ArticlePDF Available

Role of Intermediaries in Shaping Climate Finance in Developing Countries—Lessons from the Green Climate Fund

Authors:

Abstract and Figures

Social scientists are increasingly interested in the processes that give shape to global policy solutions. I investigate the issues of intermediation and the role of intermediaries in climate finance. I use the case of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), a new consortium for dedicated funding set up under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to assist developing countries in responding to climate threats, to ask a fundamental question: What role do intermediaries (GCF-accredited and related entities) play in catalysing climate action through climate finance in these countries? This paper offers three propositions focused on the role of intermediaries in the GCF, and tests these using data from the GCF and the wider literature. The results show a growing dominance of international intermediaries in GCF project development and implementation, the low capacity of national intermediaries to conceive and scale projects, and the mismatch between planned and actual funding allocations. Collectively, these outcomes derail the GCF from its core objectives of promoting country ownership of projects, building capacity of local intermediaries, and equitable allocation of funding between mitigation and adaptation. I offer three learning models to help the GCF and intermediaries capitalise on the early lessons from GCF activities and to scale climate finance effectively in developing countries.
Content may be subject to copyright.
sustainability
Article
Role of Intermediaries in Shaping Climate Finance
in Developing Countries—Lessons from the Green
Climate Fund
Abrar Chaudhury
Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1HP, UK; abrar.chaudhury@sbs.ox.ac.uk or
abrarchaudhury@gmail.com; Tel.: +44-(0)-786-1478411
Received: 4 June 2020; Accepted: 6 July 2020; Published: 8 July 2020


Abstract:
Social scientists are increasingly interested in the processes that give shape to global policy
solutions. I investigate the issues of intermediation and the role of intermediaries in climate finance.
I use the case of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), a new consortium for dedicated funding set up under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to assist developing
countries in responding to climate threats, to ask a fundamental question: What role do intermediaries
(GCF-accredited and related entities) play in catalysing climate action through climate finance in
these countries? This paper oers three propositions focused on the role of intermediaries in the
GCF, and tests these using data from the GCF and the wider literature. The results show a growing
dominance of international intermediaries in GCF project development and implementation, the low
capacity of national intermediaries to conceive and scale projects, and the mismatch between planned
and actual funding allocations. Collectively, these outcomes derail the GCF from its core objectives of
promoting country ownership of projects, building capacity of local intermediaries, and equitable
allocation of funding between mitigation and adaptation. I oer three learning models to help the
GCF and intermediaries capitalise on the early lessons from GCF activities and to scale climate finance
eectively in developing countries.
Keywords:
intermediaries; climate finance; Green Climate Fund; climate change; learning models;
developing countries
1. Introduction
The role of intermediaries in catalysing climate finance is gaining recognition in global policy
and practice space. Climate change, with its global policy and science agenda but local country-level
activities, has been an ideal setting for climate finance intermediaries that sit between these two worlds
to emerge and enable action. Formally, intermediaries are actors that bring together or link two or more
actors in activities that would not otherwise have materialised [
1
]. Building on Parag and Janda [
2
],
in this paper, I treat intermediaries as middle actors that sit between global climate finance institutions
and nation-states, as well as between climate finance and implementation, and play a crucial function
in bridging the implementation gap in developing countries. These intermediaries are a broad array of
international, public, private, and civil-society actors.
Scholarship on intermediaries points to the critical roles they play in large-scale initiatives like
market creation, innovation, policy ecacy, and implementation [
3
,
4
]. Intermediaries often help to
manage and fill critical voids by providing information, standards, and solutions [
5
7
]. In particular,
the literature on intermediaries highlights three recognised roles: Intermediaries work as brokers
between distributed policy actors [
8
,
9
]; they bridge between key constituents and stakeholders [
10
,
11
];
and they diuse knowledge and information for others and themselves [
12
,
13
], oering structural
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507; doi:10.3390/su12145507 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 2 of 17
connections among disparate actors [
14
]. This work often involves codifying information, creating
standards, and building procedures and metrics in these emerging spaces. International development
scholarship oers a comparable approach to governance, referred to as ‘orchestration’ to shape action
of intermediaries on a voluntary basis [
7
,
15
]. In this paper, I consider a wider role for intermediaries
as system builders [
16
], shaping climate change policy and implementation spaces and building
the capacities of developing countries to achieve climate finance readiness, i.e., planning, accessing,
innovating, delivering, and monitoring climate finance activities. I use the case of the Green Climate
Fund (GCF), a new consortium for dedicated climate funding set up under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to ask a fundamental research question:
What role do intermediaries in the GCF play in shaping global climate finance activities in developing
countries? Answering this question is important for understanding how climate activities are funded
and implemented and, in turn, how these shape the landscape of climate change, both nationally
and globally.
The GCF represents a nascent funding scheme with a transitional policy and operational structure.
It acknowledges that the aims of national governments and their agencies are realised with diculty
through earlier policy initiatives, such as versions of national climate policy plans. I focus on the
ways that intermediaries ‘translate’ and support local implementation and, at the same time, remain
attentive to the expectations of international and national agencies. In the GCF, intermediaries are a
deliberate introduction to promote country ownership, reduce transaction costs of direct involvement
by the GCF in local activities, promote equitable and balanced distribution of funding, set up a
mechanism of accountability and transparency, and develop local implementation capabilities. I take
an interdisciplinary approach, bringing together work from the fields of climate change, management
theory, and policy, and supported by secondary data to study the role of climate finance intermediaries.
I develop three propositions to examine the intermediaries, backed by a broad understanding of
the types of intermediaries that have appeared in the GCF domain, the roles these play in shaping
emerging climate finance spaces, and the challenges they confront. I highlight the proposition that the
current approach and design of the GCF will reinforce the historically dominant role of international
intermediaries, limit the capabilities of national intermediaries to take local ownership, and widen
the gap between adaptation and mitigation funding. This is contrary to the core objectives of the
GCF in promoting country ownership, enhancing the capacity of local intermediaries to lead projects,
and equitable allocation of funding. I oer a way forward to overcome these challenges and stay true
to the founding principles of the GCF.
The paper begins with describing the methodology of the research. I next map the landscape of
climate finance, followed by the key developments in the GCF. I identify the key roles of intermediaries
in the GCF and introduce and analyse three propositions on the role of intermediaries in the GCF.
This approach provides a framework for analysis of variation in key features of intermediaries,
distribution of intermediary types, and their activities in developing countries. The paper concludes
with a brief discussion and oers three learning models to help the GCF and intermediaries capitalise on
early lessons from the GCF’s activities and to scale climate finance eectively in developing countries.
2. Materials and Methods
I employed a mixed-method case study approach to study intermediaries [
17
19
]. The GCF is
new, so there is a dearth of published literature on the GCF and climate finance in general. I relied on
the GCF’s website and its data portal (https://www.greenclimate.fund) as the primary data source on
the intermediaries, covering accredited national, regional, and international entities and executing
agencies, approved projects, concept notes, country profiles, minutes of board meetings, and GCF
reports. The GCF’s website and data portal is considered a reliable data source for this research,
as it is an ocial UN body and oers current data on the GCF’s governance and funding activities,
including access to live transmissions of board meetings for public consumption. Independent observers
participate in the board meetings, and meeting documents are shared with the public as well as with
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 3 of 17
board members. The GCF data source is supplemented with archival material, public records,
published literature, grey literature, secondary data sources and limited interviews, and, informed by
my expertise, experience and professional networks. To study the role of intermediaries in climate
funding, I developed three propositions that originate from the challenges in the GCF, supported by
literature. The propositions allow for examining critical questions on the intermediaries and form a
strong basis for inquiry [20].
3. Landscape of Climate Finance
Climate change carries huge global costs, with estimates ranging well over hundreds of billions of
dollars annually [
21
24
], rising to trillions by the mid-century as increased droughts, flooding, and crop
failures hamper growth and infrastructure [
25
]. Despite having contributed little to climate change,
developing countries are hardest hit by these changes owing to their geographic location, reliance on
resources sensitive to climate change, such as agriculture and aquaculture, and their low adaptive
capacity [
26
,
27
]. Already burdened with huge development deficits, developing countries are unable
to meet these additional costs, making climate action eorts challenging without appropriate financial
support [21,28].
Nations have not yet agreed upon a formal distinction between climate finance and general
development assistance, but a consensus is emerging on climate finance as those resources needed
specifically to meet the costs of supporting climate action [
24
]. Debates on global climate finance have
historically been anchored on the principle of “common but dierentiated responsibility and respective
capabilities (CBDR)” introduced through Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration of 1992. The CBDR principle
implies that while all countries share and bear common responsibility for the environment, developed
countries have historically placed additional pressures on the environment to develop and command
higher levels of economic, social, and technological capital. The developed countries should thus share
greater liability and compensate developing countries for the disproportionate adverse impacts of
climate change they face [
29
,
30
]. Using the CBDR principle, the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement
called upon developed countries to ramp up financial assistance to the developing countries, which are
more vulnerable and financially weak.
A number of climate finance initiatives under the UNFCCC, preceding the GCF, have set the
groundwork formalising the GCF mechanism. The Global Environment Facility was the first in the
series of funds, established in the 1992 Rio Earth Summit to serve as the operating entity for the
formal mechanism for managing climate finance. The Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special
Climate Change Fund were established in the 2001 Conference of the Parties (COP) 7 in Marrakesh
to provide dedicated and immediate funding to address the special needs of the most vulnerable
countries. The Adaptation Fund was set up in 2010 under the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC for
climate adaptation and resilience measures. The fund is primarily financed through 2% of the proceeds
of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) issued under the Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism
projects and donor funding. Reliant on the CERs, the fund has suered from low carbon prices and
has to rely on external funding to stay afloat. The fund has pioneered the mechanism of working
directly with national entities through a detailed accreditation process, laying the foundation and
oering valuable insight for the direct accreditation mechanism adopted by the GCF [
31
]. This entailed
a significant shift by the fund from working exclusively with international institutions to engaging
national entities. The Climate Funds Update 2019 and Climate Policy Initiative 2019 [
32
,
33
] oer a
comprehensive overview of the global climate finance landscape.
The formal financing mechanism of the UNFCCC has had mixed success. While these funds have
paved a way for setting up a formal mechanism for developing countries to access climate finance under
global commitments, the scale of financing has been underwhelming. With rising funding demands
from vulnerable countries in the face of increasing climatic impacts and ever-increasing prospects of
developed countries backing away from their commitments (e.g., the United States pulling out of the
COP funding commitment) in the face of the current health crisis and global economic downturn,
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 4 of 17
there is a greater need for transparency in funding allocation to the vulnerable in an equitable way.
With the introduction of the GCF as the central UNFCCC funding mechanism, the role of the other
funds is diminishing.
Outside the UNFCCC structures, there is a growing volume of climate finance managed by
the multilateral development banks, such as the Climate Investment Funds, Clean Technology
Fund, and the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience led by the World Bank. Many multilaterals,
bilateral, and country institutions also manage their independent climate funds, although the data
on the funding commitments and disbursements are often lacking. Reinsberg et al. (2020) and the
World Bank (2018) [
34
,
35
] oer detailed reviews of climate finance and trust funds at multilateral
development banks. A new wave of finance is also emerging through innovative partnerships
between private-sector fund managers and public entities. The Climate Finance Partnership (CFP)
(https://www.afd.fr/en/actualites/blackrock-climate-finance-partnership) is an example of a blended
finance partnership between the world’s largest asset manager—BlackRock—and philanthropists and
governments, including France and Germany. The CFP will be a 1 billion USD fund, with the first
100 million USD secured by the governments to catalyse and reduce the risks from institutional capital
in climate change. Finally, we are seeing rapid growth in sustainable, responsible, and impactful
investing through dedicated private-sector investment funds with climate change as a key focus issue.
4. The Green Climate Fund
The GCF was conceived in 2010 at the COP 16 in Cancun by the Parties as the designated operating
entity for the financial mechanism under Article 11 of the UNFCCC. It took another five years for
the fund to became fully operational in 2015 after several rounds of negotiations on the operational
modalities and the funding commitments. While the GCF is accountable to the Parties under the Paris
Agreement, it is an autonomous entity with its independent secretariat and board of directors housed
in South Korea. The GCF is fundamentally a partnership body mandated to take a country-driven
approach through its partner entities to deploy climate funding in developing countries. It does not
directly implement projects, and operates through intermediaries for implementation on the ground.
The World Bank acts as a trustee to the fund.
Among the many objectives of the GCF, three critical aspects distinguish the fund from other
climate financing initiatives and global institutions. First, the GCF is governed through equal
representation by developed and developing countries in its 24 board seats, with co-chairs from each
of the two blocks, oering balanced ownership over the functionality and funding decisions of the
GCF. This addressed the long-standing demand from developing countries for ownership and a move
away from the historical control of international institutions, such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, in local aairs. Second, the GCF has committed to equal funding distribution between
mitigation and adaptation activities, and at least 50% of the adaptation funding is committed to the
Least Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States, and African countries. This commitment
was made to address the lack of attention to adaptation funding, with a huge skew of global funding
towards mitigation. Finally, the GCF mobilises project funds through a direct access mechanism,
where countries can directly access GCF project funding through national and sub-national entities
accredited by the fund. The accreditation mechanism builds on the accreditation and direct access
approach developed by the Adaptation Fund with the aim of empowering developing countries to
take ownership of local priorities and move away from international organisations’ historical role
as project administrators. The role of global international and regional development institutions is
still prevalent in the GCF under the distinct category of regional and international accredited entities.
The role of the accredited entities as intermediaries is the main focus in the remainder of this paper.
The GCF’s initial funding came from 43 countries (including a few regions and cities) that pledged
a total of 10.3 billion USD to the fund during its initial resource mobilisation (IRM) process in 2014.
To date (https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/resource-mobilisation/irm) a total of 7.2 billion USD has
been available for commitment during the IRM period through formal agreements with the pledged
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 5 of 17
countries. The dierence between the pledged and available amounts represents a loss on exchange
dierences and, most significantly, non-payment by the United States of 2 billion USD of its pledged
3 billion USD commitment following its intentions to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2017.
The squeezed funding has created operational, funding, and governance challenges in the GCF [
36
].
Of the total pledged amount, 5.6 billion USD has been allocated to projects approved by the GCF board,
with projects worth 2.8 billion USD under active implementation. With significant amounts from the
IRM committed to the projects, the first replenishment process has been triggered by the GCF to collect
funds for the next 3–5 years from developed countries.
Despite the fund’s initial enthusiasm and success as the largest formal mechanism for climate
funding, it has faced a myriad of challenges [
37
]. These range from demand for project funding
outstripping availability, lower commitment of funds from the developed countries, unequal allocation
of funding between adaptation and mitigation activities, a stringent process for accreditation of
national entities and their lower capacity to meet the extensive funding covenants, and skewed
allocation of projects and funding to international entities. These growing challenges came to their
head in the 20
th
Board meeting of the fund in 2018, where the developed and developing countries
clashed on many issues. This resulted in a stalemate with no decision-making, halting progress
on project and accreditation approvals [
38
]. The Executive Director stepped down, creating a void
in the leadership and signalling to the world about the growing division within the fund between
the developed and developing countries’ approaches. Much of this divide was attributed to the
growing mistrust between the developed and developing countries, with the latter complaining
that their priorities were not properly addressed by the GCF, especially on fund eligibility and
country ownership. Developed countries’ board members, on the other hand, were focused on
improving financial leverage, private-sector engagement, and cost eectiveness of financing [
38
].
With the arrival of the new Executive Director, renewed eorts are in place to bridge the divide
and oer a clearer strategic plan for the GCF for 2020–2023 [
39
]. Several countries have also
stepped forward to fill the funding void left by the United States in the first replenishment, with
Germany and Norway doubling their initial contributions. According to the latest figures by the
GCF (https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/resource-mobilisation/gcf-1), pledges of 3.41 billion USD
have been confirmed, representing a third of the total replenishment amount announced by dierent
countries. Despite strong support—notably by EU states, Japan, and the UK—the total funding
pledges remain similar to those of the IRM and require stronger ambition from countries to tackle
the rising threats of climate change in developing countries. Significantly, improving these growing
governance issues within the fund is necessary to spur action and ensure the continuity of the funding
mechanism [36].
GCF Accreditation Architecture
One distinct aspect of the GCF’s architecture is its accreditation and direct access mechanism
for funding. Under this architecture, the GCF oers project funding directly to developing countries
through entities that have been accredited by the fund, known as accredited entities (AEs). These AEs
are categorised as national, regional, and international, and cover a range from multilateral, bilateral,
public, private, and civil-society entities. The entities are nominated for accreditation by their host
country’s National Designated Authority (NDA) or focal point, and, in the case of international entities,
directly by the GCF. The project funding is given through financial instruments of grants, loans,
guarantees, and equity. Grant and loan instruments make up the bulk of GCF funding so far.
To date, 116 entities have submitted applications seeking accreditation, of which 95 entities
were approved, comprising 43 national entities (45%), 13 regional entities (14%), and 39 international
entities (41%). Out of these, 18 are from the private sector, highlighting the GCF’s push to improve
private-sector engagement. With the GCF’s limited capacity for accrediting entities, a growing number
of national applicants, a complex registration system, and a lack of transparency, delays are inevitable
in delivering climate funding to developing countries [
37
]. An inadvertent outcome of the GCF’s focus
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 6 of 17
on country ownership has been a surge of government entities as national AEs, as climate change is a
public-led challenge in many developing countries. The engagement of government AEs in disbursing
funding is likely to perpetuate existing local social, economic, and political structural challenges to the
GCF-funded climate projects [40].
The GCF has taken some concrete steps to overcome these challenges. It oers funding of 1.5 million
USD under its Readiness Programme to prepare national entities for accreditation. The programme
has supported 21 entities for GCF accreditation and 24 concept and project proposals. A fast-track
accreditation process is also available, but with limited scope.
5. Intermediaries in the GCF
I examine how intermediaries in the GCF shape climate action. While the GCF oers detailed
guidelines for accrediting intermediary entities and their categorisation (as national, regional,
or international, or by size of funding and type of activities), “the literature as a whole lacks clarity in
how intermediation is defined, where it begins and ends, and where interaction in general becomes
intermediation” [
1
]. Building on the definitions in the introduction, I define intermediaries to be formal
AEs and other entities that are directly or indirectly involved in the GCF’s projects, covering project
funders, designers, planners, implementers, consultants, and advisers. There are also a range of actors
that operate outside the GCF’s formal structures and influence the climate funding landscape, including
advisory firms, investment outfits, research organisations, and academic institutions. Overall, these
intermediaries act as a conduit for conceiving, developing, planning, implementing, and governing
climate projects funded by the GCF in developing countries. For the remainder of the research, I use
the term intermediaries to encompass AEs and other entities, unless otherwise specified.
While the functional categorisation of intermediaries is useful in identifying the spectrum of
entities, it oers a limited view of their role in the GCF and climate finance in general. Building on
Howells (2006), I propose four main roles of intermediaries in the GCF as (1) information providers,
(2) brokers, (3) concept and project designers, and (4) project implementers. These roles are important
to understand how intermediaries operate, influence and shape projects, and, in turn, set the tone of
how climate action is understood and implemented in developing countries.
5.1. Intermediaries as Information Providers
Intermediaries in this role provide information to translate the complex GCF funding mechanism,
but are not directly involved in the GCF’s activities per se. They oer information, data, and analysis
on the GCF’s activities and projects to parties that may be interested in the GCF and for wider
public consumption. Their aim is to become the key information source for interested parties on the
GCF’s developments and updates, and to oer helpful feedback for improving the overall funding
process. Development organisations, research institutions, consulting firms, think tanks, NGOs,
and government entities dominate this role. The GCF also encourages the information provider role
by requiring countries to nominate an NDA to act as the focal point for the GCF’s country activities.
The NDAs dier from AEs in that they are nominated by the governments to oer information and
have oversight on the GCF projects without going through a rigorous accreditation approval process.
Typically, NDAs are relevant ministries that oversee climate projects. The information intermediaries
play an important role in drawing attention to climate challenges and funding opportunities that
address these challenges, and, in turn, influence the focus of climate activities in countries.
5.2. Intermediaries as Brokers
To address the complex and distributed challenge of climate change, a larger collaboration needs
to emerge to find a solution. Intermediaries, as brokers, play an active role beyond oering information
to provide a platform and broker connections for collaboration [
3
,
4
]. These intermediaries are a bridge
between parties where direct interaction is dicult due to high transaction costs (e.g., locating a
suitable partner to collaborate with) or due to communication gaps arising from dierences in culture,
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 7 of 17
interests, and capacity to absorb or exchange knowledge [
2
,
6
]. The role is purely transactional and
ceases once the connection is made through a formal agreement between the parties. Specialised
investment advisory firms, consulting firms, and financial institutions are prominent in the broker
role, helping set up project consortiums and facilitating the funding application process for the GCF in
exchange for a fee. AEs also play the broker role because all the GCF applications have to go through
the AEs formally, whether the AEs participate in the transaction or not. Many AEs actively identify
parties and projects for the GCF, although the flow of projects and capacity of local parties remain a
challenge in developing countries. The intermediaries play an important role in creating enthusiasm
for country climate action, identifying projects attractive to the GCF, and connecting actors to take
these project ideas forward, thus influencing country climate activities in turn.
5.3. Intermediaries as Concept and Project Designers
Where there is lack of clarity of concept or action in the interaction, the intermediary can play
an important role in conception and design [
4
]. In tackling climate change, the actions and actors
necessary for robustness are not always apparent. Important expertise is invariably spread across
several actors to bring sucient funding knowledge and operational know-how for success, which
requires a pragmatic and participatory approach [
41
]. The conception and project design intermediaries
perform activities not only as service providers, facilitators, or brokers of someone else’s knowledge,
but also as architects, co-creators, and enablers of collective knowledge creation [
4
]. Examples of
such concept and design intermediaries include niche platforms, consulting firms, project design
firms, and advisory firms that bring the right actors into the room to co-innovate and facilitate the
concept and design process, thus creating new opportunities and ideas [
42
]. The lack of a credible and
sustainable project pipeline is a shared challenge across all developing countries, as these countries
still lack capacity and innovation in climate projects, which need support with rigorous scientific input,
balanced with local needs. The AEs play an important role in designing projects, as they sit between
the GCF and a country’s priorities. National AEs with on-ground presence have sound knowledge of
local priorities, whereas international and regional AEs can bring multi-country experience to support
local activities. Supported by other intermediaries, AEs can become a strong repository of credible and
implementable projects that, in turn, shape what activities get funded and promoted in country.
5.4. Intermediaries as Implementers
Much research on intermediaries focuses on the role of intermediaries in brokering, innovation,
and transformation [
1
]. However, intermediaries play an important role in actually delivering the GCF
projects. Research highlights that many projects fail during implementation due to the ‘state capability
trap’, because administrative systems in many developing countries lack capacity to implement even
the most routine tasks [
43
]. Since state actors dominate national climate action, intermediaries have
an important role in overcoming the state/capability gap by oering much-needed expertise and
support for successful implementation of the GCF projects. The AEs are generally the central delivery
intermediaries, as they are involved in setting up the projects. The AEs work with other intermediaries,
including specialist consulting and project management firms, government entities (that own the
projects or are relevant), development organisations, and the private sector to bring relevant expertise
and resources for successful completion. Most projects sit in some government department and, hence,
the involvement of the relevant government department in the project is crucial to get strong buy-in
and to ensure the continuity of the project beyond the funding period.
Combined, through these four roles, the intermediaries are instrumental in mobilising finance
and shaping action in developing countries. They influence how action is understood, which local
priorities are addressed, which projects move to funding, how these projects are implemented, and
which actors are involved in the process. This, in turn, gives intermediaries considerable power and
influence to shape actions and impact the landscape of climate change, both nationally and globally.
The roles of intermediaries are not static, as climate change is an evolving challenge that requires
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 8 of 17
constant adaptation in knowledge and skills. New intermediaries may emerge, and old ones disappear,
which may create conflicts between intermediaries, causing disruption. As the climate financing
mechanism stabilises, roles of intermediaries, especially in implementation, may be taken over by
formal government agencies, making intermediaries less important [
44
]. Nonetheless, intermediaries
will continue to play a vital role in climate finance. The next section introduces and analyses three
propositions in the context of these important roles of intermediaries.
6. Proposition Analysis
6.1. Proposition 1—The GCF Funding is Heavily Skewed towards International Intermediaries, Reinforcing the
Historical International Dominant Development Model
A central tenet of the GCF is to oer country ownership for projects. The GCF Board has repeatedly
rearmed that projects have to be owned by developing countries through their AE intermediaries.
However, it is ambiguous how the GCF defines country ownership, leading to significant gaps in
monitoring of its application [
45
]. While the ratio of national AEs to international AEs is at par,
the same is not true for the allocation of funding. An analysis of the approved project portfolio shows
a huge skew towards international AEs. Of the 132 projects in the GCF portfolio, only 17 projects are
managed by national AEs, and the balance is led by regional AEs with 12 projects and international
AEs with 103 projects. Only 13% of the projects are with the national AEs. Of the 43 national AEs,
only 12 have managed to secure a project, and the remaining 31 AEs either have no projects in the
pipelines or their projects have yet to be approved. When the quantum of funding is analysed across
entity types, it portrays an even bleaker picture. National AEs received a total of 396 million USD from
the GCF—the bulk of it as grant funding—representing a mere 6% of the total committed funding.
The balance of the 5.69 billion USD of committed funding, or 94%, went to regional and international
AEs. This highlights a serious departure from the core GCF objective of a country-driven approach.
The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and anticipated shortfall of 2 billion USD from the
pledged amount will disproportionally aect the national AEs, whose project pipeline is expected to
increase in the future as their numbers increase.
The analysis of GCF funding to the top ten AEs in Figure 1shows that all are international AEs.
The six funding proposals presented for consideration in the latest Board meeting in 2020 were all from
international AEs [
46
]. It further cements the current dominance of a small subset of international
entities, mainly multilateral institutions, channelling most of the approved GCF funding. The United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has the largest portfolio of projects with 26 projects,
representing 842 million USD, or 15% of all approved GCF project funding, which is more than double
the total funding support from the GCF to national AEs. The World Bank, as the trustee of the GCF,
oers an interesting case. It has secured eight projects, or 7% of the total, valued at 381 million USD,
which is more than the total national AE funding portfolio. Its role as both trustee and beneficiary
of the GCF funding has caused concern among developed country board members about the Bank’s
independence and possible conflict of interest.
Overall, the analysis of funding arms the proposition that the GCF is heavily skewed towards
international AEs and reinforces the historical global development model [
47
,
48
]. It highlights a
concentration and dominance of a few international agencies in the GCF. This is unlikely to change
until national AEs can produce higher-quality projects, address the lack of key intermediaries, and put
pressure on the GCF to increase its portfolio of projects to maintain the momentum of the Paris
Agreement. While this situation exists, the beneficiaries will be international AEs.
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 9 of 17
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 17
Figure 1. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) funding to the top ten accredited entities (AEs) and other
international, regional, and national AEs. All figures are in million USD. The number of projects for
each AE are shown in brackets. Data source: GCF AE and Project Database. Adapted from the GCF
financial planning report (https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/gcf-b21-33-rev01).
Overall, the analysis of funding affirms the proposition that the GCF is heavily skewed towards
international AEs and reinforces the historical global development model [47,48]. It highlights a
concentration and dominance of a few international agencies in the GCF. This is unlikely to change
until national AEs can produce higher-quality projects, address the lack of key intermediaries, and
put pressure on the GCF to increase its portfolio of projects to maintain the momentum of the Paris
Agreement. While this situation exists, the beneficiaries will be international AEs.
6.2. Proposition 2The Pipeline of Projects from National Intermediaries Will Slow down over Time as
Compared to International Intermediaries
The number of national AE intermediaries has been rising steadily, showing the commitment of
the GCF to taking a country-driven approach. However, only 12 national AEs so far have approved
projects, and of those, only three have more than one project in their portfolio. One reason for the
lower national-AE-led projects is the dearth of intermediaries and many key roles missing at the
country level to compete successfully. Conceiving and developing projects that meet the GCF’s
stringent criteria [49] requires strong project development and design as well as robust
implementation plans with measurable outcomes. While national intermediaries have played a
reasonable role in information dissemination, the conception and implementation roles have been
largely missing in developing countries, leading to weaker proposals. Historically, international
agencies such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and UNDP have supported most efforts
in tackling climate change. This dependence on international agencies, which generally operate
independently, has progressed action, but at the cost of a weak ecosystem of national intermediaries
[50]. To overcome this dependence, the GCF encourages AEs to develop concept notes and further
supports them with the Project Preparation Facility (PFF) to develop funding projects. To date, 31
applications for the PFF have been approved (https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/ppf), of which
11 (35%) were from national AEs. Despite these efforts, national AEs, with limited experience, have
too low of a technical and financial capacity to develop projects independently. An interview with a
national AE revealed that its two concept notes lay with the focal ministry (the NDA), which did not
Figure 1.
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) funding to the top ten accredited entities (AEs) and other
international, regional, and national AEs. All figures are in million USD. The number of projects for
each AE are shown in brackets. Data source: GCF AE and Project Database. Adapted from the GCF
financial planning report (https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/gcf-b21-33-rev01).
6.2. Proposition 2—The Pipeline of Projects from National Intermediaries Will Slow down over Time
as Compared to International Intermediaries
The number of national AE intermediaries has been rising steadily, showing the commitment of
the GCF to taking a country-driven approach. However, only 12 national AEs so far have approved
projects, and of those, only three have more than one project in their portfolio. One reason for the
lower national-AE-led projects is the dearth of intermediaries and many key roles missing at the
country level to compete successfully. Conceiving and developing projects that meet the GCF’s
stringent criteria [
49
] requires strong project development and design as well as robust implementation
plans with measurable outcomes. While national intermediaries have played a reasonable role in
information dissemination, the conception and implementation roles have been largely missing
in developing countries, leading to weaker proposals. Historically, international agencies such as
the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and UNDP have supported most eorts in tackling
climate change. This dependence on international agencies, which generally operate independently,
has progressed action, but at the cost of a weak ecosystem of national intermediaries [
50
]. To overcome
this dependence, the GCF encourages AEs to develop concept notes and further supports them with
the Project Preparation Facility (PFF) to develop funding projects. To date, 31 applications for the
PFF have been approved (https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/ppf), of which 11 (35%) were from
national AEs. Despite these eorts, national AEs, with limited experience, have too low of a technical
and financial capacity to develop projects independently. An interview with a national AE revealed
that its two concept notes lay with the focal ministry (the NDA), which did not have the expertise
and capacity to review the concept notes; without the NDA’s no objection certificate, these concept
notes could not be submitted to the GCF. Furthermore, the AE was struggling to develop a pipeline of
local projects from other local intermediaries that also faced similar challenges of low financial and
technical capacity.
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 10 of 17
International AEs, on the other hand, with their healthy rostrum of international consulting and
advisory intermediaries, extensive global experience, financial muscle, and high-quality technical
manpower, are able to churn out strong project proposals quickly. Having robust structures, procedures,
and policies in line with the GCF guidelines makes these international AE projects attractive for funding.
These AEs, with support of global intermediaries, can take on multiple roles as knowledge providers,
brokers, concept designers, and implementers at the same time [
4
] when dealing with climate finance.
This is evident in several international AEs securing multiple projects. A total of 25% of all the GCF
project portfolio sits between the UNDP and the World Bank. With growing GCF project implementation
experience, these international AEs create a virtuous cycle of securing more projects and helping the
GCF achieve its funding targets. This sets a dangerous double standard for national AEs, whereby
more powerful international AEs are able to negotiate less stringent terms for compliance with the
GCF mandates than others. The question also arises on the additive financing of the international
AEs—could their projects have been implemented in the same form without the GCF’s financial
support, therefore leaving more funding for national AEs?
With a widening gap between the national and international AEs’ credentials in project conception,
delivery, execution, and, in turn, successful implementation, the project pipeline from national AEs
will likely dwindle compared to that from international AEs.
6.3. Proposition 3—The Quantum of Climate Adaptation Funding Will Go Up, but the Gap between Adaptation
and Mitigation Funding Will Widen in Favour of Mitigation because of Missing Key Intermediary Roles
in Adaptation
The GCF was set up with the objective of narrowing the gap between mitigation and adaptation
financing. With much smaller greenhouse gas emission footprints and lower capacity to adapt to
the climate challenges, developing countries have been demanding adaptation financing to be on
a par with mitigation financing under the CBDR principle [
51
]. Global climate financing, however,
continues to flow toward mitigation, which accounted for 93% of total global flows in 2017/2018, or an
annual average of 537 billion USD, with the bulk of it directed towards low-carbon energy transition
and transportation [
33
]. This skewed allocation is also present in the GCF’s funding portfolio, with
financing for mitigation projects at 42%, cross-cutting projects at 34%, and adaptation projects at only
24%. The majority of adaptation projects are funded through grants by the GCF, which brings into
question their long-term sustainability. While the GCF’s funding mix is better than global allocations,
it is still far from achieving the committed goals.
With the initial funding for GCF closed and activation of the replenishment funding period
in place in 2020, funding for adaptation is likely to decrease, widening the gap for the following
reasons. First, funding for the replenishment period will decrease because the US pulled out of the
Paris Agreement and due to the weaker commitments from other countries in light of the current
economic and health crisis. Several countries have stepped forward to fill this funding gap, but many
of these pledged commitments remain unconfirmed. Innovative solutions, such as smart contracts,
may help restrict the funders from shirking their commitments, creating stronger visibility of funding
flows [
52
]. Nonetheless, with reduced funds and rising demand from national AEs, the GCF will have
to prioritise projects with demonstrably high impacts. Measuring adaptation has historically been
hard because the impact and outcomes are dicult to measure and require considerable expertise [
53
].
Mitigation, on the other hand, is quantifiable in CO2 equivalence and makes it easier for the GCF to
demonstrate impact. Global intermediaries in brokering and project development, with their vast
networks, are able to identify technologies, partners, and funders in mitigation projects. The same
is not true for adaptation projects that are mostly supported by development intermediaries that
are strong in their commitment, but lack the financial muscle to develop, implement, and monitor
adaptation projects. A recent study commissioned by the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) and the
GCF analysed projects for confluence and synergies with multiple climate funds. Overall, it found
fewer instances of convergence for funding in adaptation than mitigation [
54
]. Second, the GCF
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 11 of 17
plans to multiply its funding by leveraging funding from external financing intermediaries. For each
dollar invested, the GCF plans to leverage three times the funding from external intermediaries, with
ambitions to raise this to seven times. While this approach will help the GCF reach closer to the global
target of funding 100 billion USD annually for climate change, it will push the GCF towards projects
that oer demonstrable economic returns for the external funding intermediaries. Mitigation projects
with demonstrable economic returns will be prioritised over adaptation that does not have standard
economic measures, as discussed earlier. The current GCF project portfolio demonstrates the greater
role of leveraged funds in low-carbon energy and transportation projects. Finally, mitigation projects
are not always a priority for national AEs and their local populations [
55
]. Building on arguments
in Propositions 1 and 2, international AEs, with their expertise in mitigation and collaborations with
intermediaries in this space, will fill the role. With a successful track record of projects and higher
funding, the international AEs will shift the tilt towards mitigation projects.
Combined, these factors of decreased funding commitment, increased reliance on leveraged
funding, and strong expertise of international AEs in mitigation rearm the proposition that the
gap between mitigation and adaptation funding will widen in favour of mitigation. This will also
disproportionately lower the flow of projects and finance allocation to national AEs that have low
expertise in mitigation projects. The GCF will have to create an ‘integrity system’ [
56
] to uphold and
adhere to the values that it has publicly declared for the balance between mitigation and adaptation.
These commitments should not be simply a paper exercise, but something concrete and observable.
7. Discussion
The GCF oers a unique opportunity to study the largest public global climate funding mechanism
as it evolves and takes shape. Intermediaries are playing a key role in this evolution by shaping
which projects get funded, how they are funded, and in what geography they are implemented.
The intent behind the GCF is to oer equitable and transparent mechanisms with country-driven
ownership and balanced governance between developed and developing nations. This research
shows that these intentions are dicult to achieve in a structure that is evolving and shaped by many
intermediaries with their dierent roles, agendas, and capabilities. The three propositions point to
the disproportionate influence and role of international AEs and allied intermediaries in the funding
allocation, the widening capacity and experience gap between international and national AEs, and the
skew towards mitigation by leveraging external funding. These factors reinforce the business-as-usual
scenario in climate finance, and will likely face increasing discontent and resistance from developing
countries. To truly achieve its goal in helping developing countries tackle the threats of climate
change, the GCF will have to make a paradigm shift in how it uses its funds and operates through the
intermediaries. It has to keep national AEs at the core of its funding mechanism. International AEs,
with their greater experience, expertise, and global structures, have a role to play. However, this should
not be without incorporating the national AEs. One way to ensure this is for national AEs to be an
integral part of all projects developed and executed by international AEs. The GCF will also have to
play a stronger role in empowering national AEs through transparent and equitable funding allocation,
capacity building, simpler accreditation, and rapid project approvals. There are many lessons to be
learned from this evolution of the GCF. It is hoped that the GCF does not become a tool for political
wrangling, but a transparent mechanism with clear objectives of funding the most vulnerable. I oer
three learning models to capture the current ideas and address some of the challenges identified in the
three propositions in an eort to keep the climate financing process progressing positively. Tenets of
these learning models can be traced across multiple disciplines, from network analysis [
57
], law [
58
],
organisational theory [59], to social development [60].
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 12 of 17
7.1. Learning Models
7.1.1. The Bilateral Learning Model
This is the current learning model prevalent in the GCF’s mechanism. As shown in Figure 2, in the
bilateral learning model, the AEs and the GCF interact directly in the climate funding process. The AEs
take support from other intermediaries and follow the GCF’s structured process for accreditation
and project funding. The GCF oers some financial and knowledge support for accreditation and
developing project concept notes and proposals. There are benefits of speed in this model through
direct interactions, and it has been applied with some success in the GCF to create a panel of AEs and
build a healthy portfolio of projects to deploy the GCF’s commitments. However, the knowledge gained
in the process is contained within the AEs and the GCF, without any mechanism for wider exchange.
This model disproportionately benefits the international AEs, as they already have substantial project
experience and knowledge of implementing climate projects, and further learning augments their
project capabilities. The international AEs, with their vast networks, can take on the intermediary
roles of knowledge, brokerage, conception, and design and implementation without needing to
involve the national AEs. The national AEs, with fewer projects and less experience, fail to break into
this interactive networking process and therefore learn less, creating an unproductive vicious circle.
Where the model oers speed of interactions and learning, it lacks in fair access for all, and therefore
contributes little to local knowledge.
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 17
7.1. Learning Models
7.1.1. The Bilateral Learning Model
This is the current learning model prevalent in the GCF’s mechanism. As shown in Figure 2, in
the bilateral learning model, the AEs and the GCF interact directly in the climate funding process.
The AEs take support from other intermediaries and follow the GCF’s structured process for
accreditation and project funding. The GCF offers some financial and knowledge support for
accreditation and developing project concept notes and proposals. There are benefits of speed in this
model through direct interactions, and it has been applied with some success in the GCF to create a
panel of AEs and build a healthy portfolio of projects to deploy the GCF’s commitments. However,
the knowledge gained in the process is contained within the AEs and the GCF, without any
mechanism for wider exchange. This model disproportionately benefits the international AEs, as they
already have substantial project experience and knowledge of implementing climate projects, and
further learning augments their project capabilities. The international AEs, with their vast networks,
can take on the intermediary roles of knowledge, brokerage, conception, and design and
implementation without needing to involve the national AEs. The national AEs, with fewer projects
and less experience, fail to break into this interactive networking process and therefore learn less,
creating an unproductive vicious circle. Where the model offers speed of interactions and learning, it
lacks in fair access for all, and therefore contributes little to local knowledge.
Bilateral Learning Model
Figure 2. Bilateral learning model where the GCF and AEs interact directly.
7.1.2. The Brokerage Learning Model
The brokerage learning model offers a natural progression from the bilateral learning model by
expanding the scope of interactions. As the numbers of AEs joining the GCF’s fold increase and more
projects are funded, best practices, new lessons, and challenges emerge from the funding process.
While AEs and other intermediaries generate project experiences, the GCF acts as gatekeeper and
broker of these new learnings, using these to improve and guide its operational and funding
processes. The information flow is centralised with the GCF, as shown in Figure 3, which interacts
with multiple AEs, synthesising learning and sharing with others. The GCF takes on the intermediary
role of information sharing and, to some extent, brokering. The AEs, on the other hand, continue to
operate in silos without any direct interactions with other AEs and have to rely on the GCF for
collective guidance. With five years of work, the GCF has produced a steady flow of information on
practices and lessons that have been learned from the projects [61]. Some regional and international
AEs that operate multiple projects or run projects across multiple countries benefit from this much
wider experience. However, cross-fertilisation is limited between AEs, thus cementing the central
role of the GCF and a selected few international and regional AEs. Where this model offers reliable
Figure 2. Bilateral learning model where the GCF and AEs interact directly.
7.1.2. The Brokerage Learning Model
The brokerage learning model oers a natural progression from the bilateral learning model by
expanding the scope of interactions. As the numbers of AEs joining the GCF’s fold increase and more
projects are funded, best practices, new lessons, and challenges emerge from the funding process.
While AEs and other intermediaries generate project experiences, the GCF acts as gatekeeper and
broker of these new learnings, using these to improve and guide its operational and funding processes.
The information flow is centralised with the GCF, as shown in Figure 3, which interacts with multiple
AEs, synthesising learning and sharing with others. The GCF takes on the intermediary role of
information sharing and, to some extent, brokering. The AEs, on the other hand, continue to operate
in silos without any direct interactions with other AEs and have to rely on the GCF for collective
guidance. With five years of work, the GCF has produced a steady flow of information on practices and
lessons that have been learned from the projects [
61
]. Some regional and international AEs that operate
multiple projects or run projects across multiple countries benefit from this much wider experience.
However, cross-fertilisation is limited between AEs, thus cementing the central role of the GCF and a
selected few international and regional AEs. Where this model oers reliable learning opportunities,
it suers from restricted access to learning for smaller and local AEs. Local AEs are therefore eectively
excluded from the GCF.
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 13 of 17
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 13 of 17
learning opportunities, it suffers from restricted access to learning for smaller and local AEs. Local
AEs are therefore effectively excluded from the GCF.
Brokerage Learning Model
Figure 3. Brokerage learning model with the GCF as the central actor for AEs.
7.1.3. The Network Learning Model
Under the network learning model in Figure 4, project learning is shared freely across the AEs,
other intermediaries, and the GCF. The GCF can continue to act as the architect and central actor in
the network [62,63], but is no longer the sole gatekeeper of learning and information flows. The
intermediaries undertaking continuous relational interactions are able to generate new knowledge
and identify common challenges encountered across multiple projects. They can support
development and diffusion by sharing this knowledge widely across the network, helping
subsequent projects to benefit from the accumulated experience [64]. International AEs, national AEs,
and other intermediaries can be encouraged (or mandated) to collaborate on projects, as climate
change is too complex for a single intermediary to tackle, and requires the participation of many
actors to succeed [65]. The AEs and other intermediaries can bring their respective expertise and roles
to develop robust projects and meet the GCF’s central objective of country ownership. For example,
International AEs, with their vast project experience and networks, can take on the role of information
sharing and brokering and can co-design projects with national AEs, whereas national AEs, with their
strong local presence, can take the lead role for implementation. By building projects around national
AEs, network efforts can translate into building their capacity, helping them take on more critical
roles of concept, design, and implementation. Other intermediaries can be included to fill voids with
the aim of building local capacity and ownership. To encourage innovation and offer wide learning
opportunities, the GCF has to move from its current bilateral and brokerage learning models to the
network learning model. Where the network learning model offers collective and open learning that
enhances local knowledge and capability, it suffers from the greater complexity of curating and
maintaining the open networks needed. This learning model is closely aligned with the CGF’s
objectives of amplifying local capacity to adapt to and mitigate climate change over the long term.
Figure 3. Brokerage learning model with the GCF as the central actor for AEs.
7.1.3. The Network Learning Model
Under the network learning model in Figure 4, project learning is shared freely across the
AEs, other intermediaries, and the GCF. The GCF can continue to act as the architect and central
actor in the network [
62
,
63
], but is no longer the sole gatekeeper of learning and information flows.
The intermediaries undertaking continuous relational interactions are able to generate new knowledge
and identify common challenges encountered across multiple projects. They can support development
and diusion by sharing this knowledge widely across the network, helping subsequent projects to
benefit from the accumulated experience [
64
]. International AEs, national AEs, and other intermediaries
can be encouraged (or mandated) to collaborate on projects, as climate change is too complex for a
single intermediary to tackle, and requires the participation of many actors to succeed [
65
]. The AEs
and other intermediaries can bring their respective expertise and roles to develop robust projects and
meet the GCF’s central objective of country ownership. For example, International AEs, with their
vast project experience and networks, can take on the role of information sharing and brokering and
can co-design projects with national AEs, whereas national AEs, with their strong local presence, can
take the lead role for implementation. By building projects around national AEs, network eorts can
translate into building their capacity, helping them take on more critical roles of concept, design, and
implementation. Other intermediaries can be included to fill voids with the aim of building local
capacity and ownership. To encourage innovation and oer wide learning opportunities, the GCF
has to move from its current bilateral and brokerage learning models to the network learning model.
Where the network learning model oers collective and open learning that enhances local knowledge
and capability, it suers from the greater complexity of curating and maintaining the open networks
needed. This learning model is closely aligned with the CGF’s objectives of amplifying local capacity
to adapt to and mitigate climate change over the long term.
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 14 of 17
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 of 17
Network Learning Model
Figure 4. Network learning model for open AE and the GCF interactions.
7.2. Future Research
In this paper, I have identified four key roles of intermediaries, posited three propositions, and
offered three learning models to improve climate action in developing countries. This is a work in
progress. There are several interesting and important propositions that can be tested to strengthen
the GCF’s approach and, in turn, climate action. Some of these are:
1. The approval process of projects for national AEs is much longer than for international AEs,
making the national projects outdated and costly.
2. National AEs execute projects independently, thus limiting exposure of other local
intermediaries to the GCF process.
3. National AEs develop projects that are aligned with their organisational expertise and
capabilities, narrowing their scope for country climate action.
Funding: This research was conducted under the British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship programme.
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank the special issue editor Axel Marx for organising the paper discussion
workshop and the helpful comments of the co-participants on the early draft of the paper. The paper has also
greatly benefited from the constructive comments of the three anonymous journal reviewers.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Figure 4. Network learning model for open AE and the GCF interactions.
7.2. Future Research
In this paper, I have identified four key roles of intermediaries, posited three propositions,
and oered three learning models to improve climate action in developing countries. This is a work in
progress. There are several interesting and important propositions that can be tested to strengthen the
GCF’s approach and, in turn, climate action. Some of these are:
1.
The approval process of projects for national AEs is much longer than for international AEs,
making the national projects outdated and costly.
2.
National AEs execute projects independently, thus limiting exposure of other local intermediaries
to the GCF process.
3.
National AEs develop projects that are aligned with their organisational expertise and capabilities,
narrowing their scope for country climate action.
Funding: This research was conducted under the British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship programme.
Acknowledgments:
I would like to thank the special issue editor Axel Marx for organising the paper discussion
workshop and the helpful comments of the co-participants on the early draft of the paper. The paper has also
greatly benefited from the constructive comments of the three anonymous journal reviewers.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 15 of 17
References
1.
Kivimaa, P.; Boon, W.; Hyysalo, S.; Klerkx, L. Towards a typology of intermediaries in sustainability
transitions: A systematic review and a research agenda. Res. Policy 2019,48, 1062–1075. [CrossRef]
2.
Parag, Y.; Janda, K.B. More than filler: Middle actors and socio-technical change in the energy system from
the “middle-out”. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 2014,3, 102–112. [CrossRef]
3.
Stewart, J.; Hyysalo, S. Intermediaries, users and social learning in technological innovation. Int. J. Innov.
Manag. 2008,12, 295–325. [CrossRef]
4.
Agogu
é
, M.; Yström, A.; Le Masson, P. Rethinking the role of intermediaries as an architect of collective
exploration and creation of knowledge in open innovation. Int. J. Innov. Manag.
2013
,17, 1350007. [CrossRef]
5.
Mair, J.; Mart
í
, I.; Ventresca, M.J. Building inclusive markets in rural Bangladesh: How intermediaries work
institutional voids. Acad. Manag. J. 2012,55, 819–850. [CrossRef]
6.
Thuy, P.T.; Campbell, B.M.; Garnett, S.; Aslin, H.; Ha, H.M. Importance and impacts of intermediary boundary
organizations in facilitating payment for environmental services in Vietnams. Environ. Conserv.
2010
,37,
64–72.
7.
Abbott, K.W.; Genschel, P.; Snidal, D.; Zangl, B. International Organizations as Orchestrators; Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2015.
8.
Klerkx, L.; Leeuwis, C. Establishment and embedding of innovation brokers at dierent innovation system
levels: Insights from the Dutch agricultural sector. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang.
2009
,76, 849–860. [CrossRef]
9.
Winch, G.M.; Courtney, R. The organization of innovation brokers: An international review. Technol. Anal.
Strateg. Manag. 2007,19, 747–763. [CrossRef]
10.
Choi, Y. Intermediary Propositions for Green Growth with Sustainable Governance. Sustainability
2015
,7,
14785–14801. [CrossRef]
11.
Bakici, T.; Almirall, E.; Wareham, J. The role of public open innovation intermediaries in local government
and the public sector. Technol. Anal. Strateg. Manag. 2013,25, 311–327. [CrossRef]
12.
De Silva, M.; Howells, J.; Meyer, M. Innovation intermediaries and collaboration: Knowledge–based practices
and internal value creation. Res. Policy 2018,47, 70–87. [CrossRef]
13.
Bessant, J.; Rush, H. Building bridges for innovation: The role of consultants in technology transfer. Res.
Policy 1995,24, 97–114. [CrossRef]
14.
Howells, J. Intermediation and the role of intermediaries in innovation. Res. Policy
2006
,35, 715–728.
[CrossRef]
15.
Reinsberg, B.; Westerwinter, O. The global governance of international development: Documenting the rise
of multi-stakeholder partnerships and identifying underlying theoretical explanations. Rev. Int. Organ.
2019
.
[CrossRef]
16. Musiolik, J.; Markard, J.; Hekkert, M.; Furrer, B. Creating innovation systems: How resource constellations
aect the strategies of system builders. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang. 2020,153, 119209. [CrossRef]
17.
King, G.; Keohane, R.O.; Verba, S. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research; Princeton
University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 1994.
18. Silverman, D. Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, 2nd ed.; Sage: London, UK, 2005.
19.
Yin, R.K. Case Study Research and Application: Design and Methods, 6th ed.; Sage: Los Angeles, CA, USA, 2017.
20.
Flyvbjerg, B. Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qual. Inq.
2006
,12, 219–245. [CrossRef]
21.
World Bank. Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change—Synthesis Report; World Bank: Washington, DC, USA,
2010.
22. Fankhauser, S. The costs of adaptation. Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang. 2010,1, 23–30. [CrossRef]
23.
Parry, M.; Arnell, N.; Berry, P.; Dodman, D.; Fankhauser, S.; Hope, C.; Kovats, S.; Nicholls, R.; Satterthwaite, D.;
Tin, R.; et al. Assessing the Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of the UNFCCC and other Recent
Estimates; International Institute for Environment and Development and Grantham Institute for Climate
Change: London, UK, 2009.
24.
Gomez-Echeverri, L. The changing geopolitics of climate change finance. Clim. Policy
2013
,13, 632–648.
[CrossRef]
25.
Hoegh-Guldberg, O.; Jacob, D.; Bindi, M.; Brown, S.; Camilloni, I.; Diedhiou, A.; Djalante, R.; Ebi, K.;
Engelbrecht, F.; Guiot, J. Impacts of 1.5
C Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems; Glob. Warm. 1.5
C,
An IPCC Special Report; IPCC: Geneva, Switzerland, 2018.
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 16 of 17
26.
Adger, W.N.; Huq, S.; Brown, K.; Conway, D.; Hulme, M. Adaptation to climate change in the developing
world. Prog. Dev. Stud. 2003,3, 179–195. [CrossRef]
27.
Conway, D.; Mustelin, J. Strategies for improving adaptation practice in developing countries. Nat. Clim.
Chang. 2014,4, 339–342. [CrossRef]
28.
Stern, N.H. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
UK, 2007.
29. Huq, S.; Reid, H. Mainstreaming Adaptation in Development. IDS Bull. 2004,35, 15–21. [CrossRef]
30.
Smith, J.B.; Dickinson, T.; Donahue, J.D.B.; Burton, I.; Haites, E.; Klein, R.J.T.; Patwardhan, A. Development
and climate change adaptation funding: Coordination and integration. Clim. Policy
2011
,11, 987–1000.
[CrossRef]
31.
Schäfer, L.; Kaloga, A.; Kreft, S.; Jennings, M.; Schalatek, L.; Munyaradzi, F. Learning from Direct Access
Modalities in Africa; Germanwatch: Berlin, Germany, 2014. Available online: www.germanwatch.org/en/9475
(accessed on 1 February 2020).
32.
Watson, C.; Schalatek, L. The Global Finance Architecture. In Climate Finance Fundamentals 2; Overseas
Development Institute and Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America: London, UK, 2019. Available online: https://
climatefundsupdate.org/publications/the-global-climate-finance-architecture-2018/(accessed on 1 May 2020).
33.
CPI. Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2019; Barbara, B., Clark, A., Falconer, A., Macquarie, R., Meattle, C.,
Tolentino, R., Wetherbee, C., Eds.; Climate Policy Initiative: London, UK, 2019. Available online: https:
//climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-climate-finance-2019/(accessed on 1 May 2020).
34.
Reinsberg, B.; Shishlov, I.; Michaelowa, K.; Michaelowa, A. Climate Change-Related Trust Funds at the Multilateral
Development Banks; GIZ Berlin: Berlin, Germany, 2020.
35.
World Bank. 2018 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks: Climate Finance 2018; World Bank: Washington,
DC, USA, 2018. Available online: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/247461561449155666/Joint-
Report-on-Multilateral-Development-Banks-Climate-Finance-2018 (accessed on 29 June 2020).
36.
Bowman, M.; Minas, S. Resilience through interlinkage: The green climate fund and climate finance
governance. Clim. Policy 2019,19, 342–353. [CrossRef]
37.
Schalatek, L.; Watson, C. The Green Climate Fund. In Climate Finance Fundamentals; Overseas Development
Institute and Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America: London, UK, 2019. Available online: https:
//climatefundsupdate.org/publications/the-green-climate-fund-2019/(accessed on 1 April 2020).
38.
GCF. Report of the Twentieth Meeting of the Board, 1–4 July 2018; Green Climate Fund: Incheon, Korea, 2018.
Available online: https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-b20-26.pdf (accessed on
30 June 2020).
39.
GCF. The Strategic Plan for the GCF: 2020–2023; Green Climate Fund: Incheon, Korea, 2019. Available online:
https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-b24-inf01.pdf (accessed on 1 April 2020).
40.
Colenbrander, S.; Dodman, D.; Mitlin, D. Using climate finance to advance climate justice: The politics and
practice of channelling resources to the local level. Clim. Policy 2018,18, 902–915. [CrossRef]
41.
Ferraro, F.; Etzion, D.; Gehman, J. Tackling grand challenges pragmatically: Robust action revisited.
Organ. Stud. 2015. [CrossRef]
42. Geroski, P. The Evolution of New Markets; Oxford University Press on Demand: Oxford, UK, 2003.
43.
Pritchett, L.; Woolcock, M.; Andrews, M. Capability traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation
Failure. Center for Global Development: Washington, DC, USA, 2010.
44.
Schot, J.; Kanger, L.; Verbong, G. The roles of users in shaping transitions to new energy systems. Nat. Energy
2016,1, 1–7. [CrossRef]
45.
Solomon, A.; Jemison, C.; Khan, A.; Kyle, J.; Ottlak
á
n, L.; Polvi, J.; Puetz, D.; Puri, J. Independent Evaluation of
the Green Climate Fund’s Country Ownership Approach; Independent Evaluation Unit, Green Climate Fund:
Incheon, Korea, 2019. Available online: https://ieu.greenclimate.fund (accessed on 30 June 2020).
46.
GCF. Consideration of Funding Proposal; Green Climate Fund: Incheon, Korea, 2020. Available online:
https://www.greenclimate.fund/boardroom/meeting/b25 (accessed on 30 June 2020).
47.
Green, M. Development Theory and Practice. In Social Development: Issues and Approaches. Critical Perspectives;
Kothari, U., Minogue, M., Eds.; Palgrave: London, UK, 2002; pp. 52–70.
48.
Horner, R. Towards a new paradigm of global development? Beyond the limits of international development.
Prog. Hum. Geogr. 2020,44, 415–436. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2020,12, 5507 17 of 17
49.
GCF. GCF Project Preparation; Green Climate Fund: Incheon, Korea, 2020. Available online: https://www.
greenclimate.fund/projects/process (accessed on 30 June 2020).
50.
Ferguson, J. The Anti-politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho;
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1990.
51.
Fridahl, M.; Linn
é
r, B.-O. Perspectives on the Green Climate Fund: Possible compromises on capitalization
and balanced allocation. Clim. Dev. 2016,8, 105–109. [CrossRef]
52.
Reinsberg, B. Blockchain technology and the governance of foreign aid. J. Inst. Econ.
2019
,15, 413–429.
[CrossRef]
53.
Ford, J.D.; Berrang-Ford, L.; Lesnikowski, A.; Barrera, M.; Heymann, S.J. How to Track Adaptation to Climate
Change: A Typology of Approaches for National-Level Application. Ecol. Soc. 2013,18. [CrossRef]
54.
Wörlen, C.; Altevogt, J.; Keppler, L. Synergies between Climate Finance Mechanisms. Climate Investment
Funds (CIF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF): Incheon, Korea, 2020.
55. Reddy, B.S.; Assenza, G.B. Climate change—A developing country perspective. Curr. Sci. 2009,97, 50–62.
56.
Breakey, H.; Cadman, T.; Sampford, C. Conceptualizing Personal and Institutional Integrity: The Comprehensive
Integrity Framework, The Ethical Contribution of Organizations to Society. Research in Ethical Issues in Organizations;
Emerald Group Publishing Limited: Bingley, UK, 2015; Volume 14.
57.
Scott, J.; Carrington, P.J. The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis; SAGE Publication: London, UK, 2011.
58.
Fuller, L.L.; Winston, K.I. The forms and limits of adjudication. Harv. Law Rev.
1978
,92, 353–409. [CrossRef]
59.
Huber, G.P. Organizational learning: The contributing processes and the literatures. Organ. Sci.
1991
,2,
88–115. [CrossRef]
60.
Hawkins, J.D.; Weis, J.G. The Social Development Model: An Integrated Approach to Delinquency Prevention.
J. Prim. Prev. 1985,6, 73–97. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
61.
Fiala, N.; Puri, J.; Mwandri, P. Becoming Bigger, Better, Smarter: A Summary of the Evaluability of Green Climate
Fund Proposals; Green Climate Fund: Songdo, Korea, 2019. Available online: https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/
resources/working-papers (accessed on 30 June 2020).
62.
Barab
á
si, A.L.; Jeong, H.; N
é
da, Z.; Ravasz, E.; Schubert, A.; Vicsek, T. Evolution of the social network of
scientific collaborations. Phys. A Stat. Mech. Its Appl. 2002,311, 590–614. [CrossRef]
63.
Borgatti, S.P.; Everett, M.G.; Johnson, J.C. Analyzing Social Networks; SAGE Publications Limited: Los Angeles,
CA, USA, 2013.
64. Hargreaves, T.; Hielscher, S.; Seyfang, G.; Smith, A. Grassroots innovations in community energy: The role
of intermediaries in niche development. Glob. Environ. Chang. 2013,23, 868–880. [CrossRef]
65.
Chaudhury, A.S.; Thornton, T.F.; Helfgott, A.; Sova, C. Applying the robust adaptation planning (RAP)
framework to Ghana’s agricultural climate change adaptation regime. Sustain. Sci. 2017. [CrossRef]
©
2020 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
... Despite pledges to address all aspects of climate change equally, significantly more is spent on mitigation than on adaptation. Most studies find a bias > 90% toward financing mitigation activities compared to other measures (Chaudhury 2020;Ciplet et al. 2013). ...
Article
Full-text available
The severity of extreme weather events is increasing due to climate change. While industrialized nations have historically contributed the most to greenhouse gas emissions and are thus considered the primary polluters, the adverse impacts of climate change are disproportionately felt in low-income countries with limited capacity to cope. These regions are generally less resilient to extreme weather, resulting in significant damage. Many vulnerable countries lack the resources to manage these losses independently, necessitating international financial support. For over 30 years, the allocation of these costs has been a central issue at UN climate conferences. At COP 27 and COP 28, an international fund was established to address climate-induced losses and damages. However, key details regarding payment obligations and the distribution of funds remain unresolved. Securing consistent funding requires public approval in donor countries. To understand public preferences, we conducted a representative choice experiment in Austria exploring various financing options for such a fund. Our findings suggest that public support is higher if contributions are based on principles of responsibility rather than voluntary donations, with a preference for disaster relief payments. Additionally, respondents favored a maximum monthly contribution of 30 € per capita and prioritized funding for slow-onset events over rapid-onset events.
... Every company should mitigate risks, specifically climate-related risks. For large companies, risk-based technological innovation is essential and continues to be pursued, then enhance climate risk management strategies, increase investment in environmentally friendly technology, and develop infrastructure that is more resilient to climate change risks (Chaudhury, 2020). ...
Article
Studies related to the influence of climate risk on financial stability have been conducted, but rarely explore the gap of how climate change, both from the transition risk, physical risk, and opportunities derived from the efficiency of resources and energy sources needed for the company. Climate-related risks have not been empirically explored or discussed to date. Institutional theory is employed to determine what factors affect the financial stability gap regarding climate-related risks. The test was conducted quantitatively with 548 samples, where the data was collected from the data of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The results exhibited that climate-related risk harms financial stability, while size is able to mediate the relationship between climate-related risk and financial stability. The results display increased adaptation costs or losses due to climate change, such as costs incurred to mitigate climate-related transition risks in technology, reputation, markets, and policies and regulations. The practical implication of these results is that companies must implement proactive measures to manage climate-related risks. Companies, particularly those in sectors vulnerable to climate change, such as mining, agriculture, or manufacturing, must administer resources to mitigate the negative impacts of climate risks. Meanwhile, small companies can consider cooperation and collaboration to improve their operations, which may strengthen their financial stability in facing risks.
Article
This paper explores how climate finance approaches and logics, particularly around scale, manifest in local climate technologies in Fiji. Through multi-sited fieldwork, the paper explores experiences around three climate related infrastructures: a biomass plant in Nadroga; a diesel-solar community hybrid system in Island X; and a seawall in Levuka, Ovalua. Each represent a key aspect of Fiji's climate-related infrastructural targets. Through explorations at these sites, the paper argues that climate finance logics prioritise large scale technologies and “scalability” projects, that is, projects which seek to expand without changing their basic elements. In response, the paper aims to create scholarly space for considering alternatives around climate finance's projects. The paper embeds these considerations of climate finance alternatives within its conceptual framework of “loving technologies.” Loving technologies is a product of the interplay of Pacific theory, postcolonial and feminist technoscience with the Fijian experiences of climate finance explored in this paper. The loving technologies approach highlights the validity small-scale infrastructure as having potential to be intimate, relational, making a difference in lives, communities, and futures. Despite their small scale, they can make an impact on bigger scales, and can chart alternative pathways of progress.
Article
Full-text available
This paper examines the critical role that equitable funding for climate change would play in supporting various existing adaptation and mitigation systems and helping to develop other innovative systems to curb climate-related impacts in Africa. With most of the reported impacts of climate change happening in Africa, there is a critical need for a champion for resources from all sectors, especially developed countries, who are the significant contributors of greenhouse gases (GHG) that cause this global epidemic. Even though Africa contributes a significantly lower level of GHG, it has continued to suffer most as and when these disasters occur. The paper highlights the historical climate change funding promises made by developing countries and the pursuit of effective, agent-based realization of these promises. It emphasizes the need for all stakeholders, especially from Africa, to come together and advocate for equitable and sufficient funds for climate-related action. Focusing on the annual UN Climate Change Conferences, it spotlights the need for financial commitments that could determine the future of climate action in Africa. This paper examines the historical gaps in climate financing, outlines African countries' unique challenges, and argues for a renewed and robust financial commitment at COP 29.
Chapter
This chapter rigorously analyzes the myriad anthropogenic activities that collectively contribute to multi-stress conditions in exposed organisms, disrupting the delicate ecological equilibrium and resulting in severe ecophysiological problems. Anthropogenic activities such as industrialization, urbanization, agriculture, transportation, and resource extraction generate a wide array of stressors that affect ecosystems and organisms at multiple levels. These stressors include chemical pollutants, habitat destruction, habitat fragmentation, noise pollution, light pollution, and climate change. This chapter examines how these stressors interact and synergize to create complex multi-stress conditions that challenge the resilience and adaptive capacity of exposed organisms. Chemical pollutants released into the environment from industrial processes, agricultural runoff, urban wastewater, and transportation emissions can accumulate in soil, water, air, and biota, exerting toxic effects on organisms and disrupting physiological processes. Habitat destruction and fragmentation resulting from land-use changes, deforestation, and infrastructure development alter ecosystem structure and connectivity, leading to loss of biodiversity and habitat degradation. Noise pollution from anthropogenic sources such as shipping, construction, and recreational activities can interfere with communication, navigation, and foraging behavior in marine and terrestrial organisms, affecting their survival and reproductive success. Similarly, light pollution from artificial sources such as streetlights, buildings, and outdoor lighting disrupts natural light-dark cycles, affecting the behavior, physiology, and ecology of nocturnal species and ecosystems. Climate change exacerbates existing stressors by altering temperature regimes, precipitation patterns, sea levels, and extreme weather events, leading to habitat loss, species range shifts, phenological mismatches, and ecosystem disruptions. This chapter examines the combined effects of these anthropogenic stressors on exposed organisms, including physiological stress, immune suppression, reproductive impairment, population declines, and ecosystem dysfunction. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the implications of multi-stress conditions for ecosystem health, resilience, and ecosystem services, highlighting the need for integrated approaches to environmental management and conservation. By understanding the complex interactions between anthropogenic activities and multi-stress conditions, this chapter aims to inform decision-making and policy interventions aimed at mitigating the impacts of human activities on ecosystems and promoting sustainable development practices that safeguard ecological integrity and biodiversity.
Preprint
Full-text available
Article
Full-text available
The goal of the GCF is to support a paradigm shift towards low-carbon, high-resilience pathways. It is thus important to understand if such a paradigm shift is occurring, and, if so, to measure the extent to which the GCF has contributed to this overall result. We review 93 proposals funded by the GCF and assess their ability to credibly report their impacts, efficiency and effectiveness, in an evidence-based and robust way. There are two main aims of the study: The first is to assess the quality of the proposals for the funded projects that the GCF has approved and is supporting currently so that subsequent project managers are able to produce stronger proposals that have a higher likelihood of success and in measuring results. The second is to inform the GCF investment criteria and to introduce evidence-based learning opportunities into GCF projects and processes, to inform the implementation and overall impact of GCF resources. Using a stoplight indicator across multiple categories, we are able to quantify the ability of the GCF portfolios to meet these goals. We find that 80% of proposals do not have well-defined theories of change, with half of all proposals not identifying possible unintended consequences of their programs. We also find that almost half of all proposals have the potential to identify and measure causal change, but only one-fourth of the proposals include a discussion about economic analyses that they will carry out. Although there is potential for these measurements to occur, 68% of the proposals either do not discuss methods for measuring causal change or are unclear. Additionally, we find that while 80% of funding proposals include monitoring and evaluation “reports”, they would not be able to cover the cost of high-quality evaluations with half having no plans for the baseline data collection on key variables. Almost 94% of all funding proposals do not show any awareness that (significant) bias may (will) creep in when they are measuring or claiming impacts. One-fifth of the proposals had limitations in how investment criteria were informed and/or the information level was insufficient to inform them credibly. We find that only 15% of the proposals would allow for credible measurement of progress on investment criteria. Finally, just 13% of proposals provided impact indicators deemed capable of measuring the magnitude of causal change, with only 10% of proposals including a plan for collecting data of sufficient quality for a causal evaluation. We conclude with some recommendations for project planners.
Article
Full-text available
The global governance of development increasingly relies on multi-stakeholder partnerships between states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. This article takes on two tasks. The first is to describe quantitatively the institutional evolution of the multilateral development system over the past century. The second is to juxtapose four rational-institutionalist explanations for why states establish new organizations as transnational governance initiatives—functionalism, power-oriented theories, domestic politics, and contextual design. The empirical analysis probes these explanations using the new Transnational Public-Private Governance Initiatives in World Politics dataset, which combines several existing data sources to build the most comprehensive data on different forms of institutionalized cooperation in global governance. The results lend most support to the contextual design view, while also yielding support for other accounts. By employing Heckman selection models, the analysis addresses potential selection bias due to unobserved correlation between state choices to create a new organization and its design. A qualitative case study further validates measurement choices and causal mechanisms. These findings have implications for theories of institutional design and development practice, specifically regarding the role of intergovernmental organizations in an increasingly interconnected world.
Article
Full-text available
A North–South oriented international development framing is increasingly ill-fitting to a 21st century characterized by interconnected globalized capitalism, the challenge of sustainable development, as well as the blurring of North–South boundaries. While the term global development is increasingly employed, appears more suited, it is used with different implicit meanings and is often conflated with international development. This article explores the potential of an emerging paradigm of global development as applicable to the whole world. A relational global development approach is advocated here, acknowledging the need for critical attention to the enduring tensions between universalization and geographic variation.
Article
Full-text available
Intermediary actors have been proposed as key catalysts that speed up change towards more sustainable socio-technical systems. Research on this topic has gradually gained traction since 2009, but has been complicated by the inconsistency regarding what intermediaries are in the context of such transitions and which activities they focus on, or should focus on. We briefly elaborate on the conceptual foundations of the studies of intermediaries in transitions, and how intermediaries have been connected to different transition theories. This shows the divergence – and sometimes a lack – of conceptual foundations in this research. In terms of transitions theories, many studies connect to the multi-level perspective and strategic niche management, while intermediaries in technological innovation systems and transition management have been much less explored. We aim to bring more clarity to the topic of intermediaries in transitions by providing a definition of transition intermediaries and a typology of five intermediary types that is sensitive to the emergence, neutrality and goals of intermediary actors as well as their context and level of action. Some intermediaries are specifically set up to facilitate transitions, while others grow into the role during the process of socio-technical change. Based on the study, as an important consideration for future innovation governance, we argue that systemic and niche intermediaries are the most crucial forms of intermediary actors in transitions, but they need to be complemented by a full ecology of intermediaries, including regime-based transition intermediaries, process intermediaries and user intermediaries.
Article
Full-text available
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a significant and potentially innovative addition to UNFCCC frameworks for mobilizing increased finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet the GCF faces challenges of operationalization not only as a relatively new international fund but also as a result of US President Trump’s announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Consequently the GCF faces a major reduction in actual funding contributions and also governance challenges at the levels of its Board and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), to which it is ultimately accountable. This article analyzes these challenges with reference to the GCF’s internal regulations and its agreements with third parties to demonstrate how exploiting design features of the GCF could strengthen its resilience in the face of such challenges. These features include linkages with UNFCCC constituted bodies, particularly the Technology Mechanism, and enhanced engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially through its Private Sector Facility. The article posits that deepening GCF interlinkages would increase both the coherence of climate finance governance and the GCF’s ability to contribute to ambitious climate action in uncertain times. Key policy insights • The Trump Administration’s purported withdrawal from the Paris Agreement creates challenges for the GCF operating model in three key domains: capitalization, governance and guidance. • Two emerging innovations could prove crucial in GCF resilience to fulfil its role in Paris Agreement implementation: (1) interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism; and (2) engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially private sector actors such as large US investors and financiers. • There is also an emerging soft role for the GCF as interlocutor between policy-makers and non-Party actors to help bridge the communication divide that often plagues cross-sectoral interactions. • This role could develop through: (a) the GCF tripartite interface between the Private Sector Facility, Accredited Entities and National Designated Authorities; and (b) strengthened collaborations between the UNFCCC Technical and Financial Mechanisms.
Article
Blockchain technology has been considered a vehicle to foster development in poor countries by promoting applications such as secure delivery of humanitarian aid, digital identity services, and proof of provenance. This article examines whether (and if so, how) blockchain technology can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of foreign aid governance, thereby moving beyond completely anonymous contexts. Foreign aid governance is plagued by lack of credible commitments among states, which are further exacerbated by information asymmetries and which often undermine aid effectiveness. In this context, blockchain technology holds two promises. First, through the guaranteed execution of smart contracts, it can strengthen the credibility of state commitments, for example collective burden-sharing rules among a group of donors or recipient country compliance with policy conditionality in return for aid. Second, through leveraging prediction markets, blockchain technology can allay information problems related to the verification of real-world events along the entire aid delivery chain.
Article
Novel technologies require the support of larger technological innovation systems (TIS). A key feature of innovation systems are system resources - collective structures such as common standards, support programs, shared expectations or testing facilities all actors can use. System resources emerge either uncoordinated or as a result of strategic action by 'system builders'. In this paper we explore the conditions of system building. Taking a strategy perspective, we analyze how system building depends on resource constellations at a certain point in time. Drawing from research in the field of stationary fuel cells in Germany, we identify three generic modes, of system building: a) the "single mode", in which a system builder uses its own organizational resources to create a system resource, b) the "partner mode", in which a system builder joins forces with partners in order to co-create system resources, and c) the "intermediary mode", in which a system builder collaborates with other actors to set up an intermediary organization, which then works towards the creation of system resources. We show that the modes were chosen depending on i) what resources were initially available and ii) how they were distributed in the innovation system. Our paper contributes to a more differentiated understanding of system building in the TIS literature and beyond.