Available via license: CC BY 4.0
Content may be subject to copyright.
Implications of the Global Energy
Transition on Russia
James Henderson and Tatiana Mitrova
1 What Is Energy Transition and How Does It Affect
Different Countries?
The current energy transition can be viewed as the fourth in a series of similar fun-
damental structural transformations of the global energy sector. V. Smil defines the
first energy transition—from biomass to coal—as the period between 1840 and 1890
during which the share of coal in the energy balance increased from 5 to 50% (Smil
2018). The second energy transition is associated with the fast penetration of oil—its
share grew from 3% in 1915 to 45% by 1975—and the third transition involved the
partial replacement of both coal and oil by natural gas, the share of which increased
from 3% in 1930 to 23% in 2017. All these transitions were driven by the compara-
tively higher economic efficiency of the new energy sources. Currently, however, as
we are talking about the beginning of the fourth energy transition (from fossil fuels to
low-carbon energy sources), the situation is quite different. The share of Renewable
Energy Sources (RES) (excluding hydro) in total primary energy consumption in
2017 was 3%, but it is now expanding very quickly. In this fourth energy transition,
in contrast to the previous three, a qualitative new driver is becoming critically impor-
tant, namely, combating global climate change, which has led to the establishment
of compulsory energy sector decarbonization targets.
In a more specific sense, energy transition is a translation of the German term
“Energiewende”, which came into international use in the early 2010s after the acci-
dent at the Fukushima nuclear power plant (OSCE 2013; Trüby and Schiffer 2018).
As one of the most ambitious decarbonization projects for the energy sector on a
J. Henderson (B
)
Oxford Institute of Energy Studies (OIES), Oxford, England
e-mail: james.henderson@oxfordenergy.org
T. Mi tr ova
Energy Center, Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: mitrovat@me.com
© The Author(s) 2020
M. Hafner and S. Tagliapietra (eds.), The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition,
Lecture Notes in Energy 73, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39066-2_5
93
94 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
national scale (aiming for a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2020
and by 80–95% by 2050 from 1990 levels), “Energiewende” became a benchmark
for large-scale climate-driven transformations around the world.
Today, energy transition is driven by a complex set of different drivers: climate
agenda, technological progress and the availability of brand new technological solu-
tions which are able to dramatically increase the efficiency of the energy sector and
to change the traditional way that it functions. It has the means to satisfy the desire
of all countries to ensure the competitiveness of their national economies and to
boost development with affordable energy. Last, but not least, it taps into the need to
increase energy security, which, obviously, corresponds to the geopolitical agenda.
Basically, there are several ways in which energy transition affects different
countries:
(1) Direct influence:
•Countries which sign up to international climate agreements are supposed to
comply with their official targets and obligations, changing their energy mix; they
have no choice other than to develop new low-carbon strategies with a strong
focus on RES, energy efficiency and other ways to reduce emissions.
•Global innovation and technological development makes many new technologies
cheaper and more attractive, so often countries—driven by local stakeholders—
opt to promote these technologies voluntarily in order to decrease the cost of
energy and to sustain their economic competitiveness.
(2) Indirect influence (refers mainly to countries which are lagging behind the
energy transition):
•The changing global fuel mix with a growing share of RES limits the demand
growth for fossil fuels, thus resulting in lower than expected export volumes for
coal, oil and gas from resource-rich countries.
•New rules are under discussion in certain parts of the world concerning carbon
tracking of internationally traded goods and the creation of border carbon adjust-
ments (BCAs) as part of the carbon taxation mechanism (Morris 2018; Mehling
et al. 2017). A high carbon footprint for all exported goods might become a
long-term source of instability for economies relying on fossil fuels.
•Banks and financial institutions are assessing climate risks and becoming more
reluctant to provide financing for fossil fuel projects (UNEP 2019). This trend is
most visible in the coal industry (BANKTRACK 2019), and it will create more
obstacles for the further development of conventional energy in resource-rich
countries.
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 95
2 Russia’s Role in the International Energy and Climate
Change Landscape and Energy Geopolitics
Despite the fact that Russia produces only 3% of the world’s GDP and accounts
for only 2% of the world’s population, it is the third largest producer and consumer
of energy resources in the world after China and the US, providing 10% of world
production and accounting for 5% of world energy consumption. Russia consistently
ranks first for global gas exports, second for oil exports and third for coal exports.
With energy production of about 1470 mtoe, Russia exports over half of the primary
energy it produces, providing 16% of global cross-regional energy trade, which
makes it the absolute world leader in energy exports (ERI RAS and SKOLKOVO
2019). Its strategic behaviour regarding energy transition is therefore important not
only for the country itself, but also for the rest of the world.
From a climate perspective, the country ranks fourth globally in terms of carbon
dioxide emissions. Russia continues to rely on fossil fuels, while its GDP energy
intensity remains high amid relatively low energy prices and high capital costs. The
share of RES (solar and wind power) in the energy mix is negligible, and officially
is not projected to rise above 1% by 2035.
From an energy geopolitics viewpoint, Russia is traditionally regarded as a
resource-rich country and is accused of abusing its power as an energy (especially
natural gas) exporter. In the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2030,
it is explicitly stated that, “energy exports should help to promote the country’s
external policy”. Russia’s use of geopolitical power in the field of energy increased
during the 2000s, mainly due to Russia’s use of its energy exports in its political
relationships with post-Soviet states, as well as the strategic and economic effects of
new Russian export pipelines to Central and Eastern Europe. It was mainly applied
to influence the political behaviour of those countries purchasing Russian energy.
However, the metaphor of an “energy weapon” is misleading: Russia has not used
tough means of influence—the so-called ‘hard energy weapon’—in the context of
Western Europe (Tynkkynen et al. 2017). Nevertheless, the image of a dangerous,
unpredictable player in the global energy geopolitics game has defined Russia for
the last two decades.
3 The Direct Influence of Energy Transition on Russia
As mentioned above, there are two direct ways in which energy transition can influ-
ence different countries: first, through the official targets and NDCs set by inter-
national climate change agreements which influence national strategies to reduce
carbon, and, secondly, by commercial decisions taken by the main investors and
other stakeholders active in the country in order to take advantage of innovations and
green technologies.
96 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
4 Russian Climate Policy and the Paris Agreement
Decarbonization is the main global driver of energy transition. Individual regions,
countries or their associations set goals for reducing the carbon footprint in the energy
sector and introduce mechanisms to stimulate this process—carbon taxes, emissions
trading systems, etc. According to the World Bank Group (World Bank and Ecofys
2018), fifty-one carbon pricing initiatives have been implemented or are scheduled
for implementation in regional, national and subnational jurisdictions. Consequently,
during the period 2008–2017, the carbon content of electricity decreased by 50–100
gCO2/kWh in the European Union, US, Canada, China, Australia, Kazakhstan and
many other countries (Staffell et al. 2018).
Despite the global trend, for many years, the climate agenda and drive for decar-
bonization were not essential factors in the economic and energy strategy of the
Russian Federation. Russia signed the Paris Agreement in 2016, with voluntary
obligations to limit anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to 70–75% of 1990
emissions by 2030, provided that the role of forests was taken into account as much
as possible. But even with this very low target (which does not require any significant
effort given the country’s economic stagnation), Russia has not ratified the Agree-
ment although it did finally join the Agreement in September 2019 (without official
ratification, just by the decree of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev).
It is still unclear exactly what Russia’s climate goals will be under the Paris Agree-
ment. A few important milestones are envisaged in 2020, including the development
of a Low-Carbon Strategy for Russia up to 2030 and beyond, and the adoption
of a carbon regulation framework. But it is worth noting that there are still many
strong opponents to the Paris Agreement and carbon regulation in Russia, includ-
ing some representatives of the authorities, fossil fuel businesses and the scientific
community. Currently, discussion is mainly focused on delivering good reports and
‘greenwashing’, as opposed to real climate action.
The Paris Agreement is mentioned only once in the draft version of “Russian
Energy Strategy Up to 2035”, a key document defining the country’s strategic pri-
orities in this critically important industry, which was submitted to the government
by the Energy Ministry in 2015, but which has still not been officially approved. It
states that “in 2016, the Russian Federation signed the Paris Climate Agreement,
which included, among other things, the development by 2020 of a strategy of socio-
economic development with a low level of greenhouse gas emissions for the period
until 2050. In order to minimize possible negative consequences for the Russian fuel
and energy complex from the implementation of this agreement, an extremely bal-
anced approach is needed to take into account some additional regulatory measures
to counter climate change” (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2017).
This very cautious approach towards decarbonization is driven by several factors:
•Scepticism concerning the anthropogenic nature of climate change dominates
among stakeholders—senior representatives of the Russian Academy of Sciences
as well as many state officials publicly express their doubts over the very concept
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 97
of anthropogenically created climate change. Many experts, academicians and
policymakers see it as a concept manufactured by the West to undermine Russia.
•Secondly, following the economic downturn and restructuring in the 1990s, Russia
de facto reduced greenhouse gas emissions sharply (by about 30%). Between
1998 and 2008 emissions increased in line with GDP growth, while in the period
2010–2016 Russia’s GDP has grown by 73%, while the level of emissions has
increased by only 12% due to further economic restructuring and faster growth of
the financial and other non-energy-intensive sectors (KOMMERSANT 2016). As
a result, Russia is currently well within its emission limits due to the high initial
starting point in 1990 and economic stagnation since then.
•Lastly, Russia’s energy sector has a lower carbon footprint than many other coun-
tries, including Poland, Germany, Australia, China, India, Kazakhstan, the Arab
countries of the Persian Gulf, the US, Chile and South Africa. Around 35% of
electricity is generated by carbon-free Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and large
hydropower plants, and 48% comes from gas (IEA 2018), with gas gradually dis-
placing petroleum products and coal from the Thermal Power Plant (TPP) fuel
basket (the share of gas in TPP electricity generation has increased from 69 to
74% during 2006–2017).
This background explains why Russia has sidestepped the global decarbonization
trend for so long. Its participation in international environmental cooperation has
always been determined primarily by its external policy objectives. In Soviet times,
participation in global environmental initiatives was a channel of collaboration with
the West. In the 1990s, it was a means of integration into the international community
and one of the major areas of cooperation with the US. In the 2000s, Russia used the
environmental agenda to gain trade-offs from Western partners along with attracting
foreign investment (Makarov 2016). At present, an understanding of the possibili-
ties to reap benefits from the country’s natural capital is slowly increasing among
Russian political and business elites, so in the longer term Russia’s involvement in
international environmental cooperation may be catalysed by an increasing need for
international re-integration.
5 Businesses Promoting Green Technologies in Russia
Businesses in Russia currently seem to be more preoccupied by the climate and
energy transition agenda than the authorities. Initially, export-oriented companies
started to realize the threat of changing perceptions and regulations for their tradi-
tional business, in particular, steel and aluminium making companies, as well as paper
and chemicals businesses. Producers are now hurrying to implement ESG reporting
to please their investors and to develop “green products” (green steel, green alu-
minium, etc.) using new energy technologies and different offset mechanisms in
order to remain competitive in their core export markets. From their perspective, the
98 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
decarbonization of the Russian energy sector and the expansion of RES is needed
urgently.
There is also a rising cluster of companies interested in RES development as
their main market, namely, equipment producers for solar and wind farms. Several
oligarchs (such as Anatoly Chubais and Victor Vekselberg) have entered this business
and have now become its strongest proponents. Their commercial targets are related
to export expansion and so they are extremely interested in cooperation with other
countries which could become export markets for their equipment. The primary
targets in this respect are the former Soviet republics which prefer not to further
increase their dependence on China. Current volumes of trade are negligible, but it
is possible that at some point this could create tension between Russia and China.
6 National Technology Policy
While not paying particularly serious attention to climate policy, Russia is on the
other hand very sensitive to its rate of technological development. The country’s
leadership clearly realizes that Russia runs the risk of falling behind in the develop-
ment of new energy technologies that have become standard in most of the rest of
the world. This is the reason behind its strict requirements on equipment localization
for renewable energy and smart grids, and numerous import substitution programs.
Despite this realization, energy transition technologies are definitely not the main
focus of Russia’s technology policy. In the key state document which defines prior-
ities in this area, (the State Program for “Energy Development” approved in 2014
and amended in 2019), only the “promotion of innovative and digital development
of the fuel and energy complex” is mentioned as a target, together with many new
technologies in hydrocarbon production and processing. Nothing at all is mentioned
concerning low-carbon technologies (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation
2019a).
The desire to overcome the technological gap and to reduce the potential need for
imports if energy transition becomes mainstream has created some interest among
Russian authorities concerning technologies for energy transition. Several huge grant
programs and networks have been created for this purpose (RVK, Energynet, etc.), but
surprisingly they are mainly focused on digital technologies, rather than low-carbon
ones. Russian authorities regard the digital transformation of the energy sector as a
technological challenge (bearing in mind the high level of current import dependence
for all high-tech equipment and the potential threat of sanctions, which could create
serious problems for national energy security) and this is the reason why digitalization
has become the main driver of energy transition in Russia. In 2018, Vladimir Putin
signed a decree establishing a special state program for the creation of a “Digital
Economy” in which energy infrastructure is mentioned as one of the key components.
The Energy Ministry has also developed its special project called “Digital Energy”
(Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2019b) which is focused primarily on
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 99
the digitalization of regulation and the creation of a whole institutional framework
for a wide-scale introduction of digital technologies in the energy sector.
As the main drivers of this movement are the fear of technological lag, import
dependence on foreign equipment and, even more importantly, software (especially
given the threat of new sanctions in the energy sector), no large-scale international
cooperation can be expected in this area. Indeed, protectionism and the creation of
various trade and economic barriers is highly likely.
7 Indirect Influence
The indirect consequences of the energy transition are more obvious and sensitive
for Russia. Any changes in the demand for fossil fuels result in lower energy exports,
while the potential introduction of BCA (Border Carbon Adjustments) might become
a threat for all Russian exports, and new rules of behaviour by investors could further
constrain the availability of funding for Russian energy projects.
8 Energy Transition Limits Demand for Fossil Fuels
and Constrains Russian Energy Exports
Energy transition affects regional energy balances, specifically when RES implemen-
tation starts to limit growth or reduce overall demand for fossil fuels. For example,
rapid reduction in coal use in the EU energy balance threatens Russian exports to
Europe, which have already dropped considerably during the last decade. The share
of electric vehicles in key markets (China, the US, EU) is forecast to grow rapidly,
which is likely to reduce the demand for petroleum products. In 2018 in India, solar
energy (PV) was 14% cheaper than coal generation, while China will achieve net-
work parity in 2020 which will reduce demand for imported pipeline gas and LNG,
all of which will impact regional energy balances.
For Russia, as for many other resource-rich and energy-exporting countries,
energy transition creates new long-term challenges and calls into question the sus-
tainability of the whole economy, which is highly dependent on hydrocarbon export
revenues. In the period from the beginning of the 2000s, Russia managed to increase
its energy exports dramatically: from 2000 through 2005, exports grew by an unprece-
dented 56% (ERI RAS and AC RF 2016), exceeding the total energy exports of the
USSR, providing an incredible acceleration of the national economy and underpin-
ning the country’s position on the international arena as an “energy superpower”. But
as the global financial–economic crises came in 2008, the growth in energy exports
halted. The post-crisis years of 2011–2014 witnessed very high oil prices but stagnant
export volumes, and a lack of petro-dollar revenues resulted in GDP stagnation at an
100 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
oil price of 110 $/bbl, which was a clear evidence of deep structural economic prob-
lems. More recently, oil and gas export revenues have declined from the heights of
2008–2012 under the impact of falling prices for hydrocarbons. Nonetheless, even in
2017, hydrocarbons provided 25% of GDP and 39% of the country’s federal budget,
65% of foreign earnings from exports, and almost a quarter of overall investment in
the national economy (Trading Economics 2018).
Obviously, the energy transition affects the prospects for Russian fossil fuel
exports, particularly coal and oil, but natural gas exports might also be significantly
affected by a further increase in emission reduction goals. Indeed, economic mod-
elling has shown that climate-related actions outside Russia could lower Russia’s
GDP growth rate by about a half a percentage point (Makarov et al. 2017). ERI
RAS-SKOLKOVO analysis (ERI RAS and SKOLKOVO 2019) has demonstrated
that the role of the fuel and energy complex in the Russian economy will continue to
decline from its peak in 2012–2013, affected by shifts in world energy markets. The
technological transition of the world energy sector from the dominance of fossil fuels
to low-carbon energy resources could lead to a 16% reduction in fuel exports and an
8% reduction in primary energy production in Russia over the next two decades. In
general, by 2040 this could reduce the value added by the fuel and energy complex
by a quarter and value added by supporting enterprises by another 2–3%, due to a
decrease in capital investments within the sector. As a result, average GDP growth
in the country is forecast to slow down between 2016 and 2040 from 1.7 to 0.6% per
annum and the share of the energy sector in Russia’s GDP will decline from 25% to
just 14%. This signifies the end of the dominance of the fuel and energy complex in
the national economy during the Energy Transition.
There is little if any hope within Russia that this downward movement will be
mitigated by internal factors. GDP growth projections have been revised downwards
to 1–2% per annum due to ongoing systemic economic crisis, international financial
and technological sanctions and an unfavourable investment climate. Gone are the
years of high GDP growth (7–8% per annum) in the first decade of this century.
Russia is feeling the impact of a stagnating economy, flat domestic energy demand,
the necessity of keeping domestic regulated prices unchanged and insufficient invest-
ment in the deployment of new technologies. This situation, which limits investment
capacity, is further compounded by the high cost of capital in the domestic financial
market and the negative impact of financial sanctions.
As a result, the global rise in RES targets and the transition towards a decarbonized
energy economy are regarded in Russia as a significant threat for export revenues and
thus for Russian economic, and therefore political, security (GARANT.ru 2017).
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 101
9 Carbon Tracking of Internationally Traded Goods
and The Creation of Border Carbon Adjustments (BCA)
Challenge Russia’s Non-energy Exports
Russia also faces the risk that market barriers for its exports of energy-intensive
goods, which constitute currently 30% of exports, could be introduced. These restric-
tions are currently under discussion in Europe and in other parts of the world and
might soon become an important component of international trade. Under these
circumstances, Russian energy-intensive, export-oriented industries—initially the
metallurgical and chemical sectors—might face significant problems in protecting,
never mind expanding, their niche in export markets.
10 Difficulties in Attracting International Financing
for Fossil Fuel Projects
Another important implication, which makes Russia’s perception of energy transition
so negative, is a further increase in the difficulty of attracting international financing
for domestic fossil fuel projects. Many global banks and investment funds have
already removed coal projects from their portfolios, and some have started to refuse
to finance oil projects. Financial sanctions currently in place are already a serious
burden for the development of Russian energy projects, and so further restrictions
due to climate considerations would make life even more difficult.
11 Russia’s Potential for Energy Transition and Its
Geopolitical Implications
As shown above, the climate agenda is not a major policy issue in Russia, while the
competitiveness of the national economy, as well as its energy security, is already pro-
tected by cheap abundant hydrocarbons (primarily natural gas). As a result, for Russia
the only important driver for energy transition is technological progress and a desire
to prevent the emergence of a strong technological gap between it and other countries.
Nevertheless, despite this limited motivation to promote energy transition in Russia,
there are some areas where the potential benefits are huge and which could cre-
ate substantial value for the Russian economy, attracting considerable investment if
proper regulation was to be put in place. These key areas for Russia are the following:
–Energy efficiency,
–Renewables,
–Decentralization and distributed energy resources, and
–Hydrogen.
102 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
12 Energy Efficiency
Factors relating specifically to Russia—the cold climate, the vast distances, a huge
endowment of natural resources, poor economic organization and marked techno-
logical backwardness—have resulted in its economy having a high level of energy
intensity, 1.5 times higher than the worldaverage and that of the US, and twice that of
the leading European countries (ERI RAS and AC RF 2016). Across practically all
industrial sectors, there is a substantial energy efficiency gap compared not only with
the best available technologies but also with current performance in other countries.
Even with comparatively low fuel and energy prices, the share of fuel and energy
costs in overall production costs in Russia is higher than in developed and many
developing countries (Bashmakov 2013). Before the 2009 economic crisis, Russia
was one of the world leaders in terms of GDP energy intensity reduction rates, and
the gap between Russia and developed countries was narrowing dramatically. A 40%
reduction of GDP energy intensity within ten years was achieved between 1998 and
2008; however, since 2009 this reduction has slowed down and even reversed.
Obviously, for such an energy-intensive economy, issues such as energy efficiency
and conservation are key for any Energy Transition plan: according to analysis from
the IEA 30% of primary energy consumption and enormous amounts of hydrocar-
bons (180 bcm of gas, 600 kb/d of oil and oil products and more than 50 Mtce of coal
per annum) could be saved in Russia if comparable OECD levels of efficiency were
to be achieved (IEA 2011). A significant reduction in the growth of energy consump-
tion could be provided by structural energy conservation (changing the industrial and
production structure of the economy), with an increase in the share of non-energy-
intensive industries and products. The next most important factor in constraining the
growth of energy consumption could be improved technical application of conser-
vation processes which could provide a total energy saving of 25–40%. However,
it will be extremely difficult to close the gap with OECD countries—it is actually
widening due to a lack of investment in processes which could quickly renew assets
or improve energy efficiency. If we also include ongoing administrative barriers and,
most importantly, a lack of availability of ‘long money’ and of credits for energy
efficiency projects for small market participants, coupled with the persistence of rel-
atively low natural gas prices in the long term, then Russia could well remain stuck
in a state of high energy intensity. Strong policies are required to change this pattern,
accompanied by a substantial increase in energy prices.
Unfortunately, at present, there appears to be little incentive for anything to
change, unless Russia can develop energy efficiency technologies which could then
be exported to the rest of the world. Internally, it would seem to be too politically
risky either to raise prices or to force spending on energy efficiency at a time of
economic stagnation.
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 103
13 Renewable Energy Sources
Russia’s energy balance is strongly dominated by fossil fuels, with natural gas pro-
viding 52% of total primary energy demand, coal providing 18% and oil-based liquid
fuels a further 18%. Carbon-free sources of energy in Russia are represented primar-
ily by large-scale hydro and nuclear (which enjoys strong state support). The role of
solar, wind, biomass and other sources of renewable energy is negligible—less than
1% of the total supply (ERI RAS & AC RF, 2016). The total share of RES (includ-
ing hydro, solar, wind, biomass and geothermal) in Russia’s total primary energy
consumption was just 3.2% in 2015. By the end of 2015, total installed renewable
power generation capacity was 53.5 gigawatts (GW), representing about 20% of Rus-
sia’s total installed power generation capacity (253 GW) with hydropower providing
nearly all of this capacity (51.5 GW), followed by bioenergy (1.35 GW). Installed
capacity for solar and onshore wind by 2015 amounted to 460 MW and 111 MW,
respectively (IRENA 2017).
According to the draft Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2035 (Min-
istry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2017), the share of renewable energy in
Russia’s total primary energy consumption should increase from 3.2 to 4.9% by
2035. This includes Russia’s approved plans to expand its total solar PV, onshore
wind and geothermal capacity to 5.9 GW by the end of 2024. The foundation for the
growth of RES deployment in Russia is Decree 449, passed in 2013, which created a
legal framework to establish a renewable energy capacity system in the country. The
decree is designed to encourage the development of renewable energy in Russia, par-
ticularly focusing on wind and solar photovoltaics, and to a lesser extent, small-scale
hydropower. Under the new regulatory system, energy developers of projects with an
output of at least 5 MW can bid for capacity supply contracts with Russia’s Admin-
istrator of the Trading System via annual tenders. Winning suppliers are paid both
for the capacity they add to the energy system and for the energy they supply, based
on long-term, 15-year contracts with fixed tariffs. This regulation sets a predictable
legal and regulatory environment that allows developers to commercialize capacity
as a separate commodity to the power itself and ensures the economic attractiveness
of these projects for investors. In return, RES developers are expected to ensure they
can provide the promised capacity, within the right timescale and with sufficient
localization of equipment (Power Technology 2018).
Since then annual renewable capacity additions have risen from 57MW in 2015 to
376 MW in 2018 (320 MW solar, 56 MW wind). What is more significant, however,
is the significant decline of capital expenditure in the renewables auctions which have
taken place during the last two years: by 35% for wind and by 31% for solar, according
to the Energy Ministry (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2019b). This
process was not smooth, as some capacity auction rounds have struggled to attract
bids. Just over 2GW of renewable capacity was awarded in tenders between 2013
and 2016, while the 2017 auction resulted in a total of 2.2GW of wind, solar and
small hydro awarded in a single round. In 2018, 1.08GW of capacity was allocated
between thirty-nine projects. Additionally, in 2017 five waste-to-energy projects were
104 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
introduced to the capacity market scheme, with a total capacity of 335 MW. But in
2018, the tender for waste energy capacity failed, due to strict new requirements for
bidders to provide performance guarantees.
As technological policy is the main driver of Russia’s interest in renewables, the
country is focused on building its own RES manufacturing capacity. Russia has set a
relatively high level of local content which is required to qualify for the highest tariff
rates, an essential component of many Russian RES projects’ long-term feasibility.
The percentage of Russian-made equipment required to avoid tariff penalties was
relatively modest in the early days of the auction system but has now risen to 65%
for wind farms and small hydro, and 70% for solar until 2020, with the long-term
target level of localization set by the government at 80%. These high levels have been
behind the failure of several tenders, especially in wind farm development, for which
there has been little to no Russian-made equipment proposed. The requirements have
encouraged foreign firms to partner with Russian power companies and manufactur-
ers. Several international joint ventures have been established including Fortum and
state-owned technology investor Rusnano’s wind investment fund, and WRS Bashni,
a partnership between Spanish developer Windar Renovables, Rusnano and Russian
steel firm Severstal. Wind equipment was localized by Vestas Manufacturing Rus
in the Nizhny Novgorod region, while SGRE (Siemens-Gamesa Renewables) and
Lagerwey are also entering the Russian market (Power Technology 2018).
The problem is that the current support mechanism will expire in 2024. Russia’s
unambitious RES targets and ambitious localization targets will be nearly fulfilled
by this time, and the influx of foreign renewables developers might stop if no new
incentives for the RES market are created. But in order to create these incentives,
the Russian government needs to first confirm the long-term role of renewables in
its energy balance, which is rather difficult to do without a decarbonization agenda.
However, it seems that as a country with the world’s largest natural gas reserves
and the second-largest reserves of thermal coal, Russia does not see any real value in
transitioning from fossil fuels to zero-carbon energy sources. Despite the country’s
massive potential in wind and solar resources and the virtually limitless land avail-
able for development, the availability of oil, gas and coal is suppressing clean energy
development. Diversifying this energy mix towards carbon-free energy sources is a
challenging task: low prices for hydrocarbons, the unfavourable geographical dis-
persal of potential renewable resources from the point of their utilization (they are
mainly concentrated in non-populated areas with a long distance to the centres of
consumption) and their comparatively high costs (caused mainly by the mandated
requirements on localization, which often results in uncompetitive per-unit costs),
are hindering the development of these energy sources in Russia.
According to IRENA (2017), Russia theoretically has the potential to increase
its share of renewables from 4.9 to 11.3% of total primary energy consumption by
2030. However, without a reassessment of its energy strategy priorities and a wider
transformation of its energy system, this will not be achieved. As a result, it seems
that the only real incentive to develop any form of new technology will be the export
market. If Russia could export renewable electricity or technology it might be worth
pursuing, but for domestic use it is a real challenge, unless it becomes significantly
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 105
cheaper. In addition, for the country as a whole, the real economic necessity is to
maintain export revenues, which has resulted in enthusiasm for potential hydrogen
export to Europe, as this is where the real incentive seems to lie.
14 Russia’s Decentralization and Distributed Energy
Resources Potential
Historically, the Russian energy system has always developed in an extremely cen-
tralized way. The Russian electricity sector, for example, relies on a huge centralized
power system, while distributed energy resources, including microgrids based on
renewables, are developing slowly and only in remote and isolated areas. Russia has
one of the world’s largest national centralized power systems with single dispatch
control; as of 2017, the total length of its trunk networks was over 140 thousand km,
its distribution networks were over 2 million km and the installed capacity of power
plants was 246.9 GW. This energy system was created and historically developed
on a hierarchical basis with centralized long-term planning bodies. For decades, the
centralized model has been, and remains, the basis of its energy strategy. The role of
distributed generation has historically been significant only in remote areas of the Far
East, Siberia and the Arctic, which are too expensive to connect to a single network.
However, the penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) into the centralized
system has now begun, with potentially significant consequences for the incumbent
actors.
Decentralization in the power sector began when the role of economies of scale
in power generation globally ceased to be significant due to technological improve-
ments. The catalyst for this change was the emergence in the 1980s of gas turbines
and reciprocated gas engine technologies. It was the reciprocated gas engine global
market that showed steady growth rate (CAGR 17%) until the late 2000s (Diesel and
Gas Turbine Worldwide 2006). In the US, distributed generation has played a role in
the electric power sector for several decades (Rhodium Group 2017). Historically,
these DERs have consisted of dispatchable resources; however, the recent increase of
non-dispatchable PV capacity marks a change in this trend. BNEF’s forecast shows
that the decentralization ratio will exceed 15% (as it did in Germany in 2017) in eight
countries by 2040 (BloombergNEF 2017). Globally, annual distributed generation
capacity additions have already exceeded centralized ones, and non-generation types
of DER have even more potential than distributed generation. The estimated poten-
tial for Demand Response and Energy Efficiency in the US in 2014 (37 GW) was
higher than for CHP (18 GW) or Solar (8 GW) (Rhodium Group 2017). In line with
other countries, the integration of DER into the Russian electricity sector became
noticeable in the 2000s, but in the past seventeen years it was limited to distributed
generation only. The development of this process in Russia is driven not by global cli-
mate change or energy independence concerns, but by the economic considerations
of the largest electricity consumers. Almost all the big Russian industrial companies
106 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
(including oil and gas industry leaders like Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil, Novatek and
Sakhalin Energy) are involved in distributed generation projects in order to get a
more affordable power supply. Meanwhile, micro-generation using renewables for
households in Russia is still largely confined to enthusiasts. There are just a few cases
evident in the regions, all of them stimulated almost only by economic expediency
reasons.
However, non-generation types of DER in Russia are only in the very early stage
of development. Demand response technologies began to develop in the country
in 2016–2017, but only a small proportion of power consumption is affected (for
example, 54 MW in the second price zone of the wholesale power market, or 0.1%
of total capacity in this zone). Demand response in retail electricity market is in its
experimental stage, and energy efficiency policies have not yet achieved significant
results. According to I. Bashmakov (Bashmakov 2018), GDP energy intensity in
Russia in 2017 is just 10% lower than in 2007, a disappointing outcome given that the
initial energy efficiency target set in 2008 was to reach a 40% decline in GDP energy
intensity by 2020. Substantial federal budget subsidies were allocated but very limited
change has occurred, and as a result the initial target has been significantly scaled
down to 9.41% and federal funding has been discontinued (Ministry of Economic
Development of the Russian Federation 2018).
Nevertheless, DER has significant potential in Russia. According to a study by
SKOLKOVO Energy Centre (Khokhlov et al. 2018), it has the potential to cover over
half of the needs for generating capacity (about 36 GW by 2035) if even a small part
is actually utilized. The most promising type of DER in Russia is distributed co-
generation (~17 GW). On-site self-generation units owned by electricity consumers
can provide an additional 13 GW, demand response another 4 GW, energy efficiency
technologies a further 1.5 GW and rooftop PV systems up to 0.6 GW. Indeed, if DER
is fully utilized, the Skolkovo analysis shows that the entire generation gap in 2035
could be covered, although this would require significant acceleration from today’s
levels and a major push by the Russian government to introduce a favourable policy
framework. However, although DER has been widely analysed in international liter-
ature, in Russia there has been no integrated assessment of its potential in response
to future development needs of the national power system and as a result progress is
likely to be slower than might be hoped.
In order to stimulate the maximum utilization of DER technologies, systemic
changes are necessary in the architecture and policy of the Russian power sector,
balancing the interests of new players with the existing model. An optimal combi-
nation of centralized generation and DER will need to be found, but in order to find
such an outcome it will be necessary to develop principles and market mechanisms
for the integration of centralized and decentralized parts and to ensure their reliable
joint operation. The Russian authorities are some way from achieving this at present.
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 107
15 Nuclear
Russia is one of the world’s largest producers of nuclear energy. Its nuclear industry
has a role to play as an existing giant with decarbonization credentials. Russia is
recognized for its nuclear expertise, and it is pursuing an ambitious plan to increase
sales of Russian-built reactors overseas. Currently, it has thirty-nine reactors either
under construction or planned overseas.
Moreover, Russia is attempting to create a new breakthrough in nuclear technol-
ogy: nearly, all of the world’s reactors operate with thermal (slow) neutrons, while
Russia has developed fast neutron reactors, through which it hopes to take the signif-
icant step of closing the fuel cycle. Currently, Russia is a world leader in fast neutron
reactor technology and is consolidating this through its Proryv (‘Breakthrough’)
project. Starting in 2020–2025 it is envisaged that fast neutron power reactors will
play an increasing role in Russia, with substantial recycling of fuel. Indeed, fast
reactors are projected to account for some 14 GWe of capacity by 2030 and 34 GWe
by 2050. If successful this new technology platform envisages a full recycling of
fuel, balancing thermal and fast reactors, so that 100 GWe of total capacity requires
only about 100 tonnes of input per year, from enrichment tails, natural uranium and
thorium, with minor actinides being burned. About 100 t/yr of fission product waste
would go to a geological repository (World Nuclear Association 2019).
16 Hydrogen
Russia remains isolated from international communities and partnerships which are
developing hydrogen technologies and there is no national hydrogen program, and
only in the very end of 2019 the first attempts to coordinate various research groups
and interested parties appeared. At the same time, there are many resources in Russia
capable of producing hydrogen, and there are a number of R&D activities in this area
(most, however, far from commercialization) and also some prospective domestic
demand niches for hydrogen. There is also design work and scientific development
in the areas of production, storage and transportation of hydrogen, as well as its use
in mobile transport. In addition, Russia has enormous potential to produce hydrogen
and export it on a global scale. Therefore, hydrogen technologies are being spoken
about in a positive way both at the largest Russian forums and within the largest
Russian companies (Melnikov et al. 2019).
On the production side, there are proven technologies for producing “grey” hydro-
gen in Russia, similar to those used elsewhere in the world. They are deployed at
oil and gas processing plants, metallurgical plants, etc. (methane conversion). All
hydrogen produced is used on-site—for example, to improve the quality of hydro-
carbon processing. Furthermore, Gazprom and Rosatom are working on technologies
for producing hydrogen with a minimum carbon footprint by using adiabatic con-
version of methane (Aksyutin et al. 2017) and high-temperature nuclear reactors
108 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
(Ponomarev–Stepnoi et al. 2018). These technologies are at a preliminary scien-
tific research stage or (in the case of adiabatic methane conversion) being tested at
an experimental laboratory unit. In addition, Russian developers are also conduct-
ing laboratory tests on hydrogen generation by aluminium–water reaction1and fuel
processors for the conversion of natural gas and diesel into a hydrogen-rich fuel mix-
ture2and the release of pure hydrogen from it.3The Kurchatov Institute and various
research centres at the Russian Academy of Sciences are also engaged in scientific
research in the field of electrolysis.
However, the present work on the transportation and storage of hydrogen is less
developed because it currently tends to be consumed at the place of production.
Gazprom, the owner and operator of Russia’s gas transmission system, has conducted
studies showing the possibility of adding up to 20% hydrogen to transported natural
gas, but real experiments have yet to be conducted.
Nevertheless, the resources for hydrogen production in Russia are huge, mainly
because the country has such vast hydrocarbon reserves and wind potential. In addi-
tion, existing gas transportation infrastructure (including new gas pipeline projects)
and a growing natural gas (LNG) industry could provide a foundation in the long
term for the development of “blue” hydrogen production and export given the low
cost of raw materials and the possibility of hydrogen transportation both via pipelines
and in a liquefied form.
According to Gazprom estimates, transporting hydrogen via export gas pipelines
could entail a risk of violating long-term contractual obligations related to gas quality
and would necessitate additional investments in the gas transmission system. There-
fore, the company is considering an alternative, namely, the production of hydrogen
from natural gas at the consumer site after methane has been transported through the
trunk pipelines. Gazprom has valued the European market for hydrogen produced in
this way at 153 billion euros by 2050, according to Bloomberg.
From a Russian perspective, it is also important to note that production of “blue”
hydrogen from steam methane reforming can actually be a relatively green option
because its generation industry has one of the lowest carbon footprints in the world.
Gas-fired thermal power plants dominate in the generation structure (around 48%),
while nuclear power plants (18%) and hydroelectric power plants (17%) exceed the
share of coal-fired power plants (16%). As a result, the carbon content of electricity
produced in Russia is less than in the US, China, Australia, India, Japan, Germany
and other countries. In certain regions, particularly where hydro and nuclear dom-
inate, this creates opportunities for the production of what is effectively “green”
hydrogen via electrolysis with electricity supplied from the regional electricity grid,
without the development of solar and wind power. This can give Russia a significant
potential cost advantage. This has prompted interest from international players. For
example, Kawasaki Heavy Industries plans to revisit a feasibility study on the export
1Joint Institute for High Temperatures of the Russian Academy of Sciences, JIHT RAS.
2“Central Research Institute of Ship Electrical Engineering and Technology” (“Central Research
Institute SET”), Krylov State Research Centre.
3http://www.niiset.ru/index.php/vodedprod.
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 109
of hydrogen produced in the Magadan region to Japan. Although this project has not
yet received a development go-ahead, interest in such initiatives is likely to increase
as the infrastructure develops in the Far East and the cost of hydrogen electrolysis
and logistics technologies goes down.
Even greater opportunities could open up for Russia if its renewable energy poten-
tial is ultimately realized. Currently, the share of green hydrogen produced at RES
plants (electrolysis) is nearly zero. But although the share of wind power in Rus-
sia’s energy balance is currently insignificant (less than 1%), the total potential from
this sector is estimated at 17.1 thousand TWh, which is sixteen times higher than
total generation in Russia in 2018. As a result, many studies of the global potential of
“power-to-x” technology refer to Russia as one of the “hidden champions” as its huge
potential is currently offset by a lack of interest from the state and the stakeholders.
17 Conclusions on Geopolitical Implications for Russia
It is clear from the analysis above that the global energy transition towards a lower
carbon system presents some real threats for Russia. Perhaps the most obvious is
financial, with lower hydrocarbon rents meaning lower budget revenues and slower
economic growth, with implications for government spending and the wealth of the
Russian population at large. This could have implications abroad, if reduced military
spending limits Russia’s hard power, and at home, if the political regime is under-
mined by its ability to satisfy the welfare demands of its population. Furthermore,
these problems could be exacerbated by the fact that Russia may have a weaker posi-
tion in international financial markets as restrictions on the availability of capital for
carbon-intensive industries may well be increased. In addition, even Russia’s non-
energy exports may be impacted if carbon tax adjustments are made for imported
goods in key markets. The combination of all these factors could weaken Russia’s
global negotiating position, which could be further undermined by the increased use
of renewables in countries where Russia has previously exercised leverage through
energy exports. For example, Russia’s position in Southern and Eastern Europe is
likely to be weakened as those countries become less reliant on imported energy
and are able to diversify away from Russian oil, gas and coal. Equally, countries in
NE Asia, where Russia is hoping to gain an increasing foothold, thanks to oil and
gas exports, could also become less engaged with the Kremlin as their energy needs
increasingly focus on alternative sources with lower carbon intensity.
However, despite the presence of these clear threats to Russia’s geopolitical status,
there are also reasons for optimism, thanks to the country’s huge potential as a carbon
sink and as a potential developer of new technology. Firstly, it is possible to envisage
that Russia could become a leader in the sale of decarbonized oil and gas, in particular,
because it has huge potential in forestry. If managed properly, then reforestation could
be used by oil and gas producers as a means to offset the GHG emissions in the supply
chain and also possibly the CO2emissions at the burner tip. Indeed, some oil and gas
110 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
companies (Lukoil for example)4are already considering how this strategy might
be used to offset their carbon impact in order to improve their global bargaining
position. Secondly, Russia has huge wind power potential, especially in the Arctic,
and if improvements in technology could allow DC lines to be connected to major
consumers in European and China, then Russia could become a major exporter of
green electricity (The Moscow Times 2019).
Thirdly, Russia is also attempting to develop a unique competence in a new gen-
eration of nuclear technology based on a closed nuclear fuel cycle. If it can become
a world leader in this field, which could transform the outlook for nuclear energy, it
could provide a massive carbon-free energy source for non-OECD countries where
energy demand continues to grow rapidly. It would therefore allow Russia to build
deep relationships with economies in Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia,
expanding its geopolitical influence significantly. Finally, and more traditionally,
Russia could also exploit its gas resources to increase its presence in new market
niches, such as the bunker market where LNG could become a much more desir-
able fuel following the introduction of stricter emissions rules by the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 2020.
In addition to these energy-related issues, Russia could also benefit from the
opening of the Northern Sea Route as the Arctic ice continues to melt. Although the
opening itself would actually be caused by global warming, one key benefit from
increased utilization of a shorter route between Europe and Asia could be to reduce
the carbon footprint of transport between the two regions, thus limiting further emis-
sions impacts and potentially providing Russia with another source of geopolitical
influence, given the importance of this emerging transport route. The implementation
of appropriate national decisions on fuel regulation and environmental requirements
would be required to maximize this potential as a “green” transport option, but it is
certainly possible to see this new source of bargaining power for Russia emerging
over the next decade.
18 Overall Conclusion
In the light of Russia’s current position as a major hydrocarbon exporter and con-
sumer, any notion of a rapid energy transformation is problematic. A large-scale
shift from hydrocarbons to renewable energy sources provides energy consumers
with more choices, meaning that Russia’s control of energy flows becomes a less
effective instrument of (geopolitical) power. Furthermore, since the Russian state
budget is highly dependent on energy export revenues, a major change in this sector
will have a negative impact in many other parts of the economy, including military
funding. Lastly, although Russia has plenty of potential for renewable energy, the
country does not have a heavy focus on the sector at present and is therefore unlikely
to pioneer technological development in the wind and solar industries. Perhaps not
4See LUKOIL CSR policy at https://csr2017.lukoil.com/pdf/csr/en/hse.pdf.
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 111
surprisingly then, although Russia is involved in international climate policy, it does
not work to promote it and instead and has to date used diplomacy to influence
international energy and climate policy in a way that rather discourages change. One
key reason for this inactivity is the fact that political power in Russia is ultimately
linked with the control of strategic resources (most importantly, hydrocarbons) and
the export revenues derived from these resources (Tynkkynen et al. 2017).
Russia’s attitude towards Energy Transition is therefore quite controversial: while
acknowledging some of the key trends, the country is basically refusing to accept the
consequences of its main driver—decarbonization—and is focusing only on attempts
to develop technological expertise in its usual centralized manner. Nevertheless, at a
certain point the country will have to develop a long-term vision for both domestic
energy market development and export strategy in order to adapt to the profound
transformation of the global energy system.
However, the domestic market environment is not conducive to the development
of transition-friendly energy sources. The institutional environment is too rigid, there
is not enough capital available and there is a level of cynicism as to whether it is
really needed. The key question is whether the issue of export revenues can be a
catalyst, although there are a number of issues in this regard.
Firstly, the real threat from decarbonization concerns exports to Europe, where
gas demand in particular could suffer with potentially significant consequences for
Gazprom. This has resulted in an initial interest in hydrogen technology, specifically
methane pyrolysis, which allows the production of hydrogen and black carbon and
where Gazprom claims to have a competitive advantage. However, it remains to be
seen whether and how quickly this technology moves beyond the laboratory stage.
In contrast, other markets are less at risk, and as a result it would be a perfectly
justifiable strategy to try and re-focus hydrocarbon exports towards Asia, Africa,
Latin America, and this has indeed become a long-term goal. However, Europe
cannot be ignored because it is too important for short-term revenues, but Russia’s
real energy transition strategy for the next 20–30 years may just be to become the
lowest cost hydrocarbon supplier to emerging economies.
It would also seem that nuclear development could be a part of a transition strat-
egy. It is of course controversial, but arguably Rosatom could become a key export
company, not only providing Russia with additional revenues but also strengthening
its geopolitical influence, especially in non-OECD countries which still have fast
growing energy demand.
Russia may also attempt to establish itself as an equipment and software producer
for green energy, but it remains an open question as to whether it can realistically hope
to compete with China and the US on a technology front. As a result, its best option
may be to make incremental improvements at home while encouraging the coal-to-
gas switching model in emerging economies by continuing to offer low-cost gas (and
to an extent oil) to markets where the cost of energy supply and improving air quality
is more important than any CO2emission targets.
Finally, one area of competitive advantage in a decarbonizing energy world may
be the potential for reforestation across Russia’s huge geography. Companies are
gradually waking up to this potential, as even if they do not believe in anthropogenic
112 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
emissions as an issue themselves, they can see that a business advantage could be
gained from addressing the problem as perceived by other countries. As a result, use
of reforestation as a carbon offset mechanism, either for direct gain or to add “green
value” to Russia’s hydrocarbon exports, may become a growing theme over the next
decade.
References
Aksyutin OE et al (2017) The contribution of the gas industry to the formation of an energy
model based on hydrogen. Vesti gas science—scientific and technical collection. Environmental
protection, energy saving and labor protection in the oil and gas complex. Special edition - 2017,
p. 12
BANKTRACK (2019) Bank moves out of coal: A guide to the latest new banking sector commit-
ments on reducing coal financing”, https://www.banktrack.org/campaign/bank_moves_out_of_
coal?fbclid=IwAR2AwpQfYxEbIl7hXdQMfqiQhzrWPVaEJb1HzaZtAe1c3ueBwUIstVFhb1g.
Accessed 17 November 2019
Bashmakov I (2018) What Happens to the Energy Intensity of Russia’s GDP? Ecological Bulletin
of Russia 7:8 (in Russian)
Bashmakov I. (2013), “Driving Industrial Energy Efficiency in Russia”, Center of Energy Efficiency
(CENEf), Moscow, March 2013. Available at: http://www.cenef.ru/file/Idustry-eng.pdf (2013).
Accessed 17 November 2019
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2017) “New Energy Outlook”
Diesel & Gas Turbine Worldwide (2006), “30th Power Generation Order Survey”
ERI RAS & AC RF (2016), “Global and Russian Energy Outlook Up To 2040”, Available at: https://
www.eriras.ru/files/forecast_2016.pdf Accessed 17 November 2019
ERI RAS & SKOLKOVO (2019), “Global and Russian Energy Outlook 2019”, Energy Research
Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences & The Energy Centre, Moscow School of
Management SKOLKOVO, Moscow 2019. Available at: https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/
documents/SEneC/Research/SKOLKOVO_EneC_Forecast_2019_EN.pdf. Accessed 17 Novem-
ber 2019
GARANT.ru (2017), Presidential Decree of May 13, 2017 No. 208 “On the Strategy of Economic
Security of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2030”, Available at: https://www.garant.
ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/71572608/ (in Russian). Accessed 17 November 2019
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2018) Electricity Information. IEA/ OECD Publications, Paris
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2011) World Energy Outlook 2011. IEA/OECD Publications,
Paris, p 2011
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2017) “Renewable Energy Prospects for
the Russian Federation (REmap working paper)”, IRENA, Available at: https://www.irena.
org/publications/2017/Apr/Renewable-Energy-Prospects-for-the-Russian-Federation-REmap-
working-paper Accessed 17 November 2019
Khokhlov A., Melnikov Y., Veselov F., Kholkin D., Datsko K. (2018), “Distributed energy resources
in Russia: Development Potential”, SKOLKOVO EnergyCentre, Moscow School of Management
SKOLKOVO, October 2018. Available at: https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/documents/
SEneC/Research/SKOLKOVO_EneC_DER_2018.10.09_Eng.pdf Accessed 17 November 2019
KOMMERSANT (2016), “Favorable Climate” Kommersant Business Guide, 26 May 2016.
Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2988887 (in Russian). Accessed 17 November
2019
Makarov I.A. (2016), “Russia’s Participation in International Environmental
Cooperation”, Journal Strategic Analysis, Volume 40, Issue 6. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.1224062. Accessed 17 November 2019
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 113
Makarov I. A., Chen H. Y., Paltsev S. (2017), “Finding Itself in the Post-Paris World: Russia in the
New Global Energy Landscape”, MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research,
No. WP-2017-022, Joint Program Report Series Report 324, December 2017
Mehling M., van Asselt H., Das K., Droege S., Verkuijl C. (2017), “Designing Border Carbon
Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action”, Climate Strategies, December 2017. Available at:
https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CS_report-Dec-2017-4.pdf
Melnikov Y., Mitrova T., Chugunov D. (2019), “The hydrogen economy: a path towards
low carbon development”, SKOLKOVO Energy Centre, Moscow School of Management
SKOLKOVO, June 2019. Available at: https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/documents/SEneC/
Research/SKOLKOVO_EneC_Hydrogen-economy_Eng.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2019
Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation (2018), “State Report on the State of
Energy Savings and Energy Efficiency in the Russian Federation in 2017” Moscow, (in Russian)
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation (2019a) State Strategy “Energy Development”, (in
Russian). https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/323 (2019). Accessed 17 November 2019
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation (2019b), “Presentation on the results of the Fuel and
Energy Complex functioning in 2018 and its targets for 2019”, Moscow, (in Russian)
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation (2017), “Draft Energy Strategy Up to 2035”, Available
at: https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/1920 (in Russian). Accessed 17 November 2019
Morris A. C. (2018), “Making Border Carbon Adjustments Work in Law and Practice”, Tax Policy
Center, Urban & Brookings Institution, 26 July 2018. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2018/07/TPC_20180726_Morris-Making-Border-Carbon-Adjustments-
Work.pdf
OSCE (2013) Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy
Supply, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Federal Ministry for the
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 24 April 2013. https://www.osce.org/
eea/101047 Accessed 17 November 2019
Ponomarev—Stepnoi NN et al (2018) Nuclear energy technological complex with high temperature
gas cooled reactors for large scale environmentally friendly hydrogen production from water and
natural gas. Gas Industry, 11, 2018
Power Technology (2018) Is Russia finally ready to embrace renewable energy? https://www.power-
technology.com/features/russia-renewable-energy/ Accessed 17 November 2019
Rhodium Group (2017) What Is It Worth? The State of the Art in Valuing Distributed Energy
Resources. https://rhg.com/research/what-is-it-worth-the-state-of-the-art-in-valuing-distributed-
energy-resources/ Accessed 17 November 2019
Smil V (2018) Energy and Civilization: A History. MIT Press
Staffell I, Jansen M, Chase A, Cotton E, Lewis C (2018) Energy Revolution: Global Outlook. Drax,
5 December 2018.https://www.drax.com/energy-policy/energy-revolution-global-outlook/
The Moscow Times (2019) Murmansk launches construction of Russia’s largest wind power
park, 24 September 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/24/murmansk-launches-
construction-of-russias-largest-wind-power-park-a67406
Trading Economics (2018) Russia GDP Growth Rate. https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-
growth. Accessed 17 November 2019
Trüby J, Schiffer HW (2018) A review of the German energy transition: taking stock, looking ahead,
and drawing conclusions for the Middle East and North Africa. Energy Transitions, Volume 2,
Issue 1–2, pp. 1–14, December 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41825-018-0010-2 Accessed 17
November 2019
Tynkkynen V, Pynnöniemi K, Höysniemi S (2017) Global energy transitions and Russia’s
energy influence in Finland, Policy Brief. 19/2017. https://tietokayttoon.fi/documents/
1927382/2116852/19_Global+energy+transitions+and+Russias+energy+influence+in+Finland.
pdf/67f16b9c-daa7-445b-9ad6-76a6c1b30a99/19_Global+energy+transitions+and+Russias+
energy+influence+in+Finland.pdf?version=1.0
114 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
UNEP (2019) Global Launch of the UN Principles for Responsible Banking, Press-release,
24 September 2019. https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/speech/global-launch-un-
principles-responsible-banking
World Bank & Ecofys (2018), “State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018”, World Bank, Washing-
ton, DC, May 2018. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/
29687/9781464812927.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y
World Nuclear Association (2019) Nuclear Power in Russia. https://www.world-nuclear.
org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/russia-nuclear-power.aspx. Accessed 17
November 2019
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
