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Rebels-Turned-Narcos? The FARC-EP’s Political Involvement in Colombia’s Cocaine Economy
Abstract
According to the ‘rebels-turned-narcos’ premise, increasing involvement in the illicit drug industry causes insurgent groups to lose sight of their political aims, as they shift their focus to profit-making. The (former) Colombian rebel group, the FARC-EP, became a paragon for this idea. Drawing on primary research, we argue that the FARC-EP’s involvement in the illicit drug economy was itself political. Their involvement included governance activities, which are by their very nature political. Furthermore, these activities formed part of the FARC-EP’s political project, aimed at ensuring the reproduction of the peasant smallholder economy. Our argument challenges the rebels-turned-narcos premise more broadly by showing why involvement in the illicit drug economy, on its own, is insufficient evidence to posit the depoliticization of an insurgent group.
... The basic premise behind the 'fuel-of-the-conflict' narrative, that conflict is primarily about rent-seeking, has been discussed elsewhere (Cramer 2002, Gutiérrez-Sanín 2003, Gutiérrez and Thomson 2021. In this paper, therefore, we will question other important premises behind this narrative that have not been subject to the same critical analysis. ...
... In order to proceed with our arguments, we will focus on the political process behind the criminalisation of (mostly) small-scale producer economic activities. That political and criminal involvement are not a zero-sum type of inverse proportional relationship, and that indeed, involvement in criminal activities can in itself be political has been argued convincingly elsewhere (e.g., Gutiérrez and Thomson 2021); here we will focus on the political process behind criminalisation as such. This process reflects the tensions inherent to the accumulation patterns of both capital and political power in the Colombian context, which are indissociable from systematic large-scale dispossession of land from the myriad of independent producers who populate the Colombian hinterlands described as 'red zones' (i.e. ...
... As Colombia slips towards a new cycle of conflict (Gutiérrez 2020, Gutiérrez-Sanín 2020) most explanations still revolve around the control of illegal rents by non-Strate actors (e.g., Massé andLeBillon 2018, Idler 2019;Garzón et al., 2021, Nova 2020, FIP 2021. This so-called 'rebels-turned-narcos premise' has been critiqued as a reductionist narrative, insufficiently grounded in evidence, according to which former ideologically committed rebels, by entering into the illegal drugs production chain become irredeemably corrupted (Gutiérrez and Thomson 2021). The more involved, the less political they become. ...
Illegal economies have received substantial attention in conflict studies over the past decades. Often, this attention is linked to economicist paradigms, rendering invisible the political processes linking conflict and illegal economies. By discussing the Colombian case, we argue that criminalisation is linked to patterns of capital accumulation and State-building. First, it reflects a long-term conflict of Proudhonian overtones between small-scale producers and big capital; secondly, it reflects a Tillyian process but without a Tillyian effect. Thus, the interaction between capital accumulation, political power and warfare takes place, without the expected result of a centralised and efficient, democratic State.
... tendency to land-grab and land concentration by elites linked to drug mafias ( Reyes, 1997 ;Thomson, 2019 ), the cocaine economy, in particular circumstances, such as under insurgent control, has had the effect of guaranteeing the reproduction of the smallholders' peasant economy by providing a viable alternative to land-starved peasants ( Molano, 1994 ). Around the coca economy, also, a complex set of regulations and governance practices were established which often had the armed insurgents as the enforcers of an order at which smallholders where at its very heart Gutiérrez & Thomson, 2020 ). ...
... The rebels developed such strength in Argelia, that in 1993 the local guerrillas became a separate structure, the 60 th Front "Jaime Pardo Leal ". This was the only Traditionally this region was known for its refractory population, broadly supportive of the left; however, the coca boom of the 1990s consolidated this antagonistic relationship with the national authorities and helped to boost both rebel governance practices ( Gutiérrez & Thomson, 2020 ) as well as the autonomy of its local organisations which avoided relations with the traditional parties. Coca facilitated this autonomy: everything in the municipality was built by the efforts of the local population, the resources of coca being critical to this process. ...
... The plant of the Erythroxylaceae family should not be fetishized, as one of the government's counter-narcotics slogans which claimed that coca was 'the plant that kills' ( la mata que mata ). It is not coca per se which causes violence, but the conditions in which it is planted and incorporated into the global market, the highly exploitative nature of unregulated industries (therefore the importance of the FARC-EP as a regulator) ( Gutiérrez & Thomson, 2020 ), and, most of all, the State response to it that privileges mass repression of the lower links of the chain of production. ...
Since the formal declaration of the War on Drugs in the 1980s, illicit drugs and crops have been regarded primarily as a security problem. However, without a comprehensive development strategy and deep transformative reform addressing structural issues (land, resources, market access, etc.), it is a war bound to be lost despite enormous human suffering. In Colombia, agrarian development came as the first topic in the agenda between the FARC-EP and the government during the latest peace negotiations (2012-2016), recognising its intimate link to illicit drugs. This recognition went against the grain of dominant discourses. However, the agreement fell short of much needed transformative reform. Moreover, it also failed to engage with the governance mechanisms –enforced and sustained by the rebels- which were key to social order in many drug-producing regions. By exploring the case of Argelia, in South-Western Colombia, I will argue that a transformative approach to peace-building was needed, as rural development and engagement with local governance mechanisms in drug-producing regions are paramount to address effectively the problem of illicit crops.
... The most-obvious knock-on effect is that drug-crop farmers (although this is not unique to IDC economies) are regularly subjected to violence by criminal groups, paramilitaries or pro-state militias, insurgents, and by state forces working with or against these organisations. At the same time, these organisations often gain a measure of civilian support, especially if they perform regulatory roles and/or provide protection from others, including the state (Goodhand 2008;Gutiérrez Danton and Thomson 2020;Gutiérrez-Sanín 2021;Idler 2021;Ingalls and Mansfield 2017;Kay 1999;Mason and Campany 1995;Ramírez 2011;Taylor 2017). ...
... Groups seeking legitimacy as political actors may also attempt to regulate prices to the advantage of producers and/or impose environmental and labour standards (Ramírez 2011;Taylor 2017;E. Gutierrez 2020;Gutiérrez Danton and Thomson 2020). ...
This article and the forum it introduces examine illicit drug crop (IDC) economies from agrarian perspectives. Examining IDCs as a group implies analysing how prohibition distinguishes them from other (licit) crops. We identify seven mechanisms through which prohibition shapes the agrarian political economy of IDCs and explore how these mechanisms and their effects generate distinctive patterns of development and political action amongst ‘illicit peasantries’. We also examine connections between illicit and licit crops, including how licit crop crises and illicit crop booms intertwine. We argue that IDC economies provide a bulwark for smallholders but are by no means peasant idylls.
... Both versions rely on the assumption that once groups get involved in the narcotics trade, they no longer require support from local civilians for their financial sustenance, transforming them into little more than illegitimate criminal gangs. Groups involved with the drug trade are frequently denounced as 'Mafia,' 'Narcos' and even 'terrorists' -what has been termed the 'rebels-turned-narcos' premise (Gutiérrez and Thomson, 2021). ...
... As a result, the rebels shaped how coca was bought and sold. When disagreements about prices with the cartels occurred, the rebels could stop the flow of coca, but this would create its own complications with their supporters (Gutiérrez and Thomson, 2021). Their regulating role was not limited to prices: in Putumayo, and other areas the rebellion controlled in the South and East, it had a policy stating that no farm could have more than a third of its area cultivated with coca -the other two thirds being left for forest and edible crops, respectively. ...
The relationship between illicit drugs and war has long captured attention. While scholars and policymakers often claim that involvement in the drug industry corrupts the politics of armed groups, rebel organizations argue that involvement in the drug industry is no different than other sources of funding. Based on fieldwork across multiple sites in Colombia, we argue that involvement in the drug industry does not necessarily have a depoliticizing effect on armed groups, while at the same time, taxing drugs is not a tax like any other. Drawing on original data including internal records, focus groups, interviews and other sources, we argue that the FARC-EPs drug taxation system needs to be understood as part of a broader 'wartime economic order.' We demonstrate that FARC-EP involvement in the drug industry triggered a series of specific effects deriving from the industry's illegal nature and lack of a regulatory framework. We find that the largest impact of narcotics has to do with rebel governance and wartime order. Regulating an economic activity that hundreds of thousands of people participated in helped the rebels consolidate their authority and gain legitimacy among its constituency. At the same time, the ideological and class dimensions of the rebels' taxation system also generated resistance from rival elites.
... 52 Otro señaló cómo él y un compañero decidieron escapar de esta situación de desorientación y tristeza. 53 El homicidio del Negro Acacio, líder del Frente 16, en 2007 tuvo consecuencias similares: "Con la muerte del compañero Acacio, todo se vino abajo y se 43 notaba cómo la provisión de ropa y alimentos empezaba a disminuir y si alguien se enfermó, esto era un problema, ya que uno podía morir y a nadie le importaba. En el año 2008, vimos cómo la gente se empezó a desmovilizar; al principio eran pocos, pero luego era mucha gente. ...
... 207-252 • https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint110.2022.08 deberían ser conscientes de su impacto en los conflictos lejanos, en lugar de ver el consumo de drogas simplemente como una cuestión de política nacional.En Colombia, el acuerdo de paz de 2016 puso fin al enfrentamiento armado entre las FARC y las fuerzas gubernamentales. Sin embargo, la desmovilización colectiva de las FARC ha estado acompañada de un nuevo ciclo de violencia, con grupos disidentes, grandes organizaciones criminales y la guerrilla del Ejército de Liberación Nacional dominando las comunidades locales(Gutiérrez 2020). Estas organizaciones no tienen escasez de reclutas. ...
Objetivo/contexto:
la deserción, o salida no autorizada de un grupo armado, tiene importantes implicaciones para la contrainsurgencia, la terminación de una guerra y la dinámica de reclutamiento. Si bien la investigación existente enfatiza la importancia de motivaciones individuales para la deserción, el declive organizacional, en forma de adversidad militar y financiera, también puede condicionar la deserción. El declive organizacional socava los instrumentos de un grupo para canalizar las preferencias individuales hacia la acción colectiva. Estos instrumentos incluyen los incentivos selectivos, el atractivo ideológico y la coerción. Cuando el poder vinculante de estos instrumentos disminuye, los deseos individuales comienzan a dominar el comportamiento, lo que aumenta la probabilidad de deserción.
Metodología:
se utiliza la insurgencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) para examinar este argumento con un enfoque multimétodo. Primero, se realiza un análisis cuantitativo para explorar datos únicos sobre más de 19.000 desertores de las FARC reportados entre 2002 y 2017, proporcionados por el Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia. Al protegerse contra amenazas a la inferencia causal, el análisis estadístico indica que el declive organizacional impulsa la deserción. En segundo lugar, se lleva a cabo un análisis cualitativo utilizando una gran cantidad de informes detallados sobre entrevistas con desertores realizadas por personal militar colombiano.
Conclusiones:
los informes demuestran que el declive organizacional debilita los incentivos selectivos, la ideología del grupo y un régimen coercitivo creíble, y fomenta la deserción mediante estos mecanismos.
Originalidad:
estos hallazgos brindan información clave para los formuladores de políticas, dado que la deserción puede contribuir tanto a poner fin a un conflicto como a acelerar el reclutamiento de nuevos combatientes.
... Las relaciones de poder, conflictos sociales y de clase, los procesos de construcción de Estado, y un largo etcétera de condicionantes socioeconómicos, son invisibilizados tras correlaciones entre hectáreas de coca y violencia homicida. Esto ha sido señalado por diversos autores que han complejizado y problematizado la relación entre conflictos armados y economías ilícitas (Cramer, 2002;Goodhand, 2008;Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2004;Gutiérrez & Thomson, 2020). Ni los conflictos se pueden explicar simplemente por la presencia de drogas ilegales, ni las drogas ilegales generan, necesariamente, conflictos armados. ...
... Si bien la coca ayudó al desarrollo de una cierta gobernanza rebelde en la región (Gutiérrez & Thomson, 2020), también estimuló una cierta autonomía relativa de los procesos organizativos locales; en ambas instancias, sin embargo, se consolidaba una relación bastante antagónica con el Gobierno nacional. Todo en el municipio ha sido construido con el esfuerzo de las comunidades locales y con los aportes económicos de la coca. ...
La relación entre economías ilícitas y conflictos armados ha sido objeto de una prolífica literatura aca-démica durante las últimas décadas, y existe un creciente cuestionamiento a la noción de una relación unívoca entre ambos. El Acuerdo de paz celebrado entre el Gobierno nacional de Colombia y las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) ha replicado la premisa de que solucionar el problema de las drogas ilícitas necesariamente contribuye a la creación de una paz estable y duradera. En este artículo, utilizando a Argelia, Cauca, como un caso de estudio, discutiremos que, más allá de los incumplimientos del Gobierno nacional frente a este punto, el Acuerdo poseía limitaciones estructurales (óptica punitiva, problema de la tierra, acceso a mercados, dimensión global del tema de drogas) que limitaban su eficacia, aun si el gobierno hubiera cumplido. Abordar estas limitaciones es clave para poder retomar un camino hacia una paz transformativa.
... In response to FARC involvement in illicit drugs production, Colombian and American authorities created the "narcoguerrilla " narrative, according to which destroying the illegal crops and defeating the rebels were two sides of a single objective (For an early critical review of the concept see Camacho, 1988 ;Rensselaer, 1992 . For a recent discussion see Gutiérrez & Thomson, 2020 ). Within this framework, AD focuses on quick eradication and its priority aim has been to weaken the guerrillas. ...
... COCCAM, 2020 ;El PNIS en Terreno Informe, 2020 ). Faced with the bureaucratic weakness of the PNIS (Gutiérrez, et. al, 2019), peasant leaders acted as a bridge between participants and the government, between the distant regions in the countryside and the PNIS offices in the villages, even at the cost of great risks to their security (Int.16,18,21;Gutiérrez et al., 2020). High officials (Int.4) and officials in the field recognized this: "I have always said that the program started thanks to the leaders that you see here at CMPP [local participation body] (…) they did it [promoted the PNIS], that is admirable, they took risks, they are our eyes and the voice of the people here" (Int.6). ...
Background:
In 2016 the Colombian government and the country's most important guerrilla group - the FARC - signed a peace agreement that included the "definitive solution to the problem of illicit crops". That solution has not arrived.
Methods:
We tracked the design and implementation of the substitution program (PNIS) included in the peace agreement using an original set of in-depth interviews, press reviews and archival material, all of which were collected in different rounds of fieldwork between 2018 and 2020 in Bogotá and three coca growing regions.
Results:
We show that, as a product of several political pressures, the peace agreement introduced modifications to the standing policy against illicit crops that were favorable to peacebuilding, but also retained regressive aspects of that policy. However, following a shift in the balance of power,the policy returned to what it was during the war period.
Conclusion:
We conclude by discussing the oimportance of developing a research agenda that explores both resistances to change in illicit crops policy, and the political coalitions needed to make change sustainable.
... In relation to the former, we were told by community leaders in Suárez, Cauca, that the rebels "are aware that coca improves the economy, but it also causes damage, so they have helped" (Ca-02-f 2022) to regulate environmental damage caused by the processing of coca (cf. Gutiérrez and Thomson 2021). "It is they who can put limits to the areas where coca is planted, not the community, because the FARC has more consciousness on this issue," highlighting how the reconstituted FARC-EP was able to show continuity with the standards of the old FARC-EP, including establishing norms that the leaders, in this case, justified by claiming the lack of awareness of the broader community (Ca-01-f 2022). ...
The 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP, and the demobilization of the latter, dismantled the governance structures in regions formerly under rebel control. Drawing from a relational security framework, this article explores how, across three case-studies, communities use their former experience of rebel governance as a framework through which they could express expectations and dissatisfaction with new types of order. This blueprint is also used to make specific demands to new or reconstituted armed groups and to take direct action to address governance gaps, reproducing and co-constructing order post-demobilization. However, we observe that both the organization of the community and the capacity and ideology of armed groups could also be limiting factors to the community's reproduction of order post-demobilization. From a peacebuilding perspective, this means that there can be pressure from below in favor of remobilization, as a predictable insurgent order may be preferable to uncertainty.
... Sin embargo, la idea según la cual la mayor participación de los grupos guerrilleros en las economías ilegales equivale a su despolitización ha sido ampliamente rebatida (Gutiérrez & Thomson, 2021;Gutiérrez, 2004;Gutiérrez et al., 2005). De hecho, en términos prácticos, el proceso de paz entre el Gobierno y las farC-eP se basó en el reconocimiento del carácter político de este grupo y del conflicto armado. ...
La complejidad de la violencia urbana ha sido abordada principalmente como un problema de criminalidad, se ha dejado en manos de los cuerpos de seguridad y del sistema judicial, y ha estado al margen de las reflexiones sobre construcción de paz y del Acuerdo de Paz de 2016. Con el fin de posicionar la ciudad en el análisis de la violencia, este documento de trabajo analiza la violencia y la paz en clave urbana. Para ello, se dialoga con literatura de diversos campos, incluyendo estudios de paz y conflicto, estudios urbanos e investigación sobre violencia urbana y seguridad en América Latina. Además, se estudian las tendencias de la violencia letal en ciudades colombianas durante el periodo 1990-2019, y se identifica un conjunto de dimensiones en este fenómeno de cara a la investigación y el diseño de políticas relacionadas con la propuesta gubernamental de la paz total. Se espera contribuir a una agenda de investigación en relación con la política de paz y una reforma al sector seguridad con énfasis en las ciudades.
... Unwittingly, state militaries and international actors reinforce peasants' identities of resistance through 'big D' development measures that target their crops for eradication. In some cases, eradication initiatives have even greater blowback by enabling rebels to position themselves as protectors of the peasantry whilst simultaneously regulating and taxing the drug economy (Gutierrez, Antonio, and Thomson 2020). ...
... There is a small but growing empirical literature testing and analysing the causes of political assassinations in countries with significant criminal presence, as in Brazil (Carvalho 2022), Colombia (Chacon 2018;Gutiérrez and Thomson 2020), Mexico (Blume 2017;Esparza and De Paz Mancera 2018;Rios 2012;Trejo and Ley 2020), and Italy (Alesina et al. 2019). Three major hypotheses have been tested in the Latin American literature: repression, competition, and rentseeking. ...
When does organized crime resort to assassinating politicians? In narcocracies, criminal groups co-opt political elites through bribery in exchange for protection to traffic illegal drugs. When criminal groups compete, they may also resort to political violence to influence which candidate wins local elections in strategic areas and retaliate when state action threatens their survival. Using new data on political assassinations in Mexico during 2000–21, we show that political candidates are more likely to be assassinated in areas close to oil pipelines used by drug trafficking organizations for oil theft. Former mayors of areas near oil pipelines remain at high risk of assassination. In municipalities where at least one mayor has already been killed, the arrest of a member of organized crime significantly increases the chance that an incumbent mayor will be killed. Political violence is directed at politicians, not voters, so it has a negligible impact on voter turnout.
... 2 In this way, former members of militant ideological groups who preached a people-oriented politics -a politics of the everyday -reconfigured their strategies in the wake of peace with the state, adopting the logics of predation. This is not to say that those among rebel groups such as the FARC-EP refusing to disarm are doing so because of the appeal of narco-capital, but that narco-capital affects modes of depoliticisation; it does not necessarily produce one single outcome (Gutiérrez and Thomson 2021). ...
Capitalism is not only an economic mode of production; it is also a form of life. This also applies to a historical type of capitalism, which is the capitalism founded on (illicit) drugs – in other words: narco-capitalism. The article discusses how capitalism alters life at the nexus of drug production, trade and consumption through a study of drug heartlands in Colombia, Afghanistan and Myanmar. What forms of life emerge under narco-capitalism? And how do people seek change and express agency in the exploitative conditions governed by narco-capital? To do so, the article proceeds through the following sections: first, it elucidates its definition of the ‘everyday’ as a conceptual and methodological scheme to understand capitalist forms of life. Then it uses material collected from people’s everyday encounter with narco-capitalism in Afghanistan, Myanmar and Colombia to discuss mystification, predation and alienation. The article explores how capitalism produces forms of life that make use of drugs and narco-capital to dispossess and alienate collectivities. Finally, the article argues that to move beyond this alienating condition, drug wars and/or development are not a solution, because drugs are not the problem. Instead, it is people’s organisation and world-building in dialectical mode to capitalist forms of life that can transform everyday life beyond predation and alienation.
... The debate about the genuine -that is, political-nature of guerrillas like the FARC-EP have gone on for years, with positions for and against changing depending on the political climate and other calculations. Machuca shows in this issue how much prowess and know-how have been thrown into the effort of building the rhetoric that the FARC-EP was no more than a criminal undertaking (see also Gutiérrez and Thomson 2021). But the passive expression 'have been' is itself a black box that deserves to be opened: it involves a network of actors operating through complex forms of collective action, typically merging power structures with different forms of production of knowledge, and enabling or at least sparing some actors at the expense of others (Tate 2015). ...
This special issue revisits and reframes the old, but active, debate on the relationship between criminality and civil war. It argues that the terms in which the debate is generally posed are still inadequate to address the complexities of this relationship, showing how criminalisation and de-criminalisation are deeply political and hotly contested processes. The shifting movements towards the separation -or convergence- between criminality and politics are part of the processes of constitution of both political power and state. The articles in the issue flesh out the mechanisms and social dynamics through which this takes place.
... En dichas regiones se han documentado los vínculos de guerrillas y grupos antisubversivos con la producción de coca y opiáceos; particularmente, en Colombia, Afganistán y Perú (Felbab-Brown, 2010). A pesar de que los nexos entre actores armados y cultivos de uso ilícito tienen diferentes motivos y dinámicas, la respuesta estatal e internacional ha sido atacar ambos fenómenos mediante la combinación o la coordinación de las políticas contra las drogas y las políticas contrainsurgentes (Felbab-Brown, 2010;Gutiérrez & Thomson, 2020;Makarenko, 2004). De acuerdo con Björnehed (2004), la unificación de esas dos estrategias se inició cuando se agruparon las dos amenazas (drogas y terrorismo) en un solo concepto, denominado narcoterrorismo. ...
La política pública de erradicación de cultivos de uso ilícito en Colombia se desarrolló por más de 20 años a través del PECIG, un programa que tenía por objeto la disminución de cultivos de uso ilícito me-diante la aspersión aérea de herbicidas. El programa partía de la hipótesis de que existía una correlación entre los cultivos de uso ilícito y el conflicto armado. En este artículo nos centraremos en el papel de los jueces en la reparación de daños ocasionados por dichas aspersiones, bajo la tesis de que las cortes se vieron fuertemente influenciadas por el enfoque contrainsurgente del programa, y esto explica la negación del derecho a la reparación de los daños por las aspersiones. Además, el cambio de precedente judicial, en el que se priorizaron los derechos de las comunidades afectadas por las fumigaciones, no se dio por un cambio de legislación o por un giro garantista de los jueces, sino por un cambio explícito del enfoque de la política pública.
... Importantly, these legacies also depends on the kinds of rules impose by the armed actor. For example, if the NSAG in a specific territory develops illegal activities and engages civilians in those activities (as the FARC-EP did in other locales (Gutiérrez D & Thomson, 2020)), post-war recovery may be more difficult. Non-demobilized NSAGs and civilians may have incentives to persist in those economies jeopardizing peace endeavors (Salazar, Wolff, & Camelo, 2019). ...
Agriculture in developing countries is especially vulnerable to social and political constraints, particularly, to armed conflict and violence. Intrastate conflict, which accounts for the majority of violent conflicts since the second half of the 20th century, occurs mainly in the rural areas of these countries. In 2018, 52 intrastate conflicts were active in 36 countries, most of them with the potentiality to spark large-scale violence. Around 79.5 million people fled from their homes, 100 civilians were killed a day, and 60% of the food-insecure people worldwide lived-in war-torn areas. Intrastate conflicts greatly affect rural areas and have deep agrarian roots. Civil war onset, for instance, is usually anchored in unfair land distribution patterns and land tenure regimes that originate peasant grievances that give place to large-scale violence. The rural scenario in which civil wars occur also offers a suitable environment for insurgent activities (e.g., complex geography far from the radar of the state), funding sources (e.g., looting of natural resources), and a source of combatants (e.g., aggrieved peasants). However, the nexus between violent conflict and rural areas in the developing world is not straightforward. Moreover, intrastate conflicts unevenly affect local contexts and subsequently, their effects on agriculture and the livelihoods of rural inhabitants are unequal at the sub-national level. This means that the processes through which armed conflict and agriculture dovetail in developing countries emerge under certain conditions and must be grasped at various scales, including the local level. In order to understand these processes, this cumulative dissertation aims at exploring the intersections between civil war and the agrarian settings in which they occur. The contribution of this thesis is twofold. First, different paths through which armed conflict influences agrarian societies and the livelihoods of people living in rural areas are discerned. Complementary, the theoretical implications of having rural areas as the main scenario of both civil war and peacebuilding processes are examined. A qualitative approach bearing on a case study was applied, by focusing on Colombia, where a protracted armed conflict has created around eight million victims and 260,000 casualties. Three main gaps found in the literature are tackled in each of the articles that compounds the thesis: first, how land is accumulated in wartime. Second, why the behavior of one rebel group varies across its territories of influence. Third, why collective action is possible post-war. Regarding the first question, land accumulation dynamics during civil wars are poorly understood because the land-violent conflict nexus has been constructed around linear causations that go from aggrieved peasants to violence. In focusing on the mechanisms of land dispossession in Colombia, defined as land usurpation by taking advantage of the context of widespread violence that civil war spawns, this paper aims to shed light on how land is accumulated during an armed conflict. Based on a literature review, more than 50 different methods for dispossessing land are identified. The methods show how actors develop complex strategies for profiting from the civil war setting -often depicted as irrational-; how violent conflict benefits more certain sectors of the agrarian elites than the peasantry that initiates it; and how rural inequality is reinforced in civil war with the support of state institutions and bureaucracy. Concerning the second question, wartime social order has shown that civil wars are not exclusively chaotic but are complex phenomena that unevenly affect local contexts. Important evidence for order in civil wars are the governance regimes established by insurgents to manage civilians affairs. However, even if this is a desirable outcome for rebel groups, not all of them are able to build such regimes, and even armed groups that succeed are often unable to do so across their entire territory of influence. Instead, rebels also negotiate agreements with civilians and local authorities, or simply deal with disorder. Why? This paper explores the factors influencing these various outcomes by focusing on three neighboring territories in southern Tolima, Colombia, where the former communist guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Peoples Army FARC-EP was present for more than 50 years. The results lessen the assumptions of current theories on determinants of rebel governance, identifying that the behavior of rebel groups varies according to its own strategies and resources, intersected with the strategies and resources of the actors they interact with (whether civilians, other armed actors, or incumbent governments) in specific territories. The active role of both civilians and the state, often neglected by the explanations on the determinants of both rebel governance and the diversity of behaviors deployed by the same armed actor, is underscored. Situational, organizational, ideational, and strategic factors shaped the possibility for rebel groups to establish order or, on the contrary, to engage in widespread violence in specific locales. Regarding the third question, civil wars hit rural areas intensely and Rural Producer Organizations (RPO) -as forms of long-term collective action or cooperation among small farmers- are considered essential for peacebuilding. However, the factors underpinning the formation and performance of RPO post-war are unclear. Based on a case study in the municipality of Planadas, Colombia, where the former communist guerrilla FARC-EP was formed and several associations flourished post-war, this article identifies 14 contextual factors facilitating the rise of RPO. Contrasting the findings with variables identified by collective action, commons theory, and literature on RPO, it was determined that four additional contextual variables play a critical role in RPO development post-war, namely, legacies of war, resilience strategies, institutional intermediaries, and discourses. Legacies of war refer to the vestiges left by the kind of relationship developed between the main armed actor and the civilians in wartime. Economic activity as a resilience strategy indicates civilians strategies to stay aside from the confrontation, reducing the probability of being harmed and preventing their involvement in the war or illegal economic activities. Intermediary institutions are third-party organizations that influence RPO. In the case considered, this role was developed by certification schemes known as Voluntary Sustainability Standards. Controverting critical literature on the effects of the standards, the results suggest that they can enhance self-organizing capacities post-conflict at the local level. Finally, discourses refer to additional incentives for RPO development regarding what participants consider valuable beyond economic benefits, in this case, environmental protection. Consequently, the article presents the foundations of an expanded framework to understand and foster RPO growth in post-war settings. To qualify our understanding of civil war is imperative in a world at the edge of new forms of violence. Knowledge that illuminates public policies attempting to strengthen food systems, alleviate poverty, decrease inequalities, and build a more peaceful world, is fundamental for the future of humankind. This dissertation is intended to be a contribution in this path.
En este artículo intentamos recopilar las diferentes respuestas que se han dado al interrogante: ¿cuál es la naturaleza del conflicto armado colombiano? Para ello, hemos identificado seis denominaciones distintas: i) conflicto anti/ comunista; ii) conflicto agrario; iii) conflicto criminalizado; iv) guerra civil/ guerra contra la sociedad; v) conflicto internacionalizado; vi) amenaza terrorista. Para cada corriente, hemos analizado sus postulados, sus contextos de significación y los desafíos argumentativos que las sucedieron. Primero, concluimos que los cambios de los actores armados, sus repertorios de violencia y del contexto internacional son respondidos por masas críticas con nuevas denominaciones. Las denominaciones, así como el conflicto, son dinámicas. Segundo, mostramos que, aunque el conflicto armado ha sido considerado por varios analistas como muy único para ser comparado, en realidad sus definiciones han estado marcadas tanto por el contexto internacional (tres guerras globales), así como la literatura internacional desde la economía, la ciencia política y las relaciones internacionales.
“El nuevo libro de Sergio García-Magariño es amplio, importante y original. Es amplio porque, aunque se centra en España, aborda casos de radicalización violenta de inspiración religiosa de todo el mundo. Es importante porque, a diferencia de muchos estudios occidentales sobre movimientos yihadistas, explora las bases religiosas del fenómeno con seriedad. Y es original porque, de nuevo, a diferencia de muchos otros estudios reduccionistas, el autor examina los factores micro, meso y macro que contribuyen al fenómeno en cuestión. Es una obra indispensable tanto para quienes están preocupados por la radicalización violenta en España como para los lectores que tienen un interés teórico general en el fenómeno de la radicalización violenta de inspiración religiosa” (Sidney Tarrow).
In illicit online markets, actors are pseudonymous, legal institutions are absent, and predation is ripe. The literature proposes that problems of trust are solved by reputation systems, social ties, and administrative governance, but these are often measured independently or in single platforms. This study takes an eclectic approach, conceiving of trust as an estimate informed by any available evidence. Using transaction size as a proxy for trust I estimate the association between competing sources of trust – mediation, reputation, authentication, and social ties – and transaction value using multilevel regression. Using data from two online drug markets, I find mixed evidence that reputation and authentication are associated with transaction value, whereas results are consistent for social ties. Furthermore, transactions outside the scope of administrative mediation are generally larger. These findings have implications for future research and suggest increased attention should be given to the role of mediation practices and social ties.
Desde una perspectiva de larga duración y en el marco de la antropología del conflicto, este artículo analiza contextos de posacuerdo en el departamento de Putumayo, como la desmovilización de paramilitares en 2006 y de guerrilleros en 2017 a partir del Acuerdo de Paz. Con base en documentos de los grupos armados no estatales, del ejército y de líderes comunitarios, examino la inserción del conflicto armado en la vida cotidiana de sus pobladores y examino los órdenes sociales alternos instaurados por estos grupos armados durante las décadas de 1980 y 1990 en la región. Analizo sus rupturas y continuidades en esta coyuntura crítica, la legitimación de sus acciones ⸺a partir de retomar y resignificar narrativas anteriores que explicaban su misión⸺, así como el impacto y las respuestas de la población civil ante esta reconfiguración del conflicto armado.
Violence in post-conflict settings is often attributed to a post-war boom in organized crime, facilitated by the demobilization of armed groups and the persisting weakness of the state. The article argues that this is only one pathway of post-conflict violence. A second causal pathway emerges from the challenges that peace processes can constitute for entrenched local political orders. By fostering political inclusion, the implementation of peace agreements may threaten subnational political elites that have used the context of armed conflict to ally with armed non-state actors. Violence is then used as a means to preserve such de facto authoritarian local orders. We start from the assumption that these two explanations are not exclusive or competing, but grasp different causal processes that may well both be at work behind the assassination of social leaders (líderes sociales) in Colombia since the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla. We argue that this specific type of targeted violence can, in fact, be attributed to different, locally specific configurations that resemble the two pathways. The article combines fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis with the case studies of the municipalities of Sardinata and Suárez to empirically establish and illustrate the two pathways.
During a week in September of 2016, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC) held its tenth guerrilla conference, the Décima, in the plains of Yarí in southern Colombia. The guerrilla group blew the event open to the media, orchestrating a festival cum eco-conflict-tourism extravaganza to mark its transition to legal politics. This photo/ethnographic analysis of the Décima illuminates the FARC's symbolic and discursive formation at a pivotal transitional moment and how the group imagined its political possibilities at the cusp of its demobilisation. By engaging with Guy Debord's concept of ‘integrated spectacle’, I argue that the FARC's vanguardist structure led it to brand itself as the leader of a broad political mobilisation, even as it struggled to retain the allegiance of its former combatants. The article considers the ongoing relevance of the integrated spectacle for scholars and activists and opens a path for further research into politics of spectacle in Latin America.
For years, the Colombian state maintained its position about how the guerrillas’ involvement with drug trafficking has made them lose their political and/or ideological nature. Political and military sectors supported this approach and used the term narco-guerrilla or narco-terrorists. The peace process initiated in 2012 during the Santos administration seemed to alter this narrative. This article analyzes how Colombia’s peace process had a contradictory effect on the ‘narco-terrorist’ characterization of the FARC-EP: it opened windows of opportunity both for more peace-prone discourses and for an even more virulent version of the criminalization of the guerrillas.
Background
The pricing of illicit drugs is typically approached within the risks and prices framework. Recent sociological and economic studies of prices in online drug markets have stressed the centrality of reputation for price formation. In this paper, we propose an account of price formation that is based on the risks and prices framework, but also incorporates internal social organization to explain price variation. We assess the model empirically, and extend the current empirical literature by including payment methods and informal ranking as influences on drug pricing.
Methods
We apply our model to estimate the prices of cannabis, cocaine, and heroin in two online drug markets, cryptomarkets (n = 92.246). Using multilevel linear regression, we assess the influence of product qualities, reputation, payment methods, and informal ranking on price formation.
Results
We observe extensive quantity discounts varying across substances and countries, and find premia and discounts associated with product qualities. We find evidence of payment method price adjustment, but contrary to expectation we observe conflicting evidence concerning reputation and status. We assess the robustness of our findings concerning reputation by comparing our model to previous approaches and alternative specifications.
Conclusion
We contribute to an emerging economic sociological approach to the study illicit markets by developing an account of price formation that incorporates cybercrime scholarship and the risks and prices framework. We find that prices in online drug markets reflect both external institutional constraint and internal social processes that reduce uncertainty.
Despite the promises made in the peace agreement with the FARC-EP in 2016, bureaucratic obstacles, underfunding, and an apparent lack of political will has eroded the voluntary illegal crop substitution programme in Colombia. Armed forces are sent to the territories to forcibly eradicate the coca plants, causing violent confrontations and deepening the distrust between the state and peasant coca-leaf growers. Using qualitative data from 28 semi-structured interviews, this article analyses Colombian Army soldiers’ opinions on manual eradication operations. Their voices suggest that not all the soldiers support coercive measures to fight the rising growth of coca crops, but these measures can encourage institutional corruption and incentivise a logic of an internal enemy that justifies violence against civilians. This article offers insights into obstacles to building legitimacy and trust in the state and its institutions after peace agreements.
This article discusses the institutionalisation of calamity – in the form of fumigation and exposure to lethal violence – and its consequences over coca peasants and workers in Colombia. I show how institutionalised calamity indelibly marks their life trajectories, through repeated episodes of ‘total loss’. At the same time, it is a major illustration of a process of co-constitution of class, citizenship and state. In effect, institutionalised calamity endows illicit rural classes and economies with specific characteristics that diverge from the typical identikit attributed to peasants in some agrarian studies. These peasants and workers are much more mobile and risk prone, and less localistic and deferential, than it is frequently assumed, and have different demands with respect to markets, government and land. All this leaves a deep and lasting imprint on the claims for rights and recognition pacts demanded by them, triggering a double and apparently contradictory dynamic of rejection and inducement vis-à-vis the state. They resist state sallies into their territories, and the violence, brutality and stigmatisation associated with them. But, on the other hand, they push for infrastructure and regulation, indispensable not only for coca crops but also for any viable transit to legality. This dynamic has important spatial expressions.
The havoc and disarray among governments and societies caused by the COVID-19 outbreak also invited opportunities for violent non-state actors to exploit for their advantage governments’ failure to provide an adequate public health response or their denigration of security apparatuses due to the outbreak. Focusing on the early months of the outbreak, this study examines three courses of actions taken by those actors and the potential explanation for the variation in responses. The responses examined are actors offering COVID-related public health response as a surrogate for the state, the extension of hostilities, and the request for a ceasefire. Looking at a sample of 72 groups we suggest that the actors’ governance levels, which dictate their organizational logic and behavior, are strong predictors for the likelihood of them offering public health support, conduct attacks, or pursues a ceasefire during the period examined.
Los retos asociados al cultivo de la coca han sido objeto de debate más o menos permanente desde su inserción en el país. Este artículo se orienta a caracterizarlos, apoyándose en material empírico nuevo –una encuesta entre usuarios del Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito (PNIS) en Puerto Asís y Tumaco, trabajo de campo en esos dos municipios, bases de datos de afiliados al PNIS en otros territorios y trabajo de archivo– y en una reflexión sobre el significado de la coca en el largo proceso de expansión de la frontera agraria en Colombia.
Direct elite participation in civil wars remains unexplored terrain. It should be analytically telling, because it involves taking major risks and costs. Here, we consider the direct participation of one rural elite—big cattle ranchers—in the Colombian paramilitary saga. We claim that it was massive, locally specific, regulated by institutions, and riddled by permanent collective action issues. We focus on two important forms of direct participation: ranchers as leaders of paramilitary groups, and ranchers as promoters and beneficiaries of coercive land dispossession. This does not cover the full spectrum of potential elite participation in war, but it is a key starting point to sort out the ways in which extreme inequality is associated with political violence from above.
'Cooperation and imitation among crime and terror groups in recent years has given rise to a crime-terror nexus. A linear conceptualisation of a crime-terror spectrum, suggests that complete convergence of crime and terror in a failed state can give rise to a ‘black hole.’ Theoretical models of the crime-terror nexus, however, do not specify the means by which a crime-terror group enters this black hole state, yet others do not. Using the Taliban movement as a case study, this article presents a theoretical extension of black hole theory, using organisation-level characteristics to merge black hole theory with the crime-terror continuum.'
The escalation of violence committed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas against noncombatant civilians triggered a shift in the theoretical orientation of scholars who study Colombia’s political economy. While previous explanations emphasized the sociopolitical “grievances” underlying guerrilla activities, recent explanations emphasize the “greed” motive, including guerrilla involvement in Colombia’s illegal narcotics trade. In this article, the author posits an alternative explanation using Charles Tilly’s theories of state formation to explain FARC activities in Caquetá, Colombia. Drawing from a longitudinal data set that documents the war making, state making, extraction, and protection activities of the FARC between 1975 and 2007, in addition to historical sociological methods, the author finds that increases in FARC repression stem from the growing militarization and paramilitarization of the region, which pressured the FARC to extract resources from the local population in a way that no longer served that population’s legitimate protection interests.
The view of terrorists as entrepreneurs is not new. Yet, unlike traditional entrepreneurs, they are not motivated by profits. This article argues that terrorists are social entrepreneurs. They are motivated primarily by social returns. Furthermore, their main output is a public good due to its non-rival and non-excludable properties. Using social entrepreneurship theories, this article presents an alternative view of the incentives behind the formation of terrorist organizations. It concludes with a discussion of policy implications of this framework for combating terrorism.
This paper argues that eudaemonic legitimation is a useful tool in understanding how insurgencies seek to justify their “effectiveness” and “performance” vis-à-vis the state in order to enhance authority and mobilise support for their strategic objectives. By examining primary FARC documents, conference and plenary findings, and select interviews with former and active FARC, ELN and M-19 members, it demonstrates how FARC constructed social contracts and integrated illicit financing into its operations as a strategy to appeal to its eudaemonic legitimation in its areas of proto-state influence, in turn aiming to mobilise support and consolidate a full-spectrum normative system. “Effectiveness” in FARC’s strategic approach through rule-setting allowed the organisation to expand to control significant portions of Colombian territory, which to a degree impacted positively on social mobilisation and challenged the government’s legitimacy by consolidating power structures in areas where there was a lack of government authority. FARC further appealed to social and economic “performance” by using revenue from its fundraising activities through engagement in the coca trade and kidnap for ransom to not only strengthen its military capacity, but also implement social initiatives and provide material goods. In turn, FARC was able to develop zones of security through the creation of social contracts in which stable economic practices were able to solidify, contributing in its effectiveness in providing proto-state authority and allowing for insurgent expansion.
As loggers and miners move into previously inaccessible regions, researchers are pooling knowledge about the country’s ecosystems. As loggers and miners move into previously inaccessible regions, researchers are pooling knowledge about the country’s ecosystems.
This introduction to the double special issue on the theme of rebels and legitimacy aims to set out the parameters for the discussion. It looks at legitimacy as a concept and at legitimation as a process. To date most of the literature on legitimacy has focused on the state. However, rebel groups such as insurgents, terrorists, warlords and guerrillas have all had claims, and continue to claim, legitimacy as well. How and when are these rebels seen as legitimate actors? Existing suggestions of rebel legitimacy focus heavily on state models of social order and the social contract. This first contribution discusses how to conceptualize legitimacy and how to make it operational. A two-pronged approach, borrowing heavily from Max Weber, is proposed. Legitimacy is investigated based on beliefs and belief systems about what is considered legitimate. This is combined with practices whereby legitimacy is enacted, copied and emulated by the population the rebels claim to represent.
This article serves as an introduction to a special section on the question of the legitimacy of non-state armed groups. Starting with a short discussion of the literature on armed groups as political actors, the authors emphasize the importance of the often-underestimated dimension of legitimacy. After having conceptualized legitimacy in more detail, the article addresses three key challenges armed groups usually face regarding the politics of legitimacy: first, they need to legitimize the use of violent means; second, for moral and material support, they depend on beliefs of legitimacy; and third, they need to simultaneously address various domestic and international audiences. Finally, the authors highlight a number of pending questions for further research on armed groups.
This article analyzes the adaptation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to the post-Cold War strategic scene. In this process of change the Colombian guerrilla organization has broken away from the traditional behavior patterns of Latin American armed groups in four key ways. First, the FARC has reduced the rigidity of its ideology in order to make its political message more attractive. Second, it has made a great effort to boost its military potential. Third, it has established independent channels of funding and arms supply. Finally, the Colombian rebels have developed a very decentralized organic structure that nevertheless maintains a sufficient degree of cohesion. These innovations have made the FARC a new model of insurgency that has managed to corner the Bogota government and destabilize a significant part of the Andean region.
During the past thirty years, the illegal drug industry has marked Colombia's development. In no other country has the illegal drug industry had such dramatic social, political, and economic effects. This short article provides a synthesis of the development of the marijuana, coca-cocaine, and poppy-opium-heroin illegal industries. It studies the development of the drug cartels and marketing networks and the participation of guerrillas and paramilitary forces in the industry. The size of the illegal industry and its economic effects are also surveyed and its effects on the political system analyzed. The article ends with a discussion of the evolution of government policies and social attitudes toward the industry. The article shows that in the early years, the illegal industry was perceived by many as positive, how it evolved so that today it provides substantial funding for the country's ambiguous war, and that it is one of the main obstacles to peace.
The lines between terrorism and brutal profiteering are increasingly blurred. Terrorists engaging in criminal acts under the guise of ideology pose a real and pervasive threat to international security. Through loss of leadership, a changing historical moment or the sheer lure of fistfuls of cash, politics and ideology bow to commerce, becoming nothing more than attractive façades that can pave the way to recruitment and cooperation with other, more-principled organizations. When it comes down to it, these types of terrorists need to be treated as criminals motivated by money, not ideals.
Increasingly since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline of state sponsorship for terrorism, organised criminal activities have become a major revenue source for terrorist groups worldwide. Building on the precedent set by narco-terrorism, as it emerged in Latin America in the 1980s, the use of crime has become an important factor in the evolution of terrorism. As such, the 1990s can be described as the decade in which the crime - terror nexus was consolidated: the rise of transnational organised crime and the changing nature of terrorism mean that two traditionally separate phenomena have begun to reveal many operational and organisational similarities. Indeed, criminal and terrorist groups appear to be learning from one another, and adapting to each other's successes and failures, meaning that it is necessary to acknowledge, and to understand the crime - terror continuum to formulate effective state responses to these evolving, and periodically converging, threats.
The link between armed conflict and the production and trafficking of illicit drugs has been much noted in the popular literature, and recent research tentatively indicates a link between lootable resources, including narcotics, and conflict duration. Yet the specific dynamics of the linkage between narcotics and conflict remain poorly understood. Evolving theory on the link between organized crime and terrorism enhances and supplements the debate on economic incentives in civil war, proposing mechanisms whereby insurgent groups interact with narcotics production - a crime-rebellion nexus. Studies of nine major narcotics-producing areas indicates strong support for this nexus. Rather than generating or being generated by drug cultivation, armed conflict qualitatively and quantitatively transforms existing drug cultivation. Importantly, armed conflict is itself deeply affected by the narcotics industry, which tends to strengthen the capacity of insurgent movements while weakening that of the state. A momentous aspect of the crime-rebellion nexus is the effect that the drug industry tends to have on the motivational structures of insurgent groups: criminal involvement in some instances creates an economic function of war and vested interests in the continuation of armed conflict. This has substantial implications for strategies to resolve armed conflict involving the production and trafficking of illicit drugs.
Neoclassical economic theories of violent conflict have proliferated in recent years and, with their application to contemporary wars, have influenced donors and policy makers. This paper reviews the intellectual foundations and empirical substance of such theories and offers a critique drawing on a political economy perspective. There are strong grounds for arguing that orthodox economic theories of war are reductionist, speculative, and misleading. Theories that are driven by methodological individualism are compelled somehow to model “the social” as it affects contemporary war––for example, by appeal to indices of ethno-linguistic fragmentation––but do so in ways that fail to capture reality and its variations.
Colombia Court: Drug Trafficking is 'Political Crime
"Los 10 Duros Dardos de Uribe a la firma de la paz," Semana, 26 September 2016, https://
www.semana.com; Elyssa Pachico, "Colombia Court: Drug Trafficking is 'Political Crime',"
InSight Crime, 22 September 2015, https://www.insightcrime.org.
Hard Science or Waffly Crap? Evidence-Based Policy versus Policy-Based Evidence in the Field of Violent Conflict
- Christopher See
- Jonathan Cramer
- Goodhand
See, for example: Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand, "Hard Science or Waffly
Crap? Evidence-Based Policy versus Policy-Based Evidence in the Field of Violent
Conflict," in The Political Economy of Development. The World Bank, Neo-Liberalism and
Development Research, ed. Kate Bayliss, Ben Fine, and Elisa Van Waeyenberge (London:
Pluto Press, 2011), 231; Francisco Guti errez, "Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of Civil War
and Criminality from the Colombian Experience," Politics & Society 32, no. 2 (2004): 279;
Beyond 'Narcoterrorism': Illicit Drugs Business and Terrorist Tactics in Armed Conflicts
- Ekaterina Stepanova
Ekaterina Stepanova, "Beyond 'Narcoterrorism': Illicit Drugs Business and Terrorist Tactics
in Armed Conflicts," in The Politics of Narcotic Drugs: A Survey, ed. Julia Buxton,
(London: Routledge, 2011), 121.
Note that the FARC-EP themselves often made a similar argument -see FARC-EP
- Brittain
Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia. Note that the FARC-EP themselves
often made a similar argument -see FARC-EP, "Comunicado de las FARC-EP sobre los
Cultivos de Coca," September 2006, http://cedema.org/ver.php?id=1532; FARC-EP,
Marulanda y las FARC para Principiantes (s/l, 2014).
Hard Science or Waffly Crap?
- Goodhand Cramer
Cramer and Goodhand, "Hard Science or Waffly Crap?," 228, 230, 232.
com; Mar ıa Clemencia Ram ırez, Between the Guerrillas and the State. The Cocalero Movement
- Camilo Acero
Camilo Acero, "Review of the Literature on Illicit Drugs in Colombia," Drugs &
(Dis)order Working Paper (London: SOAS, 2020), 25; see also Hernando Corral,
"Guerrilleros o Narcotraficantes," El Tiempo, 17 December 2000, https://www.eltiempo.
com; Mar ıa Clemencia Ram ırez, Between the Guerrillas and the State. The Cocalero
Movement, Citizenship, and Identity in the Colombian Amazon (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2011), 61.
As far back as 1985, some observers were already referring to Latin American insurgent groups, such as the FARC-EP, as 'narco-terrorists'. See: Risk International
As far back as 1985, some observers were already referring to Latin American insurgent
groups, such as the FARC-EP, as 'narco-terrorists'. See: Risk International, "Special Report:
Significant Regional Developments, October-December 1984," Terrorism 8, no. 2 (1985):
165-83, 172.
Although nowadays 'terrorism' is mostly used as a term of insult, since the French Revolution it has been used to describe tactics aimed at producing terror among the enemies of a particular political project -see Mona Ozuf
Although nowadays 'terrorism' is mostly used as a term of insult, since the French
Revolution it has been used to describe tactics aimed at producing terror among the
enemies of a particular political project -see Mona Ozuf, "War and Terror in French
Revolutionary Discourse (1792-1794)," The Journal of Modern History 56, no. 4 (1984):
579-97;
- Leon Trotsky
Leon Trotsky, Terrorism and Communism (London: Verso Books, 2007);
The term 'guerrillas' refers to non-State armed groups engaged in asymmetrical armed conflict with a more powerful native or foreign incumbent, while 'guerrilla warfare' is described as a mechanism to destabilise (and eventually overturn) a political system or regime -see Ernesto Guevara
- Maximilien Robespierre
Maximilien Robespierre, Virtue and Terror (London: Verso Books, 2017). The term
'guerrillas' refers to non-State armed groups engaged in asymmetrical armed conflict with
a more powerful native or foreign incumbent, while 'guerrilla warfare' is described as a
mechanism to destabilise (and eventually overturn) a political system or regime -see
Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961);
Beyond 'Narcoterrorism'
- Stepanova
Stepanova, "Beyond 'Narcoterrorism'," 124.
Narcotization as Security Dilemma: The FARC and Drug Trade in Colombia
- Guti Errez
Guti errez, "Criminal Rebels?," 269, emphasis in original. See also: Susan Norman,
"Narcotization as Security Dilemma: The FARC and Drug Trade in Colombia," Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 41, no. 8 (2018): 638-59, 648.
Los L ımites de la Extradici on
- Alfredo Rangel
Alfredo Rangel, "Los L ımites de la Extradici on," El Tiempo, 31 December 2004, https://
www.eltiempo.com.
Las FARC y su Relaci on con la Econom ıa de la Coca en el Sur de Colombia: Testimonios de Colonos y Guerrilleros
- Juan Guillermo Ferro
Juan Guillermo Ferro, "Las FARC y su Relaci on con la Econom ıa de la Coca en el Sur de
Colombia: Testimonios de Colonos y Guerrilleros," Mama Coca, 2002, http://www.
mamacoca.org.
Guerrilla Insurgency as Organized Crime
- Hough
Hough, "Guerrilla Insurgency as Organized Crime," 389; see also e.g. Ram ırez,
"Colonizaci on, Coca y Movimiento Social," 181.
Narcotization as Security Dilemma
- Norman
Norman,
"Narcotization as Security Dilemma".
Review of the Literature on Illicit Drugs in Colombia
- Acero
Acero, "Review of the Literature on Illicit Drugs in Colombia";
An alisis Hist orico Del Narcotr afico En Colombia, C atedra Anual de Historia Ernesto Restrepo Tirado, VIII (Bogot a: Museo Nacional de Colombia
- Ortiz C Esar
C esar Ortiz, "Los Cultivos Il ıcitos En Colombia: Evoluci on Hist orica y Territorio," in
An alisis Hist orico Del Narcotr afico En Colombia, C atedra Anual de Historia Ernesto
Restrepo Tirado, VIII (Bogot a: Museo Nacional de Colombia, 2003), 199-245; Mar ıa
Clemencia Ram ırez, "Colonizaci on, Coca y Movimiento Social: El Caso Del Putumayo," in
An alisis Hist orico Del Narcotr afico En Colombia, C atedra Anual de Historia Ernesto
Restrepo Tirado, VIII (Bogot a: Museo Nacional de Colombia, 2003), 170-98;
Conflicto Agrario y Expansi on de Los Cultivos Il ıcitos En Colombia," in An alisis Hist orico Del Narcotr afico En Colombia, C atedra Anual de Historia Ernesto Restrepo Tirado, VIII (Bogot a: Museo Nacional de Colombia
- Henry Salgado
Henry
Salgado, "Conflicto Agrario y Expansi on de Los Cultivos Il ıcitos En Colombia," in An alisis
Hist orico Del Narcotr afico En Colombia, C atedra Anual de Historia Ernesto Restrepo
Tirado, VIII (Bogot a: Museo Nacional de Colombia, 2003), 246-72.
Las FARC y su Relaci on con la Econom ıa de la Coca"; Mar ıa Clara Torres
- Ferro
Ferro, "Las FARC y su Relaci on con la Econom ıa de la Coca"; Mar ıa Clara Torres, "The
Making of a Coca Frontier: The Case of Ariari, Colombia," in The Origins of Cocaine.
Colonization and Failed Development in the Amazon Andes, ed. Paul Gootenberg and
Liliana D avalos (London: Routledge, 2018), 150-51;
Seemingly, some fronts did not apply the new rules immediately. For example, at the 1987 plenary, the 7 th front (which operated in Meta and Guaviare) was accused of taxing the coca trade in ways that contravened the 1982 conference agreement -see FARC-EP "Pleno Ampliado Febrero 17-20 de
- Farc-Ep
FARC-EP, "Conclusiones de Organizaci on de la S eptima Conferencia Nacional de las
FARC-EP". Seemingly, some fronts did not apply the new rules immediately. For example,
at the 1987 plenary, the 7 th front (which operated in Meta and Guaviare) was accused of
taxing the coca trade in ways that contravened the 1982 conference agreement -see FARC-EP "Pleno Ampliado Febrero 17-20 de 1987". The proceedings of these and various other
conferences and plenaries can be found at: www.farc-ep.co.
La Guerra de 'El Mexicano'. >Qu e Lleva a Gonzalo Rodr ıguez Gacha a Echarse Plomo con todo El Mundo?
- Oscar Jansson
Oscar Jansson, "Tr ıadas Putumayenses: Relaciones
Patr on-Cliente en la Econom ıa de la Coca ına," Revista Colombiana de Antropolog ıa 42
(2006): 223-47; "La Guerra de 'El Mexicano'. >Qu e Lleva a Gonzalo Rodr ıguez Gacha a
Echarse Plomo con todo El Mundo?," Semana, 28 August 1989, http://www.semana.com.
Scandals such as this have plagued numerous other administrations, including the present one of president Iv an Duque, currently under investigations for links to narcotraffickers and votebuying. See "Los Esc andalos que tocan al Gobierno de Iv an Duque
- Arlene Tickner
Arlene Tickner, "Colombia: U.S. Subordinate, Autonomous Actor, or Something in
Between?," in Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Policy, ed. Frank O. Mora and
Jeanne A. K. Hey (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003). Scandals
such as this have plagued numerous other administrations, including the present one of
president Iv an Duque, currently under investigations for links to narcotraffickers and votebuying. See "Los Esc andalos que tocan al Gobierno de Iv an Duque," Semana, 17 June
2020, and "Vicepresidenta de Colombia, Envuelta en Esc andalo por Condena a su
Hermano," France 24.com, 12 June 2020.
Guerreros y Campesinos: el Despojo de la Tierra en Colombia
- Alejandro Reyes
Alejandro Reyes, Guerreros y Campesinos: el Despojo de la Tierra en Colombia (Bogot a:
Norma, 2009), 4-5;
Historia del Narcotr afico en Colombia
- S Eduardo
- Aenz
Eduardo S aenz, "Historia del Narcotr afico en Colombia," El
Espectador, 14 May 2016, https://www.elespectador.com.
Illegal Drugs in Colombia
- Thoumi
Thoumi, 'Illegal Drugs in Colombia', 109-11.
FARC: La Coca y el Narcotr afico
- Ariel Avila
Ariel
Avila, "FARC: La Coca y el Narcotr afico," in FARC-EP. Temas y Problemas
Nacionales, 1958-2008, ed. Carlos Medina (Bogot a: Universidad Nacional, 2008);
Drugs,(Dis)Order and Agrarian Change: The Political Economy of Drugs and its Relevance to International Drug Policy
- Jonathan Goodhand
- Patrick Meehan
Jonathan Goodhand, Patrick Meehan, and Helena P erez-Niño, "Drugs,(Dis)Order and
Agrarian Change: The Political Economy of Drugs and its Relevance to International Drug
Policy," NOREF (2014), 2.
Una Historia Oral de la Colonizaci on del Guaviare
- On Guaviare
- Alfredo Molano
- Selva Adentro
On Guaviare, see Alfredo Molano, Selva Adentro. Una Historia Oral de la Colonizaci on del
Guaviare (Bogot a: Ancora Editores, 1987). On Caquet a, see Ferro, "Las FARC y su
Relaci on con la Econom ıa de La Coca".
Tr ıadas Putumayenses
- Jansson
Jansson, "Tr ıadas Putumayenses," 227, 237.
Interview with ex-combatant, 22/04/2019 and 03/06/2019; Interview with ex-coca grower and former local trader, 24/09/2019, Puerto As ıs
- Ibid
Ibid; Interview with ex-combatant, 22/04/2019 and 03/06/2019; Interview with ex-coca
grower and former local trader, 24/09/2019, Puerto As ıs; Informal conversations
during fieldwork.