Rebel governance, rebel legitimacy, and external intervention: assessing three phases of Taliban rule in Afghanistan

Abstract

This article focuses on rebel governance and rebel legitimacy during civil war. It investigates how external intervention in support of an incumbent government and withdrawal of external forces shape rebel legitimacy dynamics and rebels’ opportunities to govern. It adopts a longitudinal perspective on Afghanistan’s Taliban, analyzing three phases of the movement’s existence. Moral forms of legitimacy resonated particularly during instances of external intervention, whereas pragmatic forms of legitimacy became more relevant after the withdrawal of external forces and during periods of the Taliban’s opponents’ ineffective governance. The article is based on a literature review and fieldwork in Afghanistan.

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Rebel governance, rebel legitimacy, and external
intervention: assessing three phases of Taliban
rule in Afghanistan
Niels Terpstra
To cite this article: Niels Terpstra (2020): Rebel governance, rebel legitimacy, and external
intervention: assessing three phases of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, Small Wars & Insurgencies,
DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2020.1757916
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1757916
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 25 May 2020.
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Rebel governance, rebel legitimacy, and external
intervention: assessing three phases of Taliban rule
in Afghanistan
Niels Terpstra
Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article focuses on rebel governance and rebel legitimacy during civil war. It
investigates how external intervention in support of an incumbent government
and withdrawal of external forces shape rebel legitimacy dynamics and rebels’
opportunities to govern. It adopts a longitudinal perspective on Afghanistan’s
Taliban, analyzing three phases of the movement’sexistence.Moralformsof
legitimacy resonated particularly during instances of external intervention, whereas
pragmatic forms of legitimacy became more relevant after the withdrawal of
external forces and during periods of the Taliban’s opponents’ineffective govern-
ance. The article is based on a literature review and fieldwork in Afghanistan.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 4 December 2019; Accepted 4 March 2020
KEYWORDS Rebel governance; rebel legitimacy; external intervention; Taliban; Afghanistan
Introduction
In response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, international
coalition forces and their Afghan allies ousted the Taliban regime from power.
Although the Taliban regime collapsed quickly, the movement re-grouped in
Pakistan and re-appeared as an insurgency only a few years later. As of 2020,
the Taliban controls large swaths of Afghanistan’s territory. As in the 1990s, it
has become increasingly involved in governance, expanding the reach of its
judiciary and governors. Though the Taliban are known to rule by coercion and
intimidation, the movement has also gained a level of legitimacy among
segments of the civilian population at the expense of the Afghan state.
However, how the Taliban legitimizes its rule and how civilians respond to
this require further empirical study.
This article, therefore, focuses on how the Taliban has become involved in
governance and how it has attempted to acquire legitimacy. Several authors
have investigated questions of rebel governance and legitimacy over the past
CONTACT Niels Terpstra n.m.terpstra@uu.nl Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht University,
Drift 6, 3512BS, Utrecht, The Netherlands
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1757916
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.

decade, mainly from a political science or anthropology perspective.
1
The
recent academic literature onrebel governance aims for a better understanding
of the interactions between rebels and civilians during civil war.
2
It criticizes the
‘failed state’paradigm and attempts to show that political and social order each
exist in various ways during civil wars.
3
Related studies have tried to gain
a better understanding of rebel legitimacy.
4
Rebels often draw from a variety
of sources to legitimize their own existence and justify their rule.
5
The dynamics of rebel governance and rebel legitimacy, however, do not
exist in isolation from other powerful actors. The actions/responses of the
state are relevant to the analysis of rebel legitimacy as well.
6
Powerful
external actors may also influence the relations between armed groups and
civilians.
7
Much research has been devoted to the effects of external support
to rebel groups
8
and the attempts of rebel groups to acquire international
legitimacy and/or recognition.
9
In this article I shift the perspective and
demonstrate how powerful external actors that support the incumbent gov-
ernment shape (though less directly) the dynamics of rebel governance and
rebel legitimacy. The presence of foreign enemy forces is an important source
of legitimacy for rebel groups and has remained relatively under-studied in
the literature on rebel governance.
Rebel legitimacy is a function of present-day events but also of prior armed
conflicts and societal tensions. As Schröder and Schmidt observe, ‘the most
important code of the legitimation of war is its historicity.’
10
In other words,
the ‘symbolic meaning of prior wars is re-enacted and reinterpreted in the
present, and present violence generates symbolic value to be employed in
future confrontations.’
11
It is therefore necessary to study rebel governance
and legitimacy from a longitudinal perspective. Whereas current sources of
legitimacy, such as service provision and protection, are an important part of
the analysis, the legitimizing effect of prior events, and external interventions
in particular, require further scrutiny. Omitting historical sources of legitimacy
may lead to an incomplete understanding of rebel groups’legitimacy.
The Afghan Taliban have had a unique historical trajectory. Some mem-
bers were part of the mujahideen
12
fighting against the Soviet regime; they
then formed a separate insurgency (pre-1996), transitioned to a semi-
recognized statehood (1996–2001), were ousted from power, and again
started an insurgency against the new Afghan government and coalition
forces (2001–2020). To understand where specific sources of legitimacy ori-
ginate, it is necessary to consider the period prior to the US intervention in
2001 and even before the Taliban established itself as a separate movement
in 1994. For example, many older-generation Taliban commanders –as well
as many commanders/governors in the current Afghan government –shared
their experiences as mujahideen. This is still relevant today.
Previous research regarding the historical trajectory of the Taliban takes
different positions in terms of continuity and change. As Ruttig notes, for
2N. TERPSTRA

example, ‘the [Taliban’s] organizational structure including the composition
of its leadership, ideology, political aims and programme’has remained
largely consistent from the 1990s until the 2010s.
13
Conversely, Strick van
Linschoten and Kuehn warn against perceiving the Taliban’s thinking and
policies as static; rather, they insist they are evolving.
14
By applying the
concepts of governance and legitimacy to the full timeframe of the Taliban,
this article aims to show the specificities of both continuity and change. The
findings are based on fieldwork data collected between 2013 and 2018 and
insights from several previous studies.
15
This article makes empirical and conceptual contributions to the academic
literature. First, it reiterates that the Taliban has emphasized and de-
emphasized specific religious, cultural, and political sources of legitimacy over
the past decades. I argue that moral forms of legitimacy resonated particularly
during instances of external intervention, while pragmatic forms of legitimacy
became more relevant after the withdrawal of external forces and during
instances of the Taliban’s opponents’ineffective governance. Second, this
article highlights the contrasting effects of external intervention on rebel
governance and rebel legitimacy. External intervention in support of an incum-
bent government decreases the number of opportunities for rebel groups to
govern, while it increases the potential moral sources of rebel legitimacy.
However, the departure of external forces gives rebels opportunities to govern,
while it diminishes the resonance of some specific moral sources of legitimacy.
First, I discuss the theoretical background of rebel governance and rebel
legitimacy. Then, I present my methodological considerations. Subsequently,
I analyze the traces of governance and legitimacy in the pre-1996 insurgency
phase, the phase of the Taliban’s proclaimed Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
(IEA) between 1996–2001, and the post-2001 insurgency phase. The last
section presents the main findings and contributions.
Rebel governance and legitimacy during civil war
Rebel governance
Rebel governance usually takes place under the conditions of civil war. Civil war
can appropriately be defined as ‘armed combat within the boundaries of
a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority
at the outset of the hostilities.’
16
Within the boundaries of that initial sovereign
entity, several armed groups may operate, often competing with one another.
This includes various types of rebel groups, militias, auxiliary forces, self-defense
forces, para-militaries, warlords, and strongmen.
17
Hence, during a civil war,
territorial control becomes fragmented and controlled by more than just state
actors. Different warring parties fully or partially control territories, while other
swaths of territories are contested with shifting frontlines.
18
Crucially, however,
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 3

the conditions of civil war do not necessarily result in ‘ungoverned spaces.’
19
Sometimes previous governance practices continue, and in other instances
new governance practices emerge.
As Kalyvas notes, insurgency can be understood as ‘a process of competitive
state building.’
20
To gain a better understanding of the relationship between
rebels and civilians during civil war, the concept of governance should not be
understood as the prerogative of a formal government. I agree with Rosenau and
colleagues (1992) and view governance as a more encompassing phenomenon.
Governance embraces informal, non-governmental mechanisms of persons and
organizations as well as formal institutions.
21
According to Kasfir, rebel govern-
ance is, at a minimum, ‘the organization of civilians within rebel-held territory for
apublicpurpose.’
22
As I define it, governance contains no prescriptive implica-
tions; it is comprised of the conduct of rebel-civilian relations regardless of morally
good or bad behavior or treatment by either side.
23
Previous studies show how
armed groups are involved in various governance sectors, including security,
justice, education, health care, taxation, and utility services.
24
In this article
I focus on the Taliban’s two main governance sectors: justice and security.
25
Changes regarding external involvement can create incentives for armed
groups to become more prominently involved in governance.
26
After the
withdrawal of external troops, power vacuums can emerge, which armed
groups may exploit. In Sri Lanka, for example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) suddenly controlled of much of the northern territories after the
Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) withdrew in 1990. The Northern Jaffna
peninsula came under full rebel control, and became the first locality that was
de facto-governed by the LTTE.
27
The vacuum that external political actors
leave behind provides opportunities for rebels to govern.
28
The dynamics of rebel legitimacy
Rebel groups and civilians
Rebels that are involved in governance cannot take their relationship with the
civilian population for granted. The dynamics of legitimacy are in a permanent
state of contestation.
29
Even rebel groups that rely mainly on coercion to
implement their rule may pursue legitimation practices to increase civilian
compliance. According to Suchman, legitimacy is a ‘generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions.’
30
Despite the absence of juridical legitimacy or international recog-
nition, rebel groups may hold a level of legitimacy among a particular
constituency.
31
While external legitimacy –i.e., how a rebel group is viewed
and treated in the international arena –is an important element, particularly for
secessionist movements,
32
I largely confine my analysis to the relationship
between rebels and civilians but take into account external actors that support
4N. TERPSTRA

the incumbent government as this influences the legitimation practices of the
Taliban vis-à-vis civilians.
For analytical purposes, I distinguish two forms of rebel legitimacy, but
I acknowledge that these forms of legitimacy may empirically overlap and
intertwine. These two forms of legitimacy are pragmatic and moral legitimacy.
Pragmatic legitimacy is based on the provision of services, protection, or even
a willingness to share power, while moral legitimacy is based on ‘narratives of
goodness, compatibility with existing norms and moral codes,’and, for exam-
ple, ‘explicitly referenced against religion or ethnicity.’
33
Pragmatic legitimacy includes the provision of basic services, sometimes
referred to as ‘delivery-based legitimation.’
34
Pragmatic legitimacy can also be
based on the rebel group’s ability to provide protection or a relatively stable
social and political order. Especially in countries racked by civil war, the capacity
of an armed organization to offer protection and stability is important to civilian
populations.
35
Moral forms of legitimacy refer to a broader set of social norms
and moral codes in society. As Schlichte and Schneckener note, rebels’claims to
legitimacy are often tied to encompassing ideologies or worldviews.
36
This
includes, for instance, religious ideas of a political order. Moreover, rebels’
claims to legitimacy are often rooted in ‘communal myth-symbol complexes,’
popular belief systems, traditions, and cultures.
37
Furthermore, moral claims to
legitimacy are often made in reference to external threats and established
enemy depictions. By portraying the enemy as ‘particularly brutal, inhuman
and evil, the armed group aims not only to create solidarity but also to present
itself and its violent actions as necessary, appropriate and comparatively less
destructive.’
38
Crucially, without the recognition of followers, the legitimacy of
a movement or its ideas does not exist.
39
Like the concept of power, rebel
legitimacy is a relational notion, not a fixed attribute.
40
Incumbent governments’responses
Although rebel groups stake their claim to legitimacy strategically, not all
legitimation effects occur due to actions of the rebels alone.
41
Legitimacy is
affected by contextual factors, such as the actions of opposing parties. In Sri
Lanka, for example, the operations and actions of the Sri Lankan Armed
Forces and the intervening IPKF also contributed to perceptions regarding
the LTTE’s legitimacy.
42
Corruption and misconduct within the Afghan gov-
ernment and the inability to protect its citizens legitimize the insurgency if
the Taliban is relatively better capable of providing some rule of law and
relative stability.
43
It is not a zero-sum game, but the incumbent govern-
ment’s actions also shape the dynamics of rebel legitimacy.
Powerful external actors
Powerful external actors affect the dynamics of rebel legitimacy too.
44
Some
provide external support to rebel groups, such as military, moral, political, or
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 5

material support.
45
In this article, however, I focus on powerful external actors that
side with the incumbent government. The intervention of the Soviet Union and
the intervention of the coalition forces have been important factors fostering
armed resistance over time.
46
Methodology
This article presents three case studies of rebel governance and legitimacy
corresponding to three phases of Taliban rule. The first two phases are mainly
based on document research. I relied on the vast amount of literature on the
Taliban movement and the contemporary political history of Afghanistan. The
third phase is mainly based on empirical evidence from fieldwork. Accordingly,
this article combines a literature-based macro perspective with a more empiri-
cal micro perspective to connect past and present forms of Taliban rule.
The findings are partly based on various fieldwork trips by the author to
Afghanistan since 2013. I conducted fieldwork in Kunduz province and Kabul
in 2013 and 2016 in collaboration with various Afghan research organizations.
In 2013, a total of 99 structured interviews were held with community
members, militiamen, local elders, jirga/shura members, civil society repre-
sentatives, Afghan Local Police (ALP) officers, and Afghan National Police
(ANP) officers in Kunduz. On the German-led Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT)
47
in Kunduz, I conducted in-depth interviews with police trainers,
military staff, diplomats, and NGO workers. During the fieldwork conducted in
2016, I interviewed various analysts, NGO workers, diplomats, military staff,
and informants from Kunduz and Kabul.
The latest set of interviews dates from late 2018. I cooperated with The Liaisons
Office (TLO) in Kabul, and we developed a structured questionnaire with open-
ended questions in order to investigate the experiences of civilians under Taliban
rule. Researchers from TLO who were originally from Kunduz province conducted
20 structured interviews with civilians who lived under the direct control and/or
influence of the insurgency in Chahar Dara district, Kunduz province. The themes
covered during these interviews were the implementation of the Taliban’srule,
modes of governance, governance interactions, service provision, and symbolism.
Throughout 2018, local sources living under Taliban rule in Kunduz province were
consulted to corroborate specificfindings from interviews and open-source data.
This sample of respondents is certainly notrepresentativeofKunduzprovinceor
the population of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the data provide unique insight into
daily civilian life under Taliban rule. The data come with several limitations that
should be kept in mind.
48
The triangulation of different sources has reduced but
not eliminated these methodological concerns. The article proceeds with the
analysis of the three selected phases of Taliban rule: early insurgency (pre-1996),
semi-recognized statehood (1996–2001), and post-2001 insurgency (2001–2019).
6N. TERPSTRA

From the fall of the Shah to the emergence of the Taliban
insurgency (1973–1996)
Context of resistance: early Taliban ‘fronts’
To understand the emergence of the Taliban, we need to study the 1970s and
1980s. In 1973, Mohammed Daoud Khan, supported by a fraction of the
military and leftist parties, seized power from his cousin (and long-term
rival), King Zahir Shah, in a bloodless coup d’état.
49
Daoud ended the mon-
archy of the Shah and proclaimed a republic.
50
While attempting to sideline
his leftist allies, Daoud also attempted to wipe out the Islamists that opposed
him. Simultaneously, the opposition to Daoud, in the form of the Marxists and
the Islamists, stepped up their recruiting efforts, seeking to weaken Daoud’s
power.
51
For years, Afghanistan had been courted by the United States and
the Soviet Union in their Cold War rivalry, but by the 1970 s, the amount of
Soviet advisors increased, and the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) gained more support in urban areas.
52
Factions of the
PDPA came to power in a coup d’état in April 1978, which was later referred to
as the Saur Revolution.
53
The newly established PDPA regime was not only interested in ruling the
country but was also keen to transform Afghanistan by revolutionary policies
of land reform, education reform, and changes in family law.
54
The revolu-
tionary regime of the PDPA attempted to clear the country of religious
elements and opposing forces, including traditional landowners, the old
military establishment, and the Islamic clergy.
55
The regime rejected the
country’s traditional Islamic symbols of legitimacy by striking religious saluta-
tions from government speeches and decrees, and it changed the color of
Afghanistan’sflag to red.
56
Overall, the regime legitimized its policies in
Marxist terms.
From the beginning, revolts against the PDPA involved religious motives and,
occasionally, religious forms of organization.
57
Prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion,
the PDPA regime faced resistance since it was seen by many Afghans as ‘godless’
(kafer), but after the Soviet invasion, a nationalist element gained more promi-
nence: the fight against an ‘illegitimate foreign occupation’.
58
Hence, a crucial
element in the mobilization of the broader public and its religious clergy was the
arrival of Soviet troops in 1979–1980.
59
Overall, both Islamic resistance and
nationalistic resistance were apparent in the 1970s and 1980s even before the
Taliban existed as a separate movement.
What became known as the Taliban movement emerged from religious
networks that were part of the wider resistance in the 1980s.
60
The primary
motivation of the mujahedeen groups and the first-generation Taliban among
them can be described as political and based on religious infrastructure. In
the 1980s, the Taliban, led by their religious teachers, did not yet constitute
a separate movement as we know it at the present time, but so-called ‘Taliban
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 7

fronts’already existed amongst the mujahideen.
61
Early incarnations of these
Taliban fronts were primarily mullahs leading their students
62
–taliban –as
commanders.
63
These fronts consisted of madrassa- or mosque-centered
networks. The Taliban fronts distinguished themselves from other mujahed-
een groups by a more radically devoted form of religious jihad.
64
The ideolo-
gically heterogeneous resistance was re-interpreted as jihad after Pakistan
officially and exclusively recognized seven Sunni Islamist resistance move-
ments, known as the Peshawar Seven,
65
that exclusively received Western
and Arab financial support.
66
The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
subcontracted its financial contributions through Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), the country’s main intelligence agency. The CIA’s covert
actions empowered the more radical factions of mujahideen, largely at the
direction of the ISI.
67
Traces of governance and legitimacy during the Taliban fronts
The religious clergy already operated so-called mujahideen courts during the
Soviet–Afghan war. These pre-Taliban courts would settle disputes, and the
mujahideen largely respected the court’sjudgements.
68
The courts were initially
indistinguishable from the military clout of the commanders, but throughout the
1980s, courts were established as separate institutions at various locations in
Afghanistanandrunbyclericsofdifferent mujahideen groups.
69
What would
become the Taliban leadership already yielded a certain status of legitimacy due
to these religious courts. Mullahs set up structures providing conflict mitigation;
they would pass judgements and issue edicts and fatwas that were mainly
concerned with issues arising among the civilian population or between different
mujahideen groups/factions.
70
Therefore, a level of pragmatic legitimacy based on
these groups’ability to settle disputes already existed.
The Taliban fronts were different from other fronts in terms of composition
and membership. While most of the other fronts were structured along tribal and
kinship lines, the Taliban networks existed through their common educational
backgrounds and their pursuit of religious studies.
71
Their experience as muja-
hideen during the Afghan–Soviet war instilled strong social ties among the
religiousstudentswhohadbecomefighters in the various Taliban fronts.
Though not always in the same group, the Talibs had spent many years together,
always in some form of close proximity or contact.
72
Even today, the Taliban
frequently refer back to the 1980s jihad as part of their founding narrative.
73
Soviet withdrawal and political fragmentation
The withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989 created a power vacuum. Political
fragmentation and continued violence characterized the 1989–1994 period.
Afghanistan descended into a brutal civil war between rivalling mujahideen
8N. TERPSTRA

groups and other strongmen.
74
The war against the Soviet Union had already
lasted for ten years, and its impact on Afghan society was severe. An esti-
mated one to two million Afghans were killed during the war, and land mines
and indiscriminate bombing injured hundreds of thousands more.
75
Hence,
a whole generation grew up as refugees or as fighters.
76
With the Soviet
Union gone, much of the territory was open to armed opportunists and
radical preachers.
77
Local armed groups continued to fight over land, water
sources, and mountain passes at different localities.
78
The various mujahideen
groups became either players in the battle for Kabul or localized armed
actors.
79
The multitude of commanders increasingly tolerated their fighters
to loot and rape the civilian population, partly due to their inability to pay
salaries and as an incentive to keep them fighting.
80
The key individuals that would eventually establish the Taliban as
a separate movement in 1994 were relatively passive between 1989 and
1994.
81
Those who would come to form the senior leadership after 1994
used to be village mullahs or worked in religious education and therefore
returned to their home villages or original madrassas.
82
Some mujahideen,
however, reconvened in 1993 and 1994 to discuss the chaotic situation in
Kandahar. As Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef –a key Taliban figure –interpreted
the situation in early 1994, ‘all over Afghanistan people faced the same
situation; the entire province of Kandahar was crawling with rogue comman-
ders and bandits lingering along the roads and cities.’
83
Allegedly, several
mujahideen who operated in the earlier Taliban fronts approached Mullah
Omar in 1994 with the request to respond collectively to the dire situation in
Kandahar and other areas.
84
The founding meeting of what became the
Taliban movement as we know it today took place in autumn 1994.
85
The initially fragmented political landscape of the civil war slowly trans-
formed from 1994 onward due to the battlefield successes of the Taliban. By
5 November 1994, Taliban fighters had taken over Kandahar city. Initially, the
Taliban’s actions were reactive and not based on long-term goals.
86
The move-
ment, however, gained momentum and expanded from Kandahar province to
Zabul, Helmand, and Uruzgan. It captured Herat in September 1995 and
Jalalabad and Kabul in September 1996. The Taliban continued to target
‘warlords who were deemed responsible for much of the destruction, instabil-
ity, and chaos that plagued the country since the outbreak of the civil war.’
87
An anti-Taliban front formed too late and was far from monolithic as its
members kept subverting one another.
88
These rivalries rendered the opposi-
tion relatively ineffective even after Kabul fell to the Taliban.
89
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 9

Traces of governance and legitimacy after the Soviet Union’s
withdrawal
The decline of legitimacy among the Taliban’s opponents –including other
mujahideen factions –during the early 1990s and the chaotic situation that
followed set the stage for the Taliban’s early success. The inability of various
mujahideen factions to cooperate effectively weakened their legitimacy. The
Taliban gradually expanded the reach of its Taliban courts nationwide from
1994 onward. In addition to the military advances, the movement presented
itself as an organization with a strict religious ideology and the ability to re-
establish law and orderafter years of disunity among various mujahideen and
the exhausting civil wars.
90
Though the movement was certainly unable to
live up to all its promises, it created a level of order in the areas it controlled.
The civilian population had grown tired of the continuing wars between
military commanders, and no credible end was in sight.
91
This context
made the promises of the Taliban resonate, and large segments of the civilian
population initially welcomed the Taliban’sefforts to restore law and order.
92
Phase one findings
During the presence of the Soviet forces, moral forms of legitimacy were most
important, but pragmatic forms of legitimacy were also relevant. The early
Taliban fronts derived their moral legitimacy from religious networks and
sources. They claimed to be involved in a religiously ‘justified’battle against
‘foreign occupation.’Furthermore, some of the mujahideen courts already
provided the Taliban fronts with a measure of pragmatic legitimacy. In the
years after the Soviet withdrawal and the political fragmentation that fol-
lowed, pragmatic forms of legitimacy became increasingly important, espe-
cially the Taliban’s ability to provide law and order. These years laid the
foundations for the IEA, as discussed below.
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001)
The Taliban captures Kabul, proclamation of the IEA
The second phase of Taliban rule followed the capture of Kabul in
September 1996 and the proclamation of the IEA. Militarily, various commanders
of Junbesh (Dostum), Jamiat-e Islami (i.e.,Masoud,Rabbani,AttaNoor,andIsmail
Khan), and Hezb-i Islami (Hekmatyar) continued to challenge the Taliban or had
brief alliances with it but with limited success.
93
Overall, the Taliban was militarily
successful and able to increase its control over Afghan territory significantly over
these five years until the US-led intervention of 2001.
10 N. TERPSTRA

Governance during the IEA
The increased territorial control put the Taliban in a position to become more
involved in governance.
94
During the IEA, the Taliban formed a two-track govern-
ance system, including a political–military leadership council based in Kandahar
called the Supreme Council and an executive Council of Ministers in Kabul.
95
While the Supreme Council represented the Taliban as an insurgency, the Council
of Ministers reflected the Taliban’sefforts to transform into a state structure.
96
The
Islamic clergy played a central role in the Taliban. In that sense, the Taliban’s
aspirations to govern marked a sharp break with long-standing Afghan political
traditions. Despite the fact that religion had always played a significant role in
Afghan politics, Muslim clerics had alwaysfunctionedasservantsofthestate
rather than its leaders.
97
Given the role of the mullahs in the resistance against the
Soviets, the clergy rose from ‘social inferiority to a position of political power.’
98
That system of governance built on the unofficial power that mullahs already
possessed: ‘the power of the sermon.’
99
The position of mullahs strengthened
when the Taliban regime turned them into the ‘eyes and ears’in the villages and
started to emphasize the collection of ushr and zakat, the religious taxes that
traditionally made up the mullahs’income.
100
Although the Taliban has always claimed to implement sharia,thereisan
underlying ambiguity regarding its interpretation. As Otto notes, ‘Like its counter-
part “Islamic law”the term “sharia”is surrounded with confusion between theory
and practice, between theological and legal meanings, between internal and
external perspectives, and between past and present manifestations.’
101
There is
not one static and uncontested sharia. There have been different interpretations
throughout time, in various countries, and from various positions –e.g., law-
makers, judges, religious scholars, religious leaders, and academics.
102
In fact, all
Afghan constitutions except the Constitution of 1980 already endorsed the
supremacy of sharia in Afghanistan, but the Taliban’s interpretation of sharia
was different from that of previous regimes.
103
During the IEA, the Taliban established its religious police, deployed by the
Taliban’s so-called Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of
Vice.
104
This department ‘was given unlimited authority for the enforcement of all
decrees issued by the Taliban Government.’
105
Its enforcement had a strong effect
on public life, particularly for women. As Rashid notes, ‘An announcement on
Radio Kabul on 28 September 1996 stated that “thieves will have their hands and
feet amputated, adulterers will be stoned to death and those drinking alcohol will
be lashed.”TV, video, satellite dishes, music, and games, including chess and
football, were pronounced un-Islamic.’
106
Particularly women were discriminated against and severely constrained
by the IEA regime. The regime essentially controlled every aspect of women’s
behavior both in the private and public sphere.
107
As explained by Yassari
and Saboory, women were
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 11

Forbidden to take employment, to appear in public without a male relative, to
participate in government or public debate, and to receive secondary or higher
education. As a result, women were deprived of the means to support them-
selves and their children. Only female doctors and nurses were allowed –under
strict observation of the religious police –to work in hospitals or private clinics.
These edicts were . . . enforced through summary and arbitrary punishment of
women by the religious police.
108
According to Edwards, the Taliban ‘forced women in territory under their
control to wear the burqa, the traditional Afghan head-to-toe veil that has
a small patch of gauze over the eyes. They have declared that Saudi-style
veils, which do not cover the eyes, are not allowed.’
109
The Taliban excluded
women from all public places and enforced a strict code imposing the veiling
and seclusion of women, and it banned all forms of entertainment.
110
The IEA’s implementation of the law stood in stark contrast with that of the
communist regime and with the norms and values of large segments of the
population. As Yassari and Saboory explain,
A decree issued in 1997 by Mullah Omar, the founder of the Taliban movement,
declared that all the laws against the principles of HanafiIslamic jurisprudence were
not applicable. The Taliban announced via the radio that after the seizure of Kabul,
they would abolish all the laws and regulations of the communist regime and
reintroduce the system of law that was in place during Zahir Shah’s reign (1964–-
1973), with the exception of the provisions related to the king and the monarchy.
111
During the IEA, the Taliban enforced a religious regime with a severe and
coercive interpretation of sharia.
112
This included a violent display of public
punishments, coercing the population to follow the rules that, among others,
prohibited music, shaving beards, and flying kites and ordered the exclusion
of women from public life.
113
Viewing themselves as custodians of Islamic
justice, the Taliban courts were an important institution to materialize the
Taliban’s vision.
114
Its implementation of sharia through the mullahs had not
been so prominent in the past because the Afghan state had assumed some
of these functions.
115
Now that the Taliban had captured state institutions, it
implemented its rules more widely and comprehensively.
Legitimacy during the IEA
Pragmatic forms of legitimacy
While the Taliban was initially lauded for bringing a measure of security to the
regions it captured, its social and religious policies were widely unpopular
among the general public.
116
Its social and religious policies were met with
resistance, particularly in the bigger cities.
117
Particularly in cities like Kabul
and Mazar-e Sharif, the Taliban’s conservative style of living contrasted with
the modern lifestyle of much of the urban population and was confronted
with pushback. For example, Wormer notes,
12 N. TERPSTRA

The commanders of the Taliban forces in Mazar-e Sharif did not stick to the
agreement to share power with Malek Pahlawan and immediately introduced
their interpretation of sharia law in the city instead. The Taliban soldiers closed
the city’s school as well as the university and tried to completely disarm all
North Alliance militias, including Malek’s. When some Wahdat units
118
resisted,
an uprising against the Taliban broke out in one of the Hazara quarters and
quickly seized the entire city. On 29 May, 1,000 to 1,500 Taliban soldiers were
killed and nearly 3,000 captured.
119
To give another example, on 17 October 1996, over one hundred women in
Herat protested against the closure of bath houses.
120
The women were
beaten and arrested by the religious Taliban police, and men were warned
to keep their women inside their houses.
121
Moral forms of legitimacy
In April 1996, only a few months before the Taliban was able to capture Kabul,
approximately 1,500 Islamic scholars from across Afghanistan gathered to meet.
During this gathering, the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, was proclaimed the Amir
ul-Mu-mineen (‘Commander of the Faithful’).
122
The proclamation aimed to pro-
ject the universal nature of the movementthattranscendedtribalandethnic
divisions.
123
In its commissioned national anthem, the Taliban made no strong
ethnic or Pashtun allusions; instead, it chose ‘to refer to Islamic or other national
symbols.’
124
The claimed legitimacy of the movement and its leadership was
derived from Islam and was presented as standing in the tradition of previous
caliphates.
125
The religious and political institutions merged into one person and
one institution. As Strick van Linschoten explains, ‘some of the most symbolic and
powerful/potent moments and statements from during the Taliban’srulecome
when the distinction was blurred; Mullah Mohammad Omar’sassumptionofthe
title amir ul-mu’mineen is perhaps the best example of this –amosquewasthe
site of what was directly a merger between religious and political spheres of
activity.’
126
However, based on religious claims and sources, the Taliban’s rule was not
necessarily perceived as legitimate by the general public. Coercion strongly
underpinned the Taliban’s Emirate, which makes it questionable whether the
extreme interpretations of religious sources attracted approval from the
population.
127
Ibrahimi elaborates in that regard:
Although Afghanistan is an Islamic country and Islam has functioned as a source
of legitimacy and jurisprudence for centuries, the Taliban’s interpretation of
Islam and its coercive approach to enforcing it was not broadly welcomed in the
country. Except for individuals who joined the Taliban, the rest of the Afghan
population, even the rural religious communities, did not tend to freely follow
the Taliban’s Islamism.
128
Moreover, in terms of legitimacy, the remaining perception of favoritism
towards ethnic Pashtuns was a problem for the Taliban. The Taliban’s
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 13

ideology potentially allowed the movement to overcome ethnic, political,
and regional barriers, but in practice it failed to expand its core leadership
beyond its parochial Pashtun base throughout these years.
129
As Ibrahimi
explains,
. . . despite the Taliban’s claim of being ethnically tolerant, there is numer-
ous empirical data and evidence that indicate the IEA’s ethnic-based beha-
vior. The IEA was entirely dominated by Pashtuns with other ethnic groups
being excluded from the IEA’s political and leadership arenas. For example,
non-Pashtuns were largely excluded from the IEA’s both governing coun-
cils, the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers. Of the six original
members of the Supreme Council, five were Pashtuns and only one . . . was
a Tajik from Badakhshan. Likewise, out of 17 members of the Council of
Ministers in 1998, only two were non-Pashtuns.
130
In a similar vein, Edwards’s study indicates that the Taliban specifically encoun-
tered resistance from non-Pashtun communities. Most non-Pashtun groups
showed ‘little willingness to relinquish their hard-earned autonomy.’
131
Moreover, the
. . . determination of the Taliban to impose their morality throughout the
country . . . further alienated groups with different and often considerably
more liberal traditions (for example, with regard to female veiling and the
right of individuals to worship as often and with whom they please) than
those of the conservative and conformist Taliban.
132
Afinal problem regarding legitimacy during the IEA was the lack of
a clear external enemy. What had ‘glued’together some fighters of the
mujahideen during the Soviet–Afghan war, for example, was a common
enemy in the image of the Soviet Union and the Afghan government.
133
For the Taliban regime, the common enemy had become less obvious. As
Barfield points out, ‘In the absence of an external enemy, the Taliban
found it difficult to gain legitimacy internally when so many Afghans saw
its regime as too dominated by Pakistan and al Qaeda Arabs.’
134
Particularly from 1998 onward, the Taliban became more heavily reliant
upon foreigners, such as Pakistani recruits from madrassas and interna-
tional jihadis (e.g., Arabs, Uzbeks, and Chechens).
135
Phase two findings
Although the Taliban proved to be militarily superior to its opponents during
the 1990s, the movement faced several challenges once it was put to the test
of governing the country. The Taliban was initially hailed for restoring order
and security. Locally, this gave them a measure of pragmatic legitimacy.
However, as the Taliban expanded its reach throughout the country, it
became clear that its social and religious policies encountered fierce
14 N. TERPSTRA

resistance, particularly in larger cities and within non-Pashtun communities.
Moreover, an essential form of moral legitimacy disappeared during this
phase due to the lack of a clear external enemy.
A return to ruling as insurgents (2001–2019)
Below, I discuss the third phase: the post-2001 insurgency. This analysis
combines a macro perspective with a micro perspective of Chahar Dara
district in Kunduz province.
US-led intervention, the Taliban reverts to insurgency mode
After the US and its allies ousted the Taliban regime from power in 2001, the
Taliban leadership went into hiding, watching the events in Afghanistan
unfold. The Taliban initially contemplated an inclusion in the new political
system, but that seemed impossible given the US ‘no talks with terrorists’
policy.
136
Instead, the Taliban reverted to a strategy of insurgency. As early as
April 2002, Taliban messaging re-appeared in Afghanistan in the form of
night letters and leaflets, in which the movement called upon the population
to resist the new Afghan government and its international allies.
137
By mid-
2003, the Taliban leadership had regrouped in Quetta, Pakistan. This is where
the Rhabbari shura, also known as the Quetta shura, was established.
138
Based
on a regional command structure, the initial council members were respon-
sible for specific regions in Afghanistan.
139
During the resurgence phase of
2003 until 2005–2006, the Taliban re-emerged in most areas of
Afghanistan.
140
In the first years, the structure transitioned from a state-like
structure with ministries, a sub-national administration, and a security appa-
ratus back to an insurgent or guerilla movement without a ‘liberated zone’in
which to establish a parallel government. Gradually, however, as its territory
expanded, the Taliban became more involved in governance again.
141
Governance during the post-2001 Taliban insurgency
With fluctuations over time, the movement controlled more territory and re-
established a parallel administration with provincial and district governors,
judges, police, and intelligence commanders and a system of taxation.
142
Through its shadow judiciary and governors, the Taliban increasingly filled poli-
tical spaces and regulated daily life in insurgent-controlled and contested
territories.
143
The key development in governance has been the re-
establishment and expansion of the Taliban’s shadow judiciary.
144
By 2003,
some of the Taliban courts had already re-emerged, though these were initially
mainly reactive bodies that held sessions for specific events and issues.
145
If we
consider Kunduz province, for instance, the Taliban judiciary was one of the main
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 15

mechanisms that resolved judicial cases by 2018, but the exact figures are
unknown.
146
Due to increased territorial control in Kunduz province, the
Taliban judiciary expanded its reach.
147
A respondent from Chahar Dara con-
firmed that the ‘Taliban has courts and judges, who resolve disputes based on
IslamicShariaandrules,’
148
and another respondent noted,
The Taliban might have one or two or more permanent judges, but it is also true that
the Taliban uses a lot of mullahs of the mosque to resolve disputes. For example,
there was a problem between families, then one day the imam of the mosque
mediated and resolved the dispute. People knew that imam of the mosque had
support from the Taliban. If anyone had had a problem with the decision, the imam
couldeasilyenforceitanywayduetotheforceofTaliban.
149
In a recent study by the Afghanistan Analyst Network (AAN) in Dasht-e Archi
district of Kunduz province, most respondents agreed that ‘the Taliban “out-
govern”the Afghan administration particularly in the justice sector in addres-
sing disputes among local people.’
150
This is not because the Taliban judiciary
system is perfectly organized but because the government justice system is
essentially paralyzed, operating remotely from Kunduz city.
151
Locals tend to
take their cases to Taliban courts because cases are generally ‘adjudicated
faster, without corruption and with satisfactory outcomes.’
152
The Taliban continues to implement its interpretation of sharia.Accordingto
one of the respondents, the Taliban ‘make people pray on time in order to stay in
accordance to Sharia. [The Taliban] impose the veil, Chadari [burqa], on women in
order to avoid bi Hejabi [unveiling]. Another example of their imposition is the
prevention of people from playing music in their marriage parties. They even
prevent the use of dollar currency.’
153
Another respondent noted that the Taliban
‘prohibits youths to have smartphones. Ifanyonegetscaughtwithasmartphone,
the Taliban would severely punish that person.’
154
Another respondent men-
tioned that the Taliban representative in his village ‘behaves respectfully with
people and tries his best to resolve disputes. However, he hates government
employees and always preaches that government employees are working for
foreign infidels. When Taliban members commit a wrongdoing, he usually
ignores the issue.’
155
Legitimacy during the post-2001 Taliban insurgency
Pragmatic forms of legitimacy
Continuing its efforts from the IEA, the obvious area for the Taliban to rebuild
its political legitimacy after 2001 was its judiciary.
156
It has used the judiciary
to legitimize itself, condemning the corruption in the Afghan state and
providing an alternative. Weigand indicates that the ability to resolve dis-
putes is one of the main sources of legitimacy for the Taliban.
157
According to
Weigand, ‘What matters much more [to the people] is the perception of the
16 N. TERPSTRA

Taliban as being less corrupt than the state.’
158
Similarly, a respondent in my
study explained, ‘We do not have any issue with any group; the government
and the Taliban do not differ much for us. We want a governing body that can
keep people secure, and it should be in accordance with Islam. Otherwise, we
have no problem with them; we just want peace.’
159
A Pashtun farmer from
Chahar Dara noted, ‘People like that there is no robbery . . . in this Taliban-
controlled area.’
160
Similar to other insurgent courts, the Taliban courts act as
a measure of legitimacy and reach as well as an instrument used to extend
and entrench that legitimacy.
161
Moral forms of legitimacy
The Taliban has incorporated the international troop presence into its natio-
nalistic narrative. Nationalism has been a key element of the Taliban’s com-
munications, beyond a purely Pashtun-centric message.
162
The purpose of
that narrative has been to unite ‘all Afghans’against foreign occupation. The
narrative often includes references to the past, such as the hardships during
resistance against the Soviets, the British, Genghis Khan, and Alexander the
Great.
163
This nationalistic source of legitimacy gained more prominence in
the post-2001 timeframe. The Taliban’s interpretation of the post-2001 situa-
tion became a religious fight that continued against another ‘foreign invader’
with a ‘puppet’Afghan regime.
164
The current framing corresponds to that
during the Afghan–Soviet war: Non-religious outsiders occupy ‘our’land in
cooperation with an ‘ingenuine’Afghan regime. The message conveyed is
that the current coalition forces are the same as the Soviet army in 1980 s.
165
As in the earlier timeframes, the Taliban’s policy has been to re-establish an
Islamic system based on its interpretation of sharia. As Johnson notes, ‘The
Taliban continue to use Islamic piety, based loosely on the strict dogmatic
Deobandi interpretation of Islam, to construct a jihadist image that evokes
righteousness and greater justification to their violent anti-government mili-
tary campaign.’
166
The Taliban’s perspective continues to be that all Muslims
have a duty to protect their religion if it is threatened.
167
A 23-year-old farmer
in Chahar Dara echoed the Taliban’s interpretations and his own perceived
religious duty: ‘We are Muslims and follow the holy Quran. Islam mandates us
to stop the current corrupt government and withstand foreigners who intend
to destroy our country and distance us from Islam.’
168
Others do not share the
Taliban’s religious interpretations and note, for example, that ‘the Taliban
have provided wrong interpretations of Jihad to locals, and they have brain-
washed people through politicizing Islam and portraying a violent under-
standing of Jihad.’
169
In a similar vein, a 43-year-old Pashtun school teacher
from Chahar Dara stated, ‘We are all Muslims, and we know what Islam is, the
principles have been taught to us . . . The Islam that Taliban represents is not
the true one; they are extremists, while Islam in every aspect of life always
encourages people to choose moderation. This is the reason people do not
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 17

always follow the rules that are enforced by the Taliban.’
170
According to a 28-
year-old Uzbek from Chahar Dara, ‘People have different opinions regarding
the truth or falsehood of Taliban rules. Many believe the rules to be in
compliance with Islam since they are uneducated and have insufficient
religious knowledge. Meanwhile, the majority thinks that the current state
is corrupt and non-Islamic, a sufficient reason that provokes many to fight
against it.’
171
Regarding the rightfulness of the Taliban’s interpretation of
sharia and Islam in general, the expressions of the respondents oppose one
another.
A common religious symbol employed by the Taliban is its white flag with
black text. As one of the respondents noted, ‘The only thing about Taliban
that is common everywhere is their flag.’
172
Usually the flag is inscribed with
the shahadah, the Islamic profession of faith, but sometimes it reads ‘Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan.’Since 2001, the Taliban has focused more on this
outlook. As Osman notes,
The Taleban appear to have woken up to the importance of organisational
symbols and their political meaning. Compared to how little they cared about
their image during the 1990s and the initial years of the insurgency, the Taleban
now project an increasing consciousness of their “brand.”This is seen in both
their media and the actions of fighters and officials on the ground.
173
Furthermore, the Taliban uses shabnameh, the so-called night letters.
174
As
Johnson explains, night letters ‘have been a traditional and common instrument
of Afghan religious figures, jihadists and rebels to encourage people, especially
(but not exclusively) rural populations to oppose both state authority and
regulations.’
175
Common symbolism the Taliban uses in these night letters and
other correspondence include stamps of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
176
The stamps indicate the formal nature of the documents issued by Taliban
representatives, such as local imams. As a respondent pointed out, ‘the Taliban
have a particular stamp that they use to validate their letters.’
177
Similarly, a 28-
year-old Uzbek respondent noted, ‘Local imams also have stamps. Once, I went
before a governor to address a problem. He asked me for a letter from the
mosque imam confirming that I was a resident of Chahar Dara. When I referred
to the imam, he issued the letter and stamped it, confirming me as a resident of
the district. The stamp is credible in all commissions and Taliban-related
offices.’
178
A 35-year-old Pashtun farmer noted, ‘The Taliban uses its own paper-
work, such as summoning letters.’
179
Johnson emphasizes in his study on Taliban
night letters that it is nearly impossible to evaluate how the Taliban’s night-letter
campaign has contributed to support for the Taliban, but he indicates that
‘Taliban narratives have clearly resonated’and ‘where their messages have not
resonated with the populace, the Taliban has compensated by waging an effec-
tive intimidation campaign.’
180
18 N. TERPSTRA

In the post-2001 timeframe, the Taliban has learned from earlier strategic
misjudgments and tends to be more inclusive towards non-Pashtun commu-
nities. Particularly in the North, the Taliban has included different ethnicities. In
Badakhshan, for instance, the Taliban started to recruit and install non-Pashtuns in
key provincial positions and as fighters.
181
This is remarkable since Badakhshan
was a stronghold of long-term Taliban rival Ahmad Shah Masoud and a province
that was not conquered during the IEA regime before 2001. As Ali notes, ‘From
2008, and in sharp contrast to behaviour exhibited during the Taleban regime
(1994–2001), the Taleban leadership council offered most local posts to this new
generation of local Taleban, instead of merely using Badakhshani recruits from
Pakistani madrassas as foot-soldiers.’
182
The Taliban has often been characterized
as a Pashtun movement, but currently it is more accurately a movement with
many Pashtun members.
183
Finally, in several of the interviews, the practice of bacha bazi
184
was men-
tioned. There is no clear legal definition of bacha bazi, but it generally refers to
‘local powerful individuals keeping one or more boys, typically between 10 to 18
of age, for use as bodyguards, servants, dancers, and for sexual exploitation or
other forms of harassment.’
185
Bacha bazi involves men in positions of power who
exploit, enslave, and abuse young boys sexually or for entertainment.
186
Not
every police chief is involved in bacha bazi, but it is a common practice.
187
Bacha
bazi seems most prevalent in northern Afghanistan, where it is associated with
local militias and state security commanders.
188
Human Rights Watch reported
that perpetrators of the sexual abuse of boys are rarely prosecuted, which can be
partly explained by taboos regarding the issue, but is primarily ‘because the
perpetrators are often members of powerful militias or have the protection of
state security forces.’
189
Based on the perceptions of the respondents, the Taliban positions itself as
an organization that effectively counters bacha bazi and other ‘forbidden
practices.’A Pashtun farmer from Chahar Dara noted, ‘People like that there is
no robbery, that there is no gambling in this Taliban-controlled area. There is
no bacha bazi. People’s sons are not taken by force for bacha bazi because
some government commanders take underage boys by force to their check-
points where they sexually abuse them.’
190
Similarly, another farmer from
Chahar Dara noted, ‘bacha bazi is a very bad thing; it is not allowed by the
Taliban. People love and support the Taliban for stopping bacha bazi. In the
same way, people hate the government for being involved in bacha bazi,
because we know that almost each commander of the police has one or more
boys who they use for dancing and for sex.’
191
Already during the 1990 s the Taliban opposed the practice of bacha bazi
as one of its claims to a legitimate authority, and it continues to do so.
192
The
Taliban deliberately refers to the actions of the Afghan security forces and
pro-government militias as a source of its own legitimacy and uses them to
justify its own policies.
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 19

Phase three findings
The beginning of the 21
st
century revealed new possibilities for the Taliban
movement in terms of moral legitimacy and pragmatic legitimacy. With the
international troop presence, the Taliban has faced an external enemy that is
more clearly identifiable. The aspirations for the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan –the name the Taliban continues to employ –have gradually
revived against the backdrop of the US-led intervention. Moral legitimacy has
become more important, as evident in the narratives about foreign occupa-
tion and religion being under threat by external forces. Pragmatic legitimacy
continues to be relevant given the Taliban’s ability to resolve disputes. The
Taliban judiciary thereby exploits instances of corruption and incompetence
of the Afghan state.
Conclusions
This article has made empirical and conceptual contributions. Empirically, it
has shown that both pragmatic and moral forms of legitimacy have been
relevant throughout these three phases of Taliban rule. In terms of pragma-
tism, the Taliban’s ability to create a relatively safe and stable environment and
to adjudicate disputes has been a legitimating factor for the movement. As
Roy noted, if an actor in the context of the Afghan state appears as a relatively
honest broker between local factions, clans, tribes, and ethnic groups, even if
some are more favored than others, it can be a major source of legitimacy.
193
This finding also underpins Weigand’s observation that ‘the people’simmedi-
ate concern is having any rule of law –regardless of its ideological sources.’
194
Moral sources of legitimacy, however, have certainly not been irrelevant. The
Taliban’s narrative of a ‘justified’struggle in the name of Islam and against
external interference has provided them with a level of legitimacy as well,
particularly in reference to external forces. Overall, the moral forms of legiti-
macy were more prominent during the presence of external forces, while
pragmatic forms became more prominent following their withdrawal and
during periods of the Taliban’sopponents’ineffective governance.
Complementary to the existing literature, this article has demonstrated the
value of a longitudinal perspective on rebel governance and legitimacy. The
post-2001 Taliban insurgency was not new to governing; it used prior net-
works, claims, and experiences. Several claims to legitimacy and policies con-
tinued albeit with small adjustments based contextual changes. Understanding
rebel governance and legitimacy, therefore, also requires researchers to con-
sider the contemporary history of armed conflict. As Schroder and Schmidt
previously noted, the ‘symbolic meaning of prior wars is re-enacted and
reinterpreted in the present.’
195
During the Soviet timeframe, the pre-Taliban
fronts mobilized based on a perceived legitimate struggle against an external
20 N. TERPSTRA

enemy that invaded Afghanistan. In the post-2001 timeframe, the foreign-
enemy image re-appeared in the form of the international coalition forces.
Together with the corruption and ineffective governance by the state, the
narrative of a nationalistic and ‘necessary’armed resistance has been revived.
Finally, this article has contributed to the existing literature by investigating
how external intervention in support of the incumbent government affects the
rebels’opportunities to govern and the dynamics of rebel legitimacy. It expands
upon other studies that have either focused on external support for rebel groups
or the strategies rebel groups employ to gain international legitimacy and/or
recognition. External intervention has contrasting effects on rebel governance
and specific forms of moral legitimacy. On the one hand, external intervention
decreases the number of opportunities of rebel groups to govern; on the other
hand, external intervention increases the potential resonance of moral forms of
rebel legitimacy. The departure of external forces also has contrasting effects on
governance and moral forms of legitimacy. Withdrawal can create more oppor-
tunities for rebel governance as it opens political space while simultaneously
undermining specific earlier forms of moral legitimacy when the rebels had
aclearlyidentifiable external enemy.
Notes
1. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers; Klem and Maunaguru,
“Insurgent Rule”; and Hoffmann and Verweijen, “Rebel Rule.”
2. Kasfir, “Rebel Governance.”
3. Stel, “Governing the Gatherings,”20–30.
4. Schlichte and Schneckener, “Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy”;
Duyvesteyn, “Rebels & Legitimacy”; Schoon, “Building Legitimacy”; Terpstra
and Frerks, “Rebel Governance and Legitimacy”; Worrall, “(Re-)Emergent
Orders”; and Kasfir, “Foreword.”
5. Terpstra and Frerks, “Rebel Governance and Legitimacy.”
6. Schoon, “Building Legitimacy,”748.
7. Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra, “Introduction,”257.
8. O’Neill, From Revolution to Apocalypse, 142–48.
9. Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War”; and Malejacq, “From Rebel to Quasi-
State.”
10. Schröder and Schmidt, “Introduction,”9.
11. Ibid., 9.
12. In general terms, the mujahideen can be characterized as a ‘force of religious
nationalists: communities –particularly those from rural areas –were motivated
to participate in the jihad by religious fatwas sanctioning jihad, but also to protect
their land, their villages, traditions and customs’(Strick van Linschoten, 2016,
p. 112).
13. Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taliban?”23–24.
14. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, The Taliban Reader,1.
15. Edwards, Before Taliban; Barfield, “Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan”;
Barfield, Afghanistan; Ruttig, “How Tribal Are Taliban?”; Strick van Linschoten
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 21

and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created; Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, The Taliban
Reader; Strick van Linschoten, “Mullah Wars”; Ibrahimi, “The Taliban”s Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001)”; Weigand, “Afghanistan”s Taliban”;
Jackson, “Life under the Taliban Shadow Government”; and Johnson, Taliban
Narratives.
16. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War,5.
17. Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra, “Introduction,”259.
18. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 210–20.
19. Duyvesteyn et al., “Reconsidering Rebel Governance”; Kasfir, Frerks, and
Terpstra, “Introduction,”258; and Murtazashvili, “A Tired Cliché.”
20. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 218.
21. Rosenau et al., Governance without Government,4.
22. Kasfir, “Rebel Governance,”24.
23. Kasfir, “Dilemmas of Popular Support in Guerrilla War,”4.
24. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, Rebel Governance in Civil
War; Duyvesteyn et al., “Reconsidering Rebel Governance”; Arjona, Rebelocracy;
and Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra, “Introduction.”
25. For a discussion on the Taliban’scurrent involvement in other governance
sectors, such as education and health care, or its taxation practices, see
Jackson (2018).
26. Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra, “Introduction,”274.
27. Terpstra and Frerks, “Governance Practices and Symbolism,”1013.
28. See note 26 above.
29. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 56.
30. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy,”574.
31. Terpstra and Frerks, “Rebel Governance and Legitimacy,”285.
32. Terpstra and Frerks, “Governance Practices and Symbolism,”1035–36.
33. Worrall, “(Re-)Emergent Orders,”715.
34. Schlichte and Schneckener, “Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy,”418.
35. Kalyvas, “Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging Research Program”; and Terpstra,
“Statebuilding, Legal Pluralism, and Irregular Warfare.”
36. Schlichte and Schneckener, “Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy,”417
37. Ibid., 417.
38. Ibid., 417–18.
39. Kasfir, “Foreword,”xiii.
40. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 359; and Kasfir,
“Foreword,”xiii.
41. Terpstra and Frerks, “Rebel Governance and Legitimacy,”281.
42. Ibid., 281.
43. Weigand, “Afghanistan”sTaliban,”376.
44. Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War”; and Podder, “Understanding the
Legitimacy of Armed Groups,”698–701.
45. See note 8 above.
46. Johnson, Taliban Narratives,31–33.
47. The PRTs were invented by the United States. They generally consist of military
compounds with military officers but also include diplomats and reconstruction
experts who work together on reconstruction.
48. The security situation in Kunduz has been dire, particularly since the temporary
fall of Kunduz city to the Taliban in September 2015. Common data collection
challenges include the following: threats to the personal security of researchers
22 N. TERPSTRA

and respondents, scarcity of data, lack of monitoring of field surveyors, high
staffturnover within research organizations, unsteady access to certain districts
at certain points in time, incorrect expectations of researchers and respondents
regarding data collection, multiple layers of interpretation in the data collection
process, and social desirability in the answers of respondents.
49. Malejacq, “From Rebel to Quasi-State,”871.
50. Barfield, Afghanistan,211.
51. Ibid., 215.
52. Johnson, The Afghan Way of War, 206.
53. Ibid., 207.
54. Barfield, Afghanistan,225.
55. Safi,“The Afghan Taliban’s Relationship with Pakistan,”14; and Barfield,
Afghanistan, 225.
56. Barfield, Afghanistan,225.
57. Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taliban?”10.
58. Ibid., 10.
59. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 18.
60. Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taliban?”11; and Safi,“The Afghan Taliban’s
Relationship with Pakistan.”
61. Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taliban?”11; Safi,“The Afghan Taliban”s
Relationship with Pakistan,”15; and Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An
Enemy We Created,43–50.
62. ‘Talib’literally translates to ‘student.”‘Taliban’or ‘Taleban’is plural and trans-
lates to ‘students.’Mullahs are religious leaders usually –at least at a very basic
level –educated in Islamic traditions and Islamic law.
63. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 45.
64. Ibid., 45.
65. The Peshawar Seven included Hezb (Hekmatyar), Hezb (Hales), Jamiat
(Rabbani), Harakat (Nabi Muhammadi), Ittehad (Sayyaf), Nejat (Mujaddedi),
and Mahaz (Gailani) (Ruttig 2010, p. 11).
66. Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taliban?”11.
67. Coll, Directorate S,2.
68. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 46.
69. Giustozzi and Baczko, “The Politics of the Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary,
2003–2013,”201; and Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created,
47.
70. Strick van Linschoten, “Mullah Wars,”111.
71. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 46.
72. Ibid., 67.
73. Ibid., 43.
74. Johnson and Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in
Afghanistan,”73.
75. Coll, Directorate S,1.
76. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created,66–67.
77. Coll, Directorate S; and Giustozzi, Empires of Mud.
78. Giustozzi, Empires of Mud, 50.
79. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion, 126–27.
80. Giustozzi, Empires of Mud, 83.
81. Strick van Linschoten, “Mullah Wars,”20.
82. Ibid., 20.
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 23

83. Zaeef, Strick van Linschoten, and Kuehn, My Life with the Taliban,60–61.
84. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 114.
85. Zaeef, Strick van Linschoten, and Kuehn, My Life with the Taliban, 65. The Taliban
movement garnered support of Pakistani authorities, but it was certainly not
founded by Pakistan (Safi, 2018, p. 17). For example, alongside the inception of
the movement in 1994, a Taliban officewasopenedinQuettainPakistan.Oneofthe
Taliban buildings there was used to ‘recruit new fighters into the movement,
another house was a place where injured Taliban were treated medically,’and
a third building ‘functioned as storage facility’(Safi, 2018, p. 18).
86. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 117.
87. Johnson and Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in
Afghanistan,”74.
88. Giustozzi, Empires of Mud, 82.
89. Ibid., 82.
90. Giustozzi and Baczko, “The Politics of the Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary,”203.
91. Giustozzi, Empires of Mud, 83.
92. Barfield, Afghanistan,261.
93. Barfield, Afghanistan;Giustozzi, Empires of Mud; and Mukhopadhyay, Warlords,
Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan, 136.
94. Depending on the strictness of the definition, the Taliban ceases to be a rebel
group or an insurgency once it capture the capital and the majority of
Afghanistan’s geographical territory. Nevertheless, for the sake of the long-
itudinal analysis in this article, I decided to expand the scope of the conditions
and also consider the full timeframe of 1996–2001 a continuation of rebel
governance and rebel legitimacy.
95. Ibrahimi, “The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001),”947–48.
96. Ibid., 947–48.
97. Barfield, Afghanistan,263.
98. Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taliban?”12.
99. Ibid., 12.
100. Ibid., 12.
101. Otto, “Introduction,”23.
102. Ibid., 23–49.
103. Yassari and Saboory, “Sharia and National Law in Afghanistan,”312.
104. Edwards, Before Taliban, 302–3.
105. Yassari and Saboory, “Sharia and National Law in Afghanistan,”291.
106. Rashid, Taliban,2000, 50.
107. Yassari and Saboory, “Sharia and National Law in Afghanistan,”292.
108. Ibid., 292.
109. Edwards, Before Taliban, 295–96.
110. Barfield, Afghanistan,262.
111. Yassari and Saboory, “Sharia and National Law in Afghanistan,”292.
112. Ibrahimi, “The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001),”955.
113. Rashid, Taliban,2001, 303–4.
114. Strick van Linschoten, “Mullah Wars,”121.
115. Ibid., 121.
116. Barfield, “Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan,”288.
117. Barfield, Afghanistan,261–63; and Weigand, “Afghanistan’s Taliban,”363.
118. Hezb-e Wahdat is a political movement in Afghanistan. Like most Afghan
political movements, it is rooted in the anti-Soviet resistance. Political
24 N. TERPSTRA

Islamism is its ideology, but it is mostly supported by ethnic Hazaras, who follow
a Shia interpretation of Islam.
119. Wörmer, “The Networks of Kunduz,”22.
120. Rashid, Taliban,2001, 163.
121. Ibid., 163.
122. Barfield, Afghanistan;Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created.
There is debate regarding why exactly this occurred (Strick van Linschoten and
Kuehn, 2014, pp. 130–34). It was an important moment for the Taliban move-
ment itself and how it was seen by the outside world. Some interpreted it as
a sign that Mullah Omar was the legitimate person to establish an Islamic
government in Afghanistan. Some Talibs who were present at the meeting
allegedly stated that it served to diffuse internal rivalries within the movement,
while others mentioned the push for Pakistani influence (Strick van Linschoten
and Kuehn, 2014, pp. 131–33).
123. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 133.
124. Strick van Linschoten, “Mullah Wars,”101.
125. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 133.
126. Strick van Linschoten, “Mullah Wars,”27.
127. Barfield, “Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan.”
128. Ibrahimi, “The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001),”956.
129. Barfield, Afghanistan,263.
130. Ibrahimi, “The Taliban”s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001),”955.
131. Edwards, Before Taliban, 301.
132. Ibid., 301.
133. Malejacq, “From Rebel to Quasi-State.”
134. Barfield, Afghanistan,263.
135. Ibid., 260.
136. Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taliban?”19.
137. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, The Taliban Reader, 226.
138. Ibid., 227.
139. Ibid., 227.
140. Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taliban?”19.
141. Jackson, “Life under the Taliban Shadow Government,”9.
142. Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taliban?”21.
143. Giustozzi, “Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun”; and Jackson, “Life under the
Taliban Shadow Government.”
144. Giustozzi and Baczko, “The Politics of the Taliban”s Shadow Judiciary,
2003–2013,”199.
145. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, The Taliban Reader, 227.
146. IWA, “Corruption and Justice Delivery in Kunduz Province of Afghanistan,”14.
147. IWA, “Corruption and Justice Delivery in Kunduz Province of Afghanistan,”
14–15; and Ali, “One Land, Two Rules.”
148. Interview code: 2018–13.
149. Interview code: 2018–05.
150. Ali, “One Land, Two Rules,”11.
151. Ibid., 11.
152. Ibid., 11.
153. Interview code: 2018–16.
154. See note 148 above.
155. Interview code: 2018 –19.
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 25

156. Giustozzi and Baczko, “The Politics of the Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary,”19–20.
157. See note 43 above.
158. Ibid., 376.
159. Interview code 2018–16.
160. Interview code: 2018–03.
161. Ledwidge, Rebel Law, 72.
162. Johnson, Taliban Narratives, 31.
163. Ibid., 32–33.
164. Ibid., 32.
165. Ibid., 36.
166. Ibid., 22.
167. Ibid., 24.
168. Interview code: 2018 –12.
169. Interview code: 2018 –20.
170. Interview code 2018 –09.
171. Interview code: 2018 –13.
172. Interview code 2018 –14.
173. Osman, “Rallying Around the White Flag,”1.
174. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah”; and Johnson,
Taliban Narratives.
175. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah,”318.
176. Interview code: 2018–12; 2018–15.
177. Interview code: 2018 –19.
178. Interview code: 2018 –13.
179. Interview code 2018 –01.
180. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night
Letters),”339.
181. Ali, “The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North.”
182. Ibid.
183. See Strick van Linschoten, “Mullah Wars”99.
184. The literal translation of bacha bazi from Dari is ‘boy play.’
185. SIGAR, “Child Sexual Assault in Afghanistan,”1.
186. Jones, “Ending Bacha Bazi,”66.
187. Reid and Muhammedally, “Just Don’t Call It a Militia”; and SIGAR, “Child Sexual
Assault in Afghanistan.”
188. Reid and Muhammedally, “Just Don’t Call It a Militia,”42.
189. Ibid.
190. See note 160 above.
191. Interview code: 2018–01.
192. See https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/dancingboys/ (Accessed11June2019).
193. Roy, “Development and Political Legitimacy,”173.
194. See note 43 above.
195. See note 10 above.
Acknowledgments
Many thanks go to the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and the
Hofvijverkring in the Hague for their financial contributions to this research project.
I am indebted to The Liaison Office (TLO) in Kabul for its hospitality and invaluable
26 N. TERPSTRA

contributions to this project. Finally, many thanks to (in alphabetical order)
Rahmatullah Amiri, Sebastian van Baalen, Chris van der Borgh, Jolle Demmers, Toon
Dirkx, Georg Frerks, Nelson Kasfir, Bart Klem, Jessica Maves-Braithwaite, and Nora Stel
for their feedback, inspiration, and support at various stages of this research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This work was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
(NWO) [322-52-012]; and the Hofvijverkring, the Hague.
Notes on contributor
Niels Terpstra is a PhD candidate and lecturer at the Centre for Conflict Studies,
Utrecht University. His research interests centre around the nature of governance as
carried out by non-state (armed) actors during violent conflict and policies of peace-
and statebuilding during third-party interventions. His regional focus is on South Asia,
particularly Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.
ORCID
Niels Terpstra http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2707-5259
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