firms are also running

prisons and a range of other security forces, acting in the interest of the state (Genders, 2002; Wood &

Wright, 2015; Alonso & Andrews, 2016). In fact, companies with large-scale, land-based operations often

have their own security forces, as there is an increasingly fierce battle to exploiting the remaining natural

resources of the planet (Borras et al., 2012).

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Regardless of their differences, both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms can be seen as part of

a wider transformation of states’ capabilities to managing strategic public assets in a context of rising

(neo-)liberal and globalized market regimes (Wood and Wright, 2015). Parallel to this transformation,

there is an increasing activism of multinational corporations, such that various analysts have claimed that

state institutions may have less capacity and willingness to implement and monitor laws and public

control on strategic assets within their jurisdiction (Kaldor, 2007). Moreover, illicit and criminal

organizations, as well as warlords, para-military, political and/or ideology-driven, violent groups are

constantly strategizing for undermining the state’s capabilities to control organized violence. In short,

the state seems to have lost power and/or redefined its capabilities as an institutional actor, which means

that it is perhaps not in full control of its own monopoly of organized violence anymore (Malešević,

2017). However, whether the loss of control is due to bottom-up or top-down mechanisms, this

approach may create a too narrow view of the governance processes shaping the privatization of

organized violence. What seems particularly neglected in this perspective is the role of other societal

stakeholders as well as the dynamic relationships between firms, states and civil society actors. Therefore,

we argue that it is important to develop a broader understanding of the privatization of organized

violence, taking into account wider governance dynamics.

BEYOND PRIVATIZATION: FIRMS, STATES AND THE GOVERNANCE TRIANGLE

OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE

Privatization is only one of the dynamics involving the role of the state and private firms in economic

activities. For more than three decades now, it has been argued that state-firm dynamics need to involve

a robust appreciation of the vital role of multiple stakeholders, in a wider state-firm-civil society relational

perspective (Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman & Phillips, 2002). As

early as in 1983, Freeman and Reed (1983) put forward the need to go beyond the sole focus of corporate

managing of shareholders, decisively moving towards, what can be called, ‘stakeholder capitalism’

(Freeman et al., 2007). Their now well-rehearsed argument has been that the firm does not only have

responsibility towards its shareholders and their financial expectations but indeed responsibilities towards

Page 6 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

a broader set of internal and external stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, customers,

communities, civil society organizations, governments and others. This has resulted in a burgeoning

literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 1984; McWilliams & Siegel,

2001; Matten & Crane, 2005).

The emerging literature on ‘political CSR’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011; Scherer et al., 2014) has

gone further, arguing that this increased focus on firm’s wider societal responsibility has been an

important political moment, as governments around the world have had less capacity – or have shown

less willingness – to address, and legislate for, social and environmental problems. This has been called

the ‘privatization of governance’ or ‘private regulation’ (Brammer et al., 2012; Vogel, 2010). While this

political move towards private regulation has been widely accepted, there is a body of literature that

argues that the role of the state has been too under-represented by management scholars (Yamak & Süer,

2005; Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2004; Moon & Vogel, 2008; Bendell et al., 2010; Fassin, 2009; Gond et al.,

2011; Schrempf-Stirling, 2018; Djelic & Etchanchu, 2017). While the role of governments has certainly

changed, these authors argue that the state has far from disappeared. It many parts of the world, for

example, governments have been much more interventionist in their industrial policy (Coates, 2005).

China’s rapid capitalist development in the past 30 years has been highly directed from the top of the

Communist State (Dickson, 2003). Even in Anglo-Saxon and so-called neoliberal contexts of the West,

governmental institutions still matter, and always have (Djelic & Etchanchu, 2017). For example, when

governments are implementing public-private partnerships – often involving large-scale infrastructure

projects – elaborate legal frameworks have to be in place to secure the workings of these often long-term

contracts between states and private sector actors (Selsky & Parker, 2005; Kwak et al., 2009).

Neoliberalism and private regulation, it is argued, cannot take place without the state (Jessop, 2002).

Instead of arguing for a one-directional perspective of privatization, a range of authors have

emphasized the changing dynamics of relations between government, business and civil society. Steurer

(2013), for example, shows how governmental deregulation has been accompanied by soft governmental

regulation as well as ‘societal re-regulation’. Here, the state does not simply disappear but is entangled in

a complex web of changing power relations that lead to different outcomes across time and space. Such

Page 7 of 34 Academy of Management Perspectives

a perspective requires detailed studies of the dynamic, triangular interactions between state, corporate

and civil society actors, involving mechanisms of political maneuvering, interest alignment and alliance

building (Levy & Kaplan, 2008; Bo et al., 2018; Midttun, 2005). What we are, hence, dealing with is, what

Abbott & Snidal (2009) call, a ‘governance triangle’.

[Insert Figure 1]

This triangle features different modes of regulation, including ‘hard regulation’ by the state,

‘industry self-regulation’ by business, and ‘civil regulation’ by civil society actors (Steurer, 2013, p. 395).

These regulatory modes are not necessarily stable, but marked by continuous struggles over differing

interests, values and cultural perspectives (Bo et al., 2018). These conflicts are well documented in the

literature (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015; Surroca et al., 2013) with authors showing how disagreements and

different interests between firm, state and civil society actors often involve struggles over identity (Bruijn

& Whiteman, 2010), recognition (Westermann-Behaylo et al., 2015) and access to resources, such as land

(Banerjee, 2011a).

However, what is perhaps less appreciated in the current literature - although there are exceptions

(e.g. Kraemer et al., 2013) - is that these conflicts can also involve violence, and more precisely organized

violence. As indicated in Figure 2 and discussed above, the current debate on the privatization of

organized violence revolves around only two specific governance dynamics involving state-firm-society

relations. Specifically, bottom-up privatization mechanisms are seen in the literature as a governance

response of the state to civil society pressures, and top-down privatization mechanisms are new

governance responses to the perceived need to outsource the control of strategic assets to private firms.

What we have discussed in this section is that this privatization-of-violence view may be too limited.

There is a need to appreciate the wider governance dynamics at play, involving a complex array of firm,

state and civil society actors and their often violent relationships. We will now further elaborate on this

approach and widen our perspective on a violence-based view of business-society relations using a

governance triangle perspective, while, first, we briefly discuss our methodological approach.

Page 8 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

[Insert Figure 2]

METHODOLOGY

Adopting an inductive and interpretative approach to theorizing (Gioia et., 2013; Gehman et al., 2018),

our main objective has been to understand contemporary forms of violence in governance relations, and

theorizing the changes in firm-state-civil society relations of organized violence (Langley 2009; Langley

et al. 2013). Based on existing literature in management and organization studies, war, peace and security

studies, political theory and international relations, we have developed conceptual propositions forming

a theoretical framework of organized violence that focuses on the dynamic relations between state

institutions, private firms and civil society actors (see Table 1).

[Insert Table 1]

Rather than a systematic literature review, we have purposively selected academic reports and

manuscripts engaging with the conception of firm-society relations as a dynamic and constantly changing

process of ‘governance making’ in which the three main actors, state, firm and civil society, have differing

interests, goals and objectives. From the selected sources, all academic sources have been categorized

and coded to delineate the different governance processes of the three main actors in the governance

framework. We have identified a set of codes related to core tensions and pressures arising between these

actors, as well as a set of codes referring to core challenges, resolved in the emergence or shift of the

control of violence in the governance triangle. Based on this perspective, we have developed six

propositions that constitute, we propose, the key violence-based governance dynamics in business-

society relations. Based on these six propositions we have finally identified three main doomsday

scenarios.

TOWARDS A VIOLENCE-BASED VIEW OF BUSINESS-SOCIETY RELATIONS

Page 9 of 34 Academy of Management Perspectives

In this section, we first present our findings related to a violence-based view of business-society relations

represented by six key conceptual propositions. Figure 3 represents the dynamic relations between our

conceptual propositions, in the attempt to enlarge and problematize the governance triangle presented

in Figure 2.

[Insert Figure 3]

Proposition 1a: Outsourcing of violence and security to firms

This proposition summarizes what has been already discussed in the debate on top-down privatization

dynamics in which states are using private firms to organize, deliver and control its monopoly of violence

and/or turn a blind eye to the violation of state laws by private firms (Volkov, 2016). In the above, we

have identified an important tendency for the state to increasingly face economic and social incentives

to ‘privatize’ and liberalize the monopoly of violence, and to include new private economic actors to

deliver security services, protect human rights, and support its geo-political interests (Kinsey, 2006;

Alonso & Andrews, 2016; McFate, 2017). This is due to either the rising of complexity in society on how

to manage control and order, or to a political shift towards the privatization of public and common assets

like social security and protection. Hence, private economic actors are more often legitimized to lead the

control of organized violence, pushing for further liberalization and ‘outsourcing’ of security services

(Krahmann, 2009; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010). The nascent private military industry, private-owned

or controlled prisons and private security forces are few examples of a fast-growing business context and

marketplace based on organized violence (Avant, 2005).

However, another form of outsourcing of violence and security is when states do not have the

capacity to challenge any violation of their laws; or states are deliberating tolerating it (Volkov, 2016).

Examples include large-scale private investments in strategic industries, such as oil, gas and mining, where

states have a strategic interest in working with private firms to develop and extract these resources. Often,

however, these industries then operate outside any regime of public scrutiny of work conditions and

environmental impacts (Bush, 2008; Obi, 2010; Volkov, 2016). This also refers to the case when

Page 10 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

corporations adopt illegal practices in the workplace or exploit natural resources without being

sanctioned by the state, or when they are bribing or corrupting key public officers to gain a license to

operate in illicit markets (Crawford & Botchwey, 2017).

Proposition 1b: Deployment of state armies and security forces (against civil society)

This proposition is about the increasing use of state armies and security forces against civil society actors,

often done in an illegitimate way (Clarke, 2010; Beckman, 2016). One could also call this the illegitimate

use of the state’s monopoly of violence. The core pressures here are arising from an increase or

persistence of political instability and social unrest, for example leading the state to pursuit a political

agenda to repress minorities/ suppress human/ democratic rights, or the need to respond to exogenous

shocks (e.g. climate change, terrorist attacks, conflicts with other state(s) or internal guerrillas,

pandemics), leading the state to quickly react to unforeseen circumstances and events. There are

increasing concerns that the freedom of speech is curtailed in even liberal, democratic societies (House,

2014). The threat of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, directed at the state, is often used by state institutions

to legitimize unprecedented increases in the powers of the police, the army and the state’s legal system

to deal with such ‘states of emergencies’ (Epifanio, 2011; Beckman, 2016). There is an extensive literature

about how, in the post-9-11 world, the freedom of expression and organization has been curtailed by

governments around the world (Epifanio, 2011).

Yet, this goes beyond anti-terrorist measures. As already mentioned above, states often support

large-scale development projects, such as dams, oil and gas installations, mines and power stations, which

will not only benefit private interests but are seen to be of strategic importance for nations’ development

(Martinez-Alier, 2001; Obi, 2010; Maher et al., 2019). When communities resist such large-scale projects,

for example because they feel their livelihoods are threatened, then often the violent force of the state is

mobilized to deal with the resisting communities (Dunlap, 2019). Banerjee argues that so-called ‘spaces

of exception’ are actively created by state authorities to push through strategic projects and crush civil

society resistance: “Violence, torture, and death can occur in this space of exception without political or

juridical intervention. The state of exception thus creates a zone where the application of law is

Page 11 of 34 Academy of Management Perspectives

suspended but the law remains in force” (2008, p. 1544). For example, in the mining conflicts they study

in Chile, Maher et al. (2019) show how violence is used as a strategic resource mobilized by the state to

support national development projects, delivered by large multinational mining companies.

Proposition 2a: ‘Mafia-like’ economic organizations

While, up until the 1950s, the mafioso was considered to be a ‘man of honour’, the Italian mafia can

increasingly be considered as a rational economic actor, “combining modern entrepreneurial activities in

the legal sector with traditional cultural values which give Mafia firms important competitive advantages

over their rivals” (Chubb, 1996, p. 275). Some of the Italian Mafia practices Chubb mentions are the

“discouragement of competition, holding down of wages, reserves of liquidity from illegal activities

which can be reinvested in the legal sector” (ibid.). Yet, it is clear that such business practices are now

commonplace, exercised and perpetrated by the criminal, illegal and violent economic activities of

organized crime gangs globally (Beckert & Wehinger, 2012; Albanese, 2014), using tactics based on

victimizing, abusing, corrupting, intimidating and threatening, among others (Kilby, 2013; Riccardi, 2014;

Chin, 2016). Mafia organizations often specialize in black market and other illegal or semi-legal economic

activities, such as weapons dealing, organized prostitution, drug trafficking, smuggling and tax evasion

(Kleemans, 2007; FBI, 2015). Their business empires are considered to be spanning the entire globe,

while there is particular emphasis on transferring proceeds from illegal activities to legitimate businesses

through money laundering (Lavorgna, 2015).

Private economic organizations acting as ‘Mafia’ organized crime may emerge when there is an

increased interest of organized crime to control socio-economic activities/assets in key regions or

sectors, for example due to weak/fragile political and institutional conditions, or when there is an

increased capacity of these organizations to influence political arenas and institutions. Mafia or mafia-

like organizations often use state institutions to organize, control and legitimize their violence (Albanese,

2014), for example by corrupting civil servants and politicians, and/or setting up public-private

enterprises operating at the edge of legal and illegal sectors (Riccardi, 2014; Chin, 2016; Volkov, 2016).

In this way, they increasingly violate the state’s monopoly of violence by weakening and corrupting its

Page 12 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

capacity to control. In some cases the mafia acts even on behalf of the state (Chubb, 1996; Naím, 2012;

Lavorgna, 2015). Some authors argue that in a world that is facing continuous and unprecedented

political, socio-economic and environmental crises, we will see a rise of mafia-like economic practices

(Enamorado et al., 2016).

Proposition 2b: Deployment of private security forces and division of resistance

As shown in Table 1, an increased interest of private businesses to control socio-economic

activities/assets in key regions or sectors or the need to respond to social unrest, political instability and

institutional uncertainty can lead private firms to be legally entitled and legitimized to exert a monopoly

of violence in certain regions or sectors. Private firms receive economic and political powers from the

state as part of a political agenda to use of violence by private firms against civil society (Brock & Dunlap,

2018). These practices include bullying, intimidation, divide and conquer deployment of private security

forces and other approaches that could be deemed violent (Sampat, 2015; Dunlap, 2019; Maher, et al.,

2019). Whereas the public image of firms is one that is dominated by CSR and other ‘win-win’

approaches, there is often a hidden, secret agenda to the way companies go about dealing with resisting

civil society groups, including NGOs, indigenous people and communities (Newell, 2005; Banerjee,

2011b; Sampat, 2015). Kraemer et al. (2013), for example, document this hybrid approach in a mining

conflict in India, where, on the one hand, the mining company tries to establish a partnership with the

local community, while, on the other hand, deploys violent measures against protesters. Equally, Hönke

(2013) shows how companies often make large investments into local communities, while also using

private security forces to coercively protect their turf. Such private security practices are often not

possible without the, at least tacit, approval by the state. That is, either states do not have the capacity or

willingness to protect people’s freedom to protest, often giving private companies a free reign in dealing

with what is perceived to be ‘uncivil’ society (Sullivan et al., 2011).

Proposition 3a: Guerrilla warfare and terrorist organizations

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Increased political, cultural and/or religious struggles in society between classes, groups or minorities, or

a raise of economic inequality and social unrest, collective fear or distrust for public authorities and

political organizations can lead groups in society, such political parties or ethnic minorities to question

the state capacity or legitimacy to maintain and enforce a shared social contract. This is also exacerbated

by the presence of economic, social and/or cultural elites directly control the state. Whereas most civil

society groups, including NGOs, community groups, etc. use non-violent tactics to resist the state and

its regime of power and control, there are also groups that specialize in using strategic violence to further

their aims and objectives (Gupta, 2008; Khalil, 2013). The most-talked about violent civil society groups

have been jihadist terrorist cells and militia, such as al-Qaida, ISIS and others (Clutterbuck, 2003;

Stepanova, 2008). There are many theories trying to explain why civil society activism for social and

political change turns into violent radicalism and extremism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; Dalgaard-

Nielsen, 2010). Some authors highlight social inequalities that have increased exponentially under

neoliberal globalization and the contingent institutional and class responses to them (Sandbrook &

Romano, 2004). Others emphasize psychological factors (Loza, 2007).

Whatever the reasons for the recent surge in terrorist activity worldwide, civil society groups have

always used violent tactics, including guerrilla warfare, to make themselves heard, defend territories or

resources and fight for recognition as well as social and political change (Duyvesteyn, 2004). Examples

include the Maoists in India and Nepal, the IRA in Ireland, among others (Sharma, 2004; Shah, 2013;

Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007), which have been fighting against regional and central governments to follow

their ideological interests. However, as Shah (2006) points out, there is not always a clear distinction

between state and violent civil society group, as both actors can be seen to compete in, what can be

called, the ‘market of protection’. That is, as the state’s monopoly of violence is watered down, violent

civil society groups can step in to provide security and protection for the population.

Proposition 3b: Mobilization of violent resistance (against corporations)

As highlighted in Table 1, increased needs for social and economic justice and/or political representation,

as well as social response to scandals or misconducts perpetrated by private businesses can lead civil

Page 14 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

society actors to act and try to directly ensure and provide social security, income redistribution, voice,

and ‘safety nets’ to citizens in opposition to the state and private firms. Civil society actors can be forced

to control and monitor private businesses’ operations due to lack of capacity or interest from the state.

Therefore, just as violent resistance can be targeted at state institutions and forces, it can also be targeted

at private firms, particularly those that are engaged in large-scale economic development projects, such

as mines, oil and gas extraction, hydropower dams and forest plantations. Such large-scale projects often

displace large amounts of people, particularly peasants, farmers, and indigenous people - those who

depend on the land for their livelihoods and spirituality (Taylor, 2011; Verweijen, 2017). Violent

resistance against firms hence can be particularly encountered in struggles over land, given that basic

livelihoods are at stake. There are many examples of land-based communities - particularly in Global

South countries - encountering evictions from their land, as extractive industries - often with the tacit or

explicit approval by state authorities - start digging for coal, oil, gas or minerals (Obi, 2010; Pedersen,

2014). Even within agricultural and forestry settings, indigenous people have been evicted as their land

is being included in global agricultural commodity chains and carbon markets (Gerber, 2011; Lyons &

Westoby, 2014). These are examples of dispossessions and land grabbing that these communities resist,

sometimes using violent tactics, in order to defend their land.

DOOMSDAY SCENARIOS OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE

In a world characterized by increasing systemic and complex crises, so-called grand challenges or wicked

problems, an extended understanding of violence-based governance dynamics in business-society

relations can help scholars and practitioners to engage in a richer and more informed sense-making of

future scenarios. Based on our conceptual propositions, outlined in the previous section and Table 1, we

now elaborate on a violence-based view of business-society relations, developing ‘ideal typical’ doomsday

scenarios of organized violence. In our approach, an ‘ideal type’ doomsday scenario of organized violence

is identified as a specific configuration of the firm-state-civil society relations, when the core tensions,

pressures and challenges pushed out of balance these dynamics, such that one of the actors takes control

of violence, establishing a new ‘monopoly’ or reinforcing an existing one. An extreme environmental

Page 15 of 34 Academy of Management Perspectives

crisis, for example, a world of extreme climate conditions, or socio-economic collapse, due to global

spread of a new contagious disease, a nuclear disaster or conflict, a systematic technology breakdown -

these are all events that can trigger a violent radicalization of contemporary governance relations,

allowing one of the actors take control of the monopoly of violence. Based on our inductive and

interpretative approach to theorizing, summarized in Table 1, we have identified the following doomsday

scenarios (see Figure 4): (1) the rise of state-based authoritarianism based on novel forms of military

dictatorships; (2) the rise of new monopolies or oligopolies of organized violence managed by private

firms; and (3) the rise of systemic and epidemic civil wars orchestrated by violent civil society

organizations at regional or global scale.

[Insert Figure 4]

Doomsday scenario 1: Rise of military dictatorships

Based on our reading and coding of an interdisciplinary set of literature, our inductive theorizing has

revealed a scenario in which states might reclaim control of organized violence and systematically limit

the activities of civil society and private firms, establishing new forms of dictatorships, for example by

the use of coercion through state-controlled police and military forces. State authoritarianism – and

military dictatorships as their most extreme version – may emerge as a response to increasingly severe

geo-political instability, rapid disease outbreaks, climate disasters and unpredictable social and political

turmoil, all triggering the need for more state control and use of organized violence (Grint, 2010;

Epifanio, 2011; Beckman, 2016). This process may emerge either through an increased state capacity and

need to limit private actors’ activities, for example by limiting any private initiatives in the military, police

and security sectors, revising and limiting any outsourcing process and by ‘re-nationalising’ the

governance of public assets, including social security through organized violence (Epifanio, 2011); or by

a full alignment between corporate and state interests and power. Novel, violence-based forms of state

authoritarianism emerge at the expense of civil society voices and democratic rights as well as by reducing

or abolishing any liberal rights (Clarke, 2010; Giroux, 2018; Volkov, 2016). The emergence of Trump

Page 16 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

and other populist governments (Fuchs, 2017) as well as the rise of China as a significant economic and

geopolitical force (Ma, 2009) has already fueled debates about an ‘authoritarian capitalism’ that has taken

hold around the world (Witt & Redding, 2014). This doomsday scenario predicts that these developments

might accelerate – particularly in times of major economic, health, social and environmental crises –

leading to the rise of extreme versions of state authoritarianism, for example military dictatorships.

Doomsday scenario 2: Rise of private security monopolies and oligopolies

Our inductive theorizing has given rise to quite a different scenario; one that predicts extreme versions

of privatized forms of organized violence, deregulated and even encouraged by states. This depicts a

future in which the state is ‘systematically outsourcing’ control and legitimization of organized violence

to private economic actors. This process is supported by a progressive control of states’ functions by

violent organizations, for example through their increased capacity to be represented in state institutions

and to use them to organize, control and legitimize their violence (Albanese, 2014). The state’s

capabilities are fully controlled by private actors, systematically using violent practices, for example by

corrupting civil servants and politicians, and legitimized to operate in illegal sectors (Riccardi, 2014; Chin,

2016; Volkov, 2016). The full collapse of the state’s monopoly of organized violence is accompanied by

the emergence of new monopolies and oligopolies in which democratic control of such organized

violence will be limited or completely absent. This can lead to increased lawlessness and a ‘wild-west’

neoliberal capitalism, which is fully focused on producing wealth for a small minority of private business

elites. This scenario also depicts a future of organized crime led by violent organizations, like the mafia,

specialized in business operations such as human trafficking, modern slavery, and private economic

organizations being directly or indirectly dependent on such organized crime (Kleemans, 2007). This

process includes the rise of private armies and warlords, with proxy wars being fought entirely by private

security forces. Part of this scenario is the prediction that states will be increasingly called upon to cover

large-scale health, economic, social and environmental risks, leading to extreme indebtedness and further

reduced capacity of the state to regulate and fund social security and welfare programs. As the global

financial crisis has shown (Kolb, 2010), large-scale, state-funded rescue packages can lead to, what is

Page 17 of 34 Academy of Management Perspectives

called, a socialization of risk, contributing to extreme income and wealth gaps in society (Lee &

Woodward, 2012).

Doomsday scenario 3: Rise of civil wars

We might also witness states increasingly incapable or unwilling to legislate against organized violence,

which will lead to increased lawlessness and the exponential increase of ‘uncivil society’ actors, including

terrorist organizations and guerrilla groups. In this scenario, democratic rights and duties as well as civil

liberties have been abolished, as the governance space is dominated by violent civil society organizations

emerging in an unregulated society. Both, states and firms, will increasingly have difficulty in controlling

any monopoly of organized violence, leading to lawlessness and civil war-like social conditions. In this

scenario, disorganized, uncoordinated, non-controlled violence becomes (again) the central trait of how

society works, resembling pre-modern state dynamics (Bloomfield et al., 2017). It is likely that groups

that dominate this scenario, i.e. terrorist and guerilla organizations, establish symbiotic and violent

relations with private economic actors, which dominate scenario 2. Hence, terrorists, guerrillas, warlords,

mafia firms and their mercenaries are likely to be engaged in direct or proxy warfare with each other,

fighting for regional or global control of the governance space of organized violence.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article we have conceptualized firm-state-civil society relations through the lens of business-

society governance of organized violence. Our inductive and interpretative approach to theorizing has

presented an ‘extreme’ perspective on business-society governance in which doomsday scenarios of

violence-based governance mechanisms emerge in response to social and environmental crises, such as

rapid climate change or outbreaks of contagious diseases. In this concluding section, let us reflect about

the implications of our analysis for management practitioners and scholars.

We should, above all, highlight that, while this article has conceptualized a governance triangle

of business-society relations, involving firms, states and civil society actors, ‘management’ cannot be

reduced to processes and structures in the domain of firms. Understanding governance as a continuous

Page 18 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

struggle over differing interests, values and cultural perspectives (Bo et al., 2018) also implies that

‘management’ should be understood as a dynamic relationship between firms, state and civil society

actors. As stakeholder theorists (Freeman et al., 2007) and political CSR scholars (Scherer et al., 2014)

have argued for a while, management can be seen as a third space in the dynamic interactions between a

range of different societal actors. Building on these understandings, the purpose of this article has been

to show that these business-society relations are by no means always following ‘win-win’ scenarios. On

the contrary, these relations should be understood as conflictual, involving violence and, more precisely,

organized violence. Our goal has hence been to read an interdisciplinary set of literatures to conceptualize

business-society relations as a dynamic process of organized violence, giving rise to a range of doomsday

scenarios that may or may not already be visible in contemporary society. We argue that anyone involved

in the management and governance of business-society relations should take note of these possible

scenarios that paint a bleak, but possible, picture of contemporary and future society. The doomsday

scenarios that have emerged out our inductive reading and theorizing are by no means inevitable. As we

have emphasized through this article, relations between firms, states and civil society will always involve

contestations and struggles, producing a range of different outcomes. It is our hope that our analysis

contributes affirmatively to these contestations, providing societal actors with conceptual tools to

critically analyze business-society relations and enabling more just and ethical futures to emerge. This

also implies that managers of governance relations can be a force for good. If they are aware of the

doomsday scenarios of the future analyzed in this paper, it would be our hope that they are able to shift

the balance of power with the governance triangle, helping to avert the worst potential outcomes in

relation to more distributed violence capabilities.

In conclusion, let us outline the three main contributions this article makes to the management

and organization studies literature:

First, we have argued that firms are embedded in dynamic governance relations, which are not

always defined by so-called ‘win-wins’ (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 1984; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). That

is, the relations between states, firms and civil society actors are not necessarily harmonious or stable.

On the contrary, they are very dynamic and often determined by conflict (Levy & Kaplan, 2008; Bo et

Page 19 of 34 Academy of Management Perspectives

al., 2018; Midttun, 2005) as well as sensitive to pressures from systemic and global socio-economic and

environmental crises. Building on this extant literature, we have suggested the idea that these conflicts

can also involve violence, and more precisely organized violence (Kraemer et al., 2013; Banerjee,

2011a,b).

Second, we have argued that the privatization-of-violence view (Wulf, 2011) may be too limited,

proposing, instead, a violence-based view of business-society relations, using a governance triangle

perspective. In other words, our approach problematizes the idea that the state has a monopoly of

organized violence that can be altered either by transferring functions and capabilities to private firms or

by the emergence of civil society actors. Instead, basing our argument on an interdisciplinary set of

literatures, we have developed six propositions that show the complex and dynamic relations of

organized violence between states, firms and civil society.

Third, key to our approach is the idea that organized violence is a strategic asset that triggers

conflictual views and interests, and can be subject to processes of commodification, and thus be

mobilized and traded as any other strategic asset in a neo-liberal world. In line with this view, Barros

(2012, p. 56) sees “violence itself a commodity-form”, which he calls ‘security’, highlighting that we can

formalize “security as a marketable commodity [...]. Thus, if security is a marketable commodity

expressible economically, then it is possible to refer to security goods and security trades as variables of

the system”. In our approach, we have identified key dynamics shaping this process and enlarged the

spectrum of actors involved.

Based on existing literature in management and organization studies, war, peace and security

studies, political theory and international relations, we have presented a first attempt to conceptualize

the governance of organized violence and violence-based doomsday scenarios, focusing on the dynamic

relations between state institutions, private firms and civil society actors. Given the intensification and

unpredictability of global challenges, the increase of political violence, terrorist activism, rapid climate

change, breakdown of liberal-democratic values and rise of authoritarianism, we highlight the importance

for management and organizational scholars to further engage with our conceptualization of organized

violence and develop an interdisciplinary research agenda fit for an uncertain future.

Page 20 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

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Page 30 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

Page 31 of 34 Academy of Management Perspectives

Table 1 – Relations between core tensions and pressures, challenges in the governance triangle and doomsday scenarios

Exemplary narratives from the literature

Core tensions and pressures

Leading to core challenges

Propositions on firm-

state-civil society

relations of organized

violence

Leading to doomsday

scenarios

“ […] Over the past decade, many governments have found it increasingly

difficult to recruit enough qualified uniformed personnel for combat and

post-conflict operations. They have consequently come to depend more and

more on Private Military Corps (PMC) and Private Security Corps (PSC) for

training, repair, and maintenance of weapons systems and vehicles;

collection of intelligence information; interrogation of prisoners of war; asset

protection; and support of troops and police personnel in operational theatres.

As a result, thousands of PMCs and PSCs, keen to cash in on this new market,

have rapidly emerged. Contractors are hired to provide support before and

during wars and, increasingly, to assist with post-war programs.”

(Wulf, 2011: 139)

“The private management of prisons has become a hotly debated issue in

many countries across the world, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, France,

the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). Some of these

countries have a long history of privately managed prisons of one sort or

another stretching back into the nineteenth century and beyond.” (Alonso

and Andrew, 2016 : 236)

1/ Increased economic and

social incentives to ‘privatize’

and liberalize the monopoly of

violence (Kinsey, 2006;

Alonso & Andrews, 2016;

McFate, 2017)

2/ Limited capacity to

challenge any violation of laws

or state deliberating tolerating

it (Volkov, 2016)

A/ State confronted with

increasing trade-offs on which

public assets to manage

(Krahmann, 2009; Abrahamsen

& Williams, 2010)

B/ State has limited

resources/capabilities/willingness

to maintain or re-establish a

monopoly of organised violence

(Bush, 2008; Obi, 2010; Volkov,

2016; Crawford & Botchwey,

2017)

P1a: Outsourcing of

violence and security to

firms

State  Firms

“Major elements of China’s strategy in the region, such as increased

migration of Han and increased state control/management of ethnic minority

religious and cultural expression, have been major ongoing sources of

Uyghur grievance against the state. The state’s response to this has consisted

of alternating periods of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies toward ethnic minority

religious and cultural expression.” (Clarke, 2010: 545)

“The declaration of a ‘war on terror’ marked the most obvious, but by no

means the only response to the rise in international terrorism. Immediately

after the attacks of 11 September 2001, governments started to overhaul their

countries’ systems of anti-terrorist legislation.” (Epifanio, 2011: 399)

“[…] efforts to implement the intervention of the executive branch of the

state also involved the use of force via police action. For example, at

Caimanes [Chile] the police broke up a roadblock with the use of riot control

gear, and then demolished the campsite in March 2015, on day 76 of protest.

The roadblock was organized in protest at the absence of any action after the

supreme court ruling in October in 2014 requesting Pelambres to disassemble

the El Mauro tailings dam. Members of the community told us that such

intervention was really a form of protecting the interests of the company

instead of complying with the court order to dismantle the El Mauro dam.”

(Maher et al., 2019: 1181)

“This police practice of planting weapons on protestors once in custody was

common during the Tía Maria conflict. This conflict began in 2009, yet

1/ Increase or persistence of

political instability and social

unrest (Clarke, 2010;

Beckman, 2016)

2/ Response to exogenous

shocks (e.g. climate change,

terrorist attacks, conflicts with

other state(s) or internal

guerrillas, pandemics)

(Epifanio, 2011; Beckman,

2016)

A/ State pursues a political

agenda to repress minorities/

supress human/ democratic rights

(Dunlap, 2019; Maher et al.,

2019)

B/ State needs to quickly react to

unforeseen circumstances/events

(Epifanio, 2011)

P1b: Deployment of

state armies and

security forces

State  Civil society

D1: Rise of military

dictatorships

Page 32 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

Southern Copper Peru, a subsidiary of Grupo Mexico, already began

assessing the mineral reserve situated above the agricultural Tambo Valley

in 2000.” (Dunlap, 2019: 11)

“Under the conditions in Russia in the mid-1990s, where the boundaries

between public and private violence became blurred, when the de facto

capacity to enforce and thereby define justice gained priority over written

laws, when protection and taxation were increasingly privatized, the very

existence of t the state as a unified entity and of the public domain itself was

called into question.” (Volkov, 2016:7)

“The additional profits from the [Italian] Mafia's economic activities in the

legal sector that created the capital reserves that in turn made possible its

entrance as a major player in the international drug trade in the 1970s and

1980s. It is striking that a substantial portion of these capital reserves can be

traced directly to Mafia penetration of the public administration. [..] The

1970s and 1980s, however, were characterized by the growing political

autonomy of the Mafia, which formed 'Mafia-political lobbies' to advance its

interests and at times directly assumed positions of political and

administrative power at the local level (Chubb, 1996: 275-276)

“[…] thanks to the inherently transnational character of the Internet, the

physical location of criminal actors is less important than it was before,

providing them with the possibility to operate in countries where there are

loopholes in legislation and security that can be exploited or to easily

connect with distant criminal peers” (Lavorgna, 2015: 156)

1/ Increased interest of

organised crime to control

socio-economic

activities/assets in key regions

or sectors, due to weak/fragile

political and institutional

conditions (Riccardi, 2014;

Chin, 2016; Volkov, 2016)

2/ Increased capacity of

organised crime/violent

organizations to influence

political arenas and institutions

(Beckert & Wehinger, 2012;

Albanese, 2014; Kilby, 2013)

A/ Private firms control specific

geographical areas or economic

sectors since the state lacks

resource and/or capabilities

(Chubb, 1996; Naím, 2012;

Lavorgna, 2015)

B/ Private firms share or take

over the political and economic

control of certain areas/societal

groups in agreement with the

State (or some of its

representatives) (Volkov, 2016;

Enamorado et al., 2016)

P2a: ‘Mafia-like’

economic organizations

Firms  State

“‘Security authorities, following Brigadier General Kitson's (1971/2010)

advice, have come to view opposition in different stages of proto-insurgent

activity: the ‘preparatory period’ and ‘non-violence phase,’ which are viewed

as precursors to an ‘insurgency’ that challenges the legitimacy and operations

of governments and resource extraction companies. This leads authorities to

respond with various pre-emptive and sustained efforts, mixing concession

and coercion to defuse social movements and their consequent disruptions of

business. It is from this perspective that we analyse the operations of

Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk (RWE), looking at how so-called

‘insurgency’ is defined and how governments and companies collaborate to

legitimise their operations and ‘pacify’ opposition (Brock and Dunlap, 2018:

35)

“When resistance against the proposed mine emerged in Niyamgiri [India],

both the corporation and state responded with counter-mobilization efforts

in an attempt to quell opposition to the mine. […] Two black jeeps driven

by pro-Vedanta ‘goons’ regularly traversed the mountains and some

Vedanta supporters even occupied a hut in a Dongria Kondh village to

demonstrate their continued presence and intimidate villagers. Pro-

corporate ‘thugs’ appeared in villages and at resistance meetings,

intimidating attendees and those who spoke out against the mine. The

heavy-handed tactics and violence by various pro-corporate actors are well

documented by international NGOs, building on information gathered with

the support of local and NAN activists” (Kraemer et al., 2013: 841)

1/ Increased interest of private

businesses to control socio-

economic activities/assets in

key regions or sectors

(Sullivan et al., 2011; Kraemer

et al., 2013)

2/ Response to social unrest,

political instability and

institutional uncertainty (Brock

and Dunlap, 2018)

A/ Private firms are legally

entitled and legitimised to exert

monopoly of violence in certain

regions or sectors (Newell, 2005;

Banerjee, 2011b; Sampat, 2015)

B/ Private firms receive

economic and political powers

from the state as part of a

political agenda (Brock &

Dunlap, 2018)

P2b: Deployment of

private security forces

and division of

resistance

Firms  Civil society

D2: Rise of private

security monopolies

and oligopolies

Page 33 of 34 Academy of Management Perspectives

“[…] warlords, organized crime, militias, rebels, and even youth gangs and

child soldiers have increasingly fought in wars and violent conflicts” (Wulf,

2011: 138)

“In Pakistan, the central state in Islamabad has little control of the “tribal

areas” such as Waziristan. Similarly, the Iraqi state in Baghdad exercises

little authority in Kurdistan. In the case of Pakistan, the tribal areas have

existed since the formation of the country in 1947, and even though they

have been largely out of the control of the central state, they have also been

represented within it. Under the 1973 Constitution the tribal areas had eight

representatives in the National Assembly elected by the tribal elders (the

Maliks). Under General Musharraf’s regime this was increased to twelve. In

Iraq, while the peshmerga militia control the streets of Mosul, a coalition of

Kurdish political parties keeps the government in power in Baghdad

(Acemoglu et al., 2013; p:6)

1/ Increased political, cultural

and religious struggles in

society between classes,

groups or regional minorities

(Sandbrook & Romano, 2004;

Acemoglu et al., 2013)

2/ Raise of economic

inequality and social unrest,

collective fear or distrust for

public authorities and political

organizations (Moskalenko &

McCauley, 2009; Dalgaard-

Nielsen, 2010)

A/ Groups in society, minorities

question the state capacity or

legitimacy to maintain and

enforce a shared social contract

(Duyvesteyn, 2004; Gupta, 2008;

Khalil, 2013)

B/ Unclear distinction between

state and violent civil society

group in the control of violence

(Shah; 2006)

P3a: Guerrilla warfare

and terrorist

organizations

Civil society  State

“[..] the majority of Hamas’s resources were spent (prior to their 2006

election victory) on the social and welfare programs that the movement

provides to the Palestinians. […] The Nepali Maoists similarly employed a

wide range of nonviolent methods with the aim of generating support

during their “People’s War.” They lowered rents in their areas of influence,

and in certain cases even fulfilled their promise to redistribute “land to the

tiller.” They also undertook campaigns in support of female inheritance

rights and employment, and in opposition to polygamy, prostitution, and

domestic violence. In addition, they provided community justice, with a

focus on crimes such as corruption, rape, and murder.” (Khalil, 2013: 422-

423)

“In April 2014, Bembe armed fighters assaulted the town of Misisi, a

burgeoning artisanal gold mining site located in Fizi territory in South Kivu

province, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Getting close to

the compound of CASA Minerals, a Virgin Islands incorporated company

engaged in gold exploration, the assailants framed their attack as a protest

against the alleged sale to CASA of ‘their’ hill, the gold-rich Akyanga

Mountain, seen as part of the Babembe’s ancestral grounds. He presented

this action as a way to express disapproval with Banro’s alleged surpassing

of its concession limits, and the derisory compensation offered to

expropriated peasants. At the face of it, these actions constitute violent

reactions against the intensifying expansion of industrial mining in the

eastern Congo, which threatens the livelihoods and ways of life of hundreds

of thousands of people depending both directly and indirectly on artisanal

mining” (Verweijen, 2017: 466-467)

1/ Increased needs for social

and economic justice / fairness

or political representation in

response to firms exploitation

of public assets (Taylor, 2011;

Verweijen, 2017)

2/ Response to scandals or

misconducts perpetrated by

private businesses (Obi, 2010;

Pedersen, 2014)

A/ Civil society actors ensure

and provide social security,

income redistribution, voice, and

‘safety nets’ to citizens in

opposition to the state (Khalil,

2013; Gerber, 2011; Lyons &

Westoby, 2014)

B/ Civil society actors control

and monitor of private

businesses’ operations due to

lack of capacity or interest from

the state (Verweijen, 2017)

P3b: Mobilization of

violent resistance

Civil society  Firms

D3: Rise of civil wars

Page 34 of 34Academy of Management Perspectives

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ORGAN STUD

Domenico Dentoni

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J BUS ETHICS

This article provides a historical contextualization of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and its political role. CSR, we propose, is one form of business–society interactions reflecting a unique ideological framing. To make that argument, we compare contemporary CSR with two historical ideal-types. We explore in turn paternalism in nineteenth century Europe and managerial trusteeship in early twentieth century US. We outline how the political responsibilities of business were constructed, negotiated, and practiced in both cases. This historical contextualization shows that the frontier between economy and polity has always been blurry and shifting and that firms have played a political role for a very long time. It also allows us to show how the nature, extent, and impact of that political role changed through history and co-evolved in particular with shifts in dominant ideologies. Globalization, in that context, is not the driver of the political role of the firm but a moderating phenomenon contributing significantly to the dynamics of this shift. The comparison between paternalism, trusteeship, and contemporary CSR points to what can be seen as functional equivalents—alternative patterns of business–society interactions that each correspond, historically, to unique and distinct ideological frames. We conclude by drawing implications for future theorizing on (political) CSR and stakeholder democracy.

The Enduring State: An analysis of governance-making in three mining conflicts

Article

Full-text available

Jun 2019

This article investigates the profound ambiguity of the state in the organization of contemporary business–society relations. On the one hand, there has been a decisive shift from government to governance, encouraging private actors, such as corporations, communities and NGOs, to address social and environmental concerns themselves, i.e. without the state’s involvement. On the other hand, however, the continued importance and relevance of the organized state is difficult to ignore. In this article we examine the role of the state in three cases of mining conflicts in Chile, one of the world’s most important mining countries. Through longitudinal, qualitative research of conflictive mining governance relations between state organizations, large corporations and local communities, we show that the modes of influence conducted by the Chilean state oscillate between direct, central steering (‘cathedral’) and indirect, dispersed vouching (‘bazaar’). Elaborating on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, we offer a hybrid theory of state organization, where the dematerialization of the state’s responsibility is seen not as the norm but rather as a particular mode of governance that sits alongside the underestimated, yet enduring, material involvement of the state.

‘Agro sí, mina NO!’ the Tía Maria copper mine, state terrorism and social war by every means in the Tambo Valley, Peru

Article

Full-text available

May 2019
POLIT GEOGR

Alexander Dunlap

The Tía Maria copper mine situated above the agricultural Tambo Valley, southwest Peru, has sparked nearly ten years of protracted conflict. This conflict began in 2009, yet Southern Copper Peru or Southern, a subsidiary of Grupo Mexico, has faced ardent resistance. This article explores the ‘political reactions from above’, examining how Southern and the Peruvian government have negotiated the popular rejection of the mine. Residents have organized a popular consultation, large-scale demonstrations, road blockades and general strikes, which has been met with violent repression. Reviewing the political ecology of counterinsurgency, which studies the socio-ecological warfare techniques employed to control human and natural resources, and relating it to social war discourse, this section lays the theoretical foundations to discuss the coercion and ‘social war component’ present in natural resource extraction. This leads to an overview of the relationship between Peruvian security forces and extraction industries, followed by a brief chronology of the Tía Maria conflict. The subsequent two sections offer a political ecology analysis of various ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ counterinsurgency techniques employed by the Peruvian state and Southern in an attempt to pacify social unrest and socially engineer acceptance of the project. The concluding section discusses the ‘whole-of-government’ counterinsurgency approach employed, recognizing how the present institutional arrangements and business imperatives are designed to override popular socio-ecological concerns. Supporting social war discourse, the article contends that the state apparatus and politics itself serve as an instrument of social pacification and ecological exploitation regardless of widespread ecological and climatic concerns.

Organizing the Environmental Governance of the Rare-Earth Industry: China's passive revolution

Article

Full-text available

Jul 2018

The rare-earth industry is of strategic importance for China and many 'clean' technologies worldwide. Yet the processes of mining, smelting and separating rare-earth ores are heavily polluting. Using a neo-Gramscian perspective in the context of organization studies, this article analyses the dynamic interactions between government agencies, business and civil society in the development of the environmental governance of China's rare-earth industry over the past 30 years, with a particular focus on China's 'top-down' passive revolution. Making use of rarely granted access to China's biggest rare-earth company, one of the country's key strategic assets, the analysis makes visible the changes of environmental contestations among five different governance actors over what we identify as three environmental governance eras in China. Besides offering unique empirical insights into the organizational processes that constitute the dynamically evolving hegemony of China's rare-earth industry, the article makes three theoretical contributions to the field of organization studies. First, we analyse the changing role of state institutions in a non-Western context, which has been de-emphasized by existing organization scholars. Second, we conceptualize the dynamics of environmental governance in China as a form of top-down 'passive revolution'. Third, we problematize the dual role of Chinese NGOs as both supporting and challenging state power. Overall, we contribute to our understanding of the organization of governance systems in non-Western contexts, which has been neglected in organizational studies.

Armies Without States: The Privatization of Security

Book

Jun 2002

Robert Mandel

Comparative Legal Approaches To Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism

Book

May 2016

James Beckman

The Oxford Handbook of Asian Business Systems

Article

Dec 2015

Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: Forecasts and Remedies

Book

Sep 2003

Richard Clutterbuck

Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are increasingly common in many countries of the world. This book examines the current state of terrorism and guerrilla warfare and indicates how they may develop in the future. It sets out the different kinds of terrorism and guerrilla warfare and discusses in detail the various types of weapons and techniques favoured by terrorists, assessing for each the latest technological changes and their effects. It looks at intelligence, propaganda and communications. It explores the tactics and strategy of terrorists and guerrillas and surveys the methods currently used and being developed for countering their activities. Throughout the author illustrates the points made with examples from around the world.

Violence and Organization Studies

Article

Jun 2018

In this paper we argue that violence is curiously both absent and present within organization studies. By violence we mean actual or potential physical harm and, building on an insight from Norbert Elias, we suggest that such violence is both ‘totally familiar yet hardly perceived’ in organizations. We examine how in two major traditions of organization studies, one deriving from Weber and the other from Foucault, violence figures as, respectively, an ‘absent-presence’ and a ‘present-absence’. We then propose that a sensibility towards violence enables the recognition of ‘the blood and bruises’ of organizational life: something present close to home as well as faraway; here and now rather than long ago; and featuring in ‘normal’ organizations as well as in abnormal or exceptional circumstances.

It’s Not Just About the Mafia! Conceptualizing Business–Society Relations of Organized Violence

Abstract

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