Immanent Reasoning or Equality in Action. A Plaidoyer for the Play Level
Abstract
This monograph proposes a new way of implementing interaction in logic. It also provides an elementary introduction to Constructive Type Theory (CTT). The authors equally emphasize basic ideas and finer technical details. In addition, many worked out exercises and examples will help readers to better understand the concepts under discussion.
One of the chief ideas animating this study is that the dialogical understanding of definitional equality and its execution provide both a simple and a direct way of implementing the CTT approach within a game-theoretical conception of meaning. In addition, the importance of the play level over the strategy level is stressed, binding together the matter of execution with that of equality and the finitary perspective on games constituting meaning.
According to this perspective the emergence of concepts are not only games of giving and asking for reasons (games involving Why-questions), they are also games that include moves establishing how it is that the reasons brought forward accomplish their explicative task. Thus, immanent reasoning games are dialogical games of Why and How.
... There are several ways to define a winning strategy within a Dialogical Framework (Krabbe, 1985;Clerbout, 2014c,b,a;Rahman et al., 2018;Lion, 2023). For the sake of a simple presentation we will offer a variation of Felscher (1985), which can be also found in Redmond and Fontaine's dialogical tables with branches (Redmond and Fontaine, 2011;Piecha, 2015) --Rahman et al. (2018, pp. ...
... There are several ways to define a winning strategy within a Dialogical Framework (Krabbe, 1985;Clerbout, 2014c,b,a;Rahman et al., 2018;Lion, 2023). For the sake of a simple presentation we will offer a variation of Felscher (1985), which can be also found in Redmond and Fontaine's dialogical tables with branches (Redmond and Fontaine, 2011;Piecha, 2015) --Rahman et al. (2018, pp. 90-109 describe a method for finding a winning strategy out of a succession of plays. ...
... As pointed out by Clerbout and McConaughey (2022), the development of the Dialogical Framework experiences currently a thriving interest especially in the field of argumentation theory (Gethmann, 1982;Barth and Krabbe, 1982;Walton, 1984;Johnson, 1999;Woods and Walton, 1989;Woods et al., 2002;van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004;Prakken, 2005;Vaidya, 2013;Dutilh Novaes, 2015Dutilh Novaes and French, 2018;French, 2019), history and philosophy of logic and mathematics (Ebbinghaus, 1964;Mittelstrass, 1966, 1967;Miller, 2020;Keffer, 2001;Yrjönsuuri, 2001;Hintikka, 2006;Dutilh Novaes, 2007;Castelnérac and Marion, 2009;Crubellier, 2011;Clerbout et al., 2011;Marion and Rückert, 2015;Gorisse, 2017Gorisse, , 2018Crubellier et al., 2019;Uckelman, 2013;Young, 2016Young, , 2022McConaughey, 2021;Iqbal, 2022), non-classical logics (Rahman and Rückert, 1999;Keiff, 2007Keiff, , 2010Rückert, 2011), computer science (Blass, 1992;Lecomte and Quatrini, 2011a,b;Fermüller, 2003), applied linguistics, legal reasoning, artificial intelligence and game theory (Ranta, 1988(Ranta, , 1994Hintikka, 1996;Hintikka and Sandu, 1997;Prakken, 2005;Ginzburg, 2012). In the present paper we will focus on the deployment of the Dialogical Framework within Per Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory (CTT) (Martin-Löf, 2015, 2019aKlev, 2022, 202x;Rahman et al., 2018), which takes anew one of the initial motivations of the dialogical logic, namely the constructivist foundations of mathematics and logic (Beth, 1955;Coquand, 1995;Felscher, 1985;Sørensen and Urzyczyn, 2006;Alama et al., 2011;Uckelman, 2013;Sterling and Angiuli, 2021). ...
The present contribution delves into a recent development of the dialogical rules for proof-theory penned by Ansten Klev that arose from Per Martin-Löf's take on assertoric knowledge as involved in the correctness criterion for assertion. The main aim of our paper is to set out the central steps towards a new Dialogical Framework called Immanent Reasoning II, which on the one hand integrates some of the CTT-rules developed by Klev, but on the other, develops further the general tenets of the dialogical perspective on meaning and logic. In contrast to Klev's approach, IR-II contains rules that indicate how to develop plays and winning strategies for a thesis.
... En efecto, la proposición atraviesa la mayoría de los problemas filosóficos más relevantes, como los problemas de la verdad, del conocimiento a priori, la validez y la consecuencia, entre otros. Analizamos entonces este problema a partir del marco teórico semántico propuesto por Shahid Rahman (2014Rahman ( , 2012Rahman ( , 1993Rahman et al., 2018;Rahman y Keiff, 2010), que es uno de los desarrollos actuales más importantes del enfoque dinámico de teoría de juegos y que conlleva una propuesta filosófica interesante. ...
... Vincent, 2014), pasando por el razonamiento lógico indio, griego y árabe, hasta la lógica medieval y de los desarrollos más contemporáneos en la teoría informática y la lingüística computacional o aplicada (cfr. Rahman, 2014;Rahman et al., 2018). Además, se han desarrollado estudios relacionados con la inteligencia artificial, las ciencias sociales y el razonamiento jurídico (cfr. . ...
... En efecto, el enfoque dialógico entiende que el razonamiento y el significado se constituyen a través de la interacción. Rahman (2018 desarrolla esta idea dentro de la TCT de Martin-Löf (1984) y sostiene que de este modo emerge una nueva concepción de conocimiento que posee una relación significativa con el inferencialismo pragmático de Brandom (1994de Brandom ( , 2000. De hecho, M. Marion (2006Marion ( , 2009Marion ( , 2010 fue el primero en proponer un vínculo entre el infe-rencialismo pragmático de Brandom y la lógica dialógica en el contexto de ataques de W. Hod-ges (2001) para los enfoques teóricos de los juegos. ...
The aim of this paper is to propose the notion of dialogical assertion as a minimal unit of knowledge in the frame of dialogical pragmatism. We argue that this minimal unity is the dialogue for the p thesis, accompanied by its game of giving and asking for reasons (Play-Level) for a winning strategy for the proponent. Thereby, we explore the problem from the semantic framework proposed by Shahid Rahman to present a dialogical definition of that concept. Furthermore, we show how the notion of proposition ceases to be the primordial logical concept and how it is replaced by the notion of assertion as an act in the process of a dialogue game and following the fundamental insights of Brandom (1994, 2000) and Martin-Löf (1984). This pragmatic approach to logic will abandon the idea that the proposition is the minimum logical unit of true knowledge.
... In this section I will explain how the formal system works clearly and briefly. A complete exposition of the formalism can be found in Rahman et al. (2018). ...
... 1 Chapter 2 of Rahman et al. (2018) may also serve as a proper presentation of CTT. For a more complete and historical exposition the reader is referred to Kamareddine, Laan & Nederpelt (2004). ...
Las leyes de la lógica no pueden adoptarse, tal como sostiene el problema de la adopción de Kripke y Padró. Su argumento puede interpretarse como una invitación a revisar la forma en que relacionamos la lógica con la práctica inferencial: la primera no viene antes, sino después de la segunda. En este artículo profundizo en esta conclusión mostrando cómo la imposibilidad de la adopción puede ser asociada muy naturalmente con algunas características de immanent reasoning, un cruce entre la lógica de diálogos y la teoría intuicionista de tipos que incorpora elementos pragmáticos en el corazón de su formalismo. La observación más importante de esta aproximación es que la adopción, aunque todavía imposible, ya no es necesaria; y, por lo tanto, el “problema” deja de ser “problemático”. Esto ilustra algunas de las ventajas de favorecer una aproximación lúdico-teórica a la semántica de la lógica filosófica.
... 7 Miller (1984) is one of the first to mention the dialogical framework of Lorenzen/Lorenz (1978) as a suitable approach for the study of Islamic argumentation. The dialogical approach to CTT is called Immanent Reasoning, see Rahman/McConaughey/Klev/Clerbout (2018). In fact there is ongoing work on deploying the dialogical setting in order to reconstruct logical traditions in ancient philosophy (see Castelnérac/Marion (2009), Marion/Rückert (2015), Crubellier/McConaughey/Marion/Rahman (2019). ...
... 34 . We invite the reader to visit the chapter on material dialogues in Rahman/McConaughey/ Klev/Clerbout (2018), where discuss material dialogues that include sets of natural numbers and the set . 32 Krabbe (1985, p. 297 ...
The present file constitutes the preface and conclusion of the book
Inferences by Parallel Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence. Al-Shīrāzī’s Insights into the Dialectical Constitution of Meaning and Knowledge. With Muhammad Iqbal and Youcef Soufi. Forthcoming in Springer.
It is fairly self-contained and the conclusion shows how schemas for legal reasoing of medieval Islam can contribute to the understanding of contemporary reasoning. We briefly disccuss there Alchourron' take on analogy, and Brewer (1996) and Woods (2015) on analogy In Common Law.
... 18 . We invite the reader to visit the chapter on material dialogues in Rahman/McConaughey/ Klev/Clerbout (2018), where discuss material dialogues that include sets of natural numbers and the set . ...
... In fact, the present paper relies heavily on the main technical and philosophical results of Rahman/McConaugey/Klev/Clerbout (2018). However, some important modifications have been introduced, particularly in the conception of strategic objects. ...
Prerprint to a chapter of the book in print by X. Weiss. "Constructive Semantics. Meaning in between Phenomenology and Constructivis". Springer in print. The main aim of the present paper is to show that, if we follow the dialogical insight that reasoning and meaning are constituted during interaction, and we develop this insight in a dialogical framework for Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory, a conception of knowledge emerges that has important links with Robert Brandom's (1994, 2000) inferential pragmatism. However, there are also some significant differences that are at center of the dialogical approach to meaning. The present paper does not discuss explicitly phenomenology, however, one might see our proposal as setting the basis for a further study linking phenomenology and the dialogical conception of meaning-the development of such a link is part of several ongoing researches.
... For this approach to the justification of surrogative reasoning, we will consider as a basis the standard dialogic but with an enriched version of the particle rules from Constructive Type Theory (Martin-Löf, 1984;Rahman et al., 2018). The new element to consider in these rules is the expression 'a:A' which means that player X possesses a proof 'a' of A. The justification for using this basic notion of Constructive Type Theory derives from the need to think in terms of proofs. ...
The aim of this paper is to propose a logical justification for the process of surrogate reasoning in modeling practice in science. To this end, we understand hypothesis generation as the creation of an interactive, formal dialogue between the model and the target system. In order to describe this idea from a logical point of view, we will rely on the pragmatic approach of Dialogic as the ideal framework to illustrate logical interactions.
... More recently Rahman and his team of Lille, in order to develop dialogues with "content" they enriched the dialogical framework with fully interpreted languages (as implemented within Per Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory). They call it "Immanent Reasoning" (Rahman/McConaughey/Klev/Clerbout (2018)). One of the chief ideas animating Immanent Reasoning is that the origin of concepts is rooted not only in games of giving and asking for reasons (games involving Why-questions), but also in games that include moves establishing how it is that the reasons brought forward accomplish their explicative task. ...
Alejandro Cassini analyzes how highly idealized theoretical models can be deidealized. He argues that idealized models are built with a definite purpose and for that reason, the advantages and disadvantages of idealizing depend essentially on the specific purpose for which a given model is designed. As a consequence, even when deidealization may be feasible, a cost–benefit analysis may suggest avoiding it. He exemplifies those circumstances with a study of deidealized models of the Solar System and physical pendula. He concludes that deidealization has not to be conceived of as an end in itself, or as aiming at a veridical representation of the phenomena, but rather as a means to other ends, such as obtaining better explanations or predictions, or more generally, improving the expediency of our models to solve the problems that originated their construction.
... eRahman and Keiff (2010).Fiutek et al (2010) study the dialogical approach to belief revision.Clerbout et al (2011) studied Jain Logic in the dialogical framework.Popek (2012, pp. 223-244) develops a dialogical reconstruction of medieval obligationes. See also Magnier (2013) -on dynamic epistemic logic and legal reasoning in a dialogical framework.Rahman et al (2018) studied Immanent reasoning or equality in action. ...
This article aims to present a Free Dialogic Logic [FDL] as a general framework for hypothesis generation in the practice of modelling in science. Our proposal is based on the idea that the inferential function that models fulfil during the modelling process (surrogate reasoning) should be carried out without ontological commitments. The starting point to achieve our objective is that the scientific consideration of models without a target is a symptom that, on the one hand, the Applicability of Logic should be considered among the conditions of adequacy that should take into account all modeling process and, on the other, that the inferential apparatus at the base of the surrogate reasoning process must be rid of realistic assumptions that lead to erroneous conclusions. In this sense, we propose as an alternative an ontologically neutral inferential system in the perspective of dialogical pragmatism.
... En lógica y filosofía la noción de proposición ha tenido aquí un papel central, especialmente para el análisis de argumentos ya que hace referencia directa a la relación que existe entre los argumentos informales, del lenguaje natural u ordinario, y su reconstrucción en argumentos de los lenguajes formales. A su vez, esta cuestión nos remite a la pregunta acerca de cuál es la clase de ítem del que debe ocuparse primeramente la lógica, y que ha sido ampliamente tratado desde una perspectiva sintáctica o semántica, y sólo muy recientemente desde una perspectiva pragmática (Haack 1991;Rahman et al. 2018). La pregunta por la proposición nos lleva a revisar las distintas interpretaciones que se han dado del concepto de proposición, su función y aserción en los diferentes enfoques de la lógica. ...
El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo explorar brevemente la noción de proposición lógica de Bernard Bolzano como concepción originaria de este concepto de la lógica moderna y como fundamental para las nociones de verdad y juicio. Las ideas de este matemático y filósofo fueron, sin duda, muy influyentes para las teorías lógicas del significado que le precedieron.
In several texts, some authored by himself alone and some in collaboration, N. D. Belnap proposed a pragmatist approach to predictions and further speech acts such as promising, betting, and wondering, in an indeterministic setting within a branching structure that shapes the future course of events. In the joint paper “Future Contingents and the Battle Tomorrow”, M. Perloff and N. D. Belnap discuss Aristotle’s famous example in the context of STIT-logic. In particular, the paper studies the pragmatics of predictions of future contingents under the background of the 480 BCE battle of Salamis: the general commanding the Greek Athenian fleet predicts that a battle will be fought on the sea while the Spartan general denies it. According to Perloff and Belnap’s analysis, this kind of prediction is neither true nor necessary at the moment of utterance, but can be vindicated or impugned, retrospectively. The central thought of the present paper is that vindication is a dialogical process associated to statements made. In the particular case that the statement expresses a prediction, the dialogical process involves plays on the settled past truth of the predicted contingent future. This way of analysing Tomorrow’s Sea Battle highlights the interplay of the ontological perspective and the linguistic perspective, where vindication or impugnment of the predictions are under scrutiny.
The present contribution delves into a recent development of the dialogical rules for type theory penned by Ansten Klev that arose from Per Martin-Löf’s take on assertoric knowledge as involved in the correctness criterion for assertion. The main aim of our paper is to set out the central steps towards a new Dialogical Framework called Immanent Reasoning II, which on the one hand integrates some of the CTT-rules developed by Klev, but on the other, develops further the general tenets of the dialogical perspective on meaning and logic. In contrast to Klev’s approach, IR-II contains rules that indicate how to develop plays and winning strategies for a thesis.
The last decade has seen a resurgence of interest in the use of higher-order logics in metaphysics. Characteristic of this trend is the use of higher-order languages to formulate metaphysical views and arguments. We call such uses of higher-order logic in metaphysics “higher-order metaphysics”. Often, higher-order quantifiers are used to formalize talk of propositions, properties and relations. This is the first volume of papers on this field, comprising 17 new essays by many of the leading contributors. The articles in this volume introduce and motivate higher-order metaphysics, discuss different choices of higher-order languages and logics, apply higher-order logic to a number of central metaphysical topics, discuss the history of higher-order logic in metaphysics, and debate the arguments for and against using higher-order logic in metaphysics.
The aim of our paper is to present the Constructive Type Theory(CTT) and some related concepts of the Swedish logician Per Martin Löf, who constructed a formal logic system in order to establish a philosophical foundation of constructive mathematics. He tried to overcome the deficiencies of the various theories constructed to solve a problematic of set theory, which is: Does the class of all classes is a member of itself or not? Among them Russell's Type Theory, which is founded on the concept of type, despite its imperfections and criticisms, opened the way to others theories like the Alonzo Church's one which is based on function not on set, and built what we call Lambda Calculus in 1930. These theories were the origin of Constructive Type theory and its basic concepts: type, proposition, judgment, proof…etc.
There is a broad debate in contemporary philosophy of logic on the informativeness of proofs. In this context, informative proofs are demonstrations whose premises do not include the content of the conclusion. D’Agostino and Floridi (Synthese 167(2):271–315, 2009) claimed that proofs are informative if they use virtual information. In their terminology, this is the data carried by dischargeable hypotheses, assumptions entertained during proof and eliminated before concluding. Although these authors capture several cases of informative demonstrations, they do not explain the nature of virtual information. Why does the use of dischargeable hypotheses increase the informativeness of a demonstration? Following a Kantian inspiration, D’Agostino and Floridi claim that virtual information adds a synthetic feature to our proofs. However, this appeal to Kantianism is misleading: for Kant, mathematics is synthetic because it requires the construction of concepts in pure intuition. On the other hand, the entertainment of provisional hypotheses does not seem to involve the construction of figures in (transcendental) imagination. Exploring a dialogical characterization of logic, I suggest that virtual information results from the dynamics between a reasoner and her audience. When a reasoner provisionally assumes P, she enacts potential interlocutors who commit to P. Thus, “virtual information” denotes the content of some assumptions of the possible audience of a demonstration. This process of departing from one’s original premises to embrace the suppositions of other people is informative, but it is not synthetic: in this way, the reasoner does not entertain intuitions but only needs to reason through the conceptual content of other people’s premises.
In this essay I propose two theories of truth and show how they deal with semantic paradoxes. Their most salient feature is that they are based on a gametheoretic understanding of logic and meaning. “Truth”, therefore, is understood dialogically, as agreement between parts. I compare this proposal with a similar one already existing in the literature —Dutilh Novaes and French 2018—, and highlight the advantages of mine. The theories of truth I present are non-trivial, substructural (in a sense to be clarified) and capture strong intuitions about truth. Some philosophical recommendations in favor of our understanding of Dialogics are delivered along the way.
Eric Weil theorizes violence, what violence means to his theory, and how his manner of theorizing violence throws down a challenge which philosophy must answer if it wants to be comprehensive and reasonable. He shows how violence bookends reason, understood as coherent discourse in situation, and how violence is fundamentally entangled with language since both are the concrete expressions of human spontaneity. This, I argue, forces us to re-examine the rational tradition that characterizes the human individual as a reasonable animal. For Weil, the individual can be reasonable, but only because they can also be unreasonable, because they can refuse the normative weight that reasonable discourse places upon individuals. In other words, this normative weight holds only as long as individuals see themselves as submitted to it. This leads us to read the Logic of Philosophy as a theory of argumentation. What is meant by this?
El filósofo persa Mullâ Ṣadrâ (1571- 1635) realizó una obra filosófica enmarcada en el concepto de wuyûd, que denota existencia o Ser. En sus textos, como en el de otros filósofos islámicos, se daba una connotación superlativa al concepto de wuyûd con el uso del elativo o âf ‘alu tafdzîl en árabe. El uso de este elativo se corresponde a una afirmación que remarca el estatus ontológico del Ser. A partir de un análisis a dos fragmentos de las obras de Mullâ Ṣadrâ “Aš-šawâhid ar-rubûbiyya” y “Kitâb al-mašâˁir” se realizará un estudio comparado del uso del elativo desde la lógica de predicados manejada por el lógico alemán Kai Borrmann y la Teoría Constructiva de Tipos (TCT) utilizada por el lógico indio-argentino Shahid Rahman.
In Islamic jurisprudence qiyās or correlational inference is a pattern of reasoning applied in order to establish the legal validity of a ruling when this ruling is neither literally nor evidently sanctioned by the scriptural sources. This pattern of reasoning is one of the forms ijitihād can take and it assumes that legal knowledge is achieved by rational endeavour, the intellectual effort of human beings. This elucidates the meaning of the word “fiqh”, Islamic law/jurisprudence, which literally means “deep understanding”.
As pointed out in the introduction, our study on Arsyad al-Banjari’s qiyās is based on the systems of qiyās and its interface with jadal theory as developed by al-Shīrāzī in his work. For that purpose, we employ an analysis that is based on a dialectical framework. However, we are not claiming that the framework we propose in the present study is either a literal description or a complete formalization of the jadal disputation form in which the qiyās is carried out.
As already discussed, correlational inferences by indication (qiyās al-dalāla) and resemblance (qiyās al-shabah), sometimes broadly referred to as arguments by analogy (or better by the Latin denomination arguments a pari), are put into action when there is absence of knowledge of the occasioning factor grounding the application of a given ruling. These forms of qiyās relate the branch-case to the root-case by developing a parallel reasoning based on some kind of similarity. However, though both qiyās al-dalāla and qiyās al-shabah are based on establishing resemblance, the notion of resemblance deployed by qiyās al-dalāla is quite different from that one deployed by qiyās al-shabah. Thus, before developing a dialogical framework for these forms of correlational inferences, we should first examine the notion of resemblance employed by each of these forms.
Ibn Ḥazm of Córdoba’s (994–1064) defence of logic has lasting consequences for the logic of norms. His book Facilitating the Understanding of the Rules of Logic and Introduction Thereto, with Common Expressions and Juristic Examples is a demonstration of how Aristotelian logic may be applied in the religious sciences, especially law. Among other things, he thoroughly investigates deontic notions and their modal counterparts, assuring him a place among the fathers of the logic of norms. The basic units of Islamic deontic logic qualify the performance of actions as subject to either reward, or sanction, or neither; and they might therefore be called, indulging in terminological anachronism, heteronomous imperatives. With remarkable insight, Ibn Ḥazm pairs these with the natural modalities of necessity, possibility, and impossibility. Employing some features of Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory (CTT) to shape the logic of heteronomous imperatives thus emerging from Ibn Ḥazm’s insights, the authors formulate a new approach to the logical analysis of deontic categories.KeywordsArabic logicHeteronomous imperativeIbn ḤazmDeontic logicIslamic jurisprudence
This article intends to approach a structure for representing analogical reasoning in law by utilising the constructive type-theoretical framework developed by Per Martin-Löf, called immanent reasoning. This is done by taking the formulation of legal conditionals to represent the notion of a case and by embedding one formulation inside another, we can represent the dependency that we find of the decision of the target case on the decision in the source cases. This representation enables us to include the condition of efficiency that we want to impose on analogical reasoning. By using such formulation, we can represent not only the dependency of a certain analogical decision, but also use it to describe how different situations in the source cases can have different legal consequences in the target case.
In this article we give an overview, from a philosophical point of view, of Lorenzen’s construction of the natural and the real numbers. Particular emphasis is placed on Lorenzen’s classification in the tradition of predicative approaches that stretches from Poincaré to Feferman.
This paper will examine an important group of illegitimate moves involving causal properties as identified by Medieval Muslim jurists in the intertwined domains of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and dialectic (jadal). More precisely, we will focus on discussions around the dialectical objection called kasr, or “breaking,” which deliberate the proper and improper paths to challenging and defending a correlational argument (qiyās) in which the ratio legis (ʿilla) of the source-case’s ruling is a compound of two or more properties. In the present study, we will therefore restrict our analyses to the relevant discussions of two 11th century CE theorists: the renowned Shāfiʿī jurist Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083) and his equally prominent one-time pupil, the Mālikī jurist Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 1081), who each elaborated two main pathways to “breaking” an opponent’s compound ʿilla. Moreover, we will confront the fallacious modes they denounce with forms of deontic paradoxes and puzzles which we group under the name logical extrapolation fallacy. Our primary claim is that whereas logical extrapolation produces fallacies or paradoxes by unsafely applying inference rules of standard alethic and/or logical necessity to the deontic realm, the fallacies generated by invalid modes of kasr in Islamic legal theory (wherein logical rules are expressed dialectically) constitute a genuine source for reflecting on what patterns of reasoning should be endorsed for determining causality in Law—and, perhaps, more generally, also for establishing causality in certain natural (as opposed to normative) epistemological contexts. Translations of the original Arabic sources relevant to this study are included in an appendix. Ultimately, the current paper is the first step towards a larger study of kasr, which will encompass both a comparison between kasr and other dialectical objections and analyses of critical discourses from later Muslim legal theorists and dialecticians.
Juan Redmond presents an inferential conception of scientific representation based on the ludic perspective of dialogical pragmatism. He conceives of his proposal as an answer to the question “How models are used to represent the world?” Consequently, he lines up with the host of pragmatic approaches that stress the importance of the notion of use and users for representing and modeling. The main point of his proposal is that users or agents use models to represent their targets doing inferences concerning those targets on the basis of reasoning dialogically about the models.
How to interpret singular terms in fiction? In this paper, we address this semantic question from the perspective of the Artifactual Theory of Fiction (ATF). According to the ATF, fictional characters exist as abstract artifacts created by their author, and preserved through the existence of copies of an original work and a competent readership. We pretend that a well-suited semantics for the ATF can be defined with respect to a modal framework by means of Hintikka’s world lines semantics. The question of the interpretation of proper names is asked in relation to two inference rules, problematic when applied in intensional contexts: the Substitution of Identicals and Existential Generalization. The former fails because identity is contingent. The latter because proper names are not necessarily linked to well-identified individuals. This motivates a non-rigid interpretation of proper names in fiction, although cross-fictional reference (e.g. to real entities) is made possible by the interpretative efforts of the reader.
The main aim of the present paper is to show that the recently developed dialogical approach to Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory (CTT), called Immanent Reasoning, provides the means for distinguishing François Recanati’s process of free enrichment and saturation, meets his own objections against perspectives based on unarticulated constituents and opens a new venue to pragmatic modulation, where the speaker-receiver interaction is integrated into the notion of enrichment. In such a setting enrichment operates on proof-objects that make fully articulated event-propositions true. The point is that distinguishing what makes a proposition true from the proposition made true offers a simple and clean way to avoid conflating the contextual elements that enrich a proposition with the proposition itself. Such a framework abounds in means for expressing reference structures such as anaphora, including time and/or location reference. Furthermore, the notion of dependent types of CTT (absent in Montague-style semantics) and the associated formation rules allow for a straightforward analysis of composition of meaning at work in Recanati’s cases concerning occasion meaning as determined by context. The brand of dialogical contextualism, grounded on the play-level (where propositional content is not necessarily truth-conditional), advocated herewith is not a form of propositional syncretism. The framework offers a straightforward response to the failure of third excluded in some instances of faultless disagreement without giving up the notion of propositional content. More generally, this suggests an alternative way to tackle the interface pragmatics semantics underlying the notion of pragmatic modulation by integrating into the interface the dialogical game of asking and giving reasons.
Mirativity is a grammatical category or a linguistic strategy that makes explicit the surprising aspect of a piece of information. Different mirativity strategies appear in different languages. Evidentiality is a grammatical category that explicitly expresses the source of information, i.e. if something has been seen, heard or inferred. Whether mirativity forms part of evidentiality is an open question. An agent makes use of a mirativity marker when she or he expresses something about a surprising fact with respect to her or his background knowledge. But there are different kinds of mirativity markers. Some of them are simple and direct and others, more complex, involve inferential processes. Here, we focus on complex mirativity and we compare it with inferred evidentials and deferred realizations. Our proposal goes beyond the purely linguistic analysis, since we try to interpret mirativity, and its role in interaction, as forming part of or involving a particular kind of inference, namely abduction. Mirativity can be used to express the surprising state that triggers an abductive reasoning but it can also encapsulate its result in such a way that it can be understood in relation to evidentiality. Thus, at least in some cases of complex mirativity, mirativity may convey indication about the source of information. Interesting for studies on dialogue is that they also indicate the degree of commitment of the speakers with the content of their own utterances.
We argue that the recent developments of the dialogical framework towards the incorporation of materiality within dialogues certainly enables one to extend its possible applications beyond the domain of logic. We ask the question of linking Bakhtin’s criticism of literary formalism, based on advocating dialogical features within novels, and the dialogical sight on formalism, in order to assess the program of constituting a dynamical formalism as a means towards literary analysis, enabling to speak of subjectivity without falling into psychologism. By the way, we propose a dialogical reading of the alleged non constructivity of Kripke’s schema in (Sundholm Constructivity and computability in historical and philosophical perspective, logic, epistemology, and the unity of science. Springer, Dordrecht, 2015) and we indicate a new path towards another understanding of its constructive content.
The Talking-Tree or Palaver Tree (Arbre à palabres) is a designated location (originally a large ancestral tree such as the baobab, but it can also be a grave) in many African traditions where the community comes together to discuss, in a peaceful and constructive manner, issues of common interest. It is conceived as an open gathering space of interactive communication led by the stance that finding a compromise or common solution is the best way to consolidate a community. At times, the interchange taking place at a Talking-Tree may also transform into conflict management. Conflict management unfolds into several specific patterns of argumentation including those that aim at deciding if some given accusation is justified or not. The main aim of this chapter is to study, within the Baule tradition of Talking-Tree debates involving accusations of wrongdoing, the meaning explanation underlying proverbs (nyanndra), which constitute the most fundamental elements of these debates. More precisely our study, based on a pragmatic approach to meaning, will focus on the distinction drawn by linguist Kouadio (2012) between ascertainment, (epistemo)logical and moral Baule proverbs by distinguishing their different role in a Talking-Tree debate. One of the main results of our approach is that it makes it patent that drawing a conclusion from a Talking-Tree debate is grounded on contentual functional links, rather than on the analysis of logical constants. This research should set the basis for a larger epistemological research on the structure of argumentation patterns born and developed in Africa, where meaning and knowledge are constituted during dialogical interaction. The dialogical system underlying such form of argumentation, that we call Dialogues of functional reasoning by proverbs, we think provides a general instrument for the study of patterns of argumentation beyond the African tradition.
Employing Constructive Type Theory (CTT), we provide a logical analysis of Ibn Sīnā’s descriptional propositions. Compared to its rivals, our analysis is more faithful to the grammatical subject-predicate structure of propositions and can better reflect the morphological features of the verbs (and descriptions) that extend time to intervals (or spans of times). We also study briefly the logical structure of some fallacious inferences that are discussed by Ibn Sīnā. The CTT-framework makes the fallacious nature of these inferences apparent.
Traditionally, dialogue has been conceived as communicative interaction
that consists of turn-taking, alternating roles and face-to-face
communication. New forms of digital communication require a revision
of this definition. The fact that the interlocutors are not physically present,
the extent to which they know each other and the potential multiplicity by
creating virtual identities generates a rhetoric whose content is sometimes
difficult to retrieve. This work uses the Conversation Analysis methods to
describe these “electronic conversations” to determine whether they follow
the prototypical structures and functioning of dialogue, and the strategies
used by interlocutors to achieve their effectiveness
Most of the standard approaches consider abduction in terms of a backward reasoning and miss some of its fundamental features. Overall, they neglect its pragmatic dimension and the conjectural aspect of the conclusion. In this paper, we approach abduction in terms of strategic adjustment process in the context of dialogical logic. This sheds light on the use of conjectures in argumentative interactions. Although abductive dialogues are sometimes based upon sentential conjectures, they can also involve hypotheses about the context of argumentation itself. Indeed, the underlying logic of an argumentative interaction is not always settled since the beginning. In this context, abduction is not only concerned with the introduction of sentential hypotheses, but also with hypotheses concerning the structural rules governing the dialogue itself. We thus emphasize the instrumental dimension of abduction in dialogues.
Aim of this article is to develop a Free Dialogic Logic (FDL) that offers the necessary conditions to address the difficulties that present targetless models. Our proposal is fully developed in the ludic approach of Dialogical Pragmatism and allow to understand inferences as flow of information without ontological commitments. A central point of our work is the defense of what we will call "the applicability of logic". We are going to defend that this is a condition of adequacy that must be considered in conjunction with the function of substitute reasoning that models fulfill. In particular, in the case of targetless models, the applicability of the logic chosen for the substitute reasoning will determine the success of the practice of proposing hypotheses on the target system from M. In our logic we are going to develop particle and structural rules to elaborate a ludic semantics where targetless models are considered as symbolic entities. Introduction The objective of our work is to propose a Free Dialogic Logic (FDL henceforth) that addresses the problems that arise when we must infer from models that are substitutes for targets whose existence is contestable. If a model M should allow us to generate hypotheses about their target systems (Surrogate Reasoning), it can only be done from a notion of inference that is not committed ontologically. In other words, the question that guides our work is which is the most adequate inference notion for the function of Surrogate Reasoning that fulfills M when there is no target system that corresponds to what is represented by M (Targetless)? Our general answer, on the one hand, consists in proposing Dialogic as a dynamic and interactive frame appropriate for the study of the modeling process in terms of flows of information; on the other hand, within this frame, we developed a FDL as a proof system without ontological commitments, suitable for Targetless cases.
The present chapter examines al-Shīrāzī’s classification of correlational inferences by indication (qiyās al-dalāla) and resemblance (qiyās al-shabah) based on pinpointing specific relevant parallelisms between rulings or resemblances between properties. These forms of inferences, sometimes broadly referred to as arguments by analogy (or better by the Latin denomination arguments a pari) are put into action when there is absence of knowledge of the occasioning factor grounding the application of a given ruling. These forms of correlational inferences should make the process of transferring the relevant juridical ruling from the root-case to the branch-case plausible. The plausibility of a conclusion attained by parallelism between rulings (qiyās al-dalāla) is considered to be of a higher epistemic degree than the conclusion obtained by resemblances based on sharing properties (qiyās al-shabah). Conclusions obtained by either qiyās al-dalāla or qiyās al-shabah have a lower degree of epistemic plausibility than conclusions inferred by the deployment of qiyās al-‘illa.
The main aim of the present chapter is to provide a systematic overview on the dialogical framework called Immanent Reasoning. Moreover, we would like to suggest that, if we follow the dialogical insight that reasoning and meaning are constituted during interaction, and we develop this insight in a dialogical framework for Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory, a conception of knowledge emerges that has important links with Walter Young’s (2017) concept of Dialectical Forge in the context of Islamic Law. Moreover, both the dialogical approach and the Dialectical Forge seem to be close to Robert Brandom’s (1994, 2000) inferential pragmatism. The content of the present chapter is basically the same as in Rahman (2019).
One of the epistemological results emerging from the present study is that the different forms of correlational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās, represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning that not only provides new epistemological insights into legal reasoning in general but also furnishes a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning which can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical argumentation studied in contemporary philosophy of science.
Now anthologized in my new book Experience and the Ultimate Structure of Reality, Husserl's Pursuit of Truth (London: College Publications 2024). What follows is about Husserl, whose phenomenology, I believe, can be understood as a form of constructivism. However, I generally write about Husserl’s philosophy of logic and mathematics, which he repeatedly said had nothing to do with transcendental phenomenology. So, my aim here is to discuss some things that I believe people interested in constructivism and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology need to keep in mind. I say that, despite appearances, phenomenology was not everything for Husserl. As much as he loved it, he placed definite limits on what one should do with it and believed that it required an objective complement in the form of pure logic, that it had to be subject to a priori laws to keep phenomenologists from falling into psychologism, naturalism, empiricism, relativism and associated evils. According to this interpretation, Husserl the possible constructivist, Husserl the phenomenologist, Husserl the Platonist, Husserl the realist, Husserl the idealist were one and the same person from the late 1890s until his death, something which is particularly well expressed in the volumes of his lecture courses published since the 1980s, which shed considerable light on his thought.
The present paper aims at integrating the phenomenological reading of Brouwerian intuitionism into the domain of semantics, by challenging the claim that the very meaning of mathematical expressions—expressions of free choice sequences included—is invariable and objectively determinable and that, accordingly, any deictic expression should be removed from mathematics. By introducing constructability into the constitution of meaning itself and by considering meaning as a “social act”, we try to map another route into intersubjectivity, based on the distinction between the play-level and the strategic level, which has been further developed in the dialogical framework, following the work of Paul Lorenzen. It is suggested that the steps towards such a route can be retraced from Oskar Becker’s original “Cartesian” approach to intersubjectivity, which facilitates a new reading of Brouwer’s own way of conceptualizing “mutual understanding”. In doing so, our general purpose is therefore to promote an insertion of dialogical constructivism into Mark van Atten’s take on the intuitionist Creating Subject.
The main aim of the present paper is to show that, if we follow the dialogical insight that reasoning and meaning are constituted during interaction, and we develop this insight in a dialogical framework for Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory, a conception of knowledge emerges that has important links with Robert Brandom’s (1994, 2000) inferential pragmatism. However, there are also some significant differences that are at center of the dialogical approach to meaning. The present paper does not discuss explicitly phenomenology, however, one might see our proposal as setting the basis for a further study linking phenomenology and the dialogical conception of meaning—the development of such a link is part of several ongoing researches.
Argumentamos que ningún intento de reducir el significado a un conjunto sistemático de reglas, según el cual el papel de las expresiones lingüísticas debe definirse normativamente, puede abstraerse de un compuesto irreductiblemente decisional. Comparando el proyecto de Lorenzen de construir un lenguaje ortodoxo (Orthosprache) con el enfoque inferencialista de Brandom sobre el significado, distinguimos aquí dos formas de reconocer este hecho. Afirmaremos entonces que el enfoque de Lorenzen es más genuinamente constructivo, en la medida en que las elecciones se consideran características genuinas de las construcciones. Esto nos llevará a una nueva perspectiva de la relación entre el constructivismo dialógico y el intuicionismo de Brouwer. De esta manera, presentamos un argumento filosófico para la afirmación de que las reglas de interacción deben indexarse en relación a los jugadores y sus elecciones, al proporcionar bases deónticas a la semántica.
In this paper, we provide a detailed critical review of current approaches to ecthesis in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, with a view to motivate a new approach, which builds upon previous work by Marion & Rückert (2016) on the dictum de omni. This approach sets Aristotle’s work within the context of dialectic and uses Lorenzen’s dialogical logic, hereby reframed with use of Martin-Löf's constructive type theory as ‘immanent reasoning’. We then provide rules of syllogistic for the latter, and provide proofs of e-conversion, Darapti and Bocardo and e-subalternation, while showing how close to Aristotle’s text these proofs remain.
Despite the fact that the spread of Islam in Indonesia can perhaps be traced back to the 9 th century, it had to wait until the 17 th and 18 th centuries to reach its full cultural, scientific and institutional outcomes. One crucial challenge was one that nowadays rises up in our modern society, namely finding out ways of cultural integration. In Borneo, strategies of integration involved pondering the legal status of uses of the Banjarese tradition, which were the dominant tribe in these times. Particularly so, since as in every legal system, Islamic Law contained the principle that what is not explicitly forbidden is allowed. It is here where the work of Sheikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari (in English Arshad al-Banjari) who lived from 1721 to 1810, becomes relevant. Indeed, Arsyad al-Banjari, of Banjarese origins himself, and whose writings were in Banjarese, applied a model of integration based on a dialectical constitution of qiyās, the legal argumentation theory for parallel reasoning and analogy, he learned from the Shāfi'ī-school of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). Our paper focuses in the model of integration proposed and practiced by al-Banjari, a rational debate grounded on a dynamic view on legal systems. We will illustrate the method with the help of two different kinds of qiyās deployed by al-Banjari in order to argue for the rejection of some traditional Banjaresse offering-rituals for avoiding disease or calamities (Manyanggar and Membuang Pasilih), and for the acceptance of the use of consumming the traditional drink called Lahang made of the juice of sugar-palm. As we see from our dialogical reconstruction the debates, particularly the one concerning Manyanggar and Membuang Pasilih are quite sophisticated, with a Banjarese opponent that does not surrender easily to the rejection of his use of those rituals. 2 More generally, the point is that Arsyad al-Banjari's sets a paradigm on how to implement the idea that Law is largely a matter of practice, and that one of the most suitable instruments for legal practice is a dialectical framework that calls for a collective act of understanding. The paper will also provide the first translation from the Indonesian of the Relevant texts and a study of the dialectical structure of the qiyās involved.
Extended abstract for my talk at the Centre Léon Robin (CNRS, Université de Paris IV -Sorbonne)
PRC Fapesp/CNRS "PATHOS. La doctrine aristotélicienne des émotions"
,23 May 2019
It attempts to link and summarize the joint work on dialectical legal reasoing with natural and deontic necessity.
it is based on the book in print and two other papers, but i added some new reflections
it is nevertheless only an abstract. However, here and there, informed by recent discussions with Hassan Tahiri and Walter E. Young I added some new remarks and (initial) reflections on how to embed the subject of the papers (the parallelism between natural and deontic necessitation) in the dialectical framework of the theory of the occasioning factor (the Islamic counterpart to notion of ratio legis of Roman Law), the main subject of the book
The work of Roshdi Rashed has set a landmark in many senses, but perhaps the most striking one is his inexhaustible thrive to open new paths for the study of conceptual links between science and philosophy deeply rooted in the interaction of historic with systematic perspectives. In the present talk I will focus on how a framework that has its source in philosophy of logic, interacts with some new results on the foundations of mathematics. More precisely, the main objective of my brief remarks is to discuss some claims of the late Hintikka (1996, 2001) who brought forward the idea that a game-theoretical interpretation of the Axiom of Choice yields its meaning “evident”. More precisely I will show that if we develop Per Martin-Löf’s (1984) demonstration of the axiom within a dialogical setting, the claim of Hintikka can be upheld. However, the dialogical demonstration, shows that, contrary to the expectations of Hintikka, the meaning that the game-theoretical setting provides to the Axiom is compatible with constructivist rather than with classical tenets.
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