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Self and Identity
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/psai20
The function of vertical and horizontal space to
social group identity
Sarah Ariel Lamer , Caterina Suitner , Anne Maass , Rosa Caccioppoli &
Halley Pradell
To cite this article: Sarah Ariel Lamer , Caterina Suitner , Anne Maass , Rosa Caccioppoli &
Halley Pradell (2020): The function of vertical and horizontal space to social group identity, Self and
Identity, DOI: 10.1080/15298868.2020.1785929
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2020.1785929
Published online: 03 Jul 2020.
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ARTICLE
The function of vertical and horizontal space to social group
identity
Sarah Ariel Lamer
a
, Caterina Suitner
b
, Anne Maass
b
, Rosa Caccioppoli
b
and Halley Pradell
c
a
Department of Psychology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville;
b
Department of Psychology, University of
Padua, Padua, Italy;
c
Department of Psychology, Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA
ABSTRACT
Where an object or person is located in space can communicate
important attributes, such as power, agency, or status. We theorized
that people may use location to convey messages about social
groups. In four studies, we examined whether women and men
express ingroup bias or stereotypical bias in their placement of and
memory for gendered objects. In Study 1, participants placed
objects symbolizing their ingroup higher but not further left than
objects symbolizing their outgroup. Vertical ingroup-bias emerged
consistently in spatial placement (Studies 2 and 4) but not spatial
memory (Studies 3 and 4). We discuss the inuence of gender
identity, the role of automaticity, and the value of vertical versus
horizontal spatial location in communicating group bias.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 6 December 2019
Accepted 16 June 2020
Published online 4 July 2020
KEYWORDS
Vertical location; gender
identity; ingroup bias; spatial
agency bias
Where an object or image appears in space may seem arbitrary, but past work has shown
that where someone is located in space conveys meaningful information to perceivers
about that person’s power (i.e., how much inuence they have over others; Giessner &
Schubert, 2007; Schubert, 2005; Zanolie et al., 2012) and agency (i.e., how independent,
self-directed, and assertive they are; Maass et al., 2009; Suitner & Maass, 2007). In
languages written from left to right, leftward horizontal locations convey that a person
has more agency, consistent with the trend for agents to come before objects in
a sentence (e.g., “Peggy saw a gorilla”; Maass et al., 2009, 2014; Suitner & Maass, 2007,
2011). For example, people perceive acts of aggression as more powerful when the
instigator is to the left of the victim and a soccer goal as faster when the player is moving
from left to right (Maass et al., 2007). Conversely, in languages like Arabic written from
right to left, rightward horizontal locations convey agency (Maass et al., 2014). Therefore,
Italian speakers write from left to right and tend to draw an aggressive interaction with
the aggressor to the left of the victim, whereas Arabic speakers write from right to left and
tend to draw that same interaction with the aggressor to the right of the victim (Maass
et al., 2014).
Just as with horizontality, a large body of literature suggests that vertical spatial
location also conveys meaningful information to perceivers (e.g., Landau et al., 2010;
Meier & Robinson, 2004; Schubert, 2005; Tang et al., 2018). For example, objects and
CONTACT Sarah Ariel Lamer slamer@utk.edu University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37916
SELF AND IDENTITY
https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2020.1785929
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
people located high in space or viewed at an upward angle are attributed more power
and status than those located low in space or viewed at a downward angle – even when
those people are situated in environments with visual complexity (Giessner et al., 2011;
Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019; Schubert, 2005; Zanolie et al., 2012). The association between
vertical location and power can be observed in common phrases in many languages. For
example, in American English, people use phrases such as “climbing the ladder of
success,” “being promoted above your peers,” or “being high in the hierarchy.” In Italian,
people use phrases like “sottomettere qualcuno” (literally, “put somebody under”) and
“conosco gente ai piani alti che si dà da fare per me” (meaning “I know people high up
pulling strings for me”). Powerful words like director or general even direct attention
upwards in space while powerless words like servant or follower direct attention down-
wards (Zanolie et al., 2012).
It is reasonable that spatial location is prevalent and inuential given its importance to
cognitive processing. Location is prioritized in the visual system such that spatial localiza-
tion begins at some of the earliest stages of the visual cortical hierarchy (Engel et al., 1997;
Holmes, 1945; Serences & Yantis, 2006). In fact, humans and animals alike can learn
associations between an object’s location and its appearance in a single experimental
session (Ciaramitaro et al., 2001; Sridharan et al., 2013). Drawing from this convergent
body of work, we hypothesized that spatial location may be a valuable means of convey-
ing socially meaningful messages such as group value. Indeed, horizontal and vertical
biases have been observed in how groups are spatially positioned in various cultural
media (Hegarty et al., 2010; Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019; Suitner & Maass, 2007). Here, in
a series of four studies, we examined whether spatial biases may be observed through the
coordinate positioning of objects that symbolize women versus objects that symbolize
men. Specically, we had two competing hypotheses: (a) Ingroup Bias: that people would
exhibit ingroup bias in spatial positioning or (b) Stereotypical Bias: that people would
exhibit stereotype-consistent bias in spatial positioning. Ingroup bias would yield
a pattern in which women would place feminine symbols (e.g., ballet shoes) higher and
further left than masculine symbols (e.g., a soccer ball), whereas men would place mascu-
line symbols higher and further left than feminine symbols. Conversely, stereotypical bias
would yield a pattern in which both women and men would place masculine symbols
higher and further left than feminine symbols.
Stereotypical placement bias
There are reasons to believe that either of these patterns may emerge. For example,
research on group-based dierences in spatial placement suggests that patterns
observed in social environments tend to be consistent with stereotypes. For example, in
cartoon pairs of women and men, men tend to be presented to the left and women to the
right when the man in the couple is perceived to be more agentic than the woman (Maass
et al., 2009). The same pattern is true of graphical depictions of scientic data in which
bars depicting men are more likely to appear on the left and bars depicting women are
more likely to appear on the right (Hegarty et al., 2010). Research suggests that exposure
to this pattern subsequently reinforces gender stereotypes among perceivers (Suitner,
Maass, Ronconi et al., 2017). Similar patterns of stereotypical bias have been noted
regarding vertical location. Recently published work documents a pattern of male spatial
2S. A. LAMER ET AL.
elevation in which images of men are located higher than images of women in popular US
magazines (Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019). Subsequent exposure to this pattern in the lab
reinforced participants’ gender stereotypical beliefs that men are more powerful and
dominant than women. Patterns of spatial placement may, therefore, reify established
gender stereotypes. Both women and men may spatially advantage masculine objects.
It may seem counterintuitive that women would place masculine objects high in space.
Yet, members of low-power groups sometimes adopt culturally prevalent negative beliefs
about their own groups (e.g., Brescoll et al., 2013; Calogero & Jost, 2011; Kay et al., 2009;
Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Spence & Buckner, 2000). For example,
women exhibit similarly strong implicit associations between men and power, are simi-
larly biased against female (vs. male) job applicants, and endorse gender stereotypes with
similar frequency as men do (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Spence &
Buckner, 2000). Therefore, it is possible that both women and men spatially advantage
objects symbolizing men.
Ingroup bias
However, it is also possible that women and men will spatially advantage their ingroups.
For example, in past work on spatial cues, researchers have found evidence consistent
with an ingroup bias. In analyses of Spatial Agency Bias in portraits, female painters did
not exhibit biases favoring men; they were equally likely to paint women in agentic
horizontal orientations as they were to paint men in agentic horizontal orientations
(Suitner & Maass, 2007). Similarly, in magazines, Lamer and Weisbuch (2019) report
preliminary evidence that the pattern of male spatial elevation in which images of men
appeared higher than images of women was stronger among magazines with male than
female editors. Culturally prevalent patterns of stereotypical bias may reect inequitable
distributions of power and spatial placement may be skewed to advantage the ingroup,
even for members of low-power groups.
It is advantageous for people to exhibit ingroup preferences because people derive
self-esteem from the value of the groups they identify with and tend to like ingroup
members who exhibit ingroup bias more than those who act in an egalitarian manner
(Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001; Castelli et al., 2008; Crocker et al., 2003; Reinhard et al., 2009;
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Group aliations thus predict that people will have biased beha-
vior, attitudes, and memory that favor their ingroups. For example, people expect mem-
bers of their ingroup to behave more favorably than members of an outgroup and their
memory is biased accordingly; people remember negative behaviors performed by an
outgroup member better than negative behaviors performed by an ingroup member and
therefore generate illusory correlations between groups and their behavior (Howard &
Rothbart, 1980; Schaller, 1991). People are also more likely to vote for political candidates
of their own gender than the other gender (Hoyt et al., 2009; Plutzer & Zipp, 1996),
interpret intentions of ingroup members more positively than those of outgroup mem-
bers (Correll et al., 2002; Jones et al., 1999; Payne, 2001), and are more likely to reward
work they think was completed by someone of their own gender than the other gender
(Bian et al., 2017).
SELF AND IDENTITY 3
The importance of subtle cues to group value
Yet explicit group-based biases and outgroup harassment are typically considered unac-
ceptable by current social standards (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Devine et al., 2002). This is
not always true and blatant bias can still sometimes be observed in the general popula-
tion (e.g., Kteily et al., 2015; Miller, 2014). However, when group value corresponds to
social group identities historically associated with inequality (e.g., gender, race, sexual
orientation), people are substantially less likely to explicitly express them. In contempor-
ary Western cultures, gender-stereotypic statements are often met with swift condemna-
tion. Accordingly, people are on average tentative to make explicit sexist or racist
statements and provide alternative explanations for instances when they do exhibit
group-based preferences (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Devine et al., 2002).
Yet, that does not mean group-based biases disappear. Instead, social psychologists have
suggested that group biases are expressed through more subtle, automatic, or covert
means such as nonverbal behavior, language construction, and mental representation
(Lloyd et al., 2017; Maass et al., 1989; Von Hippel et al., 1997; Weisbuch, Seery et al., 2009;
Weisbuch, Sinclair et al., 2009). For example, children encode positive information about
members of minimally assigned ingroups (but not outgroups) and college students spon-
taneously respond more positively to an anxious speaker if told that they share a political
aliation (Dunham et al., 2011; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008). Research on those with white
racial identities suggests that these individuals more strongly associate white with good
than black with good, sit farther away from a black than a white interviewee, and selectively
follow the eye gaze of white individuals more than black individuals (Pavan et al., 2011;
Weisbuch et al., 2017; Williams, 1964; Word et al., 1974). Thus, although people may be
unlikely to verbally say biased statements (to bolster their self-esteem or reify existing
stereotypes), they may continue to exhibit group bias in more nuanced ways.
Automaticity
Spatially advantaging one group over the other may be subtle, but not necessarily automatic.
This is an important distinction to make. Automatic behaviors are those that occur without
processing capacity needs or intention, whereas controlled behaviors are those that reect an
individual’s intentions but are therefore limited by processing capacity (Govorun & Payne,
2006; Jacoby, 1991). Automatic and controlled processes often co-occur and contribute to the
ways that group bias is expressed. For example, researchers have teased apart automatic and
controlled components guiding individuals’ behavior in weapon identication tasks (Correll
et al., 2015; Payne, 2001) and recognition memory (Hense et al., 1995; Jacoby, 1991). When
respondents do not face a time constraint, controlled processes are especially likely to
contribute to behavior. However, as time becomes more restricted, people are less able to
inhibit undesirable responses and behavior is more likely to reect automatic processing.
Group bias in spatial location may operate through both automatic and controlled
mechanisms. For example, placing an object in space requires deliberation and intent, even
if people are unaware of their reasoning for aesthetic preference. Controlled and automatic
processes guiding aesthetic preference are both likely to be operating in such instances. In
other tasks, the role of automaticity may be more pronounced. For example, research in
cognitive and social psychology has long examined the role of automaticity in spatial memory
(Richardson & Spivey, 2000). People encode information about where objects and faces are
4S. A. LAMER ET AL.
located in space even when spatial information is irrelevant to the task at hand (Fitousi, 2017;
Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Shadoin & Ellis, 1992). Encoding spatial information may be
adaptive because perceivers learn stimulus probabilities for reward or threat (Biederman
et al., 1982; Ciaramitaro et al., 2001; Druker & Anderson, 2010; Fiser & Aslin, 2016). Even
metaphorical associations, such as those between vertical location and positivity, can shift
spatial memory such that perceivers recall positive objects as being higher than they were,
but negative objects as being lower than they were (Crawford et al., 2006). Stereotype
knowledge (not necessarily personal beliefs) predicts biases on automatic outcomes like the
shooter task (Banse et al., 2010; Correll et al., 2002). Thus we reasoned that stereotypical bias
may be more likely on automatic than controlled tasks.
Here, we examine the role of both controlled and automatic components in group-based
spatial bias using two dierent kinds of tasks: placement and memory. In Studies 1, 2, and 4,
participants place objects in space; there is no time constraint in this task and participants
are allowed to rearrange objects until they are pleased with their nal product. Conversely,
in Studies 3 and 4, participants are asked to perform a free recall of gendered objects. They
are only allowed to view the objects for a short amount of time (30 s) and then asked to
recall placement. Both of these tasks likely employ automatic and controlled components;
tasks are rarely process-pure. However, consistent with past research, we theorize that the
latter free-recall tasks involving spatial memory likely draw more on automatic processes
than does the former object placement task.
The current studies
In this series of studies, we were interested in why patterns of spatial gender bias exist
(Hegarty et al., 2010; Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019; Suitner & Maass, 2007). What may account
for culturally prevalent depictions of men being higher than or to the left of women? We
proposed that the use of spatial location in communicating gender bias may contribute to the
persistence of these subtle cultural patterns. Specically, we hypothesized that people may
either (a) arrange their environments to bolster their ingroup gender identity or (b) arrange
objects consistent with current gender stereotypes – with masculine objects higher or further
left than feminine objects.
In Study 1, we tested for stereotypical bias and ingroup bias in the placement of feminine
and masculine objects as moderated by dierent aspects of gender identity (i.e., how
positively one feels about their gender identity, how central gender is to the self, and ties
to ingroup members). In Study 2, we manipulated the salience of gender identity to test for
an ingroup identity bias on spatial placement. In Study 3, we tested for evidence of
gendered spatial bias in memory, given that this spatial memory task is likely to engage
more automatic processes. In Study 4, we compared spatial memory and spatial placement
tasks to replicate and extend eects with a high-powered sample. We also include
a measure of gender stereotyping in this last study as a potential moderator of spatial bias.
Study 1: ingroup bias in object placement
In this rst study, we were interested in how perceivers placed stereotypically feminine and
masculine images in space as a function of their own gender. Specically, participants were
asked to complete an aesthetic arrangement task by placing feminine and masculine
SELF AND IDENTITY 5
magnets (e.g., a ballerina or a soccer player) on a virtual refrigerator. We were interested in
the extent to which participants spatially advantaged magnets symbolizing the ingroup
relative to magnets symbolizing the outgroup. We hypothesized that people would either
(a) spatially advantage magnets that symbolized the ingroup by placing them high and
leftward relative to magnets that symbolize the outgroup or (b) spatially advantage mascu-
line magnets to replicate prevalent cultural patterns. We tested aspects of gender identity
(ingroup ties, aect, centrality) as a moderator of any observed spatial bias.
Methods
Participants and setting
Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and paid for their participa-
tion in the 10-minute experiment. The study was approved by the institutional review
board at the University of Padua and was conducted using Qualtrics. The nal sample
consisted of 187 participants (57% women) located in the US, ranging in age from 19 to 77
with quartiles at 30, 38, and 50.
1
We estimated a conservatively small eect size (d =.20),
for which initial power analyses using G*POWER (Faul et al., 2007) suggested collecting
199 participants for an independent sample t-test. We met this number of participants
prior to exclusions. However, after data collection, we opted to use multilevel models as
these are more appropriate to the methodological design given that responses are nested
within stimuli and subjects.
2
Materials
Spatial placement task
The goal of this task was to quantify where participants would place objects symbolizing
femininity and masculinity. Participants were shown a blank refrigerator (410 x 737 pixels)
and asked to place each of eight magnets (four feminine/masculine pairs). The magnets
were presented to the participant in random order. Magnets (100 x 63 pixels) were
pretested and we chose the four magnet pairs that were most similar on valence but
polarized in gender-typicality.
Magnet pretesting
We selected 60 images for pretesting that ranged in gender stereotypicality. We selected
images that could be cropped to look like refrigerator magnets and that fell into ve
dierent categories: animals, nature, paintings, bikes, cars, and athletics. We chose images
so that selected pairs could be matched on art style, color scheme (e.g., black-white vs
color), and image complexity (e.g., with white background or not). Once we had selected
these images, we standardized them to be the same in height and width (100 pixels wide
x 63 pixels high). Furthermore, we cropped each feminine image so that the target (e.g.,
a kitten) was centered and facing the same direction as its masculine counterpart (e.g.,
a lizard).
Participants (66% women) were 32 volunteers ranging in age from 22 to 59 with
quartiles at 23, 24, and 48. They rated each of the magnets in random order twice. The
rst time they saw the magnets, they were asked to rate them on gender (from 1 to 7;
6S. A. LAMER ET AL.
whether extremely feminine was 1 or 7 was counterbalanced between participants).
The second time participants saw the magnets, they were asked to rate them on valence
(from 1 to 7; whether extremely positive was 1 or 7 was counterbalanced between
participants). We selected four magnet pairs that were dierent in terms of gender
stereotypicality but close to the midpoint on valence. See Table 1 for a list of these stimuli
and their gender and valence ratings.
We chose refrigerator magnets because they mitigated many potential issues present
when encountering actual women and men. The vertical location of women and men
encountered in person, for example, is often constrained by average sex and gender
dierences in height (Touraille, 2013; Zheng et al., 2013). Magnets can be scaled such that
feminine and masculine objects – even women and men – are the same size and can be
located anywhere in space. Here, all magnets were the same size and, depending on
counterbalancing condition, were facing toward the right or left (some examples of
magnet images are shown later in Figure 4).
Procedure
Participants were told that their arrangements would be rated by another set of partici-
pants for aesthetic appeal. They could rearrange their magnets until they were pleased
with their nal arrangement. Participants were not, however, allowed to exclude any of
the magnets from the fridge. There were four dierent versions of the task varying the
direction of the images (e.g., ballerina/soccer player looking right or left) and which side of
the refrigerator the handle was located on. Spatial placement scores here were calculated
by computing the horizontal and vertical location in pixels as a percentage of the width
and length of the refrigerator, respectively. Higher values mean that the magnet was
placed further right or lower on the refrigerator.
Social identity scale
Participants completed a measure of social identity adapted to gender (Cameron, 2004).
This scale includes three subscales: centrality, ingroup ties, and ingroup aect. Participants
responded to questions like “I often think about the fact that I am a woman/man” and “In
general, I’m glad to be a woman/man” on a scale from 1, Strongly Disagree, to 6, Strongly
Disagree. We tested each of these subscales as potential moderators of spatial bias. Past
Table 1. Pretest ratings for each of the selected magnet pairs.
Magnet Gender Stereotypicality Valence
Animals
Kitten 5.41 (1.62) 4.56 (1.98)
Lizard 3.63 (1.54) 4.09 (1.89)
Bicycles
Feminine 5.28 (1.69) 4.06 (1.93)
Masculine 3.25 (1.68) 4.31 (1.67)
Cars
Minivan 4.59 (1.88) 3.88 (1.95)
Sports Car 3.06 (1.72) 3.75 (1.65)
Paintings
Ballerina 4.84 (1.44) 4.41 (1.64)
Soccer Player 3.03 (1.86) 3.41 (1.92)
SELF AND IDENTITY 7
work supports the distinctiveness of these dimensions for women and men. These subscales
have demonstrated high reliability (α ranging from .76 to .84 for ingroup ties, here: .83; from
.67 to .78 for centrality, here: .78; from .77 to .82 for ingroup aect, here: .86).
Procedure
Participants completed an informed consent and indicated their age and gender to allow for
proper wording of additional measures (see Appendix). Participants completed the Spatial
Placement Task and then rated each of the magnets on gender stereotypicality from 1
(Extremely Masculine) to 7 (Extremely Feminine).
3
All participants then completed the Social
Identity Scale, questions about their experience taking the study, and a brief demographics
questionnaire before receiving a debrieng about the purpose of the study.
Results
Vertical placement
Because placement data were nested within person and within stimuli, a cross-classied
mixed model was the most appropriate t to the data. Cross-classied mixed models are
well suited to data that contain two random eects like that of subject and stimuli (Judd
et al., 2012, 2017). Furthermore, multilevel models are more robust to Type I error and
allow researchers to generalize beyond the particular sample of stimuli and participants
used by accounting for individual variance of items and subjects (Judd et al., 2012, 2017;
Westfall et al., 2015). Thus, we estimated mixed eect models to examine whether the
participant’s gender and magnet rating inuenced magnet placement. Mixed models
were estimated in R (R Core Team, 2017) with the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) using
Satterthwaite approximate degrees of freedom (i.e., lmerTest; Kuznetsova et al., 2017).
4
Ratings were analyzed as a function of participant gender (woman (1) vs. man (−1);
contrast-coded), centered magnet ratings (higher values indicated more femininity),
and the interaction of the two. Random intercepts of subject and stimuli were included
in the model.
5
We had two competing hypotheses: ingroup spatial bias or stereotypical spatial bias.
An ingroup spatial bias would be observed through an interaction of participant gender
and magnet gender, whereas a stereotypical spatial bias would be observed through the
main eect of magnet gender. Consistent with ingroup bias, the interaction of participant
gender and magnet gender on vertical placement was signicant, b = −2.63, se = .30, t
(1359.14) = −8.69, p < .001. Women placed magnets higher on the refrigerator that they
perceived as more feminine, b = −2.75, se = .54, t(282.68) = −5.06, p < .001. In contrast,
men placed magnets higher on the fridge that they perceived as more masculine, b = 2.50,
se = .58, t(409.55) = 4.34, p = .002. See Figure 1. There were no main eects of participant
gender or magnet gender (ps>.582). Furthermore, there was no signicant dierence
between these two slopes, b = −.13, se = .47, t(192.03) = −.27, p = .787, indicating that
women and men had similar ingroup bias.
We next added each subscale of social identity to the model as a predictor to test
whether this factor moderated ingroup spatial bias. We rst added ingroup aect to the
model. There was a signicant interactive eect of magnet rating, participant gender, and
8S. A. LAMER ET AL.
ingroup aect on ingroup bias, b = 1.66, se = .49, t(1345.08) = 3.36, p < .001. Women,
b = −.97, se = .44, t(1346.11) = −2.19, p = .029, and men, b = .69, se = .22, t(1345.11) = 3.17,
p = .002, with stronger ingroup aect exhibited more vertical ingroup bias. There was also
a marginal interactive eect of magnet rating, participant gender, and ingroup ties,
b = .75, se = .39, t(1356.38) = 1.93, p = .054. Specically, men, b = .44, se = .18, t
(1344.88) = 2.40, p = .017, but not women, b = −.30, se = .34, t(1360.70) = −.90, p = .370,
with stronger ingroup ties exhibited more vertical ingroup bias. Finally, there was
a signicant interactive eect of magnet rating, participant gender, and gender centrality,
b = 1.19, se = .39, t(1357.22) = 3.07, p = .002. Men, b = .80, se = .20, t(1399.99) = 4.10,
p < .001, but not women, b = −.38, se = .33, t(1342.99) = −1.15, p = .250, who considered
gender more central to their identity exhibited more vertical ingroup bias. Thus, gender
Figure 1. Average placement of magnets by women and men based on how masculine or feminine
the magnets were rated.
SELF AND IDENTITY 9
identity can in part account for the expression of vertical ingroup bias. Ingroup bias was
strongest among women with high ingroup aect and among men with high ingroup
aect, ingroup ties, or centrality.
Horizontal placement
We then tested these same predictions with horizontal placement. The interaction of
participant gender and magnet gender on horizontal placement was not signicant,
b = −.001, se = .003, t(1492) = −.29, p = .776. Nor were there were main eects of
participant gender or magnet gender (ps>.250). Gender ingroup aect (b = −.0003,
se = .003, t(1483.00) = −.10, p = .919), ingroup ties, (b = .002, se = .002, t(1488.00) = .96,
p = .335), and gender centrality (b = .003, se = .002, t(1485.00) = 1.38, p = .169) did not
moderate horizontal ingroup placement.
Discussion
We had theorized that people express bias in their placement of objects that symbolize
women and men. Specically, we posed two alternative hypotheses: (1) gender stereo-
typical bias – that people would place masculine objects higher than feminine objects – and
(2) ingroup bias – that people would place ingroup objects higher than outgroup objects. In
this study, women placed feminine things higher in space, whereas men placed masculine
things higher in space. Vertical location can communicate power (Giessner & Schubert,
2007; Hall et al., 2005; Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019; Landau et al., 2011, 2010; Schubert, 2005)
and recent research suggests that vertical placement may be biased toward certain groups
(e.g., in popular US magazines; Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019). Yet it is unclear why such spatial
patterns may exist. Here we identied one possible mechanism: People use vertical place-
ment to express ingroup bias.
However, for men, placement that favors the ingroup is the same as placement
consistent with gender stereotypes. It is possible that one or both mechanisms are
guiding men’s behavior since men’s pattern of placement could be supported by either
hypothesis. We observed evidence that self-reported gender identity was involved in
spatial placement for both women and men: ingroup aect (and to a lesser extent gender
centrality and ingroup ties) moderated the extent to which women and men expressed
ingroup spatial placement. Thus, we next experimentally manipulated gender identity to
assess changes in placement: To the extent that ingroup spatial bias is guided by one’s
gender identity, we expected to be able to modulate it by threatening individuals’
perceived prototypicality with their gender group.
Study 2: placement bias under social identity threat
Social identity theory conceptualizes an individual’s prototypicality within a group as
malleable (Haslam et al., 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Feeling as if one is far from the
group prototype prompts an individual to feel uncertain about their identity, especially if
this results in feeling close to the prototype of an outgroup (e.g. Haslam et al., 1995;
Jetten et al., 2002). People are motivated to reduce uncertainty about the self and may do
so by increasing prototypicality in a meaningful social group (Hohman et al., 2017).
10 S. A. LAMER ET AL.
Increasing prototypicality can take numerous forms including favoring prototypical (vs.
nonprototypical) group members or expressing ingroup bias (e.g., Schmitt &
Branscombe, 2001). We reasoned that if gender identity was related to how people
placed gendered objects, that shifting individuals' gender prototypicality would also
shift their placement behavior. The salience of a prototypicality threat depends on the
value of ingroup membership and consequence of peripheral status, making
a prototypicality threat important to individuals that identify with high-status groups
(Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001). Not feeling prototypical can motivate individuals to
exhibit ingroup-biased behaviors by way of self-uncertainty (Hohman et al., 2017) and
those motivated to defend group status are especially likely to exhibit ingroup bias in the
face of prototypicality threat (Jetten et al., 1997). We reasoned that prototypicality threat
and armation would modulate the likelihood that people would exhibit ingroup spatial
bias if this behavior was related to gender identity. In this study, participants were
assigned to one of three conditions: threat, armation, or control and asked to complete
the same spatial placement task as was used in Study 1.
Consistent with social identity theory, threat should impact members of high- and low-
status groups dierently because the consequences of being peripheral in a high-status
group are greater than being peripheral in a low-status group (Haslam et al., 1995;
Hohman et al., 2017; Jetten et al., 1997). Being told that you are not a prototypical
member of a high-status group (i.e., men) should elicit stronger responses than being
told that you are not a prototypical member of a low-status group (i.e., women). Similarly,
being told that you are a prototypical member of a high-status group should elicit
stronger responses than being told you are a prototypical member of a low-status
group. For example, men tend to respond particularly strongly to changes in their
perceived gender prototypicality. A man told he is dissimilar from other men (and thereby
similar to women) is more likely to sexually harass a woman by sending her pornography,
is more likely to express support for war, and is more likely to blame a woman for the
circumstances of her assault than a man whose social identity has been armed (Hunt &
Gonsalkorale, 2014; Maass et al., 2003; Munsch & Willer, 2012; Willer et al., 2013). Women
tend to respond much more weakly to prototypicality threat than men (Munsch & Willer,
2012; Vandello et al., 2008). Due to gender-based status dierences in many modern
societies, rejecting femininity imbues power to both women and men, even though
women must also reject their ingroup (Munsch & Willer, 2012). In fact, telling a woman
she is not like other women or is not a “girly girl” is often considered a compliment. Thus,
we did not expect women to respond strongly to prototypicality threat.
Nonetheless, in Study 2, we assessed both women’s and men’s group spatial bias in
response to gender identity threat, armation, or control. We expected that any response
to gender prototypicality threat would be observed more so among men than women
given the precarious nature of masculinity and the relative status of men and women in
US culture which is where our sample was drawn from for this study (Brandt, 2011; Graf
et al., 2019; Moore & Shackman, 1996; Munsch & Willer, 2012; Vandello et al., 2008)
rendering prototypicality threat a useful mechanism to assess the role of gender identity
in motivating spatial placement bias. We tested for eects on both the vertical and
horizontal dimension to replicate and extend ndings from Study 1.
SELF AND IDENTITY 11
Methods
Participants and setting
Students were recruited from the Psychology Department at a US mid-western private
university. Participants were paid for their participation in the 30-minute experiment. The
study was approved by the university Institutional Review Board. The lab session was
conducted using Qualtrics with each student in their own room for the duration of the
experiment. The nal sample consisted of 239 participants (71% women), ranging in age
from 18 to 35 with quartiles at 19, 19, and 21.
6
We aimed for 256 participants based on
power analyses of a conservatively small eect size (f
2
= .03) and a priori decided to stop
data collection once this number was reached or once the academic quarter had con-
cluded – whichever came rst. After data
collection was complete, we shifted to use multi-level models for analysis to replicate
Study 1 and to generalize beyond the particular sample of participants and stimuli used.
7
Materials
Prototypicality threat
To induce gender identity threat, participants rst completed a shortened 12-item version of
the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1974; Vafaei et al., 2014) and were then provided ctitious
feedback with their score (for similar manipulations, see Maass et al., 2003; Munsch & Willer,
2012; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001; Vandello et al., 2008). Participants were assigned to the
threat, armation, or control condition. In the control condition, they received no feedback
on how they scored relative to others of their gender and they did not see the graph of the
distributions. They did, however, respond to the Bem Sex Role Inventory. In the other two
conditions, participants were shown their score along with what they were told was the
average distributions for women and men of their age (see Figure 2). In order to ensure that
the participant read and understood their score, they were asked to plot it along the x-axis of
the distributions. In the threat condition, the score shown was close to the end of the normal
distribution and participants were told “your score is outside of the average range for your
gender.” In the armation condition, the score shown was close to the middle of the normal
distribution and participants were told “your score is within the average range for your gender.”
Procedure
When participants rst arrived at the lab, they completed informed consent and indicated
their age and gender to allow for proper randomization into feedback condition.
Participants completed the Bem Sex Role Inventory and were randomly assigned to
receive threatening feedback, arming feedback, or no feedback. All participants then
completed the spatial placement task and a brief demographics questionnaire before an
experimenter fully debriefed them about the purpose of the study and nature of the
personality feedback.
8
12 S. A. LAMER ET AL.
Results
Vertical placement
We again estimated cross-classied mixed models to examine whether the participant’s
gender, magnet rating, and gender identity threat condition inuenced where the parti-
cipant positioned the magnet. Vertical placement was nested within the subject and the
stimuli; we, therefore, analyzed the data as a function of participant gender (woman (1) vs.
man (−1); contrast-coded), centered magnet ratings (higher values indicated more fem-
ininity), condition (threat (1) vs. armation (0) and control (1) vs. armation (0); dummy-
coded), and all higher-order interactions. There was a marginal main eect of participant
gender, b = .03, se = .01, t(233.10) = 1.80, p = .073; a main eect of magnet rating, b = −.02,
se = .007, t(974.00) = −2.21, p = .027; and a marginal two-way interaction of the two,
b = −.01, se = .006, t(1718.00) = −1.91, p = .056. However, we hesitate to interpret these
eects given that they are qualied by three-way interactions with each of the two
dummy-coded condition variables. Specically, participant gender and magnet rating
interacted with threat (vs. armation), b = −.02, se = .009, t(1743.00) = −2.05, p = .040, and
control (vs. armation), b = −.02, se = .009, t(1773.00) = −2.41, p = .016. Women exhibited
an ingroup bias in spatial placement regardless of prototypicality threat condition (mag-
net by threat condition interactions for women: ps>.204; see Figure 3). Men, on the other
hand, were signicantly impacted by condition (magnet by threat condition interactions
for men: ps<.042). They exhibited an ingroup bias in vertical placement when threatened
or not given any feedback, but not when armed. Thus, armation mitigated men’s
ingroup bias but had no impact on women’s ingroup bias.
Figure 2. Example feedback provided to women participants in Studies 2 and 3. Panel A provides
identity-threatening feedback, whereas Panel B provides identity affirming feedback. Whether the
distribution of women’s scores was higher or lower (i.e., to the left or right) than that of men’s scores
was counterbalanced across participants. Thus, whether threatening feedback was associated with
a higher or lower absolute value was counterbalanced.
SELF AND IDENTITY 13
Horizontal placement
We tested horizontal placement of the magnets using the same predictors in a cross-classied
model. No eects emerged except for a main eect of threat (vs. armation) such that people
placed magnets farther to the right when threatened than armed, b = 3.96, se = 1.47, t
(1894.00) = 2.68, p = .007. The interactions of participant gender and magnet rating with
threat (vs. armation), b = −.71, se = .94, t(1895.36) = −.76, p = .447, and with control (vs.
armation), b = −.66, se = .96, t(1894.14) = −.76, p = .447, were not signicant.
Discussion
We theorized that people would draw from stereotypes or ingroup identity to place
gendered objects. Men could have placed masculine objects higher because their gender
identity was important, because they endorsed gender stereotypes, or both. We expected
Figure 3. Magnet placement in Study 2 for women (left panel) and men (right panel). Women placed
feminine magnets higher than masculine magnets regardless of condition, whereas men placed
masculine magnets higher than feminine magnets only in the threat and control condition. In the
affirmation condition, men placed feminine magnets higher than masculine magnets.
14 S. A. LAMER ET AL.
Figure 4. Example spatial memory task performance. Original magnet placements are shown in faded
grayscale watermark with how a participant may have remembered the placement on top at full
opacity. Deviation scores were calculated by measuring the distance that each magnet was moved
from its original position. When a magnet was recalled as being in a more advantaged location (i.e.,
higher or more leftward), it was recorded as a positive number. Values are reported as a percent of
refrigerator length and width.
SELF AND IDENTITY 15
that if gender identity contributed to men’s spatial placement, that prototypicality threat
should shift their behavior accordingly. Consistent with the eects observed in Study 1,
participants in Study 2 exhibited a gender ingroup bias in how they placed feminine and
masculine objects. Women placed feminine objects higher than masculine objects – and
this was true regardless of their condition. However, men placed masculine objects higher
than feminine objects, but only in the control and threat conditions. Only the armation
condition mitigated ingroup placement bias.
The similarity in men’s response between threat and control is consistent with past
work. There are reasons to expect that men may typically respond as if they are under
threat. The Precarious Manhood Theory posits that men’s t with their gender is evaluated
more on the basis of social evidence than biological markers and therefore must be
regularly proven (Vandello et al., 2008). Other work suggests that arming one’s proto-
typicality can generate a modesty eect wherein people exhibit an outgroup bias (Cadinu
& Cerchioni, 2001). We found evidence consistent with this Modesty Eect (Cadinu &
Cerchioni, 2001); men responded to armation by exhibiting an outgroup bias in vertical
placement relative to the control condition.
Thus, Studies 1 and 2 provide self-report and experimental evidence consistent with
our theory that gender identity contributes to men’s (and women’s) spatial placement.
We also found further support for the importance of vertical (but not horizontal) space in
transmitting ingroup bias. Ingroup bias was observed among women and men along the
vertical, but not the horizontal axis.
Study 3: memory bias under social identity threat
In the previous two studies, we observed an eect of participant gender on magnet
placement. In this task, participants were not limited by time and were allowed to rearrange
objects until they are pleased with their nal product. Despite the subtlety of expressing
ingroup bias by placing an object in space, we reasoned that the observed eect on the
placement task likely owed to more controlled processing given that the act of placing
a magnet engages personal choice and deliberation. However, we were interested in
whether spatial bias would also be observed in more automatic processing. Thus, in
Study 3, we sought to test for ingroup bias and stereotypical bias in spatial memory.
Indeed, a large literature has examined the nature of location memory nding support
for the automaticity of this process (Druker & Anderson, 2010; Richardson & Spivey, 2000;
Shadoin & Ellis, 1992; Sridharan et al., 2013). People encode location information even when
such information is irrelevant to the task at hand (Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Shadoin & Ellis,
1992). Furthermore, human and non-human animals learn associations between an object’s
location and its appearance in as little as a single experiment and stimulus location
probabilities can facilitate item detection (Ciaramitaro et al., 2001; Druker & Anderson,
2010). Thus, we expected that to the extent ingroup spatial bias extends to automatic
processing, it would be observed in a task employing spatial memory. Ingroup biases in
spatial memory would suggest that cultural patterns of male spatial elevation wherein men
are higher than women are amplied in memory for men.
16 S. A. LAMER ET AL.
Methods
Participants and setting
Students were recruited from the Departments of Engineering, Chemistry, Biology,
Psychology, and Mathematics at the University of Padua. Participants were uent either
in Italian or English and were tested by an experimenter uent in that language.
Participants were paid for their participation in the 30-minute experiment. The study
was approved by the institutional ethical committee of psychological departments at the
University of Padua. The experiment was conducted using Qualtrics and Tobii Pro Studio
with each student in their own room for the duration of the experiment. The nal sample
consisted of 138 participants (57% women), ranging in age from 19 to 28 with quartiles at
20, 21, and 23.
9
There were 121 participants who completed the study in Italian and 17
international participants who completed the study in English. We aimed for 20–40
participants per gender/condition cell based on sample sizes of previous studies assessing
spatial memory (Bettinsoli et al., 2019; Crawford et al., 2016, 2006; Richardson & Spivey,
2000; Vestner et al., 2019). After exclusions, there were between 27 and 39 participants per
cell of the 2 (Threat) by 2 (Gender) design.
Spatial memory task
The goal of this task was to test participants’ memory for the vertical and horizontal
location of feminine and masculine objects. Participants were shown a refrigerator with
the same eight magnets as used in Studies 1 and 2 – four feminine/masculine pairs (e.g.,
ballerina/soccer player) for 30 seconds. The magnets were arranged such that feminine
and masculine magnets were, on average, centered at the vertical and horizontal mid-
point of the refrigerator. The positions of the specic magnets were also counterbalanced
into 16 dierent arrangements so that each magnet appeared in each location in each
mirrored version.
We calculated deviation scores by computing the dierence between where each
magnet originally appeared and where the participant recalled it having been. Higher
values indicated that participants placed the magnet higher or further left than where it
had originally appeared on the refrigerator. See Figure 4 for example.
Procedure
When participants rst arrived at the lab, they were calibrated on the Tobii Pro X3-120 eye
tracker.
10
They then completed informed consent and indicated their age and gender to
allow for proper randomization into feedback condition. Participants completed the BSRI
and were randomly assigned to receive threatening or arming feedback. All participants
then completed the spatial memory task and a brief demographics questionnaire before an
experimenter fully debriefed them about the purpose of the study and nature of the
personality feedback.
SELF AND IDENTITY 17
Results
We again estimated cross-classied mixed models but this time to examine whether the
participant’s gender, magnet rating, and gender identity threat condition inuenced where
the participant recalled each magnet’s location. Vertical placement was analyzed as a function
of participant gender (woman (1) vs. man (−1); contrast-coded), centered magnet ratings
(higher values indicated more femininity), condition (threat (1) vs. armation (−1); contrast-
coded), and all higher-order interactions. There were no main eects (ps>.384), no two-way
interactions (ps>.456), and, critically, no three-way interaction, b = .05, se = .48, t(1089.36) = .12,
p = .909. We also tested horizontal spatial memory using the same predictors in a cross-
classied model. No eects emerged, ps>.456. Thus, we observed no eects on spatial
memory.
Discussion
We found no evidence that people exhibit ingroup bias in their memory for the location of
gendered objects. Nor did we nd evidence of a stereotype-consistent bias in spatial
memory. The absence of an eect here is in contrast to Study 1 and Study 2 wherein we
found gender ingroup bias in vertical spatial placement. The null eect may be a result of
the unique mechanisms guiding spatial memory (relative to spatial placement). Research
suggests that spatial memory is automatically encoded and recalled during these free
recall tasks (Logan, 1998; Shadoin & Ellis, 1992). Thus, the absence of an eect suggests
that vertical spatial bias is bounded by task automaticity. We observed vertical placement
bias, but not vertical memory bias suggesting that women and men only exhibit spatial
bias in tasks enabling more controlled processes such as placement (Studies 1 and 2 here).
Further research is needed to disentangle these two components within the same task
(see Jacoby, 1991 & Payne, 2001).
It is worth noting that the sample and procedure in Study 3 were unique in
a number of ways. Participants were calibrated to an eye tracker before completing
the study. This may have made them anxious or more attentive to the study
protocol. The sample was smaller in this study given time limitations of data collec-
tion with the eye-tracker (i.e., each experimental session was conducted one at
a time with an experimenter uent in that participants’ preferred language) and
a smaller estimated sample size based on the spatial memory task. Participants were
also recruited from an Italian university; thus, the majority of participants were Italian
and completed the study in Italian. We do not anticipate that this latter set of
dierences altered the experimental manipulation in meaningful ways. For example,
the model is based on individualized ratings of each magnet so cultural dierences
in the perception of magnet gender-stereotypicality should be accounted for.
Furthermore, past work has used gender identity threat manipulations with Italian
samples successfully (Hunt et al., 2016; Maass et al., 2003) and we were thus assured
that this manipulation would be suited to this population. Nonetheless, we wanted
to replicate the null eects observed in Study 3 on the memory task in a larger
sample where individuals were randomly assigned to complete the placement or
memory version of the task.
18 S. A. LAMER ET AL.
Study 4: comparing placement and memory bias
We hypothesized that people would place objects in ways that vertically (but not
horizontally) advantaged their ingroup. Women would place feminine objects higher
than masculine objects, whereas men would place masculine objects higher than
feminine objects. As in Study 2, we anticipated moderation by gender identity
armation for men (but not women). Furthermore, we hypothesized that gender
ingroup bias would not be observed in spatial memory, and exploratorily examined
the hypothesis that stereotype-consistent bias would be observed on this more
automatic outcome.
We also explored the role of gender stereotypes in spatial bias. In Study 1, gender
identity (i.e., positive aect toward one’s gender) predicted the strength of ingroup spatial
placement bias and in Study 2, inducing gender identity armation mitigated the
ingroup bias among men. Yet behavior is multiply determined and the inuence of
gender identity on spatial placement does not preclude the inuence of gender stereo-
types. This is especially true for men whose pattern of spatial placement would be
identical regardless if they were guided by gender identity as if they were guided by
gender stereotypes.
Methods
Participants and setting
A large sample of US participants were recruited from both introductory psychology
classes at a southeastern public university for partial course credit and from Prolic
Academic for pay. The study took participants about 15 minutes to complete and was
approved by the Institutional Review Board. The experiment was conducted using
Qualtrics with each participant completing the study online. The nal sample consisted
of 805 participants (53% women; 77% Prolic Academic; 74% white
11
), ranging in age
from 18 to 73 with quartiles at 20, 26, and 34.
12
Using the simR package in R (Green &
Macleod, 2016), we estimated the sample size needed to achieve .80 power. Specically,
we used the eect observed in Study 2 from the addition of the three-way interaction of
gender, dummy-coded threat v. armation condition variable, and magnet gender. This
analysis yielded a sample size of 400 participants. (See SOM for R script and materials.)
Since we planned to add a factor in which participants were randomly assigned to the
placement or memory task, we doubled this number to yield our target sample size. In our
pre-registration for this study (https://osf.io/ez5vh/?view_only=82ccc390bcc54e5c
b269a71b44b6a31a), we indicated that we sought to collect 880 participants (i.e., our
target sample size plus 10%). We oversampled to account for the anticipated exclusions
based on technical errors, attention checks, and non-binary gender identity. Following
exclusions, we met our required a priori sample size goal.
Gender stereotype measure
Participants indicated their perceived gender stereotypes with 10 adjectives. They
responded to items like, “People think that men, in general, are competent” and
SELF AND IDENTITY 19
“People think that women, in general, are independent” on a scale from 1 (not at all)
to 7 (extremely). The scale included the following adjectives: competent, intelligent,
independent, competitive, condent (α = .76). We took a dierence score between
ratings of women and ratings of men such that higher scores indicated stronger
perceived gender stereotypes.
Procedure
When participants clicked on the study link, they were asked to complete the study in one
sitting and turn o all distractions in their environment. Qualtrics and Prolic restricted
participants from completing the task on a mobile device. They then completed informed
consent and indicated their age and gender to allow for proper randomization into
feedback condition. Participants completed the BSRI and were randomly assigned to
receive threatening or arming feedback. All participants then completed either the
spatial memory task or spatial placement task before completing a gender stereotype
measure and a brief demographics questionnaire. They were then fully debriefed about
the purpose of the study and nature of the personality feedback before being given the
opportunity to reconsent using their data in analyses.
Results
Vertical location
We anticipated that participants would preferentially place gender ingroup items high in
space and that armation would mitigate this bias among men. We did not anticipate
gender ingroup bias in spatial memory.
Vertical placement
Vertical placement was analyzed as a function of participant gender (woman (1) vs. man
(−1); contrast-coded), centered magnet ratings (higher values indicated more femininity),
condition (threat (1) vs. armation (−1); contrast-coded), and all higher-order interac-
tions. Vertical placement values could vary from 0 to 100 (i.e., distance from the top of the
fridge to the magnet as a percent of the fridge length). No signicant main eects
emerged. There was a marginal main eect of threat such that people in the threat
condition placed objects lower than those in the armation condition, b = −1.00,
se = .55, β = −.20, t(465.34) = −1.82, p = .070. However, the sample was large and thus
we hesitate to over-interpret this marginal eect. A signicant two-way interaction of
participant gender and magnet rating indicated that participants placed ingroup objects
higher than outgroup objects, b = −1.17, se = .23, t(3415.99) = −5.15, p < .001 (see Figure
5). Women placed feminine objects higher than masculine objects, b = −1.48, se = .33, t
(3322.50) = −4.43, p < .001, whereas men placed masculine objects higher than feminine
objects, b = .87, se = .36, t(3436.13) = 2.42, p = .016. However, this interaction was not
moderated by gender identity threat, b = .06, se = .23, t(3416.42) = .28, p = .782. Thus,
armation did not signicantly mitigate men’s ingroup bias as it had in Study 2. See
discussion for more on this pattern of results.
20 S. A. LAMER ET AL.
We also exploratorily entered gender stereotypes into a model with magnet rating
separately for men and for women. Endorsement of gender stereotypes moderated
magnet placement for men, b = .58, se = .29, t(1565.82) = 1.99, p = .047, such that men
who strongly endorsed gender stereotypes were especially likely to spatially advantage
masculine (vs feminine) objects, b = .92, se = .45, t(1246.09) = 2.06, p = .040. In contrast,
magnet gender ratings did not predict vertical placement for men low in gender stereo-
type endorsement, b = −.26, se = .51, t(1414.63) = −.50, p = .614. For women, the
endorsement of gender stereotypes did not moderate magnet placement, b = −.05,
se = .22, t(1789.11) = −.24, p = .807. Even when accounting for gender stereotype
endorsement in this model, women still placed feminine objects signicantly higher
than masculine objects, b = −1.06, se = .34, t(1784.17) = −3.09, p = .002. Thus, men's
spatial placement is guided by both perceived gender stereotypes and gender identity.
Vertical memory
Vertical memory was analyzed as a function of participant gender (woman (1) vs. man
(−1); contrast-coded), centered magnet ratings (higher values indicated more femininity),
condition (threat (1) vs. armation (−1); contrast-coded), and all higher-order interac-
tions. Vertical memory values could vary from −100 to 100 (i.e., the dierence between
actual and remembered location of each magnet as a percent of fridge length). People
Figure 5. Magnet placement in Study 4 for women (left panel) and men (right panel) in each
condition. Women place feminine magnets higher than masculine magnets while men place mascu-
line magnets higher than feminine magnets regardless of condition.
SELF AND IDENTITY 21
recalled objects as higher than they were, b = .02, se = .007, t(7.06) = 2.55, p = .038. No
other main eects or two-way interactions emerged, ps>.317. Critically, the three-way
interaction was not signicant, b = −.002, se = .002, t(2367) = −1.36, p = .175 (see Figure 6),
even when testing for moderation by gender stereotypes, b = .002, se = .001, t
(2374.00) = 1.59, p = .113.
Horizontal location
Although we anticipated no eects in horizontal placement or memory, we tested out-
comes on this dimension. As predicted, no eects emerged in a model predicting
horizontal spatial placement, ps>.384, or horizontal spatial memory, ps>.129.
Discussion
We had hypothesized that we would observe gender bias in spatial placement but not
spatial memory and that threat would moderate eects for men. These hypotheses were
partially supported. As we had observed in Study 2, participants exhibited ingroup bias in
vertical but not horizontal placement. Women placed feminine magnets higher than
masculine magnets regardless of whether having been told they were typical or atypical
Figure 6. Vertical memory bias in Study 4 for women (left panel) and men (right panel) in each
condition. Positive values on the y-axis mean that magnets were placed higher than they originally
appeared. There were no significant effects of magnet rating, participant gender, or threat condition
on memory for object location.
22 S. A. LAMER ET AL.
of women in their age group. However, in contrast to Study 2, we observed no eect of
gender identity armation on men’s ingroup placement bias. Even when armed, men
placed masculine objects higher than feminine objects. There are two possible explana-
tions. First, it is possible that the true eect of identity armation on men’s ingroup
placement bias is weaker than Study 2 indicated. In this case, gender identity may be less
critical in guiding men’s placement of gendered objects. Nonetheless, we still nd
evidence of gender identity being related to vertical ingroup bias among men in Study
1. Thus, second, it is possible that the gender identity threat manipulation was less
compelling to participants in this online format. Indeed, participants were not in physical
proximity to the researcher, did not engage with the researcher during setup, and feed-
back may have thus felt less personalized. Comparing a suspicion question asked during
the debrief (scale from 1 to 5), participants reported being more suspicious of personality
feedback in this study (M = 2.94, SD = 1.18) than in Study 2 (M = 2.68, SD = 1.22), t
(1042) = 2.94, p = .003, 95% CI [.08,.43]. Thus, we tentatively suggest that gender
armation may indeed reduce ingroup placement bias among men when armation is
provided in a more personalized way. Additional research would be valuable to test this
hypothesis.
This study provided a robust and well-powered assessment of ingroup vertical place-
ment bias. Both women and men placed objects according to their femininity and
masculinity. However, we observed no such eect on spatial memory, replicating the
null eect observed in Study 3. We discuss the implications for the automaticity versus
controlled nature of spatial bias in the General Discussion.
General discussion
People tend to vertically advantage objects that symbolize their gender ingroup. In Study 1,
women and men both expressed ingroup vertical placement bias. This was strongest
among women with high ingroup aect and among men with high ingroup aect, ingroup
ties, or centrality. This is consistent with past theorizing; people favor their ingroups to
bolster their own self-esteem and this is especially true for those who identify with their
group (Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001; Haslam et al., 1995; Hohman et al., 2017; Tajfel & Turner,
1979). In Study 2, we observed that gender armation mitigated men’s ingroup response,
conrming support for a mechanism of gender identity. Women, on the other hand, were
unaected by threat. This is perhaps because being told they are not very feminine is not
much of a threat in the current social hierarchy where women are a lower-power group
(Browne & Misra, 2003; Halim et al., 2013; Moore & Shackman, 1996; Munsch & Willer, 2012).
In Study 3, we focused on teasing apart automaticity versus control. We did not observe
a pattern of group bias in spatial memory; gendered spatial bias thus occurs more so in tasks
that allow for control than those that do not. In Study 4, we replicated this null nding on
spatial memory alongside ingroup bias on spatial placement.
Underlying mechanisms of spatial bias
We had broadly theorized that spatial bias would be guided by two potential mechan-
isms: that people may (a) arrange their environments to bolster their ingroup gender
identity or (b) arrange objects consistent with current gender stereotypes – with
SELF AND IDENTITY 23
masculine objects higher or further left than feminine objects. Throughout this set of
studies, we observed evidence consistent with the rst mechanism: ingroup bias.
However, men’s spatial placement of objects may have owed to either mechanism:
gender identity or gender stereotypes. Women’s spatial placement of objects may instead
owe to just gender identity – since gender identity and gender stereotypes would work
against each other. In Studies 1 and 2, we observed evidence that gender identity
predicted spatial placement. In Study 1, responses to the Social Identity Scale predicted
spatially advantaging ingroup magnets relative to outgroup magnets for women and
men. In Study 2, gender prototypicality threat altered men’s ingroup spatial bias. Gender
identity armation mitigated the ingroup bias such that men in this condition placed
feminine objects higher than masculine objects. Yet in Study 4, we observed evidence
that gender stereotypes guide men’s (but not women’s) object placement. The more than
men endorsed the prevalence of traditional gender stereotypes, the more that they
spatially advantaged masculine objects relative to feminine objects. Thus, it is possible
that gender identity predicts spatial bias in some settings, whereas gender stereotypes
predict spatial bias in others. More research is needed to test when each of these
mechanisms is operating.
Whether or not participants expressed gender spatial bias depended on the type of
task they completed. Specically, we observed gender bias in vertical placement, but not
vertical memory recall, suggesting that gender spatial bias is observed in tasks involving
more controlled processes. A large body of research suggests that spatial location is
automatically encoded. For example, people recalled where a photograph appeared
regardless of whether they were instructed to do so and even elementary-aged children
exhibit incidental memory for spatial location (Park & James, 1983; Shadoin & Ellis, 1992).
Of course, other factors contribute to spatial memory, such as age, task load, and
individual dierences (Naveh-Benjamin, 1987). We anticipated that if spatial bias
extended to automatic processes, that gender identity or stereotypes may contribute to
encoding or recall of spatial memory. Yet, we instead found null eects suggesting that
automaticity is a boundary condition for gendered spatial bias.
The importance of vertical vs. horizontal space
Gendered spatial bias was only observed on the vertical (not horizontal) spatial dimen-
sion. This is perhaps unsurprising given the limited horizontal width of the refrigerator
(410 pixels) and the landscape layout of the magnets (100 pixels wide x 63 pixels high).
The vertical axis of the fridge used in the studies was about 80% larger than the horizontal
axis (i.e., 737 pixels). Thus, the spatial placement task and the spatial memory task had
somewhat limited horizontal space in which to observe bias.
Preliminary evidence
To evaluate that limited space may have a limited observation of horizontal ingroup spatial
bias, we designed a follow-up spatial placement task to examine whether ingroup spatial
bias would also be observed on the horizontal dimension if the task had allowed. In this
follow-up study, participants were asked to complete a similar aesthetic arrangement task of
feminine and masculine objects, but this time instead of a refrigerator, participants arranged
objects in an undecorated waiting room (813 pixels wide x 542 pixels high; see Supplement
24 S. A. LAMER ET AL.
Figure S1 for example). Participants (N = 211; 50% women) were recruited from Mturk and
ranged in age from 20 to 76 with quartiles at 28, 36, and 47. Objects were digitally created so
that they were matched in style and could be moved around a waiting room with
a transparent background. These objects were pretested using a similar methodological
structure and participant sample as when pretesting the refrigerator magnets (see Study 1).
All objects (i.e., a backpack, a purse, a brown watch, a pink watch, a picture of a soccer player,
a picture of a ballerina, a women’s magazine, and a men’s magazine; see supplement for
examples) were signicantly dierent in their stereotypicality. We tested for ingroup spatial
bias along the horizontal axis. Using the same analytical approach to account for variation
by subject and stimulus, we did not nd evidence of horizontal placement bias. The
interaction of participant gender and magnet gender on horizontal placement was not
signicant, b = −.30, se = .20, t(1672) = −1.37, p = .172. See Figure 7. Nor were there any main
eects of participant gender or magnet gender (ps>.473) suggesting that gender spatial
bias may not be expressed along the horizontal axis even when the task allows.
However, there was an unexpected main eect of magnet gender on vertical place-
ment, b = .37, se = .18, t(1612.90) = 2.07, p = .039, such that women and men participants
placed masculine objects higher than feminine objects. We explore the potential implica-
tions of this preliminary nding for our broader theory below. Thus, even when people
could vary the horizontal placement of objects, group biases did not emerge.
The secondary nature of horizontal location
We can speculate a few reasons why verticality may have been more utilized in the
expression of ingroup bias. First, this pattern may be due to the importance of vertical and
horizontal cues relative to each other. Specically, the meaning ascribed to verticality may
be more universal than the meaning ascribed to horizontality. Humans and many non-
human animals use size to communicate dominance. Humans stand taller and use
Figure 7. Average horizontal placement of magnets by women and men based on how masculine or
feminine the magnets were rated in the follow-up.
SELF AND IDENTITY 25
expansive postures to communicate dominance while non-human animals like dogs and
gorillas bristle their hair and stand on their hind legs to communicate dominance
(Maslow, 1940; Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982). The vertical dimension is also sustained by
a constant physical force (i.e., gravity), whereas this is not true for the horizontal dimen-
sion. Gravity is universally experienced on Earth and thus associations between verticality
and power may be more constant (i.e., experienced since birth) and therefore stronger
than associations between horizontality and agency. Conversely, the link between agency
and horizontal location is culturally specic; it is related to written language and learned
alongside reading and writing (Maass et al., 2014; Suitner, Maass, Bettinsoli et al., 2017).
Thus, this association may be weaker because it is dependent on exposure to language
and cultural environments in which L to R or R to L associations with agency are featured.
Associations between verticality and power are learned early; research suggests that
both children and adults hold links between power and vertical location (L. Schubert et al.,
2013). In fact, scientists argue that children are exposed to the association between
vertical size and power from birth because their parents and other caretakers are larger
than they are (Landau et al., 2010). Thus, when verticality and horizontality are pitted
against each other, verticality may take precedence. It is possible that horizontal place-
ment becomes more important when variability along the vertical dimension is removed
or in situations when the relative positioning of just two objects (i.e., an agent and an
object) is central.
Different dimensions for different meanings
Alternatively, both kinds of spatial associations may be held strongly but employed to
communicate slightly dierent messages. Evidence from developmental samples sug-
gests that children and adolescents exhibit both vertical and horizontal associations with
power and agency (Lu et al., 2017; Suitner, Maass, Bettinsoli et al., 2017). Thus, we may
have observed eects uniquely on vertical placement because verticality is more mean-
ingful in the communication of group bias.
The vertical axis is related to valence (Meier & Robinson, 2004, 2006; Meier et al., 2007)
and to power/status/dominance (Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019; Schubert, 2005; Zanolie et al.,
2012). Especially the latter suggests that verticality is a marker of social hierarchies.
Horizontal spatial bias is related to motor action and is considered a marker of agency
(Maass et al., 2014; Suitner & Maass, 2016). Agency may have been less relevant than
status and power in the arrangement of gendered objects. For example, the tasks
required no movement of the objects once they had been set and the objects themselves
(e.g., backpack, kitten) were mostly unrelated to agency. Future research should explore
the question of when horizontal location is used to convey group bias.
Some research has looked at the combined inuence of horizontal and vertical space. For
example, Schoel et al. (2015) have developed an individual dierence measure – the Spatial
Power Motivation Scale – that tests perceivers’ attention to power along both the horizontal
and vertical dimensions. Participants see dots symbolizing self and other; their task is to
select which orientations they prefer. Higher scores on this measure indicate that people
prefer upper-left positioning relative to lower-right positioning. However, scores are
reported cumulatively and not separately by horizontal and vertical dimensions. In other
work, Paladino et al. (2017) compared how the four spatial quadrants (e.g., upper-left, lower-
right) communicate leadership. Consistent with work on both horizontal and vertical space,
26 S. A. LAMER ET AL.
participants inferred that people pictured in the upper-left hand corner of a layout were
more likely to hold leader (vs. follower) roles in an organization. However, it is unclear what
role vertical and horizontal space have relative to each other in communicating leadership
in this paradigm. The work we have presented here provides some initial evidence for the
relative importance of vertical and horizontal spatial cues and lays a foundation for future
research questions comparing the inuence of vertical and horizontal dimensions in com-
municating attributes like power, status, and agency.
Variation in vertical group bias
Conceptual Metaphor Theory argues that people employ concrete concepts, like vertical
location, to understand and convey abstract concepts, like power, status, or agency
(Landau et al., 2010). Indeed, higher vertical location is associated with higher perceived
power (i.e., control over resources), greater dominance (i.e., personality trait), higher status
(i.e., respect), and more positive aect (Giessner & Schubert, 2007; Hecker Von & Sankaran,
2013; Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Tang et al., 2018; Weisfeld &
Beresford, 1982). Group bias in the placement of feminine and masculine objects may
reect associations with any of these dimensions. For example, men may place masculine
objects higher than feminine objects because they endorse gender stereotypes of dom-
inance, because they are aware of status dierences between women and men, because
they are bolstering the power of their own gender group, or even because they feel more
positively about their own gender group (though this would be inconsistent with the
Women are Wonderful eect; Eagly & Mladinic, 1994). Vertical location may be a uniquely
eective way of communicating group bias because location is associated with these
dierent concepts that overlap with existing gender stereotypes (Hentschel et al., 2019).
Whether people place objects consistent with stereotypical or ingroup bias may also
be impacted by the type of setting being manipulated. We suspect that the anticipated
audience may contribute to whether people express ingroup bias or stereotypical bias.
For example, we observed a stereotypical bias on vertical placement in the waiting room
task reported above. Both women and men placed feminine objects lower than masculine
objects. Finding an eect on verticality in this task where there was less vertical distance in
which to move objects rst bolsters the idea that verticality may be especially important
in the expression of information about groups. Further, the stereotypical bias suggests
that there may be important moderators to the kind of product people are designing. It is
possible that stereotypical bias would be observed in arrangements created for public
settings relative to private settings. That is, waiting rooms are encountered by many
people, whereas refrigerators are primarily encountered by the individual(s) who live in
that home. However, these hypotheses are purely speculative and require replication and
further investigation.
Further research is needed to understand how people use vertical location to bolster
groups and an important extension of this work will be the examination of spatial bias in
other kinds of groups, such as race groups or minimal groups. For example, minimal group
assignment would enable researchers to examine group placement in the absence of
established group-based stereotypes. Conversely, testing spatial bias with race would enable
researchers to examine group placement by participants who do not share an ingroup
identity with targets to be placed. This sort of examination would also enable researchers to
SELF AND IDENTITY 27
assess the role of specic stereotypes on placement. For example, stereotypes about people
with Black racial identities include aspects of dominance and aggression (Bjornstrom et al.,
2010; Dill et al., 2005) whereas those about people with Asian racial identities include aspects
of passivity and submission (Zou & Cheryan, 2017). Thus, if group bias in vertical placement is
primarily an expression of dominance, then placement of Black individuals should be higher
than placement of Asian individuals. Conversely, if group bias in vertical placement is
primarily an expression of status, then placement of Asian individuals should be higher
than Black individuals (to the extent participants endorse model minority stereotypes; Kao,
1995). Future work should leverage the unique components of these alternative groups (e.g.,
minimal groups, race/ethnic groups) to isolate the meaning of vertical location in spatial
placement bias and assess cultural patterns of spatial bias along other social dimensions.
Cultural patterns
There is a cultural pattern of vertical placement favoring men over women (i.e., in maga-
zines; Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019). Given that men are more likely to be on magazine and
journal editorial boards than women (Kulik & Metz, 2017; Pollitt, 2011), this may in part
explain the pattern of spatial bias that favors men in magazines. Thus, patterns of men
being placed higher than women should be observed more strongly in media where men
hold a disproportionate amount of power relative to women. Consistent with other work
on the importance of representation (Oyserman et al., 2006; Stout et al., 2011), this work
highlights that lack of representation can have subtle consequences for patterns of social
group bias. People may not even recognize the ways that they exhibit group-based biases,
such as placing objects in space. Having women and men represented is one way to reduce
bias selectively favoring one group. Although spatial bias is subtle, consistent exposure to
patterns of men being higher than women may accumulate meaningfully to shape stereo-
typical beliefs (see Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019). Thus, these studies highlight the importance
of gender representation, especially at high levels of leadership and decision-making.
Conclusion
The studies we report here are consistent with our theory that people express gender bias
via vertical spatial placement. People may typically organize information in a way that
favors their gender and our data suggest that this is guided by both gender identity and
stereotypes for men and by gender identity for women. Not only is vertical location
prioritized in the human visual system, but it may also be used to communicate and reify
bias toward social groups.
Notes
1. We excluded participants who had incomplete data. Sixteen participants were excluded
because they failed to complete the study. These participants did not follow the external
link to complete the spatial placement task. We were therefore unable to run analyses
including these participants’ data.
2. Results are similar regardless of the analytic method.
28 S. A. LAMER ET AL.
3. Magnet ratings from participants in Study 1 conrmed pretesting; feminine magnets were
rated as signicantly more feminine than masculine magnets (M
dierence
= 2.86, SD = 1.21), t
(186) = 32.39, p <.001.
4. Signicance testing with mixed eect models can be calculated several dierent ways. In this
case, we estimated degrees of freedom using Satterthwaite’s procedures which are based on
the number of participants rather than groups (Satterthwaite, 1946). Degrees of freedom may
vary substantially within the same model based on which eect is evaluated. The
Satterthwaite method has demonstrated reliability in mixed eect models with sucient
sample sizes and low Type I error rates (Manor & Zucker, 2004). See Kuznetsova, Brockho,
and Christensen (2017) for more information on the implementation of this estimation
procedure in R.
5. Including random slopes exceeded what the data could reliably estimate in models we report
throughout the manuscript. We, therefore, have run all models with only random intercepts.
6. Seven participants were excluded for one of these two reasons: because they did not
complete the placement portion of the study (n = 6), or because they identied as gender
non-binary (n = 1).
7. Although multi-level models draw statistical power from both the sample size of participants
and stimuli, this study and Study 3 are likely underpowered given the small number of
stimuli. We address this power issue in Study 4.
8. Participants also completed several other exploratory measures. See Appendix for a list of
these additional measures.
9. One person declined to provide their age; their data were included in analyses. Ten partici-
pants were excluded because they did not complete the study due to technical issues with
the eye tracker.
10. Exploratory analyses were conducted on visual attention as part of a student’s thesis project.
See Appendix for list of additional measures used in this thesis project.
11. The sample included 90 participants who identied as Asian/Pacic Islander, 45 who identi-
ed as Black/African American, 44 who identied as Hispanic/Latinx, 595 who identied as
White/European American, 5 who identied as Native American, 3 who identied as Middle
Eastern, and 21 who identied as Multiracial.
12. One person declined to provide their age and two people declined to provide their race; the
rest of their data were still included in analyses. Twelve participants were excluded because
they did not pass the attention checks. Specically, they did not correctly plot their score on
the graph during the identity threat manipulation (± 5 points) and failed to accurately recall
their score (± 5 points). We reasoned that if people failed both of these checks that they were
unlikely to have been paying attention to or have understood the experimental manipula-
tion. See pre-registration for more information (https://osf.io/ez5vh/?view_only=
82ccc390bcc54e5cb269a71b44b6a31a). We also excluded participants using the following
pre-registered criteria: 20 identied as gender non-binary, 2 entered their gender incorrectly
at the start of the study, 55 failed to complete a portion of the study (i.e., they did not follow
the external link or started but did not complete the study), and 7 opted to exclude their data
once they learned the purpose of the study.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Stefano Andriolo for lending his expertise and constructing the web-based
platforms for spatial placement and memory data collection. We would also like to thank Stephanie
Lamme for photo-editing/creating the objects and backgrounds used in these tasks.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the authors.
SELF AND IDENTITY 29
Funding
This research was supported by an NSF GRFP [DGE-1104602].
ORCID
Sarah Ariel Lamer http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3597-0958
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Appendix Additional Measures
Study 1
Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1974; Vafaei et al., 2014)
Experienced Threat Scale (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001)
Study 2
Collective Identity Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992)
Spatial Power Motivation Scale (Schoel et al., 2015)
Study 3
Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (Crocker et al., 2003)
Experienced Threat Scale (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001)
Spatial Power Motivation Scale (Schoel et al., 2015)
Need to Belong Scale (Baumeister & Leary, 1995)
Social Identity Scale (Cameron, 2004)
SELF AND IDENTITY 37
