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Estonia, the Digital Nation: Reflections on a Digital Citizen’s Rights in the European Union

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EDPL|1ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
Estonia,theDigitalNation-Reflectionsofa
DigitalCitizensRightsintheEuropean
Union
ReportFullVersion
PalomaKrõõtTupay*
Ifwedefinelawasasystemofruleswhichaparticularcountryorcommunityrecognizes
asregulatingtheactionsofitsmembersandwhichitmayenforcebytheimpositionofpenal-
ties,thenthequestionarises:Whicharetherulessuitableforadigitalcounty?Arepeople’s
rightsinadigitalnationbetterprotectedordotheyneedenhancedsafeguards?Doesrights’
protectioninthedigitaleraneedanewapproach?Doesadigitalsocietyhavetoleavebe-
hindtheprincipleideasofprivatelifeandinformationalself-determination?Searchingfor
answerstothesequestions,thefollowinglongversionofthisreportonEstonia(fortheshort
versionseeEDPL2020-2)firstintroducesthereaderintothemeaningandcontentoftheEs-
toniane-state’.Onthatbasis,itthenreflectsonthedigitalnation’simpactontheindivid-
ualandhisorherrightsandbythis,onthequestionsthelegalsystemhastoprovidean-
swersforinadigitsedsociety.
I.Introduction:TheSuccessStoryof‘E-
Estonia’
InDecember2017,TheNewY orkerpublishedan
articlewiththeheadline‘TheDigitalRepublic’.1
ThedigitalrepublicdescribedthereinisEstonia.
Almost90%oftheEstonianpopulationusestheIn-
ternetregularly,99.6%ofbankingtransactionsare
doneelectronically,99%ofpublicservicesareavail-
ableonline,withoutqueueing.2Onlymarriage,di-
vorceandthesaleofrealestatecannotbeconclud-
edexclusivelyonline.3Morethan95%ofpeople
submittheirincometaxreturnonline,95%ofda-
tastoredbyhospitalsandfamilydoctorsisdigital.4
Entrepreneursestablishnewbusinessesandsub-
mittheirannualreportsviathee-businessregister.5
Since2002,morethan500millionEstoniandigital
signatureshavebeenused,morethanintherestof
theEuropeanUnionaltogether.6Toputitinthe
wordsofthePresidentofEstonia,KerstiKaljulaid:
‘globallythereisnootherdigitalnationthathasa
state’.7
*DriurPalomaKrõõtT upay,LecturerinConstitutionalLaw ,School
ofLaw ,DepartmentofPublicLaw,T artuUniversity,former
legaladvisertothePresidentofEstonia.F orcorrespondence:
<palomakreet.tupay@ut.ee>.TheauthorthanksMonikaMikiver
andMarisJuhafortheirvaluableadviceandhelpfulsuggestions.
Theresponsibilityforthecorrectnessofanyinformation,state-
mentandopinionstatedinthereportresidessolelywiththe
autor.Anabridgedversionofthisreportwaspublishedinissue
6(2)EDPL.
1NathanHeller ,‘TheDigitalRepublic’TheNewYorker(18and25
December2017)<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/
12/18/estonia-the-digital-republic>.AllURLsinthiscontribution
werelastaccessed1May2020.
2EnterpriseEstonia,‘e-Estoniafacts’<https://toolbox.estonia.ee/
media/1780>.
3EnterpriseEstonia,‘e-governance’<https://e-estonia.com/
solutions/e-governance/>.Concerningtheobligatoryinvolvement
ofthenotaryinagreementsconcerningthetransferofrealestate,
therearealreadyinitiativestoreplacethenecessityofphysical
presenceofthepartiesbyvideotransmission.
4ibid.
5EnterpriseEstonia,‘e-Estoniaguide’(2019)4,9<https://e-estonia
.com/toolkit/>.
6ibid.
7SpeechofthePresidentoftheRepublicofEstonia,2November
2018atColumbiaUniversity<https://president.ee/en/official
-duties/speeches/14790-president-kaljulaid-at-columbia
-university/index.html>.
EDPL|2ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
Inthelast29years,Estonia-acountryof1.3mil-
lioninhabitants,abitlargerthantheNetherlands8
andhalf-coveredbyforest-hasstrodeforwardinsev-
en-leagueboots.Estoniaregainedindependencein
1991,whichendedaperiodofmorethan50yearsoc-
cupationbytheSovietUnion.Thetracestheforeign
ruleleftonthecountrywhereimmense.Theecono-
mywasonitsknees,thestatesystemailing.Every-
thinghadtobereinventedfromscratch,andtheEs-
toniansdidso.Oneofthethingstheydidwastoput
theirlongdreamofafree,democraticcountryonsol-
idground:on24June1992Estoniansadoptedthe
ConstitutionoftheRepublicofEstonia(EC)bypop-
ularvote.9Thetaskfulfilledbythefathersandmoth-
ersoftheConstitution,whohadthemselvesbeen
keptforciblyawayfromthedevelopmentsofthede-
mocraticlegalsystemsforsolong,isimpressive.
Theyhadmanagedtodrawupinlessthanayear
withnotmuchmorethantheperiodichelpofdiffer-
entinternationallegalexpertsanewconstitution,
thatlaidgroundforalegalstateorderthathasbeen
inforcesince.TheEChasbeencalledoneofthe‘in-
terestingconstitutions’ofmoderntimes10and
gainedspecialattentionongroundsofitsmodern
fundamentalrightscatalogue.11
Still,despitearesolutemoneyreform,privatisa-
tionandacleardecisioninfavourofaliberalmar-
keteconomy,Estoniawasinthebeginningofthe
ninetiesaverypoorcountry,withanaveragemonth-
lyincomeof30dollarsin1992.12Fromtheneedto
buildupacountryaffordableforitssmallnumber
ofinhabitantsandthenecessitytofindsomething
thatwouldputEstoniaonthemap,thedecisionof
embracingthenewlyariseninterestforan‘informa-
tionsociety’wasborn.
BasedonarespectiveinitiativeonEuropean
Union(EU)level,13agroupofexpertspublishedin
1994itsproject‘Estonia’swayintoinformationso-
ciety’.14In1997,theso-calledTigerLeapProgram
waslaunched.ItsaimwastoequipEstonianschools
withinformationandcommunicationtechnology
andtheknowledgeofhowtouseit.Thisprogramis
consideredoneofthecornerstonesofthe‘Interneti-
sation’oftheEstoniansociety.15In1998,theEston-
ianparliamentadoptedformallythe‘Principlesof
EstonianInformationPolicy’,designatingthefol-
lowingfourmainaims:modernisationoflegisla-
tion,promotionoftheprivatesector,enhancing
communicationbetweenthestateanditscitizens
andawarenessconcerningtheproblemsofaninfor-
mationsociety.16Oneofthekeyelementsofthesuc-
cessfulimplementationofthee-statehasbeenthe
closecooperationofthestateandtheprivatesector,
especiallyScandinavianbanksinterestedinthis
newmarketanditsopportunities.17Thebankswere
alsopioneersinofferingcustomerstheirserviceson-
line.
From2000,theso-callede-Cabinetprovidesthe
meansforapaper-freegovernmentaldecision-mak-
ingprocess.18Inthesameyear,theEstonianelectron-
ictaxboardwasintroducedandreachedamajorde-
velopmentalmilestonewiththeintroductionofau-
tomatedtaxdeclarationformshelpingtoreducedras-
ticallythetimespentbyprivateindividualsanden-
8Netherlandstotal:approx.41.5sqkm.Estonia:approx.45.2sq
km.Source:LivingintheEU<https://europa.eu/european-union/
about-eu/figures/living_en>.
9TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofEstonia(EestiV abariigi
Põhiseadus1992),EnglishtranslationaccessibleattheState
gazette<https://www .riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/
consolide>.Since1June2010,theEstonianstategazetteRiig-
iteatajaispublishedonlineexclusivelyat<https://www
.riigiteataja.ee>andcontainsnexttotheofficialEstonianlegal
actsEnglishtranslationsofseveralofthem.Englishtranslationsof
Estonianlegalactsareavailableat<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/
en/>.
10ManfredH.Wiegandt,‘GrundzügederestnischenVerfassungvon
1992’(MainfeaturesoftheEstonianConstitutionfrom1992)
(1997)45JöR151,151.
11SeefurtherWolfangDrechslerandTaaviAnnus,‘DieVerfas-
sungsentwicklunginEstlandvon1992bis2001’(TheEvolutionof
theConstitutioninEstoniafrom1992to2001)(2000)50JöR
473,481ff;seealsoPeterHäberle,‘V erfassungsentwicklungenin
EuropaausderSichtderRechtsphilosophieundderVerfas-
sungslehre’(EvolutionofconstitutionsinEuropefromtheview-
pointsoflegalphilosophyandconstitutionaltheory)(1994)AöR
169,197f.
12SpeechofthePresidentoftheRepublicofEstonia(n8).
13EuropeanCommissionWhitePaperon‘Growth,competitiveness,
andemployment’(1993);seealsoBangemannGroupreporton
theglobalinformationsociety(1994).
14TarmoKalvet,‘TheEstonianInformationSocietyDevelopments
Sincethe1990s’(2007),no29PRAXISpublication10<http://
praxis.ee/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2007-Estonian
-information-society-developments.pdf>accessed17January
2020.
15PilleRunneletal,‘TheEstonianT igerLeapfromPost-Commu-
nismtotheInformationSociety:FromPolicytoPractice’(2009)
JournalofBalticStudies29.
16Thedocument(inEstonian)canbefoundatthehomepageofthe
Stategazette(n10)<https://www .riigiteataja.ee/akt/75308>
accessed17January2020.
17SeealsoKalvet16f(n15).
18e-Estoniaguide8(n6).
EDPL|3ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
trepreneursonfilingtaxes.Anemployeewillnowa-
daysspendlessthanfiveminutesinfillingouthis
orhertaxdeclaration.19
On1May2004Estoniabecameamemberofthe
EU.Onlyoneyearlateritwasthefirstcountryinthe
worldtointroducee-voting.Attheelectionstothe
EuropeanParliamentinMay2019over45%ofthe
voteswerecastonline.20LikeinallEUcountries,the
directlybindingandapplicableEU’sGeneralData
ProtectionRegulation(GDPR),21alongsidewithDi-
rective(EU)2016/68022establishingrulesforthepro-
tectionofindividualswithregardtotheprocessing
oftheirpersonaldatabypoliceandcriminaljustice
authorities,harmonizesince25May2018datapro-
tectionalsoinEstonia.ThereformedEUdataprotec-
tionlaw’saimistocompromiseonandharmonize
thehithertorathervariedapproachesofEUmember
statestodataprotection.AlthoughthereformedEU
dataprotectionlawallowsforspecialnationalprovi-
sionsanddifferencesespeciallyonquestionscon-
cerningdatahandlingbypublicauthorities,23data
processinginEstoniacannotbediscussedwithout
incorporatingthedirectaswellasindirecteffectsof
therespectiveEUlaw.
II.TheE-State’sFoundations
ThetwopillarsofEstoniandigitallifearecalleddig-
italIDandx-road.
1.DigitalID
InEstonia,theidentityofeverypersonbeitcitizen
orforeignresidentisbasedonapermanentindi-
vidualIDcode.TheIDcodeconsistsof11numbers,
ofwhichthefirstindicatestheperson’sgender(even
numbersforwomen,unevenformen)andthefol-
lowingsixcorrespondtotheperson’sbirthdate24;the
nextthreeareserialnumbersforpeoplebornonthe
samedayandthelastoneservesascontrolnumber.25
ThisIDcodemaybepublishedforthepurposeof
identificationoftheperson.TheEstonianDataPro-
tectionInspectorate(DPI)hasaffirmedthattheID
numberis,justlikethebirthdate,isnotconsidered
tobesensitive,ieaspecialcategoryofdata.26The
regulationforeseeingthestringofnumbersoftheID
numberhasneverbeenlegallycontested.Theonly
mandatoryidentificationdocumentinEstonia,the
IDcard,carriesinteraliathecardholder’sphotoand
IDcodeandservesaspersonalidentificationdocu-
ment.Additionally ,thecard’schipincludestwoelec-
troniccertificates:oneallowingforthedigitalau-
thenticationofthepersonthedigitalID-,theoth-
eroneenablingthecardholdertosigndocuments
electronically.27
ThedigitalidentityofanEstoniancitizenisgen-
eratedautomaticallywhenthedoctorentersthebirth
dataofachildintothee-healthsystem.Later,thepar-
entscanaddthechild’snametothedigitalidentity
online.28Therefore,everyEstoniancitizenhasa
19ibid4,6.
20EstonianNationalElectoralCommittee,‘StatisticsaboutInternet
votinginEstonia’<https://www.valimised.ee/en/archive/statistics
-about-internet-voting-estonia>.
21Regulation(EU)2016/679oftheEuropeanParliamentandofthe
Councilof27April2016ontheprotectionofnaturalpersons
withregardtotheprocessingofpersonaldataandonthefree
movementofsuchdata,andrepealingDirective95/46/EC(Gen-
eralDataProtectionRegulation2016)OJL119/1.
22Directive(EU)2016/680oftheEuropeanP arliamentandofthe
Councilof27April2016ontheprotectionofnaturalpersonswith
regardtotheprocessingofpersonaldatabycompetentauthorities
forthepurposesoftheprevention,investigation,detectionor
prosecutionofcriminaloffencesortheexecutionofcriminal
penalties,andonthefreemovementofsuchdata,andrepealing
CouncilFrameworkDecision2008/977/JHA(2016)OJL119/89.
23SeeegJürgenKühlingandFlorianSackmann,‘Datenschutzord-
nung2018nachderReformistvorderReform?!’(2018)NVwZ
681;HolgerGreve,‘DasneueBundesdatenschutzgesetz’(2017)
NVwZ737,737f.
24Egincaseof10December1977:101277.
25Seefurther,ElectronicIdentity(eID)ApplicationGuide,AShort
IntroductiontoeID<https://eid.eesti.ee/index.php/A_Short
_Introduction_to_eID>.Astothelegalregulation:Population
registerActpara39s1:‘Apersonalidentificationcodeisanum-
berformedonthebasisofthesexanddateofbirthofaperson
whichcomplieswiththestandardoftheRepublicofEstoniaand
allowsthespecificidentificationofaperson.’
26SeerespectiveinformationontheEstonianDataProtection
Inspectorate’shomepage:<https://www.aki.ee/et/kas-isikukood
-delikaatne>;Sensitivedataaretodayconsideredtobespecial
categoriesofdata,seealsorecital10GDPRandart9GDPR.
27ThedigitalIDcannowadaysalsobeaccessedviamobile
phonetheso-calledmobileIDanddirectlyonline,as smart
ID’service.ThemobileID,thathastheadvantagethatthe
mobileIDcanbeusedwithoutacardreader,isbasedona
specialSIM-card,whichcanbeobtainedfromthemobile
phoneoperator,seefurther<https://www.id.ee/index.php?id
=36882>.Thesmart-IDisanappthatcanbeusedonamodern
smartphoneoratablet.Itenablestheusertoaccesse-services
ordigitallysignDocumentwithouttheadditionalneedofa
specialSIM-cardsoracard-reader<https://www.smart-id
.com/>.
28MinistryoftheInterior,informationonthePopulationRegister ,
‘Personalidentificationcode’<https://www.siseministeerium.ee/
en/population-register>;also:SpeechofthePresidentofthe
RepublicofEstonia(n8).
EDPL|4ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
digitalID,whichisassignedalsotoeveryforeignper-
manentresidentofEstonia.29ThisdigitalIDenables
thepersontoidentifyhim-orherselfonlineandthus
usetheservicesprovidedbythestate.Additionally ,
thiswayofauthentificationcanalsobeusedbypri-
vateserviceproviders.Therefore,thedigitalIDisin
practicealsousedasonlinebankingIDandassuper-
marketclientcard.
2.X-teeandtheOnce-OnlyPrinciple
TheX-tee(English:x-road),thedataexchangelayer
forthenation’svariouspublicandprivatesectore-
servicedatabasesandotherinformationsystems,30
formstodaytheheartofEstoniandigitalservices.It
linksthedifferentdatabasesandinformationsys-
temsandallowsforfastandsecuredinternet-based
dataexchangesbetweenthem,31thusmakingitin-
teraliapossibletopresentone’staxdeclaration
withinafewminutes:thetaxandcustomsboardfor-
wardsthetaxpayerapre-filleddeclarationinwhich
informationobtainedbyotherinstitutionsinthis
case,thepopulationregisterandthecommercialreg-
ister32hasalreadybeeninserted.Thetaxpayercan
simplyapprovethedeclarationwithhisorherdigi-
talsignatureormakenecessaryamendmentsbefore
doingso.33
Theideathatthepublicauthoritiesshouldnever
askasecondtimeforinformationthepersonorin-
stitutionhasalreadyprovidedtotheauthorities,has
alsobeenwrittenintolaw .AccordingtothePublic
InformationAct’s(PIA)§431section3:‘Collectionof
datainthedatabaseshallbebasedontheone-re-
quest-onlyprinciple’.34Thisidea,namedalsothe
‘OnceOnlyPrinciple’ ,hasalsobeenembracedatEU
level.In2009,theMinisterialDeclarationone-Gov-
ernmentstatedthatthemembers’intenttojointly
investigatehowmemberstates’publicadministra-
tionscanreducethefrequencywithwhichcitizens
andbusinesseshavetoresubmitinformationtoap-
propriateauthorities.35TheEUministersresponsi-
blefore-GovernmentreaffirmedintheTallinne-Gov-
ernmentdeclarationof2017theircommitmenttoim-
plementtheonce-onlyprincipleforkeypublicser-
vices36andtheEuropeanCommissiondeclaredto
launchapilotprojectforthe'Once-Only'principle
andexplorethepossibilityofitsEUwideapplication
initsDigitalSingleMarketStrategy.37However,the
applicationoftheonceonly’principleraisesalso
questionsregardingitscompatibilitywithEUdata
protectionlaw,especiallythepurposelimitation
principle,accordingtowhichpersonaldatashallbe
collectedforspecified,explicitandlegitimatepur-
posesandnotfurtherprocessedinamannerincom-
patiblewiththosepurposes.38Sincetheadoptionof
theDataProtectionDirectivein1995,39thepurpose
limitationprincipleconstitutesoneoftheEU’sdata
processingbasicconceptsandistodaylaiddownin
Article5paragraph1(b)GDPR.Thelimitationofthe
29IdentityDocumentsAct(Isikuttõendavatedokumentideseadus
1999)para6andpara201s2,<https://www .riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/
529032019005/consolide>.
30Homepages,Excelspreadsheets,slidesetcmayconstituteother
informationsystems,see:AndmekaitseInspektsiooniAnd-
mekogudeJuhend(TheEstonianDataProtectionAuthorities’
Guidelinesondatabases)(updatedversion2016,Estonianonly)3
<https://www.aki.ee/et/juhised>.
31FurtherinformationcanbeaccessedattheInformationSystem
Authority’shomepage‘DataExchangeLayerX-tee’<https://www
.ria.ee/en/state-information-system/x-tee.html>.
32Employersarerequiredtoregisterthepersonsemployedbythem
intheemploymentregister,whichismaintainedbytheTax-and
Customs-Boarditself.
33Estonianelectronictaxfilingisexplainedinmoredetailasshow-
caseat<https://scoop4c.eu/showcase/electronic-tax-filing-e-tax>.
TheSCOOP4cprojectisprojectlaunchedbytheEuropean
Commissionin2016exploringhowtheonce-onlyprinciplein
publicserviceprovisioningcanbeimplementedatEuropean
level..
34PublicInformationAct(avalikuteabeseadus2000),English
translationaccessibleattheStategazette(n10)<https://www
.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/529032019012/consolide>;similarly,ibid,
theGeneralP artoftheEconomicActivitiesCodeAct’ s(Majan-
dustegevuseseadustikuüldosaseadus2014)para13prohibits
economicadministrativeauthoritiestorequirefromundertakings
alreadysubmittedinformation.
35MinisterialDeclarationoneGovernment,theso-calledMalmö-
Declarationof18November2009,accessibleat<https://ec
.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ministerial-declaration
-egovernment-tallinn-declaration>.
36MinisterialDeclarationoneGovernment-theT allinnDeclaration
of6October2017,ibid.
37CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParlia-
ment,theCouncil,theEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee
andtheCommitteeoftheRegions(SWD(2015)100final,6May
2015).OngoingEU-projectsontheimplementationoftheonce-
onlyprincipleareegtheSCOOP4cproject(fn33)andtheTOOP
project,whichaimstoexplorethepoosibilitiesoftheapplication
oftheonce-onlyprincipleacrossborders(seefurtherat<http://
www.toop.eu/info>).
38SeefurtherMarioMartiniandMichaelWenzel,‘’Onceonly’
versus’onlyonce’:DasOnce-only-PrinzipzwischenZweck-
bindungsgrundsatzundBürgerfreundlichkeit’(2017)DVBl749.
39Seeart6para1b)Directive95/46/ECoftheEuropeanParliament
andoftheCouncilof24October1995ontheprotectionof
individualswithregardtotheprocessingofpersonaldataandon
thefreemovementofsuchdata[1995]OJL281,31.
EDPL|5ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
datahandlingpurposeaimsatenhancingtrustbe-
tweenthedatasubjectandthedatacontroller,bylim-
itingthecontroller’srighttopassonthedatasub-
ject’spersonaldatatoanunlimitednumberofdata
processorsunknowntotheindividualconcerned.40
Itisconsidereda‘cornerstone’oftherighttodata
protectionandformsassuchalsopartoftheOECD
PrivacyGuidelines41andthe(updated)Councilof
Europe’sConvention108ondataprotection.42The
‘onceonly’principleforeseesacomprehensiveex-
ceptiontherefrom.
Whencreatingtheconceptofthex-layer,itwas
initiallyheldthatthedataobtainedbytheauthori-
tiesintheconductoftheirtasksbelongstothestate
asawhole.43AccordingtotheEstonianDataProtec-
tionAuthority’sguideondatabasesfrom2016,the
rightto(re-)usedataobtainedonapreviouslydiffer-
entpurposeisbasedonthedataprocessor’slegiti-
materighttousedatainordertoperformitspublic
tasks.44Thislegalbasiscanagainbedeductedfrom
theGDPR,accordingtowhichdataprocessingshall
beconsideredlawfulifitscompliantwithalegal
obligationtowhichthecontrollerissubject(Article
6(1)(c)GDPRor/andnecessaryfortheperformance
ofataskcarriedoutinthepublicinterestorinthe
exerciseofofficialauthorityvestedinthecontroller
(Article6(1)(e)GDPR)).45
AtEUlevel,theEuropeanDataProtectionSuper-
visor(EPDS)presentedhisopinionontheonce-on-
ly’principlein2017.WelcomingtheCommission’s
proposaltomoderniseadministrativeservicesand
agreeingthateasingadministrativeburdenonindi-
vidualsororganisations,increasingefficiencyofad-
ministrativeproceduresandsavingtimeandre-
sourcesareworthwhilepublicinterestobjectives,he
notesthatthesedoanyhownotconstituteaseparate
groundunderArticle2(1)GDPRwhichwouldpro-
videagenerallegalreasonforrestrictingtheprinci-
pleofpurposelimitation.46TheEPDSthereforepro-
posesinteraliatostatethattheproposaldoesnotin
anywayaimtoprovidearestrictionontheprinciple
ofpurposelimitationpursuanttoArticles6(4)and
23(1)GDPR.47Regrettably,theEDPSdoesnotsub-
stantiatehowthisstatementcouldbeconsideredto
bewellfounded.48AccordingtotheEuropeanDigi-
talRights(EDRi)advocacygrouptheonce-onlyidea
couldpotentiallyreducecitizens’controlovertheir
personaldata.Therefore,itsimplementationhasto
prioritiseprivacybydesignanddefault.49Addition-
ally,theEDRipointsattheneedtoadequatelyassess
andsolvetherisksthatfollowfromthefactthatthe
implementationoftheonce-only-principlecanlead
tomoreprofilingofcitizens.50
III.TheIdeaofanOpenInformation
Society
TheunderlyingideaoftheEstoniandigitisationis
thatofanopeninformationsociety.51Thefundament
forthisideacanalsobefoundintheEstonianCon-
stitution.Accordingtoparagraph44EC,everyone
hastohavefreeaccesstopublicinformationandstate
agenciesandlocalgovernmentshavethedutytoin-
40SeealsoIoannisRevolidisandAlanDahi,‘FurtherProcessingof
PersonalDataIsthereaFutureforthePurposeLimitationPrin-
cipleintheUpcomingGeneralDataProtectionRegulation?’
(2015)ZD-Aktuell04618.
41TheOECDPrivacyGuidelines,ch1.Recommendationofthe
CouncilconcerningGuidelinesgoverningtheProtectionof
PrivacyandT ransborderFlowsofPersonalData(2013)PartT wo.
Basicprinciplesofnationalapplication,p9.
42Amendingprotocol(CETSNo223)amendingtheCouncilof
Europe’sConventionfortheProtectionofIndividualswithregard
toAutomaticProcessingofP ersonalData(ETSNo.108),adopted
bytheCommitteeofMinistersatits128thSessioninElsinoreon
18May2018art5s4b.
43RiinaKivi,‘RiigiandmekogudehetkeolukordjaAndmekogude
seadus’inInfotehnoloogiaavalikushalduses.RiigiInfosüsteemide
OsakonnaAastaraamat(Yearbookofthestateinformationsystems
department)(2003)ch10.1.
44TheEstonianDataProtectionAuthorities’Guidelinesondatabas-
es(n31)12.
45Justiitsministeerium,‘Isikuandmetekaitseuueõiguslikuraamistiku
kontseptsioon’(10.05.2017toimikunr:17-0584)(Conceptofthe
newlegalframeworkontheprotectionofpersonaldata,Estonian
MinistryofJustice10May2017)10f,33<http://eelnoud.valitsus
.ee/main/mount/docList/db80bf57-35ca-41e3-be15
-827a2f056fdd#aek0ABB0>.
46EuropeanDataProtectionSupervisor, AdigitalEuropeneeds
dataprotection’(2017)6,10<https://edps.europa.eu/press
-publications/press-news/press-releases/2017/digital-europe
-needs-data-protection-0_en>accessed17January2020.
47ibid13.
48Annationallevel,theauthorisatpresentundertakingalegal
analysisonthisquestiontogetherwithPhDstudentMonika
Mikiver.
49EuropeanDigitalRights,Analysis:AtrulyDigitalSingleMar-
ket?’(2015)2<https://edri.org/files/DSM_Analysis_EDRi
_20150617.pdf>accessed17January2020.
50ibid8ff.
51SeeKalvet(n15).
EDPL|6ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
formcitizensabouttheiractivitiesandgivethemac-
cesstoinformationtheinstitutionsownabout
them.52Furthermore,everyonehastherighttoad-
dressnoticesandstatementstogovernmentalandlo-
calauthoritiesandreceiveanswerstothemaspro-
videdbylawaccordingtoparagraph46.53Thisright,
unknowntoEstonia’spreviousconstitutions,wasin-
cludedinthenewECwithanexplicitreferraltocoun-
triesundertheruleoflaw,whereintheviewofthe
ConstitutionalCommissionsucharighthadtoap-
ply.54Theopeninformationsociety’slegalframe-
workistodaylaiddowninthePIAwhichaimedto
establishabasisforthetransparentexerciseofpub-
licpower ,whichwouldenablethepublictocontrol
itsexecution.55Inaddition,thehoped-forcost-effi-
ciencyofpublicadministrationwasanadditionalim-
portantargumentforasmallandyoung’countryas
Estoniatoembracedigitalsolutions.56
1.ObligationtoDiscloseInformation
AccordingtothePIA,governmentalagenciesandin-
stitutionsasthechancelleryoftheEstonianparlia-
ment(Riigikogu),theofficeofthepresident,theOf-
ficeoftheChancellorofJustice,thecourts,andlegal
personsinpubliclawarerequiredtomaintainweb-
sitesforthedisclosureofinformation(paragraph31
PIA).Alldatacontainedinpublicdatabasestowhich
accessisnotrestrictedaswellasdatawhichthehold-
erofthedatabaseconsidersnecessarytomakepub-
liclyavailable,shallbepublishedonline(paragraph
28,pages30and32PIA).Amongstother,informa-
tionconcerningpublicinstitutions,includingtheir
budgetsaswellascivilservants’salarieshavetobe
public(paragraph28PIA).Thedisclosureobligation
appliesalsofordraftactsandregulationsandfor
courtdecisions,furthermore,forthelistsofmem-
bersofpoliticalparties(paragraph28,pages15-17,
29and28PIA).Apartfromthat,thePIAinterdicts
torestrictthepublicityofsupervisoryanddiscipli-
narymeasuresandoffencesthatarenotyettime-
barred(paragraph36(1),page12PIA).
3.ObligationtoMaintainaDocument
Register
Furthermore,thePIAestablishestheobligationof
anypublicinstitutiontomaintainadocumentregis-
ter,ieapublicdigitalregisterthatrecordsalldocu-
mentsreceivedbytheagencyandpreparedbyit.As
farasaccessisnotlimitedonspecialgroundseg
informationobtainedinthecourseofcriminalpro-
ceedings,informationcontainingspecialcategories
ofdata57etc.alldocumentcontentscanbefreely
accessedbyanyone(paragraphs12(4)(1)and35PIA).
Paragraph14PIAgiveseveryonetherighttorequest
informationfromtheholderofit,withouttheneed
forspecialjustification.
4.OfficialDatabases
ThePIAsetsalsotherulesfordatabasesthestate,lo-
calgovernmentsorotherpersonsmaintainforper-
formingpublicdutiesprovidedbylaw.Asarule,
thesehavetobepublic,aslongasthelawdoesnot
provideotherwise(paragraph43(8)PIA).Thepublic
databasessuchasthepopulationregister,theland
register,thecriminalrecordsdatabase,theregister
offarmanimalsandothermaycontainanyinfor-
mationassociatedwiththeperformanceofapublic
duty(paragraph43(1)PIA).Accordingtothelawa
databasedoesnotnecessarilyhavetobekeptindig-
italform,butasitshallingeneralberegisteredin
theadministrationsystemofthestateinformation
52ECpara44.‘(1)Everyoneisentitledtofreeaccesstoinformation
disseminatedforpublicuse.(2)Pursuanttoaprocedureprovided
bylaw,allgovernmentagencies,localauthorities,andtheir
officialshaveadutytoprovideinformationabouttheiractivities
toanycitizenofEstoniaathisorherrequest,exceptforinforma-
tionwhosedisclosureisprohibitedbylawandinformation
intendedexclusivelyforinternaluse.(3)Pursuanttoaprocedure
providedbylaw ,anycitizenofEstoniaisentitledtoaccess
informationabouthimselforherselfheldbygovernmentagencies
andlocalauthoritiesandingovernmentandlocalauthority
archives.Thisrightmaybecircumscribedpursuanttolawto
protecttherightsandfreedomsofothers,toprotecttheconfiden-
tialityofachild’sfiliation,andintheinterestsofpreventinga
criminaloffence,apprehendingtheoffender ,orofascertaining
thetruthinacriminalcase.(4)Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw ,
citizensofforeignstatesandstatelesspersonsinEstoniaenjoythe
rightsspecifiedinparastwoandthreeofthissequallywith
citizensofEstonia.’(seealson10).
53ibidpara46.
54ViljarPeep(ed.),‘PõhiseadusjaPõhiseaduseAssamblee’(The
ConsitutionandtheConstitutionalAssembly)(Juura1997)551.
55ExplanatorymemorandumtothePublicInformationActdraftact
no462(20June2000)18.Allparliamentarydraftactsincl
therewithconnecteddocumentscanbeaccessedinEstonianat
thehomepageoftheparliamentofEstoniaat<www .ri-
igikogu.ee>.
56ibid.
57seen29.
EDPL|7ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
systemthatallowsthedatabasetobecomepartof
thedataexchangelayerx-tee,itusuallyhasto(para-
graph43(1),(2)and(7)PIA).
5.LimitsofDisclosure
Thelawalsoprovidesforthegroundstoclassifyin-
formationasinternal.AccordingtothePIA,informa-
tionthatcouldendangerforeignrelations,innerse-
curityormilitarydefence(paragraph35PIA,p3-6)
shallnotbedisclosed.Theobligationofnon-disclo-
sureappliesalsotoinformationcontainingspecial
categoriesofpersonaldata,iedatacontainingdetails
ofaperson’sfamilylifeorhealthandinformation
thatsignificantlybreachestheinviolabilityofprivate
life(paragraph35,pages11-14).
PrivatelifeisprotectedalsounderEstoniancon-
stitutionallaw.AccordingtoECparagraph42,gov-
ernmentagenciesandlocalauthoritiesmaynotgath-
erorstoreinformationonitscitizens’convictions
againstthewilloftheconcernedindividual.TheEC’s
paragraph26protectseveryone’srighttoprivacyand
theEstonianStateCourthasalreadyin1994acknowl-
edgedtherighttoinformationalself-determina-
tion.58Thecourthasnotitselfspecifiedthisrights’
content,butonlystateditsvalidity .Fromits‘creation’
bytheGermanConstitutionalCourtin1983itcan
bederivedthatitcomprisestheindividual’srightto
decideifandtowhatextenttheperson’sdataiscol-
lectedandstoredbythestate.59TheEstonianper-
sonaldataprotectionact(PDPA)ensurestheindivid-
ual’srighttoprotectionofhisorherdata.ThePDPA
isconsideredtobelexspecialisinrelationtothe
PIA.60
6.ObligationtoInformtheDataSubject
Theindividual’srighttoknowwhoisprocessinghis
orherdataisprotectedbyarightofinquiry.Asen-
shrinedinECparagraph44section3,everyEston-
iancitizenisbylawentitledtoaccessinformation
heldbytheauthoritiesabouthim-orherself.This
rightmaybeinvokedbyarequestforinformation
collecteduponperformanceofpublicduties61orby
arequestforexplanation.62Therequestcanbesub-
mittedbyanyoneanddoesnotrequirealegitimate
interest.Anyhow ,thelawalsoprovidesforgrounds
onwhichtheaddresseehastherighttodeclinethe
request,egincaserestrictionsonaccessapplytothe
informationrequestedongroundsoftheirusein
criminalormisdemeanourproceedingsorincaseit
containspersonaldataandaccesstoitcouldsignif-
icantlybreachtheinviolabilityofprivatelifeofthe
datasubject.63Siminarly,inEUlawtheGDPR’sAr-
ticles13and14forseethedatacontroller’sobliga-
tiontoinformthedatasubjectabouttheprocessing
ofhisorherdataandsodoesrespectivelythe
PDPA.64
Additionally,inEstoniaanypersoncan,bylogging
inintotheStatePortalanonlineportal,fromwhere
publice-servicesandinformationaboutstate-related
activitiescanberetrieved65accessthepersonalda-
tausagemonitor .Themonitorallowsthedatasub-
jecttocheckwhichpublicauthorityhasbeenaccess-
inghisorherpersonaldatainanonlinedatabase.66
However,notalldatabases’managershaveyetdecid-
edtomakeuseofthispossibility ,asjoiningthemon-
itoris(today)optional.67Currently ,thedatabasesof
theCitizenshipandMigrationBoard,thePopulation
Register,theMedicalPrescriptiondatabase,theSo-
cialServicesdatabaseandtheUnemploymentIn-
58JudgmentIII-4/A-1/94oftheConstitutionalReviewChamberof
theEstonianSupremeCourtfrom12January1994,Englishtrans-
lationavailableat<https://www.riigikohus.ee/en/constitutional
-judgment-III-4A-194>accessed17January2020:‘Thelackof
thoroughregulationbylawsandcovertnatureofthemeasures
depriveapersonoftherighttoinformationalself-determination,
therighttochoosehisorherbehaviourandtherighttodefend
himselforherself.’
59Judgment1BvR209,269,362,420,440,484/83oftheBun-
desverfassungsgerichtfrom15December1983(Volkszählung-
surteil)II1b).
60PIA,para2s2(n35).
61PIA,paras1and6.
62ResponsetoMemorandaandRequestsforExplanationsand
SubmissionofCollectiveProposalsAct(MRSA)(Märgukirjaleja
selgitustaotluselevastamiseningkollektiivsepöördumiseesitamise
seadus2004)para2s2<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/
501112016001/consolide>.
63SeePIA,para23ec1p1)inconjunctionwithpara35(n35)and
MRSA,para1s3(n78)respectively.
64SeePersonalDataProtectionAct(isikuandmetekaitseseadus
2007,newversionof2019)paras22-24<https://www
.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/523012019001/consolide>.
65TheStatePortalcanbeaccessed(inEstonian,EnglishandRuss-
ian)at<https://www.eesti.ee/et/>.Forfurtherinformationabout
theStatePortalsee<https://www.ria.ee/en/state-information
-system/state-portal-eestiee.html>.
66Formoretechnicalinformation,seeinformationabouttheper-
sonaldatausagemonitoronthesoftwaredevelopmentplatform:
<https://github.com/e-gov/AJ/issues/4>.
67Accordingtotheinformationprovidedatthesoftwaredevelop-
mentplatform:<https://github.com/e-gov/AJ/blob/master/doc/
spetsifikatsioonid/Tehniline_kontseptsioon.md>.
EDPL|8ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
surancedatabaseapplythemonitor.68Altogether,the
government’sinformationsystemcomprisesmore
than1700databases.69Themanagerofthedatabase
canalsodecidetorestrictthedatasubject’saccessto
informationprovidedbythedatamonitoron
groundsprovidedbylaw ,forexampleonthebasis
ofthePDPAthatprovideslegalgroundsonwhich
thefactofdataprocessingisnotdisplayed,forexam-
pleincasesthisisdeemednecessaryforthedetec-
tionorpersecutionofcrimesorifthisisconsidered
tobenecessarytoprotectotherpeoples’rightsorna-
tionalsecurity.
IV .TheIndividualandtheE-stateA
newBeginningortheEndofSelf-
Determination?
1.DatabasesandPersonalData
Accordingtothelaw,publicdatabasesareestablished
bylaworbyvirtueoflaw,70butthetypeandcompo-
sitionofdatacollectedinthemisregulatedinthe
statuteoftherespectivedatabase.71However,thees-
tablishmentofadatabaseaswellaschangestothe
compositionofitsdatashallbeapprovedbythe
DPI.72Anexamplethathasraisedquestionsisthe
EstonianCommunicableDiseasesRegister(ECDR).73
Accordingtothestatute,thesickperson’sprofession,
addressandsocio-economicstatusisamongsttheda-
tatobecollected,74theregisteralsoforeseesthereg-
istrationofanimalandtickbites.75Additionally ,the
dataoftheECDRisstored‘permanently’ ,ieforever.76
ThecompatibilityofthisregulationwithArticle5
GDPR,accordingtowhichonlydatanecessaryfor
theachievementoftheprocessingpurposemaybe
collected(dataminimisationprinciple)andshallbe
deletedwhennolongernecessary(storagelimitation
principle),raisesquestions.77Ascanbeseenfrom
thisexample,themanyregistersmaintainedbythe
Estonianpublicinstitutionsneedcarefulpermanent
analysisinordertoensuretheirconformitywithcur-
rentlaw.
Anotherrisktobeconstantlykeptinviewarepos-
sibledataleaksresultingfromhumanfailure.Such
dataleaksmostlyoccurwheredatathatshouldbe
classifiedasinternal(seeabove,III.4.)ismistakenly
not.Wheresuchleaksoccur,theireffectissignifi-
cant.Fromlastyear,twomajorexamplescanbere-
called.Inonecase,hundredsofchildrenwereaffect-
ed,asajournalistfoundoutthatdataonchildren’s
behaviour,mentalconditionandpsychiatricreports
hadbeenpubliclydisplayedintheschools’manage-
mentinformationsystemforyears.78Inanothersim-
ilarcase,informationaboutconsciptscharacterisa-
tions,healthdataanddisciplinaryproceedings,con-
tainingdetailsoftheirbehaviour,privatelifeandpsy-
chologicalcondition,hadbeenpubliclyaccessiblein
theEstonianDefenceForcesregisteroveryears.79In-
terestinglythough,suchcaseshavenothadawider
impactonpeoples‘confidenceinthepublicregisters.
Also,questionsofpossiblecompensationsforthose
affectedbysuchleakshavenotyetbeenapublicis-
sueofdebate.Thismayforonereasonbeowedto
thereluctanceoftheindividualtosuethestateasthe
evidentlymorepowerfulparty .Additionally,theleak-
68ThedatabasesoftheCitizenshipandMigrationBoardismanaged
bythePoliceandBoarderGuardBoard,theP opulationRegister
bytheMinistryoftheInterior,T heMedicalPrescriptiondatabase
bytheEstonianHealthInsuranceFond,theSocialServicesdata-
basebytheMinistryofSocialAffairsandtheUnemployment
InsurancedatabasebytheUnemploymentInsuranceFund.
69AccordingtothehomepageoftheAdministrationsystemforthe
stateinformationsystemRIHA,thestateinformationservice
comprisestogetherwithprivateinformationsystemswhohave
acceededit,morethan2300databases.
70PIA,para433s1(n35).
71PIA,para435(n35).
72PIA,para433s3(n35).
73Nakkushaigustejanakkushaiguskahtluseesinemiseninghaigestu-
miseohuteguritejaennetamisekohtateabeedastamisekord,
nakkushaigusteloetelujaandmesubjektiisikuandmetegaedas-
tatavateandmetekoosseis(Statuteonthenotificationprocedure
ofcommunicabledeseasesinfectionsandrespectivesuspicions,
hazardsandprevention,listofcommunicabledeseasesand
compositionofpersonaldatatobecommunicated2019)<https://
www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/113032019241>;Informationcontained
intheCommunicableDeseasesRegisterisexchangedviathe
communicabledeseasesdatabaseNAKIS;formoreinformation,
see:<https://www .terviseamet.ee/et/nakkushaigused-menuu/
tervishoiutootajale/nakis>(inEstonian).
74ECDR,para1s5,p3(n89).
75ECDR,para1s1,p53.
76ECDR,para12s1.
77GDPR,art5.
78EevaEsseandPriitPärnapuu,‘Sadadelastedelikaatseddokumen-
didrippusidaastaidavalikultinternetis’(Delicatedocumentsof
hundredsofchildrenwereforyearspubliclyontheinternet),
EstonianNewspaperPostimees(16October2018)<https://radar
.postimees.ee/6429640/sadade-laste-delikaatsed-dokumendid
-rippusid-aastaid-avalikult-internetis>.
79EveLoondeetal,‘Kaitseväesalajaseddokumendidrippusidaastaid
avalikultinternetis’(SecretdocumentsoftheEstonianarm ywerefor
yearspubliclyontheinternet),EstonianNewspaperEestiPäevaleht
(8November2018)<https://epl.delfi.ee/eesti/kaitsevae-salajased
-dokumendid-rippusid-aastaid-a valikult-internetis?id=84260115>.
EDPL|9ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
ingmaynotcauseameasurabledamageandthefeel-
ingofshamemayprevail.
2.TheLandRegister
AsaGermandata-leakin2019confirmed,theonline
publicationofpropertyowners’homeaddressesand
theirrealestatesmayinsomecountriesbeconsid-
eredadangertocertainpeople’ssafety,egFORpoliti-
ciansandpersonsofpublicinterest.80Inasmall
countrylikeEstonia,wherethehomeaddressofthe
primeministeriscommonlyknown,thegeneralon-
linepublicityofthelandregisterprovidedforbylaw
hadlongbeenconsideredunproblematic.81
Attheendof2019,however,theMinistryofJus-
ticedeclaredthatinfuture,accesstootherpersons’
landregisterdatawillonlybegrantedoncondition
thattheinterestedpersonauthenticateshim-orher-
selfonlineviaID-card,mobile-IDorinternetbank
link.82Theministryjustifiedthisdecisiononthe
groundsthatanincreasingnumberofcitizenshad
writtenletterstotheministryandtotheChancellor
ofJustice,expressingtheirdissatisfactionwiththe
factthatanyonecouldfreelylookuponlinewhich
propertiestheyowned.TheMinistryfurtherstated
thattheidentificationofthepersonwould,onthe
onehand,enabletheownertoseewhohadaccessed
hisorherdatainthelandregisterandthus,byhope-
fullyreducingthenumberofrequestsoutofpurecu-
riosity,enableabetterprotectionoftheirdata.On
theotherhand,theMinistryarguedthatauthentica-
tiondoesnotviolatethelegallyrequiredpublicac-
cesstothelandregister.83However,theMinistrydid
notspecifywhetheritconsideredthattherewasare-
strictionofthepublicityoftheregister .Asthere-
quirementofauthenticationisapurelytechnicalso-
lutionandhasnolegalbasis,itseffectivenessremains
uncertain.
ItshouldbenotedthattheMinistryofJusticehas
linkedthenewregulationspecificallytotheEUda-
taprotectionreformof2018andconsiderationsof
respectivenationalamendments.84Intheauthor’s
view,theincreasedinterestofcitizensintheprotec-
tionoftheirpersonaldatacanalsobeassociatednot
leastwiththeEU’sactivestanceinthisregard.
3.CourtRulings
AccordingtotheECparagraph24sections3and4,
courtproceedingsandthedeclarationofthecourt
decisionareusuallypublic.Theobligationtopublish
courtrulingsonlineformspartofthetransparency
principleestablishedbythePIA.85Whenadopting
thePIAin2000andregulatingtherewiththeoblig-
ationtopublishcourtrulingsonline,thelawmaker
didnotseparatelyexplaintheregulations’propor-
tionality,86nordidtheStateCourthavetoexplainit-
selfonthatquestion.
LaterattemptsbytheMinistryofJusticetorestrict
theprincipleofthepublicityofcourtrulingshave
beenmetwithharshcriticism.In2014,theMinistry
ofJusticemadepublicanamendmentproposal,ac-
cordingtowhichthenamesofmostconvictedinrul-
ingspublishedonlinewouldhavebeensubstituted
byinitialswiththeexceptionofcertainserious
crimes,suchastraffickinginhumanbeings,rape,
murdercrimesagainstthestateandotherswhile
accesstothenamesofconvictedpersonswouldhave
beenpurchasableforfoureuros.87Theexplanatory
memorandumcommentedontheproportionalityof
theproposal.Butcontrarytothenewspapers’strong
criticismthattheproposedamendmentwouldre-
strictthefreedomofthepressandinformation,88the
80‘PrivateDatenvonHundertenPolitikernundKünstlernveröf-
fentlicht’(Privatedataofhundredsofpoliticiansandartistspub-
lished)MDRaktuellnewsportal(4January2019)<https://www
.mdr.de/nachrichten/politik/inland/persoenliche-daten-von
-politikern-gehackt-100.html>.
81Seetheelectronicpropertyregister’shomepage(Englishversion):
<https://www.rik.ee/en/e-land-register>.
82‘Kinnistusraamatussaabedaspidiotsinguidtehavaidennast
autentides’(Infuture,searchesinthelandregistercanonlybe
carriedoutundertheconditionofauthentication)Informationby
theMinistryofJustice(26November2019)<https://www.just.ee/
et/uudised/kinnistusraamatus-saab-edaspidi-otsinguid-teha-vaid-id
-kaardiga>;seealso:II.1.
83LandRegisterAct(Kinnistusraamatuseadus1993)para74(see
alson10).
84NewspaperPostimees(12February2019)<https://tehnika
.postimees.ee/6521532/lugeja-kusib-kas-uus-e-kinnistusregister
-ohustab-inimeste-privaatsust>.
85PIA,para29s1andpara28s1no29(n35).
86Explanatorymemorandumtodraftactno462(n56).
87Amendmentacttothecriminalprocurementactandtherewith
connectedacts,draftactno578SE(12January2014)<https://bit
.ly/3gfvtcX>.
88TarmoV ahter,‘Riikhakkabkurjategijatenimesidmüüma’(The
stateplanstosellthenamesofcriminals),Estoniannewspaper
EestiEkspress(23January2014)<https://ekspress.delfi.ee/kuum/
riik-hakkab-kurjategijate-nimesid-muuma?id=67659517>;T armo
Vahter,‘Kohtuotsusesolgunimed,mitteinitsiaalid‘(Courtrulings
shallcontainnames,notinitials)EstonianNewspaperÄripäev(6
March2014)<https://www .aripaev.ee/blog/2014/03/06/
kohtuotsuses-olgu-nimed-mitte-initsiaalid>.
EDPL|10ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
MinistryofJusticeexplainedthattheamendment
wasmotivatedbyadministrativereasonsprimarily .
Thiswasduetothefactthattheimplementationof
theobligationtoexchangetheconvictednames’with
initialswhentheirpunishmentbecomestimebarred
hadproventobeproblematic,ascopiesoftheprevi-
ouspersonalizedrulingscouldstillbecirculatingon
theinternetandthefulfilmentoftheobligation
causedaconsiderableadministrativeburden.89How-
ever,theamendmentwasnotapprovedbythepar-
liament.In2018,theamendmentproposalsencom-
passingtheenactmentoftheGDPRdidia.propose
toshortentheperiodoftimeofpublicationofcon-
victednames’dependingontheseverityoftheof-
fencecommitted.90Accordingtothedraft’smemo-
randum,thepublicationofcourtrulingsservesthe
interestsofthepublic,suchastransparencyandcon-
trolofthecourt,legalclarity,monitoringandhar-
monisingoftheapplicationoflaw ,generalandspe-
cificdeterrence.91However,thememorandumar-
guesthatnotalloftheseaimsrequirethepublica-
tionofthenameoftheconvictedduringthewhole
lengthofhisorherconviction,butcanbeachieved
alsowithlessintrusivemeasures,eganindividual
requestforaccesstothecriminalrecords.92Thepro-
posedamendmentdidnotbecomelaw.93
Theextenttowhichthepersonalinformationof
thelitigantsispublished,hasbeenadjustedovertime.
Atpresent,incivilandadministrativecourtrulings,
thelitigant(beinganaturalperson)canrequestthe
non-publicationofhisorhernameandIDcode(or
birthdate).94Incriminalproceedings,thedefendant’s
nameandIDcode(orbirthdate)arereplacedbyini-
tialsorcharactersincaseofminors,exceptinthecase
theminorisathirdtimeoffender .Ifthedecisioncon-
tainssensitivedataorpersonaldatathepublication
ofwhichisrestrictedbylaw,thecourtshallrefrain
fromthedisclosureoftheperson’sidentitybyreplac-
ingthedefendant’snamebyinitialsorpublishingon-
lytheconclusionorfinalpartofthedecision.95
4.CriminalRecords
Oneofthemostwell-knownEstoniandatabasesis
theCriminalRecordsdatabase.96Thedatabasecon-
tainsinformationaboutcurrentconvictionsformis-
demeanoursandcriminaloffences.Since2012,ac-
cesstothecriminalrecordsofotherpeoplecostsfour
eurosperrequest.Thisishowmuchapersonhasto
paytogettoknowiftheindividualconcernedhas
validcriminaloffences.97Noadditionalcondition(le-
gitimateinterestorsimilar)hasbeensincerequired.
However,apersoncancheckhisorherownperson-
alrecordforfree.Thelawmakerarguedthatdueto
thefactthatcourtrulingswereanyhowpublicand
didnotcontainsensitivedata,98therewasnoreason
torestrictaccesstocriminalrecords.99Thisargumen-
tationhasneitherbeencontestedbytheEstonian
publicnorthecourts.
However,theentryintoforceofGDPRhasledto
theconclusionthattherespectiveregulationneeds
89‘Justiitsministeeriumpõhjendabtapjate,röövlitejaväljapressijate
kaitsmist’(MinistryofJusticejustifiestheprotectionofkillers,robbers
andracketeers),EstoniannewspaperEestiEkspress(24January
2014)<https://ekspress.delfi.ee/kuum/justiitsministeerium-pohjendab
-tapjate-roovlite-ja-valjapressijate-kaitsmist?id=67671423>.
90ExplanatorymemordandumtotheImplementationActtothe
DataProtectionAct(IADPA),draftactno650(4June2018),42f
<https://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/96c37d10
-383c-40ad-87be-a8583008b994/Isikuandmete%20kaitse
%20seaduse%20rakendamise%20seadus>;criticalcommentary
ontheplannedchanges:T armoVahter ,‘KeskuratloobEestis
riiki,kuskeegimidagiteadaeitohi?!’(Whothehellcreatesan
Estonianstateinwhichno-oneisallowedtoknowanything?!)
EstoniannewspaperÕhtulehtfrom21June2018<https://www
.ohtuleht.ee/883784/kes-kurat-loob-eestis-riiki-kus-keegi-midagi
-teada-ei-tohi>.
91ibid62.
92ibid.
93ImplementationActtotheDataProtectionAct,draftactno778
(13December2018)<https://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/
eelnou/9d1420bb-b516-4ab1-b337-17b2c83eedb1/
Isikuandmete%20kaitse%20seaduse%20rakendamise
%20seadus778>.
94CodeofCivilProcedure(Tsiviilkohtumenetluseseadustik2005)
para462<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/512042019002/
consolide>;CodeofAdministrativeCourtProcedure(Halduskoh-
tumenetluseseadustik2011)para175<https://www.riigiteataja
.ee/en/eli/521032019005/consolide>(seealson10).
95CodeofCriminalProcedure(Kriminaalmenetluseseadustik2003)
para4081s2<https://www .riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/515052019002/
consolide>(seealson10).
96SeealsotheCentreofRegistersandInformationSystem’ shome-
page:‘CriminalRecordsDatabase’<https://www .rik.ee/en/
criminal-records-database>.
97AccordingtotheCriminalRecordsDatabaseAct(Karistusregistri
seadus2011)para19,informationonoffencesofminorsis
excludedfromthegeneralpublicityofcriminalrecords;however ,
asanexception,accessshallbegrantedi.atoanemployer
uponhiringtheminor.ThelegalregulationisaccessibleinEng-
lishat:<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/501042019021/
consolide/current>(seealson10).
98Todaynamed‘specialcategoriesofdata’(seen27).
99ExplanatorymemorandumtotheCriminalRecordsDatabaseAct,
draftactno762(13December2018)2<https://www.riigikogu
.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/8ffa1f1d-8dea-9b9b-53f1
-ddf8f342a164/Karistusregistri%20seadus>.
EDPL|11 ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
tobeamended,asitisnotcompatiblewithArticle
10GDPR,whichstipulatesthatpersonaldatarelat-
ingtocriminalconvictionsandoffencesshallbecar-
riedoutunderthecontrolofofficialauthorityexclu-
sivelyoriftherespectivelegalbaseprovidesforap-
propriatesafeguardsfortherightsandfreedomsof
thedatasubject.100AccordingtotheamendedCrim-
inalRecordsDatabaseAct(CRDA)paragraph15sec-
tion1,inforcesince1March2019:
Everyonehastherighttoobtaindatafromthe
databaseconcerninghimselforherselforanyle-
galperson.Whendataofanotherpersonarere-
quest,thelegalbasisorobjectiveofrequestingthe
datahastobeconfirmedinthequery.
Astotheexplanatorymemorandum,criminalrecords
ofothernaturalpersonswillbeaccessiblealsoinfu-
tureonthegroundslaiddowninarticle6GDPR.That
is,withthedatasubject’spriorconsent,onthebasis
ofarespectivelegalbase,iftheprocessingisneces-
saryfortheperformanceoftasksofpublicinterest,
fortheexerciseofofficialauthority,fortheperfor-
manceofacontract,fortheprotectionofvitalinter-
estsofthedatasubject,incaseofpreponderatelegit-
imateinterestsofthecontrollerorfortheexerciseof
thepressandinformationfreedom.101Thememoran-
dumaddsthattheindicatedgroundsareneithersep-
aratelycontrollednorevaluatedbytheregistrar.102
AsofJanuary2020,thecitedlegalregulationhas
notbeenputintopracticeandonlinequeriescon-
cerningcriminalrecordsofthirdpersonsdonotre-
quiretheentryofaspecialreason.Itisalsoquestion-
ableiftherequirementof‘control’byanofficialau-
thorityorrespectivesafeguards,assetoutbyArticle
10GDPRcanbeconsideredfulfilledincasetheright
toobtaindataoncriminalconvictionsofthirdper-
sons(CRDAparagraph15section1)isinnowaycon-
trolledbytheauthorities.
7.Parties’MembershipandthePractice
ofDisclosure
ThePIAincludesalsotheobligationtodisclosepo-
liticalparties’membershiplists.Thelawmakerdid
notcommentonthegroundsofthatlegalregulation,
buttheEstonianChancellorofJusticedid,whohas
analysedtheact’slawfulnesstwice.In2003,thethen
ChancellorofJusticeAllarJõksquestionedthecon-
stitutionalconformityoftheregulation.Politicians
andthepublicopiniondidnotfollowthechancel-
lor’sconcerns103andinhisfinalconclusionthatwas
publishedin2004,he,too,tooktheviewthatthereg-
ulationdidnotinfringefundamentalrights.104The
argumentsinfavouroftheregulationareinlinewith
theopinionofthenextChancellorofJusticeIndrek
Teder ,whoin2008,reiteratedtheviewoftheregu-
lation’sconstitutionalconformity .105Accordingto
theseconcurringopinions,apoliticalpartyisnota
secretorintimateorganisation.106Therefore,ithas
toabidebythetransparencyprinciplesstemming
fromdemocraticrule.Bothopinionsdeemtheargu-
mentsinfavourofthepublicityofpoliticalpartyaf-
filiationtobesignificant,asitpreventscorruption
andconflictofinterestandallowforavalue-based
executionofpublicpower.Comparedtothat,thein-
fringementoftheindividual’srightsisconsidered
moderate.107ThechancellorofJustice’sviewof2004
addsthatapoliticallyactivepersonjoiningapoliti-
calpartyhastobereadyforanincreaseddisclosure
ofhisorherbeliefsandactsandbelongingtoapo-
liticalpartyisnotobligatory.108Respondingtothe
possibledangerofstigmatisationanddiscrimination
itissaidthatdiscriminationisforbiddenbylawand
anyonediscriminatedagainsthastherighttotakele-
galmeasures.109Neitheroftheopinionsmadeadif-
ferencebetweenso-calledordinarypartymembers
andpoliticians.Nordidanyofbothaddresstheprob-
abilityandprospectofsuccessof(potential)party
memberstotakelegalactionagainstpossibledis-
crimination.
100ExplanatorymemordandumtotheIADPA44f(n97).
101ibid,45.
102ibid.
103BalticNewsService/Estoniannewsportaldelfifrom26July2003:
‘Jõkssalastakserakondadenimekirjad’(Jõkswouldhidepolitical
parties’themembershiplists)<https://www .delfi.ee/news/
paevauudised/eesti/joks-salastaks-erakondade-nimekirjad?id
=6048372>.
104TheChancellorofJustice’sopinionnr6-8/1443from30Septem-
ber2004.
105TheChancellorofJustice’sopinionnr6-1/080996/00808156of
28November2008<https://www.oiguskantsler.ee/sites/default/
files/field_document2/6iguskantsleri_seisukoht_vastuolu
_puudmine_erakonnaliikmete_nimekirjade_avalikustamine
_loppvastus.pdf>.
106TheChancellorofJustice’sopinionnr6-8/1443from2004,3(n
111).
107ibid.
108TheChancellorofJustice’sopinionnr6-1/080996/00808156
from2008,8(n112).
109TheChancellorofJustice’sopinionnr6-8/1443from2004,3(n
111).
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AlthoughEstonianpoliticalpartieshavebeenpri-
vateorganisationsformorethan25yearsnow ,110it
isinthelightofthecountry’shistoricalbackground
thatpeople’sattitudestowardspoliticalpartiesmust
beunderstood.DuringthetimeofSovietOccupation,
from1940until1990,therewasonlyonelawfulpo-
liticalparty,theCommunistPartyofEstonia.Itwas
understoodtobetheextensionof(Soviet)statepow-
er,notatooltoplacepoliticalpowerintopeoples’
hands.111Extensiveregulationsonpartyfinancing
andorganisationadoptedafterregainingindepen-
dencearelikelytohaveconfirmedtheimpressionof
politicalpartiesascentresofpoliticalpower.112Also
today,publictrustinpoliticalpartiesislow,113civil
andstatecontrolovertheiractingisdeemedneces-
saryandjustified,astheChancellorofJustice’sopin-
ionsconfirm.Additionally,Estonia’ssmallsizecan-
notbeneglectedinthisregard.Patronagebetween
higherstateservantsandpoliticalcareerscanhard-
lybeexcluded,itmayinmanycasesevenbejusti-
fiedbythesimplelackofqualifiedleadersandmas-
tersoftheircraft.114
Fromthefactthatcourtrulings,partyaffiliation
andcriminalrecordsarepublicoratleastpublicly
accessible,anewissuearoseinthebeginningof2019,
shortlybeforetheEstonianparliamentaryelections
inMarch2019.Amediaoutletpublishedonlineand
inthenewspaperallnamesofpartymembersserv-
ingsentencesandthosewithvalidandpartlyalso
time-barredoffencesandmisdemeanours,includ-
ingtheactscommittedbythem.115Whilesomepo-
liticalparties’statuteshadregulationsinforce,ex-
cludingfrommembershipforexamplepeopleserv-
ingasentence,otherslackedrespectiveregulations.
Reactingquickly,thepartiesdecidedwhomtoex-
cludefromthepartyandwhomnot.Theparties’re-
actionsweredifferent:Someexcludedonlythose
whoseconvictions’werenotyettime-barred,others
decidedtoexcludememberswhohadcommittedcer-
tainseriouscrimesandonesmallpartydecidedto
notexcludeanyone,asaccordingtotheirspokesman,
peopleshouldhavetherighttogoonwiththeirlives
afterconviction.116Althoughitwasmentionedonthe
fringesofthediscussionthatespeciallythedisclosure
ofthenamesofthosepeoplewhoseconvictionwas
alreadytime-barred,mightbeveryunpleasantfor
them,thepublicaswellasthepartiesgenerallyDID
notcallintoquestionthebehaviourofthejournal-
ists.Therewerealsonodebatesconcerningthelegal-
ityofsuchadisclosure,asthejournalistsinvestiga-
tionwasclearlyinlinewithcurrentlaw .According
totheCRDA,aperson’snameintherespectivecourt
decisionshallbereplacedbyinitialsafterthepunish-
menthasbeentime-barred.117Anyhow ,thisregula-
tiondoesnotapplyforcertainoffences,including
murder,manslaughterandoffencesagainstminors,
butalsotraffickingofnarcotics,affiliationincrimi-
nalorganisationsandmoneylaundering.118
Thepracticeofpublicdisclosureofinfringements
isnotuncommoninEstonia.Inthebeginningofthe
2000s,thecityofTartuhadthepracticeofpublish-
ingonlinethosepeople’snamesanddebts,whoowed
110AccordingtothePoliticalP artiesAct(erakonnaseadus1994)para
1s2,politicalpartiesareintheirlegalnaturenon-profitorganisa-
tions:<https://www .riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/513042015011/
consolide>(seealson10).
111SeealsoAllanSikk,‘FromPrivateOrganizationstoDemocratic
Infrastructure:PoliticalPartiesandtheStateinEstonia’(2006),
22(3)JournalofCommunistStudiesandTransitionPolitics341,
345f.
112Compareibid,344;ÜlleMadiseandAllanSikk,‘DieInstitution
derpolitischenP arteiinEstland’in:D.Th.Tsatsosetal(eds),
‘ParteienrechtimeuropäischenVergleich,DieParteieninden
demokratischenOrdnungenderStaatenderEuropäischen
Gemeinschaft(2ndedn,Nomos2006),ch4,4,16f.
113AccordingtotheEuropstatbarometerofFebruay2019,political
partiesconstitutewithasupportof18%theleasttrustedEstonian
institution,see:<https://ec.europa.eu/estonia/news/20190219
_Eurobarometer_et>accessed17January2020.
114SeealsoMadiseandSikk7f,18(n119).
115Seeforexample:JoosepTiksandPriitPärnapuu,‘Peksjad,vargad,
pedofiilid.EKREliikmeskondkubisebkurjategijatest’(Violent
criminals,thiefs,pedophiles.EKRE’ssupporterscampisover-
crowdedwithcriminals),EstoniannewspaperEestiPäevaleht(22
January2019)<https://epl.delfi.ee/eesti/kriminaalipaanika-pani
-reformierakonna-enda-liikmete-hulgast-kurjategijaid-otsima-neid
-leiti-ligi-pool-tuhat?id=85234743>;JoosepT iksandPriitPärna-
puu,‘Punasteroosideokkadtilguvadverest.Sotsideliikmeskon-
nas165kriminaali’(Thethornsoftheredrosesdripofblood.The
membershipofthesocialdemocratsmembership165criminals),
EstoniannewspaperEestiPäevalehtfrom30January2019
<https://epl.delfi.ee/eesti/punaste-rooside-okkad-tilguvad-verest
-sotside-liikmeskonnas-165-kriminaali?id=85188135>;Joosep
TiksandPriitP ärnapuu,‘KriminaalipaanikapaniReformierakonna
endaliikmetehulgastkurjategijaidotsima.Neidleitiligipool
tuhat,Estoniannewspaper’(Criminals’panicmadetheReform
partysearchforcriminalsinitsownrows.Approximatelyhalfa
thousandwerefound),EstoniannewspaperEestiPäevalehtfrom5
February2019<https://epl.delfi.ee/eesti/kriminaalipaanika-pani
-reformierakonna-enda-liikmete-hulgast-kurjategijaid-otsima-neid
-leiti-ligi-pool-tuhat?id=85234743>.
116MarvelRiik,‘Üle2000partei-kriminaali:millisederakonnadon
omahingekirjastkurjategijadväljavisanud?’(Over2000party
criminals:whichpartieshavethrownthecriminalsoutoftheir
membershipslists?),EstoniannewspaperÕhtuleht(6February
2019)<https://www .ohtuleht.ee/939948/ule-2000-partei
-kriminaali-millised-erakonnad-on-oma-hingekirjast-kurjategijad
-valja-visanud>.
117CRDA,para28(n106).
118ibid.
EDPL|13 ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
thecitymoney .Similarly ,theEstonianpoliceusedto
publishthenamesofthosecaughtdrunk-driving.119
Bothmeasuresweretakenwithoutarespectivelegal
regulationandwereabandonedonlyafteryearswith-
outhavinghadtofaceanylegalconsequences.How-
ever,similarpracticeshaveproventobeeffective.Be-
tween2010-2016,childsupportdebtorswerepub-
lishedonline.120Alreadyinthefirstninedaysofthe
applicationofthemeasureoutstandingsumsinthe
amountofhalfamillioneuroswerepaid.121Such
practiceshavebeensuccessfullyappliedalsointhe
privatesector.In2008,adebtcollectionagencypub-
lishedonabillboardatoneofthemostfrequented
crossingsinTallinnalistofdebtorswhowerelegal
personsinlaw,includingtheirboardmember’s
names.TheEstoniadataprotectionagencyargued
thatastheinformationonthesedebtswasinaccor-
dancewiththeprincipleofpublicityofpublicadmin-
istrationavailabletoeveryoneonthecommercialreg-
ister,thepublicationdidnotbreachprivacylaw.122
TheStateCourtconfirmedthelegalityofthepubli-
cation,asitconsideredittobejustified.123
Astheaforementionedcasesshow ,Estonianlaw
considersthepublicationofoffencescommittedby
thedelinquenttobepartofpublicpunishmentby
thesociety.Thisapproachislikelytobeinconflict
atleastwiththoseEuropeancountries,whichhavea
functioningrehabilitationlegislationandpolicyin
place.IvoPilving,todayjudgeattheSupremeCourt
inEstonia,notedwithrespecttotheproportionality
ofthedisclosureofdrunkdriversanddebtorsofcom-
munaldebtorsin2004thatbeforeapplyingpublic
disclosureasapreventivemeasure,thelawmakerhad
theobligationtoevaluateand,asfarasnecessary ,to
adjustthepreventiveeffectivenessoftheexisting
punitivemeasures.Toensureitsproportionality ,the
statehastobeabletocontroleverypenaltyimposed
byit.Thisisnotgiveninthecaseofpillory ,where
theimpactofthemeasuredoesnotdependonthe
committedact’sseveritybutonthe(accidental)me-
diaandpublic’sreaction.124Pilvingreferredalsoto
thefactthatthepublicstigmatisationofdebtorsmay
nothaveanypositiveeffectwherethedebtorissim-
plylackingmoney ,butevenhinderhimorhertofind
orkeepanemploymentthatmakesthereimburse-
mentofthedebtpossible.125Regrettably,theseargu-
mentshavenotgainedfurtherattentionneitherby
theEstonianlegislatornorbythepublic.
5.ProfilingforthePerson’sBestInterest?
In2017,theproblemoftheNEETyouth(‘youthnei-
therinemploymentnorineducationortraining’)be-
cameanissueofenhancedpublicawarenessinEsto-
nia.T otackletheproblem,thegovernmentpresent-
edalegalamendment,withwhichitaimedtoenhance
therapproachmentofthoseyoungpersonsbetween
theageof16-26intothelabourmarketorintoeduca-
tion.Accordingtotheamendment,thelocalauthori-
tywheretheyoungpersonisresidenthastheright
toidentifyonitsowninitiativeifthatpersonmay
needassistance.Thisisassumediftheyoungperson
doesneitherworknorstudyanddoesnothaveany
wellfoundedreasonfornotdoingso(reasonsfor
exludingapersonfromthelistareegregistrationas
unemployed,entrepreneurship,imprisonment,mili-
taryserviceetc).126Forthepurposeofidentifying
119SeealsoP alomaKrõõtTupayandMonikaMikiver‘Derestnische
E-Staat-zukunftsweisendesVorbildoderbefremdlicherEinzel-
gänger?’(TheEstonianE-stateforward-lookingrolemodelor
oddmaverick?)(2015)1ZeitschriftOsteuropa-Recht2,27f;Ivo
Pilving,‘Sugupuudmüügiksjaroolijoodikudhäbiposti?’(Ge-
nealogicalrecordsforsaleanddrunkdriverstopillory?)(2004)II
Juridica75,79.
120From2016,theinformationcanbeobtainedbyanyonewhohas
accesstotheEstoniane-servicesbyenteringtheperson’ sname
andIDcodeorbirthdateintheregisterofmaintenancedebtors.
Thelegislatorjustifiedtheamendmentnotbyreasonofabetter
rightsprotectionbutbytheaimtoavoidtheduplicationofdata,
seeexplanatorymemorandumtothetotheCodeofEnforcement
Procedureactandtherewithconnectedactsamendmentact,draft
actno803(1December2014)<https://www.riigikogu.ee/
tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/6e9fb22e-69d1-449d-93a1
-40fe2415c1a4/T%C3%A4itemenetluse%20seadustiku
%20muutmise%20ning%20sellega%20seonduvalt%20teiste
%20seaduste%20muutmise%20seadus>;childsupportdebtinfor-
mationservice<https://www.eesti.ee/eng/services/citizen/
perekond_1/elatisvolgnevus>.
121ReportoftheEstoniannewspaperÄripäevfrom10June2014,
‘Häbiposttõitagasipoolmiljoniteurot’(Thewhippingpost
broughtthetaxofficehalfamillioneuro)<https://www.aripaev
.ee/article/2014/6/10/maksuameti-habipost-toi-juba-tagasi-pool
-miljonit-eurot>.
122ErikRand, Andmekaitseseadusvõlgadesfirmajuhatusthäbi-
postisteipäästa’(Thedataprotectionactdoesnotsafethe
indebtedmanager).EstoniannewspaperÄrileht(7January2009)
<http://arileht.delfi.ee/news/uudised/andmekaitseseadus-volgades
-firma-juhatust-habipostist-ei-paasta?id=51154582>.
123Judgment3-2-1-67-10oftheCivilChamberoftheEstonian
SupremeCourt(21December2010),19.Thedecisionsofthe
EstonianSupremeCourtcanbeaccessedonthecourt’shome-
pageat<https://www.riigikohus.ee/>accessed17January2020.
124Pilving83(n126).
125ibid.
126SeefordetailstheSocialWelfareAct(sotsiaalhoolekandeseadus
2015)para15(1)<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/
522032019017/consolide>(seealson10).
EDPL|14ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
suchpersons,theSocialServicesandBenefitsReg-
istryisautomaticallyscreenedforpeoplewhomatch
thosecriteriatwiceayear.Inordertodeterminethe
realneedforassistance,thelocalauthoritymaythen
contacttheyoungpeopleidentified.Ifthepersondoes
notwishforhisorherdatatobeprocessed,thepro-
cessingofdatashallbeconcludeduponreceiptofa
respectiveapplication.127Thelawmakerdidnotmake
itafurtherpointofdiscussionthatthenameandID
codeofthoseyoungpersonswhodeclinefurtherda-
taprocessingbythelocalauthorityinthisregardswill
anyhowberecordedinthedatabaseuntiltheperson’s
27thbirthday .128Suchinformationmayagainlay
groundfornegativeinterpretation,astheyoungper-
sonhasdeclinedtoaccepthelpofferedtohimorher.
Anyhow ,thegroundsfornotworkingorstudyingare
notknowntotheauthorities;theyoungpersoncan
betouringtheworld,writingabookorsimilar.
TheEstonianDataProtectionInspectorate’sDirec-
torGeneralandtheChancellorofJusticecalledinto
questiontheregulation’sconformitywiththeECpara-
graph26secondsentence,accordingtowhichthe
publicauthoritymayinterfereinanyperson’sprivate
andfamilylifeonlyincasesandpursuanttoaproce-
dureprovidedbylawtoprotectpublichealth,public
morality ,publicorderortherightsandfreedomsof
others,topreventacriminaloffenceortoapprehend
anoffender.129Accordingtotheirviews,the‘preven-
tive’interferenceintoyoungpersons’rightscaused
bytheautomaticscreeningoftheSocialServicesand
Benefitsdatabasemightnotbeinaccordancewiththe
provisionwhichrequiresaconcretedangerforalegal-
lyprotectedright.Anyhow,thelawwasproclaimed
bythepresidentandenteredintoforceinApril2018
andhassofarnotbeencontestedbeforeacourt.The
questionoftheconformityofthelegalamendment
washandledbythemediaonsomeoccasionsbutdid
notgainthepublic’sparticularattention.130
6.AnyProblemswiththeDigitalDivide?
ArecentdecisiondeliveredbytheEstonianSupreme
Courtenbancaddressedinteraliathelegalregula-
tionobligingunexceptionallyallnon-profitorgani-
sationstopresentannualreportstothenon-profitas-
sociationsandfoundationsregisterindigitalform.131
Asanalternative,anotarypublicmaybeauthorised
bytheorganisationwiththeelectronicpresentation.
AccordingtotheNotaryFeesAct,thisservicecur-
rentlycosts25eurosand55cents.132Failureto
presentannualreportsleadstothedeletionoftheor-
ganisationfromtheregister .133Inthecaseathand,
thepartyclaimingtheunconstitutionalityofthereg-
ulationwasasmallnon-profitassociationwhichdid
notactforthepublicbenefitnorcarryoutanyeco-
nomicactivity .Thecourtruledtheregulationde-
mandingthepresentationofannualreportsexclu-
sivelyinelectronicformconstitutional,withami-
norityoffivejudgesoutof16presentingdissenting
opinionsinthisquestion.134Accordingtothecourt,
theregulationmakesadministrationsimplerand
moreeffectiveandreportingmoretransparentand
comparable.135Asthedecisionnotes,itmaybeas-
sumedthataprivatelegalpersonistodayabletocom-
municatewiththestateelectronically.136Thedissent-
127ibidpara15(1)s8:‘Ifthepersonwhois16-26yearsofagedoes
notwishforhisorherdatatobeprocessed,theprocessingof
datashallbeconcludeduponreceiptofanappropriateapplica-
tionfromthesaidperson.Uponfirstcontactwithapersonwhois
16-26yearsofage,thelocalauthorityshallaskthepersonfor
consenttofurtherprocesshisorherdata.Ifthepersondoesnot
givehisorherconsent,thefurtherprocessingofdatawillbe
stopped.Inordertoruleoutanyfurtherdataprocessingonlythe
personalidentificationcodeofthepersonshallbestoredinthe
SocialServicesandBenefitsRegistryuntilthepersonattains27
yearsofage.
128ibid.
129DataInspectorate’sopinionno1.2.-4/18/111from13January
2018;OpinionoftheChancellorofJusticeno
18-2/170578/1701993(10May2017);seealsoIII.4.
130LauraMallene,‘AndmekaitseOssinovskile:erinevaltnõukogude
ajasteiolemittetöötaminekõlblusvastane‘(TheDataInspectorate
toOssinovski:OppositetoSoviettimesnotworkingisnotim-
moral)EstoniannewspaperEestiPäevaleht(8May2017)<http://
epl.delfi.ee/news/eesti/andmekaitse-ossinovskile-erinevalt
-noukogude-ajast-ei-ole-mittetootamine-kolblusvastane?id
=78144546>;MonikaHaukanõmm,‘Lapsedeitohiollavahend
süsteemikatsetamiseks’(Childrenmaynotbeatoolfortestingthe
system)EstoniannewspaperÕpetajateLeht(26January2018)
<http://opleht.ee/2018/01/lapsed-ei-tohi-olla-vahend-susteemi
-katsetamiseks/>;<http://opleht.ee/2018/02/riik-ulatab-noortele
-oppima-ja-toole-asumiseks-abikae/>.
131Judgment2-17-10423oftheEstonianSupremeCourtenbanc
from2October2018.
132NotaryFeesAct(Notaritasuseadus1996)para31p25<https://
www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/512022018001/consolide>(seealson
10).
133Non-ProfitAssociationsAct(mittetulundusühinguteseadus1996)
para361s3<https://www .riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/526032019007/
consolide>(seealson10).
134Judgment2-17-10423(n147).DissentingopinionoftheJudges
PeeterJerofejev,HennJõks,AntsKull,VilluKõveandMalle
Seppik.
135ibid;judgement’sp56;59.1.
136ibid;judgement’sp59.1.
EDPL|15 ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
ingopinioninthisquestionratedtheregulationto
bedisproportionate,asitdoesnotallowforanyex-
ceptionsforparticularcases,asforeseeninmanyoth-
erregulations.137Thepossibilityofturningtoano-
taryisnotenoughtoconsidertherequirementcon-
stitutional,asitdemandsadditionalfinancialand
timeconsumingexpendituresbytheperson.138
Followingthejudgement,theChancellorofJus-
ticeaskedinanopinionpiece,ifapersonhadthe
righttolivewithoutinternet.Ifnot,shesuggested,
theimplementationofafundamentalobligationto
itsuseshouldbeconsidered.139Apartfromthat,the
court’srulingdidnotgainanypublicattention.But
thecaseservesasareminderforanimportantaspect
ofdigitisation:ifdigitalsolutionsshallservesociety
asawhole,risksofadigitaldivide’havetobebe-
stowedsufficientattention.
7.HealthDataaWantedAsset
Estoniahasalsooneoftheworld’smostdeveloped
e-healthsystems.99%ofhealthdataisdigitisedand
99%ofprescriptionsaredigital.140TheEstoniane-
healthRecordisanationwidesystemthatintegrates
datafromdifferenthealthcareprovidersandgener-
atescomprehensivemedicalrecordsofeachpatient,
includingmedicaldiagnosis,visitstodoctors,pre-
scribedmedication,x-raysandother.Healthcare
providersareobligedtosubmittheirmedicalinfor-
mationtothee-healthRecord.141Byloggingintothe
e-PatientportalwiththeelectronicID,142thepatient
canthenaccesshisorherpersonalmedicalrecord.
Accordingto§41HealthServicesOrganisationAct
(HSOA),allhealthcareproviders,whohavealegal
obligationtomaintainconfidentiality,havetheright
toprocesspersonaldatarequiredfortheprovision
ofahealthservice,includingpersonaldataofspecial
categories,withoutthepermissionofthedatasub-
ject.However,thepatientcanchoosetooptoutof
theruleofdatasharingviathee-healthRecord.In
thiscase,hisorherhealthdataisexcludedfrombe-
ingsharedbetweendifferenthealthcareservice
providers.143
Additionally,accordingtotheHSOA,accesstopa-
tients’healthdataforotherpersonsmaybeprovid-
edforbylaw .144FromtheHSOA,itcanthereforenot
beclearlydeducedwhomayhaveaccesstothe
Record.Oneexampleofsuchadelegationcanbe
foundintheInsuranceActivitiesAct(IAA).TheIAA
obligespublicinstitutionsandhealthcareproviders
attherequestofaninsurance‘totransmitorgrant’
accesstopersonaldataofthedatasubjectwithout
hisorherconsent‘ifthepersonaldataarenecessary
totheinsuranceundertakingfortheperformanceof
aninsurancecontractandensuringtheperformance
thereoforforexercisingtherightofrecourse.145The
norm’svaguewordingallowsforabroadinterpreta-
tiononhowtosecureinsuranciesaccesstothenec-
essarydata.Untiltodaythough,accessisprovided
viapublicinstitutionsandhealthcareproviders,the
insurancecompaniesthemselvesdonothavedirect
accesstothee-healthRecord.
Commentingontheregulations’proportionality ,
thelawmakerarguesthattheprocessingofhealthda-
tabytheinsurancesisjustifiedbyArticle9(2)(c)and
(g)GDPR.Thepromptcompensationoftheperson
entitledtoinsuranceformspartofthepublicsocial
protectionsystemandisthereforeinthepublicinter-
est.146Thelegalregulationsoninsuranceactivities
andthepurposelimitationapplyingtotheinsurances’
righttoobtaindataareconsideredsuitableandspe-
cificmeasurestosafeguardthefundamentalrights
andthepurposelimitationinterestsofthedatasub-
jectwithinthemeaningofGDPRArticle9(2)(g).147
Itshouldbenotedinthisrespectthatin2015,the
lawandethicsworkinggrouptooktheviewthatac-
cesstothee-healthdatabaseshouldnotbegivento
entitieslackingspecialexpertiseonthehandlingof
137ibid.DissentingopinionoftheJudgesPeeterJerofejev,HennJõks,
AntsKull,VilluKõveandMalleSeppik,p28.
138ibid;judgement’sp28f.
139ÜlleMadise,‘P õhiseadusearengajaloolisesjavõrdlevasvaates’
(Theevolutionoftheconstitutionfromahistoricalandacompar-
ativeperspective)(2019)1Juridica3,10.
140InformationretrievedfromEnterpriseEstonia<https://e-estonia
.com/solutions/healthcare/e-prescription/>.
141HealthServicesOrganisationAct(HSOA)(Tervishoiuteenuste
korraldamiseseadus2001)para592<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/
en/eli/508042019003/consolide>(seealson10).
142Seeabove,partII.1.
143Thepatientcannotexcludesingleinformationfrombeingshared
(egonmentalhealth),butcanonlychoosetoexcludeallofhisor
herdatafrombeingshared.Onlyafterthat,heorshecandecide
onacase-by-casebasistoshareparticularentriesofhisorher
healthrecord.Theopt-outmodel’suser-friendlinessistherefore
limited.
144SeeHSOA(n148)para59(3)and(1).
145InsuranceActivitiesAct(Kindlustustegevuseseadus2015)para
219<https://www .riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/526032019002/consolide
>.
146ExplanatorymemordandumtotheIADPA49(n97).
147ibid.
EDPL|16ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
healthdata,astheymaybeunfitforitsappropriate
use.148Theworkinggrouppointedtothemanydif-
ferentcasesinpractice,wheredirectaccesstodata
systems,egthepopulationregister,hadresultedin
anabusebyimpermissiblybroaduseofthisrightby
respectiveofficials.149Theworkinggroupreferred
alsotoanopinionoftheEUArticle29WorkingPar-
ty150of2007 ,wherethedataprotectionexpertstook
theviewthathealthdatacollectedformedicalrea-
sonsshouldnotbemadeaccessibleforthirdparties
whoseaimsdifferfromthoseoftheoriginaldatacol-
lector.151Additionally,theexpertstooktheviewthat
itwasnotenoughtoprotectthedatasubjectbyal-
lowinghimorhertoseewhohascheckedhisorher
dataandcontestpossibledatainfringementsin
court.Astheprivatepersonistheweakerpartofthis
legalrelationshiptheresponsibilitytoprotecthis
rightscannotbefullydelegatedtohimorher,be-
causethepersonmaynotfeelcompetentenoughto
asserthisorherright.152
a.InsuranceFundsandHealthData
Asalreadypointedoutbythelawandethicswork-
inggroupandtheArticle29WorkingParty ,153there
isanever-growinginterestandpressurefromdiffer-
entprivateandnon-privateentitiestogetaccessto
individuals’medicalrecords.Notwithstanding,by
theendofthesameyear2015,theparliamentseemed
readytoadoptalegalamendmentthatwouldex-
presslygiveinsurancesdirectandindividualaccess
tothee-healthRecordassuch.154Itwasonlyforthe
veryclearcriticismfromtheEstonianDataProtec-
tionInspectorate’sDirectorGeneralandtheChancel-
lorofJusticethattheamendmentwasnotpassed.
Likebeforetheworkinggroup,thedataprotection
officerunderlinedthedatasubject’sweakerposition,
whichwouldalsoundermineapossiblevoluntary
consentofthedatasubject,astheindividualisin
practicedependentontheinsuranceproviders.155
Providingtheinsuranceswithunrestrictedaccessto
allhealthdataofeveryEstonianpatientwouldopen
theopportunityforsubstantialmisusebypersons
notsufficientlycompetentinthisfield.156Thepar-
liamentwasfinallyconvincedbythesearguments
andrefrainedfromadoptingtheamendment.Still,
thisincidentatteststwothings.First,thegreatinter-
estofthirdpartiestogainaccesstotheinformation
storedinthee-Healthsystem.Andsecond,theprob-
lemthatmodernlegalregulations’technicalcontent
maynotbefairlyunderstandabletothosebeitusu-
alcitizensorparliamentarianswhohavenotbeen
thoroughlyintroducedtoitscontent.
b.WhatIsItWorth?
Ifdataasissaidisthenewoil,Estoniacancon-
sideritselfarichcountry.Thequestionisnowhow
todrillthisoil.Forthetimebeing,thegovernment
haslaunchedanewprojecttofoundastateenter-
prise,whichwouldthenbecommissionedto
anonymisecollectedhealthdataanddecidefor
whom,howandonwhichconditionsthedataob-
tainedwouldbemadeaccessible.157Therehaveal-
sobeenrumoursofgivingthedatasubjectsthem-
selvestherighttodecidetogivehealthwatchesand
148TheLawandethicsworkinggroup(leadedbyReetP ärgmäe,set
upaspartofthee-healthstrategybytheMinistryoftheInteriorin
2015):‘Legalandethicalaspectsforthegovernmentale-health
strategyuntil2020’(2015),27ff.
149ibid,28f.
150TheArticle29WorkingPartywasanindependentEUworking
partythatdealtwithissuesrelatingtotheprotectionofprivacy
andpersonaldataandwasmadeupofarepresentativefromthe
dataprotectionauthorityofeachEUMemberState,Asof25May
2018,thisbodyhasbeenreplacedbytheEuropeanDataProtec-
tionBoard.Formoredetails,see:<https://ec.europa.eu/
newsroom/article29/news-overview.cfm>.
151‘Legalandethicalaspectsforthegovernmentale-healthstrategy
until2020’(n155),30,referringto:Article29WorkingParty
workingdocumentontheprocessingofpersonaldatarelatingto
healthinelectronichealthrecords(WP131,2007),16<https://ec
.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion
-recommendation/index_en.htm#maincontentSec11>.
152ibid,31f.
153SeeegWP131,2007(n158)5;‘Legalandethicalaspectsforthe
governmentale-healthstrategyuntil2020’(n155),27ff.
154AmendmentacttotheWorkingAbilityEndorsementActand
otheracts,draftactno84SEI(14September2015)<https://bit.ly/
38jWZmZ>.
155LetteroftheEstonianDataProtectionInspectorate’ sDirector
GeneraltotheSocialCommitteeoftheP arliamentfrom19Octo-
ber2015,no1.2.-4/15/1976,3f.Thelettercanbeaccessedat
thewebaddressoftheamendmentactinquestion(ibid).
156ibid,4.
157HansLõugas,Eestie-riigiuussuurprojekt:hakkamemeierahva
terviseandmetegasuurtrahategema’(TheEstoniane-state’sgrand
newproject:let’smakebigmoneywithpeople’ shealthdata)
(Onlineportaldigigeenius,8October2018)<https://digi.geenius
.ee/rubriik/uudis/eesti-e-riigi-uus-suur -projekt-hakkame-meie-rahva
-terviseandmetega-suurt-raha-tegema/>andHansLõugas,‘Tervise-
andmeteuueriigifirmaplaanjõuabvalitsusse’(Theplanonanew
stateenterpriseforhealthdataheadstothegovernment)(Online
portaldigigeeniusfrom,10October2018)<https://digi.geenius.ee/
rubriik/uudis/terviseandmete-uue-riigifirma-plaan-jouab-valitsusse/>.
EDPL|17 ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
fitnesstrackersaccesstotheirhealthdata.158Nole-
galanalysishasbeenpresentedinthisregardsofar.
Attentionhastobepaidtoparticularcommercialin-
terestsofdifferentmarketplayers,bearinginmind
thegenerallyweakerpositionoftheconsumer.
V .Concludingremarks
1.TheEstonianUnderstandingofRights’
Protection
TheEstonians’approachtotheprocessingandpro-
tectionoftheirdatahasbeendepictedbyalarge-scale
surveyontherighttoprivacyasahumanrightand
everydaytechnologiesin2014.15941%ofthoseques-
tionedwereoftheopinionthattheconcernsabout
dataprotectionwereexaggerated,16074%didagree
withthestatementthat‘theyhavenothingtohide’ .161
61%agreedwiththeclaimthatthestateneedsfora
betterrightsprotectionmorerightsfordataprocess-
ingwithouttheconsentofthedatasubject.Likewise,
86%ofEstonianinhabitantstrusttheEstonianpo-
liceand75%trusttheEstonianarmy.16283%ofEs-
tonianpeoplebelievethatthedatathestatecollects
fromthemissufficientlyprotected,therespective
numberformedicalinstitutionsis81%.163
Referringtothesurveyof2014,theBritishpriva-
cyadvocateandacademicSimonDaviescalledthe
resultsdisappointing.Accordingtohim,theEstoni-
anshavenotlearnedfromtheirpastunderSovietoc-
cupationandlackunderstandingforthedangerthat
asowellinformedpublicpowerinthewronghands
couldbringabout.164Intheperspectiveoftheauthor
ofthisreport,inordertounderstandtheEstonian
approachtodatahandlingandprotection,cultural
andhistoricalaspectsofthecountrymustnotbene-
glected.165Forone,Estoniahasalwaysbeenasmall
countrywithapopulationsizeofothercountries’
mediumsizetowns;today,ithasslightlymorethan
1.3millioninhabitants.166ThereishardlyanyEston-
ianinhisorherfourtieswhocouldgetacquainted
withsomeoneheorshehasneverheardof.Withthis,
cleardemarcationbetween‘private’and‘public’life
ineverydayEstonianlifehasalreadylongbeforedigi-
tisationbeenfluent.Secondly ,Sovietoccupation
markedtheEstoniansocietyformorethanfiftyyears,
duringwhichpublificationandsharingofpersonal
informationwascommon.Itwasnotonlyusedby
theKGB,theSovietCommitteeforStateSecurity,
whousedcivilinformantsasundercoveragentsto
controlthesocietyanditsmembers’thoughtsand
actions.Itwasalsocommontoensureconformbe-
haviourbythedisseminationofinformationbe-
tweenthepeoplethemselves:Theemployerwasin-
formedofsexuallytransmitteddiseasesoftheem-
ployee,driverscaughtdrunkatthewheelwereis-
suedcarbadgesstartingwiththenumber‘O’,167di-
vorceprocesseswerepublishedinthenewspaper,168
anditwasthedutyoftheso-calledcomrade-courts
establishedineachoffice,collectivefarm,schooland
districttojudgeabouttheinsufficienteducationof
children,improperbehaviourinthefamiliyorcurs-
ingoftheircolleaguesandneighbors.169Itappears
unlikelythatsuchlong-standingpracticesandcultur-
alpecularitieswouldnothaveanyeffectsonthepop-
ulation’sperceptionsconcerningtherighttoprivacy .
Thisunderstandingholdsintheauthor’sviewal-
sotheanswertothequestionsraisedatthebegin-
ningofthisreport:legalregulationsonrights’pro-
tectioninadigitisedcountryarenotaprimarilytech-
nicalquestionthesolutionsofwhichcanbeapplied
incountriesequally .Justasanyothersignificant
question,regulationsareframedbythecountries’his-
158P alomaKrõõtT upay,‘Saeipõgene,vabalaps’(Youcan’tescape,
freechild),EstonianNewspaperPostimees(13November2018)
<https://arvamus.postimees.ee/6452035/paloma-kroot-tupay-sa-ei
-pogene-vaba-laps>.
159StudybytheEstonianInstituteofHumanRights,‘Therightto
privacyasahumanrightandeverydaytechnologies’(2014)
<http://www.eihr .ee/en/privacy-as-a-human-right-and-everyday
-technologies/>.
160ibid:methodologyandresultsofthestudy,48;summary,4.
161ibid4,49.
162HomepageoftheMinistryofDefence, Avalikarvamusriigikait-
sest’(Publicopiniononstatedefence)(autumn2018)<http://
www.kaitseministeerium.ee/et/eesmargid-tegevused/avalik
-arvamus-riigikaitsest>.
163Studyontherighttoprivacyasahumanrightandeveryday
technologies(n166),methodologyandresultsofthestudy,54.
164SeethecriticalstatementofSimonDaviesattheAnnualConference
onHumanRightsinTallinn,Estonia,10December2014,Session1
part5<https://www .youtube.com/watch?v=PiTkSaJpwsw>.
165SeealsoT upayandMikiver31f(n126).
166SeerespectivedataattheStatisticsEstoniahomepage(asof4
April2019)<https://www.stat.ee/pressiteade-2019-007>.
167SeealsoJuhanSepp,‘T ervislikeeluviisidenimelIX’(Inthename
ofhealthylifestyles),EstonianNewspaperNõukogudeÕpetaja
(25April1987)3<https://bit.ly/3eSvUcU>.
168Forthis,seealsothereferralin:T iitHennosteandRoosmarii
Kurvits,‘Eiolemidagiuutpäikeseall’(Nothingnewunderthe
sun)EstonianmagazineSirp(8June2007)<https://sirp.ee/s1
-artiklid/c8-meedia/ei-ole-midagi-uut-p-ikese-all/>.
169SeeKaarelP aas(ed.)‘Eestiseltsimehelikekohtutepõhimäärus.
Kommenteeritudväljaanne’(Commentaryonthebasicregulation
oftheEstoniancomradecourts),Eestiraamat1972.
EDPL|18ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
toricalbackgroundandsociety .Thedevelopmentof
thenotionofprivacyhas,eveninacountryasdigi-
tallyprogressiveasEstonia,notgeneratedacom-
pletelynewunderstandingofprivacy,butratherde-
lineatesanaturalevolutionoftheperceptionofthe
relationshipbetweentheperson’sinformationalself-
determinationandpublicinterestinEstoniaover
time.Anadditionalargumentforalessprivacy-fo-
cusedapproachiscertainlyalsothesimpleconve-
nienceofdigitalpublicadministrationwhowould
notliketopresenthisorhertaxdeclarationwithina
fewminutesandreplacehoursofqueuingattheau-
thoritieswithafewsimplemouse-clicksfromhome?
However,theexampleoftheEstonianregulationon
publicaccesstothelandregistershowsthattheun-
derstandingofdataprotectiondoesbynomeanshave
tomovelinearinthedirectionoflessdataprotection.
Digitisationdoesnotnecessarilymeantheendof
privacyorofself-determinationasitisunderstood
intherespectiveculturalspace.Theperceptionand
extenttowhichthedatahandledbystateauthorities
ismadepubliclyavailable,processedorforwarded,
isaquestionshapedbysocialattitudesanddecided
bytherespectivelawmaker.
AtEUlevel,thereformeddataprotectionlawaims
toconstitutethebasisforacommonunderstanding
ofdataprotectionwithintheUnion.Forthisreason,
thisreportalsoaddresseditsimpactonnationalEs-
tonianlegislationandperceptionwhichhasseen.As
shown,thenewEUdataprotectionlaws’entryinto
forcein2018hasledtoamendmentproposalsand
changesalsoindomesticEstonianlawasaconse-
quence.170Itwillbeofdecisiveimportancetofurther
analyseandcomparetheapplicationofbothregula-
tionsinallEUmemberstates,asinterpretationof
decisiveindeterminatelegalterms,suchas‘public
andlegitimateinterest’ ,andtheimplementationof
EUdataprotectionlawmayvarysignificantly .Atthe
sametime,comparisonandadaptionofthedifferent
nationalunderstandingswillbekeytothebestpos-
sibleimpactofdataprotectionlawintheEU,asthis
ensuresacompromisebasedonallmembersstates’
contributions.
8.TheFutureofDataProtectionin
EstoniaandtheEU
Inviewofthealmostinfiniteincreaseofubiquitous
datahandling,Roßnagelstatedalreadyin2005that
dataprotectionneededanentirelynewapproach.171
Particularlywithregardtotheprinciplesofrequired
consentandpurposelimitationhearguedthatthese
werenotcompatiblewiththeevolutionofdatapro-
cessing.172Asalternativemethodstoensureade-
quatedataprotection,heproposediaabetterand
moretransparenttechnicaldataprotectioncontrol
notonlyatindividual,butalsoinstitutionallevel.173
TheEUlawmakerinturndecidedtomaintainthe
principleofpurposelimitationandthegeneralre-
quirementofconsentalsointhereformedEUdata
protectionlawof2018.174Atthesametime,thepos-
sibilitiestheonce-only’ideaoffersforasimplerand
morecitizen-friendlyprovisionofgovernmentalser-
viceshavenotonlyfoundtheirwayinnationalleg-
islations,175butalsointoEUpolicies.However,un-
liketheEstonianSupremeCourt,theEDPShasnot
acceptedtheeasingofadministrativeburdenandits
increasedefficiencyasajustificationforapossible
limitationofdatasubjectrightsrelatedtothedigiti-
sationofadministrativeprocedures.176Asdatapro-
cessingkeepsexpanding,thereisaconstantneedfor
monitoringandadaptionofdataprotectionregula-
tions.TheEstoniane-statecaninsofarserveasa
‘sandbox’forexploringpossiblenewapproachesand
solutions.177ConsideringEstonia’spositiveexperi-
encewiththeapplicationofthe‘onceonly’principle
inpublicadministration,wherethelawfulnessof
processingisjustifiedbytheprocessor’slegaloblig-
ationandarespectivepublicinterest,itcouldbe
askedifthegeneralnecessityofconsent,aslaiddown
inArticle6(1)(a)GDPR,couldtoabroaderextentbe
substitutedbyasystemenablingtheusertocheckat
anytimewhohasaccessedhisorherdata.AstheEs-
170SeeegIV .2.,3.and4.
171AlexanderRoßnagel,‘ModernisierungdesDatenschutzrechtsfür
eineWeltallgegenwärtigerDatenverarbeitung’(2005)2MMR
71.
172ibid72.
173ibid73ff.
174SeeGDPRart5s1point(c)andart7.Arespectivecritiquecan
befoundat:WinfriedV eil,‘DieDatenschutz-Grundverordnung:
desKaisersneueKleider’(2018)10NVwZ686ff.
175Seeforotherexamples:EuropeanCommission,‘Finalreport:
StudyoneGovernmentandtheReductionofAdministrative
Burden’(2014),highlightingas‘champions’UnitedKingdom,the
NetherlandsandDenmark,IV<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single
-market/en/news/final-report-study-egovernment-and-reduction
-administrative-burden-smart-20120061>.
176CompareII.2.andIV .7.
177Seealso:MartiniandWenzel(n39).
EDPL|19 ReportFullVersion:Estonia,theDigitalNation
toniancaseshows,furtherquestionsarisefromthat.
Oneofthemcomprisesthechallengetobuildasys-
temtransparentenoughtomakeuserstrustthecon-
trolsystemsprovidedbythepublicauthorities.This
includessufficienttransparencyofthetechnological
solutionsusedaswellasabouttheinformationpro-
vided,includinginformationontheexeptionsofdis-
closureofinformation,suchasdatahandlingon
groundsofstateorpublicsecurity.
Anotherchallengearisingfromthedigitalisation
ofpublicadministrationistheoneofadequatere-
sponsibility:Towhatextentshouldthestatebeliable
fordataleaksorthelackofsufficient(data)protec-
tion?178Inprinciple,theGDPRprovidesasystem
thataimstosolvethisquestion.179However,ascan
beseeninthecaseofEstonia,thisdoesnotensure
thatpeoplemakeuseofit.Thegroundsforthatmay
bemanifold,incaseofEstoniapartlyalsocultural,
asthepossibilitytoinvokeone’srightswasnotac-
knowledgedduringSoviettimes.Anyhow ,asweak-
erparty ,theindividualwillgenerallybemorere-
servedtoclaimhisorherrightsvis-à-visthestate.Es-
tonianlawhasalsonot(yet)usedthepossibilitypro-
videdbyArticle80(2)GDPR,whichgivesmember
statesthepossibilitytoregulatenon-profitorganisa-
tions’rightstolodgecollectivecomplaints,iehold
datacontrollersorprocessorsliableindependently
ofarespectivemandatebythedatasubjectcon-
cerned.180Abroaderandsimplersystemofstatelia-
bilityforbreachesoftherighttoprivacyanddata
protectioncouldenhancetheauthorities’effortsto
ensuretheprotectionofdatasubjects’rights.Asthe
Estonianexperienceshows,thestatemaynotalways
bemotivatedtoendthedisproportionalhandlingof
personaldatapromptly .181Atthesametime,person-
aldatathatbecomespublicknowledgehasagreat
impactonthedatasubject’slife.
Withtheadoptionandentryintoforceofthe
GDPR,theEUmemberstateshavedeclaredtheirwill-
ingnesstonotprioritisetechnologyovertheindivid-
ual’srights.However,technologyshouldnotbeseen
asanantipodetopeoples’rights,asatechnological-
lyadvanced,simpleandtransparentsystemofpub-
licadministrationdoesequallyservebetterrights’
protectionandtheirexercise.Constanttechnological
evolutionandthenationallyvaryingunderstanding
oftheGDPRmakethecoordinatedcomparison,
analysisanddevelopmentofdataprotectionlawat
EUlevelapreconditionforaneffectivedataprotec-
tionwithintheUnion.Itisthepresentreport’saim
tocontributetothisprocesswithanoverviewofthe
understandingofdataprotectionwithintheframe-
workoftheEstoniane-state.
178Compareegabove,theEstonianexamplesdescribedinIV .1.and
5.
179CompareGDPRarts77,78,82;seealsoKarinSeinetal.Pil-
guheitandmesubjektiõiguskaitsevahenditeleuuesisikuandmete
kaitseüldmääruses(Aglimpseintothelegalremediesofthe
datasubjectprovidedbythenewgeneralregulationondata
protection)(2018)2Juridica94;interalia,Estoniahas(asof
today)notusedthepossibilitytoexcludeorlimittherightto
imposeadministrativefinesonpublicauthoritiesandbodies,as
foreseeninGDPR,art83s7.
180KarinSeinetal(n187).
181SeeegaboveIV .4.and5.
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The availability of open data has increased dramatically, partly in reaction to several types of government agencies publishing their raw data. Access to and use of open data is not only essential for the development of public policy and delivery of various services, but it is also of eminent value for private (and often economic) purposes. To meet these demands, the availability of open data has increased dramatically both domestically and EU-wide. Nevertheless, it is still access to and use of personal data which is usually in the spotlight of public—and also legal—debates. Contributing to fill this gap, this paper analyses the significance of open data and the resulting challenges imposed by the widespread lack of specific open data policies. The paper also provides an overview of the existing systems used in Estonian governance to ensure access to open information, but also highlights the shortcomings, before it finally makes proposals on how to improve open data disclosure practices in Estonia.
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Mit freundlicher Genehmigung des C.H.Beck-Verlags, München. Allgegenwärtige Datenverarbeitung wird die Verwirklichungsbedingungen für das Grundrecht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung so verändern, dass dessen Schutzprogramm, wie es im geltenden Datenschutzrecht umgesetzt ist, nicht mehr greifen wird. Daher ist es dringend notwendig, dieses Schutzprogramm so fortzuentwickeln, dass es den neuen Risiken gerecht wird. Dies darf jedoch nicht isoliert in eigenen gesetzlichen Vorschriften erfolgen, sondern muss sich einbetten in eine systematische Modernisierung des gesamten Datenschutzrechts. Der Beitrag benennt diese Aufgabe (I.), stellt die neuen Herausforderungen dar (II.) und zeigt, wie eine adäquate Fortentwicklung des Datenschutzrechts möglich wäre (III.).
Andmekaitseseadus võlgades firma juhatust häbipostist ei päästa' (The data protection act does not safe the indebted manager)
  • Erik Rand
Erik Rand, 'Andmekaitseseadus võlgades firma juhatust häbipostist ei päästa' (The data protection act does not safe the indebted manager). Estonian newspaper Ärileht (7 January 2009) <http://arileht.delfi.ee/news/uudised/andmekaitseseadus-volgades -firma-juhatust-habipostist-ei-paasta?id=51154582>.
Legal and ethical aspects for the governmental e-health strategy until 2020' (n 155), 30, referring to: Article 29 Working Party working document on the processing of personal data relating to health in electronic health records
'Legal and ethical aspects for the governmental e-health strategy until 2020' (n 155), 30, referring to: Article 29 Working Party working document on the processing of personal data relating to health in electronic health records (WP 131, 2007), 16 <https://ec .europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion -recommendation/index_en.htm#maincontentSec11>.
158) 5; 'Legal and ethical aspects for the governmental e-health strategy until 2020
See eg WP 131, 2007 (n 158) 5; 'Legal and ethical aspects for the governmental e-health strategy until 2020' (n 155), 27 ff.
Terviseandmete uue riigifirma plaan jõuab valitsusse' (The plan on a new state enterprise for health data heads to the government) (Online portal digigeenius from
  • Hans Lõugas
Hans Lõugas, 'Eesti e-riigi uus suur projekt: hakkame meie rahva terviseandmetega suurt raha tegema' (The Estonian e-state's grand new project: let's make big money with people's health data) (Online portal digigeenius, 8 October 2018) <https://digi.geenius .ee/rubriik/uudis/eesti-e-riigi-uus-suur-projekt-hakkame-meie-rahva -terviseandmetega-suurt-raha-tegema/> and Hans Lõugas, 'Terviseandmete uue riigifirma plaan jõuab valitsusse' (The plan on a new state enterprise for health data heads to the government) (Online portal digigeenius from, 10 October 2018) <https://digi.geenius.ee/ rubriik/uudis/terviseandmete-uue-riigifirma-plaan-jouab-valitsusse/>.
Tervislike eluviiside nimel IX' (In the name of healthy lifestyles
  • See Also
  • Juhan Sepp
See also Juhan Sepp, 'Tervislike eluviiside nimel IX' (In the name of healthy lifestyles), Estonian Newspaper Nõukogude Õpetaja (25 April 1987) 3 <https://bit.ly/3eSvUcU>.
See GDPR art 5 s 1 point (c) and art 7. A respective critique can be found at: Winfried Veil
See GDPR art 5 s 1 point (c) and art 7. A respective critique can be found at: Winfried Veil, 'Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung: des Kaisers neue Kleider' (2018) 10 NVwZ 686 ff.