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Editorial: Memory as Mental Time Travel
Abstract
Originally understood as memory for the “what”, the “when”, and the “where” of experienced past events, episodic memory has, in recent years, been redefined as a form of past-oriented mental time travel. Following a brief review of empirical research on memory as mental time travel, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, which explore the theoretical implications of that research.
... Trainees might have thought about such a return in a mental time travel [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37]. The authors' realization makes a trainee's daydreams come true in unfolding stories. ...
Fiction is an ancient virtual reality technology that specializes in simulating human problems. The stories told are the media and, according to Marshall McLuhan, the medium is the message. The technology is interwoven with up to date digital media design and information technologies including artificial intelligence (AI). According to Keith Oatley, stories are the flight simulators of human social life. From the many fields of human life, emphasis is put on the training of occupational accident prevention. The potential of storytelling is deployed for the prevention of accidents to preserve human lives, to avoid human injuries, the damage of installations and financial losses. Aiming at effectiveness and sustainability, the task under consideration is the interdisciplinary design of spaces of stories with a high educational potential. The authors abandon the educational paradigm of telling stories of disaster. Interactive digital storytelling is tailored to allow for unprecedented learner engagement in stories of success. Prevention training is designed to appear playfully based on the original concept of time travel prevention games. Trainees who failed to complete their task-thereby possibly ruining a (fortunately only virtual) technical installation-are enabled to travel back in time to do better the next time. AI guides the trainees to a success of their own. In the condition of training with time travel prevention games, designing spaces of stories to be experienced playfully is an ambitious variant of gamification. The design of stories in story spaces is a particularly complex case of dynamic AI planning. Patterns that occur in story spaces wrap educational theory as well as ideas of game design. The plan generation concepts foster interdisciplinary cooperation of educators, domain experts, VR specialists, game designers, psychologists, and others in creating spaces of affective stories of success.
... There is a quite recently emerging movement of time travel perspectives at cognitive processes [18][19][20][21], although the ideas have a longer history [22]. Reviews are [23][24][25]. ...
[I decided no longer (only) to copy the abstracts of the publications. Instead, I am giving some retrospective summary.] First, notice that we do not have the right to make the full paper freely available. Readers interested in may contact us for getting a free private copy. Now, a few words about the paper. When dealing with issues of industrial accident prevention, we deploy Time Travel Prevention Games, a concept and a term I introduced on the conference and expo German Prevention Day in 2015. When humans play a particular Time Travel Prevention Game. highly interesting stories unfold. This paper deals with the design of story spaces for the purpose of industrial accident prevention training. [Klaus P. Jantke, 06.10.2024; what follows is the original abstract of the paper.] One may consider fiction an ancient virtual reality technology that specializes in simulating human problems. In the present approach, this is interwoven with up to date digital media design and information and communication technologies. According to Keith Oatley, stories are the flight simulators of human social life. The present work has a slightly narrower focus on the training of industrial accident prevention. The potential of storytelling is deployed for the prevention of accidents to preserve human lives, to avoid human injuries, the damage of installations and financial losses. Aiming at effectiveness and sustainability, the task under consideration is the interdisciplinary design of spaces of stories with high educational potential. Interactive digital storytelling is tailored to allow for unprecedented digital story engagement. Prevention training is designed to appear playfully based on the authors’ original concept of time travel prevention games. Trainees who failed to complete their task – thereby possibly ruining a (fortunately only virtual) technical installation – are enabled to virtually travel back in time to make good the damage. In the condition of training with time travel prevention games, designing spaces of stories to be experienced playfully is an ambitious variant of gamification. The unfolding of personalized stories at play time is controlled by Artificial Intelligence (AI). The design of stories in story spaces is a particularly complex case of dynamic AI planning. Patterns that occur in story spaces wrap educational theory as well as principles of game design. The plan generation concepts underlying the interdisciplinary design of story spaces in which educators, domain experts, learning psychologists, VR specialists, game designers, and others co-operate allow for the exploitation of advanced concepts of interactive digital storytelling such as non-linearity and non-monotonicity.
... Modern humans, or Homo Sapiens, dates 320 000 years before the present (Hublin et al. 2017). We can understand all of this by using a mental capacity called imagery backward and forward in time (Kosslyn and Miller, 2013;Sant'Anna, Michaelian and Perrin, 2020;Schacter, 2007;Schacter, 2010;Suddendorf et al. 2009;Tulving, 1993), i.e, the foundation for academic thinking. ...
Universities are communities that are rooted in a tradition of passing on knowledge, exploratory thinking, and exchanging ideas through language, based on acceptance of viewpoint diversity. This work climate is protected by principles of academic freedom granted by the EU. Recently, signs that academic freedom is being suppressed are showing across the globe; professors in Australia, Canada, India, Sweden, and the USA have been warned or fired because they exercised their freedom of speech. In Finland, a researcher contacted a local newspaper to reveal suppression of freedom of speech at one faculty. Several questions emerge: (1) Why do academic managers suppress researchers freedom of speech? (2) Is this suppression of academic freedom of speech a new thing? (3) What factors have influenced the work climate in this direction? Modern thinking was shaped by evolution and by the many changes in the environment and the diet: social cognition, executive functions,constructive memory, and prospection - a four-part taxonomy: prediction, intention, simulation, and planning, that allows elaborating scenarios. The Milesian School of thinkers and the University of Bologna were founded as communities. Later, during the renaissance, the Copernicus model of heliocentrism was promoted by Galileo Galiei (1564 – 1642), but was met by resistance. The tractate was banned, and Galileo was sentenced to house arrest. In the early 1990s the university management changed with the advent of New public management. Instead of the traditions that emerged from Aesthetics, philosophy, and science, a more business oriented way of running universities was applied. Between 2016 to the present, university professors have been warned, fired and sent alarm about the deteriorating work climate. The way forward is to apply the principles which saw the emergence of the Milesian School of thinkers and the university of Bologna: assignment of learning goals, and decentralization of decision making to attain that goal to the level of operation.
Keywords: Academic bullying, Leadership, Management, decentralization, university work climate, heterodoxy.
... In particular, the "mental time travel" or autonoesis (see Irish et al., 2008;Tulving, 2005) associated with reminiscence may represent an important factor in these effects. The ability to mentally re-experience an event from a first-person perspective, thereby activating the respective sensory areas associated with the sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and other sensory modalities engaged at the time of the memory's formation, may enhance the sense of "presence" during retrieval, in turn heightening the emotional connection to the event (see Sant'Anna et al., 2020;D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). Different methods have been used to probe AM during fMRI scanning. ...
Introduction
Reminiscence therapy (RT), which engages individuals to evoke positive memories, has been shown to be effective in improving psychological well-being in older adults suffering from PTSD, depression, and anxiety. However, its impact on brain function has yet to be determined. This paper presents functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data to describe changes in autobiographical memory networks (AMN) in community-dwelling older adults.
Methods
This pilot study used a within-subject design to measure changes in AMN activation in 11 older adults who underwent 6 weeks of RT. In the scanner, participants retrieved autobiographical memories which were either recent or remote, rehearsed or unrehearsed. Participants also underwent a clinical interview to assess changes in memory, quality of life, mental health, and affect.
Findings
Compared to pretreatment, anxiety decreased (z = −2.014, p = .040) and activated significant areas within the AMN, including bilateral medial prefrontal cortex, left precuneus, right occipital cortex, and left anterior hippocampus.
Conclusion
Although RT had subtle effects on psychological function in this sample with no evidence of impairments, including depression at baseline, the fMRI data support current thinking of the effect RT has on the AMN. Increased activation of right posterior hippocampus following RT is compatible with the Multiple Trace Theory Theory (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997).
... Contrary to traditional philosophical analysis, it does not assume a gap between remembering the past and imagining the future. For a detailed analysis of the models of episodic memory, see, for example, Sant'Anna et al. (2020) and Michaelian (2016). ...
A new interest in space emerged in contemporary studies of body memory. According to Merleau-Ponty, the lived body constitutes a close connection between place and memory. The real or even imagined movements of the body contribute to the recollection of places. Recently, Edward S. Casey and Thomas Fuchs highlighted the constitutive role of the body in remembering. First, the paper intends to show the intertwined relation between body memory and place memory. For instance, Casey regards Proust’s madeleine experience as an instance of place memory, and he argues that the body can sustain and recollect place memories. According to Casey, modern philosophy neglected the concept of place, in which the lived body is dwelling, and introduced the concept of site; that is, the geometrical extension of a homogeneous and isotropic space. Second, the paper examines the psychological and emotional aspects of place memories. According to Fuchs, body and place memory constitute a horizontal unconscious that consists of the zones of attraction and avoidance of the lived space. Finally, the paper argues that place memory has much to offer to the phenomenological investigation of the self. Place memory eventuates the recollection of distant memories in an affectively charged form. This type of memory establishes an affective connection with the past and contributes to the preservation of personal identity.
This chapter puts forward an argument for studying embodiment, and embodied memory in particular, as a stylistic phenomenon. It introduces the concept of body memory with reference to the embodied cognition hypothesis in cognitive linguistics and experimental evidence on the role of the body in remembering. It then zooms in on the main linguistic tools used in the book’s analyses, the notion of construal in Cognitive Grammar and conceptual metaphors that allow for understanding the passage of time in bodily terms. The chapter furthermore provides a territory-mapping discussion of sensory memory in cognitive science and particularly the psychological phenomenon of mental time travel. Lastly, the book’s stylistic take on the lyric and the overall structure of the book are presented.
The (dis)continuism debate —the debate over whether remembering is a form of imagining—is a prominent one in contemporary philosophy of memory. In recent work, Langland-Hassan (2021) has argued that this debate is best understood as a dispute over whether remembering is a form of constructive imagining . In this paper, I argue that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because constructive processes in remembering and imagining are constrained , and hence controlled , in different ways at the level of consciousness. More specifically, I argue that remembering and imagining differ in terms of the interventions we can make on the constructive processes as they unfold. If this is correct, then a form of discontinuism is vindicated: remembering and imagining are, on this view, processes of different kinds.
The method of phenomenal contrast (in perception) invokes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as a means to discover its contents. The method implicitly takes for granted that ‘what it is like’ to have a perceptual experience e is the same as ‘what it is like’ to imagine or recall it; accordingly, in its various proposed implementations, the method treats imaginations and/or recollections as interchangeable with real experiences. The method thus always contrasts a pair of experiences, at least one of which is imagined or remembered rather than occurrent. Surveying all eighteen forms of implementing the method, I argue that in all of the proposed pairings, the substitution of imagination or recollection for perceptual experience in the method, is either inconceivable or impermissible. I identify four reasons why I think imagination cannot be substituted for real experience, and three reasons why recollection cannot be substituted for real experience. If my argument works, there is no form of implementing the method that is useful for discovering the contents of experience, and thus the method is not a well-functioning tool to study the contents of perception.
La metáfora de la memoria como “viaje mental en el tiempo” (“mental time travel” en inglés) ha tenido una gran influencia en la ciencia cognitiva de la memoria así como también en la filosofía de la memoria contemporánea. A pesar de su relevancia, no ha habido ninguna discusión teórica real ni sobre el significado de la metáfora en sí misma ni sobre su adecuación para dar cuenta de los recuerdos de experiencias pasadas. Este artículo trata de llenar este vacío al examinar con más detalle la metáfora del “viaje mental en el tiempo”, centrándose más específicamente en los problemas que dicha noción presenta. Si la metáfora del “viaje mental en el tiempo” pretende referir no solo a una facultad o sistema cerebral sino también a una experiencia subjetiva particular, como así ha sido sugerido en la literatura, no es de por sí evidente que sea compatible con las nociones de (re)construcción y simulación con las que se la asocia frecuentemente, ni que describa de manera fehaciente la fenomenología de todo recuerdo del pasado personal. Si, por el contrario, sólo se refiere a una facultad o sistema cerebral y no pretende dar cuenta de la fenomenología del recuerdo, el uso de dicho término parece perder todo sentido para nombrar dicha facultad. A pesar de su relevancia, la metáfora del “viaje mental en el tiempo” no se ha impuesto como paradigma único: otras metáforas distintas continúan guiando actualmente programas más o menos fructíferos de investigación de la memoria. El artículo concluye que aunque dicha metáfora fue beneficiosa en su momento para la ciencia y la filosofía de la memoria, el examen minucioso de dicha noción sugiere que no constituye realmente una buena metáfora de la memoria sobre las experiencias pasadas, por lo que debería ser abandonada.
The current dispute between causalists and simulationists in philosophy of memory has led to opposing attempts to characterize the relationship between memory and imagination. In a recent overview of this debate, Perrin and Michaelian (2017) have suggested that the dispute over the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination boils down to the question of whether a causal connection to a past event is necessary for remembering. By developing an argument based on an analogy to perception, I argue that this dispute should instead be viewed as a dispute about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining. The focus on attitudes, rather than on causal connections, suggests a new way of conceiving of the relationship between memory and imagination that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of memory.
O que é o lembrar? Quando podemos dizer que um sujeito lembra um evento do passado? Essas são duas questões centrais na filosofia da memória, uma área que vem experimentando uma rápida expansão nos últimos anos. Por quase meio século, a teoria causal da memória, inicialmente proposta por Martin e Deutscher (1966), dominou o debate sobre como devemos responder às duas questões iniciais. Mais recentemente, no entanto, a teoria causal se tornou alvo de duras críticas, o que motivou os filósofos da memória a desenvolverem duas novas teorias sobre o lembrar: a teoria simulacionista e a teoria funcionalista. Neste artigo, exploramos essas teorias em mais detalhes com o objetivo de tornar mais claro quais são seus comprometimentos, assim como suas vantagens e desvantagens.
When a person decides to do something in the future, she forms an intention and her intention persists. Philosophers have thought about the rational requirement that an agent’s intention persists until its execution. But philosophers have neglected to think about the causal memory mechanisms that could enable this kind of persistence and its role in rational long-term agency. Our aim of this paper is to fill this gap by arguing that memory for intention is a specific kind of memory. We do this by evaluating and rejecting standard declarative accounts of memory for intention and arguing for the plausibility of an alternative model of memory for intention. We argue for the alternative by spelling out a number of computational principles that could enable retaining and retrieving intentions from long-term memory. These principles could explain a number of core features of intentions.
The construct “remembering” is equivocal between an epistemic sense, denoting a distinctive ground for knowledge, and empirical sense, denoting the typical behavior of a neurocognitive mechanism. Because the same kind of equivocation arises for other psychologistic terms (such as believe, decide, know, judge, decide, infer and reason), the effort to spot and remedy the confusion in the case of remembering might prove generally instructive. The failure to allow these two senses of remembering equal play in their respective domains leads, I argue, to unnecessary confusion about memory externalism, the possibility of episodic memory in non-human species, and the thesis of memory continuism. By distinguishing these equivocal senses of remembering, we thus gain leverage on understanding how the distinctive epistemic norms that define many of our psychologic terms are more plausibly related to the capacities studied by empirical science, given that neither identity nor elimination are possible.
Mental time travel (MTT) is defined as projecting the self into the past and the future. Despite growing evidence of the similarities of remembering past and imagining future events, dominant theories conceive of these as distinct capacities. I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process – constructive episodic simulation – and demonstrate that the ‘simulation system’ meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system. Irrespective of whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation system: (1) acts on the same information, drawing on elements of experience ranging from fine-grained perceptual details to coarser-grained conceptual information and schemas about the world; (2) is governed by the same rules of operation, including associative processes that facilitate construction of a schematic scaffold, the event representation itself, and the dynamic interplay between the two (cf. predictive coding); and (3) is subserved by the same brain system. I also propose that by forming associations between schemas, the simulation system constructs multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation is mapped by the hippocampus. Finally, I suggest that simulation is a general capacity that underpins other domains of cognition, such as the perception of ongoing experience. This proposal has some important implications for the construct of ‘MTT’, suggesting that ‘time’ and ‘travel’ may not be defining, or even essential, features. Rather, it is the ‘mental’ rendering of experience that is the most fundamental function of this domain-general simulation system enabling humans to re-experience the past, pre-experience the future, and also comprehend the complexities of the present.
Re-encountering certain kinds of artworks in the present (re-listening to music, re-reading novels) can often occasion a kind of recollection akin to episodic recollection, but which may be better cast as ‘phasic’, at least insofar as one can be said to remember ‘what it was like’ to be oneself at some earlier stage or phase in one’s personal history. The kinds of works that prompt such recollection, I call ‘still lives’ - they are limited wholes whose formal properties are stable over time. In the first part of the paper, I spell out a way of making sense of the peculiar power that certain artworks have to occasion such recollection – it is, as I explain, a power or ductus that derives from the form of the artwork, though possession of such a power is not limited to art. I then detail three dimensions along which episodic recollection and phasic recollection as occasioned by re-encountering ‘still lives’ differ: metaphysical, phenomenological, and descriptive. In the second half, I explore a challenge for my account of phasic recollection, which in turn helps make more vivid my proposal as well as the spectral analogy at the heart of it: Just as one can see regions behind one by looking in the direction of a mirror located in the same space in which one is, sometimes by re-encountering certain kinds of artworks now, past intervals or phases ‘behind one’ can be ‘made present’ in a way that the paper aims to make plain. I also explain to what extent phasic recollection might be understood as a form of mental time travel, and what the attendant phenomenology of ‘transportation’ involves.
The paper develops an account of minimal traces devoid of representational content and exploits an analogy to a predictive processing framework of perception. As perception can be regarded as a prediction of the present on the basis of sparse sensory inputs without any representational content, episodic memory can be conceived of as a “prediction of the past” on the basis of a minimal trace, i.e., an informationally sparse, merely causal link to a previous experience. The resulting notion of episodic memory will be validated as a natural kind distinct from imagination. This trace minimalist view contrasts with two theory camps dominating the philosophical debate on memory. On one side, we face versions of the Causal Theory that hold on to the idea that episodic remembering requires a memory trace that causally links the event of remembering to the event of experience and carries over representational content from the content of experience to the content of remembering. The Causal Theory, however, fails to account for the epistemic generativity of episodic memory and is psychologically and information-theoretically implausible. On the other side, a new camp of simulationists is currently forming up. Motivated by empirical and conceptual deficits of the Causal Theory, they reject not only the necessity of preserving representational content, but also the necessity of a causal link between experience and memory. They argue that remembering is nothing but a peculiar form of imagination, peculiar only in that it has been reliably produced and is directed towards an episode of one’s personal past. Albeit sharing their criticism of the Causal Theory and, in particular, rejecting its demand for an intermediary carrier of representational content, the paper argues that a causal connection to experience is still necessary to fulfill even the minimal requirements of past-directedness and reliability.
Every episodic memory entails a sense of identity, which allows us to mentally travel through time. There is a special way by which the subject who is remembering comes into contact with the self that is embedded in the episodic simulation of memory: we can directly and robustly experience the protagonist in memory as ourselves. This paper explores what constitutes such experience in memory. On the face of it, the issue may seem trivial: of course, we are able to entertain a sense of identity—the experience of our recollection structurally resembles our perception of the original event. However, given the phenomenon of observer memory, in which our visual perspective is decoupled from our embodied dimension, it is unclear whether it is the observing or the embodied one that is identified. This phenomenon is important not only in illustrating the complexity of identification but also in assessing how best to address it. In this paper, the issue is analyzed through concepts introduced from the literature on bodily self-consciousness. The potential approaches to addressing the issue of identification are examined, including the inheritance view, according to which the identification relies on the inheritance of mnemonic content from the original experience. I propose and argue for the self-simulation view, which suggests that what results in the experience of “I am this” in memory is the observing and the embodied dimensions as well as the relation between them, which enable different ways of projecting oneself into an episodic simulation.
The paper discusses radical constructivism about episodic memory as developed by Kourken Michaelian under the name of “simulationism”, a view that equates episodic memory with mental time travel. An alternative, direct realist view is defended, which implies disjunctivism about the appearance of remembering. While admitting the importance of mental time travel as an underlying cognitive mechanism in episodic memory, as well as the prima facie reasonableness of the simulationist’s critique of disjunctivism, I formulate three arguments in defense of disjunctivism, which thus appears to be a feasible alternative to radical constructivism.
In the philosophy of memory, singularism is the view that episodic memories are singular mental states about unique personally experienced past events. In this paper, I present an empirical challenge to singularism. I examine three distinct lines of evidence from the psychology of memory, concerning general event memories, the transformation of memory traces and the minimized role temporal information plays in major psychological theories of episodic memory. I argue that singularist views will have a hard time accommodating this evidence, facing a problem of transitional gradation. I then look at some potential consequences for the larger debate, highlighting the way in which singularism has featured in three important recent arguments in the philosophy of memory.
When faced with intertemporal choices, which have consequences that unfold over time, we often discount the future, preferring smaller immediate rewards often at the expense of long-term benefits. How psychologically connected one feels to one’s future self-influences such temporal discounting. Psychological connectedness consists in sharing psychological properties with past or future selves, but connectedness comes in degrees. If one feels that one is not psychologically connected to one’s future self, one views that self like a different person and is less likely to wait for the future reward. Increasing perceived psychological connectedness to one’s future self may lead to more far-sighted decisions. Episodic prospection may help in this regard. Episodic prospection is our ability to ‘pre-experience’ the future by mentally simulating it, drawing on information from episodic memory and other sources. Episodic memory and prospection are thought to involve a special form of consciousness, which underpins the capacity to appreciate the connection between one’s past, present, and future selves. Simulating the future self through prospection may increase felt psychological connectedness and support future-oriented decision-making. Yet this is where a puzzle arises. The imagery of episodic memory and prospection is perspectival: often one views the visualised scenario from a detached perspective, seeing oneself from-the-outside as if viewing another person. The aim of this paper is to characterise how the perspectival imagery of prospection relates to psychological connectedness, and to show that even though such imagery involves a detached perspective it can still be used to help reward one’s future self.
The more interest philosophers take in memory, the less agreement there is that memory exists—or more precisely, that remembering is a distinct psychological kind or mental state. Concerns about memory’s distinctiveness are triggered by observations of its similarity to imagination. The ensuing debate is cast as one between discontinuism and continuism (Perrin, D in Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives of Future Oriented Mental Time Travel, 39–61, 2016). The landscape of debate is set such that any extensive engagement with empirical research into episodic memory places one on the side of continuism. Discontinuists concerns are portrayed as almost exclusively conceptual and a priori. As philosophers of memory become increasingly interested in memory science, this pushes continuism into an apparent lead. The aim of this paper is to challenge this characterization of the (dis)continuism debate—namely, that a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of mind and memory favors continuism. My response has two components. First, I argue for weakening the alignment between naturalism and continuism. Second, I defend a naturalistically oriented, empirically-informed discontinuism between memory and imagination. I do so by introducing seeming to remember, which I argue is distinct from other mental attitudes—most importantly, from imagining.
According to simulationism, the function of episodic memory is not to remember the past, but to help construct representations of possible future episodes, by drawing together features from different experiential sources. This article suggests that the relationship between the traditional storehouse view, on which the function of memory is remembering, and the simulationist approach is more complicated than has been typically acknowledged. This is attributed, in part, to incorrect interpretations of what remembering on the storehouse view requires. Further, by appeal to function pluralism, the article questions both the assumption that the traditional view and simulationism are inconsistent, and the simulationist’s inference to the best explanation strategy that is based upon this assumption. The article then provides an evaluation of the simulationist argument against the traditional view, and finds it in need of further support.
Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can shed some light on the experience of mental time travel. This is the view that, when a subject remembers some fact episodically, their memory represents itself as coming from a perception of that fact. I propose that the experience of mental time travel in memory is the experience of representing one of the elements in this complex content, namely, the past perceptual experience of the remembered fact. In defence of this proposal, I offer two considerations. Firstly, the proposal is consistent with the idea that memories enjoy a temporal phenomenology (specifically, a feeling of pastness). Secondly, the proposal is consistent with the possibility that some of our other cognitive capacities might yield an experience of mental time travel which can be oriented towards the future. I argue that the received conception of mental time travel is in tension with those two ideas.
The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role in the development of memory research in the last couple of decades. Despite its growing importance in psychology, philosophers have only begun to develop an interest in philosophical questions pertaining to the relationship between memory and mental time travel. Thus, this paper proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memory and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start by discussing some of the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental time travel. I call the resulting view of memory the mental time travel view. I then proceed to consider important philosophical questions pertaining to memory and develop them in the context of the mental time travel view. I conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory and research on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional philosophical questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before. © 2018 Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos. All Rights Reserved.
Semantic dementia is a progressive neurodegenerative condition characterized by the profound and amodal loss of semantic memory in the context of relatively preserved episodic memory. In contrast, patients with Alzheimer's disease typically display impairments in episodic memory, but with semantic deficits of a much lesser magnitude than in semantic dementia. Our understanding of episodic memory retrieval in these cohorts has greatly increased over the last decade, however, we know relatively little regarding the ability of these patients to imagine and describe possible future events, and whether episodic future thinking is mediated by divergent neural substrates contingent on dementia subtype. Here, we explored episodic future thinking in patients with semantic dementia (n = 11) and Alzheimer's disease (n = 11), in comparison with healthy control participants (n = 10). Participants completed a battery of tests designed to probe episodic and semantic thinking across past and future conditions, as well as standardized tests of episodic and semantic memory. Further, all participants underwent magnetic resonance imaging. Despite their relatively intact episodic retrieval for recent past events, the semantic dementia cohort showed significant impairments for episodic future thinking. In contrast, the group with Alzheimer's disease showed parallel deficits across past and future episodic conditions. Voxel-based morphometry analyses confirmed that atrophy in the left inferior temporal gyrus and bilateral temporal poles, regions strongly implicated in semantic memory, correlated significantly with deficits in episodic future thinking in semantic dementia. Conversely, episodic future thinking performance in Alzheimer's disease correlated with atrophy in regions associated with episodic memory, namely the posterior cingulate, parahippocampal gyrus and frontal pole. These distinct neuroanatomical substrates contingent on dementia group were further qualified by correlational analyses that confirmed the relation between semantic memory deficits and episodic future thinking in semantic dementia, in contrast with the role of episodic memory deficits and episodic future thinking in Alzheimer's disease. Our findings demonstrate that semantic knowledge is critical for the construction of novel future events, providing the necessary scaffolding into which episodic details can be integrated. Further research is necessary to elucidate the precise contribution of semantic memory to future thinking, and to explore how deficits in self-projection manifest on behavioural and social levels in different dementia subtypes.
Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering is typically thought to happen because our memory system malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory’s malfunction, but rather as the normal result of a larger cognitive system that performs a different function, and for which remembering is just one operation. Building upon extant psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I offer a picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system that supports not only thinking of what was the case and what potentially could be the case, but also what could have been the case. More precisely, I claim that remembering is a particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the flexible recombination of different components of encoded traces into representations of possible past events that might or might not have occurred, in the service of constructing mental simulations of possible future events.
So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations hath diverse names.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1.2.
The ability to mentally simulate hypothetical scenarios is a rapidly growing area of research in both psychology and neuroscience. Episodic future thought, or the ability to simulate specific personal episodes that may potentially occur in the future, represents one facet of this general capacity that continues to garner a considerable amount of interest. The purpose of this article is to elucidate current knowledge and identify a number of unresolved issues regarding this specific mental ability. In particular, this article focuses on recent research findings from neuroimaging, neuropsychology, and clinical psychology that have demonstrated a close relation between episodic future thought and the ability to remember personal episodes from one's past. On the other hand, considerations of the role of abstracted (semantic) representations in episodic future thought have been noticeably absent in the literature. The final section of this article proposes that both episodic and semantic memory play an important role in the construction of episodic future thoughts and that their interaction in this process may be determined by the relative accessibility of information in memory.
© The Author(s) 2010.
Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability to mentally project oneself backward or forward in time in order to remember an event from one's personal past or to imagine a possible event in one's personal future. Past and future MTT share many similarities, and there is evidence to suggest that the two temporal directions rely on a shared neural network and similar cognitive structures. At the same time, one major difference between past and future MTT is that future as compared to past events generally are more emotionally positive and idyllic, suggesting that the two types of event representations may also serve different functions for emotion, self, and behavioral regulation. Here, we asked 158 participants to remember one positive and one negative event from their personal past as well as to imagine one positive and one negative event from their potential personal future and to rate the events on phenomenological characteristics. We replicated previous work regarding similarities between past and future MTT. We also found that positive events were more phenomenologically vivid than negative events. However, across most variables, we consistently found an increased effect of emotional valence for future as compared to past MTT, showing that the differences between positive and negative events were larger for future than for past events. Our findings support the idea that future MTT is biased by uncorrected positive illusions, whereas past MTT is constrained by the reality of things that have actually happened.
Despite the growing interest in future-oriented cognition in various areas of psychology, there is still little empirical data regarding the occurrence and nature of future-oriented thoughts in daily life. In this study, participants recorded future-oriented thoughts occurring in natural settings and rated their characteristics and functions. The results show that future-oriented thoughts occur frequently in daily life and can take different representational formats (more or less abstract), embrace various thematic contents (e.g. work, relationships) and serve a range of functions (e.g. action planning, decision making). The functions and characteristics of thoughts differed according to their temporal distance, with thoughts referring to the near future being more specific and serving action planning to a greater extent than thoughts concerning the far future. The characteristics of future thoughts were also related to affective content, with positive thoughts being more frequent, more specific, and associated with more visual images than negative thoughts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
There are logical and empirical grounds that link episodic memory and the ability to imagine future events. In some sense, both episodic memory and episodic foresight may be regarded as two sides of the same capacity to travel mentally in time. After reviewing some of the recent evidence for commonalities, I discuss limits of these parallels. There are fundamental differences between thinking about past and future events that need to be kept in clear view if we are to make progress in understanding the nature of mental time travel. The reviewed evidence suggests that mental time travel is based on a complex system selected not for accuracy about past and future per se, but for fitness benefits. Functional analyses promise to lead to fruitful avenues for future research. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Mechanisms that produce behavior which increase future survival chances provide an adaptive advantage. The flexibility of human behavior is at least partly the result of one such mechanism, our ability to travel mentally in time and entertain potential future scenarios. We can study mental time travel in children using language. Current results suggest that key developments occur between the ages of three to five. However, linguistic performance can be misleading as language itself is developing. We therefore advocate the use of methodologies that focus on future-oriented action. Mental time travel required profound changes in humans’ motivational system, so that current behavior could be directed to secure not just present, but individually anticipated future needs. Such behavior should be distinguishable from behavior based on current drives, or on other mechanisms. We propose an experimental paradigm that provides subjects with an opportunity to act now to satisfy a need not currently experienced. This approach may be used to assess mental time travel in nonhuman animals. We conclude by describing a preliminary study employing an adaptation of this paradigm for children.
While the self has been extensively explored in amnesic patients with severe episodic but not semantic memory disturbance, little is known about the self in semantic dementia (SD), which generally features the reverse pattern of impairment. In the present study, we investigated the structural (self-representations) and functional (consciousness) dimensions of the self in a group of eight SD patients in the early to moderate stages of the disease. We used two original tasks designed to probe both structural characteristics, namely the strength and the certainty of self-concept and the episodic/semantic nature of self-representations, and functional characteristics, namely autonoetic/noetic level of consciousness, self-evaluation and self-projection into the past, present and future. Results for the structural self showed impairment on the semantic aspects of the self-representations, except for those related to the present. Moreover, SD patients were affected regardless of the episodic or semantic nature of self-representations into the future. As regards the functional self, self-projection and level of consciousness were only impaired for the future. This study confirms the persistence of a feeling of identity in SD over time for the past and present selves. However, it also highlights the loss of the future self in SD patients. These results are discussed in relation to models of long-term memory and future thinking focusing on the interplay of episodic and semantic memory and mental time travel.
Episodic memory is widely conceived as a fundamentally constructive, rather than reproductive, process that is prone to various kinds of errors and illusions. With a view towards examining the functions served by a constructive episodic memory system, we consider recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies indicating that some types of memory distortions reflect the operation of adaptive processes. An important function of a constructive episodic memory is to allow individuals to simulate or imagine future episodes, happenings and scenarios. Since the future is not an exact repetition of the past, simulation of future episodes requires a system that can draw on the past in a manner that flexibly extracts and recombines elements of previous experiences. Consistent with this constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, we consider cognitive, neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence showing that there is considerable overlap in the psychological and neural processes involved in remembering the past and imagining the future.
We investigate the common development of children's ability to "look back in time" (retrospection, episodic remembering) and to "look into the future" (prospection). Experiment 1 with 59 children 5 to 8.5 years old showed mental rotation, as a measure of prospection, explaining specific variance of free recall, as a measure of episodic remembering (retrospection) when controlled for cued recall. Experiment 2 with 31 children from 5 to 6.5 years measured episodic remembering with recall of visually experienced events (seeing which picture was placed inside a box) when controlling for recall of indirectly conveyed events (being informed about the pictures placed inside the box by showing the pictures on a monitor). Quite unexpectedly rotators were markedly worse on indirect items than non-rotators. We speculate that with the ability to rotate children switch from knowledge retrieval to episodic remembering, which maintains success for experienced events but has detrimental effects for indirect information.
We recently reported that older adults generate fewer episodic details than younger adults when remembering past events and when simulating future events. We suggested that the simulation findings reveal an age deficit in recombining episodic details into novel events, but they could also result from older adults “recasting” entire past events as future events. In this study, we used an experimental recombination paradigm to prevent recasting while imagining and to compare imagining the future with imagining the past. Older adults generated fewer episodic details for imagined and recalled events than younger adults, thereby extending the age-related simulation deficit to conditions of recombination.
After thinking about the past and imagining the future, how do people separate these real and imagined events in memory? We had subjects engage in past and future autobiographical elaboration, then later take memory tests that required them to recollect these earlier generated events. In Experiment 1, testing memory for previously generated past or future autobiographical events led to fewer source memory confusions than did an elaborative control task, suggesting that the distinctive features of autobiographical elaboration improved subsequent retrieval monitoring accuracy. In Experiment 2, we directly compared retrieval monitoring accuracy for previously generated past and future autobiographical events and found that subjects made fewer source confusions when searching memory for future events. This asymmetry suggests that the features characterizing future elaborations (e.g., cognitive operations) were used more effectively during reality monitoring than were the features characterizing past elaborations (e.g., perceptual details), and has implications for future-oriented theories of memory.
Over the past decade, episodic memory has been reconceptualised as future-oriented. In 2007, Schacter and I proposed the ‘constructive episodic simulation hypothesis’ to account for emerging findings that past and future thinking share overlapping cognitive and neural substrates, arguing that the constructive nature of episodic memory provides the perfect neurocognitive architecture for future simulation. Here, I update and refine this theoretical position, arguing that, fundamentally, episodic memories are not special. I shift the emphasis from conceptualising memory as the basis of imagination, instead proposing that both are instantiations of the same constructive simulation process. I synthesise emerging neuroscientific perspectives to show how the brain’s default mode network underpins the remembering, imagining and perception of event representations via a common simulation process that is constructive and iterative, involving the interaction of pre-existing knowledge and reinstated perceptual content with incoming experiential information to create and refine online mental simulations of experience.
Donna Rose Addis.
This introductory chapter reviews research on future-oriented mental time travel to date (the past), provides an overview of the contents of the book (the present), and enumerates some possible research directions suggested by the latter (the future).
Continuists maintain that, aside from their distinct temporal ori-entations, episodic memory and future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) are qualitatively continuous. Discontinuists deny this, arguing that, in addition to their distinct temporal orientations, there are qualitative metaphysical or epistemological differences between episodic memory and FMTT. This chapter defends continuism by responding both to arguments for metaphysical discontinuism, based on alleged discontinuities between episodic memory and FMTT at the causal, intentional, and phenomenological levels, and to arguments for episte-mological discontinuism, based on alleged discontinuities with respect to the epistemic openness of the past and future, the directness or in-directness of our knowledge of past and future, and immunity to error through misidentification. The chapter concludes by sketching a positive argument for continuism.
Drawing on current research in psychology, a new philosophical account of remembering as imagining the past.
In this book, Kourken Michaelian builds on research in the psychology of memory to develop an innovative philosophical account of the nature of remembering and memory knowledge. Current philosophical approaches to memory rest on assumptions that are incompatible with the rich body of theory and data coming from psychology. Michaelian argues that abandoning those assumptions will result in a radically new philosophical understanding of memory. His novel, integrated account of episodic memory, memory knowledge, and their evolution makes a significant step in that direction.
Michaelian situates episodic memory as a form of mental time travel and outlines a naturalistic framework for understanding it. Drawing on research in constructive memory, he develops an innovative simulation theory of memory; finding no intrinsic difference between remembering and imagining, he argues that to remember is to imagine the past. He investigates the reliability of simulational memory, focusing on the adaptivity of the constructive processes involved in remembering and the role of metacognitive monitoring; and he outlines an account of the evolution of episodic memory, distinguishing it from the forms of episodic-like memory demonstrated in animals.
Memory research has become increasingly interdisciplinary. Michaelian's account, built systematically on the findings of empirical research, not only draws out the implications of these findings for philosophical theories of remembering but also offers psychologists a framework for making sense of provocative experimental results on mental time travel.
This article examines the effects of memory loss on a patient's ability to remember the past and imagine the future. We present the case of D.B., who, as a result of hypoxic brain damage, suffered severe amnesia for the personally experienced past. By contrast, his knowledge of the nonpersonal past was relatively preserved. A similar pattern was evidenced in his ability to anticipate future events. Although D.B. had great difficulty imagining what his experiences might be like in the future, his capacity to anticipate issues and events in the public domain was comparable to that of neurologically healthy, age-matched controls. These findings suggest that neuropsychological dissociations between episodic and semantic memory for the past also may extend to the ability to anticipate the future.
During the past few years, there has been a dramatic increase in research examining the role of memory in imagination and future thinking. This work has revealed striking similarities between remembering the past and imagining or simulating the future, including the finding that a common brain network underlies both memory and imagination. Here, we discuss a number of key points that have emerged during recent years, focusing in particular on the importance of distinguishing between temporal and nontemporal factors in analyses of memory and imagination, the nature of differences between remembering the past and imagining the future, the identification of component processes that comprise the default network supporting memory-based simulations, and the finding that this network can couple flexibly with other networks to support complex goal-directed simulations. This growing area of research has broadened our conception of memory by highlighting the many ways in which memory supports adaptive functioning.
The recent attempt to move research in cognitive psychology out of the laboratory makes autobiographical memory appealing, because naturalistic studies can be done while maintaining empirical rigor. Many practical problems fall into the category of autobiographical memory, such as eyewitness testimony, survey research, and clinical syndromes in which there are distortions of memory. Its scope extends beyond psychology into law, medicine, sociology, and literature. Work on autobiographical memory has matured since David Rubin's Autobiographical Memory appeared in 1986, and the timing is right for a new overview of the topic. Remembering our Past presents innovative research chapters and general reviews, covering such topics as emotions, eyewitness memory, false memory syndrome, and amnesia. The volume will appeal to graduate students and researchers in cognitive science and psychology.
The study of future thinking is gaining mo-mentum across various domains of psychology. Mentally projecting the self forward in time (i.e., mental time travel) is argued to be uniquely human and of vital importance to the evolution of human culture. Yet it is only recently that developmentalists have begun to study when, and how, this capacity emerges. I begin by outlining the concept of mental time travel, along with newly developed methodol-ogies to test children's ability to mentally project the self into the future. Data suggest that this ability is in place by ages 4 or 5 but also reveal conditions under which children may experience difficulty accurately predicting their future desires. I conclude by discussing how the research on children's mental time travel can be used to further our understanding of the development of future-oriented behaviors, including planning and delaying gratification. KEYWORDS—future thinking; mental time travel; episodic memory; conceptual development; planning Humans spend a great deal of time anticipating, planning for, and contemplating the future. Our future thinking is directed toward such ordinary events as what to wear the next day or where to go for lunch, but also toward more significant choices that will potentially impact our long-term happiness and suc-cess, such as accepting a job or getting married. The fact that we think (and often ruminate) about these and numerous other aspects of our personal futures is argued to be a reflection of our cognitive capacity for mental time travel (e.g., Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2005).
This book presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, defends a version of the causal theory of memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial for memory. The book argues that memory, unlike knowledge, implies neither belief nor justification. There are instances where memory, though hitting the mark of truth, succeeds in an epistemically defective way. This book shows that, contrary to received wisdom in epistemology, memory not only preserves epistemic features generated by other epistemic sources but also functions as a source of justification and knowledge. According to the causal theory of memory argued for in this book, the dependence of memory states on past representations supports counterfactuals of the form: if the subject hadn't represented a given proposition in the past he wouldn't represent it in the present. The book argues for a version of content externalism whereupon the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past physical or social environment. Moreover, it shows that memory doesn't require identity, but only similarity, of past and present attitudes and contents. The notion of content similarity is explicated in terms of the entailment relation.
Numerous neuroimaging studies have revealed that in young adults, remembering the past and imagining the future engage a common core network. Although it has been observed that older adults engage a similar network during these tasks, it is unclear whether or not they activate this network in a similar manner to young adults. Young and older participants completed two autobiographical tasks (imagining future events and recalling past events) in addition to a semantic-visuospatial control task. Spatiotemporal Partial Least Squares analyses examined whole brain patterns of activity across both the construction and elaboration of autobiographical events. These analyses revealed that that both age groups activated a similar network during the autobiographical tasks. However, some key age-related differences in the activation of this network emerged. During the construction of autobiographical events, older adults showed less activation relative to younger adults, in regions supporting episodic detail such as the medial temporal lobes and the precuneus. Later in the trial, older adults showed differential recruitment of medial and lateral temporal regions supporting the elaboration of autobiographical events, and possibly reflecting an increased role of conceptual information when older adults describe their pasts and their futures.
The role of the hippocampus in imagining the future has been of considerable interest. Preferential right hippocampal engagement is observed for imagined future events relative to remembered past events, and patients with hippocampal damage are impaired when imagining detailed future events. However, some patients with hippocampal damage are not impaired at imagining, suggesting that there are conditions in which the hippocampus may not be necessary for episodic simulation. Given the known hippocampal role in memory encoding, the hippocampal activity associated with imagining may reflect the encoding of simulations rather than event construction per se. The present functional (f)MRI study investigated this possibility. Participants imagined future events in response to person, place, and object cues. A postscan cued-recall test probing memory for detail sets classified future events as either successfully encoded or not. A contrast of successfully versus unsuccessfully encoded events revealed anterior and posterior right hippocampal clusters. When imagined events were successfully encoded, both anterior and posterior hippocampus showed common functional connectivity to a network including parahippocampal gyrus, medial parietal and cingulate cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex. However, when encoding was unsuccessful, only the anterior hippocampus, and not the posterior, exhibited this pattern of connectivity. These findings demonstrate that right hippocampal activity observed during future simulation may reflect the encoding of the simulations into memory. This function is not essential for constructing coherent scenarios and may explain why some patients with hippocampal damage are still able to imagine the future.
This study investigated whether temporal clustering of autobiographical memories (AMs) around periods of self-development (Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 2008, 2009) would also occur when imagining future events associated with the self. Participants completed an AM task and future thinking task. In both tasks, memories and future events were cued using participant-generated identity statements (e.g., I am a student; I will be a mother). Participants then dated their memories and future events, and finally gave an age at which each identity statement was judged to emerge. Dates of memories and future events were recoded as temporal distance from the identity statement used to cue them. AMs and future events both clustered robustly around periods of self-development, indicating the powerful organisational effect of the self. We suggest that life narrative structures are used to organise future events as well as memories.
Episodic future thinking is a projection of the self into the future to mentally preexperience an event. Previous work has shown striking similarities between autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking in response to various experimental manipulations. This has nurtured the idea of a shared neurocognitive system underlying both processes. Here, undergraduates generated autobiographical memories and future event representations in response to cue words and requests for important events and rated their characteristics. Important and word-cued events differed markedly on almost all measures. Past, as compared with future, events were rated as more sensorially vivid and less relevant to life story and identity. However, in contrast to previous work, these main effects were qualified by a number of interactions, suggesting important functional differences between the two temporal directions. For both temporal directions, sensory imagery dropped, whereas self-narrative importance and reference to normative cultural life script events increased with increasing temporal distance.
Recent findings suggest that constructed experience, the ability to envision future events, activates the same cortical network as recollection of past events. For example, damage to one key area, the hippocampus, impairs patients' ability to remember the past and to imagine novel experiences (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). Here, we investigated whether damage to two other areas, posterior parietal cortex and prefrontal cortex, also impairs this ability. Patients with bilateral posterior parietal lesions or unilateral prefrontal lesions were tested in their ability to describe imaginary future events. Only parietal patients were impaired at freely describing autobiographical memories, but both patient groups were impaired when elaborating constructed experiences. This dissociation suggests that parietal and prefrontal structures are differentially involved in constructed experience. Current tasks may impose overly broad cognitive demands making it impossible to specify the deficient cognitive component in any patient group. These findings provide additional constraints regarding the mechanistic role of the parietal cortex in memory.