Missiles Are Not the Only Threat

Abstract

It is normal for discussions about anti-access/area denial, A2/AD, to focus on the threat of missiles, their ranges and capabilities, and how to counter them. But this is only part of the challenge posed to military mobility by states like Russia; and in fact, launching missiles is the least likely means of preventing movement that Russia could employ.

Russia has a wide range of other means of preventing movement into or within an area of potential or current conflict. Whether referred to by any of their current names - political warfare, or sub-threshold operations, grey zone or hybrid - any of the methods that Russia could employ that do not involve open and undeniable hostilities will be encountered well before the first missile is fired. Russia will use these measures first because they are less costly, less risky, and certainly less escalatory than any of the more high-profile methods normally considered under the heading of A2/AD.

This chapter therefore considers the range of measures that Russia could employ against plans for national and operational military movement, reception, staging, onward movement, and integration that do NOT involve missiles, mines, or other munitions.

Full text

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10. Missiles Are Not the Only Threat
Keir Giles, Senior Fellow, Chatham House
It is normal for discussions about anti-access/area denial, A2/AD, to focus on the
threat of missiles, their ranges and capabilities, and how to counter them. But this
is only part of the challenge posed to military mobility by states like Russia; and
in fact, launching missiles is the least likely means of preventing movement that
Russia could employ.
Russia has a wide range of other means of preventing movement into or within an
area of potential or current conflict. Whether referred to by any of their current
names – political warfare, or sub- threshold operations, grey zone or hybrid – any
of the methods that Russia could employ that do not involve open and undeniable
hostilities will be encountered well before the first missile is fired. Russia will use
these measures first because they are less costly, less risky, and certainly less
escalatory than any of the more high-profile methods normally considered under
the heading of A2/AD; up to and including the laying of mines at sea, another area
of threat at present entirely eclipsed by the intense focus on missile capabilities.
This chapter therefore considers the range of measures that Russia could employ
against plans for national and operational military movement, reception, staging,
onward movement, and integration that do not involve missiles, mines, or other
munitions.
305
A Pervasive Challenge
Russia is still investing heavily in developing its military capabilities with the aim
of prevailing in high-end high-intensity warfare when confronted with the overall
conventional superiority of the West as a whole – ideally in a conflict that is limited
in time and scope in order that the full force of that superiority is not brought to
bear. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Russia has abandoned the search for
asymmetric measures that would make that Western conventional superiority, and
the exquisite technologies on which it is partly based, irrelevant. When compared
with direct military action, these asymmetric approaches have a number of
distinguishing features. They present a threat that spans all levels, from strategic
through operational to tactical. They are by their nature deniable, whether
plausibly or implausibly – a distinction that is of demonstrably little importance to
305
In this context, “national military movement” refers to the movement of forces on home territory from
their home base to the point of embarkation, and “operational” to movement through host nations from
the point of debarkation to the area of operations. See discussion in Eva Hagström Frisell, Robert
Dalsjö, Jakob Gustafsson, and John Rydqvist, Deterrence by Reinforcement: The Strengths and
Weaknesses of NATO’s Evolving Defence Strategy, ed. Eva Hagström Frisell, report, FOI-R--4843--SE
(Stockholm: FOI, November 2019), 11.

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Russia. And they can be deployed at any time, including pre-emptively, without
waiting for the commencement of open hostilities.
At the time of writing, the challenges at the strategic level have recently been
clearly illustrated by statements and actions by North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) leaders in the period preceding the London NATO “non-summit,” in
December 2019. While the danger to NATO of impetuous decisions by US
President Donald Trump had long been recognised, in late 2019 competitors
emerged, in the form of French President Emmanuel Macron and Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for the title of who could make the most
alarming statement calling NATO unity, and unity of purpose, into doubt. In
addition, the danger was more pronounced and specific than previously. Instead of
mere threats of upheaval to NATO by President Trump based on insistence that
the United States should contribute less to European security in relative terms, late
2019 saw an alarming demonstration of the danger posed to friends and allies by
actual Trump decisions. The US withdrawal from northeast Syria, implemented at
zero notice, with no consultation, and in direct contradiction of the stated plans
and priorities of the US Department of Defense and armed forces, set a highly
alarming precedent for allies that might rely on American support in time of crisis.
It demonstrated that while the good intentions and value placed on alliance
solidarity by the US defence and foreign policy establishment as a whole remain
strong, they are nevertheless hostage to snap decisions by the commander-in-chief.
Meanwhile, Turkey was developing a policy line of opposing the ratification of
plans by NATO to defend frontline states in the Baltic. At the last minute, Turkey
was dissuaded from doing so, in return for incentives to do so that at the time of
writing remain undisclosed.
306
In each of these cases, as with the disturbing spectacle of President Macron
repeating lines on NATO that perfectly match Russian state narratives, it may not
necessarily be that this results from Russian influence. Nevertheless, each case
serves the interests of Russia far more than it does those of each national leader’s
notional allies, and demonstrates the potential that could be achieved by Russia’s
exerting influence or pressure on key leaders, including through techniques of
reflexive control.
307
If national leaders can be induced to issue legitimate orders
to stop military movement, this is a far more effective means of doing so than
carrying out missile attacks.
306
“Turkey Drops Block on Defence Plan for Baltics – NATO Chief,” Reuters, December 4, 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/nato-summit-turkey/turkey-drops-block-on-defence-plan-for-baltics-
nato-chief-idUSL9N26V03R.
307
Keir Giles, Anthony Seaboyer, and James Sherr, “Russian Reflexive Control,” Defence Research and
Development Canada, October 2018,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328562833_Russian_Reflexive_Control.

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At the other end of the spectrum, potential adversaries of Russia need to consider
the range of levers available to Moscow at the tactical level to interfere with the
movements of men and materiel. These levers include not just organised state
agencies, including the intelligence services and Spetsnaz of varying flavours and
degrees of sophistication that could carry out active measures or sabotage, or even
private military companies and proxies.
308
They also include a range of arm’s-
length and non-governmental organisations whose links with the Russian state are
fully or partially deniable, such as:
• oligarchs funding and sponsoring political subversion operations and
providing both a duplicate chain of command and direct economic
leverage;
• cyber-criminal organisations, enjoying a symbiotic relationship with
Russian security agencies and acting as proxies and contractors, which
could turn their hostile attention to critical logistics functions;
• state-controlled commercial entities, such as the Night Wolves (a
multinational corporation masquerading as a motorcycle gang), which
was observed carrying out a blockading function before and during the
Russian military intervention in Crimea;
309
• a variety of organisations promoting the rights of “compatriots” and
ethnic Russians living abroad, and which seek to co-opt their efforts on
behalf of the Russian state – which could potentially extend to attempting
to mobilise them for demonstrations, protests, or blockades;
• legitimate means of exerting economic or logistical pressure on adver-
saries, including ownership of private sector logistics chains, via willing
proxies in the target nation;
• infiltration of private sector logistics entities by Russian or Russian-
sympathising employees, with instructions to carry out specific actions in
time of crisis;
• organised crime, with its transnational reach into various sectors of the
economy;
• agents of influence in the target country, supporting Moscow and seeking
to influence and carry out policy in Russia’s favour, either because they
are paid or induced to do so, or out of their own convictions (the “useful
idiots”).
Taken together, challenges of this nature point to a gap in the joint defence of
Europe. This gap arises because, while the joint military defence of Europe is the
purview of NATO (or, for non-member states, surrogate organisations and
308
Keir Giles and Valeriy Akimenko, “Use and Utility of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” Journal
of Future Conflict, Issue 01 (2019), https://www.queensu.ca/psychology/research/journal-future-
conflict/journal-future-conflict-issue-01-fall-2019.
309
Matthew A. Lauder, “‘Wolves of the Russian Spring’: An Examination of the Night Wolves as a Proxy
for the Russian Government,” Canadian Military Journal 18, no. 3 (2018): 5–16.

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coalitions of the willing such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, JEF), non-military
defensive functions – such as good governance, financial integrity, counter-
subversion activities, counter-intelligence in critical national infrastructure and
logistics, and the integrity and resilience of civil society – remain the task of
individual states, with no effective supranational mechanism for pooling and
coordinating efforts. In theory, these functions should be in the purview of the
European Union (EU). But resistance to Russian political warfare at present
consists of national measures of widely varying effectiveness and commitment,
undertaken in some cases despite, not because of, Brussels; while the consensus
nature of the EU leads to the lowest common denominator response, which can
effectively equate to no response at all.
310
Non-kinetic actions against civilian targets may not be a military responsibility,
but they are certainly a military problem, because they entail direct military
consequences. In the case of A2/AD, dealing with missiles is the task of national
militaries, which especially in the Nordic-Baltic region are already alert to the
challenge. But dealing with non-kinetic A2/AD means defence against everything
else; against the full range of means that would be either plausibly or implausibly
deniable by Russia and hence do not automatically and unarguably signify open
hostilities.
The remainder of this chapter therefore considers specific examples of ways in
which Russia could interfere with military movement in Europe without
necessarily triggering a military response from the target country or its allies. Each
of these distinct options could be applied either in isolation, or (more likely) in
combination, to present severe challenges for timely force projection. It should be
remembered in each case that while not all Russian covert actions against its
adversaries are successful, for Moscow to achieve its aims the measures it
undertakes need not be elegant or efficient to be effective.
Subversion
As noted above, the most effective way of preventing movement by the armed
forces of a given country is through causing a legitimate order to be given by the
country’s own chain of command or political leadership. It follows that political
influence through subversion should be considered a key vulnerability to Russian
activities. In fact, viewed through the prism of non-kinetic A2/AD, Russia’s entire
foreign policy could be seen as devised in large measure to hamper freedom of
manoeuvre or even deny access to whole countries or even regions for powers or
blocs deemed hostile to the Kremlin. The apparent power and reach of Russian
information warfare techniques presents a substantial risk at crisis points,
310
Mark Galeotti, “Living in Different Worlds: The European Union and Russian Political War,” MC
Series: Security Insights no. 39, September 2019, https://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/en/nav-
fix-sec-insights/2790-art-pubs-sec-insights-39-full-en.html.

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especially if Russia chooses to deploy capabilities known to be held in reserve in
order to foment opposition and obstruction to troop movements among local
populations and governments.
Russia could affect reinforcement efforts in northern Europe by targeting states
even outside the immediate locality for political subversion; indirect effect can be
achieved by subverting political processes in countries far from the target area.
Delivery of reinforcements to the scene of a crisis in the Baltic Sea region depends
on mitigating a long chain of vulnerabilities stretching back through multiple
countries.
311
Among these, some states (such as the front-line states and the Nordic
nations) may have a well-developed perception of the threat and be taking steps to
reduce it; but certainly not all.
In the United States, although the most visible and alarming risk to commitments
to the defence of Europe is that of impetuous decisions by President Donald Trump
(whether under Russian influence or not), this is not the only challenge. Russia
could seek other means of inducing the US to constrain its response in the
European theatre and undercut US domestic support for vigorous American
participation. Through traditional media outlets and a broad-based social media
campaign, Russia can reach out to anti-war or isolationist elements inside the
United States. Subversive messaging could emphasise the narrative that European
countries are shirking their own defence responsibilities, further develop support
for US politicians who share ideological sympathies (for instance transnational
isolationist and nativist agendas) with Moscow, and suggest that Europe’s security
is not worth American blood. Russia might hope that these low-cost, plausibly
deniable efforts could be sufficient for the US to place caveats on the movements
or actions of its forces in Europe.
In most scenarios of confrontation in northeastern Europe, Germany plays a key
role as a transit country and logistics enabler. Russia could seek to neutralise
Germany in this role through a combination of diplomatic and economic measures,
targeting of influential individuals, and a propaganda campaign aimed at
government and public opinion. Friends of Russia would be employed to
propagate a narrative supportive of Russia's actions in a crisis, together with
assurances that Germany itself is under no military threat. The result could be civil
society or even elements of the German state or federal governments raising
questions about the movement of US personnel and defence materiel across its
territory. These questions might not even be political or ethical in nature: if
German national authorities could be induced to enforce with diligence the rules
and regulations regarding customs clearance, transport of hazardous materials,
protection of the environment, safety in the workplace, and all other considerations
that are inimical to rapid movement of combat power, this in itself could severely
311
Frisell, Dalsjö, Gustafsson, and Rydqvist, Deterrence by Reinforcement.

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compromise reinforcement efforts. Russia could further boost this effect by using
disinformation channels to encourage mass demonstrations across the country,
work stoppages, protests that block rail lines, and other actions.
The EU as a whole also presents a target. The confused delineation of
responsibility between the EU and NATO in regard to security policy still risks
being blurred further by the EU’s determination to create armed forces under its
command from already overstretched European military resources. At the same
time, Russia can combine aggressive action in its neighbourhood with continued
engagement with Russia-friendly elements within the EU’s leadership. In time of
crisis, these Russia-friendly elements could well be induced to demand restraint
from NATO and the US, including holding back from delivering reinforcements
to the front-line states.
Russian political interference, assisted by information warfare campaigns, can
have aims as ambitious as a change in government or as modest as simple
disruption and destabilisation. Action anywhere along this spectrum could be
conducive to hindering the arrival or integration of reinforcements in a front-line
state in time of crisis. An extreme case would be the political neutralisation of the
host country. But other options, particularly in the case of countries with a direct
border with Russia, include terrorist actions and insurgency campaigns, for
political exploitation with the aim of keeping NATO, the United States, and other
allies at arm’s length.
In the Baltic states themselves, Russia could seek to replicate the tactics used in
the early stages of the conflict in Ukraine, and stage protests by “activists” in order
to prevent movement of local or foreign troops, with or without cooperation from
the local Russian-speaking population.
312
Covert actions to discourage or impede
friendly reinforcement could include staging protests and provocations organised
near foreign forces’ bases and transportation nodes, and efforts to engineer direct
violent confrontation between visiting troops and protesting ethnic
Russians. Sabotage, corruption, and instigation of civil protest to block railway
lines could compel use of road transit, with consequent potential delays, increased
dispersion and far greater vulnerability to further enemy action.
More assertive steps could include terrorist attacks against public gatherings (e.g.,
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians welcoming the arrival of foreign forces), the
NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs), and bases where visiting forces would be
deployed. The aim would be to constrain the activities of foreign troops and in
particular their interaction with the local population, create the impression that
they are unwelcome in the country, and directly interfere with the infrastructure
and personnel needed to carry out reinforcement. All of the above would be
accompanied by a disinformation campaign intended to create and exploit
312
Andrew Roth, “From Russia, ‘Tourists’ Stir the Protests,” New York Times, March 3, 2014.

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divisions between visiting troops, the local civilian population, the host
government, and overseas allies, with the aim of persuading other states against
deploying additional forces to the region on the grounds that sending reinforce-
ments into the region would “inflame the situation” and “provoke Russia.”
Additional elements of disinformation for foreign consumption would, as seen in
the case of Ukraine, seek to persuade Western Europeans that conflict in the Baltic
states was civil or internal in nature, as opposed to the result of Russian
intervention; and therefore NATO allies should not be involved. Further afield,
anti-war demonstrations or blockades at key transport nodes or outside military
storage facilities could compel friendly forces or local law enforcement agencies
to use force in order to proceed, which would constitute a substantial propaganda
opportunity for Russia and a potential domestic political crisis.
313
Russia could be expected to combine information activities with direct action in
other domains, such as economic pressure or in particular energy blockades,
raising the prospect of what one senior European politician speaking under the
Chatham House rule described as “the lights going off across Europe and all the
spineless Europoliticians denying America access to the continent to save their
positions of power and their heating.” The long contest between the United States
and Russia over the status of the Manas transit centre in Kyrgyzstan provides a
case study of Russia’s eventually successful mutually reinforcing use of a variety
of levers in this manner to impede US logistical capability.
314
In fact, Russia has a wide range of options for slowing, disrupting, or sabotaging
the movement of reinforcements across Europe through economic and commercial
means before resorting to hostilities. Road and rail transportation networks and
hubs and the commercial entities that operate them can all be targeted through
economic leverage, market manipulation or insider threat. This could include
intervention to deny access to transportation or routes by for instance reducing the
amount of rail rolling stock or port space available, or causing chokepoints in
transportation networks through coordinated efforts to saturate key points with
commercial cargo. Exploitation of the open nature of commercial logistics entities
in Europe could include infiltration, recruitment or coercion of individuals in
transport and logistics corporations to report on movements of personnel and
materiel and disrupt this movement on demand,
315
or triggering or manufacturing
313
Precedents include the “peace camps” set up in the United Kingdom to protest against the deployment
of ground-launched cruise missiles in the 1980s; and movements for conventional and nuclear
disarmament that urged their members to collect and report information on military facilities and
movements in their own country.
314
“US Transit Center at Manas,” NATO Stratcom CoE, June 6, 2019,
https://www.stratcomcoe.org/hybrid-threats-us-transit-center-manas.
315
“Russian spy is judged in Latvia,” Baltvideo.com, June 12, 2017, http://baltvideo.com/en/latvia/russian-
spy-is-judged-in-latvia.

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labour unrest to shut down critical facilities or networks serving land, sea or air
transport.
However, logistical challenges will not solely be the result of Russian intervention.
Commercial developments in European rail transport since the end of the Cold
War mean that there is no longer the guarantee of capacity to move reinforcements
that was previously ensured by national governments. In addition, in a pre-crisis
situation, reinforcements will not at present be afforded either priority access to
rail transport or exemption from restrictive EU road regulations. Overall, one
expert assessment holds that “a working hypothesis is that civilian capabilities
would face substantial disruption in times of crisis and war. This would further
restrict effective military mobility, and increase reinforcement times.”
316
Sabotage
Direct action in the form of physical sabotage is also likely both before and during
open conflict, both on land and at sea through the entire depth of friendly territory,
and whether carried out by special forces inserted covertly for the purpose or by
long-term sleeper agents already in position.
On land, targets would include storage and transit locations, road and rail routes,
and transport assets. Attacks on prepositioned military stocks intended to facilitate
rapid reinforcement would seek to damage or destroy them in place, or prevent
their movement. At sea, Russia could use a number of covert or deniable
techniques to hamper navigation and impede and delay the arrival by sea of
reinforcements and/or their heavy equipment.
• Key navigational aids such as lighthouses, buoys, and markers can be
removed or put out of use.
• Port and harbour facilities, where military movements will already face
severe capacity issues, can be sabotaged to complicate operations and
movements.
• Short of an overt campaign of mining, stray sea mines can be covertly
placed in shipping lanes. Russia could use a small number of mines of
obsolete or foreign type to interdict traffic if deniability needs to be
maintained.
These actions would meet several Russian strategic objectives:
• Discourage and delay the arrival of reinforcements by sea.
• Impede freedom of movement at sea overall.
• Cause NATO and partner nations to expend extra resources and time to
secure shipping lanes and freedom of shipping.
316
Frisell, Dalsjö, Gustafsson, and Rydqvist, Deterrence by Reinforcement, 47.

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• Gain time for Russia’s own dispositions in the region.
• Block access to Baltic seaports of debarkation (SPODs).
• Create a more favourable maritime environment for Russian operations in
the event of a transition to hostilities.
All of these methods would have the secondary effect of heightening the percep-
tions of vulnerability of the front-line states, while at the same time diminishing
the impression of allied military capability and – crucially – maximising the
leverage of a key Russian advantage, namely Western aversion to risk.
Sabotage can also be carried out remotely, in the form of cyberattacks on port, rail,
logistics, or transit facilities.
317
The attacks can be against individual facilities or
locations (as in 2013, when a group of hackers was able to close a major tunnel in
Haifa, Israel)
318
or they can be against corporations and networks. The widespread
disruption caused by the NotPetya virus to Maersk, the world’s largest cargo-
shipping company, in 2017, demonstrates the vulnerability of logistics chains to
targeted cyberattack.
319
With shipments delayed by weeks, and cargo handlers
temporarily resorting to pen and paper to log movements, the implications for
urgent reinforcement measures are clear.
Furthermore, cyberattacks are unlikely to be conducted in isolation, but will more
probably present just one of a number of simultaneous threats. The socio-
cyberattacks on Estonia in May 2007 provide a case study of demonstrative cyber
operations that cause more disruption than actual damage, but can be combined
with instigation of social unrest to present more complex challenges to the target
country.
320
A related topic is A2/AD in cyberspace itself, where Russia has been intensively
probing vulnerabilities in civilian telecommunications infrastructure in order to be
able to interdict or impede communications, including over the internet, in time of
crisis.
321
Denial of access to cyberspace for a targeted nation could include
physical operations to inflict damage to vital information technology
infrastructure, such as fibre-optic cables, servers, terrestrial communication lines,
317
Alison Lawlor Russell, “Strategic Anti-access/Area Denial in Cyberspace,” NATO CCD CoE, 2015,
153–160, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Art-11-Strategic-Anti -Access-Area-Denial-in-
Cyberspace.pdf.
318
Abby Ohlheiser, “Hackers Shut Down a Tunnel Road in Israel,” Atlantic, October 2013.
319
Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,”
Wired, August 22, 2018.
320
Rain Ottis, “Analysis of the 2007 Cyber Attacks Against Estonia from the Information Warfare
Perspective,” NATO CCD CoE, 2018, 1–6,
https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Ottis2008_AnalysisOf2007FromTheInformationWarfare
Perspective.pdf.
321
Keir Giles, “The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare,” NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence, November 2015,
https://www.academia.edu/31014519/The_Next_Phase_of_Russian_Information_Warfare.

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wireless communication systems, antennas, telecommunication towers, and space
infrastructure. The effect of communications failures on reinforcement efforts
would be inability to coordinate movements with commercial logistics organisa-
tions or the host nation, and in some cases inability to navigate.
Counter-space Capabilities
This latter vulnerability is even more pronounced given the reliance of Western
forces on overhead capabilities. As entire military land, aerospace, and maritime
capabilities are heavily dependent on space-based communications, navigation,
reconnaissance, and intelligence systems, they are vulnerable to a determined
adversary that wishes to target those systems.
322
Russia is pursuing a diverse suite of counter-space capabilities to damage or
destroy satellites in all orbital regimes. Methods under development include
ground-based kinetic attack, in-orbit rendezvous and proximity operations, and
directed-energy applications (such as laser or jamming).
323
Non-physical counter-
space capabilities include the use of laser, microwave, and electromagnetic pulse
energy against space systems. Relevant electronic warfare (EW) capabilities
involve interference, denial, and manipulation of radio frequencies operations
against satellite and ground support systems.
324
At the juncture of the domains of
space and cyber, cyber counter-space operations include capture, disruption, and
denial operations against satellite systems through the utilisation of cyber
capabilities and the exploitation of digital vulnerabilities.
325
Satellite communications systems (SATCOM) are exposed to cyber intrusion and
sabotage operations in a variety of threat scenarios.
326
SATCOM data links are a
fundamental part of C5ISR (command, control, computers, communications,
cyber, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) military transportation, and
especially aviation technology, where these data link systems are indispensable.
322
Northrop Grumman, “Assured Position, Navigation and Timing: The Future Challenge,” 2019, 1,
https://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/AssuredPNT/Documents/NorthropGrumman-
APNT.pdf.
323
Leonard David, “China, Russia Advancing Anti-Satellite Technology, US Intelligence Chief Says,”
Space.com, May 18, 2017, https://www.space.com/36891-space-war-anti-satellite-weapon-
development.html.
324
Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, April 2018, 13, https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/180823_Harrison_ SpaceThreatAssessment_FULL
_WEB. pdf.
325
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Electronic and Cyber Warfare in Outer Space,” UNIDIR, May 2019, 1–
11, https://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/electronic-and-cyber-warfare-in-outer-space-en-
784.pdf. See also Beyza Unal, “Cybersecurity of NATO’s Space-based Strategic Assets,” Chatham
House, July 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-27-Space-Cybersecurity-
2.pdf.
326
Ruben Santamarta, “SATCOM Terminals: Hacking by Air, Sea, and Land,” IOActive, 2014,
https://www.blackhat. com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Santamarta-SATCOM-Terminals-Hacking-By-
Air-Sea-And-Land-WP.pdf

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Cyber vulnerabilities in satellite receiving stations also pose a risk to military
transportation, as many operational services including weather data are distributed
via ground station links.
327
Russia is known to have the capability to execute cyber
operations against satellite systems, as was the case in 2015 when a Russia-linked
cyber unit was able to successfully issue instructions, which appeared to come
from its control server, to a commercial satellite.
328
In the worst-case scenario, Russia would use both land- and space-based anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapons systems to launch a mass attack on satellites, targeting
the situational awareness of governments and military forces in Europe and
elsewhere, potentially globally, and their ability to communicate, navigate, and
target opposing forces.
• This process could begin with non-kinetic attacks on space systems.
Jamming attacks on ISR and communication satellites may be difficult to
attribute and are unlikely to provoke military escalation. These low-level
attacks are reversible yet effective at degrading decision-quality
information to leaders and their ability to command fielded forces.
• The next level of escalation in the battle of space systems would include
regional jamming of global positioning system (GPS) and navigation
systems. Disrupting commercial air and sea transportation, especially in
critical choke points, is more likely to be attributable and lead to a public
response, but not necessarily a military one.
• Escalating further would include more advanced attacks targeting military
systems. This might include spoofing GPS in order to control remotely
piloted aircraft or defeat precision-guided munitions. Direct attacks on
targeting radars would also occur. Injecting false information favouring
Russian objectives into audio and video transmissions could also be done
at this point.
• The final stage would be to openly attack and permanently degrade space
systems, beginning with directed energy attacks to degrade or destroy
surveillance satellites. Kinetic attacks on the space segment could come
from ground-based interceptors or co-orbital ASAT satellites. Destroying
ground stations would also deliver the desired effects.
There are clear advantages for Russia in attacks on space systems; not only is
Russia less reliant on them, but also degradation or destruction of space assets puts
expeditionary forces at a severe disadvantage relative to forces who are already
present in theatre and can use terrestrial systems.
327
Mike Gruss, “Report Cites Vulnerability in NOAA’s Satellite Ground Stations,” Space News, August
2014, https://spacenews.com/41685report-cites-vulnerability-in-noaas-satellite-ground-stations/.
328
Sam Jones, “Russian Group Accused of Hacking Satellites,” Financial Times, September 9, 2015.

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Information Attacks
For Russia, both cyberattacks and physical attacks on information nodes such as
satellites and their ground stations come under the broad heading of information
warfare. This holistic concept is often subdivided into two categories:
“information-technical” activities, including what Western militaries would refer
to as computer network operations, but also other activities targeting data and its
processing; and “information-psychological” activities that target the human
cognitive domain, for example psychological operations, malign influence
campaigns, deception, and propaganda. Each of these categories has A2/AD
applications.
Information-technical
In addition to the cyber operations and attacks on space- or land-based navigation
and telecommunications systems discussed above, information warfare activities
launched by Russia could include EW operations designed to hamper
communications, navigation (military and civilian), and targeting. This would
create problems with military command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I); sea and air transportation; troop movements; and military
reinforcements. Whether brought about through counter-space capabilities or other
means, information outages could be just as damaging as cyberattacks on infra-
structure, if troops and equipment are moving blind, deaf, and unable to communi-
cate.
Russia has shown the ability to jam radio and telecommunication frequencies with
two distinct effects:
1. to deny access to cyberspace for wireless cellular receivers; and
2. to disable semi-autonomous weapon systems reliant on remote digital
connection, such as drones, from operating within the effective distance
of the jammer.
329
In doing so, it is meeting its ambition to extend the scope of cyberspace infor-
mation denial capabilities from closed internal systems to national level, affecting
broad-scale geographic areas and entities.
330
Closing down internet and mobile
communications would create severe challenges for the economy and day to day
329
Kelsey D. Atherton, “Russian Drones Can Jam Cellphones 60 Miles Away,” C4ISRNET, November
2018, https://www.c4isrnet.com/newsletters/unmanned-systems/2018/11/16/russian-drones-can-jam-
cell-phones-60-miles-away/.
330
Martti J. Kari, Russian Strategic Culture in Cyberspace: Theory of Strategic Culture – A Tool to
Explain Russia’s Cyber Threat Perception and Response to Cyber Threats, JYU Dissertations 122
(Jyväskylä, Finland: Faculty of Information Technology, University of Jyväskylä, October 2019), 61–
63, https://jyx. jyu.fi/bitstream/handle/123456789/65402/978-951-39-7837-
2_vaitos_2019_10_11_jyx.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y.

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activity in a region where e-governance, and reliance on connectivity more
generally, has greatly expanded.
Navigational systems, in particular GPS, are distinctly vulnerable to sub-threshold
and partially deniable attack. Persistent and enduring shutdown of GPS across
large areas of Europe before overt hostilities begin would meet several objectives.
It would, for instance, complicate road movements and every other type of activity
that depends on GPS. Navigation systems without multiple redundancies and
fallback systems would be affected, as would millions of embedded systems.
Military movements would be affected even if military navigational systems
themselves were resilient; with civilian traffic reliant on GPS, chaos on road
networks would be likely. Similarly in the air, while commercial air traffic would
continue to be able to navigate due to redundancy of systems, general aviation with
greater reliance on GPS would cause severe ATC and traffic management
challenges, for instance by blundering into busy controlled airspace. In addition to
the civilian chaos that would result, target nations would be presented with the
challenge of how to respond to a form of attack with no evident countermeasures,
either in a technical or legal sense.
Russia’s capability to interfere in the operation of the global navigation satellite
system has been demonstrated repeatedly. In October–November 2018, during
NATO’s Trident Juncture exercise in Norway, the Baltic Sea, and the North
Atlantic, Norway’s Ministry of Defence blamed Russia for the disruption of GPS
systems, which, it said, endangered all air traffic in the region. Later, the Finnish
Foreign Ministry announced that there was evidence of Russian interference, and
demanded that Moscow cease all further such actions, which could lead to
“undesirable incidents.”
331
Russian efforts to protect its Khmeimim air base in
Syria through GPS jamming and spoofing have also been blamed for GPS
disruptions in Israel and as far away as Cyprus. Pilots flying throughout the Middle
East first began to report GPS problems in the spring of 2018. The problem was
initially limited to high-flying aircraft. In mid-2019, however, the signal began to
affect take-offs and landings as far away as Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International
Airport. GPS disruptions have also been reported at Larnaca International Airport,
in Cyprus, approximately 225 kilometres away, and the signal was so strong that
it could even be picked up by sensors on the International Space Station.
332
One
study logged nearly 10,000 instances of Russian interference with GPS services,
and found that a total of 1,311 ships in Russian waters had had to correct their
331
Aleksandr Gostev, “‘Мишки’ на Севере. Был ли российский спецназ на Шпицбергене” [‘Little
Bears’ in the North: Was there a Russian Spetsnaz force on Spitsbergen ?], Radio Svoboda (Radio
Liberty), October 2, 2019, https://www.svoboda.org/a/30195704.html.
332
Kyle Mizokami, “Russia Is Disrupting GPS Signals and It’s Spilling into Israel,” Popular Mechanics,
July 1, 2019, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a28250133/russia-gps-signals-
israel/.

FOI-R--4991--SE
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course because GPS signals were being spoofed and were unreliable.
333
Russia
would be able to extend the already substantial range of its EW capabilities in
peacetime by, for example, placing EW systems on vessels on scheduled transits
between St Petersburg and Kaliningrad.
Use by Russia of EW assets to interdict navigation and communications services
would have the following effects:
• to hamper movement of military units and cargo;
• to impede air and sea navigation on the approaches to ports of
debarkation;
• to hamper communications and therefore joint operations between Allies.
To date, Russia’s interference with navigational aids has been relatively overt.
However, if Russia wished to create even greater confusion through frustration of
attribution, far more deniable options for disrupting civilian traffic are available,
as demonstrated by experiments spoofing traffic bottlenecks in navigation
software via use of a collection of slow-moving smartphones.
334
Information-psychological
The paralysis thus induced would be capitalised on by other measures, including,
for example, information warfare strategies to emphasise the helplessness of
NATO and the defencelessness of the Baltic States. The aim of such an
information warfare campaign would be to reduce public and government support
in the United States for sending further reinforcements to the region, and among
European NATO members for allowing their transit.
At a more localised level, Russia could undertake targeted information attacks
intended to slow or prevent movement – for instance, triggering shutdowns or
evacuations of transit points through terror scares, blocking traffic with refugees,
stirring labour unrest through social media efforts, or reducing transit capacity
through real or fictitious contamination of cargo and handling facilities. Any
credible threat of hazardous contamination of a port or airport, up to and including
the reported presence of a “dirty bomb,” could significantly slow or disrupt normal
operations by forcing port and transport authorities to verify reports and put
additional security measures in place.
On an even more personalised scale, Russia has practised and refined its
techniques for undertaking information activities against individuals, including
delivering disinformation to the mobile devices of military personnel as well as
333
BBC News, “Study Maps ‘Extensive Russian GPS Spoofing,’” April 2, 2019,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-47786248.
334
Brian Barrett, “An Artist Used 99 Phones to Fake a Google Maps Traffic Jam,” Wired, February 3,
2020, https://www.wired.com/story/99-phones-fake-google-maps-traffic-jam/.

FOI-R--4991--SE
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targeting them through their families.
335
While the effectiveness of these measures
remains undetermined, Russia claims that they have had substantial effect in Syria,
and they have since been used against frontline military personnel in Ukraine.
336
Individual information exposure of individuals on social media has been demon-
strated to be a key enabler for tracking military movements, and consequently for
interdicting them;
337
there is at least one instance, from Israel in 2010, of an
injudicious social media post causing the cancellation of an entire military
operation.
338
Intimidation
A campaign intended to deter and intimidate Western political leaders and
populations could include military movements, activities, and threats short of
actual use of force. Provocative behaviours from the staging of deliberately
reckless close encounters across the domains, including in the air, at sea, on the
ground, and in other environments such as cyber and electromagnetic, all the way
up to nuclear threats, could substantially augment Russia’s current broad-based
campaign to persuade Western leaders that sending reinforcements into a given
region is dangerous and provocative, with potential consequences including
widespread and uncontrollable escalation.
One means by which Russia could attempt to intimidate Western powers into
inaction in a period of escalating tensions and prior to the commencement of overt
hostilities would be to declare an “Air and Sea Self-Protection Zone” covering
areas of the eastern Baltic from Kaliningrad north to the Gulf of Finland, and state
that movements by US and NATO naval and air assets into this zone would be
considered hostile acts and constitute grounds for use of force. Russia could deploy
a broad diplomatic and information warfare campaign targeting public opinion and
policymakers across NATO members and partners, highlighting that challenging
this exclusion zone would be an escalatory move by the US. At the same time, it
could demonstratively deploy or put on high alert a range of interdiction
capabilities intended to convince politicians that an attempt to force the issue
would be costly and potentially fruitless. A key part of this effort would be
leveraging Western misconceptions about Russian A2/AD capabilities, and using
the plethora of infographics available from previous studies on A2/AD, including
from official Western government sources, showing neat circles on maps to
335
“Time to Shed More Light on Russian Harassment of NATO Forces’ Families,” Chatham House,
August 14, 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/time-shed-more-light-russian-
harassment-nato-forces-families.
336
Keir Giles, “Assessing Russia’s Reorganised and Rearmed Military,” Carnegie, 2017, 7,
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/5.4.2017_Keir_Giles_RussiaMilitary.pdf.
337
Issie Lapowsky, “NATO Group Catfished Soldiers to Prove a Point About Privacy,” Wired, February
18, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/nato-stratcom-catfished-soldiers-social-media/.
338
BBC News, “Israeli Military ‘Unfriends’ Soldier After Facebook Leak,” March 4, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/8549099.stm.

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suggest that areas within Russian missile coverage are impregnable.
339
Russia
could not only declare the area “out of bounds,” but also make navigation there
challenging through use of electronic warfare systems targeting communications
and navigational aids across the region. While NATO pondered its options and
attempted to prompt national governments into making a decision, Russia could
use the window of opportunity to take any one of a range of actions in the region
without the immediate risk of NATO intervention.
Alternative means of preventing movement into an area of the Baltic Sea could
include the declaration of temporary exclusion zones for military exercises,
including live firing, as has been repeatedly practised in the Black Sea; or an
ultimatum to an individual national government to allow short-term freedom of
movement or transit to Russian forces, especially by air, without opposing them.
The latter approach would take advantage of the massive disparity in locally
available air power between the Baltic states and Russia, and could attempt to
frame the ultimatum in a manner politically palatable to the target nation’s friends
and allies, in order to buy the few hours necessary to present the world with a fait
accompli.
340
NATO partners Sweden and Finland present a special case for Russian attempts at
intimidation, given their role both as non-members, but also as critically important
to effective measures by NATO to defend the Baltic states. Russia can be expected
to combine diplomatic and soft power efforts with military intimidation to
convince Sweden and Finland not to provide logistical support to NATO or grant
access to their territory, airspace, or waters. This would involve diplomatic
approaches, military-to-military communications, and broader messaging
targeting the publics in both countries, warning that any material support to NATO
or the United States would make Sweden and Finland a party to the crisis and bring
major risks. While pursuing diplomatic options, Russia would also emphasise the
possibility of a pre-emptive military strike.
In addition to the tactical and operational levels of A2/AD activities against the
movement of NATO assets and information outlined above, strategic-political
influence also has A2/AD potential if it causes the decisionmaking systems of
NATO member states and partner nations to be affected. One potential example is
opposition to the Host Nation Support Memorandum of Understanding, signed by
both Sweden and Finland, to provide a legal framework for the enhancement of
339
As discussed in Keir Giles and Mathieu Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities: Real and Imagined,”
Parameters 49, nos. 1–2 (2019): 21–36. See, also, Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund, and Michael
Jonsson, Bursting the Bubble: Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region – Capabilities,
Countermeasures, and Implications, report, FOI-R--4651--SE (Stockholm: FOI, March 2019).
340
This would follow a pattern set by Operation GATLING, in 1978, where Rhodesia utilised all of these
elements for a highly successful operation on Zambian territory. Audio recording of the polite
conversation between the Rhodesian Air Force delivering the ultimatum and Zambian air traffic control
is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z0 ft w4bQq6g.

FOI-R--4991--SE
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logistical efforts and deployment of forces of a third-party nation in the event of a
military conflict.
341
The Host Nation Support agreement has been under constant
indirect information pressure on Russia’s behalf via its political proxy groups in
Finland, which support “alternative” ideologies, anti-immigration themes, and the
strategic isolation policies for Finland,
342
and this pressure can be expected to
intensify radically in time of crisis. Russia could also use leaks of documents (real
or fabricated) related to US military cooperation with Helsinki and Stockholm in
order to generate public debate about whether the governments have been honest
about such cooperation, and distract attention from Russia’s own actions.
Diplomatic approaches could be coordinated with military moves to demonstrate
Russia’s intent while attempting – not necessarily successfully – to stop short of
measures that would swing Sweden and Finland to anti-Russian positions. In
public messaging, Russia would step up attempts to exploit local sympathetic
figures and agents of influence ready to argue in favour of positions that ultimately
benefit Russia’s interests.
It should be noted that previous intensive campaigns to sway public opinion in
Sweden and Finland – most notably on the topic of potential or possible NATO
membership – have as a rule been counter-productive, serving only to highlight
the nature of the threat from Moscow. Successful campaigning would therefore
require an increase in sophistication, and in particular in awareness and
understanding of the target audience. Meanwhile, however, Russia could also seek
to leverage potentially sympathetic voices in other EU member states in order to
prevent a strong EU position in support of NATO’s and the United States’ actions.
By thwarting EU consensus, Russia could negate the possibility of the Lisbon
Treaty’s solidarity clause being invoked, thus eliminating a mechanism of support
for Sweden and Finland.
Detection
If Russia were to undertake any of these forms of hostile action, it is to be expected
that it would deny doing so. These denials might well be implausible, but positive
attribution by Western nations to a standard that will satisfy their domestic
populations takes time; and in almost all cases where Russia is carrying out this
kind of activity, its primary purpose is precisely to buy time for Russia to achieve
341
Juha Pyykönen, Nordic Partners of NATO: How Similar Are Finland and Sweden within NATO
Cooperation? FIIA Report 48 (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2016), 93–95,
https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/04/report48_finland_sweden_nato.pdf.
342
Daniel Sallamaa, Ulkoparl amentaarinen äärioikeistoliikehdintä ja maahanmuuttovastaisuus 2010-
luvun Suomessa, report, Publications of the Faculty of Social Sciences 97 (Helsinki: Centre for
European Studies, University of Helsinki, 2018), 27–28,
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/253474/Raportti-
Sallamaa.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

FOI-R--4991--SE
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its objectives with minimal opposition. Thus, even temporary obfuscation by
Moscow may be effective in meeting Russia’s overall goals.
It follows that early detection, and methods for clear attribution, of the kinds of
measures described above are a key capability. Target nations need an appropriate
level of vigilance to intercept preparations for active measures like sabotage, as
well as robust physical, commercial, cyber, and personnel security. There is a
parallel with early detection of attempts at radical Islamic terrorism: Western
police and security agencies have some successes as well as some failures at pre-
empting attacks through effective intelligence work. However, the challenge from
Russia is far more profound. Domestic terrorists may be determined and
unscrupulous, but they are not as a rule professional and highly-trained intelligence
or special forces personnel fully supported by the resources of a nation state, as
would be the case with attacks from Russia.
The experience of confirmed or possible sub-threshold attacks in northern Europe
suggests that a key question is how a victim can identify for sure what is
happening. Especially if there is an effort to maintain deniability and frustrate
attribution, at a low intensity of activity it might even be difficult for the victim to
know that it is under attack.
343
A key task is to determine what combination of
unexplained incidents – “things going wrong” – would indicate a coordinated
assault; to take an example from late November 2019, whether a major outage of
e-government services is the result of a cyberattack by a hostile power, or of rats
chewing through cables.
344
An additional complication is that socio-political
threats, such as successful subversion, could develop from the convergence of a
number of already existing social, technical, or economic problems. Such threats
are then exploited by an adversary – without having been necessarily planned,
masterminded, or coordinated ab initio.
Key indicators would probably comprise a mixture of the traditional and the novel.
Traditional warning signs would include the arrival in the country, or in a specific
region, of meaningful numbers of a specific type of visitor from an adversary
country; or civil discontent or protest turning into a staged confrontation; or a
sudden or escalating pattern of sabotage. More novel indicators would include
promotion of a specific narrative by Russia’s disinformation media and channels,
preparing the ground for a specific campaign of subversion or destabilisation. In
either case, there is no substitute for well-developed situational awareness by the
target nation across all domains.
343
Patrick J. Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, “MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project:
Understanding Hybrid Warfare,” MCDC, January 2017,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/647776/dar_mcdc_hybrid_warfare.pdf.
344
“E-services Inaccessible After Rats Chew Through Wires,” ERR, November 21, 2019,
https://news.err.ee/1005241/e-services-inaccessible-after-rats-chew-through-wires.

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Recommendations
As noted earlier in this paper, it should not be assumed that if Russia attempts any
or all of these measures they will necessarily be successful. But in addition to the
key advantage that Russian interventions need not be elegant to be effective,
Moscow also benefits from two important force multipliers: the ability to take and
implement decisions rapidly when required; and lack of restraint or compunction
in causing collateral damage. These three considerations together substantially
broaden the range of possible actions that are available to Russia. In a time of
confrontation, therefore, the Baltic Sea region and its approaches could be
subjected to a mess of coordinated and uncoordinated Russian actions in the
physical, informational, political, and economic domains and more: some would
be ineffective, while others would be in conflict with or impede each other, but all
would be intended to buy time for Russia to achieve its overarching strategic aims.
The key lesson from the vulnerabilities described above is that approaches to
mitigating Russian A2/AD should not be limited to military posture and
conventional defence capabilities, but also extend to bolstering whole-of-
government resilience in relevant fields, including improving situational
awareness and hardening logistics chains. The challenge extends beyond purely
military implications such as impeding freedom of movement and reinforcement
of friends and allies in time of conflict, and into the foreign policy domain, with
the necessity of close cooperation on politically challenging issues with partners
and allies, not all of whom are fully cognisant of the threat. But the current focus
on only conventional capabilities risks leaving Western armed forces blind-sided
by the spectrum of unconventional means that Russia could use to impede or
prevent their freedom of movement.
In addition, it has been persistently demonstrated through the experience of the
frontline states that a critically important element in bolstering national and
societal resilience to sub-threshold threats is raising the awareness of the civilian
population, and ensuring an appropriate level of threat perception. This is a key
enabler in avoiding the vacuums that these kinds of actions can exploit – vacuums
of knowledge or situational awareness, of attention, of physical presence of
military and law enforcement agencies, and above all, of political will to accept
risk and responsibilities.
International cooperation in countering the threats is essential. But despite their
military implications, the role of military cooperation organisations in doing so is
strictly limited. Defence against campaigns of this kind is largely societal, not
military, and assistance to civil society is tangential to NATO’s or JEF’s core
functions. Instead, coalitions of the willing are needed to provide a currently
missing coordinating function between allies and partners, pooling and sharing
experience and efforts to ensure resilience of freedom of movement, fostering
awareness, and sharing best practice at national level.

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In practical terms, the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative
also presents opportunities for enhancing the efficiency and security of cross-
Europe logistics. PESCO’s “Military Mobility” subsection aimed to simplify and
standardise cross-border military transport procedures in order to guarantee
unhindered movement of military personnel and assets within the borders of the
EU
345
– in effect, the “military Schengen” consistently called for by co-author Lt.
Gen Ben Hodges and others. Measures under PESCO that deliver real and tangible
improvements in logistical resilience and capability should be encouraged and
implemented briskly; for example, to address the challenge of EU requirements
for vehicles, drivers, and loads that restrict military movements, PESCO should be
leveraged to ease EU road regulations in the pre-crisis phase, when speed of
reinforcement could be critical but open hostilities have not yet begun.
346
But this
must be only part of much broader efforts to reconstitute the ability swiftly and
efficiently to move reinforcements across Europe, remedying the situation where
“many years of post-Cold War out-of-area operations [have] left European military
transport infrastructure, logistics, and bureaucracy to wither.”
347
In particular,
military mobility initiatives must not be allowed to be hazarded – or potentially
left unfunded – as a result of EU politicking.
348
Until cancelled due to coronavirus, the Defender 2020 exercise scheduled for
May–June 2020 was set to be a major test of the capability of the United States
and its NATO allies to move reinforcements across Europe as intended. The
exercise was to be as much a test of ability to overcome legal and bureaucratic
obstacles as it is of logistical capacity and competence.
349
But while exercises such
as this are in effect held under peacetime conditions, it is to be hoped that if and
when they resume they will also take account of hostile actors who wish to impede
the movements they are practising, and plan to test resilience accordingly. In any
case, it can safely be assumed that Russia will be observing these exercises closely,
not only to assess NATO military capability but also to search for critical
vulnerabilities of the entire reinforcement process at all stages and across all
domains. NATO too needs to carry out a similar search in order to identify and
mitigate the same non-military vulnerabilities.
345
European Council, “Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) First Collaborative PESCO Projects –
Overview,” December 11, 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32079/pesco-overview-of-
first-collaborative-of-projects-for-press.pdf.
346
See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, European
Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), in 2 vols, vol I
– ECE/TRANS/275 (New York/Geneva: United Nations, 2018),
https://www.unece.org/index.php?id=50858&no_cache=1.
347
Frisell, Dalsjö, Gustafsson, and Rydqvist, Deterrence by Reinforcement, 25.
348
Alexandra Brzozowski, “Europe’s Military Mobility: Latest Casualty of EU Budget Battle,” EurActiv,
February 25, 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/europes-military-mobility-
latest-casualty-of-eu-budget-battle/.
349
Jen Judson, “Fighting the Bureaucracy: For NATO, the Defender 2020 Exercise in Europe Will Test
Interop erability,” DefenseNews, October 14, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-
dailies/ausa/2019/10/11/fighting-the-bureaucracy-for-nato-the-defender-2020-exercise-in-europe-will-
test-interoperability/.

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