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The influence of decision time on sensitivity for consequences, moral norms, and preferences for inaction: Time, moral judgments, and the CNI model
Abstract
It is often discussed that moral judgments are either consistent with the principle of utilitarianism or with the principle of deontology. Utilitarianism is a moral principle stating that the right act is the one that produces the best overall outcome. Deontology represents an ethical position indicating that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action regardless of the consequences. Criticism on the structure of moral dilemmas includes the problem that these dilemmas confound norms and consequences. Recently, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action (I), respectively. In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of time pressure on moral judgments using the CNI model. We found that time pressure influenced moral dilemma judgments by decreasing participants' sensitivity for consequences. There were no significant effects of time pressure on participants' sensitivity to norms and general preference for inaction. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined the link of reaction times to moral judgments more closely by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. Longer reaction times lead to an increase in parameter N, and there was no influence of reaction times on parameter C or I.
... Timers were perceived as inhibiting careful moral consideration, promoting instinct-driven decisions, which aligns with research that identified time pressure to not influence moral judgement (Kroneisen & Steghaus, 2021;Tinghög et al., 2016) but fostering instinctive decision making (Fischer, 2023;Holl et al., 2022). Furthermore, Kroneisen and Steghaus (2021) found time pressure decreased consideration of consequences when making a decision, suggesting that timers in moral decision making games prompt players to act on their own moral instincts (the influence on decisions is discussed in more detail in Section 7.2). ...
... Timers were perceived as inhibiting careful moral consideration, promoting instinct-driven decisions, which aligns with research that identified time pressure to not influence moral judgement (Kroneisen & Steghaus, 2021;Tinghög et al., 2016) but fostering instinctive decision making (Fischer, 2023;Holl et al., 2022). Furthermore, Kroneisen and Steghaus (2021) found time pressure decreased consideration of consequences when making a decision, suggesting that timers in moral decision making games prompt players to act on their own moral instincts (the influence on decisions is discussed in more detail in Section 7.2). ...
... However, if the objective is to foster moral reflection instead, the use of timers should be avoided. Participants reported that timers hindered their consideration of moral decisions, a sentiment supported by previous research (Kroneisen & Steghaus, 2021; Phillips-Wren & Adya, 2020). ...
Video games offer a unique platform for players to engage interactively with morally challenging topics and dilemmas. Despite the growing popularity of games that offer such content, there is a paucity of research on the player experiences and the specific game mechanics that facilitate moral decision making. To address this gap, this research identifies key game mechanics that support moral decision making through a comprehensive review of related literature and qualitative survey responses from players (n = 30). The effects of these mechanics on players’ decision making processes and their overall impact on player experience were further explored through semi-structured, video-elicitation interviews (n = 11). This research develops a theoretical framework based on the findings from these two exploratory studies, culminating in a set of design guidelines to inform the future development of moral decision making games.
... Previous research in moral decision-making has demonstrated that time pressure affects the outcomes and the processes involved in moral judgement, as it is assumed to reduce the time for the cost-benefit calculation letting emotional processes prevail. This led to a reduced proportion of utilitarian choices [6][7][8][9][10], and a decreased willingness to self-sacrifice in dilemmas with personal involvement [11]. However, evidence remains mixed, with some studies suggesting that reduced decision times are associated with a higher proportion of utilitarian choices [12,13], and other studies finding null results [14]. ...
... To address these gaps, in our study, we used a standardised set of moral scenarios to investigate the effect of impulsivity and BIS-BAS sensitivity on moral decision-making under time pressure. We manipulated decision time between participants, as it has been successfully done by the majority of studies manipulating time pressure in a moral dilemma task (e.g [6][7][8][9]). A within-subjects design, conversely, may not have been appropriate because it could have generated a sequential effect in the responses (cf [21,22]): the speeding effect of the time pressure condition could have extended to the condition with no time pressure, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the manipulation. ...
... Moreover, we measured impulsivity and BIS/BAS sensitivity as well as self-reported valence and arousal experienced during decision-making. Consistently with the dual-process model, in the time pressure group, we expected to find faster response times, higher arousal and unpleasantness ratings, and lower proportions of utilitarian choices [6][7][8][9][10]. As for the effect of impulsivity and BIS-BAS sensitivity, the literature is less conclusive in guiding stringent confirmatory hypotheses. ...
Background
Making timely moral decisions can save a life. However, literature on how moral decisions are made under time pressure reports conflicting results. Moreover, it is unclear whether and how moral choices under time pressure may be influenced by personality traits like impulsivity and sensitivity to reward and punishment.
Methods
To address these gaps, in this study we employed a moral dilemma task, manipulating decision time between participants: one group (N = 25) was subjected to time pressure (TP), with 8 s maximum time for response (including the reading time), the other (N = 28) was left free to take all the time to respond (noTP). We measured type of choice (utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian), decision times, self-reported unpleasantness and arousal during decision-making, and participants’ impulsivity and BIS-BAS sensitivity.
Results
We found no group effect on the type of choice, suggesting that time pressure per se did not influence moral decisions. However, impulsivity affected the impact of time pressure, in that individuals with higher cognitive instability showed slower response times under no time constraint. In addition, higher sensitivity to reward predicted a higher proportion of utilitarian choices regardless of the time available for decision.
Conclusions
Results are discussed within the dual-process theory of moral judgement, revealing that the impact of time pressure on moral decision-making might be more complex and multifaceted than expected, potentially interacting with a specific facet of attentional impulsivity.
... Intuitive thinking has been found to relate to avoidability of harm, whereas need for cognition has been linked with considering a utilitarian motive for killing (Cushman et al., 2012;Hauser et al., 2007;Patil et al., 2020;Paxton et al., 2012). In other studies it was found that time pressure and cognitive load (simultaneously completing a digit-search task) decreased sensitivity to consequences and utilitarianism because people do not have the cognitive resources necessary to deliberate (Greene et al., 2008;Kroneisen & Steghaus, 2021). ...
... Moral judgments are not stable: they are affected by various contextual cues and people rely on intuition or elaborative reasoning to think about moral events depending on context. Deontological moral judgments are usually driven by moral intuition, whereas utilitarian decisions require deliberation (Greene et al., 2008;Kroneisen & Steghaus, 2021;Patil et al., 2020). ...
... However, the decisions may be harmful when their heuristic and subjective experiences come from inappropriate information sources (Weick & Guinote, 2008). Although it is not possible to state that deliberative thinking must be better than intuitive thinking, deliberation can give decision makers a chance to consider the benefits and outcomes for all parties (Kroneisen & Steghaus, 2021). Our findings suggest that related regulations can be instigated in organizations and institutions to ensure that the people who are in positions of authority use a deliberative process before making important decisions. ...
Power affects how people think about moral issues, and has been found to elicit deontological moral judgments. We hypothesized that powerholders' propensity to rely on intuitive thinking would trigger deontological moral choices. In two studies, power was induced by role simulation tasks and participants then made a judgment on a moral dilemma that did not involve bodily harm. In Study 1 memory cognitive load was manipulated to induce an intuitive processing style, and in Study 2 deliberation was induced by asking participants to deliver strong arguments. Results of Study 1 show that high power led to deontological judgments regardless of cognitive load, and cognitive load enhanced deontological preferences among powerless individuals. In Study 2 we found that deliberation shifted the judgments of powerholders toward utilitarianism. These results extend prior findings and reinforce the links between power and deontology. The findings suggest that powerholders' preference for deontological moral judgments is driven by their reliance on intuitive thinking.
... MPT models are useful tools that serve to disambiguate observable responses by decomposing them into different underlying latent processes 59,60 . Easy-to-read tutorials 61 and user-friendly software 62 have facilitated the application of these models in a variety of fields 60 , including moral judgements and decision making [63][64][65][66][67][68][69][70] . The multinomial cooperation-and-punishment model (see Fig. 2) serves to separately measure cooperation, moral punishment, hypocritical punishment, antisocial punishment and a punishment bias 5,[56][57][58] . ...
The deliberate-morality account implies that moral punishment should be decreased with time pressure and increased with deliberation while the intuitive-morality account predicts the opposite. In three experiments, moral punishment was examined in a simultaneous one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. The players cooperated or defected and then decided whether or not to punish their partners. In Experiment 1, the punishment decisions were made without or with time pressure. In Experiment 2, the punishment decisions were immediate or delayed by pauses in which participants deliberated their decisions. In Experiment 3, participants were asked to deliberate self-interest or fairness before deciding whether to punish their partners. Different types of punishment were distinguished using the cooperation-and-punishment model. In Experiment 1, time pressure decreased moral punishment. In Experiment 2, deliberation increased moral punishment. So far, the evidence supports the deliberate-morality account. Experiment 3 demonstrates that the effect of deliberation depends on what is deliberated. When participants deliberated self-interest rather than fairness, moral punishment was decreased. The results suggest that unguided deliberation increases moral punishment, but the effects of deliberation are modulated by the type of deliberation that takes place. These results strengthen a process-based account of punishment which offers a more nuanced understanding of the context-specific effect of deliberation on moral punishment than the deliberate-morality account.
... The dual-process model of moral judgment [26] states that there are two key psychological processes involved: affective processes and cognitive processes. A series of previous studies have demonstrated that a number of factors-associated affective processes lead to more deontological thinking and cognitive evaluation of outcomes is usually associated with utilitarian moral judgments, for example, harm and intuition [27], cognitive load [28,29], decision time [30], reasoning [31], etc. Recently researchers have also focussed on some other processes that might be involved in moral reasoning but have not been investigated by the dual-process model, such as rule orientation, deliberation orientation, integration, and sentiment orientation [25]. ...
This study aims to examine how the activation of the role of nursee and professional identification as a nurse can influence moral judgments in terms of deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In Study 1, a priming technique was used to assess the impact of activating the nursing concept on moral reasoning. Participants were randomly assigned to either a nursing prime or neutral prime condition. By using a scrambled-sentence task, participants were prompted to think about nursing-related or neutral thoughts. Following the priming task, participants were asked to respond to 20 moral dilemmas. The process dissociation approach was employed to measure the degree of deontological and utilitarian tendencies in their moral reasoning. In Study 2, participants completed the nursing profession identification scale and the moral orientation scale before engaging in moral judgments similar to those in Study 1. The findings revealed that priming the concept of being a nursee resulted in an increase in deontological clinical inclinations while having no significant effect on utilitarian inclinations. Additionally, a positive correlation was observed between identification with the nursing profession and deontological clinical inclinations, whereas a negative correlation was found with utilitarian inclinations. Deliberation orientation acted as a complete mediator in the relationship between nursing professional identification and deontological tendencies and as a partial mediator for utilitarian tendencies.
... The dual-process model of moral judgment [18][19][20] states that there are two key psychological processes involved: affective processes and cognitive processes. Previous studies have demonstrated that a number of factors associated affective processes lead to more deontological thinking, and cognitive evaluation of outcomes is usually associated with utilitarian moral judgments [21][22][23][24][25][26]. ...
This study aims to examine how the activation of nursing roles and professional identification as a nurse can influence moral judgments in terms of deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In Study 1, a priming technique was used to assess the impact of activating the nursing concept on moral reasoning. Participants were randomly assigned to either a nursing prime or neutral prime condition. By using a scrambled-sentences task, participants were prompted to think about nursing-related or neutral thoughts. Following the priming task, participants were asked to respond to 20 moral dilemmas. The process dissociation approach was employed to measure the degree of deontological and utilitarian tendencies in their moral reasoning. In Study 2, participants completed the nursing profession identification scale and the moral orientation scale before engaging in moral judgments similar to those in Study 1. The findings revealed that priming the concept of nursing roles resulted in an increase in deontological clinical inclinations, while having no significant effect on utilitarian inclinations. Additionally, a positive correlation was observed between identification with the nursing profession and deontological clinical inclinations, whereas a negative correlation was found with utilitarian inclinations. Deliberation orientation acted as a complete mediator in the relationship between nursing professional identification and deontological tendencies, and as a partial mediator for utilitarian tendencies.
... Multinomial models have become increasingly popular as they allow to estimate the latent cognitive processes that underlie observable categorical behavioral data [e.g., 42,43,56,57 ]. The cooperation-and-punishment model used here has been successfully used to measure cooperation and punishment in previous studies [44][45][46] . ...
Do people punish others for defecting or for failing to conform to the majority? In two experiments, we manipulated whether the participants’ partners cooperated or defected in the majority of the trials of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The effects of this base-rate manipulation on cooperation and punishment were assessed using a multinomial processing tree model. High compared to low cooperation rates of the partners increased participants’ cooperation. When participants’ cooperation was not enforced through partner punishment, the participants’ cooperation was closely aligned to the cooperation rates of the partners. Moral punishment of defection increased when cooperation rates were high compared to when defection rates were high. However, antisocial punishment of cooperation when defection rates were high was much less likely than moral punishment of defection when cooperation rates were high. In addition, antisocial punishment was increased when cooperation rates were high compared to when defection rates were high. The latter two results contradict the assumption that people punish conformity-violating behavior regardless of whether the behavior supports or disrupts cooperation. Punishment is thus sensitive to the rates of cooperation and defection but, overall, the results are inconsistent with the idea that punishment primarily, let alone exclusively, serves to enforce conformity with the majority.
... On the one hand, two studies by Gawronski et al. (2017) found that cognitive load induced through a cognitively-taxing memorization task (versus an easier memorization task) increased general preference for inaction without affecting sensitivity to consequences and sensitivity to moral norms. On the other hand, Kroneisen and Steghaus (2021) found that time pressure reduced sensitivity to consequences without affecting general preference for inaction and sensitivity to moral norms. In a follow-up study, however, Kroneisen and Steghausen (2021) failed to obtain a significant effect of deliberation instructions on sensitivity to consequences, and instead found a significant positive association between individual differences in reactions times and sensitivity to moral norms. ...
Whereas norm-conforming (deontological) judgments have been claimed to be rooted in automatic emotional responses, outcome-maximizing (utilitarian) judgments are assumed to require reflective reasoning. Using the CNI model to disentangle factors underlying moral-dilemma judgments, the current research investigated effects of thinking about reasons on sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general action preferences. Three experiments (two preregistered) found that thinking about reasons (vs. responding intuitively or thinking about intuitions) reliably increased sensitivity to moral norms independent of processing time. Thinking about reasons had no reproducible effects on sensitivity to consequences and general action preferences. The results suggest that norm-conforming responses in moral dilemmas can arise from reflective thoughts about reasons, challenging the modal view on the role of cognitive reflection in moral-dilemma judgment. The findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between degree (high vs. low elaboration) and content (intuitions vs. reasons) as distinct aspects of cognitive reflection.
... As the CNI model overcomes the shortcomings of the dual-process model, it enables researchers to investigate issues pertaining to moral judgment from a new perspective. It has been applied in many studies, for example, on psychopathic traits (Li et al., 2020), internet addiction (Lu et al., 2022), decision-making time (Kroneisen & Steghaus, 2021), language use (Białek et al., 2019), and motivational differences (Cornwell & Bella, 2022). The CNI model is more suitable for inter-population comparisons (Gawronski et al., 2017), and a recent study has developed an extended dilemma battery that enables the CNI model to research individual differences in moral dilemma judgments (Körner et al., 2020). ...
Unlabelled:
Recently, researchers have proposed a polynomial model called the "consequences, norms, generalized inaction" (CNI) model for researching moral judgment. However, it is unclear whether the model can be used to explore cultural differences in moral judgment. In this study, we investigated the applicability of the CNI model of moral judgment to East Asian groups, and subsequently explored cultural and gender differences in moral judgment between East Asian (i.e., Japan, n = 211; China, n = 200) and Western (i.e., USA, n = 201) groups. The CNI model was proposed by Gawronski et al., and it can quantify individuals' sensitivity to moral consequence, sensitivity to moral norms, and their general preference for inaction or action in moral dilemmas. Our results indicate that the CNI model fits well for Japanese and Chinese individuals. Both East Asian women and Western women were significantly more sensitive to moral norms than men in their respective countries. In the international comparison, Westerners were more sensitive to moral norms. The Japanese groups, for both men and women, were most biased towards inaction. Regarding sensitivity towards consequences, no differences were observed in the comparison between Eastern and Western male groups, whereas poor sensitivity was observed among women. By using this new model, this study provides new insights into the differences of cultural and gender in moral judgment.
Supplementary information:
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04662-6.
... Gawronski et al. (2017, Study 2a, 2b) report similar resuls for I (and C): cognitive load (vs. a control task) resulted in higher values of I, but did not affect C and N . In contrast, Kroneisen & Steghaus (2021) report lower values of C in a time pressure group compared to a control group (I and N did not differ significantly between the two groups; Study 1), and no significant differences in any of the three parameters between an induced-reflection and induced-intuition group (Study 2). Based on this small body of studies, it is difficult to see any clear potential patterns. ...
A major question in moral psychology revolves around the role of deliberation or reflection in moral judgment. One common approach to investigating this question is to study the effect of cognitive-processing manipulations on moral judgment, which are experimental manipulations designed to either encourage participants to engage in reflection, or to inhibit their ability to reflect. Both psychologists and philosophers often appeal to studies of this sort to argue that reflection should, does or fails to make a significant contribution to moral judgment in many circumstances (often compared to a more intuitive type of processing).
This article presents the first systematic review of the psychological literature on the effect of cognitive-processing manipulations on moral judgments. I identified a total of 58 articles for inclusion, reporting results from 99 studies (total N = 19,341; M(N) = 199.4). Since a large majority of these studies involved moral judgments about acts or decisions in sacrificial moral dilemmas, the review is split in two parts. In the first part, I provide a narrative synthesis of studies that involved moral judgments about stimuli other than sacrificial dilemmas, organized by the area of morality that participants made moral judgments about. I then present a meta-analysis of the remaining 72 studies (N = 16,104; M(N) = 230.1), which all investigated the effect of cognitive-processing manipulations on moral judgments about acts or decisions in sacrificial moral dilemmas. While there was a small, significant pooled effect, when taking small- publication bias into account, this effect became indistinguishable from zero. I argue that these results do little to support the influential Dual Process Model of moral judgment.
To end, I discuss how the results of my review bear on several topics within moral philosophy, including moral rationalism and moral progress, and sketch a number of potential avenues for future research.
... Further analyses using the CNI model suggest that this negative relation is driven by a positive association between need for cognition and sensitivity to moral norms. A conceptually similar link has been found in studies using reaction times as an indicator of cognitive elaboration, showing that longer reaction times are associated with greater sensitivity to moral norms (Kroneisen & Steghaus, 2021). A potential explanation for the conflicting findings is that low plausibility of the dilemmas in prior research produces artificial associations that do not reflect genuine differences in moral preferences (see Körner et al., 2019). ...
In the current chapter, we illustrate the value of a mathematical modeling approach in understanding individual differences in moral dilemma judgments. Toward this end, we first explain the traditional approach to studying moral dilemma judgments and its limitations. We then describe the CNI model of moral decision-making (Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, & Hütter, 2017), which quantifies three determinants of moral dilemma judgments: (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral norms, and (3) general preference for inaction versus action. In the remainder of the chapter, we review research that has used the CNI model to investigate the nature of individual differences in moral dilemma judgments. Our central argument is that, by identifying individual differences along the three dimensions, research using the CNI model provides more nuanced insights into the roots of societal controversies about the right course of action in real-world dilemmas.
... Calculated parameters reflect the extent to which that response pattern reflects the prioritization of the concerns associated with one or more of these parameters, with higher numbers reflecting a greater prioritization. Using this model, researchers have found differences in these three parameters driven by differences in emotions (Gawronski et al., 2018), chronic stress (Zhang et al., 2018), decision time (Kroneisen & Steghaus, 2021), personality variables (Körner et al., 2020), and even foreign languages (Bialek et al., 2019). In spite of this increased attention and wide-ranging examination of this topic, we are not aware of any research examining the effects of differences in motivational orientations on the three dimensions of the CNI model. ...
Recent research on moral dilemmas has delineated preferences for utilitarian vs. deontological judgments along three parameters: sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to norms, and general preferences for inaction (Gawronski et al., 2017; Körner, et al., 2020). However, research has not yet determined whether motivational differences contribute to these three parameters in moral judgment. Across two studies, using regulatory mode theory, we demonstrate that a motivation to initiate and sustain smooth movement (locomotion), independent of a motive to engage in critical evaluation and reflection (assessment), is associated with greater sensitivity to norms in moral judgments. We demonstrate this association through both a chronic measure of individual differences (Study 1), and through a preregistered experimental induction (Study 2). Implications of our findings for moral judgment and motivation are discussed.
Temporary full-text link: https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1ens651f8l3eV
... Consistent with this idea, Baron and Goodwin (2020) argued that a bias against action is an explanation of deontological judgments rather than an alternative process. Although the CNI model's 12 Different from the effect of cognitive load in Gawronski et al.'s (2017) studies, Kroneisen and Steghaus (2021) found that time pressure reduced sensitivity to consequences on the CNI model's C parameter. However, this effect failed to replicate in a follow-up study reported in the same article. ...
Joshua Greene has argued that the empirical findings of cognitive science have implications for ethics. In particular, he has argued (1) that people's deontological judgments in response to trolley problems are strongly influenced by at least one morally irrelevant factor, personal force, and are therefore at least somewhat unreliable, and (2) that we ought to trust our consequentialist judgments more than our deontological judgments when making decisions about unfamiliar moral problems. While many cognitive scientists have rejected Greene's dual-process theory of moral judgment on empirical grounds, philosophers have mostly taken issue with his normative assertions. For the most part, these two discussions have occurred separately. The current analysis aims to remedy this situation by philosophically analyzing the implications of moral dilemma research using the CNI model of moral decision-making-a formalized, mathematical model that decomposes three distinct aspects of moral-dilemma judgments. In particular, we show how research guided by the CNI model reveals significant conceptual, empirical, and theoretical problems with Greene's dual-process theory, thereby questioning the foundations of his normative conclusions.
... For some decades, this class of models has also proven to be a useful tool for disentangling different component processes underlying moral judgements and behaviors and identifying different strategies underlying decision making (e.g. [57][58][59][60][61]. Computer programmes such as multiTree 62 are used to estimate model parameters from observable behavior categories to perform statistical tests on these parameters. ...
The present study serves to test whether cooperation and moral punishment are affected by cognitive load. Dual-process theories postulate that moral behavior is intuitive which leads to the prediction that cooperation and moral punishment should remain unaffected or may even increase when cognitive load is induced by a secondary task. However, it has also been proposed that cognitive control and deliberation are necessary to choose an economically costly but morally justified option. A third perspective implies that the effects of cognitive load may depend on the specific processes involved in social dilemmas. In the present study, participants played a simultaneous Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a punishment option. First, both players decided to cooperate or defect. Then they had the opportunity to punish the partners. In the cognitive-load group, cognitive load was induced by a continuous tone classification task while the no-load group had no distractor task. Under cognitive load, cooperation and moral punishment decreased in comparison to the no-load condition. By contrast, hypocritical and antisocial punishment were not influenced by the dual-task manipulation. Increased cognitive load was associated with a bias to punish the partners irrespective of the outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, suggesting that punishment was applied less purposefully in the cognitive-load condition. The present findings are thus in line with the idea that the availability of cognitive resources does not always have a suppressive effect on moral behaviors, but can have facilitating effects on cooperation and moral punishment.
Recent theoretical work has argued that moral psychology can be understood through the lens of “resource rational contractualism.” The view posits that the best way of making a decision that affects other people is to get everyone together to negotiate under idealized conditions. The outcome of that negotiation is an arrangement (or “contract”) that would lead to mutual benefit. However, this ideal is seldom (if ever) practical given the resource demands (time, information, computational processing power) that are required. Instead, the theory proposes that moral psychology is organized around a series of resource‐rational approximations of the contractualist ideal, efficiently trading off between more resource‐intensive, accurate mechanisms and less. This paper presents empirical evidence and a cognitive model that test a central claim of this view: when the stakes of the situation are high, then more resource‐intensive processes are engaged over more approximate ones. We present subjects with a case that can be judged using virtual bargaining —a resource‐intensive process that involves simulating what two people would agree to—or by simply following a standard rule. We find that about a third of our participants use the resource‐rational approach, flexibly switching to virtual bargaining in high‐stakes situations, but deploying the simple rule when stakes are low. A third of the participants are best modeled as consistently using the strict rule‐based approach and the remaining third as consistently using virtual bargaining. A model positing the reverse resource‐rational hypothesis (that participants use more resource‐intensive mechanisms in lower stakes situations) fails to capture the data.
Objectives: The psychology of moral decision-making classically contrasts utilitarianism (i.e., based on consequences) and deontology (i.e., based on moral norms). Previous studies capitalizing on this dichotomy have suggested the presence of a utilitarian bias among patients with severe alcohol use disorder (SAUD). We aimed to further disentangle the processes involved in such bias through a more validated approach, the CNI model of moral decision-making. This model allows to go further than the traditional approach by distinguishing sensitivity to consequences (C), to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction over action (I) in response to moral dilemmas.
Methods: Thirty-four recently detoxified patients with SAUD and 34 matched control participants completed a battery of 48 dilemmas derived from the CNI model, as well as social cognition tasks.
Results: In contrast with the utilitarian bias suggested in previous studies based on the traditional approach, patients with SAUD did not show an increased sensitivity to consequences in comparison with control participants. However, they showed a reduced sensitivity to moral norms, as well as a greater action tendency. These biases were not related to social cognition deficits.
Conclusions: Patients with SAUD are not more utilitarian than healthy controls, this previously reported bias being artificially generated by the methodological limits of the traditional approach. Instead, they present a reduced sensitivity to moral norms and an action bias, which might impact their interpersonal relations and contribute to the social isolation frequently reported in this population, thus identifying moral decision-making as a new therapeutic lever in SAUD.
Greene's influential dual-process model of moral cognition (mDPM) proposes that when people engage in Type 2 processing, they tend to make consequentialist moral judgments. One important source of empirical support for this claim comes from studies that ask participants to make moral judgments while experimentally manipulating Type 2 processing. This paper presents a meta-analysis of the published psychological literature on the effect of four standard cognitive-processing manipulations (cognitive load; ego depletion; induction; time restriction) on moral judgments about sacrificial moral dilemmas [n = 44; k = 68; total N = 14, 003; M(N) = 194.5]. The overall pooled effect was in the direction predicted by the mDPM, but did not reach statistical significance. Restricting the dataset to effect sizes from (high-conflict) personal sacrificial dilemmas (a type of sacrificial dilemma that is often argued to be best suited for tests of the mDPM) also did not yield a significant pooled effect. The same was true for a meta-analysis of the subset of studies that allowed for analysis using the process dissociation approach [n = 8; k = 12; total N = 2, 577; M(N) = 214.8]. I argue that these results undermine one important line of evidence for the mDPM and discuss a series of potential objections against this conclusion.
A large body of research has investigated responses to artificial scenarios (e.g., trolley problem) where maximizing beneficial outcomes for the greater good (utilitarianism) conflicts with adherence to moral norms (deontology). The CNI model is a computational model that quantifies sensitivity to consequences for the greater good ( C), sensitivity to moral norms ( N), and general preference for inaction versus action ( I) in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. Expanding on a description of the CNI model, the current article provides (a) a comprehensive review of empirical findings obtained with the CNI model, (b) an analysis of their theoretical implications, (c) a discussion of criticisms of the CNI model, and (d) an overview of alternative approaches to disentangle multiple factors underlying moral-dilemma responses and the relation of these approaches to the CNI model. The article concludes with a discussion of open questions and new directions for future research.
Public Abstract
How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.
Which social decisions are influenced by intuitive processes? Which by deliberative processes? The dual-process approach to human sociality has emerged in the last decades as a vibrant and exciting area of research. Yet a perspective that integrates empirical and theoretical work is lacking. This review and meta-analysis synthesizes the existing literature on the cognitive basis of cooperation, altruism, truth telling, positive and negative reciprocity, and deontology and develops a framework that organizes the experimental regularities. The meta-analytic results suggest that intuition favors a set of heuristics that are related to the instinct for self-preservation: people avoid being harmed, avoid harming others (especially when there is a risk of harm to themselves), and are averse to disadvantageous inequalities. Finally, this article highlights some key research questions to further advance our understanding of the cognitive foundations of human sociality.
Objective:
The current study aims to assess, for the first time, whether vaccination is predicted by different behavioral and cognitive aspects of moral decision-making.
Background:
Studies linking moral factors to vaccination have largely examined whether vaccination decisions can be explained by individual differences in the endorsement of various principles and norms central to deontology-based arguments in vaccination ethics. However, these studies have overlooked whether individuals prioritize norms over other considerations when making decisions, such as maximizing consequences (utilitarianism).
Method:
In a sample of 1492 participants, the current study assessed whether vaccination is explained by individual differences in three aspects of moral decision-making (consequence sensitivity, norm sensitivity, and action tendency), while also considering ethics position (idealism, relativism) and moral identity.
Results:
Supportive vaccination (vaccine uptake accompanied by a positive attitude toward vaccines) was associated with utilitarianism (increased consequence sensitivity) and increased tolerance to risks and harm toward others. Meanwhile, although those in the non-vaccinated group was associated with higher harm sensitivities, they neither supported nor received the COVID vaccines (when vaccines prevent harm from infection).
Conclusion:
Pro-vaccination messages may be made more effective by addressing perceptions of harms associated with vaccines and infections, respectively.
Previous research has provided ample evidence for an impact of language on moral dilemma judgments, suggesting higher willingness to sacrifice one person to save several others when the dilemma is presented in a foreign as opposed to the judge’s native language. In accordance with the dual-process model of moral judgment, the foreign language effect is frequently taken to indicate either decreased “deontological” norm-adherence or increased sensitivity to aggregate consequences of a decision. However, previous research has rarely investigated these supposed mechanisms directly. We applied a multinomial modeling approach to investigate the effect of language on endorsement of aggregate consequences, norm-endorsement, and inertia, while differentiating between low- and high-involvement scenarios. The results of two experiments indicate that foreign language reduces norm-endorsement. Moreover, results of an interaction analysis suggest that among high-involvement scenarios foreign language may also decrease inertia, relative to native language. Endorsement of aggregate consequences was unaffected by language. Our multinomial modeling approach thus indicates that theorizing on the foreign language effect should consider both norm-endorsement and inertia.
Previous research has demonstrated that people remember information that is (emotionally) incongruent to their expectations, but it has left open the question if this memory enhancement has also an influence on our later actions. We investigated this question in one pilot study and two experiments. In all studies, participants first interacted with trustworthy and untrustworthy looking partners in an investment game. Facial trustworthiness was manipulated to stimulate social expectations about the behavior of the partners. In a later second investment game, participants played against old opponents from the first game and new opponents. Overall, willingness to cooperate in the second game was influenced by the formerly behavior of the opponent. However, facial trustworthiness affected economic decisions, too. Furthermore, we analyzed source memory data that indicated no differences in memory between cheaters and cooperators. Instead, source guessing was related to cooperation: The more participants guessed that an untrustworthy looking face belonged to a cheater, the less they cooperated with untrustworthy looking opponents. Interestingly, in experiment 2, we found a positive correlation between old-new recognition and later cooperation. In sum, the results demonstrate that memory and guessing processes can influence later decisions. However, economic decisions are also heavily affected by other social expectations like facial trustworthiness.
In bottleneck models of overlapping-task performance, stimulus–response translation for secondary tasks is postponed until the primary response is selected. If this is so, then compatibility between the secondary and primary responses, or between the secondary response and the primary stimulus, should not affect primary-task performance. Yet such effects were demonstrated in 5 dual-task experiments combining primary manual and secondary vocal tasks: Pronounced effects of compatibility between the secondary and primary response and between the secondary response and primary stimulus were found on primary-task performance. The latter effect was also found with the lowest level of an extensive stimulus onset asynchrony variation, when the secondary task was not speeded, and even when the 2 tasks were performed on different trials. Findings suggest that secondary responses were activated before primary response selection was completed and thus support an automatic-translation hypothesis holding that, although eventual response selection may be serial, stimulus–response translation is performed in parallel.
Research on moral decision making usually focuses on two ethical principles: the principle of utilitarianism (= morality of an action is determined by its consequences) and the principle of deontology (= morality of an action is valued according to the adherence to moral norms regardless of the consequences). Criticism on traditional moral dilemma research includes the reproach that consequences and norms are confounded in standard paradigms. As a remedy, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences ( C), sensitivity to moral norms ( N), and general preference for inaction versus action ( I). In two studies, we examined the link of basic personality traits to moral judgments by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. As predicted, high Honesty–Humility was selectively associated with sensitivity for norms, whereas high Emotionality was selectively associated with sensitivity for consequences. However, Conscientiousness was not associated with a preference for inaction.
The Savage-Dickey density ratio is a simple method for computing the Bayes factor for an equality constraint on one or more parameters of a statistical model. In regression analysis, this includes the important scenario of testing whether one or more of the covariates have an effect on the dependent variable. However, the Savage-Dickey ratio only provides the correct Bayes factor if the prior distribution of the nuisance parameters under the nested model is identical to the conditional prior under the full model given the equality constraint. This condition is violated for multiple regression models with a Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow (JZS) prior, which is often used as a default prior in psychology. Besides linear regression models, the limitation of the Savage-Dickey ratio is especially relevant when analytical solutions for the Bayes factor are not available. This is the case for generalized linear models, nonlinear models, or cognitive process models with regression extensions. As a remedy, the correct Bayes factor can be computed using a generalized version of the Savage-Dickey density ratio.
Moral dilemmas typically entail directly causing harm (said to violate deontological ethics) to maximize overall outcomes (said to uphold utilitarian ethics). The dual process model suggests harm-rejection judgments derive from affective reactions to harm, whereas harm-acceptance judgments derive from cognitive evaluations of outcomes. Recently, Miller, Hannikainen, and Cushman (2014) argued that harm-rejection judgments primarily reflect self-focused—rather than other-focused—emotional responses, because only action aversion (self-focused reactions to the thought of causing harm), not outcome aversion (other-focused reactions to witnessing suffering), consistently predicted dilemma responses. However, they assessed only conventional relative dilemma judgments that treat harm-rejection and outcome-maximization responses as diametric opposites. Instead, we employed process dissociation to assess these response inclinations independently. In two studies (N = 558), we replicated Miller and colleagues’ findings for conventional relative judgments, but process dissociation revealed that outcome aversion positively predicted both deontological and utilitarian inclinations—which canceled out for relative judgments. Additionally, individual differences associated with affective processing—psychopathy and empathic concern—correlated with the deontology but not utilitarian parameter. Together, these findings suggest that genuine other-oriented moralized concern for others’ well-being contribute to both utilitarian and deontological response tendencies, but these tendencies nonetheless draw upon different psychological processes.
Recent research has relied on trolley-type sacrificial moral dilemmas to study utilitarian versus nonutilitarian modes of moral decision-making. This research has generated important insights into people’s attitudes toward instrumental harm—that is, the sacrifice of an individual to save a greater number. But this approach also has serious limitations. Most notably, it ignores the positive, altruistic core of utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-being of everyone, whether near or far. Here, we develop, refine, and validate a new scale—the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale—to dissociate individual differences in the ‘negative’ (permissive attitude toward instrumental harm) and ‘positive’ (impartial concern for the greater good) dimensions of utilitarian thinking as manifested in the general population. We show that these are two independent dimensions of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay population, each exhibiting a distinct psychological profile. Empathic concern, identification with the whole of humanity, and concern for future generations were positively associated with impartial beneficence but negatively associated with instrumental harm; and although instrumental harm was associated with subclinical psychopathy, impartial beneficence was associated with higher religiosity. Importantly, although these two dimensions were independent in the lay population, they were closely associated in a sample of moral philosophers. Acknowledging this dissociation between the instrumental harm and impartial beneficence components of utilitarian thinking in ordinary people can clarify existing debates about the nature of moral psychology and its relation to moral philosophy as well as generate fruitful avenues for further research.
Effects of incidental emotions on moral dilemma judgments have garnered interest because they demonstrate the context-dependent nature of moral decision-making. Six experiments (N = 727) investigated the effects of incidental happiness, sadness, and anger on responses in moral dilemmas that pit the consequences of a given action for the greater good (i.e., utilitarianism) against the consistency of that action with moral norms (i.e., deontology). Using the CNI model of moral decision-making, we further tested whether the three kinds of emotions shape moral dilemma judgments by influencing (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral norms, or (3) general preference for inaction versus action regardless of consequences and moral norms (or some combination of the three). Incidental happiness reduced sensitivity to moral norms without affecting sensitivity to consequences or general preference for inaction versus action. Incidental sadness and incidental anger did not show any significant effects on moral dilemma judgments. The findings suggest a central role of moral norms in the contribution of emotional responses to moral dilemma judgments, requiring refinements of dominant theoretical accounts and supporting the value of formal modeling approaches in providing more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments.
The backward crosstalk effect (BCE) in dual tasking means that characteristics of Task 2 of 2 subsequently performed tasks influence Task 1 performance. This observation indicates that certain features of the second response are already activated to some degree before the first response is selected. Therefore, the BCE challenges bottleneck models, which assume that Task 2 response selection does not begin until Task 1 response selection is finished. Instead, an extended model with a capacity-unlimited response activation stage prior to the bottleneck as the locus of the BCE was suggested. To determine the exact locus of the BCE within the stages of task processing, 5 experiments were carried out. Experiments 1 to 4 were psychological refractory period-like experiments with 3 subsequent tasks. A prebottleneck locus of the BCE was ruled out in Experiments 1 to 3 by using the locus of slack logic. Additionally, a postbottleneck locus of the BCE was ruled out in Experiment 4 by using the effect propagation logic. To further support this latter conclusion, Experiment 5 applied a go-signal manipulation. Taken together, the results of all 5 experiments strongly suggest that the BCE has its locus in the capacity-limited stage, which contradicts the widely accepted notion that a capacity-unlimited stage of response activation preceding response selection proper is the locus of the BCE.
Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models are a class of measurement models that account for categorical data by assuming a finite number of underlying cognitive processes. Traditionally, data are aggregated across participants and analyzed under the assumption of independently and identically distributed observations. Hierarchical Bayesian extensions of MPT models explicitly account for participant heterogeneity by assuming that the individual parameters follow a continuous hierarchical distribution. We provide an accessible introduction to hierarchical MPT modeling and present the user-friendly and comprehensive R package TreeBUGS, which implements the two most important hierarchical MPT approaches for participant heterogeneity − the beta-MPT (Smith & Batchelder, 2010) and the latent-trait MPT approach (Klauer, 2010). TreeBUGS reads standard MPT model files and obtains Markov chain Monte Carlo samples that approximate the posterior distribution. The functionality and output is tailored to the specific needs of MPT modelers and provides tests for the homogeneity of items and participants, individual and group parameter estimates, fit statistics, within- and between-subject comparisons, as well as goodness-of-fit and summary plots. We also propose and implement novel statistical extensions to include continuous and discrete predictors (either as fixed or random effects) in the latent-trait MPT model.
Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology—consequences and norms—are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinomial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions.
Do individuals intuitively favor certain moral actions over others? This study explores the role of intuitive thinking—induced by time pressure and cognitive load—in moral judgment and behavior. We conduct experiments in three different countries (Sweden, Austria, and the United States) involving over 1,400 subjects. All subjects responded to four trolley type dilemmas and four dictator games involving different charitable causes. Decisions were made under time pressure/time delay or while experiencing cognitive load or control. Overall we find converging evidence that intuitive states do not influence moral decisions. Neither time-pressure nor cognitive load had any effect on moral judgments or altruistic behavior. Thus we find no supporting evidence for the claim that intuitive moral judgments and dictator game giving differ from more reflectively taken decisions. Across all samples and decision tasks men were more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments and act selfishly compared to women, providing further evidence that there are robust gender differences in moral decision-making. However, there were no significant interactions between gender and the treatment manipulations of intuitive versus reflective decision-making.
Processing tree models offer a powerful research framework by which the contributions of cognitive processes to a task can be separated and quantified. The present article reviews a number of applications of processing tree models in the domain of social psychology in order to illustrate the steps to be taken in developing and validating a given model and applying it to the measurement and comparison of processes across experimental and quasi-experimental conditions. Process dissociation models are discussed as special cases of processing tree models. Crucial assumptions of processing tree models are considered and methods to overcome violations of such assumptions are reviewed. In addition to the application of processing tree models for the analysis of social and cognitive processes, their value is also discussed for the elicitation of truthful responses to socially sensitive questions.
In dual-task studies, Task 1 performance is often improved when Task 2 requires a spatially compatible response (i.e., 1 on the same side)-the backward crosstalk effect (BCE). This BCE is taken as evidence that at least some of the tasks' central processing related to response selection occurs in parallel, and the size of the BCE has been interpreted as an index of how well Task 1 is shielded against influences from the concurrent Task 2 processing. In 3 experiments, it is investigated whether the compatibility status of the previous trial influences the BCE similar to the Gratton effect observed for conflict tasks. In all experiments, the BCE was large after a compatible trial but absent (or reversed) after an incompatible trial, thus a Gratton-like sequential modulation of the BCE. This result suggests rapid bottom-up adjustments as a consequence of just-experienced incompatibility of responses. One explanation is that the degree of allowed parallel processing during Task 1 response selection is adjusted according to recent experience. (PsycINFO Database Record
Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models have become popular in cognitive psychology in the past two decades. In contrast to general-purpose data analysis techniques, such as log-linear models or other generalized linear models, MPT models are substantively motivated stochastic models for categorical data. They are best described as tools (a) for measuring the cognitive processes that underlie human behavior in various tasks and (b) for testing the psychological assumptions on which these models are based. The present article provides a review of MPT models and their applications in psychology, focusing on recent trends and developments in the past 10 years. Our review is nontechnical in nature and primarily aims at informing readers about the scope and utility of MPT models in different branches of cognitive psychology.
Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person. It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality, and thereby enable us to study the psychological and neural basis of utilitarian judgment. However, it has been previously shown that some sacrificial dilemmas fail to present a genuine contrast between utilitarian and deontological options. Here, I raise deeper problems for this research paradigm. Even when sacrificial dilemmas present a contrast between utilitarian and deontological options at a philosophical level, it is misleading to interpret the responses of ordinary folk in these terms. What is currently classified as "utilitarian judgment" does not in fact share essential features of a genuine utilitarian outlook, and is better explained in terms of commonsensical moral notions. When subjects deliberate about such dilemmas, they are not deciding between opposing utilitarian and deontological solutions, but engaging in a richer process of weighing opposing moral reasons. Sacrificial dilemmas therefore tell us little about utilitarian decision-making. An alternative approach to studying proto-utilitarian tendencies in everyday moral thinking is proposed.
A growing body of research has focused on so-called ‘utilitarian’ judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such ‘utilitarian’ judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between ‘utilitarian’ judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes, judgments and behaviors that either reflect or reject an impartial concern for the greater good of all. In Study 1, we found that rates of ‘utilitarian’ judgment were associated with a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context, as well as with sub-clinical psychopathy. In Study 2, we found that ‘utilitarian’ judgment was associated with greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. In Studies 3 and 4, we found no association between ‘utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit and unequivocal. This lack of association remained even when we controlled for the antisocial element in ‘utilitarian’ judgment. Taken together, these results suggest that there is very little relation between sacrificial judgments in the hypothetical dilemmas that dominate current research, and a genuine utilitarian approach to ethics.
According to the resource model of self-control, overriding one's predominant response tendencies consumes and temporarily depletes a limited inner resource. Over 100 experiments have lent support to this model of ego depletion by observing that acts of self-control at Time 1 reduce performance on subsequent, seemingly unrelated self-control tasks at Time 2. The time is now ripe, therefore, not only to broaden the scope of the model but to start gaining a precise, mechanistic account of it. Accordingly, in the current article, the authors probe the particular cognitive, affective, and motivational mechanics of self-control and its depletion, asking, "What is ego depletion?" This study proposes a process model of depletion, suggesting that exerting self-control at Time 1 causes temporary shifts in both motivation and attention that undermine self-control at Time 2. The article highlights evidence in support of this model but also highlights where evidence is lacking, thus providing a blueprint for future research. Though the process model of depletion may sacrifice the elegance of the resource metaphor, it paints a more precise picture of ego depletion and suggests several nuanced predictions for future research.
© The Author(s) 2012.
Dual-process theories of moral judgment suggest that responses to moral dilemmas are guided by two moral principles: the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming others is wrong regardless of its consequences); the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people). Despite the proposed independence of the moral inclinations reflecting these principles, previous work has relied on operationalizations in which stronger inclinations of one kind imply weaker inclinations of the other kind. The current research applied Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Study 1 confirmed the usefulness of process dissociation for capturing individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations, revealing positive correlations of both inclinations to moral identity. Moreover, deontological inclinations were uniquely related to empathic concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian inclinations were uniquely related to need for cognition. Study 2 demonstrated that cognitive load selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, with deontological inclinations being unaffected. In Study 3, a manipulation designed to enhance empathy increased deontological inclinations, with utilitarian inclinations being unaffected. These findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgments, resolving many theoretical ambiguities implied by previous research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
A two-systems model of moral judgment proposed by Joshua Greene
holds that deontological moral judgments (those based on simple rules concerning
action) are often primary and intuitive, and these intuitive judgments must be overridden
by reflection in order to yield utilitarian (consequence-based) responses. For
example, one dilemma asks whether it is right to push a man onto a track in order to
stop a trolley that is heading for five others. Those who favor pushing, the utilitarian
response, usually take longer to respond than those who oppose pushing. Greene’s
model assumes an asymmetry between the processes leading to different responses.
We consider an alternative model based on the assumption of symmetric conflict
between two response tendencies. By this model, moral dilemmas differ in the “difficulty”
of giving a utilitarian response and subjects differ in the “ability” (tendency) to
give such responses. (We could just as easily define ability in terms of deontological
responses, as the model treats the responses symmetrically.)We thus make an analogy
between moral dilemmas and tests of cognitive ability, and we apply the Rasch model,
developed for the latter, to estimate the ability-difficulty difference for each dilemma
for each subject. We apply this approach to five data sets collected for other purposes
by three of the co-authors. Response time (RT), including yes and no responses, is longestwhen difficulty and ability match, because the subject is indifferent between the
two responses, which also have the same RT at this point. When we consider yes/no
responses, RT is longest when the model predicts that the response is improbable.
Subjects with low ability take longer on the “easier” dilemmas, and vice versa.
Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models are a family of stochastic models for psychology and related sciences that can be used to model observed categorical frequencies as a function of a sequence of latent states. For the analysis of such models, the present article presents a platform-independent computer program called multiTree, which simplifies the creation and the analysis of MPT models. This makes them more convenient to implement and analyze. Also, multiTree offers advanced modeling features. It provides estimates of the parameters and their variability, goodness-of-fit statistics, hypothesis testing, checks for identifiability, parametric and nonparametric bootstrapping, and power analyses. In this article, the algorithms underlying multiTree are given, and a user guide is provided. The multiTree program can be downloaded from http://psycho3.uni-mannheim.de/multitree.
Traditional theories of moral psychology emphasize reasoning and "higher cognition," while more recent work emphasizes the role of emotion. The present fMRI data support a theory of moral judgment according to which both "cognitive" and emotional processes play crucial and sometimes mutually competitive roles. The present results indicate that brain regions associated with abstract reasoning and cognitive control (including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex) are recruited to resolve difficult personal moral dilemmas in which utilitarian values require "personal" moral violations, violations that have previously been associated with increased activity in emotion-related brain regions. Several regions of frontal and parietal cortex predict intertrial differences in moral judgment behavior, exhibiting greater activity for utilitarian judgments. We speculate that the controversy surrounding utilitarian moral philosophy reflects an underlying tension between competing subsystems in the brain.
The key insight behind the adaptive memory framework is that the primary function of re-membering is not to help us to relive the past but to inform adaptive behavior in the future. Howev-er, the beneficial effects of memory on the individual’s fitness are often difficult to study empirical-ly. In the case of social cooperation, it is comparatively easy to derive testable predictions about the relationship between specific types of memory (e.g., source memory) and specific types of adaptive decision making (e.g., direct reciprocity). In the present study, we examined both the participants’ behaviors in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game and their memory performance in a source-monitoring test. Participants showed evidence of adaptive decision making. Their willingness to cooperate was strongly determined by their partners’ behaviors in previous rounds. Individual parameter estimates of old-new recognition, source memory, and guessing were obtained via hierarchical multinomial processing tree modeling. Source memory was positively associated with adaptive decisions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The better participants’ source memory, the more often they cooperated with cooperators and the less often they cooperated with cheaters. Guessing in the memory test, by contrast, was unrelated to cooperation. The results underline the importance of source memory in adaptive decision making.
Researchers have used "sacrificial" trolley-type dilemmas (where harmful actions promote the greater good) to model competing influences on moral judgment: affective reactions to causing harm that motivate characteristically deontological judgments ("the ends don't justify the means") and deliberate cost-benefit reasoning that motivates characteristically utilitarian judgments ("better to save more lives"). Recently, Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, and Savulescu (2015) argued that sacrificial judgments reflect antisociality rather than "genuine utilitarianism," but this work employs a different definition of "utilitarian judgment." We introduce a five-level taxonomy of "utilitarian judgment" and clarify our longstanding usage, according to which judgments are "utilitarian" simply because they favor the greater good, regardless of judges' motivations or philosophical commitments. Moreover, we present seven studies revisiting Kahane and colleagues' empirical claims. Studies 1a-1b demonstrate that dilemma judgments indeed relate to utilitarian philosophy, as philosophers identifying as utilitarian/consequentialist were especially likely to endorse utilitarian sacrifices. Studies 2-6 replicate, clarify, and extend Kahane and colleagues' findings using process dissociation to independently assess deontological and utilitarian response tendencies in lay people. Using conventional analyses that treat deontological and utilitarian responses as diametric opposites, we replicate many of Kahane and colleagues' key findings. However, process dissociation reveals that antisociality predicts reduced deontological inclinations, not increased utilitarian inclinations. Critically, we provide evidence that lay people's sacrificial utilitarian judgments also reflect moral concerns about minimizing harm. This work clarifies the conceptual and empirical links between moral philosophy and moral psychology and indicates that sacrificial utilitarian judgments reflect genuine moral concern, in both philosophers and ordinary people.
Intentional forgetting of information that has recently been encoded is regarded an active and adaptive process and is widely studied using the item-method or the list-method directed forgetting (DF) paradigm. In the present research, we tested whether inter-individual differences in working-memory capacity (WMC), that have been identified as a relevant predictor of DF within the list-method, are also related to stronger DF effects within the item-method. Furthermore, we investigated relationships between WMC and item-method DF at different processing stages by applying the multinomial storage–retrieval model (Riefer & Rouder, 1992) hierarchically to our data. Results showed that individuals with high WMC are better able to store to-be-remembered information than individuals with low WMC; whereas WMC was not related to retrieval of to-be-remembered information or to either storage or retrieval of to-be-forgotten information. Implications for theoretical accounts of item-method DF are discussed.
The (generalized) sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of utilitarian moral judgment predicts that utilitarian responses often arise from a system-two correction of system-one deontological intuitions. Response-time (RT) results that seem to support this model are usually explained by the fact that low-probability responses have longer RTs. Following earlier results, we predicted response probability from each subject’s tendency to make utilitarian responses (A, “Ability”) and each dilemma’s tendency to elicit deontological responses (D, “Difficulty”), estimated from a Rasch model. At the point where A = D, the two responses are equally likely, so probability effects cannot account for any RT differences between them. The sequential two-system model still predicts that many of the utilitarian responses made at this point will result from system-two corrections of system-one intuitions, hence should take longer. However, when A = D, RT for the two responses was the same, contradicting the sequential model. Here we report a meta-analysis of 26 data sets, which replicated the earlier results of no RT difference overall at the point where A = D. The data sets used three different kinds of moral judgment items, and the RT equality at the point where A = D held for all three. In addition, we found that RT increased with A–D. This result holds for subjects (characterized by Ability) but not for items (characterized by Difficulty). We explain the main features of this unanticipated effect, and of the main results, with a drift-diffusion model.
The distinction between utilitarianism and deontology has become a prevailing framework for conceptualizing moral judgment. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the morality of an action depends on its outcomes. In contrast, the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on its consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, research in psychology and neuroscience has investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley dilemma). However, the interpretation of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the defining aspects of utilitarianism and deontology, outcomes and norms, are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming distorts interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that overcomes the limitations of the traditional paradigm.
Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontological) subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task.
Self-control refers to the mental processes that allow people to override thoughts and emotions, thus enabling behavior to vary adaptively from moment to moment. Dominating contemporary research on this topic is the viewpoint that self-control relies upon a limited resource, such that engaging in acts of restraint depletes this inner capacity and undermines subsequent attempts at control (i.e., ego depletion). Noting theoretical and empirical problems with this view, here we advance a competing model that develops a non-resource-based account of self-control. We suggest that apparent regulatory failures reflect the motivated switching of task priorities as people strive to strike an optimal balance between engaging cognitive labor to pursue “have-to” goals versus preferring cognitive leisure in the pursuit of “want-to” goals.
Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models are theoretically motivated stochastic models for the analysis of categorical data. Here we focus on a crossed-random effects extension of the Bayesian latent-trait pair-clustering MPT model. Our approach assumes that participant and item effects combine additively on the probit scale and postulates (multivariate) normal distributions for the random effects. We provide a WinBUGS implementation of the crossed-random effects pair-clustering model and an application to novel experimental data. The present approach may be adapted to handle other MPT models.
The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title.
Multinomial processing tree models are widely used in many areas of psychology. A hierarchical extension of the model class
is proposed, using a multivariate normal distribution of person-level parameters with the mean and covariance matrix to be
estimated from the data. The hierarchical model allows one to take variability between persons into account and to assess
parameter correlations. The model is estimated using Bayesian methods with weakly informative hyperprior distribution and
a Gibbs sampler based on two steps of data augmentation. Estimation, model checks, and hypotheses tests are discussed. The
new method is illustrated using a real data set, and its performance is evaluated in a simulation study.
Keywordsmultinomial processing tree models-hierarchical models-Gibbs sampler
An encompassing prior (EP) approach to facilitate Bayesian model selection for nested models with inequality constraints has been previously proposed. In this approach, samples are drawn from the prior and posterior distributions of an encompassing model that contains an inequality restricted version as a special case. The Bayes factor in favor of the inequality restriction then simplifies to the ratio of the proportions of posterior and prior samples consistent with the inequality restriction. This formalism has been applied almost exclusively to models with inequality or “about equality” constraints. It is shown that the EP approach naturally extends to exact equality constraints by considering the ratio of the heights for the posterior and prior distributions at the point that is subject to test (i.e., the Savage–Dickey density ratio). The EP approach generalizes the Savage–Dickey ratio method, and can accommodate both inequality and exact equality constraints. The general EP approach is found to be a computationally efficient procedure to calculate Bayes factors for nested models. However, the EP approach to exact equality constraints is vulnerable to the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox, the consequences of which warrant careful consideration.
Do moral judgments hinge on the time available to render them? According to a recent dual-process model of moral judgment, moral dilemmas that engage emotional processes are likely to result in fast deontological gut reactions. In contrast, consequentialist responses that tot up lives saved and lost in response to such dilemmas would require cognitive control to override the initial response. Cognitive control, however, takes time. In two experiments, we manipulated the time available to arrive at moral judgments in two ways: by allotting a fixed short or large amount of time, and by nudging people to answer swiftly or to deliberate thoroughly. We found that faster responses indeed lead to more deontological responses among those moral dilemmas in which the killing of one to save many necessitates manhandling an innocent person and in which this action is depicted as a means to an end. Thus, our results are the first demonstration that inhibiting cognitive control through manipulations of time alters moral judgments.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), filósofo alemán. Realizó estudios de Física y Matemáticas y ejerció la docencia en lógica y metafísica en la Universidad de Königsberg. Con sus planteamientos inauguró una nueva teoría del conocimiento y una nueva moral. En la presente obra plantea los fundamentos de su sistema ético que se basa en la idea de que la razón es la autoridad última de la moral, pues lo que cuenta en sí no son los hechos, sino el motivo del actuar.
The long-standing rationalist tradition in moral psychology emphasizes the role of reason in moral judgment. A more recent trend places increased emphasis on emotion. Although both reason and emotion are likely to play important roles in moral judgment, relatively little is known about their neural correlates, the nature of their interaction, and the factors that modulate their respective behavioral influences in the context of moral judgment. In two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using moral dilemmas as probes, we apply the methods of cognitive neuroscience to the study of moral judgment. We argue that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment. These results may shed light on some puzzling patterns in moral judgment observed by contemporary philosophers.
We review a current and popular class of cognitive models called multinomial processing tree (MPT) models. MPT models are simple, substantively motivated statistical models that can be applied to categorical data. They are useful as data-analysis tools for measuring underlying or latent cognitive capacities and as simple models for representing and testing competing psychological theories. We formally describe the cognitive structure and parametric properties of the class of MPT models and provide an inferential statistical analysis for the entire class. Following this, we provide a comprehensive review of over 80 applications of MPT models to a variety of substantive areas in cognitive psychology, including various types of human memory, visual and auditory perception, and logical reasoning. We then address a number of theoretical issues relevant to the creation and evaluation of MPT models, including model development, model validity, discrete-state assumptions, statistical issues, and the relation between MPT models and other mathematical models. In the conclusion, we consider the current role of MPT models in psychological research and possible future directions.
Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.
Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.
Most people consider it morally acceptable to redirect a trolley that is about to kill five people to a track where the trolley would kill only one person. In this situation, people seem to follow the guidelines of utilitarianism by preferring to minimize the number of victims. However, most people would not consider it moral to have a visitor in a hospital killed to save the lives of five patients who were otherwise going to die. We conducted two experiments in which we pinpointed a novel factor behind these conflicting intuitions. We show that moral intuitions are influenced by the locus of the intervention in the underlying causal model. In moral dilemmas, judgments conforming to the prescriptions of utilitarianism are more likely when the intervention influences the path of the agent of harm (e.g., the trolley) than when the intervention influences the path of the potential patient (i.e., victim).
No Abstract Provided Psychology
Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.
SoSci Survey (Version 3.2.00) [Computer software
- D J Leiner
Leiner, D. J. (2019). SoSci Survey (Version 3.2.00) [Computer software].