Policy Cycle

Abstract

The policy cycle framework originates from the idea of organizing and ordering the complexity of policymaking. It is a heuristic tool through which different stages of the ongoing and never-ending dynamics of policy processes can be segmented and then analyzed. It was originally proposed by Lasswell (1956), the founder of modern policy analysis and public policy, and is still considered one of the essentials in the conceptual toolbox of policy scholars. The policy cycle – also called the “stages approaches to policy process” (De Leon, 1999) – does not have any explanatory relevance and is thus not at the theoretical core of public policy (where there is a richness of different theoretical frameworks). However, it is a powerful conceptual tool to simplify and make “workable” the complexity of policymaking. Overall, it holds a relevant descriptive capacity that is still useful, despite many critics having underlined that it risks oversimplifying the interconnected and intertwined density of the policy process flux. The cycle is usually divided into five stages: agenda setting, formulation, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation.

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Policy Cycle
Giliberto Capano
1
and Andrea Pritoni
2
1
Department of Political and Social Sciences,
University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
2
Department of Cultures, Politics and Society,
University of Torino, Turin, Italy
Keywords
Policy cycle · Policymaking · Lobbying ·
Venue shopping
Definition
The policy cycle framework originates from the
idea of organizing and ordering the complexity of
policymaking. It is a heuristic tool through which
different stages of the ongoing and never-ending
dynamics of policy processes can be segmented
and then analyzed. It was originally proposed by
Lasswell (1956), the founder of modern policy
analysis and public policy, and is still considered
one of the essentials in the conceptual toolbox of
policy scholars. The policy cycle –also called the
“stages approaches to policy process”(De Leon,
1999)–does not have any explanatory relevance
and is thus not at the theoretical core of public
policy (where there is a richness of different the-
oretical frameworks). However, it is a powerful
conceptual tool to simplify and make “workable”
the complexity of policymaking. Overall, it holds
a relevant descriptive capacity that is still useful,
despite many critics having underlined that it
risks oversimplifying the interconnected and
intertwined density of the policy process flux.
The cycle is usually divided into five stages:
agenda setting, formulation, decision-making,
implementation, and evaluation.
Introduction
The use of the policy cycle image and related
stages is a common practice in public policy. Its
principal function is to help order the analysis of
the complex and apparently chaotic dynamics of
policymaking. The simple, apparently rough idea
to divide the flux of policymaking into stages
originally proposed by Lasswell (1956) has been
very successful because it proposes a kind of
minimal common alphabet both for the analysis
of public policy and for eventual prescriptions. It
is analytically useful because, by dividing the
policy process into different stages, it is possible
to better grasp the specific dynamics occurring in
any given stage. These stages can also be consid-
ered arenas where different actors play different
roles while pursuing their own goals. For exam-
ple, if we consider a five-stage format (agenda
setting, formulation, decision-making, implemen-
tation, and evaluation), for every stage, a final
output can be expected: definition of the problem,
definition of the possible alternatives, decision,
the actual realization of the expected goal, and
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
P. Harris et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs ,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13895-0_69-1

Many more scholars have focused on formula-
tion and decision-making. These stages see the
use of both direct and indirect lobbying, although
the former is generally considered more effective
than the latter (Grant, 1989). As a result, the
literature has variously highlighted how business
groups are particularly influential in this specific
stage of the policy cycle, based on a number of
factors. First, they usually have more resources
than “cause groups.”Second, they exploit closer
relationships with decision makers than other
types of groups. Third, business groups usually
sacrifice the so-called logic of membership for the
sake of the logic of influence. However, it is not
true that, with regard to both formulation and
decision-making, business always wins (Dür et
al., 2015). In contrast, many studies have shown
that “cause groups”are often able to obtain many
of their policy preferences (Dür & Mateo, 2014).
This outcome happens especially when they are
able to manipulate the political salience of the
issue at stake: the more public opinion is involved
in the decision-making process, the more decision
makers –whose main objective is to be (re)elected
–are forced to follow the public’s preferences,
which are more likely to be aligned with the
broader interests of “cause groups”than with the
more limited interests of business groups (Woll,
2013).
Finally, scholars who analyzed interest group
behavior in the implementation stage stress a few
very interesting empirical findings: first, one of
the most utilized tactics in this stage is represented
by litigation (Bouwen & Mccown, 2007;de
Figueiredo & de Figueiredo, 2002). In fact,
through litigation, interest groups can delay the
implementation of a new policy that is less favor-
able to the group than the status quo, even though
they know they might eventually lose (de Figuei-
redo & de Figueiredo, 2002, p. 176). Second,
litigation is a valuable recourse for groups who
are politically weak in legislative lobbying (ibi-
dem, p. 162). Third, interest groups do not inevi-
tably wait until the end of the decision-making
stage to litigate, reserving it as a “threat,”but they
do so as another way of initiating policy change
(Bouwen & Mccown, 2007, p. 428). Fourth, busi-
ness interests dominate implementation at the
expense of the broader public (Yackee & Yackee,
2006, p. 128); this domination depends on the fact
that business groups generally have more organi-
zational resources and provide the bureaucracy
with higher quality information.
Cross-References
▶Bureaucracy
▶Influence
▶Interest Group Access
▶Interest Groups and Agenda Setting
▶Public Policy
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