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Illusory Gender-Equality Paradox, Math Self-Concept, and Frame-of-Reference
Effects: New Integrative Explanations for Multiple Paradoxes
Herbert W. Marsh, Philip D. Parker, Jiesi Guo,
and Geetanjali Basarkod
Australian Catholic University
Christoph Niepel
University of Luxembourg
Brooke Van Zanden
Australian Catholic University
Gender-equality paradoxes (GEPs) posit that gender gaps in math self-concepts (MSCs) are larger—not
smaller—in countries with greater gender equality. These paradoxical results suggest that efforts to improve
gender equality might be counterproductive. However, we show that this currently popular explanation of
gender differences is an illusory, epi-phenomenon (485,490 students, 18,292 schools, 68 countries/regions).
Between-country (absolute) measures of gender equality are confounded with achievement and socioeco-
nomic-status; tiny GEPs disappear when controlling achievement and socioeconomic-status. Critically, even
without controls GEPs are not supported when using true gender-gap measures—within-country (relative)
female-male differences, that hold many confounds constant. This absolute/relative-gap distinction is more
important than the composite/domain-specific distinction for understanding why even tiny GEPs are illusory.
Recent developments in academic self-concept theory are relevant to GEPs and gender differences, but also
explain other, related paradoxes. The big-fish little pond effect posits that attending schools with high
school-average math achievements leads to lower MSCs. Extending this theoretical model to the country-
level, we show that countries with high country-average math achievements also have lower MSCs. Dimen-
sional comparison theory predicts that MSCs are positively predicted by math achievements but negatively
predicted by verbal achievements. Extending this theoretical model, we show that girls’ low MSCs are due
more to girls’ high verbal achievements that detract from their MSCs than to their low math achievements. In
support of the pan-human wide generalizability of our findings, our cross-national results generalize over 68
country/regions as well as multiple math self-belief constructs (self-efficacy, anxiety, interest, utility, future
plans) and multiple gender-equality measures.
Keywords: math self-beliefs, gender differences, gender-equality paradox, cross-national comparisons,
social and dimensional comparison theories
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000306.supp
Gender-equality paradoxes (GEPs) are based on the finding that
gender gaps in math self-concepts (MSCs) are larger—not small-
er—in countries with greater gender-equality; paradoxically, girls
are more disadvantaged in more gender-equal countries (e.g.,
Baker & Jones, 1993;Else-Quest, Hyde, and Linn, 2010;Guo,
Marsh, Parker, & Dicke, 2019;Marsh et al., 2019;Niepel, Stadler,
& Greiff, 2019;Stoet, Bailey, Moore, & Geary, 2016;Stoet &
Geary, 2018). MSC is an important construct that is reciprocally
related to academic achievement, predicts coursework selection
and long-term educational attainment, and contributes to gender
imbalances in STEM disciplines (Marsh, 2007;Marsh et al., 2019;
Möller et al., 2011). Similarly, Charles and Bradley (2009) found
girls’ affinity for math was higher in developing countries than
advanced industrial countries. Support for GEPs (greater disad-
vantage for girls in more gender-equal countries) is not only
paradoxical, but also calls into question international efforts to
enhance gender equality. However, we posit that this GEP is
illusory, an epi-phenomenon, and explore alternative explana-
tions based on how measures of gender equality are constructed,
adding appropriate controls for achievement and socioeconomic
status (SES), and applying recent theoretical advances in aca-
demic self-concept theory.
XHerbert W. Marsh, XPhilip D. Parker, XJiesi Guo, and
XGeetanjali Basarkod, Institute for Positive Psychology and Education
(IPPE), Australian Catholic University; XChristoph Niepel, Department
of Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences, University of Luxembourg;
XBrooke Van Zanden, Institute for Positive Psychology and Education,
Australian Catholic University.
Brooke Van Zanden is now at Graduate School of Health, University of
Technology Sydney.
This research was supported by a grant from the Luxembourg National
Research Fund (FNR) to Christoph Niepel (C16/SC/11333571).
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Herbert
W. Marsh, Institute for Positive Psychology and Education (IPPE), Aus-
tralian Catholic University, Level 10, 33 Berry Street, North Sydney, NSW
2060, Australia. E-mail: Herb.Marsh@acu.edu.au
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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology:
Personality Processes and Individual Differences
© 2020 American Psychological Association
ISSN: 0022-3514 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000306
168
2021, Vol. 121, No. 1, 168–183
This article was published Online First June 11, 2020.