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Public attitudes towards COVID-19 contact tracing apps: A UK-based focus group
study
Simon N Williams1,2 Senior Lecturer in People and Organisation:
s.n.williams@swansea.ac.uk
Christopher J. Armitage3,4, Professor of Health Psychology:
chris.armitage@manchester.ac.uk
Tova Tampe5, Independent Consultant: tova.tampe@gmail.com
Kimberly Dienes3, Lecturer in Clinical and Health Psychology:
kimberly.dienes@manchester.ac.uk
1 People and Organisation Group, School of Management, Swansea University, Swansea,
SA1 8EN
2 Department of Medical Social Sciences, Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern
University, Chicago, Illinois, 60611, United States of America
3 Manchester Centre for Health Psychology, University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL
4 Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust, Manchester Academic Health Science
Centre, Manchester, M13 9PL
5 World Health Organisation, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland.
Correspondence to: Simon Williams s.n.williams@swansea.ac.uk
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Abstract
OBJECTIVE: To explore public attitudes to the proposed COVID-19 contact tracing app in
the United Kingdom.
DESIGN: Qualitative study consisting of five focus groups carried out between 1st-4th May,
2020 (39-42 days after the official start of the UK lockdown).
SETTING: Online video-conferencing
PARTICIPANTS: 22 participants, all UK residents aged 18 years and older, representing a
range of different genders, ages, ethnicities and locations.
RESULTS: Participants were split roughly equally in number across three groups: will use
the app; will not be using the app; and undecided as to whether they will use the app.
Analysis revealed five main themes: (1) Lack of information and misconceptions surrounding
COVID-19 contact tracing apps; (2) concerns over privacy; (3) concerns over stigma; (4)
concerns over uptake; and (5) contact tracing as the ‘greater good’. These themes were found
across the sample and the three groups. However, concerns over privacy, uptake and stigma
were particularly significant amongst those state they will not be using the app and the view
that the app is for the “greater good” was particularly significant amongst those who stated
they will be using the app. One of the most common misconceptions about the app was that
it could allow users to specifically identify and map COVID-19 cases amongst their contacts
and in their vicinity.
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CONCLUSIONS: We offer four recommendations: (1) To offset the fact that many people
may not be accessing, or might be avoiding, news coverage on COVID-19, authorities must
communicate to the public via a range of methods including but not limited to: social media
ads, postal information, text messaging and other emergency alert systems. (2)
Communications should emphasise that the app cannot enable the user to identify which of
their contacts has reported COVID-19 symptoms or tested positive. (3) Communication
should emphasise collective responsibility (‘the greater good’) to promote social norms
around use of the app (4) Communication should provide a slogan that maximises clarity of
message, for example: ‘Download the app, protect the NHS, save lives’.
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Background
The current coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic is widely considered the greatest challenge to
public health in living memory. As of 7th May 2020, COVID-19 accounted for a reported
one-quarter of a million deaths globally, and 30,000 deaths in the UK alone, with total
numbers of cases and deaths increasing daily [1]. The novelty of the SARS-CoV-2 virus
means that no vaccines or antiviral drugs are available. In the absence of biomedical
interventions to reduce morbidity and mortality from COVID-19, non-pharmaceutical
interventions, such as physical distancing, hand hygiene and restricted movement have been
proposed, including the “lockdown” policy of only leaving the home when essential
(implemented in the UK on 23rd March 2020) [2]. Although highly effective as a means to
significantly slow the transmission of the virus (that is, to lower its reproductive (R0) value)
in the population, lockdown is a very strict strategy that has a number of significant adverse
impacts, including wider economic impacts for society [3] and social and psychological
impacts for individuals [4]. As such, it is necessarily a temporary and relatively short-term
measure.
One of the key components of many countries’ post-lockdown strategies is the use of
contact tracing. Contact tracing is where those in close contact with individuals, who report
symptoms indicative of an infectious disease and/or test positive for the disease, are
identified and given appropriate medical instruction. It has successfully been used to control
the spread of other novel communicable diseases like Ebola [5]. Traditionally, contact
tracing relies on a team of health workers to track possible transmissions manually, through
interviews with those who test positive for an infectious disease, in order to work out with
whom they have recently been in close contact. Contacts deemed at risk are then informed of
the fact they have been exposed and are then advised (or in some countries required) to self-
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isolate. Several countries, most notably South Korea and Singapore, have successfully used
contact tracing (primarily using manual tracing) methods at an early stage in the outbreak in
order to dramatically slow the spread of, and reduce the total number of cases and deaths
from, COVID-19 [6].
However, whilst manual contact tracing has proven successful at early stages in the
outbreak, where total number of cases are relatively low, it has been argued that doing so at a
later stage (such as the current stage in the UK), when total numbers of infections are much
higher, is problematic [7]. Firstly, manual contact tracing on a large scale is highly resource-
intensive. For instance, it is proposed that in the UK, a contact tracing team of 18,000 people
will be employed [8]. Secondly, it has been argued that due to the speed at which COVID-19
spreads, manual contact tracing might be too slow to be effective on its own [9]. As such
digital contact tracing has been proposed and is being actively explored in a number of
countries, including the UK, as a potential supplement to manual contact tracing [10].
On 4th May 2020, the UK government revealed details of its app, developed by NHSX
(the technology arm of the UK’s National Health Service), and began piloting the app on the
Isle of Wight (a small island with a population of approximately 140,000) [11]. The app has
attracted some criticism, as reported in the UK media, because of general concerns over
privacy as well as because, unlike versions used or proposed in a number of other countries,
it uses a ‘centralised model’ (i.e. where contact data is stored in a central database and not
exclusively on the phones themselves) [12]. Although at time of writing, subsequent plans for
the full release of the app to the total UK population were yet to be confirmed, it was
suggested that the app would be rolled out sometime in May 2020 [13]. Modelling evidence
suggests that in order for the app to be effective, use and adherence would need to be very
high, with 80% of smartphone users (equivalent to 56% of the UK population) needing to use
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the app in order to completely stop the pandemic spreading, although lower rates of use could
still have beneficial impacts [9].
Research is beginning to explore public attitudes towards potential exit strategies,
although much of it so far has taken the form of public opinion surveys [14] [15]. Some
surveys have suggested that a majority of smartphone users would use the app [16], but
emerging evidence from early adopting countries like Singapore suggests that actual uptake
might be considerably lower [17]. There is, to our knowledge, as yet no published qualitative
research on public attitudes towards COVID-19 contact tracing apps. Qualitative research
can provide an important supplement to large sample opinion polls involving an in-depth
exploration of the reasons and motivations behind individuals’ intentions towards use of
contact tracing apps. If the UK’s contact tracing strategy is to be effective, government and
health authorities will need to understand and respond quickly to any public concerns over
the app. The aim of this paper is to explore attitudes towards the proposed contact tracing
app in a diverse sample of the UK public. Specifically, we seek to explore people’s
knowledge of the contact tracing app, their views on the app (specifically the extent to which
they are favourable to it or not), and ultimately whether they plan to use the app or not.
These findings can feed into debates around how best to communicate to the public the
importance of contact tracing as a means to reduce the spread of, and prevent further waves
of, the virus, which in turn could prevent the need for further lockdowns.
Methods
We conducted five online focus groups with 22 participants between 1st and 4th May 2020
during the UK’s COVID-19 lockdown (39-42 days after the official start of the UK
lockdown). Participants were adults aged 18 years or over currently residing in the UK.
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Online focus groups were methodologically necessary due to the fact that in-person focus
groups were not feasible due to the pandemic. However, online focus groups do have
methodological benefits particularly as a cost-effective method of eliciting public views from
a geographically dispersed group of participants [18][19].
Focus groups were conducted as part of a larger, mixed-methods longitudinal study
tracking public attitudes to COVID-19 and its associated policies in the UK, as well as the
social and psychological impacts of such policies. Focus group recruitment took place online
through a combination of social media snowball sampling, online community and volunteer
advertising sites and social media advertisement. We took a purposive approach to sampling,
attempting to include a range of ages, genders, racial/ethnic identities and occupational
backgrounds (Table 1).
Table 1: Demographic details reported by participants.
Characteristic
N (%)
Gender
Female
10 (45)
Male
12 (55)
Age range
18-29
8 (36)
30-39
3 (14)
40-49
6 (27)
50+
1 (5)
Undisclosed
4 (18)
Ethnicity
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White - British
13 (59)
White – any other White background
2 (9)
Asian or Asian British - Pakistani
4 (18)
Undisclosed
3 (14)
Focus groups met virtually via the web video-conferencing platform Zoom for approximately
one hour each. Most participants joined using both video and audio, although some were
given the option, and preferred, to join with audio only. All focus groups were organised and
moderated by SW (a medical social scientist). The topic guide for the focus groups was
initially developed by the research team in virtual group meetings. Although the focus
groups discussed topics related to the broader research project (e.g. experiences on social
distancing, views on COVID-19 testing and vaccinations), it also specifically included
questions seeking to elicit participants views on covid-19 contact tracing apps (e.g. ‘do you
think you will use the planned covid-19 app?’ and ‘what are your views on the planned
covid-19 contact tracing app?’
Analysis
Data were collected and analysed in accordance with a Grounded Theory approach [20].
This is an iterative process through which emergent themes from early focus groups were
used to add to or refine questions and prompts during subsequent groups. Data were
transcribed for coding, with all participant information being anonymised to protect
confidentiality. SW and KD analysed the transcripts and developed and applied the thematic
coding framework, moving from open through to more focused coding [20][21]. Themes
were discussed and developed with CJA and TT during virtual research group meetings.
Negative case analysis was used to seek for information that did not fit emergent themes, and
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where this occurred, themes were modified accordingly [22]. Data collection and analysis
continued until theoretical saturation was reached [21]. Data were analysed in NVivo
(version 11.4.3, QRS).
Results
Participants fell into three groups regarding whether or not they felt they would use the
contact tracing app. One group of participants stated they will be downloading the contact
tracing app (‘would use app’) (n = 7), one group stated they will not (‘will not use app’) (n =
7), and a third group were undecided (‘undecided’) (n = 8). No patterns emerged according
to the demographics of the participants, with a mix of genders, ages and occupational groups
across all three groups.
Analysis revealed five main themes: (1) Lack of information and misconceptions
surrounding Covid-19 contact tracing apps; (2) concerns over privacy; (3) concerns over
stigma; (4) concerns over uptake; and (5) contact tracing as the ‘greater good’. These themes
were found across the sample and the three groups, however certain themes were more
apparent, and appeared to carry more weight in influencing their views as to whether they
would use the app or not, in some groups compared to others. Many participants across all
three groups either expressed a lack of knowledge of, or displayed misconceptions about,
COVID-19 contact tracing apps. Concerns over privacy and uptake were expressed across all
three groups, but seemed to be particularly significant for those who said they would not use
the app. Concerns over stigma were expressed by participants in the ‘would not use app’ and
‘undecided’ groups, but not in the ‘would use’ group. The view that contact tracing was for
‘the greater good’ was expressed by participants in the ‘would use’ and ‘undecided’ groups,
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but not in the ‘would not use’ group, and was particularly significant for those in the ‘would
use’ group.
Lack of information and misconceptions surrounding Covid-19 contact tracing apps
Many participants either expressed a lack of knowledge of contact tracing and contact tracing
apps or appeared to have misconceptions over what the official UK government-proposed
app entails. Amongst those who had not heard of contact tracing apps, one of the reasons
was because they had “not been watching the news” (Participant 19, female, 20s), as they
were “sick and tired of hearing more of coronavirus” (Participant 20, female, 20s). Amongst
those who had heard of them, one of the biggest misconception was that the app would entail
some form of ‘mapping’ that would be visible to other smartphone users or the public in
general:
“I think they wanted to develop an app or something, so you would know how many Covid
cases are in your area, so you know where not to go. So, if everyone got sent a test and
managed in certain areas not go out until everyone has been tested, so you know where the
virus is so you know who can leave their homes and who can’t” (Participant 6, male, 20s)
Concerns over privacy
The most commonly stated concern was over data privacy and security. Participants
expressed a reluctance to have their data accessed by government or health authorities.
Participants associated contact tracing with increased surveillance by government, and were
concerned by what they perceived as “submitting” their personal information:
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“Contact tracing seems quite Big Brotherly. I don’t think I am willing to submit all my data
and all of my contacts for the government to scrutinise who I see regularly. I don’t think I
will be willing to join the contact tracing apps” (Participant 16, female, 30s)
Participants were also concerned that their data would be accessible to others outside of
government and health authorities, including “third parties” or “hackers”:
“You don’t know who is running these apps, you don’t want third party accessing your
information. This is the worrying thing about modern technology; you do not know who is
accessing your health and things.” (Participant 10, male, 40s)
“Hackers could pose as health experts or something, there are so many scams that are going
on. Scammers are supposedly selling. I am not in favour of this app personally.” (Participant
7, male, 20s)
However, some of these concerns over privacy seemed to stem from the misunderstanding
discussed in the previous section that app users would be able to identify specific covid-19
cases amongst their contacts or their vicinity:
“Imagine walking around, and thinking ‘you’ve got it, you’ve got it’ and you have got it
[phone] in your hand … Imagine you were like, oh ill go see my friends when we are all
allowed, and they were like ‘You have got corona it says it on my app’” (Participant 19,
female, 20s)
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For those who stated they will not use the app, privacy was the most common reason stated
for their decision. They were generally opposed to anyone, including government and health
officials accessing their data under any circumstance. For those who said they would
download the app, privacy concerns were mentioned, but were seen to be outweighed by the
perceived benefits of the app for public health (as discussed below). Those who were
undecided tended to argue that they would use the app provided they were sure that their data
was not visible to other smartphone users or the general public they were given assurances
over privacy and data protection:
“I would get it if there were no privacy concerns and it was just for the government to track
the spread of the virus … but I wouldn’t do it if there was a map to see.” (Participant 18,
female, 20s)
Those who were undecided also tended to weigh up their concerns over data privacy with
their view that apps which require the disclosure of personal information are already
commonplace:
“I’m a bit waryy with the app but I tend to download anything and sign my life away all the
time … I think I would be alright with that kind of stuff …. I think everyone is already traced
and they don’t even know.” (Participant 16, female, 30s)
Concerns over stigma
Another commonly expressed concern was over the stigmatizing potential of the app. This
concern was related to concerns over a lack of privacy and specifically the misconception
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that the app would enable people to use the app to identify others that have or have had
covid-19:
“I actually think that [the contact tracing app] is a terrifying concept… it’s like being
branded with a. horrendous black mark. … I could look and be like my friend, my neighbour
has got Covid.” (Participant 17, male, 20s)
These participants feared that being able to identify others with covid-19 would lead to
discrimination:
“It could cause hate crime as well. Finding out ‘oh you know I got it from this person’, and
finding out your neighbours have it, and ‘oh I will stay away from them’.” (Participant 9,
female, 30s)
“It is just asking for more isolation and hysteria. … It would be like Snap Maps: ‘oh I want
to go to Tesco, but oh no she’s there and she has got Covid’…. I think that would make me
not want to get tested [for covid-19]. I wouldn’t want to be on the ‘Snapmap of Shame’. Like,
if you could see all these people that you know have corona, that could lead to bullying in
some cases.” (Participant 19, female, 20s)
Concerns over uptake
Another commonly voiced concern was over uptake of the app. A number of participants
questioned whether enough people would use it in order for it to be an effective means of
reducing the spread of the virus:
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“We have only reduced or flattened the curve because we have all collectively socially
distanced … and if people were to download the app I think it would have to be done in a
large group of people if not everybody for it to be effective … I don’t know how effective it
would be in terms of transmission rates. I wouldn’t rush to download it.” (Participant 17,
male, 20s)
Amongst those who had heard of contact tracing, some drew comparisons between the UK
and countries who had experienced the pandemic earlier and who had already made, in their
view, effective use of contact tracing, such as Singapore. However, these participants tended
to argue that the high level of adherence and enforcement in such countries would not be
achievable in the UK which was perceived as less accepting of state interventionism and less
collectivist:
“The issue here is will society take it on board and actually do it. I think one of the reasons
why places like China, South Korea, Singapore, those Asian countries can successfully
manage those situations is because they have a relatively compliant society, people tend to
work together or maybe it’s just because they are used to having their civil liberties curbed to
a degree” (Participant 12, male, 40s)
Another consideration was that a proportion of the population did not have smartphones, for
example the homeless, elderly or socially or economically vulnerable in society. For some,
such inequalities in access to the technology would reduce the effectiveness of using an app
as part of a contact tracing strategy:
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“Some people don’t know how to download an app, some people don’t have a smartphone,
some people may be left out, the vulnerable, and if they aren’t able to put in the data this
might have an effect on other people. So how accurate and how up to date and how reliable
the information could be would make a difference” (Participant 1, male, 30s)
Contact tracing as “the greater good’
No participants were unequivocally positive about the contact tracing app. Ultimately, what
distinguished those who were intended to use the app from those who did not intend on using
it, was their belief that it was the ‘right thing’ to do because it would be beneficial for the
wider public health, and that this potential benefit outweighed their concerns:
“If it is going to be for the greater good, I would do it, but it doesn’t fill me with joy.”
(Participant 17, male, 20s)
“I would do it if it helps but it’s not something I want to do.” (Participant 8, female, 40s)
In particular the recognition of the severity and urgency of the pandemic was seen as a reason
as a reason to use the app:
“I would really support it, I know privacy is really important … anything that would help, it
doesn’t make sense why people wouldn’t participate; people are dying all over the world,
what’s more important at the moment, to try and stop this or people knowing what’s
happened on your phone” (Participant 16, female, 30s)
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These participants implied that, because contact tracing in their view was necessary for
slowing the spread of the virus, they had little agency over whether or not to use the app.
Contact tracing was here characterized as an unavoidable exit strategy, as the “only way out”:
.
“The idea of tracking, with a Big Brother or something, I am totally opposed to it normally,
but I can’t tell you how totally opposed normally. But based on what countries that have
been successful have done, I feel like this might be the only way out of this.” (Participant 21,
female, 50s)
Discussion
Our findings reveal that the UK public are split over whether they feel they will use the
proposed COVID-19 contact tracing app. We found three, roughly equally sized, groups:
those who feel they will download the app, those who won’t and those who are undecided. A
major theme was the perceived lack of knowledge and the existence of misconceptions
around the app. One of the common misconceptions was that the app would provide
identifiable information, and users themselves would be able to specifically identify others
with COVID-19 (or be identified themselves). Three main concerns were raised: concerns
over privacy; concerns over stigma; and concerns over uptake. These concerns were
expressed by participants across all three groups, but, as discussed below, were more salient
in some groups over others, in relation to influencing their view on whether they will likely
use the app or not.
The fact that the groups were roughly equal in proportion contrasts with recent
surveys that suggest a very high (~80%) proportion of the UK public will either definitely or
probably install the app [16]. It is of course a limitation of this study that its sample size,
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which is small in relation to such large quantitative surveys, does not permit our findings to
be readily generalized to the UK population as a whole, and so the findings on the
proportions of who plans to use the app or not should be treated cautiously and followed up
with further research. This however is a limitation inherent to all qualitative research and not
specifically to the current study. The contribution of this study is its ability to shed light on
the underlying reasons and beliefs that account for people’s views on the app and which
ultimately shape their decision of whether or not to use it.
Concerns over stigma stemmed from a fundamental misconception that the app could
enable its users to identify COVID-19 cases amongst their contacts or even synchronously
map cases near them. It is worth noting that, despite these misconceptions, such findings
imply that COVID-19 may be, for some, becoming a stigmatised disease. Future research
will explore the potential stigmatization of COVID-19 sufferers in more depth and over time.
The main implication of relevance to the present study is that the public may not be
adequately informed as to what the app entails. Improved communication regarding the
purpose and nature of the app will likely lead to increased use of the app (see implications
section below). Concerns over uptake were framed in terms of social inequalities and
cultural norms around state interventionism. It was argued that because certain social groups
do not have access to smartphones, and because the UK public would not be willing to accept
contact tracing in general as a strategy, it would not be as effective as it had been in countries
like Singapore or South Korea. Of course, the risk here, from a public health perspective is
that if enough people feel that it is not going to be effective because not enough people are
going to use it (and use this as a reason to not use it themselves) then their beliefs may
contribute to a self-fulfilling prophesy at the population level. Thus, normative beliefs in the
potential effectiveness of the app amongst the UK public are necessary in order to maximise
uptake (see implication section below). Concerns over privacy were often framed in terms of
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a general lack of trust or faith in government and its handling of the pandemic thus far, and
their opposition to what was perceived as an unnecessary form of government control and the
role of technology in the rise of a surveillance society [23][24][25].
Decision-making was heavily influenced by moral reasoning. Those who said they
would not download the app were motivated primarily by their moral opposition to the use of
such technologies as an infringement of individual civil liberties. By contrast, among those
who were intending on using the app, decision-making was driven by a more utilitarian
evaluation of the relative costs and benefits. Many shared the same concerns as those who
did not intend to use the app, but deemed that the potential life lost from COVID-19
outweighed any privacy infringements. Arguably, these participants viewed using the app to
be a decision high in ‘moral intensity’, because of the temporal immediacy of the pandemic
(its rapid spread), the magnitude of its consequences (its high death rates), and its
concentration of effect (i.e. severe impacts (serious illness and death) amongst a relatively
small number of people being greater than modest impacts (privacy risks) amongst a much
larger number of people (total app users)) [26]. Finally, those who were undecided were
generally still in the process of a utilitarian evaluation of the perceived costs and benefits of
the contact tracing app. Therefore, if the UK is to achieve the high uptake levels that would
be required in order to stop or even substantially reduce the spread of the virus, it is necessary
to achieve the support of those who are as yet undecided on whether they are likely to use the
app. Some ways in which governments and public health authorities can better communicate
to the public around the COVID-19 contact tracing app are discussed below.
Limitations
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As discussed above, one of the limitations of this study is, like all qualitative research, it is
not possible to generalize findings (for example on the proportions of how many people plan
to use the app) to the wider UK public. However, our qualitative research will also be used
to inform future quantitative research exploring patterns and factors related to intentions and
beliefs concerning Covid-19 contact tracing apps. For example, this research can inform the
development of survey questions related to underlying beliefs concerning the nature of the
app, normative beliefs concerning protecting the vulnerable (the ‘greater good’), and
concerns over privacy, uptake and stigma.
This study is also limited insofar as it did not recruit participants from ‘clinically
extremely vulnerable’ categories [27]. Additionally, the study did not include any
individuals aged 70 or older (also considered ‘clinically vulnerable’, although this was
because we did not receive any responses from this age group, despite noting in our
recruitment material that applications from those considered clinically vulnerable were
particularly encouraged. Future research will specifically explore the attitudes of those
clinically extremely vulnerable and clinically vulnerable on COVID-19-related policy.
Recommendations for policy and practice
Based on our findings, we suggest the following recommendations for policy and practice
concerning engaging and communicating with the public regarding the proposed COVID-19
contact tracing app:
(1) Government and public health authorities need to consider a range of methods to
engage and communicate to the public as to the purpose and nature of the contact
tracing apps. Although traditional media play an important role in disseminating
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information, our findings suggest that there is a proportion of the population who may
be actively avoiding news coverage on coronavirus (as a result of over-exposure to
Covid-19 coverage and/or as a coping or avoidance strategy). Indeed, limiting
watching news coverage on COVID-19 has been recommended as a means to protect
mental health during the pandemic [28], and some people may be significantly
avoiding news coverage. As such, authorities must explore a range of methods and
media to communicate the purpose and nature of contact tracing apps, including but
not limited to the use of: social media ads, postal information, text messaging and
other emergency alert systems.
(2) Communications should succinctly explain that the app cannot enable the user to
identify which of their contacts has reported COVID-19 symptoms or tested positive,
and that confidentiality is protected. The UK government should reconsider the
decision to adopt a decentralised system. Concerns over “Big Brother” government
surveillance will likely be allayed for many by a switch to a decentralised system.
This could in turn have a positive effect on app uptake and use.
(3) Government and public health authorities need to continue to harness the message
that contact tracing is a measure that can contribute to “the greater good” in terms of
saving lives and reducing the spread of the disease. Amongst those who intend to use
the app, this was the key factor driving their decision. Linking to the ‘moral intensity’
of Covid-19 pandemic, specifically its high death rates and the potential threat of a
second wave is also likely to be effective in facilitating uptake of the app. Similar to
the campaign over ‘stay at home, protect the NHS, save lives’ campaign for
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lockdown, the proposed app should provide a slogan that maximises clarity of
message, for example: ‘Download the app, protect the NHS, save lives’.
(4) In order to maximise uptake, normative beliefs will need to reflect the potential
effectiveness and popularity of the app. In this way, public health messages could be
similar to those employed in the effort to encourage widespread adherence to social
distancing guidelines, including campaigns around collective responsibility (‘stick
together by staying apart’).
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Declarations
Competing interest statement: Armitage is supported by NIHR Manchester Biomedical
Research Centre and NIHR Greater Manchester Patient Safety Translational Research Centre.
Tampe is an independent consultant and currently consults for the World Health
Organization. The authors have no other relationships or activities that could appear to have
influenced the submitted work.
Transparency declaration: The lead author (the manuscript’s guarantor) affirms that the
manuscript is an honest, accurate, and transparent account of the study being reported; that no
important aspects of the study have been omitted; and that any discrepancies from the study
as planned (and, if relevant, registered) have been explained.
Authors’ contributions: All authors contributed to the planning of the study. The analysis
was conducted by SW and KD. The initial draft of the article was written by SW. All authors
revised the manuscript and approved the final version for publication. SW is the guarantor of
the article.
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is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review) The copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 18, 2020. .https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.05.14.20102269doi: medRxiv preprint
Funding statement: This research was supported by the University of Manchester’s of
Health Psychology Section research monies (£2000). The funders played no role in the
conduct of the study.
Data sharing statement: Ethical restrictions related to participant confidentiality prohibit the
authors from making the data set publicly available. During the consent process, participants
were explicitly guaranteed that the data would only be seen my members of the study team.
For any discussions about the data set please contact the corresponding author, Simon
Williams (s.n.williams@swansea.ac.uk).
Ethics statement: Ethical approval was received by Swansea University’s Research Ethics
Committee.
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is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review) The copyright holder for this preprint this version posted May 18, 2020. .https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.05.14.20102269doi: medRxiv preprint