The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern Europe after the End of the Second World War and Their Influence on the UPA and OUN Movements

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A N N A L E S
U N I V E R S I T A T I S
A P U L E N S I S
SERIES HISTORICA
23/I
Minorities in East
–
Central Europe
throughout the Twentieth Century
Edited by Sorin Arhire
Editura Mega
2019

This volume was supported by MEN – CNFIS, project number CNFIS – FDI-2019-0660,
entitled:
Acțiuni și instrumente suport pentru susținerea cercetării de excelență din
Universitatea „1 Decembrie 1918” din Alba Iulia
.
EDITORIAL BOARD
Radu Ardevan
(Babeș-Bolyai University
of Cluj-Napoca)
Barbara Deppert-Lippitz
(Deutsches Archäologisches
Institut Frankfurt am Main)
Keith Hitchins
(University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign)
Eva Mârza
(1 Decembrie 1918 University
of Alba Iulia)
Bogdan Murgescu
(University of Bucharest)
Alexandru-Florin Platon
(Alexandru Ioan Cuza University
of Jassy)
Alex Rubel
(Archaeological Institute of Jassy)
Ernst Christoph Suttner
(Universität Wien)
Michael Vickers
(Jesus College, University
of Oxford)
Acad. Alexandru Zub
(A. D. Xenopol History Institute
of Jassy)
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
Daniel Dumitran (Chief-Editor)
Sorin Arhire (Secretary)
Ileana Burnichioiu, Mihai Gligor, Valer Moga
Cosmin Popa-Gorjanu, Marius Rotar
Cover image: Photo (approx. 1897) with
Lole
in a secondary role. Helga Lutsch’s
personal archive (Heilbronn)
Copyright © 2019, 1 Decembrie 1918 University of Alba Iulia
15-17 Unirii Street
Tel.: +40-258-811412; Fax: +40-258-806260
E-mail: aua_historia@uab.ro
Web: http://auash.uab.ro/AUASH
ISSN 1453-9306
www.edituramega.ro

CONTENTS
EVA MÂRZA
Valer Moga – omul și profesorul – la aniversare 5
SORIN ARHIRE
Minorities from East–Central Europe in the Twentieth Century:
A Retrospective 11
STUDIES AND ARTICLES
HANNELORE BAIER, RAMONA BESOIU ȘI SORIN RADU
„Fuga lolelor” din Agnita – transfer de funcționalitate și de semnificații 21
SIMONA ADAM AND MIRCEA MĂRAN
Ethnic Identities Face to Face:
Serbian and Romanian Minorities from the
Banat between History and Memory 41
HALIDA UMBAROVA
Post-Pogrom Research Processes Cited in Documents and
Newspapers Published in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries 53
VLADIMIR ROMANOV
The United States and National Self-Determination of Minorities in the
‘Russian Space,’ 1914–1920 67
TATYANA KATTSINA AND LUDMILA MEZIT
Between the Front Line and the Rear: The Position of the Jewish Evacuees
of the First World War in Eastern Siberia in the Russian Empire 85
NATALIIA ZHUKOVSKAYA
Canada and the Problem of Protection of Minorities in the League of
Nations 97
KEZBAN ACAR
The Legal Status of Russian Refugees in Turkey in the 1920s 109
MYKOLA HALIV AND VASYL ILNYTSKYI
The Industrial School for Jewish Girls, Sambir (1925–1939):
A Local Institutional Description 119
LUKÁŠ NOVOTNÝ AND ANDREJ TÓTH
The Censorship Praxis and the Press Law in the First Czechoslovak

4
Republic and the German and Hungarian Minorities 133
SORIN ARHIRE
The Governing of Patriarch Miron Cristea and His Policy toward Jews:
The Attitude of Great Britain 151
OTTMAR TRAȘCĂ
Situația din Transilvania de Nord în ultimele luni ale anului 1940 în
viziunea Consulatului German din Cluj 163
MAIK SCHMERBAUCH
German Catholics as a Minority in the Catholic Church of Polish Silesia
after 1945 191
TOMÁŠ ŘEPA
The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern
Europe after the End of the Second World War and Their Influence
on the UPA and OUN Movements 199
ANNA G. PIOTROWSKA
Re-Negotiating the Public Image of Gypsy Musicians in the Polish
Everyday Press of the Communist Period 217
ELEONORA-MARIA POPA
Aspecte referitoare la statutul social al minorităților în timpul
regimului comunist din România 229
NURI KORKMAZ AND SERPIL GÜDÜL
Accommodation of Minorities in Nation-States during the Twentieth
Century: The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria and the Policies of Communist
Rule between 1945 and 1989 245
MISCELLANEA
CONSTANTIN I. STAN
Prima Alba Iulia – „Manifestul” de la Darnița din 13/26 aprilie 1917 265
ABSTRACTS 281
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 291
LIST OF AUTHORS 295

Annales Universitatis Apulensis. Series Historica
23, I (2019): 199-215.
THE ETHNIC DISPLACEMENTS OF UKRAINIANS AND RUTHENIANS IN
EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND
THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE UPA AND OUN MOVEMENTS
TOMÁŠ ŘEPA∗
The current shape of Eastern and Central Europe was created by forced
national migration after the Second World War. The results of this dreadful
conflict have had great impact because they have led to the decision to create
new borders in territory on which displaced population groups can settle. Thus,
the current shapes of states and ethnic boundaries have not developed
naturally. Rather they are the result of the bloodiest conflict in human history,
in which the violent expressions of Nazism and Communism clashed in the
Eastern Europe. These struggles were also influenced by the forces of radical
nationalism of all the participating nations. Unlike Nazism and Communism,
nationalism remains strong even today, and it still has the potential to ignite
dangerous conflicts. The forced relocation of the inhabitants to places where
they had nothing in common had produced feelings of injustice, and in the
memories of witnesses have remained an unfair ‘solution.’ Yet, even in the
attitudes of younger generations who are only acquainted with the events and
consequences of the Second World War indirectly, we can also find strong
traces of disagreement. All the participants, however, would surely agree on
one fact. The transfers of inhabitants and the transformation of the frontiers
where the ethnic collectives originally lived were radical solutions to the severe
societal tensions of that period. For the Ukrainians, the Second World War was
just another disaster that hit this great nation. The Ukrainians did not achieve
their independence after the two world wars; they gained their autonomous
statehood only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
This paper focuses on the forced migration of Slavic nationalities after
the Second World War, the migration of Ukrainians, Ruthenians (Lemkos), and
also of the Poles. All these forced movements were important in their impact on
Bandera’s movement (‘banderovci’). In this context, we deliberately ignore the
relocation of other nationalities in Eastern Europe, in order to emphasize the
major events that have had the greatest impact on Bandera’s movement and
their activities. The radical nationalist tendencies of the Ukrainian nation
manifested themselves in the founding of various organisations already active
during the interwar period. The most important organisation was the Bandera
group. The Bandera’s followers became the most distinguished offshoot of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was founded in 1929 by
∗ University of Defence in Brno; e-mail: tomas.repa@unob.cz.

TOMÁŠ ŘEPA
200
Ukrainian emigrants to Vienna to fight for the independent Ukraine. Radical
nationalists were firmly associated with the wealth of Ukrainian minorities
living in much larger territories than the territory of today’s Ukraine.
Particularly in today’s south-eastern Poland and in an area known under the
historical name of Galicia, there were violent conflicts between the Bandera
group, retreating German troops, the Red Army, and the Polish army. These
clashes occurred as much during the Second World War as in its aftermath.
Galicia became the stage of further bloody conflicts at a time when, at other
places, consolidation had already begun, and many other civilians finally
experienced a period of peace. In order to understand the events that preceded
the displacement of the population in this area, it is necessary to examine the
connection between the local Ukrainian minorities and the Bandera group and
to depict the development of radical Ukrainian nationalism in the twentieth
century.
In the post-war period, the Germans could lose a life of similar probability as
the Poles, who represented another group of population shifted to the west.
However, the Ukrainians, Romanians, or members of the Baltic, Caucasian, or
Crimean nations were more likely to be killed in those relocations. During or as
a direct result of escape, expulsion or deportation, less than one German and
Poles died out of ten, while in the case of citizens of the Baltic States and the
USSR one of five died. In general, the deportation took place in the east, and
the more Soviet the regime was involved in it, the more deadly it was.1
Historian Timothy Snyder reports that in the Soviet Union and Poland
during the war in its aftermath, 12 million Ukrainians, Poles, Belarusians and
other nationalities fled or were violently force to move, not counting about 10
million people who were killed by the Germans during the occupation, the
majority of whom had been forced to migrate before that.2
The complete version of the story of later multi-national forced
migrations begins in the aftermath of the First World War, since it produced a
situation full of tensions from a political as well as ethnic point of view.3 These
conditions eventually became increasingly unsustainable, and the period of the
Second World War only constituted the accumulation of this process. The
oldest generation of the Bandera group perceived Stalin’s Soviet Russia and
Poland under the leadership of Marshal Pilsudski as two states that, after 1918,
divided Ukraine amongst themselves and suppressed Ukrainian national rights.
The nationalist tendencies of all three of these nations were at stake. Inter-war
Ukrainian nationalism manifested itself mainly in the Polish part of the divided
1 Timothy Snyder,
Krvavé země: Evropa mezi Hitlerem a Stalinem
[Blood Lands: Europe between
Hitler and Stalin], trans. Petruška Šustrová (Prague: Paseka/Prostor, 2013), 320–321.
2 Ibid.
3 See A. J. P. Taylor,
Příčiny druhé světové války
[The Origins of the Second World War], trans.
Stanislav Cita (Bratislava: Perfekt, 2005).

The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern Europe
201
territory; under the Soviet Union there was a much harder regime, which did
not allow emergence of organised opposition. As the first political leader of the
OUN, Colonel Jevhen Konovalec,4 said:
The Ukrainian state-level political goal will be achieved only by organised
struggle, especially against the Soviet Union and Poland; The Ukrainians will
be able to dare to fight this fight only when one of these states or both of them
gets into conflict or other civil wars with other states.5
By 1933, the OUN did not expect Germans to invade the Soviet Union.
Later, they relied on a possible Soviet conflict with Japan, which invaded China
in 1931, threatening Stalin’s interests. Since 1933, Colonel Konovalec hoped to
gain assistance from other European countries, especially from Germany.6
The general concept of approach to the Ukrainian minority in Poland
was flawed. The total number of Ukrainians7 in the Polish interwar8 state was
over six million, and thus it was the largest minority within the polity. The
history of the coexistence of the Ukrainians and Poles was full of unresolved
disputes involving bloody pogroms. But Ukrainians experienced even harsher
treatment in Soviet Russia, where they were exposed to drastic russification.
Poland and the Soviet Union have advantages through their greater military
power and the Ukrainian nationalists felt trapped, which led to desperate
counter-actions on their side. In addition, a famine9 occurred in the Soviet state
in this period, which is still discussed as a possible attempt of Soviet Russia to
commit genocide of the Ukrainians in order to break their resistance. This
4 Jevhen Konovalec (14 June 1891 – 23 May 1938) was historically the first politician leader of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. After its establishment, it focused mainly on expanding
the contacts that could help create an independent Ukraine, especially in the Ukrainian
emigration in the USA, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and also in Czechoslovakia. For
these activities, the enemy of the Soviet Union was under the supervision of NKVD agents and
one of them, Pavel Sudoplatov, was also assassinated in 1938. Tomáš Řepa,
Banderovci, celkové
zhodnocení projevů ukrajinského nacionalismu v československých dějinách po roce 1945
[The
Bandera’s Movement, Overall Evaluation of the Manifestations of Ukrainian Nationalism in
Czechoslovak History after 1945] (PhD diss., Masaryk University in Brno, 2017), 11.
5 Ján Mlynárik,
Osud banderovců a tragédie řeckokatolické církve
[The Fate of the Bandera
Group and the Tragedy of the Greek-Catholic Church]
(Prague: Libri, 2005), 21.
6 Tomáš Řepa,
Banderovci. Politické souvislosti, následky zneužití tématu komunistickou
propagandou, návaznost na hybridní konflikt v současnosti
[Bandera’s Units: Political Contexts,
Consequences of Abuse by Communist Propaganda, Continuity to Hybrid Conflict in the Present
Time] (Prague: Academia, 2019), 53–54.
7 For precise statistics of the number of Ukrainians before the Second World War, see Paul Robert
Magocsi,
Historical Atlas of East Central Europe
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 49.
8 Clarence A. Manning,
Ukrainian Resistance: The Story of the Ukrainian National Liberation
Movement in Modern Times
(New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1949), 17–
23.
9 A description of the events of the Great Famine in 1933 contains the chapter of this publication
Lynne Violová,
Neznámý gulag: Ztracený svět Stalinových zvláštních osad
[Unknown Gulag: The
Lost World of Stalin’s Special Settlements] (Prague: Naše vojsko, 2012), 211–234.

TOMÁŠ ŘEPA
202
famine reached its most catastrophic proportions in 1933. It was a dramatic
situation that had remained unresolved for a long time, leading to the escalation
of violence and the rise of mutual unresolved disputes.10
The Ukrainian underground OUN undertook sabotage and assassination,
destroyed and damaged communications, assaulted trains and mail transports,
committed a many of robberies and thefts of state property, persecuted and
terrorized the population (in the case of Poland, mainly in Galicia), burned
farms, and robbed postal offices. Many of these actions took place to ensure that
the organisation had enough funds for its further terrorist and intelligence
work. The intelligence activities engaged in by the groups included espionage.
The situation resembled a civil war. Polish government units actively
participated in the repression of the Ukrainian population, regardless of
whether they supported the OUN or not. The polonization of the Ukrainians in
Galicia and Western Ukraine was carried out by drastic methods, which are
inadmissible in today’s civilized world, and Polish historians also admit this.
Similar events also occurred in a much larger area inhabited by ethnic
Ukrainians in the Soviet Union between the wars. However, there were more
harsh conditions due to the much tougher regime.11 Due to Stalin’s repression,
the OUN was faced with great difficulties, so Ukrainian nationalism at that time
manifested itself primarily on Polish territory. For example, on 15 June 1934,
the Ukrainian nationalists in Warsaw committed the assassination of Polish
Interior Minister Bronislaw Pieracki.12 He was paradoxically more likely to
follow a moderate approach towards the Ukrainian minority. He understood
that the current policy towards the Ukrainians would not solve anything and,
on the contrary, would incite further violence. This is an illustration of the
inconsistency of some acts of the Ukrainian nationalists.
In connection with the assassination process13 of Minister Pieracki,
Stepan Bandera,14 the later most-known OUN leader, was arrested. He was not
10 Mlynárik,
Osud banderovců
, 23.
11 For illustrating the cruelty of relations in Stalin’s Russia, see Roj Medvedev,
Stalin a stalinizmus
–
historické črty
[Stalin and Stalinism – Historical Features], trans. Melita Albrechtová et al.
(Bratislava: Obzor, 1990).
12 Jan Fiala,
Zpráva o akci B
[Report on Action B]
(Prague: Vyšehrad, 1994), 25–27.
13 As a revenge for assassination, ten leaders of the OUN were arrested.
14 Stepan Bandera (1 January 1909 – 15 October 1959) was the most prominent leader of the OUN.
The detachment of this organization has been named after Bandera since 1939, and under the
name the Bandera group (‘banderovci’) came into history by an armed struggle for an
independent Ukraine. During his life, Stepan Bandera was imprisoned by several regimes for his
attitudes and nationalist activities, and his life only illustrates the tragic destiny of Ukraine in the
twentieth century. After the end of the Second World War, he moved to exile in Munich,
Bavaria, to continue his past activities. The Soviet Union remained so dangerous that it was
decided to liquidate him. It was done by KGB agent Bohdan Stashinsky using cyanide, which was
injected into Bandera’s face. For many contemporary nationalists in Ukraine, Stepan Bandera’s

The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern Europe
203
involved in the terrorist act itself, but he was now in the OUN leadership which
was responsible for that act of terrorism. Stepan Bandera was subsequently
sentenced to death but his sentence was reduced to imprisonment until death
by the Polish president.15
All considerations of power politics led the OUN to seek German aid,
since Germany was the only power which had either the will or the means to
attack its archenemies, Poland and the Soviet Union. The great problem was
that of dealing with the Germans without becoming their helpless puppet,
given the enormous disparity of strength between the parties. Up to 1939, the
Ukrainian Nationalist leaders had been confident that Germany was interested
in securing the independence of the Ukraine and felt that Germany would deal
fairly with them. To an extent, however, they were less dependent on Germany
than this trustful attitude might have implied.16
An important event in the further development of the OUN was the
liquidation of Jevhen Konovalec by NKVD agent Pavel Sudoplatov,17 who killed
Konovalec with an explosive hidden in a postal package.18 All the activities of
Ukrainian nationalists were under the supervision of Stalin’s agents, who
rightly feared that their nationalist tendencies might be a threat. Stalin did not
hesitate to deploy a whole network of spies abroad and devoted vast financial
resources to the elimination of both real and imagined opposition. Jevhen
Konovalec, head of the Ukrainian nationalists, was replaced by Andrij
Melnyk.19 Melnyk, however, was not as popular as Konovalec. Hence, he
legacy is still alive and is reflected in the political situation in the country. Řepa,
Banderovci
,
celkové
,
13.
15 Fiala,
Zpráva
, 30.
16 John A. Armstrong,
Ukrainian Nationalism
(New York and London: Columbia University Press,
1963), 42.
17 Pavel Sudoplatov (7 July 1907 – 26 September 1996) was a Soviet general and a spy. During his
lifetime, he became the main organizer of many spy events, for example, against Trotsky and
during the Second World War against German troops. In 1953 he was arrested, released in 1968
and fully rehabilitated until 1992. Řepa,
Banderovci
,
celkové
,
14.
18 Pavel Sudoplatov later made a statement in his memoirs. This attack was carried out on Stalin’s
direct order, and Stalin planned everything personally. Also interesting is the way the explosive
was disguised. Specifically, it was a confectionery package, a traditional Ukrainian gift and sign of
respect. Pavel Sudoplatov,
Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness: A Soviet
Spymaster
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 23–24.
19 Andrij Melnyk (12 December 1890 – 1 November 1964) was the leader of the OUN, which
included mainly older and less radical nationalities. During the interwar period, more than the
others, OUN leaders focused on political debate and contacts with the Greek-Catholic Church in
Western Ukraine. After 1938, Melnyk probably became the agent of the German Abwehr.
Melnyk’s faction co-operated with the Germans more than Bandera’s faction, but also sought to
create an independent Ukraine. Bandera’s faction disapproved of the targets and methods they
chose, and this disagreement weakened them. Many of Melnyk’s closest members were liquidated
by the Bandera group, and thus Bandera’s faction became the dominant component of OUN. In
1944, Melnyk was interned in a crackdown against the national movement in the Sachsenhausen

TOMÁŠ ŘEPA
204
turned to Stepan Bandera and appointed him as an envoy in Poland. Originally,
the unified organisation continued to incorporate the more radical younger
members who joined Bandera’s faction, dissatisfied with how the current
leadership planned their next steps. On the other hand, the other faction,
composed of the elderly moderate members (Melnyk’s faction), was
increasingly inclined to cooperate with Germany. Thus, by this internal split,
Bandera’s group was finally formed. What all the factions had in common was
the goal of the emergence of a separate Ukraine and the transformation of the
geographic form of Eastern Europe.20
The outbreak of the Second World War was, for Ukrainian nationalists,
the moment they relied so much on in their plans. Of course, nobody could
know how exactly how the situation would develop. If the war did not break
off, nationalists would never think about implementing their ambitious plans
for an independent and powerful Ukraine. Later national movements were also
the result of the failure of these ideas. The right to self-determination is the
legitimate right of all nations in the world. Ukrainian minorities living in
Poland and the Soviet Union did not have the opportunity to manage the
territory in which they lived or to freely develop their culture and customs. The
use of the Ukrainian language was under the control of the state apparatus in
the processes of polonization in the west and russification to the east. The
explosion of national passions was to be expected. It was left to the Ukrainians
to either reconcile with foreign domination and repression or to fight with
weapon in hand. The Bandera group chose a violent path with no possible
return, as it bet everything on the one card and relied on the particular
outcome of the Second World War. The result of the war then also determined
their destiny.
The Second World War began for the Ukrainian nationalists in its first
stage, with the invasion of Poland.21 After the combined invasions of Nazi
Germany and the Red Army into the western part of today’s Belarus and
Ukraine,22 Ukrainian minorities found themselves under Soviet rule. Stepan
Bandera nevertheless developed extensive organisational and promotional
activities amongst the Ukrainians who lived in the part of south-eastern Poland
that was occupied by the Germans. Bandera won over the Ukrainian youth in
concentration camp. After the Second World War, he went into exile in Luxembourg, where he
died in 1964. Melnyk remained politically active and led several Ukrainian emigrant
organizations but was not such a symbol of resistance and a threat to the Soviet Union as Stepan
Bandera, and as the only former OUN leader he died a natural death in exile in Luxembourg.
Řepa,
Banderovci
,
celkové
,
14.
20 Mlynárik,
Osud banderovců
, 22.
21 See Martin Gilbert,
Druhá světová válka. Úplná historie
[The Second World War: Full History],
trans. Zdeněk Hron
(Prague: BB art, 2006).
22 For the situation at the beginning of the war, see Magocsi,
Historical Atlas
, 153.

The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern Europe
205
particular. Young Ukrainian women were included in the civil network of the
OUN and young Ukrainians were trained to use weapons for other combat
tasks.23
When the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the
Ukrainian nationalists were assigned to German troops operating in the
direction of Lviv. German generals wanted to use the fanaticism of Ukrainian
nationalists for their benefit. There probably also occurred some promises that
if the unit were to gain Lviv, there would be an independent government in
Ukraine, and Stepan Bandera would become its chairman. This was probably
not a spontaneously generous German idea, but a suggestion of Bandera and
those around him, who tried to speed up the stream of events and make the
most of the dynamic development of events at that time. Lviv was in the midst
of bloodshed and confusion, and it was already 29 June 1941.24
The key date for Ukrainian nationalists was 30 June 1941, when
Ukrainian independence was proclaimed in Lviv, and Jaroslav Stecko,25
Bandera’s associate, became chairman of the Ukrainian government. Andrij
Melnyk remained cautious in this situation. At this moment, Stepan Bandera
may have felt triumphant at fulfilling the life dream of many other
nationalistically-minded Ukrainians.26
However, this fulfilled vision did not last long. Nazi leadership had been
taken aback by this step that prompted such a positive response from the
Ukrainian population. After just three days of Ukrainian self-rule, the Gestapo
broke the Ukrainian government in Lviv. Ukrainian officials were arrested and
taken to Berlin, where they were forced to revoke the proclamation of
independence. As they refused, they were sent into concentration camps. Many
of Bandera’s associates were executed or imprisoned. Bandera himself remained
until 1944 in the concentration camp Sachsenhausen.27 At that time, he lost two
brothers in Nazi concentration camps; previously, the NKVD had executed his
father. Of course, Bandera had ceased to trust the Germans. The Nazi
23 Mlynárik,
Osud banderovců
, 24.
24 Gilbert,
Druhá světová válka
, 249; Tadeusz Piotrowski,
Poland’s Holocaust: Ethnic Strife,
Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918
–
1947
(Jefferson: Mc Farland, 1998), 210.
25 Jaroslav Stecko (19 January 1912 – 5 July 1986) was a Ukrainian politician and member of the
OUN. On 30 June 1941, he participated in the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in Lviv
and became the Prime Minister of Ukraine. He was arrested and taken to Germany for twelve
days, where he was forced to withdraw this declaration. As Stepan Bandera refused to withdraw
the Ukrainian independence, he was sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where he
remained until 1944. After the Second World War he lived in Munich, was one of the leaders of
the exile OUN, and he also devoted himself to publishing activities. Řepa,
Banderovci
,
celkové
,
17.
26 Mlynárik,
Osud banderovců
, 25.
27 Fiala,
Zpráva
, 35.

TOMÁŠ ŘEPA
206
occupation administration only considered the Ukrainians a threat, or a source
of cheap manpower; it did not need them and did not perceive them as equal
partners. The creation of an independent Slavic state was part of the diplomatic
or strategic intentions of Nazi Germany.
As one of the best Second World War German generals Erich von
Manstein said:
Adolf Hitler presupposed that the Soviet Union could be defeated in one
campaign. This plan was possible only if the Soviet Union could break out from
within. But the policy Adolf Hitler pursues, contrary to the opinion of the
military leadership, had been carried out by his Imperial Commissioners and
security forces in the occupied areas of the East could only achieve the
opposite.28
Manstein expressed this attitude with the assumption that the Ukrainian
nationalism could be utilized in much more effective manner. On the eve of the
Second World War, there were at least 40 million Ukrainians living in the vast
territory. If the Reich Occupation Administration treated the Ukrainians as
something other than ‘inferiors,’ then this huge number of inhabitants could be
used in a war with the Soviet Union, under which the overwhelming majority
of them had lived and for which the majority lacked sympathy. During the
advance of the Wehrmacht into Eastern Europe, German soldiers were first
welcomed in many places as liberators, but the expectations of the population
were very quickly disappointed. In both Ukraine and Poland, a tough regime
has been set up to terrorize the local population. Their vision of free life was
quickly replaced by further suffering, this time inflicted by Nazi occupiers.
Adolf Hitler and other powers did not rely on the support of the Slavic
population, which, according to their plans,29 was destined for annihilation or
slave labour for the Nazi Empire.
The radical nationalists reacted to the situation of the Ukrainians by
creating armed organisations.30 In 1942, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)
was established.31 The first commander of this other radical organisation was
28 Erich von Manstein,
Ztracená vítězství
[Lost Victories], vol. 1,
Paměti německého polního
maršála
[Memory of the German Field Marshal], trans. Jiří Fidler (Brno: Jota, 2006), 243; Correlli
Barnett,
Hitlerovi generálové
[Hitler’s Generals], trans. Petr Antonín
(Brno: Jota, 1997), 245–273.
29 See Jaroslava Milotová, „Česká otázka“ a nacistické plány na její řešení [‘The Czech Question’
and the Nazi Plans for Its Solution], in
Vynútený rozchod. Vyhnanie a vysídlenie
z Československa 1938-1947 v porovnání s Poľskom, Maďarskom a Juhosláviou
[Forced Gauge:
Ejection and Displacement from Czechoslovakia 1938–1947 Compared to Poland, Hungary and
Yugoslavia], eds Detlef Brandes et al. (Bratislava: Veda, 1999), 21–30.
30 Fiala,
Zpráva
, 35.
31 UPA was not the only armed organization in this area, but others never achieved more than
local significance. During the war, UPA was the only truly substantial organized combat force of
Ukrainian, especially after 1943. Antoni B. Szcześniak and Wiesław Z. Szota,
Wojna polska z
UPA. Droga do nikąd
[Polish War with UPA: Road to Nowhere]
(Warsaw: Bellona, 2013), 140.

The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern Europe
207
Roman Šuchevyč,32 alias Taras Čuprynka. UPA fought against all those who
could threaten the emergence of independent Ukraine and the subsequent
transformation of the borders according to the ideas of all Ukrainian minorities
in Eastern Europe. They fought not only the Nazi occupation administration,
but also the local Polish population and the Polish resistance organisations of all
sorts.33 In addition, the Soviet partisans (such as the Kovpak’s troop) were added
to the battle lines, as were the Red Army and its troops. The situation of the
Bandera group was complicated; they only they relied on the local Ukrainian
population. This produced consequences for the Ukrainian population there.
By fall 1943, the Bandera group was substantially in control of the
country districts of Volhynia and south-western Polesia. The Germans, of
course, held the towns and, with difficulty, maintained movement on the
principal roads, but such a large area east of Rovno was under full control of the
insurgents that the insurgents set about constructing a ‘state’ apparatus,
including military training camps, hospitals, and a school system. The total
number of persons involved in the movement, including medical,
administrative, and instructional personnel, as well as fighting men, was tens of
thousands. The weakness of the insurgent structure became apparent in
February 1944, when the Red Army advanced into Volhynia and reached the
Lutsk-Rovno line.34
During the German occupation, the nationality problem in Poland grew
to a whole new dimension. The war definitively sparked conflicts between
various nationalities and completed the dissolution of the Polish society based
on a national principle. Ethnic antagonism was steadily growing during the pre-
war years. The tragic fate of the Jews in Poland did not lead to deeper
cooperation between them and the Poles, even though they were recognized as
the only minority that did not collaborate with occupying regime. Bigger
conflicts arose between the Poles and the other national minorities during the
interwar period, especially in the case of Ukrainians, as a result of the escalating
conflict in Volhynia in 1943, which culminated from the tension between
Poland and the Ukraine in the previous period. The Polish government in exile
and the leadership of Armija Krajowa understood that the Ukrainians, White
Russians and Lithuanians were not on friendly terms with the Poles.
32 Roman Šuchevyč (30 July 1907 – 5 March 1950) alias ‘Taras Čuprynka’ was a member of OUN
since 1930. His most important function was the position of the UPA commander from 1942 until
his death in the shootout with NKVD agents in 1950. Given the poor outlook in the encirclement,
he shot himself rather than be captured alive. Bandera’s troops fought against that mighty power
for a very long time, thanks to the personality of their commander and their perfectly
sophisticated guerrilla combat techniques. After the liquidation of Šuchevyč, the organized
resistance Bandera group definitively disappeared. Řepa,
Banderovci
,
celkové
,
110.
33 For example WIN
(Wolność i Niepodleglość), NSZ (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne) or AK (Armia
Krajowa).
34 Armstrong,
Ukrainian Nationalism
, 156–157.

TOMÁŠ ŘEPA
208
Nevertheless, they were not able to create a program for conflict management
and coexistence with national miniorities in the post-war period. They
concentrated only on very general presentations of possible laws for the
protection of national minorities. The program of population transfer was
largely organised and completed by Polish communists, who took power in
Poland.35
Some of the Ukrainians enlisted during the Second World War, on a
voluntary basis36 or through the use of forceful levies, to some SS divisions,37
such as Galizien or Karpatien. But this was only at the very end of the war,
when German troops were unable to stop the Red Army. The Nazi occupation
administration controlled large areas, too large for their full own supervision, so
they used the Ukrainian militia and the police for the purpose of control. These
units tried to assist with maintaining peace in the background, often
cooperating with the UPA. Before the arrival of the war front many of them
strengthened the ranks of the UPA.38 Even the SS divisions, after crushing the
Red Army struggle, ceased to exist and part of their soldiers joined the Bandera
group. However, it is not possible to mix the fanaticism of the elite divisions of
the SS with these units formed at the end of the war. Many Ukrainians
continued to perceive the danger of the Soviet Union and other communist
rulers to be so serious that they joined the German forces and then quickly
deserted or found themselves at the rear of the Red Army. For many of them
cooperation with the Bandera group came as the only possible way to survive at
all, and after a while they wanted to go again on their own way.39
Desperate combat operations against everyone had escalated primarily
with the approaching end of the Second World War. The Bandera’s troops
became accustomed to the harsh conditions.40 The tragic reality was the
burning of villages of all parties involved. Guerrilla tactics prevailed, striking
and then fading back into the background. In this way, the fighting continued
after the end of the Second World War. Overall, the activities of the Bandera
35 Michal Šmigeľ et al., “Ethnic Cleansings and a Concept of Ethnically Homogenous States in
Europe (In the Context of Historical Experience and Memory),” in
Resettlement and
Extermination of the Populations: A Syndrome of Modern History
, ed. Zlatica Zudová–Lešková
(Prague: Institute of History, Czech Academy of Sciences, 2015), 101–102.
36 Bohdan Zilynskyj,
Ukrajinci v Čechách a na Moravě –
stručný nástin dějin
[The Ukrainians in
Bohemia and Moravia – A Brief Outline of History] (Prague: Sdružení Čechů z Volyně a jejich
přátel, 2002), 48.
37 See Gordon Williamson,
Věrnost je mou ctí. Osobní výpovědi bývalých příslušníků jednotek SS
[Loyalty is My Honour: Personal Testimonies of Former SS Units], trans. Dona Zalmanová
(Prague: Svojtka & Company, 1999).
38 Archive of Security Forces in Prague (ASFP), fund 305 (State Security Centre 1945–1948), vol.
305–143–1, fol. 15–16.
39 Mlynárik,
Osud banderovců
, 26.
40 Fiala,
Zpráva
, 36.

The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern Europe
209
group were focused on violent forms of resistance and the struggle for
independent Ukraine. It is necessary to say that, regarding radical Ukrainian
nationalists, a number of ‘ordinary’ criminal elements had joined in all of these
activities. It is important to carefully consider who entered the ranks of the
UPA and for what reasons, and how this person subsequently acted.41 The
members of the Bandera group were always referred to as fascists by communist
propaganda. Their actions, however, were really inspired by radical
nationalism. Nazism and, in turn, fascism, which did not allow the emergence
of independent Ukraine, were perceived by the nationalists as another enemy,
and the combat operations and clashes with the Germans only confirmed it.42
From the point of view of national issues, the situation after the end of
the Second World War was extremely complicated. On the one hand, it was
intended to consolidate the problems and return to a peaceful order, but on the
other hand, the most devastating conflict in human history forced the
representatives of the victorious powers to think about the most radical possible
solutions to prevent similar conflicts. For this reason, those in power decided to
support national and ethnic movements, which led to the transformation of
geographical and ethnic borders.43 For the Ukrainians, the Poles, the Germans,
and other nationalities spread out in the East of Europe, it meant not only an
irreversible change of residence, but it also forced them to abandon their
traditions and culture. For Ukrainians, this period of large displacements
represented another failure of national efforts. Ukraine, as after the First World
War, did not form an independent state, but it had suffered huge human and
material damages. Radicals from OUN and UPA44 have decided that self-
sacrifice is the only possible decision for any nationalist. For the Ukrainians,
this meant the beginning of another war, this time with the clear result of the
annihilation of the nationalist movement. The Bandera group had decided to
continue fighting.
Stepan Bandera, after his release from the Nazi concentration camp in
1944, was persuaded to cooperate with the Germans, which he refused. He tried
to seek help for his units in exile. At the very end of the Second World War, he
41 See Peter J. Potychnyj,
My Journey
, part 1, bk. 4 (Toronto and Lvov: Litopys UPA, 2008).
42 Janusz Zajączkowski,
Trudne sąsiedztwa. Polska i Ukraina a Rosja i Niemcy
[Difficult
Neighbourhoods: Poland and Ukraine and Russia and Germany] (Lublin: Werset, 2013), 399–402;
Milan Syrůček,
Banderovci –
hrdinové nebo bandité?
[The Bandera Group – Heroes or Bandits?]
(Prague: Epocha, 2008).
43 For an overview of legal assumptions of population transfers based on international agreements,
see Jan Kuklík,
Mýty a realita tzv. “Benešových dekretů”: dekrety prezidenta republiky 1940–
1945
[Myths and Reality of the So-Called ‘Beneš Decrees’: Decrees of the President of the
Republic 1940
–
1945] (Prague: Linde, 2002), 121–133.
44 René Petráš,
Cizinci ve vlastní zemi.
Dějiny a současnost národnostního napětí v Evropě
[Foreigners in Their Own Country: History and Presence of National Voltage in Europe] (Prague:
Auditorium, 2012), 100–106.

TOMÁŠ ŘEPA
210
moved to the American occupation zone in Bavaria and settled in Munich. This
decision was later reflected in Czechoslovakian post-war relations.45 The
Bandera group consisted of two components, the civilian (the OUN) and the
military (the UPA). In the Polish, Czechoslovakian and Soviet news reports,
they are usually referred to only in the post-war period as UPA.46
The organised resistance of the Bandera group after the end of the
Second World War moved primarily to today’s south-eastern Poland, to
Galicia.47 The Ukrainian minority in the area provided Bandera’s troops with a
base and support for clashes with the Polish army. This was particularly
important for the sustainability of badly damaged units, which were also
supported by food supplies and munitions.48
Galicia, the only area in which the Ukrainians lived, remained in
Poland, which, at the decision of the superpowers, made a move on the map to
the west. The eastern territory which the Poland lost to the Soviet Union was
compensated by the inclusion of previously German lands into Poland... All
these movements of countries on the map were also accompanied by ethnic
movements, and they had the greatest impact on the further development of
the areas concerned. The change of borders was also sought by the Ukrainians,
but the outcome of the Second World War did not allow for the realization of
any of the objectives with which the radical nationalists had entered the war.
Life for the Bandera group between the relocation of the Ukrainian
minority from Galicia and their final annihilation is captured within the review
of the National Security Corps (SNB) from 1947:
The activity of these units is best illustrated by the reports that the individual
groups produced in the form of reports to the headquarters, which are partly in
our hands, which clearly show that the units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
did not show any losses until the arrival of the Red Army or only very small,
while after the Red Army’s arrival suddenly these losses are very high. After
the end of the war in 1945, the Bandera group continued their terrorist
activities, both against the Red Army and against the armies of Poland and
Czechoslovakia. The Red Army soon destroyed the band’s activities in the
Soviet Union just as the terrorist activity of the band in the territory of the
Czechoslovak Republic was largely restricted, while the territory of Poland is
still being maintained for the following reasons:
1. The Polish consolidation conditions are much more difficult than in the
other countries mentioned.
2. On the Polish territory, there is the Ukrainian population who, because of
45 Michal Šmigeľ,
Letopis Ukrajinskej povstaleckej armády. UPA vo svetle slovenských a českých
dokumentov (1945–1948)
[The Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. UPA in the Light of
Slovak and Czech Documents (1945–1948)] (Toronto and Lviv: Litopys UPA, 2010).
46 ASFP, fund 307 (Bandera group), vol. 307–65–1, fol. 1–323 (whole fund).
47 See Magocsi,
Historical Atlas
, 157.
48 Syrůček,
Banderovci
, 117.

The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern Europe
211
the unhappy policy of the Polish pre-war government, hated everything Polish
and saw its protectors in the Bandera group, and therefore encouraged them
until they were convinced of the terrorist activities of the band.
3. The Polish government, troops and security authorities devoted themselves
first of all to annihilating their own, Polish, terrorist bands.49
The review of the National Security Corps and its thesis also draw
emphasis to the situation in Poland before the removal of the Ukrainian
minority. In the period 1944–1948, Poland underwent fundamental changes,
the beginning of which was the annihilation of the German occupation and the
end of the integration of the country into the Soviet bloc.50 The Armija Krajowa
and other pro-Western patriotic organisations have also been named for their
own terrorist bands, which the Polish army and security authorities have
suppressed. This had also brought about a situation where Poland was already
fully under the Soviet sphere of influence, and any opposition would be broken.
As soon as the domestic situation in Poland51 had calmed, the Polish army and
security forces, as well as special NKVD52 units, focused their attention on the
UPA. In Moscow, they were rightly afraid that the strong national feeling of the
Ukrainians who had persisted in the struggle against the Soviet Union for
several years could have continued to build similar centres of national
resistance elsewhere. The fortitude of the Bandera group, whom the Soviets
were still unable to get under control, forced Moscow to a military response53
49 ASFP, fund 300 (State Department of Security Prague), vol. 300–25–1, fol. 21.
50 Jiří Vykoukal, “Polsko: Základní rysy sovětizace (1944-1948)” [Poland: Basic Features of
Sovietization (1944–1948)], in
Sovětizace východní Evropy. Země střední a jihovýchodní Evropy
v letech 1944–1948
[Sovietization of Eastern Europe: Countries of Central and Southeastern
Europe in 1944–1948], ed. Miroslav Tejchman (Prague: Institute of History, Czech Academy of
Sciences, 1995), 79–117.
51 Jacques Rupnik,
Jiná Evropa
(Prague: Prostor, 1992), 94–100.
52 For more about the topic using special NKVD units, see Grzegorz Motyka,
Ukraińska
partyzantka 1942–1960. Dzialalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej
Powstańczej Armii
[The Ukrainian Partisans of 1942–1960: Activities of the OUN and the UPA]
(Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM, 2006), 592; Michal
Šmigeľ, “Banderovci na Slovensku (1945–1946):
K problematike činnosti a propagačných
antikomunistických aktivít oddielov Ukrajinskej povstaleckej armády” [Bandera’s Movement in
Slovakia (1945–1946): On the Issue of Activities and Promotional Anti-Communist Activities of
the Sections of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army], in
Radikálný socializmus a komunismus na
Slovensku (1918–1989). Spoločnosť medzi demokraciou a totalitou
[Radical Socialism and
Communism in Slovakia (1918–1989): Society between Democracy and Totalitarianism], ed.
Michal Šmigeľ (Banská Bystrica: Institute of History, Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2007), 143.
53 Michal Šmigeľ, “V boji s banderovci na Slovensku (1945–1947). Aktivity československých
bezpečnostních složek proti UPA – spolupráce s Polskem a SSSR” [In the Fight with the Bandera
Group in Slovakia (1945–1947): Activities of Czechoslovak Security Forces against UPA –
Cooperation with Poland and the USSR], in
Aktivity NKVD/KGB a její spolupráce s tajnými
službami střední a východní Evropy 1945–1989
, ed. Kateřina Volná (Prague: Institute for the
Study of Totalitarian Regimes, 2009), 217–226.

TOMÁŠ ŘEPA
212
involving moving more troops to Poland.54
The preparation for the deportations of the Ukrainian population was
accelerated after the murder of Polish Minister of National Defence Karol
Świerczyski55 in March 1947. The Bandera group made a public display of this
event. It was the most striking act of post-war resistance of the Ukrainian
radical nationalists. In south-eastern Poland, the situation was already
unbearable; the local Polish population was terrorized by the Bandera group
and Polish government units set fire to Ukrainian villages in retaliation. All the
participants knew that the violence was escalating to anti-counter-attacks.
However, a peaceful solution was not offered because both the Poles and the
Ukrainians considered Galicia to be their home. However, the authority of
military strength and sovereignty of state belonged to the Poles, who wanted to
end the bloody protracted disputes. South-eastern Poland had not experienced
normal peaceful coexistence since the front operations in 1944.
The shift of the Polish border to the west and the associated national
homogenization of Poland could not affect Czechoslovakia. In 1945, in Poland
and in Czechoslovakia, only the extent and manner of ‘ethnic cleansing’ was
dealt with, not the principles of post-war Europe. The Soviet Union played an
extraordinary role here, although for the ‘purges’ it acted for other tactical
reasons in eastern Galicia than in the case of the Germans in Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Polish-Ukrainian conflict also shows to what
great extents the war and the occupation regime damaged relations between
those nations that were not warring parties in the narrower sense. Neither does
this inevitably result in the outcome of historical processes in later expulsion
and displacement. However, a return to ethnic and political status quo before
the outbreak of the war was ruled out at the end.56
The Bandera group fought for such a long time thanks to the support of
a large part of the Ukrainian population living in Galicia and hiding in the
forests of south-eastern Poland. Their activities were directly tied to this
population. From the Ukrainian settlements, they received material and
spiritual support from the Greek-Catholic Church, which they then shared with
each other. Young Ukrainians entered the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent
54 See Volodymyr Vjatrovyč,
Rejdy UPA terenami Čechoslovaciji
[UPA Raids on the Territory of
Czechoslovakia] (Kiev and Toronto: Vydavnyctvo Litopys UPA, 2001).
55 Karol Świerczewski (22 February 1897
–
28 March 1947) was the Polish general, politician and
post-war Deputy Minister of Defence. He participated in the Civil War in Russia, and since 1918
he has been a member of the Bolshevik Party. He participated in post-war repression of non-
communists, especially against Armija Krajowa (AK). From February 1946, he served as Second
Deputy Minister of National Defence. In March 1947, in Bieszczady, he was most probably by
Bandera unit killed in a shootout. Řepa,
Banderovci
,
celkové
,
121–122.
56 Philipp Ther, “Polsko-ukrajinský konflikt v letech 1939–1947. Srovnávací poznámky k diskusi o
česko-sudetoněmeckém konfliktu”
[The Polish–Ukrainian Conflict in 1939–1947: Comparative
Notes to the Discussion on the Czech-Sudeten German Conflict],
SD
9, no. 2 (2002): 258.

The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern Europe
213
Army throughout the period after the end of the Second World War. Most
soldiers entered voluntarily, but sometimes violent levies were necessary. On 17
April 1947, the Polish State Committee, as the ultimate authority, decided to set
up the operating group Visla, which began operations on 14 June, in response to
the necessary consolidation of the situation and the final resolution of the
Ukrainian nationalist tendencies in the Polish state. The Polish government
carried it out simultaneously with the fight against the UPA and the transfer of
the population in cooperation57 with the Soviet Union, to which the main
resettlement58 of the Ukrainian population was directed.59
Of the Ukrainian settlements in Poland, a smaller part, over 150,000
inhabitants, was transported to the western regions of the country that Poland
had gained at the expense of Germany after the end of the Second World War.
In the displacement, not only ethnic origin but also membership of the
Orthodox or Greek Catholic Church were decisive. Residents, including not
only the Ukrainians, but also the Ruthenians60 and the Poles from mixed
families, could take only a minimum of property. The original family and local
relationships were broken. However, most of the Ukrainians moved to the
Soviet Union, approximately a half of a million people.61 The Bandera group
responded to the displacements with increased attacks; it was the last chance to
hinder the politics that meant the end of their movement.62
The NKVD’s decisive motive, which oversaw forced displacement and
deportation, was the defeat of the anti-communist army of UPA. The Ukrainian
nationalists moved to south-eastern Poland, mainly to the Bieszczady
Mountains, leading from there a bloody guerrilla war against the Red Army and
57 The co-operation of the various states took place in the removal and during the military
operations against the Bandera group. See Jan Štaigl,
Spolupráca vojenských jednotiek ČSR,
Poľska a ZSSR v akciách proti UPA na východnom Slovensku v rokoch 1945–1947
[Cooperation
of the Military Units from Czechoslovakia, Poland and USSR in the Actions against UPA in the
Eastern Slovakia 1945–1947],
VH
, no. 2 (2011): 72–101.
58 Resettlement also influenced other regional Ukrainian or Ruthenian ethnic groups like
‘Lemkos’ or ‘Bojkos.’ For more details, see Luboš Veselý, “
Proti ‘fašistickým bandám UPA’.
Ukrajinci v propagandě lidového Polska” [Against ‘Fascist UPA Bands’: Ukrainians in the
Propaganda of Republic of the People’s Republic of Poland],
SD
17, no. 4 (2010): 667–701.
59 For numbers of removals of ethnic groups and national minorities, including Ukrainian, Polish
and German, see Magocsi,
Historical Atlas
, 164.
60 See Paul Robert Magocsi,
Rusíni a jejich vlast
[Ruthenians and Their Homeland] (Prague: Česká
expedice, 1996).
61 Marek Jasiak, “Overcoming Ukrainian Resistance: The Deportation of Ukrainians within
Poland in 1947,” in
Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948
,
eds
Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak
(Lanham, Boulder, New York, etc: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
Inc., 2001), 173–197; Norman M. Naimark,
Plameny nenávisti: etnické čistky v Evropě 20. století
[Hate Flames: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe], trans. Šimon Pellar and Milena
Pellarová (Prague: NLN, 2006), 122.
62 Vjatrovyč,
Rejdy UPA
,
142–146.

TOMÁŠ ŘEPA
214
NKVD. The complete ethnic cleansing of the Krakow, Lublin and Przemyśl
voivodships followed not only the objective of ‘monolithic’ Poland, but also the
strategic interests of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian resistance after the end of
the Visla event had been weakening as the Soviet security authorities had killed
roughly twenty times more UPA fighters (over 100,000 in total) than their
Polish counterparts in the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, numbers indicate
that guerrilla war may have led to more deaths than ethnic cleansing. It was not
possible, however, to attribute collective guilt to Ukrainians, because from the
point of view of ideology, they were the brothers of the Russians, and there
were a lot of Ukrainians. Thus, only the Polish Ukrainians lost their own home,
supposedly, or indeed, in connection with OUN and UPA.63
By the end of the autumn of 1947, the UPA had ceased to exist. During
the winter and spring of the following year, the Polish Army and Security
Components completed the ‘cleansing’ of south-eastern Poland of its remains,
represented by small groups or individuals who wandered around the country
and committed various crimes in the search for food. In the spring of 1948, most
organised combat activities ended, even though the remnants of OUN activity
were present in Eastern Europe until the 1950s.64
The OUN leadership, following the Polish events, decided that civilian
network officials should prepare for the transfer of the last leaders of the
Bandera group to the site of his exile in Bavaria. The Bandera group had
appeared in Czechoslovakia more and more frequently since June 1947, and
their behaviour showed a clear change from the previous actions, which were
directed mainly to the eastern Slovak border.65 This time, there were more
determined groups, or whole units of the Bandera group, who did not think of
returning back to Poland, thus triggering the biggest Bandera group incursion,
which had a significant impact on the post-war Czechoslovakia and its later
communist political orientation.
Several hundreds of members of the Bandera group faced up to 13,500
Czechoslovakian soldiers66 and members of the National Security Corps. Even
63 Philipp Ther,
Temná strana národních států: etnické čistky v moderní Evropě
[The Dark Side of
National States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe], trans. Zuzana Schwarzová (Prague: Argo,
2017), 154–155.
64 Jan Pilusiński, “Wojewódski urząd bezpieczeństwa publicznego w Rzeszowie wobec
spoleczności ukraińskiej 1944–1956” [Voivode’s Office of Public Security in Rzeszów against the
Ukrainian Community of 1944–1956],
in
Służby bezpieczeństwa Polski i Czechosłowacji wobec
Ukraińców
[Security Services of Poland and Czechoslovakia towards Ukrainians], ed. Grzegorz
Motyka (Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance, 2005), 20–57.
65 Šmigeľ,
Radikálný socializmus
, 172.
66 Alex Maskalík, “Veliteľský zbor Československej armády v boji proti ‘banderovcom’ vo svetle
archívnych dokumentov Vojenského historického archívu Bratislava”
[Command of the
Czechoslovak Army in the Fight against ‘banderovci’ in the Light of Archive Documents of the
Military Historical Archive Bratislava],
VH
, no. 1 (2011): 99–125.

The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern Europe
215
war veterans who knew the terrain on which they fought were summoned.
This whole campaign was ideologically misused by the Czechoslovakian
communists. The conspiracy to move the Bandera group, which triggered the
removal of the Ukrainian minority from Poland, can be documented in
Czechoslovakia even in the 1950s’ political processes. From the Bandera
movement’s point of view, the forced migration of Ukrainians in Eastern
Europe was a definitive defeat. From this moment on, the struggle for an
independent Ukraine, conducted by any means, was a rare and unorganised
phenomenon.
The removal of the nations of Eastern Europe had irreversibly altered
the ethnic circumstances of many states. For the present form of Ukraine, it
meant occupying territories that were always ethnically Polish. For example,
the city of Lviv could hardly be called the Great Ukrainian City before the
Second World War. On the contrary, for Poland, the transformation of borders
meant greater national homogenization, but only at the cost of losing large
tracts of land in the East and gaining other territories in the West, to which the
Polish citizens had no relationship. From the Bandera movement’s (OUN, UPA)
point of view, the forced migration of Ukrainians in Eastern Europe was a
definitive defeat. From this moment on, the struggle for an independent
Ukraine, managed by any means, only further diminished. The persecution of
the Ukrainians was certainly not over. Historian Andrej Zubov in the History of
Russia states that, between 1944 and 1952, 203,662 western Ukrainians were
displaced, including 182,000 ‘nationalists,’ OUN activists and members of their
families.67
67 Andrej Zubov et al.,
Dějiny Ruska 20. století
[The History of Russia of the Twentieth Century],
vol. II,
1393–2007
(Prague: Argo, 2014), 234.

ABSTRACTS
HANNELORE BAIER, RAMONA BESOIU AND SORIN RADU, Transfer of Functionality and
Meanings within the Celebration of the Escape of the
Lole
(
fuga lolelor
) from Agnita
Abstract: The Escape of the
Lole
(Urzelnlauf) represented a traditional Saxon holiday
related to the custom of handing the guild chest over to the new guild master. The
event known today in the town of Agnita by the name
fuga lolelor
– a manifestation in
the form of a parade of the
Lole
and guild representatives who are (mostly) Romanians,
Saxons and Hungarians, on the main street of the town, followed by speeches delivered
in front of the Town Hall and by traditional Saxon and Romanian dances, as well as the
intonation of the Transylvanian Hymn (Siebenbürgenlied) – is really classified under
the heading of Culture and Heritage, within the events of Sibiu County.
Our study aims firstly to understand the extent to which the Escape of the
Lole
is still a manifestation of ethnic and regional identity for the Saxon community, the
community of the Agnita inhabitants, and how it has become an important means of
promoting the local identity and the development of ethno-tourism; and secondly, to
identify what encourages Saxons, Romanians or Hungarians to participate in or organize
the event. The study uses bibliographic sources regarding the history of the Escape of
the Lole, alongside a series of field researches conducted during 2019 in Agnita and the
Hârtibaci Valley area.
Keywords:
Lole
, Saxons, ethno-tourism, Agnita inhabitants, Sibiu County.
List of Illustrations:
Fig. 1. Photo (approx. 1897) with
Lole
in a secondary role. Helga Lutsch’s personal
archive (Heilbronn).
Fig. 2. Photo (approx. 1910) with
Lole
as guardians of the Furriers’ Guild chest. Helga
Lutsch’s personal archive (Heilbronn).
Fig. 3. Group with
Lole
(
Kränzchen
) from 1919, in a time when women were not yet
allowed to wear
Lole
costumes. Helga Lutsch’s personal archive (Heilbronn).
Fig. 4. Group of
Lole
(gang) at the renewal of this celebration in 2007, in Agnita, with
women costumed as
Lole
. Helmut Lerner’s personal archive (Sibiu).
Fig. 5.
Lole
wearing masks at the
fuga lolelor
(Chasing the
Lole
) in 2018. Helmut
Lerner’s personal archive (Sibiu).
Fig. 6. Souvenir stand at the
fuga lolelor
(Chasing the
Lole
) in 2019. Photo: Hannelore
Baier (Sibiu).
SIMONA ADAM AND MIRCEA MĂRAN,
Ethnic Identities Face to Face: Serbian and
Romanian Minorities from the Banat between History and Memory
Abstract: Ethnic identity is not just given but is continuously constructed and
reconstructed from generation to generation. Major historical events and also individual
or collective experiences influence the members of ethnic minorities differently. In this
paper, we analyse the way in which the ethnic identity of the Romanian minority from
the Serbian Banat region and that of the Serbian minority from the Romanian Banat

ABSTRACTS
282
region were constructed during the twentieth century. We start by describing ways of
expressing ethnic identity in multiple aspects of social life, such as education, cultural
life, religion and publications. We also reveal the most preeminent anchors of identity
for each of the two minorities. By combining traditional history sources with oral
history resources, we aim to identify the mechanisms used by each ethnic group in
maintaining and negotiating its identity through the twentieth century. This paper is
the result of a cross-border and interdisciplinary collaboration in which, over the course
of the last five years, the two authors have interlaced their historical and sociological
perspectives in order to enhance their own individual research interests through joint
projects. These projects aim not only to increase scientific knowledge, but also to
promote the two minority identities on both sides of the border between Romanian and
Serbian Banat.
Keywords: ethnic identity, Banat, Serbian minority, Romanian minority.
HALIDA UMBAROVA, Post-Pogrom Research Processes Cited in Documents and
Newspapers Published in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
Abstract: There are multiple contradictory theories regarding the basic causes of
pogroms in the Russian Empire and Vistula Land. Some theories claim that pogroms
were organised by the government and propose hypotheses and logical solutions which
could be interpreted in support of their theories. For example, they ask how otherwise
to explain that the police stood aside during the Kishinev massacre in 1903. Among
those who support this theory is Simon Dubnov, and a further reputable example is
found in G. Sliozberg, who was an eye-witness of the pogroms. Yet modern researchers,
including Weeks and Gessen have found archival evidence that the government was
fighting against the pogroms and did not support these incidents. However, it is not
possible to assert that these contradictory versions are altogether right or wrong. The
evidence found during this research supports both versions. Additionally, in historical
papers and books about pogroms, it is common to find much generalisation of facts.
Claims that the government was involved or planned pogroms are frequent, but such
accusations were often made in very broad terms, for instance that the government
allowed the organisation of propaganda, that it was not sufficiently engaged in
preventing pogroms, or simply that it was to blame for apathy and inactivity. It is
impossible to construct a precise picture of the culprits of mass slaughter from the use of
such generalisations, which, moreover, confuse the reader. In many cases also, the
‘government’ referred to whichever narrow identification of a unit of state power or
person was engaged in the specific event. Behind each action stood people, groups of
people, or organisational units who were responsible for the pogroms.
Keywords: Jews, pogrom, twentieth century, Russia, local authorities.
VLADIMIR ROMANOV, The United States and National Self-Determination of Minorities
in the ‘Russian Space,’ 1914–1920
Abstract: The article discusses the political course of President Wilson’s administration
regarding issues of national self-determination in Russia during the First World War
and 1917 revolution. It was a period when almost every national minority in the

ABSTRACTS
283
‘Russian Space’ declared its desire for self-determination, and it seemed that this desire
was fully consistent with Wilson’s philosophy and foreign policy aims. His approach,
however, was significantly different from that of the Russian authorities, as was already
evident during the discussion of the ‘Jewish’ and ‘Polish’ questions. The real prospects
for national self-determination for minorities in the territory of the former Russian
Empire opened up only after the overthrow of Tsarism. However, only the Poles and
Finns gained real independence. Despite all disagreements with the Provisional
Government and the Bolsheviks, Wilson nevertheless outlined his goal to safeguard the
territorial integrity of almost the entire former imperial space. Moreover, the American
administration in 1917-1920 refused official recognition not only of the Bolsheviks, but
also of a number of nation states that had declared their independence. This policy was
enshrined in the key document known as Colby’s note (1920). The author substantiates
the argument that Wilson wanted to preserve a united and democratic Russia as a
strong partner of the United States in the international arena after the end of the First
World War.
Keywords: national self-determination, Russia, Wilson, ‘Fourteen Points,’ Colby note.
TATYANA KATTSINA AND LUDMILA MEZIT,
Between the Front Line and the Rear: The
Position of the Jewish Evacuees of the First World War in Eastern Siberia in the
Russian Empire
Abstract: Based on contemporary historiography research, as well as on archival records
and released documents, this article reveals the problem of social assistance to the
Jewish people who were exiled by force from the areas of the Eastern Front in European
Russia to Siberia. The analysis is restricted to the Yenisseyskaya and Irkutskaya
Provinces of Eastern Siberia. As exemplified by these regions, we present a concept of
how social support measures to the cohort in question were arranged in the regions of
the Russian Empire. The chronological framework covered by the article includes the
period from autumn 1914 (when the first evacuees arrived in Eastern Siberia) to
September 1917 (when the Temporary Government announced the Russian Republic).
Aiming to draw together a complete picture of the practices of social assistance to the
Jewish evacuees, we analysed the content of state policy and the experience of local
charity organisations in this sphere, in terms of how results corresponded to social
expectations. Applying methods of general scientific and concrete-historical research
helped find a solution. We come to the conclusion that during the period under study
the Jewish evacuees in Eastern Siberia represented a vulnerable community in social,
political and economic terms. Local authorities deliberately sent the evacuees to isolated
or economically under-developed districts with poor employment opportunities. In
such conditions, the evacuees became directly dependent on humanitarian assistance.
However, the communities that accepted the evacuees could not help them effectively,
since they too were some of the most vulnerable populations. All these facts
complicated the ability to solve quickly and efficiently the problems which occurred.
The life strategy of the majority of Jewish evacuees to the territory of Eastern Siberia
during the First World War was directed at simple survival.
Keywords: The First World War, social assistance, refugees, deported Jews, social
support, forms of social support.

ABSTRACTS
284
NATALIIA ZHUKOVSKAYA, Canada and the Problem of Protection of Minorities in the
League of Nations
Abstract: The problem of minorities was one of the most acute throughout the existence
of the League of Nations. The outcome of the First World War largely changed the map
of Europe. New borders and old scores between the states only exacerbated national
problems. While the Great Powers allowed their own interests to influence any possible
solution of the issue, the Canadian approach to the protection of minorities is more
interesting. In the first half of the twentieth century, Canada did not have any major
influence on world politics. Canada could not dictate its terms to the member states of
the League, and they, in turn, were reluctant to listen too much to the British
Dominion, even when it tried to speak. However, the problem of the protection of
minorities proved an important exception to the usual hierarchy. Elected in 1927 as a
non-permanent member of the Council of the League, Canada itself had no direct
interest in resolving national disputes in Europe. On this issue, however, Canada fought
ardently and persistently. As a multicultural state, Canada felt strongly the need to
protect the rights of national minorities. Its voice was heard and, as a result, the League
of Nations changed its approach to the national minority dispute procedure, making the
process more open to all parties. This article will consider how Canada, which had no
serious foreign policy weight, managed to make progress in such a complex issue as the
protection of the rights of national minorities in Europe.
Keywords: League of Nations, Europe, national minorities, Canada, Madrid Procedure.
KEZBAN ACAR, The Legal Status of Russian Refugees in Turkey in the 1920s
Abstract: Following the October Revolution in 1917, a civil war broke out between the
Bolsheviks and their opponents, who consisted mostly of officers and commanders of
the Tsarist Army, Cossacks and aristocrats. There were also some peasants and non-
Russian groups such as Kalmuks, Tatars and others. Even though the Russian Civil War
took place from 1917 to 1925, the anti-Bolshevik groups began to leave Russia and
migrate to other countries from the spring of 1919. The great majority of them,
however, left Russia in November 1920, when the White Army faced defeat at the
hands of the Bolshevik troops. Of these refugees, approximately 145,000–150,000 came
to Istanbul, Turkey. Although their number was greater than the Ottoman government
and the Allied Powers expected, both Ottoman officials and the Allied Powers accepted
them. However, from the early 1920s a new government came to power in Ankara,
which claimed to represent Anatolia, and to be the only legal power since it fought
against the Allied Powers that either occupied different parts of Anatolia or supported
the Greek Army. Since it aimed to create a new nation state, the Ankara government
imposed a new nationality policy, affecting non-Turkish or more specifically non-
Muslims in Turkey. This article, based on primary sources such as archival documents
and newspaper articles and secondary sources, aims to explain the major aspects of this
new policy of nationality and how the policy affected Russian refugees living in Turkey.
Keywords: Russian Civil War, Russian refugees, the White Army, Wrangel, Istanbul,
Ankara, Turkey, 1920s.

ABSTRACTS
285
MYKOLA HALIV AND VASYL ILNYTSKYI, The Industrial School for Jewish Girls, Sambir
(1925–1939): A Local Institutional Description
Abstract: The publication’s purpose is to analyse the activities of the professional school for
Jewish girls in Sambir (1925–1939), to identify the stages of its history and to reveal aspects
of its life. The methodology of the research is based on the concept of the ‘history of
institutions’ as a special field of scientific and historical research. The Industrial School
for Jewish Girls was a private educational institution owned by the Göthelf Foundation.
It consisted of three classes, each of which was divided into special departments.
Initially there were two departments, Clothing Design and Carpet Weaving, and then
the Tailor department was added, along with Tailor and Linen. Teachers at the school
had varying qualifications and work experience and belonged to different religions and
nationalities (although Jews prevailed). The number of schoolchildren varied greatly in
different periods of its history, due primarily to the economic crisis and local market
requirements, as the local market did not require a significant number of craftsmen, as
prepared by the industrial school. The content of schooling was determined by state
requirements and was orientated towards secondary level education.
Keywords: professional education, Gotkhelf Foundation, Jews, Eastern Halychyna,
private educational institution.
LUKÁŠ NOVOTNÝ AND ANDREJ TÓTH, The Censorship Praxis and the Press Law in the
First Czechoslovak Republic and the German and Hungarian Minorities
Abstract: This study will examine the question of censorship and press law in the First
Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938) and their relationship with the German and
Hungarian minorities. Through research of published and unpublished sources, the
authors will demonstrate that the new state adopted its basic standards regarding press
law and censorship from its predecessor – the Habsburg Monarchy. It will also
demonstrate that the press law of Czechoslovakia in the 1920s and 1930s lacked some
basic elements, in particular a specific press law which would deal with all aspects of
this problem. Several acts enabling significant state interference in certain situations
into the freedom of the press were adopted which, just as in the history of Austria-
Hungary, enabled the Czechoslovak government to put censorship provisions into
effect, and to intervene against the press of the Communist Party and that of certain
national minorities. The study will also demonstrate that, as a result of the rise of
Nazism, many of the laws relating to the press were revised in the 1930s. This was
caused by the rise of aggressive policy and the need for a reaction on the part of
Czechoslovakia.
Keywords: First Czechoslovak Republic, press law, national minorities, confiscation,
newspaper.
SORIN ARHIRE, The Governing of Patriarch Miron Cristea and His Policy toward Jews:
The Attitude of Great Britain
Abstract: After a short period of rule by the National-Christian government, presided
over by Octavian Goga, on 10 February 1938 King Carol II ended Romania’s democratic

ABSTRACTS
286
experiment, by installing a regime of royal dictatorship. The leader of the Orthodox
Romanian Church, Patriarch Miron Cristea, was named President of the Ministers’
Council. Although, during his time in power, Miron Cristea did not adopt laws against
the Jewish population, he did preserve all the anti-Semitic legislation that he inherited
from the previous government. As such, in accordance with decree-law number 169,
from 22 January 1938, Romanian citizenship was withdrawn from a significant number
of Jews. The claims of a persistent existence in Romania of a ‘Jewish issue’ were clear
evidence that the new government formula was no less nationalist than the Legionary
Movement, and this policy towards the Jews was cynically used to conciliate the
numerous sympathisers of the Romanian extreme right. London officials were deeply
interested in the situation in Romania, as Great Britain was a power named on the 1919
Protection Treaty of Minorities, a treaty signed also by Romania through its
representatives sent to Paris, during the peace conference that followed the First World
War. The existing situation in much of South-Eastern Europe regarding national
minorities flagrantly defied the provisions of the document agreed in France, and the
fears of the British were more than justified. The difficulties that the Romanian Jews
faced in 1938 had important consequences, including raising a question over the official
visit that King Carol II wished to make to Great Britain.
Keywords: anti-Semitic policy, Romanian Orthodox Church, Jews, emigration, League
of Nations.
OTTMAR TRAȘCĂ, The Situation in Northern Transylvania in the Last Months of 1940
According to the German Consulate in Cluj
Abstract: It is a well-known fact that, following the second German-Italian arbitration
on 30 August 1940, Romania was forced to cede Northern Transylvania, a territory of
approximately 42,000 square kilometres with a population of about 2.5 million
inhabitants, to Hungary. The novel document that we publish comes from the archives
of the German Consulate of Cluj and was kept in the Politisches Archiv des
Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin. This document is a detailed report drawn up on 20
December 1940 by the German Consul in Cluj, Ulrich von der Damerau-Dambrowski
(1900–1980), on the situation in Northern Transylvania following the establishment of
the Hungarian civil administration. The report is structured in five parts and drawn up
from the discoveries made by the German consul on site and from information received
from all the regions of his jurisdictional constituency – particularly from those
inhabited by Germans – and represents a complete picture of the political, economic
and social situation in Northern Transylvania in the relatively short period between the
introduction of the Hungarian civil administration in late November 1940 and the date
when the document was written. The report reveals the clear discontent of the local
Hungarian population itself with regard to the policies and measures implemented by
the government in Budapest then headed by Prime Minister Pál Teleki, and the author
further details the negative, discriminatory – most of the times overtly hostile – attitude
adopted by the Hungarian authorities towards the German, and particularly to the
Romanian, minorities.
Keywords: Northern Transylvania, the Vienna arbitration, the German consul from
Cluj, report, minorities.

ABSTRACTS
287
MAIK SCHMERBAUCH, German Catholics as a Minority in the Catholic Church of Polish
Silesia after 1945
Abstract: The article outlines the situation of the German Catholics who lived as a
minority in the Catholic Church of Polish Silesia after 1945. Germans had lived in the
historical region of Silesia since the Middle Ages, and they were Christians with a
strong relationship with their Catholic Church. After the Reformation in the sixteenth
century many became Lutherans, but a number remained within the Catholic faith. The
downfall of the Third Reich had significant consequences for many Germans in Silesia,
who were expelled or forced to emigrate from the newly risen Poland. A small minority
remained in Polish Silesia and found further trust in the Catholic Church in of their
difficult situation. The article provides an overview of the period from 1945 to 1989 and
gives a brief look at contemporary developments.
Keywords: minority, Silesia, Catholic Church, Third Reich, Poland.
TOMÁŠ ŘEPA, The Ethnic Displacements of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Eastern
Europe after the End of the Second World War and Their Influence on the UPA and
OUN Movements
Abstract: After the Second World War, the ethnic situation in Eastern Europe was far
from clear. Europe was exhausted, with the war just ended, and individual states had
gained new boundaries, defined by the outcome of the war. The deployment of national
minorities in Eastern Europe, however, caused further strife and bloodshed. In
particular, Ukrainian nationalists from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
(OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) had no intention of accepting the new
borders and fought Poland and the Soviet Union for the creation of an independent
Ukraine and their own state. Allied powers (especially the Soviet Union) and new
Polish state found radical solutions to the ongoing conflicts and ethnic violence by the
expeditious removal of ethnic minority Ukrainians, Poles and Ruthenians either to
different parts of a country or out of a country completely. The relocation of hundreds
of thousands of people affected large areas. This contribution focuses on the causes and
course of such relocation and its impact on Ukrainian nationalist movements. The
relocation of minority groups in Eastern Europe has irreversibly changed the ethnicity
of many states. For present-day Ukraine, this meant occupying territories that had
always been ethnically Polish. These issues were later reflected also in Czechoslovak
post-war relations.
Keywords: Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), Stepan Bandera, removals, minorities,
Czechoslovakia.
ANNA G. PIOTROWSKA, Re-Negotiating the Public Image of Gypsy Musicians in the
Polish Everyday Press of the Communist Period
Abstract: The article discusses how the Roma minority was portrayed in the Polish
press during the communist era, taking so-called Gypsy musicians as an example.
Having analysed a number of articles, notes and reports, as well as reviews and
editorials published before 1989 in the Polish daily press, the author identifies the main

ABSTRACTS
288
tendencies in portraying Gypsies during the communist era, identifying nostalgia for
the romanticised Gypsies, and the inclination to homogenise their image, as prevailing
trends. Focusing on the Roma musicians, the author examines how they were officially
portrayed in the communist Polish press, deliberating on whether this portrayal was
promoting the minority, as influenced by the romantic tradition glorifying the
wandering Gypsy life-style, or rather subjugating them to serve as another proof of
Gypsy backwardness. While claiming that the figure of the splendid Gypsy virtuoso was
almost erased from the Polish post-World War II press, the author argues that the
Gypsies’ position in the public discourse was overtaken by the Roma folk bands. At the
same time the author questions to what degree the musical stereotype associated with
the Roma in general was exploited to re-create and to re-negotiate the place of the
Roma people as a specific minority functioning within a Polish socialist society.
Keywords: Roma musicians, Polish press, communist times, stereotype, Roma minority.
ELEONORA-MARIA POPA, Aspects Regarding the Social Status of Minorities during the
Communist Regime in Romania
Abstract: The article proposes an analysis of the situation of minorities in Romania
during the communist regime, focusing on the Jewish, Hungarian and German
communities. Based on the opinions of Romanian specialists, (Victor Frunză, Vlad
Georgescu, Ghiță Ionescu, Vladimir Tismăneanu, Lucian Boia), and Westerners (Dennis
Deletant, Keith Hitchins, Katherine Verdery, Catherine Durandin) the article considers
the social status of the above-mentioned groups, specifying how they related to the
internal political regime and to the international conjuncture. The two communist
leaders, Gheorghe Gheroghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceaușescu, had a similar policy towards
the Jewish community. More specifically, the emigration of the Jews to Israel was
encouraged because it brought consistent economic gains for the RPR and later the
RSR. Nicolae Ceaușescu, however, changed the conditions of the exchange, relying on
the power of the US dollar. As regards the ethnic Hungarians, assimilation strategies
were applied, such as settling Romanians in areas with a population consisting of ethnic
minorities, moving Hungarians into areas inhabited by Romanians, and reducing
education in minority languages. Under these conditions, in the 1980s, clandestine
publications of the samizdat type appeared, coordinated by representatives of the
Hungarian community. The Germans were accepted, for political and economic
reasons, as a minority who would participate with the Romanians in the construction of
the new state. Both the Germans and the Jews who benefited from the opportunity to
emigrate did not engage in dissent that would endanger their departure.
Keywords: community, international conjuncture, emigration, assimilation, samizdat.
NURI KORKMAZ AND SERPIL GÜDÜL, Accommodation of Minorities in Nation-States
during the Twentieth Century: The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria and the Policies of
Communist Rule between 1945 and 1989
Abstract: Since the fall of Ottoman Empire and the creation of new nation states, the
Balkans have experienced many conflicts and border issues. The early years of the
nineteenth century witnessed massive wars and adjustment of the borders in line with

ABSTRACTS
289
the demands of the new nation states. Bulgaria emerged in late nineteenth century as a
newly independent nation with a large Turkish minority. Treaties signed with Turkey
and the Ottoman Empire aimed to protect of the rights of the Turkish minority going
forward. Nevertheless, in the second half of the twentieth century, the communists
took power, and decided to follow a different path. Ignoring Bulgaria’s commitments in
international treaties and other bilateral documents, they decided to embark on an
assimilation policy supported by partial migration that would keep the numbers of
Turks in Bulgaria low, in order to balance the unwanted population growth. This article
discusses the inconsistency of Bulgarian policies towards the Turks, who are Bulgaria’s
largest minority group. Documents from the Bulgarian state archives are used in order
to depict the environment in which the so-called assimilationist policies were adopted.
Keywords: Turkish minority, Bulgaria, Communism, nationalism, migration.
CONSTANTIN I. STAN, The First Alba Iulia – “The Manifesto” from Darnița of 13/26 April
1917
Abstract: The ‘manifesto’ which was voted on 13/26 April 1917 by Romanian volunteers
who were imprisoned in Darnița was considered ‘the first Alba Iulia,’ meaning that it
was the first important international manifestation of the Romanians in Transylvania
and Bukovina, in which they proclaimed the need for unification of all the Romanian
territories in the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the Kingdom of Romania. The
statement was, in fact, a historical moment and a political act of incontestable value,
because it set out the desire to see the unification of the territories inhabited by
Romanians under the double monarchy with Romania.
This study presents an event of great importance in the history of volunteering
during the First World War and reflects the struggles of representatives of various
nationalities in Austro-Hungary who were in Russian captivity. The Romanian
prisoners in Russia had tight connections with former Czech, Pole and Slovak officers
and soldiers in Russian camps. The idea of making a declaration came from the
Romanian volunteers; the other minorities from the Austro-Hungarian Empire who
were in the Russian territory at that time were not party to it. The Romanian prisoners
in Russia were keen to make their contribution to the national unification movement
by directly participating on the Romanian front rather than remain prisoners in Russia.
In this regard, the Romanian volunteers were ready to go so far as to sacrifice their own
lives to fulfil the national ideal. Their declaration in Darnița was followed by the arrival
of a few battalions of Romanian volunteers who fought in the bitterly contested battles
at Mărășești and Oituz in the summer of 1917. In this way, young Transylvanians and
Bukovinians put into practice the objectives established in Darnița in the spring of 1917.
Keywords: Pompiliu Nistor, Darnița, manifesto, 1917, first Alba Iulia.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AB
–
Altarul Banatului
.
Mitropolia Banatului. Timișoara.
AH
–
Almanach Historyczny
. Uniwersytet Humanistyczno-
Przyrodniczy Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach). Kielce.
AHUK
–
Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis
.
Institute
of Baltic Region History and Archaeology of Klaipėda
University. Klaipėda.
AIIX
–
Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A.D. Xenopol”
. Iași.
AJIL
–
American Journal of International Law
.
Cambridge
University Press (USA).
AMN
–
Acta Musei Napocensis
. Muzeul Național de Istorie a
Transilvaniei. Cluj-Napoca.
AMP – Acta Musei Porolissensis
. Muzeul Județean de Istorie și
Artă Zalău.
Angustia – Angustia
. Muzeul Național al Carpaților Răsăriteni. Sfântu
Gheorghe.
Apulum
–
Apulum. Acta Musei Apulensis
. Muzeul Național al Unirii.
Alba Iulia.
ARCE
–
Aspen Review Central Europe
.
Aspen Institute Central
Europe. Prague.
ASKG
–
Archiv für Schlesische Kirchengeschichte.
Institut für
Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte der Deutschen in Ostmittel-
und Südosteuropa e.V. Tübingen.
АУ
–
Архіви України
. Державна архівна служба України.
Київ.
AUASH
–
Annales Universitatis Apulensis. Series Historica.
Universitatea „1 Decembrie 1918” din Alba Iulia.
AUS
–
Acta Universitatis Sapientiae. European and Regional
Studies
. Universitatea Sapientia. Cluj-Napoca.
BuF
–
Berichte und Forschungen.
Carl von Ossietzky Universität.
Oldenburg.
CC –
Codrul Cosminului
. Universitatea „Ștefan cel Mare” din
Suceava.
CEH
–
Central European History
. Cambridge University Press
(UK).
DIJGSI
–
Društvena Istraživanja / Journal for General Social Issues.
Institute of Social Sciences lvo Pilar. Zagreb.
DS
–
Diplomacy & Statecraft.
Routledge, Taylor & Francis
Group. London.
EJCP
–
The European Journal of Cultural Policy
. Taylor & Francis
Group. London.
EJST
–
European Journal of Science and Theology
.
Jassy.
Essehist
–
Essehist
. University of Osijek.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
292
Folklorica – Folklorica.
The Slavic, East European and Eurasian
Folklore Association.
Framework
–
Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media
. Wayne
State University Press. Detroit.
GRE
–
The Global Review of Ethnopolitics
.
Routledge, Taylor &
Francis Group. London.
HA
–
History and Anthropology
.
Taylor & Francis Group.
London.
HJSR
–
Humboldt Journal of Social Relations
.
Humboldt State
University.
HRQ
–
Human Rights Quarterly
.
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Baltimore, Maryland.
HSR
–
Hungarian Studies Review
. The Hungarian Studies
Association of Canada, the Hungarian Studies Association
and the National Széchényi Library of Hungary.
HZ
–
Historische Zeitschrift. Goethe Universität. Frankfurt am
Main.
ICMR
–
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations
.
Taylor & Francis
Group. London.
ИАгу
–
Известия Алтайского государственного университета
.
Алтайский государственный университет. Барнаул.
IB
–
Îndrumător bisericesc
. Arhiepiscopia Sibiului. Sibiu.
IM
–
International Migration
. Carleton University. Ottawa.
IP
–
Îndrumător pastoral
. Arhiepiscopia Ortodoxă Alba Iulia.
JAH
–
The
Journal of American History
.
Oxford University Press
on behalf of the Organization of American Historians.
Bloomington.
JCR
–
Journal for Cultural Research.
Institute for Cultural
Research. Lancaster University.
JGR
–
Journal of Genocide Research
.
Routledge, Taylor & Francis
Group. London.
JPMS
–
Journal of Popular Music Studies
. Blackwell Publishing
(Denmark).
JSEB
–
Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans
.
Taylor &
Francis Group. London.
LHS
–
Lithuanian Historical Studies
.
Lithuanian Institute of
History. Vilnius.
Limes
–
Limes
. Komárom-Esztergom Megye Önkormányzata.
Komárom.
MEJ – The Middle East Journal
.
Middle East Institute.
Washington DC.
MLJ
–
Macquarie Law Journal
.
Macquarie University. Sydney.
MPYUNL
–
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law
. Max Planck
Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law.
Heildelberg.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
293
Нкч
–
Незалежний культурологічний часопис «Ї»
. Громадська
організація Незалежний культурологічний часопис «Ї».
Львів.
NN
–
Nations and Nationalism
.
Association for the Study of
Ethnicity and Nationalism. Oxford.
Нни
–
Новая и новейшая история
.
Издательство «Наука».
Москва.
PAS
–
Polish American Studies
.
Polish American Historical
Association. University of Illinois Press. Champaign.
ПгнСІ
–
Проблеми гуманітарних наук. Серія Історія
.
Дрогобицький державний педагогічний університет
імені Івана Франка. Дрогобич.
PM
–
Die Politische Meinung
.
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung e.V.
Sankt Augustin.
PNA
–
Prace Naukowe Akademii im. Jana Długosza w
Częstochowie. Seria Pedagogika
. Uniwersytet
Humanistyczno-Przyrodniczy im. Jana Długosza w
Częstochowie. Częstochowa.
Právo
–
Právo. Časopis pro právní teorii a praxi
. Ústav práva a
právní vědy. Praha.
ПбР
–
Призрение и благотворительность в России
.
Всероссийский союз учреждений, обществ и деятелей по
общественному и частному призрению. Санкт-
Петербург.
PSQ
–
Presidential Studies Quarterly
.
Center for the Study of the
Presidency and Congress. Washington.
RIS
–
Review of International Studies
.
Cambridge University
Press on behalf of the British International Studies
Association. Cambridge.
RKNP
–
Rocznik Komisji Nauk Pedagogicznych
. Polska Akademia
Nauk, Oddział w Krakowie. Kraków.
RR
–
The
Russian Review
.
University of Kansas. Lawrence.
SD
–
Soudobé dějiny
. Ústav pro soudobé dějiny Akademie věd
České republiky. Praha.
SH
–
Studia Historyczne.
Polska Akademia Nauk, Oddział w
Krakovie. Kraków.
Сів
–
Східноєвропейський історичний вісник
. Дрогобицький
державний педагогічний університет імені Івана Франка.
Дрогобич.
Славяноведение
–
Славяноведение
. Издательство «Наука». Москва.
SR
–
Slavic Review
.
Association for Slavic, East European, and
Eurasian Studies.
SS
–
Studii și comunicări.
Asociația Folcloriștilor și Etnografilor
Sibiu.
SSHT
–
Śląskie Studia Historyczno-Teologiczne.
Uniwersytetu
Śląskiego. Katowice.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
294
SUPM
–
Studia Universitatis „Petru Maior”. Series Historica
.
Universitatea „Petru Maior” Târgu Mureș.
Századok
–
Századok
. Magyar Történelmi Társulat. Budapest.
Terra Sebus – Terra Sebus. Acta Musei Sabesiensis
. Muzeul Municipal
„Ioan Raica” Sebeș.
TİD
–
Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi
.
Aegean University. Izmir.
TR
–
Transylvanian Review
. Centre for Transylvanian Studies
in Cluj-Napoca.
TT
–
Third Text
. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. London.
Уив
–
Уральский исторический вестник
.
Институт истории и
археологии Уральского отделения Российской академии
наук. Екатеринбург.
Вестник
–
Вестник Еврейского университета
.
Еврейский
университет. Москва.
ВКгпу
–
Вестник Красноярского государственного
педагогического университета имени В. П. Астафьева
.
Красноя́рск.
VMT – Vlaams Marxistisch Tijdschrift.
IMAVO. Brussels.
Впу
–
Вестник Пермского университета.
Пермский
государственный национальный исследовательский
университет. Пермь.
Világosság
–
Világosság Alapítvány
. Budapest.
VH
–
Vojenská história
. Vojenský historický ústav. Bratislava.
Ziridava
–
Ziridava
. Complexul Muzeal Arad.
ZP
–
Zeszyty politologiczne
. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Filia w
Białymstoku. Białystok.