Participatory governance in Lake Victoria (Kenya) fisheries: whose voices are heard?

Abstract

Co-management is advocated as a means to improve human equity and the ecological sustainability of common-pool resources. The promotion of co-management of fisheries often assumes the participation of resource users in decision-making ensures more ecologically sustainable outcomes than top–down management approaches while improving livelihoods and food security. However, in fisheries co-management approaches, participation is often poorly defined and measured by co-management proponents. For resource users, it may not be clear what their participation in co-management entails, and what such participation might involve or achieve. For the fisheries of Lake Victoria (Kenya), the introduction of co-management established Beach Management Units (BMUs) on a model of participatory decision-making. Unsurprisingly, given global experiences of institutions for resource users’ participation in co-management, the structures established across Lake Victoria (Kenya) have not resulted in effective participation of fisher folk. We examine why this is so. Specifically, we examine the influence of institutions on fisher folks’ participation in co-management, using critical institutionalism to explain how participation of resource users is shaped by the relation between formal government institutions and informal social norms. We take four BMUs as case studies to investigate how historical administrative structures shape the development of co-management, how power relationships within co-management are negotiated at the local beach level and the fisher folks’ understanding of their participation in co-management. We document how informal institutions undermine and replace formal institutions at the local beach level, while formal institutions suppress and ignore informal ones at the national and regional levels. From this, we argue power sharing between the government and fisher folk is key for fisher folk participation in fisheries co-management, capable of addressing both social and ecological challenges facing fisheries management.

Full text

RESEARCH
Participatory governance in Lake Victoria (Kenya) fisheries: whose
voices are heard?
Christine Adhiambo Etiegni
1,2,3
&Kenneth Irvine
1,2
&Michelle Kooy
1,4
Received: 19 February 2020 / Accepted: 8 July 2020
#The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
Co-management is advocated as a means to improve human equity and the ecological sustainability of common-pool resources.
The promotion of co-management of fisheries often assumes the participation of resource users in decision-making ensures more
ecologically sustainable outcomes than top–down management approaches while improving livelihoods and food security.
However, in fisheries co-management approaches, participation is often poorly defined and measured by co-management
proponents. For resource users, it may not be clear what their participation inco-management entails, and what such participation
might involve or achieve. For the fisheries of Lake Victoria (Kenya), the introduction of co-management established Beach
Management Units (BMUs) on a model of participatory decision-making. Unsurprisingly, given global experiences of institu-
tions for resource users’participation in co-management, the structures established across Lake Victoria (Kenya) have not
resulted in effective participation of fisher folk. We examine why this is so. Specifically, we examine the influence ofinstitutions
on fisher folks’participation in co-management, using critical institutionalism to explain how participation of resource users is
shaped by the relation between formal government institutions and informal social norms. We take four BMUs as case studies to
investigate how historical administrative structures shape the development of co-management, how power relationships within
co-management are negotiated at the local beach level and the fisher folks’understanding of their participation in co-manage-
ment. We document how informal institutions undermine and replace formal institutions at the local beach level, while formal
institutions suppress and ignore informal ones at the national and regional levels. From this, we argue power sharing between the
government and fisher folk is key for fisher folk participation in fisheries co-management, capable of addressing both social and
ecological challenges facing fisheries management.
Keywords BMUs .Co-management .Critical institutionalism .Fisheries .Lake Victoria .Participation
Introduction
Co-management has been widely promoted as a preferred
approach for managing common-pool resources such as
fisheries, moving away from top–down government control
and providing greater opportunities to integrate views of
stakeholders in decision-making (Armitage et al. 2009;
Ayers and Kittinger 2014; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). A
powerful drive toward co-managed resources is the claimsthat
it improves resource yields, ecological sustainability and le-
gitimacy of governance (Herrera-Racionero et al. 2015;
Measham and Lumbasi 2013). A co-managed resource im-
plicitly involves greater participation among resource users.
There are different typologies and definitions of participation.
Here, we mean an active process through which resource users
influence the management of natural resources to enhance
their livelihoods and improve food security (Tiller et al.
2015). A fundamental necessity for a move from traditional
top–down to co-management arrangements is that the govern-
ment must be willing to share power and involve resource
users in decision-making (Pinkerton et al. 2014). This might
*Christine Adhiambo Etiegni
c.etiegni@un-ihe.org
1
IHE Delft, P.O. Box 3015, 2601 DA Delft, The Netherlands
2
Aquatic Ecology and Water Quality Management, University of
Wageningen, P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands
3
Kenya Fisheries Service, Lake Victoria Regional Office, P. O. Box
1084- 40100, Kisumu, Kenya
4
Department of Human Geography, Planning and International
Development Studies, Amsterdam Institute for Social Science
Research, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht, 166,
1018 WV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40152-020-00195-x
/ Published online: 21 July 2020
Maritime Studies (2020) 19:489–507
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involve creation by government of appropriate facilitation and
logistics for participation, including provision of resources to
support the process. At the local level, cultural values and
practices, leadership by resource users’leaders and attention
to the influence of power dynamics among stakeholders are
important to foster participation and equity (Ho et al. 2016b;
Ostrom 1990).
A number of approaches to participation have been identi-
fied depending on the management goals and power dynamics
(Puente-Rodríguez 2014). Arnstein (1969) described increas-
ing levels of participation, using the analogy of a ladder. The
lower rungs, manipulation and therapy coincide with non-par-
ticipation. At these levels, the government is expected to train
resource users on what they are expected to do. The next three
rungs—informing, consultation and placation—allow for lim-
ited consultations among resource users and government. The
views of resource users may be invited, but these may have
limited influence on the actions of more powerful stake-
holders. The last three upper rungs—partnership, delegated
power and citizen control—allow for more decision-making
power to be vested in resource user communities, who are
better empowered to make decisions on the management of
resources. In the recent past, other participation typologies
have been described. For instance, Fung (2006)participatory
cube consists of three participation dimensions, namely, direct
participation by those who participate, how information is
shared by stakeholders for decision-making, and the link be-
tween what is decided and action taken. The cube consists of
three axes that focus on interactive communication, access to
space for participation and power for decision-making. Pretty
(1995) presents a seven-level participation typology, from ma-
nipulation in which unelected and powerless representatives
participate, to self-mobilization in which participation consists
of people taking initiatives. Another typology by White
(1996) provides some insights into how various stakeholders
use participation to drive their interests. The typologies
highlighted previously indicate that participation is about
power and control (Cornwall 2008).
Introduction of co-management often involves the devel-
opment of new institutions at the local level to enable resource
users’participation in management decisions. Co-
management integrates institutions—understood as rules,
norms and organizations (Hodgson 2006)—and stakeholders
at different scales, providing linkages among resource users,
government and other stakeholders (Nielsen et al. 2004). The
linkages may be horizontal or vertical, enabling collaboration
among stakeholders (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). The vertical
linkages involve institutions at the local level with those at the
national and regional levels. Horizontal linkages involve in-
stitutions for managing natural resources that involve multiple
uses such as fisheries and other economic activities like tour-
ism, aquaculture and wildlife management (Pascaul-
Fernández et al. 2005). The development of new institutions
to encourage resource users’participation (Islam et al. 2017)
includes Beach Village Committees (BVCs) in the fisheries of
Lake Malawi (Njaya et al. 2012), forest committees
established in the Amazon to manage timber and other forest
products’use (de Koning 2011), Gippsland Plains Tree Health
Group (GPTHG) to conserve and manage remnant vegetation
in the threatened grassy woodland in Australia (Measham and
Lumbasi 2013) and fishers’organizations, called van,inthe
Tam Giang Lagoon in Vietnam, involved in the management
of fisheries in collaboration with the government (Ho et al.
2016a). For Lake Victoria, Africa, community-based institu-
tions known as Beach Management Units (BMUs) were
formed in 2007, with networks at the regional, national and
beach levels, to enable fisher folk participation in co-manage-
ment. Despite the widespread emphasis on the development of
these local institutions, there is limited discussion in literature
about how power is negotiated among the co-management
partners and how this influences participation of resource
users.
Power sharing is an important element of co-management
(Béné et al. 2009; Njaya et al. 2012). However, discussions of
power within co-management often centre on power sharing
within formal institutions, with limited attention to power
exercised among resource users and within informal arrange-
ments (Quimby and Levine 2018). Formal institutions include
government and resource users’regulations, rules and organi-
zations, while informal institutions are socially embedded and
include accepted norms and bonds of kinship (Etiegni et al.
2016,2019; Nunan et al. 2015). These institutions play a key
role in guiding practice and interactions among resource users.
Power relations are inseparable from institutions and inevita-
bly shape interactions among stakeholders (Berger and
Luckmann 1967; Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2007;Van
Hecken et al. 2015). This applies to both formal and informal
institutions (Agrawal and Gibson 1999;Hoetal.2015;
Lwenya et al. 2009; Njaya et al. 2012; Nunan et al. 2015).
More understanding is needed on how formal and informal
institutions influence resource users’participation in co-man-
agement. Other factors identified in literature that influence
participation include logistical, relational and trust issues
(Ballou et al. 2016).
Within co-management, institutions can be political, ad-
ministrative or social in nature and are the mechanisms
through which power and authority are held and exercised
(May 2012). Power is continuously negotiated (Berkes
2009; Njaya et al. 2012; Nunan et al. 2015;Quimbyand
Levine 2018), creating new forms of power (Carlsson and
Berkes 2005). Participation in co-management involves pow-
er sharing among resource users and external agents such as
government (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; Cleaver and
Whaley 2018;Nunanetal.2015; Quimby and Levine
2018). Unequal power relations have been shown to impede
participation of resourceusers (Ballou et al. 2016; Nunan et al.
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2015), while poorly crafted co-management simply redistrib-
utes power among co-management partners, disadvantaging
categories of resource users (Béné et al. 2009). Power influ-
ences who gets to participate, where to participate (space for
participation), what can be put on the agenda and decisions to
be made (Gaventa 2006). Limited participation happens more
often within invited spaces (Gaventa 2006; Nunan et al.
2012), meaning that those who invite have the opportunity
to control what goes on within those spaces. Power redistri-
bution in co-management happens within institutions and,
therefore, understanding co-management requires an under-
standing of institutions, including those operating within local
communities (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Borrini-Feyerabend
et al. 2004;Nunan2006; Nunan et al. 2015).
Literature on institutions for resource users’participation in
co-management is divided into two distinct groups: main-
stream institutionalism and critical institutionalism. The anal-
ysis of institutions for natural resource management under
mainstream institutionalism has focused mostly on formalized
institutional arrangements (bureaucratic institutions), includ-
ing legislative frameworks and policy processes aimed at
achieving optimum resource use (Ostrom 1990). The assump-
tion has been that institutions are crafted for a specific pur-
pose. This assumption overlooks the fact that there are socially
embedded institutions that play a key role in determining par-
ticipation in natural resource management (Cleaver 2002;de
Koning 2011). Mainstream institutionalism does not take into
account the local specific situations in which power
asymmetries occur, with varied interests among stakeholders
(de Koning 2011).
Critical institutionalism recognizes both social and histori-
cal contexts in which institutions are embedded, with more
focus on local institutions and practices (de Koning 2014;
Etiegni et al. 2016; Nunan et al. 2015). It draws on a critical
realism in that decisions are shaped not by rules and regula-
tions but through human actions determined by formal and
informal institutions (Cleaver and Koning 2015). This ap-
proach to institutional analysis views institutional influence
in natural resource governance as a non-linear process (de
Koning 2011), away from the formal–informal dichotomy.
Critical institutionalism emphasizes (i) “the complexity of in-
stitutions entwined in every day social life; (ii) their historical
formation;and (iii) the interplay between traditional and mod-
ern, formal and informal arrangements”(Hall et al. 2014).
Specifically, critical institutionalism provides the conceptual
lens through which governance arrangements are understood,
how power is shared (benefiting some and not others) and
how these arrangements have meaning and legitimacy among
stakeholders (Cleaver and Whaley 2018). It recognizes that
institutions are entrenched within specific social, political
and economic structures (Mosse 1997), providing insights
on processes, power and meaning within co-management
(Cleaver and Whaley 2018). Attempts, therefore, to introduce
new institutions at the local level, without regard to existing
social relations and cultural practices, often lead to unintended
outcomes (de Koning 2011; Russell and Dobson 2011). A
critical institutionalism perspective also avoids a more norma-
tive approach assessing deviation from compliance and views
of “good”or “bad”practice.
A good deal of critical institutionalism engages institution-
al bricolage—a concept that describes the way resource users
consciously and unconsciously piece together institutional ar-
rangements from social and cultural resources available to
them (Cleaver 2002). This is a process that occurs when
new formal institutions are introduced within a local context
where socially embedded institutions already exist (Cleaver
2002;deKoning2014). In her research on forest practices
within the Amazon, de Koning (2011) identified three pro-
cesses of institutional bricolage as aggregation, alteration
and articulation. Aggregation involves recombining intro-
duced institutions with existing ones in order to come up with
institutions that are practical to the prevailing circumstances at
the local level. Alteration involves changing both formal and
informal institutions in order to adapt them to the local con-
text. Articulation entails making traditions and norms visible
in resistance to introduced formal institutions.
For Lake Victoria (Africa), the BMUs were created to fol-
low co-management principles. BMUs comprise registered
members engaged in all the fish value chains of the lake’s
fisheries, primarily the Nile perch (Lates niloticus), Nile tila-
pia (Oreochromis niloticus), a high economic value cichlid
and a small cyprinid omena (Rastrineobola argentea), also
known in the lake as dagaa. The fisheries of the three main
species provide a major source of food and support for liveli-
hoods. Thispaper focuses on the Nile perch fishery because of
its dominance in influencing the structure of the fishery and its
economic importance as a high-value fish for international
markets.
Three decades after its introduction to the lake in the 1950s,
the Nile perch had proliferated to an extent that it both sup-
ported an industrial fishery and, through its predation onother
fish species, led to the decimation of endemic haplochromines
and the traditional fishery they supported (Marshall 2018).
Landings of Nile perch had grown from 335 tonnes in 1975
(Geheb et al. 2008) to 340,000 tonnes in 1990 (LVFO 2016),
although fluctuations in reported landings were later noted
(Indian Ocean Commission 2015). By that time, there were
also clear signs of overfishing, with a reduction of mean size
of landed perch and reductions of catch per unit effort
(CPUE). Reduced catch of Nile perch has continued, attribut-
ed mainly to the use of outlawed fishing gears, eutrophication,
proliferation of the invasive water hyacinth (Eichhornia
crassipes) in some areas and destruction of fish breeding areas
(Aura et al. 2019). The decline of the Nile perch coincided
with increases of the much smaller omena, used mainly as
local food for humans. Omena contributes to food security,
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nutritional requirements and socio-economic development of
the riparian communities and is also an important raw material
in the fish meal industry. The third main commercial species,
theintroducedNiletilapia(Oreochromis niloticus), currently
comprises about 9.5% of the commercial catch (Mkumbo and
Marshall 2015).
As the nature of the fishery changed, with increasing con-
cerns over sustainable yields of the Nile perch as well as the
quality of fish to meet health standards required for the EU
market (Geheb et al. 2008;Medard2015), the governance of
the fishery moved from top–down to co-management. This
shift in governance reflects a global trend over the last few
decades away from “command and control”, designed and
implemented by governments and their agencies, to greater
empowerment in decision-making of local communities
(Ann Zanetell and Knuth 2004;May2012; Sen and Nielsen
1996). An underlying assumption is that sustainable yields of
local resources are best managed by local communities, in-
volving local governance structures and processes that have
legitimacy (Ayers and Kittinger 2014; Pomeroy and Berkes
1997). In Lake Victoria, agreement among the riparian gov-
ernments (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania), development part-
ners (European Union and World Bank) and the regional Lake
Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) led to the production
of government guidelines for the establishment and operations
of the locally organized Beach Management Units (BMUs)
(Nunan et al. 2015;Obieroetal.2015). The guidelines define
roles and responsibilities, and the standardization of fisheries
operations and governance structures (Government of Kenya
2006). Each BMU forms an assembly of stakeholders includ-
ing boat owners, fishers, fish traders, fish gear dealers and ice
sellers.
The changes in fisheries governance in Lake Victoria has
been a major undertaking. In Kenya, this created 283 BMUs
comprising over 40,000 crew and other stakeholders
(Government of Kenya 2014). The BMUs were designed to
enable participation of fisher folk in management decisions
through local democratic structures. The former fisheries in-
stitution mandated through the Fisheries Act of 1989
(Government of Kenya 1989) was managed by local fisheries
officers, with powers of enforcement for breaches of fishery
regulations. This has been replaced by the Fisheries
Management and Development Act, 2016 (Government of
Kenya 2016) that devolves fisheries compliance and enforce-
ment to the BMUs. The shift in governance raises important
questions on the extent that resource users are included in
decision-making and co-management (OECD 2015), the pro-
cess of participation and, especially, the extent power and
decision-making is devolved from upper tiers of governance
to local levels. This is not dependent on how a certain man-
agement structure is created or imagined, but how government
actors, resources users and other stakeholders are actually in-
volved in the process of governance, and the extent that co-
management includes collective decision-making within and
among heterogeneous groups of stakeholders. These move
from high-level government to fisher folk, with stakeholder
participation occurring within hierarchies that are embedded
within formally stated settings, as well as the rules, norms and
practices of informal ones (Nelson 2010;Robinsonand
Makupa 2015).
For the participation of fisher folk within the newly created
Lake Victoria (Kenya) BMUs, how participation was de-
signed and occurs within the new fisheries institutions and
whether they can afford to abide by the new rules are of crit-
ical importance for acceptance by fisher folk of the new order.
All institutions are human constructs bounded by “humanly
devised constraints that shape interaction”(North 1990)and
elusive to predictions of how they may in practice shape/
determine use of natural resources (Nunan et al. 2015)and,
hence, the actions of fisher folk. Motivations of actors and the
social relations among them shape/determine who partici-
pates, in what, how, when and for whose benefits (Béné
et al. 2009;Hoetal.2015). In the BMUs of Lake Victoria
(Kenya), this can include restriction to decision-making for
the less powerful or, through cultural biases such as clanship,
even to the fishery itself.
Seen from a social ontology perspective, an institution
needs more than a formal declaration to “exist”.Onlyifthe
status and authority of the BMUs is collectively recognized
and accepted by stakeholders, and the shift of power relations
is reflected in their actions, does an institution, and its struc-
ture, become a “reality”with relevance and meaning (Searle
2010). For the BMUs, this can determine compliance of local
users (fishers, boat owners, traders, etc.) with the new regula-
tions and participation in governance procedures. This re-
quires fisher folks’recognition of BMUs as an authority
through which the State Department for Fisheries operates,
enabling BMUs to fulfil their intended (status) functions.
Collective acceptance that maintains the authority of the for-
mal institution
1
of the BMU is demonstrated and re-affirmed
by participants in their actions and speech, and in documents
expressing collective intent. The formal institutions of the
BMUs are different from informal institutions, which are typ-
ically emergent phenomena that do not require any formal
declaration of status by a central authority. Rather, they man-
ifest implicit collective recognition of an authority.
The formal and informal institutions can be connected in
the sense that they both work to shape practices, and can be
fully or partially supportive of, or against, each other. For the
fisheries of Lake Victoria, participatory governance processes
would be expected to include (1) formalized mechanisms of
stakeholder engagement, (2) processes that promote collective
acceptance of the new authority of the BMU demonstrated
1
Formal institution is an institution invested with authority through a formal
act of legislation or regulation.
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through compliance of rules and (3) mechanisms to maintain
the new institution, with stakeholders demonstrating and re-
affirming their acceptance through on-going participation. For
participation in co-management, it is also necessary that
upper-tier government stakeholders (in this case, the State
Department for Fisheries) recognize the authority and status
of lower tiers (in this case the BMUs). It too has to demon-
strate and re-affirm its recognition of the BMU’sdeontic pow-
er (that which is exercised in human institutions formed from
social relations) just like any other stakeholder. If the State
Department for Fisheries demonstrates in its actions that the
BMUs have incomplete power,or will not receive support and
backup, it can send a powerful negative signal to fisher folk
(Ribot et al. 2006).
Participation within the BMUs is therefore a “two-way
street”. A critical institutionalism approach helps in under-
standing how stakeholder participation is influenced by tradi-
tions of fishing practice, local social order and power dynam-
ics, and the expectation of whether decision-making powers
devolved to the BMUs lead to better management outcomes.
For this study, a critical institutionalism approach seeks to
understand participation within three key aspects of the co-
management of the Lake Victoria (Kenya) Nile perch fishery.
First, how did historical administrative structures shape the
process for stakeholder participation in co-management insti-
tutions? Second, how did the ostensible shift in the
Mainstream Institution from top–down control to co-
management affect power constellations at the beach level?
Third, to what extent is participation understood and has
meaning for fisher folk? This work focuses particularly on
the role of individual participation in design and practice of
co-management of the fishery of the lake, and contributes
empirical evidence on participation to the broader examina-
tion of the interactions between institutions and co-
management provided by Nunan et al. (2015), who drew on
experience of working in Lake Victoria (Uganda) and in Lake
Malawi.
Methods and research area
Our analysis of co-management in Lake Victoria used four
selected BMUs, labelled A, B, C and D to retain confidenti-
ality. In consultations with fisheries officials, the BMUs were
chosen based on (1) willingness of fisher folk to participate
and (2) beach accessibility. The number of BMUs included
was constrained by time and finances, and the need to build
familiarity and trust of the communities with the researcher.
On the advice of local fisheries department personnel, the
selected BMUs were those viewed as two with a good and
two with poor reputation for record and account keeping
based on quarterly inspections of the BMUs. An implicit
assumption was that record keeping would reflect operational
legitimacy of the BMUs.
A case-study approach was used to provide an in-depth
understanding of fisher folks’involvement in the implemen-
tation of co-management. Information collected through indi-
vidual interviews and document review were followed up with
focus group discussions in each BMU with BMU executives,
fisher folk, fisheries officials and local leaders. Forty-nine (49)
individual interviews concentrated on identifying institutions
involved in the creation and operation of co-management
structure, the stakeholders involved and how they participat-
ed. The questions asked started with “how”to enable the re-
spondent to talk at length while choosing their own words.
Further probing was done using questions beginning with
“what”to understand further what was being explained by
the respondent. In group meetings, questions were chosen to
generate a discussion without fisher folk feeling intimidated
by their leaders or government officials. Data collected from
May 2013 to June 2014 from different methods were triangu-
lated such that findings generated for the research questions
from the different methods used were cross-checked for con-
sistency (Yin 2003).
We asked fisher folk to recall activities that involved par-
ticipation during and following the drafting of BMU guide-
lines and regulations in 2006 and 2007, respectively.
Questions asked of participants required them to remember
past events. To mitigate recall bias, a number of measures
were put in place including (1) ensuring the questions were
well articulated in a language the respondent understands best;
(2) employing interview techniques like probing to get more
and better understanding of the information given by the re-
spondent; and (3) giving the respondent ample time to reflect
on questions before answering them. The term “participation”
used the Kiswahili kuhusishwa and the Luo tio kanyakla,
followed by a description of what was being drafted.
Prompting and probing were used to help respondents’recall
(Beegle et al. 2012), while guarding against leading questions
which could lead to biased answers. Individual confidentiality
was central to the study design to avoid any personal reper-
cussions from other fisher folk, their leaders or fisheries offi-
cials. Questioning was both at individual level as well as use
of open questions during the focus group discussions.
Confidentiality was maintained at the individual level inter-
view to avoid identification of illegal activities at specific lo-
cations and to encourage respondents to speak in confidence
and avoid the concern of repercussion for engaging in illegal
activities. Conclusions made are based only on the fourBMUs
studied, with any wider interpretation a matter of conjecture.
To better understand the emerging BMU formal institution-
al structure following the shift from previous government-
directed top–down management to a local participatory ap-
proach, a review of government policy and BMU documents
was done. This was supplemented through the interviews of
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fisher folk, fisheries officials and local leaders using pre-
determined semi-structured questions. The 49 interviews in-
cluded 38 fisher folk and were stratified according to BMU
membership categories (crew, boat owners, traders, proces-
sors, fishing gear makers and repairers and other members
registered with the BMU, and 9 BMU-elected executives).
Interviewees were selected by approaching anyone who was
willing to participate in the interview from each stratum. In
addition, four fisheries officials, three chiefs and four village
heads were interviewed. The chiefs and village heads provide
a link between the government and local population and pro-
vide important perspectives of what took place when co-
management was introduced. The total number of interviews
was deemed sufficient after reaching a point of saturation
where it was considered that the inclusion of more respon-
dents in the study was unlikely to provide additional insights.
Interviews were undertaken in Luo (local) and Kiswahili
(national) languages both of which are spoken at the beaches,
and in which the researcher and anassistant were fluent. Notes
were taken during the interviews and data organized using
ATLAS.ti software and analysed using a thematic content
analysis approach.
Results
Historical formation of institutions for fisheries
governance in Lake Victoria (Kenya)
The review of literature on fisheries governance in Lake
Victoria (Kenya) and interviews constructed the historical de-
velopment of the fisheries institutions from pre-colonial tradi-
tional management to current co-management. Before coloni-
zation, predating 1900, clan elders and local leaders (chiefs,
sub-chiefs and village heads) controlled access to and use of
fisheries by decree, determining when fishing could be done,
where it was allowed and who could do it. The local leaders
were very influential in fisheries management then (Opondo
2011). Following adoption of the co-management model in
Lake Victoria, the local leaders seem to have lost this influ-
ence. From a review of co-management documents (BMU
guidelines, regulations and the Fisheries Act), it was noted
that local leaders have not been allocated any roles in co-
management. Overall demand for fish during the pre-
colonial period was limited by low density of the riparian
population, and fishing gears comprising mainly inshore de-
ployment of nets and baskets, although this could have local-
ized impact on stocks (Kudhongania and Chitamweba 1995;
Marshall 2018).
The colonial period (1901–1962) coincided with the in-
crease in human population, with documented signs of over-
fishing on some species (Graham 1929). The demand for fish,
both for consumption and export, increased following growth
in local population, immigration to the lake region and expan-
sion of fish export markets (Geheb et al. 2008;Kirema-
Mukasa and Abura 2013; Mkumbo and Marshall 2015).
These changes altered the process of participation in the lake
as demand for fish grew and more efficient gears were used to
harvest fish. The increase in fish demand coincided with an
upsurge in unsustainable fishing practices (Etiegni et al.
2016).
The first Fisheries Act to manage the fisheries was the
Cap 378 of the laws of Kenya of 1945, prohibiting fishing
in certain areas and limiting certain fishing gears and sizes
of fish caught. A major shift in the ecological state of the
lake came from the introduction in the 1950s of the Nile
perch and later that of the Nile tilapia (Marshall 2018). The
impacts of, especially, the Nile perch took two decades to
be clearly realized and coincided with a second major eco-
logical impact from nutrient enrichment (Hecky et al.
1994). Meanwhile, fisheries governance after indepen-
dence in 1963 retained the structure from the colonial pe-
riod while the fishery adapted from one based largely on
species of endemic haplochromines to high-value Nile
perch and Nile tilapia. The increasing profitability of the
Nile perch fishery led to industrial-scale offshore fishing
by trawlers and hook-and-line (Medard 2015) and value
chain that increasingly relied on an international export
market (Schuurhuizen et al. 2005). By the mid-1990s, total
catch and mean size of Nile perch was in decline, with an
increasing catch of the smaller omena suggesting changes
in trophic structure in the lake (Irvine et al. 2019).
A transition from state-led fishery control toward partici-
patory co-management was instigated and financed by devel-
opment partners (World Bank and European Union) as a
higher-level government and regional initiative through the
Lake Victoria Environment Management Programme 1
(LVEMP1) from 1997 to 2002, and the Implementation of
Fisheries Management Plan (IFMP) project from 2003 to
2010. LVFO developed harmonized guidelines for BMUs at
the regionallevel (Government of Kenya 2006). This included
addressing procedures for establishing BMUs, and defining
their role, financing and election of BMU leaders. During this
period preceding implementation of co-management, fisher
folk involvement was confined to fisher folk representatives
and other stakeholders (including government officials and
NGOs) attending LVFO workshops to comment on drafts of
BMU guidelines. Most fisher folk representatives at these
workshops worked as beach leaders, appointed by local chiefs
before the adoption of co-management. They continued work-
ing as the first BMU leaders following formal adoption of co-
management, raising doubts if the primary needs of fisher folk
were fully represented in the workshops since they were not
elected leaders. The draft of the BMU guidelines were further
developed by a team of three co-management specialists
appointed from ministries in-charge of fisheries in riparian
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states, one from each state. During this period, between 1997
and 1999, Nileperch was subject to three export bans fromthe
European Union because of bacterial contamination (Geheb
et al. 2008;Medard2015) that accentuated the need for im-
proved management of the fishery, providing a motivation for
the creation of the BMUs. A fisheries official at beach C
considered that “the bans were as a result of salmonella detec-
tion in fish, cholera outbreaks along the shores of L. Victoria
which were linked to fish contamination and unacceptable
fishing methods including use of toxic substances to capture
fish. The ban affected livelihoods of many fisher folk.”To add
to this, a fisheries official at beach D said, “The ban did not
only affect livelihood activities around the lake, but the econ-
omy of the country too, due to loss of revenue from fish
exports. However, to lift the ban, co-management was one
of the conditions from the European Union.”This placed a
particular focus on the creation of BMUs on landing sites to
improve post-harvest handling of fish. Infrastructure to sup-
port this including toilets, potable water supply and fish han-
dling equipment (gloves and boots) was noted from a review
of co-management documents and interviews with fisher folk,
fisheries officials, local leaders and BMU leaders. Although
co-management was initiated in the late 1990s, it would take
around 7 years for its implementation to begin.
From the harmonized regional guidelines, Kenya de-
veloped country-specific BMU guidelines and develop-
ment of co-management (Fig. 1). A team of fisheries of-
ficers was mandated to design draft country BMU guide-
lines, subject to consultation through government-
organized meetings and workshops at which fisher folk
representatives and other actors (NGOs, local leaders
and research institutes) were invited. This led to the de-
velopment of country-specific BMU regulations by anoth-
er team of fisheries officers. The regulations were crafted
from the BMU guidelines and they provided legal backing
for the BMUs (Government of Kenya 2007). The BMU
regulations were first presented to the Lake Victoria
(Kenya) riparian fisheries officers and later to fisher folk
representatives (BMU chairpersons and secretaries), local
leaders, researchers and local and national NGOs at work-
shops organized by the government. Government orga-
nized training of extension staff, NGOs, faith-based orga-
nizations (FBOs) and community-based organizations
(CBOs) on co-management principles. The NGOs and
FBOshaveahistoryofworkingwithfisherfolkbypro-
viding training, credit and development of alternative
income-generating activities.
It is clear that the creation of the BMUs was a process
driven by the riparian governments in consultation with, and
possibly driven by, powerful external actors, also representing
economic and consumer interests beyond the region. The new
formal structures and implementing institutions were directly
influenced by existing and historical government-led fisheries
management. At best, information was conveyed from the
government of how BMUs should organize fisher folk partic-
ipation at the local level.
Interactions between formal and informal institutions
within Lake Victoria (Kenya) co-management
Following the formal process in creating the BMUs, devel-
opment of their structures and governance at the local level
required the participation of fisher folk. For instance, part
III of the BMU regulations stipulates that fisher folk need
to participate in the election of their BMU leaders. In part
IV of the regulations, fisher folk need to fund the opera-
tions of the BMUs from fees they pay to undertake various
activities on the beach. BMU development also involved
establishing the boundaries of the BMU, its organizational
structure for registration of assembly members, and financ-
ing through payment of membership and fishing gear reg-
istration fees. The BMU boundaries were delineated by the
Director of Fisheries in consultation with local chiefs
(Government of Kenya 2006). The beach area was sur-
veyed and boundaries marked to form the BMU areas of
jurisdiction and this required participation of fisher folk in
various activities (Table 1). Co-management implementa-
tion determined who could earn their livelihood from the
fishery, in contrast to informal institutional arrangements
where clan membership was required. With co-manage-
ment, fisher folk need to register through payment of a
feetobecomeamemberofaBMUandbeallowedto
participate in the fishery. Before co-management adoption,
being a member of a clan was enough to earn entry to the
fishery. In the development of BMU structures at the beach
level, fisher folk participated personally rather than repre-
sented by their leaders. The space for participation was at
the local level where most registered BMU members could
access and participate. Participation at national and region-
al levels required resources that most members did not
have and spaces for participation were located far from
the beach. At the national and regional levels, participation
was through beach leaders who had served before the
adoption of co-management.
Each BMU developed by-laws, based on government
guidelines, for day-to-day running of BMU activities. A re-
view of the by-laws from the four BMUs studied showed no
major differences among them, with all adhering to govern-
ment guidelines. BMU assembly members were allowed to
suggest ways for revenue generation to pay for the day-to-
day running of activities (Table 2) and to be approved as by-
laws by the Director of Fisheries.
The sources of revenue generation for the BMUs are based
on BMU regulations. The regulations set out thatBMUs are at
liberty to identify any means through which they can generate
revenue for their activities. Thus, co-management
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implementation introduced payment of fees, identified by re-
spondents as an assured source of BMU revenue and as com-
pliance to BMU rules. Out of 38 fisher folk interviewed, the
vast majority (95%) were registered members of the BMUs
where they operate, indicating they had paid their annual
membership; as described by a fisherman from beach C:
In this place you cannot fish if you are not registered.
Where will you land your fish because the leaders here
cannot allow you to land if you are not registered? Also,
if you try to land in areas not allowed for fish landing
and they find you, you will be fined a lot of money.
More than the registration fee you would have paid
and they can also make your life difficult by making
sure you do not fish at all. If they do that to me or my
friends here, where shall we get our “ugali”
2
from?
Look at our area here. Can you farm anything in this
rocky place? This is why I am careful and I must register
with the BMU. I do not want problems.
Payment of an annual membership fee at the beginning of
every calendar year, or through periodic instalments, is an
outcome of formal institutional structure of the BMU. This
illustrates power relations based on authority of the
2
Ugali is a dish made of maize, sorghum, millet, or cassava flour mixed in
boiling water and cookedto a dough-like consistency. It is considered a staple
food for a majority of Kenyans and also consumed in some other parts of
Africa.
Regional Level
The regional body, Lake Victoria
Fisheries Organization (LVFO)
funded by the European Union to
organize the drafting of Harmonized
BMU guidelines for the riparian
states
Development of harmonized
BMU guidelines for riparian
states in 2004
Capacity building (raising
awareness) in 2004-2005
Regional Level
Several workshops held at the
regional level for riparian fisheries
officers, fisher folk representatives,
NGOs and other stakeholders to
create awareness on co-management
Development of national BMU
guidelines and regulations in
2006 and 2007
National Level
Workshops/meetings held for fisher
folk and other stakeholders on draft
BMU guidelines and regulations
Steps in co-management
development
Level of engagement
Involvement procedure
Fisheries officers in Lake Victoria
(Kenya) riparian districts organized
meetings for fisher folk and other
stakeholders on the draft BMU
guidelines and regulations
District Level
Development of BMU structures
starting in 2006 using
harmonized BMU guidelines
Local (beach)
Level
Fisher folk, fisheries officers and local
leaders (chiefs and village heads)
involved in the demarcation of BMU
boundaries. BMU leaders also elected
Capacity building (awareness
creation) in 2007
Beach by-laws developed by fisher folk
under guidance from fisheries officers.
By-laws submitted to Director of
Fisheries for approval.
Development of beach specific by-
laws starting in 2006 using BMU
guidelines and regulations
Beach level
Fig. 1 The process of co-management institutions’development in Lake Victoria (Kenya) that occurred from 2004 to 2007
496 Maritime Studies (2020) 19:489–507
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government over the BMUs, which is later reflected as power
of BMU leaders over fisher folk. Non-payment is an observed
reason within the formal BMU institution to exclude individ-
uals from fishing and, hence, not only from their livelihood
but capacity to participate in elections of BMU assembly
members. As such, informal institutions based on clan mem-
bership to access the fisheries appear lost or weakened. A
BMU leader in beach A stated “it is only through member
registration that we can have an assembly and some of us
can be elected. If you do not have a membership card, you
cannot vote.”A fisheries official from beach D added:
For one to undertake fisheries activities in this lake, they
must register with a BMU. They are free to choose
which BMU they want to register with, but the point
is, they must be registered. That is what the law says,
and we are doing well in this because the BMU leaders
are on the spot to ensure this rule is implemented.
For at least some BMU members, it was possible to cir-
cumvent the formal institutional requirement to register, as
illustrated by a trader from beach A:
Currently I am not registered because I noted there are
some traders who come from outside and they are not
registered but they are allowed to buy fish from this
beach. I used to register but for the last 2 years I have
not because I do not see the point of registering if out-
siders can come and compete with me for fish. The
leaders know I have not registered but there is nothing
they can do to me because they know I am aware of
what they are doing.
Despite not paying the registration fee, BMU leaders did
not stop the trader from engaging in his livelihood, but it does
prevent the trader from voting in BMU assembly elections, for
which a registration card is needed. Such a view was contrary
to that of fisheries officials that registration was mandatory.
However, because registration is related to voting it is in the
interest of more influential candidates at election time for fish-
er folk to be registered. It is not possible to know the motiva-
tion that allowed this particular trader to continue business
without registering (and in contrast to the example of the fish-
er not being allowed to fish given previously), but there was
evidence more generally that inter-personal relationships can
play an important role in the informal institutional aspects that
allows BMU leaders to exert power selectively based on kin-
ship, marriage or friendship. The importance of interpersonal
relations between BMU leaders and their associates in deter-
mining participation of users in formal institutions was cor-
roborated by a fisherman from beach D who noted “aBMU
chairman may find a relative using an illegal gear and he will
do nothing, but if he finds someone who is not a friend or
relative, he will confiscate his gear.”
Institutions and fisher folk participation in co-
management
To gauge the extent to which institutions developed for co-
management involved fisher folk participation, we considered
Table 1 Lake Victoria (Kenya) BMU structures and institutions developed for fisher folk participation in co-management
BMU structures/institutions Participation level Who participated Area of participation
Structures
BMU assembly Beach level Individual fisher folk Membership registration
BMU executive Beach level Individual fisher folk Election/removal of leaders
BMU sub-committees Beach level Individual fisher folk Election/removal of members
BMU networks All levels Fisher folk/representatives Election of network leaders
Institutions
BMU revenue Beach level Individual fisher folk BMU funding
BMU regulations National level Representatives Development of regulations
BMU guidelines Regional/national level Representatives Development of guidelines
BMU by-laws Beach level Fisher folk/representatives By-laws development
Table 2 Examples of possible sources for BMU revenue generation
identified in the study
1. Membership fee as prescribed in the by-laws
2. Annual registration fee for members based on member categories
3. Fish landing fees
4. Support from development partners
5. Use of BMU assets charges
6. Income from projects
7. Other ways stipulated in the by-laws and approved by assembly such as
fines and penalties
8. Occasional support from the government
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(1) the extent to which fisher folks’views were considered for
decision-making; (2) their knowledge of BMU guidelines,
regulations and by-laws; (3) who represented them in situa-
tions where individual participation was not possible; and (4)
the powers devolved to them by the government within the co-
management arrangement. Fisher folk were involved in vari-
ous activities and steps during the development of co-
management institutions (Table 3).
Fisher folk considered that participation in developing co-
management institutions was through representation by BMU
executives (55% of respondents). At that time, these represen-
tatives, who were not elected but had been serving as beach
leaders selected by chiefs, assumed BMU leadership during
the transition from top–down to co-management and were
considered as group category
3
leaders (19% of respondents).
However, 26% of fisher folk interviewed were not aware of
who participated or represented them in developing BMU
guidelines and regulations. Although a majority of fisher folk
were of the opinion they were represented by BMU chairper-
sons, these leaders were mainly the wealthier and more pow-
erful boat owners. Boat owners may have championed their
interests over those of other fisher folk categories (fishers,
traders, fishing gear repairers, etc.) within decision-making
space where they represent others as members of BMU exec-
utive. BMU regulations specify each BMU executive commit-
tee should comprise at least three women (Government of
Kenya 2007), but none of the chairpersons was a woman
although there were women registered as members of
BMUs. Most of the women were fish traders, although a
few owned boats.
In the four beaches sampled, 71% of fisher folk consid-
ered their views were not collected for the initial drafting
of BMU guidelines and regulations. A fish trader from
beach B, who had witnessed the BMU development,
stated, “I was not consulted when the BMU regulations
and guidelines were being drafted. These are things that
were done by our leaders and I do not know what their
contents are.”A fisherman from beach A, who was not
consulted, stated “only a few people were selected from
the beach to attend the meetings”. A boat owner from
beach D added, “I was not involved, but some of my col-
leagues were consulted”. A fish trader from beach A, who
reported having participated in the development of BMU
guidelines (Fig. 1,tier3)stated,“I was involved in the
development of BMU guidelines though the document
hadalreadybeendraftedandwewenttoKisumu(acity
on the shores of Lake Victoria) to familiarize ourselves
with it and we even made amendments to sections we were
not happy with”.HeaddedtherewasaclauseintheBMU
guidelines that required all BMU leaders to have primary-
level certificates, but they were able to change the require-
ment to apply only to beach secretaries and treasurers.
Similarly, a fish trader from beach B indicated, “the regu-
lations and guidelines were complete by the time we got to
hear about them. However, little has been done to let us
know what they contain. Some of us have not even seen
those documents. We need to be trained on these things.”
Of the 11 (29% of the sample) fisher folk who reported
their views were collected, only five indicated that any of
their proposals were included, mainly in the development
of by-laws. A fisherman from beach C claimed, “what we
proposed to be paid as allowances for the BMU leaders
was maintained”, and a fish trader from beach B stated,
“the fines we proposed for those who do not follow the
by-laws are the way we passed them as an assembly”.
Referring to a reduction of an annual membership fees
from Ksh 500 (US $5) to Ksh 200 (US $2), a boat owner
from beach C said, “I was involved in that the BMU exec-
utives drafted the by-laws after which they called an as-
sembly meeting and the draft laws were discussed. We
were able to remove some of the proposed laws through
Table 3 Response of fisher folk (N= 38) relating to their participation in the development of the co-management institutions for the Lake Victoria
(Kenya) BMUs
Fisher folk in co-management Activity Number of respondents
Fisher folk’s views for BMU development Views collected by fisheries officials and BMU leaders 11
Views included in the by-laws 5
Views not collected 27
Knowledge of co-management documents (number of
respondent answers in brackets)
Knowledge of BMU guidelines Yes (14) No (24)
Knowledge of BMU regulations Yes (6) No (32)
Knowledge of BMU by-laws Yes (24) No (14)
Fisher folk’s representation in document’s drafting process Represented by BMU leaders 21
Group category leaders 7
Do not know 10
3
Fisher folk are registered in various groups based on activities they undertake
in the beach, e.g. fishermen, traders, boat owners and fishing gear repairers,
and each group has its elected leader.
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the assembly and we also added some.”In reference to
being involved in the drafting of beach by-laws, a boat
owner from beach D stated:
Yes, I was involved but some of the issues we gave were
not fully included. We discussed as assembly members
and proposed in our by-laws we should use money col-
lected from licenses sold to crew, boat owners and
traders as part of BMU revenue but this was rejected
by the government.
The influence of fisher folk in crafting fisheries man-
agement rules seems to have been minor. There was no
evidence that the management rules included any degree
of co-design with users of the resource, but a firm de-
piction of government as the higher authority and adju-
dicator of what was included in fisheries management
rules. This influences the way the rules are viewed by
fisher folk, although they are required to comply with
fisheries regulations of the Fisheries Act (Government
of Kenya 2016). Nonetheless, fisher folk seemed to have
a larger influence on whether fisheries rules would be
implemented or not, and outcome of co-management.
From observations at the four beaches studied, it was
evident that although the government expected fisher
folk to implement fisheries rules, observed practice in
all four BMUs were contravening government fisheries
rules, most clearly seen through the increased use of
illegal fishing gears and methods.
Fisher folk, however, were able to craft various rules for
managing beach activities and fines to be administered in
case of violation of BMU rules, and included in specific
by-laws. For example, an ice seller from beach C described
how they took part in developing the by-laws by demon-
strating his understanding of the laws by stating “by-laws
are used to ensure members work in a secure environment.
They are also used to solve problems that occur among
members. We are also able to propose conditions under
which work should be done such as the type of uniform
to be worn while on duty”.
A boat owner from beach A described how conflicts at the
beach were resolved using by-laws, stating “we (complainant
and the accused) go to the BMU office to have our case heard.
We both first pay Ksh 200 (approximately US$2) each for
taking the case to the BMU office. The case is heard and
determined using our by-laws”. Nevertheless, limited types
of cases could be resolved using the by-laws, as described
by a fish trader in beach C, “BMU office also solves problems
that emanate from family issues. What they cannot resolve is
referred to the chiefs.”The limit to the cases that could be
heard and determined using the by-laws was further con-
firmed by a fisheries officer-in-charge of beach C who
indicated:
The by-laws basically contain rules used to run the
beaches by the BMU executives and resolve minor
problems in the beach. There are also fines in the by-
laws administered by the BMU executives. However,
that goes as far as beach running is concerned, but fish-
eries rule violations are handled by courts. When fish-
eries rules are violated, the BMU executives report the
same to fisheries officials who take the matter to court.
The capacity of the BMU executives to levy fines under the
by-laws suggests a leverage of power and influence over other
fisher folk, with possible consequences on fisher folk partici-
pation in the BMU.
Fisher folk participated in the crafting of by-laws and they
have a good awareness of them, but less so on the meaning of
co-management. Enabling fisher folk participation in co-manage-
ment, capacity building through training and raising awareness
were reported by respondents as activities undertaken to prepare
fisher folk for participation. BMU leaders, trained at the national
and regional levels, were expected to create awareness of other
fisher folk on co-management and how to structure BMUs and
develop institutions (by-laws) at the beach level. Fisheries offi-
cials and local leaders (chiefs and village elders) were also in-
volved in the awareness creation on co-management and the
crafting of by-laws at the beach level. A majority (63%) of fisher
folk interviewed agreed there were attempts to create awareness
on co-management by BMU leaders during assembly meetings.
This comprised stating the importance of co-management, com-
position of BMU committees and procedures such as electing
and removing their leaders from office, most of which seemed to
involve them in the formation of BMU structures at the local
level. Only 13% of respondents reported having undergone train-
ing in co-management. Local leaders used “barazas”
4
to create
awareness on co-management among fisher folk and local beach
inhabitants who may not be involved in active fisheries.
However, interviews eliciting fisher folk’sviewsofco-
management demonstrated little understanding of co-
management principle of involvement of fisher folk and the state
in fisheries management decision-making, what is required of
them, and how they are supposed to benefit from co-manage-
ment. For instance, when asked about their understanding of co-
management, a majority (90%) of fisher folk linked co-
management to government rules, suggesting government’s
dominance in co-management.
Only in BMUs A and C were some leaders conversant with
the meaning of co-management as some form of collaboration
among stakeholders. A leader from beach A defined co-
management as “collaboration between fishers and govern-
ment in the management of L. Victoria fisheries”, while a
leader from beach C defined co-management as
4
Village gatherings convened by local leaders (chiefs and village heads) to
share information and discuss matters that concern the community.
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“collaboration of stakeholders in fisheries management”.A
leader from BMU D attributed his lack of understanding of
co-management by “I was just elected 2 years ago and I was
not in office when BMUs were being established”,whilea
leader from BMU B linked his low knowledge of co-
management to absence of training since elected to office.
Limited knowledge of co-management was also evident
among some fisheries officials. For instance, a fisheries offi-
cial from beach C understood co-management as “the drafting
of new laws by government to improve fisheries manage-
ment”, while a fisheries official from beach B defined co-
management as “implementation of fisheries rules.”In addi-
tion, there were three fisheries officials who could not attempt
to define co-management during the interviews, indicating
their own low level of awareness.
To understand power sharing between the two main co-
management stakeholders (government and fisher folk) in-
volved in fisheries governance, we examined the powers held
by the government before co-management and powers de-
volved afterwards to fisher folk through the institutions of
BMUs (Table 4). Our results indicate the government still
holds most of the formal decision-making powers within co-
management except for power of enforcement of fisheries
rules, which have been fully devolved to BMUs. Fisher folk
found violating fisheries rules by BMU executives are handed
over to fisheries officials for onward transmission to the
courts. In the previous order, it was the duty of fisheries offi-
cials to enforce fisheries rules, a task that they did not have the
human capacity to perform. The power to levy fines under by-
laws for non-compliance with rules, although described as a
minor operational issue, was found to be a lucrative source of
income for the BMU executives. The real power and influence
stems from the national regulations.
Discussion
Resource users’participation has long been considered as an
important part of natural resource governance (Ansink and
Bouma 2013;AyersandKittinger2014) for benefits that in-
clude inclusive decision-making (Armitage 2005) and em-
powerment of resource users (Ho et al. 2015;Nunan2006).
These elements are linked to sustainable resource manage-
ment outcomes (Ann Zanetell and Knuth 2004). The present
study used the case of Lake Victoria (Kenya) to explore how
fisher folk participate in co-management decision-making.
In the introduction of this paper, we posed three questions,
which we re-visit here:
1. How did historical administrative structures shape the
process for stakeholder participation in co-management
institutions?
From the findings, it was established that the historical
administrative structures at the local level consisting of
chiefs, sub-chiefs, and village heads played a key role in
determining how fisher folk participated in the develop-
ment of co-management local institutions. The local leaders
were powerful and influential in fisheries management pri-
or to co-management, and in most cases, they were obeyed
without questioning. They determined who, when, where,
and how fishing was done (Opondo 2011). The local ad-
ministrative structures provided a link between the govern-
ment and fisher folk during co-management development.
However, during co-management implementation, the local
administration seems to have lost fisheries management
power. Instead, implementation of fisheries rules within
co-management at the beach level is undertaken by the
Table 4 A summary ofpowers heldby the key stakeholdersinvolved in fisheries governance identified from interviews with respondents involved in
Lake Victoria co-management
Powers held by government
before co-management
Power held by government after co-
management adoption
Powers devolved to
BMUs by government
Extent of power devolution to BMUs
Create rules or modify old
ones (legislative)
Create fisheries rules or modify old ones Craft by-laws for
managing internal
BMU activities
Limitedtoby-laws
Power to make decisions on
fisheries resource use held
by the government
Power to make decisions on fisheries
resource use remained with the
government
No power devolved to
the BMUs by the
government
No resource use decision-making powers devolved to
BMUs. They implement fisheries rules contained
in the Fisheries Act
Government the main
enforcer of fisheries rules
Government still involved in fisheries
rule enforcement
Power to enforce
fisheries rules
Power to enforce fisheries rules fully devolved to
BMUs. Both government and BMU institutions
involved in fisheries rule enforcement
Conflict resolution (judicial) Powers to resolve conflicts from rule
enforcement held by the judicial arm
of the government (courts)
Power to adjudicate
social disputes
among BMU
members
Limited-only power to resolve conflicts among BMU
members devolved
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BMUs, while local leaders handle social disputes within
their locations.
Formal institutions including Fisheries Act, BMU regula-
tions, guidelines and by-laws do not include the roles played
by local leaders in fisheries management (Government of
Kenya 2007,2016). This has largely removed the participa-
tion of those leaders in fisheries management. This is contrary
to what has been reported in the fisheries of Lake Malawi,
where chiefshave an influential and important role in fisheries
co-management (Njaya et al. 2012; Russell and Dobson
2011). The local leaders have power to make fisheries man-
agement decisions, although these can be motivated primarily
by self-interest rather than improving fisheries management
(Njaya et al. 2012). The powers exercised by local leaders,
who are not elected in Lake Malawi, is used to marginalize
fishers further, suggesting that co-management does not guar-
antee fisher folk participation. In some instances, poorly de-
signed co-management merely re-enforces control by the
more powerful stakeholders (Béné et al. 2009).
Co-management in Lake Victoria was instigated and im-
plemented from the highest tiers of government (Beem 2007;
Herrera-Racionero et al. 2015; Njaya et al. 2012), influenced
by donors and external partners over international food safety
concerns of exported Nile perch (Medard 2015). This drove a
process that relied on existing formal institutional structures as
provided by the Fisheries Act and associated regulations. The
process appeared to have largely ignored the realities of the
informal institutions of fishing. Such an approach can have
little effect on informal institutions (Pejovich 2006), leading to
an undermining of formal structures and ambitions for sustain-
able resource use (Etiegni et al. 2016; Nunan et al. 2018).
While co-management theory acknowledges the influence of
institutions on the participation of fisher folk in co-
management (Agrawal and Gibson 1999;Rahmanetal.
2012; Snell et al. 2013), the interaction between formal and
informal institutions are important to co-management.
2. How did the ostensible shift in the mainstream institution
from top–down control to co-management affect power
constellations at the beach level?
Power is key to participation in co-management (Njaya
et al. 2012; Nunan et al. 2012; Quimby and Levine 2018).
Power devolved to fisher folk in Lake Victoria by the govern-
ment to enable their participation in co-management is limited
and, therefore, does not enable meaningful resource users’
participation (Béné et al. 2009). The ostensible shift from
top–down management to co-management has not changed
substantially the way power is distributed and exercised with-
in the fisheries of Lake Victoria (Kenya). Only limited powers
to enforce/implement fisheries regulations are fully devolved
by the government to fisher folk, while the government still
controls the more important fisheries management powers,
including power to craft and modify fisheries regulations
and power to make decisions on fisheries resource use.
Limited power devolution from the government to fisher folk
is a barrier to fisher folk participation. This impedes them
from having a voice in fisheries management decision-mak-
ing. However, that does not mean that they implement what
the government prescribes for them. They implement what
they perceive as acceptable to them based on their accepted
norms and practices, influenced by informal institutions and
the need to earn a livelihood. Such approach to participation
by resource users is mainly due to lack of involvement in the
initial stages of co-management planning and development,
which are needed for building legitimacy of co-management
institutions. A similar outcome was discussed by Herrera-
Racionero et al. (2015) among fishermen operating in the
Spanish Mediterranean port of Gandia, who lost legitimacy
of co-management institutions due to lack of their involve-
ment in the development of those institutions.
Among the different fisher folk categories, the limited powers
that were devolved by government are held and exercised by a
few wealthier and more powerful boat owners who determine
how co-management is implemented and, therefore, how fisher
folk participate. More centres of power were developed within
BMUs with co-management, giving rise to more fisheries elites at
the local level (Etiegni et al. 2019). Power to implement fisheries
rules is devolved to the BMUs, which in practice are extremely
limited in their role to craft fisheries management rules. However,
informal rules operating within the BMUs determine what rules
are implemented at the beach level. As such, BMUs may not have
been influential in the planning and structuring of Lake Victoria
co-management institutions, but they determine to a larger extent
the effect of co-management on the fishery. Within the BMUs,
our work concurs with Nunan et al. (2012,2015) in Uganda that
BMU chairperson and executive positions are dominated by the
wealthier and more powerful boat owners who champion their
interests, and not the interests of the people they represent. While
BMU regulations stipulate that at least three of the executive
committee positions should be reserved for women and 30% of
positions should go to crew, it is unusual, although not impossi-
ble, for women, traders or crew to be elected to the more powerful
position of the BMU chairperson. Relations of power are critical
to the outcome of co-management (Quimby and Levine 2018).
These relations, however, should be considered not only between
the government and the recipients of devolved powers (resource
users) but also among resource users. The findings of this research
have shown that power relations/sharing among fisher folk was
not considered during the design and shift to co-management. The
domination of boat owners in the BMU executive provides un-
equal power relations among fisher folk, leading to interference
and inefficiencies in fisheries management.
3. To what extent is participation understood and has mean-
ing for fisher folk?
501Maritime Studies (2020) 19:489–507
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Co-management is implemented in many countries and in
different contexts, and focuses on increasing resource users’
participation in management for improved ecological sustain-
ability and livelihoods (Ayers and Kittinger 2014;Measham
and Lumbasi 2013; Quimby and Levine 2018). To understand
the extent to which participation is understood and has mean-
ing for resource users, we first determined fisher folks’under-
standing of co-management since participation is a key prin-
ciple of co-management (May 2012; Quimby and Levine
2018). The general understanding of co-management by fisher
folk, and even fisheries officials, weakens the likelihood of
fisher folks’understanding of participation or, more impor-
tantly, the benefits of participating (Ostrom 1990; Pomeroy
et al. 2001). Among the fisher folk of the four Kenyan BMUs
involved in the study, co-management is viewed as a govern-
ment project they implement or, at least, need to conform to.
To them, participation is some sort of government support
which they can give or fail to give, instead of being active
partners in co-management. This appears to fit the reality of
“what does happen”as opposed to “what should happen”
(Blackstock et al. 2012). Overall, the disconnect between the
stated rationale for a devolution to co-management has hardly
translated to a serious engagement of fisher folk to support the
process, risking a lack of institutional legitimacy of fisheries
policies, perceived as made by far-away decision centres
(Herrera-Racionero et al. 2015).
Our research suggests many fisher folks seem not to have
understood the problems that co-management aims to solve
and, by extension, why they should be part of the process. The
approach given to co-management development process is
equally important. The top–down approach to co-
management provides less incentives to fisher folk to partici-
pate (Islam et al. 2017). Similarly, when what seems to be
benefits that accrue from co-management, in this case, money
from licensing, goes only to the government, this acts as a
disincentive to fisher folk participation. That they view co-
management as external to them suggest a lack of institutional
legitimacy. It can also be a consequence of low-level engage-
ment during the initial stages of co-management development.
So, while there may be a good to reasonable comprehension of
co-management, the meaning of participation to fisher folk as
indicated by extent of non-compliance seems deficient.
Broader meaning of wider rationale of participation in co-
management for sustainable resource use can, at best, be the-
oretical as, in reality, the BMUs do not, and cannot, lead to
sustainable yields. As all institutions require legitimacy and
meaning (Cleaver and Whaley 2018), the BMUs face a num-
ber of serious challenges.
For the four BMUs that were the topic of this research,
there is little evidence that there was any meaningful engage-
ment of fisher folk in the design of the government-mandated
fishing regulations. Documented participation of fisher folk
leaders in the development of the BMU institutions appears
to comprise informing them of decisions already made, and
they were supported by government through payment of their
transport and accommodation fees to attend workshops.
Fisher folk participation was primarily informative, thus cor-
responding to Arnstein’s(1969) lower rungs. Decisions had
already been made at the regional and national levels, and
fisher folks’inputs were only considered if they supported
what had already been decided at those levels. Participation
occurred mainly within invited spaces (Gaventa 2006) and the
regional agenda, which was also the national agenda,
prevailed. This corresponds to what was later discussed by
Pretty (1995) as manipulation of stakeholders, in which par-
ticipation is by those who have not been elected and are pow-
erless. For the BMUs, fisher folk leaders who participated in
the development of co-management and in the initial imple-
mentation were not elected and they did not have power to
influence decisions. They did not understand what was ex-
pected of their participation. However, the election of BMU
leaders in the later years has not changed the way co-
management is implemented in Lake Victoria (Kenya). How
fisher folk are to participate is decided externally, although the
participation cube developed by Fung (2006) advocates direct
participation, information sharing for decision-making and
understanding the link between decisions made and action
taken. For Lake Victoria (Kenya) co-management, communi-
cation between fisher folk and the government is not interac-
tive but informative. Power is not devolved from the govern-
ment to fisher folk in a way that encourages meaningful par-
ticipation in co-management. Government, as the more pow-
erful stakeholder at the national level, uses participation to
drive her interests, while at the beach level, the more powerful
boat owners’interests are advanced. This approach to partic-
ipation is, therefore, determined by power and interests (White
1996). As such, information sharing and linking of fisheries
management decisions to actions are unlikely to play any role
in improving fisheries management.
The government exercised hidden power, used by some
actors due to their positions to achieve their objectives
(Njaya et al. 2012), to decide on who to invite to the workshop
and also control the nature of discussions taking place by
determining the agenda (Cleaver and Whaley 2018). This
conforms with “instrumental”co-management (Arthur 2005;
Nielsen et al. 2004) that restricts resource users’participation
in decisions. Since the government facilitated fisher folk par-
ticipation, it very much controlled the space for participation
(Gaventa 2006). The review of the by-laws of the four BMUs
showed these simply adhered to government guidelines and
the Fisheries Act (Government of Kenya 2016). This was seen
with the similarities of the sources of revenue suggested by the
four BMUs and what the revenue was to be used for.
The stated formal ambition to establish a sustainable fish-
ery as an outcome of co-management has very little substance
in the face of the maintenance of an open-access fishery
502 Maritime Studies (2020) 19:489–507
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(Irvine et al. 2019), the realities of the informal institutions that
subvert compliance of rules (Etiegni et al. 2016) as a result of a
governance structure of co-management providing limited
space for fisher folk participation in the crafting of the fisher-
ies management rules. Participation of fisher folk at the four
BMUs is largely limited to co-management implementation,
with only minor capacity to influence matters of governance.
Nunan (2010), investigating co-management on Lake Victoria
in 2007, also concluded a general lack of participation per-
ceived by BMU members. This concurs with our findings that
participation among most of the BMU members remains re-
stricted, with power very much invested in the BMU execu-
tives. See also Etiegni et al. (2019). The persistence and even
increase in illegal fishing practice (Irvine et al. 2019)providea
strong signal that the formal institutional structure of a regu-
lated fishery is not aligned with the informal institutions,
where clan and kinship relationships foster local corruption
(Etiegni et al. 2016; Nunan et al. 2015;Obieroetal.2015).
This could be viewed as aspects of institutional bricolage in
which fisher folk ignore or bend formal government rules as
they participate in the fishery (de Koning 2011). This they do
with the sole aim of earning a livelihood. BMU leaders use
interpersonal relations to selectively enforce formal regula-
tions that require fisher folk registration to participate. They
use their power to determine who can participate without reg-
istering and who must register to participate. As such, the
formal regulation is not fully implemented, but subverted
through power and interpersonal relations that exist between
the BMU executives and other fisher folk.
The categories of fisher folk laid out in the BMU reg-
ulations comprise a heterogeneous mix and the extent that
each category participates or influences co-management
of the fishery is debatable. For many fisher folk, partici-
pation is dominated by picking their way through the for-
mal and informal institutions, including payment of bribes
and fines to continue fishing (Nunan et al. 2015). At the
very least, this provides a particular flavour to the concept
of participation. For others, it may be about the next sliver
of income. In the fishery of Lake Victoria, many crew are
low-skilled transient workers (personal communication
BMU Chairperson) in the employ of a boat owner, but
nevertheless, crew are required to register with the
BMU. While a noble ideal, especially for collective ac-
tion, boat crew have limited space for participation in co-
management (Nunan et al. 2012), other than providing a
cohort of votes for BMU executives. It is, therefore, a
contestable point why they should be required to partici-
pate in the payment of membership fees to a BMU. This
seems to be recognized in Malawi, where a fisher is de-
fined as a gear owner, restricting any role a crew member
has in formal co-management structures, even though it is
those who actively fish that effect compliant fishing or not
(Hara 2006).
Conclusions
This paper used the case of Lake Victoria (Kenya) to explore
the nature of resource users’participation in the development
and implementation of co-management. As currently consti-
tuted, the government still holds most decision-making pow-
ers that structure co-management, with fisheries management
retaining the character of a traditional top–down approach.
Fisher folk’s participation is largely a formalized action aimed
at implementing externally crafted rules (Nielsen et al. 2004).
However, from the evidence, it can be concluded that institu-
tions and the interactions between them are important for the
social–ecological structure of that co-management. The for-
mal and informal institutions interact in ways that are not
complementary, undermining the ambitions of fisheries co-
management. Informal rules shape fisheries practices at the
beach level. For instance, corruption undermines enforcement
of fisheries rules with outcomes that are socially and ecolog-
ically damaging (Etiegni et al. 2016). As such, a greater level
of understanding of how formal and informal institutions in-
teract can help develop more meaningful participation of
stakeholders to better align fisheries management objectives
with fishing practice. This would also improve accountability
of BMU leaders to their local constituents as well as to
government.
Our study suggests that to have meaningful participation of
fisher folk in co-management, there is a need for greater de-
volution of power. Considering both hidden and open sources
of power, taking into account the realities of inter-personal
relations at different scales, and from the earliest stages of
co-management design, will promote better outcomes. For
the Lake Victoria BMUs, this was not done, and revising the
now established governance structures, with their current
power dynamics, will be extremely difficult. At the beach
level, this would require an effort to open spaces for partici-
pation to less powerful fisher folk for their better involvement
in decision-making on fishing practice. It would necessitate an
enabling environment supported by local fisheries officers,
including addressing local instances of criminality and corrupt
practices (Etiegni et al. 2016), and an extension service that
provides better awareness of the benefits of sustainable re-
source use. Enhancing fisher folks’understanding of the goals
of co-management, and their role in that, can also help identify
misuse of power by their leaders. This will enable participa-
tion of fisher folk that goes beyond being advised by more
powerful actors within co-management, to one that they par-
ticipate on a more equal basis.
To make co-management more inclusive (Armitage 2005),
emphasis should be on resource users’empowerment that also
facilitates the empowerment of marginalized resource users.
Co-management structures that provide more space, vertically
and horizontally, for fisher folk participation foster meaning-
ful participation at all levels. Ceded powers to resource users
503Maritime Studies (2020) 19:489–507
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within co-management is a general principle that can lead to
more meaningful participation in fisheries management and
for participants to claim their space in fisheries management
(Béné et al. 2009; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). Such de-
velopment does not negate the role of informal institutions but
likely moves closer the where processes of bricolage work to
reduce rather than increase potential management conflicts.
The example of how fisher folk participate in co-
management discussed in this study suggests that re-
search on co-management should give greater attention
to factors that impede and facilitate resource users’par-
ticipation in co-management. This view is supported by
Ballou et al. (2016) who, while acknowledging the im-
portance of resource users’participation in resource man-
agement, suggest a focus on barriers to participation,
which may be logistical or relational, to boost participa-
tion. For the current structure of fisheries governance in
Lake Victoria (Kenya), it is hard not to conclude that
this is not a simple denial of reality, driven by a top–
down management philosophy, inevitably resulting in
non-compliance of fisheries regulations (Etiegni et al.
2016), which themselves fall short of the fundamental
challenge presented by an overexploited open-access re-
source. The critical institutionalism perspective shines a
light on these conclusions but, more importantly, pro-
vides a way forward that can help achieve more sustain-
able outcomes that support local beneficiaries.
The process of co-management development in Lake
Victoria (Kenya) was instigated from the top and it focused
on external interests rather than resource users’interests.
Fisher folk do not, therefore, know the problems co-
management is intended to solve, why they should participate,
and what benefit participation is to them. The management
benefit of the BMUs is not what was envisaged. In its devel-
opment, fisher folk involvement was effectively absent. Their
involvement in the implementation stage is limited to being
informed of decisions already taken. Since what precedes co-
management implementation and what happens during imple-
mentation stages are important to co-management success
(Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2007), for the lake’s co-manage-
ment, neither the beginning nor the implementation has been
done with any clear objective legitimacy. A lot of focus was
put on developing formal institutions with little regard to the
influence and importance of informal ones. As such, the lake’s
co-management is unlikely to provide benefits that include
sustainable fisheries and improved livelihoods for fisher folk
(FAO 1995,2015).
Acknowledgments Lake Victoria (Kenya) fishing communities are
thanked for providing data used in this research. Staff from the State
Department for Fisheries are thanked for assisting with logistics during
field work. Wealso thank two anonymous reviewers of the earlier version
of this paper. Lastly, we would like to thank Prof. Maarten Bavinck for
his valuable comments during the writing of this paper.
Funding information This research draws on a PhD study supported by
the Netherlands Fellowship Programme (NFP).
Compliance with ethical standards
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adap-
tation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, pro-
vide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were
made. The images or other third party material in this article are included
in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a
credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's
Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this
licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
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