Excluded futures: the continuity bias in scenario assessments

Abstract

Abstract Global scenario assessments in support of climate, biodiversity, energy and other international policy deliberations tend to focus on a narrow bandwidth of possibilities: futures that unfold gradually from current patterns and trends. This “continuity bias” downplays the real risks (and opportunities) of structural discontinuity in the evolution of the global social-ecological system. The inclination to focus on mathematically tractable representations and conventional futures preferred by decision-makers is understandable, but constrains the scientific imagination and the scope of policy guidance. Earlier studies spotlighted discontinuous global futures, thereby revealing a broader spectrum of possibilities and repertoire of actions than found in contemporary scenario analysis. The paper revisits three types of futures introduced 25 years ago; examines three truths they convey about the contemporary moment; and points to three courses of action they suggest. Contemporary assessments centre on incrementally changing Conventional Worlds, yet varieties of global disruption (Barbarization) and progressive transformation (Great Transition) remain plausible alternatives. Corresponding to this triad, three synergistic action prongs—reform (incremental policies), remediation (emergency preparedness and prevention), and redesign (deep cultural and institutional change)—come into focus. Recovering a comprehensive perspective on the global possible would reinvigorate debate on the kind of transformation needed, broaden the action agenda, and stimulate innovative research for illuminating our indeterminate future. The COVID-19 pandemic, a concrete illustration of historical discontinuity, underscores the critical importance of emphasizing nonconventional futures in policy assessments.

Full text

D E B A T E Open Access
Excluded futures: the continuity bias in
scenario assessments
Paul Raskin
1*
and Rob Swart
2
Abstract
Global scenario assessments in support of climate, biodiversity, energy and other international policy deliberations
tend to focus on a narrow bandwidth of possibilities: futures that unfold gradually from current patterns and
trends. This “continuity bias”downplays the real risks (and opportunities) of structural discontinuity in the evolution
of the global social-ecological system. The inclination to focus on mathematically tractable representations and
conventional futures preferred by decision-makers is understandable, but constrains the scientific imagination and
the scope of policy guidance. Earlier studies spotlighted discontinuous global futures, thereby revealing a broader
spectrum of possibilities and repertoire of actions than found in contemporary scenario analysis. The paper revisits
three types of futures introduced 25 years ago; examines three truths they convey about the contemporary
moment; and points to three courses of action they suggest. Contemporary assessments centre on incrementally
changing Conventional Worlds, yet varieties of global disruption (Barbarization) and progressive transformation
(Great Transition) remain plausible alternatives. Corresponding to this triad, three synergistic action prongs—reform
(incremental policies), remediation (emergency preparedness and prevention), and redesign (deep cultural and
institutional change)—come into focus. Recovering a comprehensive perspective on the global possible would
reinvigorate debate on the kind of transformation needed, broaden the action agenda, and stimulate innovative
research for illuminating our indeterminate future. The COVID-19 pandemic, a concrete illustration of historical
discontinuity, underscores the critical importance of emphasizing nonconventional futures in policy assessments.
Keywords: Global scenarios, Social-ecological system, Discontinuity, Vision, Socio-economic transformation,
Transdisciplinary research, New paradigms
Background: spotlighting system discontinuity
The emergent interdependent global system stands as a
key feature of our historical moment. Far-flung forces—
environmental, economic, cultural, technological, polit-
ical—are binding us together in a single community of
fate. At the same time, climate change, social fissures, and
other powerful stressors are eroding social-ecological re-
silience as we drift toward perilous thresholds of instability
and discontinuity [1–3]. These unprecedented conditions
demand foresight on the broad range of futures that might
materialize.
Yet, international policy negotiations, and the scientific
assessments that support them, have relied on a narrow
bandwidth of scenarios that unfold gradually from
current patterns and trends. This “continuity bias”
downplays the real possibility of structural discontinuity
in the evolution of the global social-ecological system.
The COVID-19 pandemic is vividly illustrating one type
of discontinuity. The inclination for assessments to focus
on mathematically tractable representations and conven-
tional futures preferred by decision-makers is under-
standable, but constrains the scientific imagination and
the scope of policy guidance.
Correspondingly, policies to address urgent environ-
mental and social problems, such as climate change, bio-
diversity loss, and income inequality, focus on incremental
nudges to socio-economic and environmental patterns in
© The Author(s). 2020 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons
licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
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* Correspondence: praskin@tellus.org
1
Tellus Institute, 2 Garden St, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
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more sustainable directions. Lessons drawn from a quarter
century of visionary global scenario, paired with observa-
tions on how the world has actually unfolded, can enrich
the discourse on ways to enable deep transformation and
avoid collapse.
Contrasting futures
Calls for systemic change have grown more urgent, but
have a long history. The World Commission on Envir-
onment and Development [4] irrevocably etched the
challenge of long-term sustainability onto the inter-
national policy agenda. In its wake, the “problem of the
future”[5] drew the attention of analysts, visionaries,
and activists to core existential questions: Where are we
headed? Where do we want to go? How do we get there?
Although the future cannot be predicted, alternative nar-
rative and quantitative global scenarios—plausible stories
about how world history might unfold in the coming
decades—laid the foundation for addressing these
questions.
Responding to the challenge, a multidisciplinary, inter-
national team of natural and social scientists formed the
Global Scenario Group (GSG) in 1995. The GSG orga-
nized a wide range of possible futures into three broad
paths: Conventional Worlds, Barbarization, and Great
Transitions [6]. These scenario categories reflect arche-
typal social visions—continuity, degradation, transform-
ation—with deep roots in the history of ideas. Each
scenario has two variants. Conventional Worlds assume
the continuity and spread of dominant values and socio-
economic patterns, driven by neoliberal policies (Market
Forces variation) or, alternatively, by sustainability
policies (Policy Reform). In Barbarization scenarios,
Conventional Worlds crises spiral out of control, leading
to an authoritarian future (Fortress World) or outright
collapse (Breakdown). By contrast, Great Transitions en-
vision responses to systemic crises of Conventional
Worlds that bring forth enriched socio-economic forms,
such as the autarkic Eco-Communalism variation or as a
revitalized global civilization (New Sustainability Para-
digm). For short descriptions and visual impressions of
each scenario, please see Fig. 1.
This framework has been adopted in scores of
scenario-based research studies [7,8]. However, main-
stream policy assessments, e.g., in the context of climate
change, biodiversity loss and energy futures, have
downplayed the possibility of collapse or structural
reorganization [9,10], thereby painting pictures of the
future that generally remain within the Conventional
Worlds range of possibilities,: the “continuity bias”(cf.
Figure 1). Some recent analyses refer to transformational
policies, but the scenarios themselves remain firmly
within a Policy Reform framework [11,12]. For climate
change, high greenhouse gas emissions scenarios have
been included in some analyses [13], but not the impli-
cations for the stability of global economic and natural
systems. Influential policy assessments, by failing to
foreground discontinuous trajectories, lack scientific
rigor and imagination. The consequences are to obscure
real risks, policy opportunities, and unconventional
interventions.
The continuity bias may be due, at least in part, to
political pressure on analysts to conform findings to the
narrow outcomes acceptable to decision-makers [14].
The bias resides, as well, within the scientific discourse
itself, where continuity is baked into prominent
economic-environmental projection models calibrated to
gradually unfolding historic trends and patterns [15].
The inadequacy of applying such mechanistic techniques
to deeply uncertain global futures, akin to applying
Newtonian physics to quantum phenomena, highlights
the need for basic methodological innovation. For the
sake of sound science, effectual policy, and better public
understanding, the time is long overdue for overcoming
political constraints and transcending modelling defi-
ciencies in order to highlight the full spectrum of the
global possible, from catastrophic collapse to civiliza-
tional shift.
Which future are we living in?
Now, a quarter of a century since they were conceived,
which of the GSG’s scenarios are we living in? A scan of
the heterogeneous world scene reveals the answer: all of
them. Global society today comprises a mosaic of
Conventional Worlds, Barbarization, and Great Transi-
tion tendencies in proportions that vary across space
and time [16]. Dogmatic neoliberal policy and faith in
technological solutions (Market Forces) remain perva-
sive. At the same time, Policy Reform has emerged in
widely varying degrees, e.g., in the United Nation’s
Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agree-
ment, and in multifarious efforts to tame the unwelcome
social and environmental consequences of unbridled
markets at local, national, and regional levels.
Meanwhile, multiple vectors of disruption—among
them ecological disturbance, financial instability, socio-
economic disparity, pandemics, and technological
change—diminish social-ecological resilience, heighten
migration, and unleash reactive forces. Harbingers of
Barbarization lurk in rising xenophobia, chauvinism, and
fundamentalism. The contemporary wave of authoritar-
ianism could be precursor to a Fortress World, while
regional chaos, conflict, state failure, and environmental
calamity might presage the apocalyptic vision of Break-
down. By contrast, the same factors driving the crisis
also incubate a rising cosmopolitan and ecological
consciousness, antecedents of a potential Great Transi-
tion. This shift flourishes now in myriad social and
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environmental movements, civil society campaigns, and
small-scale social experiments, all promoting cooperative
economies, humane and diverse cultures, and revitalized
ecosystems.
This rapidly changing melange of social forms is char-
acteristic of a complex system approaching thresholds of
systemic instability. Some observers, peering through
narrow philosophical perspectives, reduce world com-
plexity to simple truths. Celebrants of Conventional
Worlds amass evidence of a world growing safer, health-
ier, richer [17], trusting in technological and economic
responses to adequately counter the emergent crises of
the growth-oriented development paradigm. Doomsayers
attuned to the instabilities and inequalities that herald
Barbarization warn that the end is near [18]. Paradoxic-
ally, both extremes have a case: average wealth and life
expectancy have indeed risen, but so have income
disparity and social fissures; local environmental remedi-
ation has transpired but macro-instabilities deepen the
risk of structural rupture in biospheric processes. Trans-
cending these polarities, novel conditions—global inter-
dependence, shared risk, new technology—could forge
another truth: the advent of a diverse transnational
cultural and social movement for a Great Transition to a
liveable and just future [19].
The way ahead: three synergistic strategies
The world today evolves as a complex mixture of Con-
ventional Worlds, Barbarization, and Great Transition
tendencies. These three truths suggest three concurrent
action prongs expanding on the current focus on gradual
policy change: reform (incremental policy), remediation
(emergency management), and redesign (system trans-
formation). The reform prong resonates with dominant
policy paradigms seeking to ease social-ecological stress,
such as cautious efforts to control greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Unfortunately, conventional institutions, notably
the state-centric international order and corporate domi-
nated political economy, appear profoundly ill-equipped
to meet the challenge of deep reform. The most promis-
ing efforts, such as the Paris Agreement on climate
change and the United Nations Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, are steps in the right direction, but not the
leap forward now needed. Still, civil society reform
efforts can help mute dangerous trends, thereby coun-
tering Barbarization while buying time for a Great Tran-
sition mobilization. However, evidence mounts that
incremental action alone is insufficient, especially as key
government and corporate leaders continue to deny,
ignore, or respond indecisively to threats.
The second action prong—emergency management—
counters head-on the real risk of system collapse
(Barbarization). This strategy evokes an existential
“precautionary principle”proscribing policies that allow
further drift toward conditions where science cannot
rule out social-ecological tipping points. It would be
timely to extend the environmental precautionary
principle, embodied in Principle 15 of the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development
Rio Declaration [20] to the system level. Additionally,
redoubled cultural and educational efforts are needed to
counter the politics of hate and polarization. In parallel,
international emergency preparation for humane inter-
vention into hotspots of chaos and conflict are essential,
Fig. 1 Excluded Futures and the Continuity Bias. See https://greattransition.org/explore/scenarios/excludedfutures to view an enlarged image
and scenario descriptions
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lest military containment becomes the rule. Finally,
critical consideration of selected geoengineering options
compatible with the precautionary principle, such as
massive biomass sequestration in soils, rather than peril-
ous solar radiation management, would be prudent.
Since thus far the reform and emergency prongs have
proved too little, too late, the third prong comes to the
fore: actions to advance transformative cultural and in-
stitutional change. A robust strategy for deep change has
many dimensions, including designing innovative eco-
nomic and governance models attuned to contemporary
challenges, debating alternative global visions, and nurt-
uring a shift toward values of global solidarity, ecological
sensibility, and lives of qualitative fulfilment over con-
sumerism. Critical to this approach are new initiatives to
foster connectivity across popular movements and civil
society networks, thereby creating a path to an overarch-
ing movement of global citizens for a Great Transition.
The three action prongs—reform, remediation, and re-
design—are best pursued synergistically, rather than as
independent strategies. Non-government actors and
networks are critical to all dimensions: prodding govern-
mental reform, prompting calamity control, and galvan-
izing transformative movements. In parallel, research
can better support and guide these efforts by giving pri-
ority to the exploration of nonconventional futures and
their links to near term choices. For example, for cli-
mate, integrated assessment models used to quantify
greenhouse gas emissions underlying climate projections
do neither incorporate the potentially disruptive feed-
backs of climate impacts on economic and demographic
drivers of emissions, nor are they equipped to deal with
deep societal or economic transformation. Most imme-
diately, assessments such as those of the IPCC need to
be enhanced to incorporate disruptive change, whether
the feedbacks of severe climate change on economic and
demographic assumptions or the impacts of a deep shift
in human values and institutions.
Beyond the climate issue, the search for pathways to
social-ecological sustainability requires integrated ana-
lysis across sectors, geographic scales, and time horizons.
The research agenda now taking shape to address this
challenge [21] would be well advised to highlight the ex-
ploration of system discontinuity and transformation as
a critical dimension for deepening understanding, broad-
ening policy, and engaging citizens. Facing a holistic
challenge, we need a new transdisciplinary science that,
in collaboration with artists, historians, innovators and
social visionaries, can propel awareness and action by
illuminating the landscape of the future, in all its dire
peril and unique opportunity. This would better connect
science, policy and society, and foster explorations of
alternative paradigms for a civilization fit for the twenty-
first century. The COVID-19 pandemic has painfully
demonstrated the real risk of historical discontinuity. A
varied array of other social-ecological discontinuities can
plausibly emerge in the coming decades. Going forward,
scenario assessments with claims to relevance and rigor
must emphasize nonconventional global futures.
Acknowledgements
Not applicable.
Authors’contributions
Both authors contributed equally to the manuscript. The authors read and
approved the final manuscript.
Authors’information
PR is the founding president of the Tellus Institute. The overarching theme
of his work has been the development of visions and strategies for a
transformation to more resilient and equitable forms of social development.
Toward this larger aim, his research has spanned issues (energy, water,
climate change, ecosystems, and sustainable development) and spatial scales
(local, national, and global).
Since the 1980s, RS worked at the interface of science and policy on
integrated assessment and scenario development for international
environmental issues in the context of sustainable development at
institutions such as the national Environmental Assessment Agency and
Wageningen Environmental Research in The Netherlands, the European
Environment Agency (EEA) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC).
Funding
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the
public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Availability of data and materials
Not applicable.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Competing interests
Not applicable.
Author details
1
Tellus Institute, 2 Garden St, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
2
Wageningen
Environmental Research, Droevendaalsesteeg 4, 6708 PB 9101, 6700, HB,
Wageningen, The Netherlands.
Received: 11 February 2020 Accepted: 22 June 2020
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