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Universal Values as a Peace Building Orthodoxy: Can Minority
Empowerment and Multi-Ethnic Statebuilding Coexist?
An analysis of the value-driven approach to EU Enlargement and its role in the management of
ethnic relations and minority rights in Kosovo
Canterbury, Friday March 22nd 2019
By
Elsa Lilja Gunnarsdottir
A Dissertation Submitted to the
Brussels School of International Studies
of the Department of Politics and International Relations
in the Faculty of Social Science
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Award of the Degree of
Master of Arts in International Relations and EU External Relations
(13960 words)
Gunnarsdottir
1
Table of Contents
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….1
2. Methodology, Chapter Outlines and Theoretical Framework………………………...……....3
2.1. Methods…………………………………………………………………………………....3
2.2. Chapter One: Background……………………………………………………...………....4
2.3. Chapter Two: Ethnic and Civic Nationalism…………………………………………...…4
2.4. Chapter Three: Liberal Peace……………………………………………………………..4
2.5. Chapter Four: Managing Ethnic Relations…………………………………………….....5
2.6. Chapter Five: Minority Rights…………………………………………………………….5
2.7. Chapter Six: Power and Subjectivities…………………………………………………….5
3. Background……………………………………………………………...………………………..6
3.1. A Liberal Peace…………………………………………………………………………....6
3.2. Kosovo…………………………………………………………………………………….6
3.3. EU Accession: The Copenhagen Criteria………………………………………………....8
3.4. The Stabilisation and Association Process………………………………………………..8
3.5. The Brussels Dialogue……………………………………………………………….……9
3.6. The Association of Serb Majority Municipalities………………………………………..10
3.7. Constitutional Court Ruling………………………………………………………...……11
3.8. Territorial Exchange……………………………………………………………….....….12
4. Ethnic Nationalism……………………………………………………………………………....14
4.1. Ethnic conflict in Kosovo…………………………………………………………...…...14
4.2. Nationalism: antithetical to the EU project?……………………………………………..15
4.3. A counter-nationalism?…………………………………………………………………..16
4.4. Theories on civic and ethnic nationalism………………………………………………...16
5. Civic National Identities………………………………………………………………………...17
5.1. European identity as policy……………………………………………………………....19
5.2. The pursuit of multi-ethnicity: United in Diversity?…………………………………….21
6. Management of Ethnic Relations…………………………………………………………...….21
6.1. Individual and group identities…………………………….…………………………….22
6.2. Approaches to managing ethnic relations………………………………………………..23
6.2.1. Power-sharing: Together but (un)equal……………………………………...….24
6.2.1.1. Conditions for successful power-sharing…………………………….…26
6.2.2. Ethno-federalism as an approach to minority rights………………………….....27
7. Minority Rights: The Challenge to Unity in Diversity………………………………………..28
7.1. International frameworks for minority rights………………………………………....…28
7.2. How can we evaluate minority rights?………………………………………………...…29
7.3. From self-determination to multiculturalism and interethnic coexistence: the evolution of
minority rights………………………………………………………………………....…30
8. Power and Subjectivities……………………………………………………………………..…31
8.1. Pastoral power: shaping civic subjectivities……………………………………………..32
8.2. Resistance………………………………………………………………………………..33
8.3. Dividing practices: individual and group identities……………………………………...36
8.4. Universal values and the EU: Pastoral power?………………………………………..…38
9. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………….…40
Gunnarsdottir
2
1. Introduction
Universal values have come to constitute a commonly accepted set of beliefs and aims
that guide actions. Peace and institution building in the 21st century has increasingly been
centred around the pursuit of human rights, democracy and rule of law. The EU often explains
itself as being constituted by these universal values, which guides its approach to Enlargement.
Having become a commonly accepted creed, the promotion of these values has come to shape
peace, state- and institution building in the 21st century. Alongside the construction of liberal
institutions, the EU has sought to foster a European identity in prospective member states.
With the rise of nationalism around Europe, fostering a ‘European Identity’ has come to
be seen as crucial in order to ensure the strength and survival of the European Union. In recent
years, the European continent has also witnessed an emergence of sub-state national movements
advancing claims for greater self-determination based on a set of group characteristics that form
an identity distinct from the majority population in a unitary state. These have sometimes led to
self-determination and emancipation; yet smaller levels of power-sharing or group differentiated
rights within a unitary state have become increasingly favoured approach. Segregating
communities along ethnic lines- and the assimilationist and homogenising rationales they imply,
has increasingly been problematised. The protection and empowerment of minorities have
evolved in favour of more inclusive approaches to peace and state building, permissive of
diversity.
The EU Enlargement process towards the Western Balkans- where ethnic tensions
persist- aims to inspire sustainable peace by enforcing a common identity united around
universal values that embrace multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. In the avenue of minority
rights, however, this ideal is challenged. Conventionally, the protection of minorities- a
precondition to EU membership- has been associated with rights to a degree of self-governance
and territory separate from the central governing structures. In Kosovo, several proposals to
manage ethnic relations risk institutionalising and entrenching ethnic divides. This seems to
conflict with the ideal of interethnic coexistence. Yet, from a minority empowerment
perspective, enforcing a degree of separation and differentiated rights are at the same time not
incompatible with EU Enlargement. Outside of the EU framework, these ‘rights’ are not far
away from the logic of ethno-territorial claims that brought the Western Balkans into conflict in
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3
the 1990s; yet now gaining new legitimacy within the framework of minority rights, consistent
with an emerging liberal peace orthodoxy.
The liberal peace approach has been criticised primarily in two ways. Firstly, critics have
questioned the assumption that liberal peace values are compatible with communities outside of
Western Europe. Secondly, others have criticised the assumptions of liberal peace for acquiring a
neo-orientalist and ethnocentric flavour that devalues local solutions. Although a central value to
the EU project is the coexistence of ethnically diverse groups; when pitted against ethno-
nationalism, this acquires an intrinsically homogenising logic that assumes communities will best
be governed by abandoning exclusionary ethnic identities. In Kosovo, attempts to forge a
common identity has led for instance to the creation of a new flag as an alternative to the
commonly used ethnic flags, and in a national anthem called ‘Europe.’ Finding difficulty,
however, in reducing the salience of ethnic identities, the EU has demonstrated willingness to
accept proposals for group-differentiated rights, a degree of autonomy for ethnic minorities
(Kosovo Serbs), and even partition along ethnic lines.
Both efforts to foster a common identity and proposals to draw further boundaries along
ethnic lines, implies that subjects can best be governed by homogenising territories (which has
many horrific examples in history) and directly goes against the aims and values of the European
project. It proposes a problematic ‘civilising’ logic, implying tensions between citizens of multi-
ethnic territories can be solved by transforming them into civic subjects who are compliant with
values set forth by the liberal peace orthodoxy.
2. Methodology, Chapter Outlines and Theoretical Framework
2.1. Methods
In order to de-naturalize the concept of universal values in managing ethnic relations and
minority rights, I lay out historical contexts that have shaped and evolved the modes of thought
surrounding ethnic nationalism.Through theories on ethnic and civic nationalism, I will analyse
how European civic identities have come to be seen as a way to counteract the negative
consequences of (ethnic) nationalism. Through critiques of liberal peace, I aim to analyse some
common assumptions regarding liberal peacebuilding and how certain universal values, e.g.
minority rights and multicultural diversity, have come to clash in practice. Using theories on the
power to influence and construct such identities, I will attempt to unpack how universal values
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4
have evolved into a commonly accepted creed that establishes who these ‘new’ Europeans
should be in order to best adapt them to an EU framework.
2.2. Chapter One: Background
This chapter will give background on Kosovo and the EU Enlargement process. It will
outline central documents relating to the approximation process. Further, it will assess some
common approaches to minority rights and the role of values in shaping strategies to manage
ethnic relations. Will also provide some background on the proposed Association for Serb
Majority Municipalities and the proposal for Territorial Exchange.
2.3. Chapter Two: Ethnic and Civic Nationalism
In order to understand what informs the rationale that constructing sustainable peace will
come from the promotion of civic identities, I will analyse the endorsement and pursuit of
specific proposals through theories on civic and ethnic nationalism. These theories underline a
tendency to see ethnic identities as static, exclusionary and based on irreconcilable differences.
The juxtaposition of these two theories propose that civic identities are more conducive to peace.
This understanding- of a negative and positive form of nationalism- I will argue, guides the EU
towards efforts to promote a European or civic identity. This attempts to unite differences in an
identity centred around universal values- which I will problematise in the next chapter.
2.4. Chapter Three: Liberal Peace
Contemporary critiques of liberal peace unpack and problematise theories on intervention
and power in international relations.
1
The authors of these critiques take a critical perspective on
what they see as predominant consensus: that the best approach to sustainable peace in post-
conflict societies is by the promotion of democracy, rule of law and market economics.
2
These
values have been the ideological backbone for international interventions to promote ‘liberal
peace.’
Critics view liberal universalist assumptions as problematic and advocate a more context-
sensitive approach.
3
As Richmond and Mac Ginty point out, certain critiques have underlined the
problematic aspects of bringing peace without enabling subjects to shape this peace. Certain
1
Richmond, Oliver P, and Roger Mac Ginty. “Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?” Cooperation and
Conflict 50, no. 2 (June 2015): 171–89. doi:10.1177/0010836714545691.
2
Campbell, Susanna, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam, eds. A liberal peace?: the problems and practices of
peacebuilding. Zed Books Ltd., 2011: 1
3
Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam, 4
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5
critiques allude to the neo-colonial tendencies of processes influenced by a liberal peace logic.
4
They further suggest that liberal peace can be seen as an extension of power since it aims to
extend the reach of liberal (Western) forms of governance. Furthermore, they argue that this
approach can be perceived as narcissistic since specific assumptions, norms, historical
positioning and social, political and economic systems -emerging out of a certain privileged
position- are believed to bring about peace and stability in post-conflict societies. In other words,
Western approaches to peace are seen as superior to norms, values and systems originating
elsewhere.
Critiques of liberal peace allow us to engage critically with the core aspirations of liberal
peace that goes beyond utopian objectives and values of multiculturalism, inter-ethnic
coexistence and human- and minority rights. Using critiques of liberal peace, I aim to
demonstrate that despite its well intended objectives, liberal peacebuilding is not a linear,
mutually agreed and understood approach. Despite claims of universal values, liberal peace
should not be understood to provide a coherent, practicable framework for peace- and institution
building.
2.5. Chapter Four: Managing Ethnic Relations
Will outline some approaches to managing ethnic relations in Kosovo in order to develop
an understanding of the rationale that influences the various approaches. Furthermore, this aims
to demonstrate that despite efforts to guarantee representation and power-sharing, new proposals
suggest these are not considered enough to ensure positive interethnic relations.
2.6. Chapter Five: Minority Rights
In this chapter I will analyse the EU’s approach to minority rights, surveying different
strategies in Kosovo as well as a general evolution of minority rights and how to best promote
them. I will demonstrate how conventional approaches to minority rights- that rest on granting a
degree of self-governance and territory- are a challenge to the virtue of multiculturalism and
interethnic coexistence (within the borders of a unitary state).
2.7. Chapter Six: Power and Subjectivities
In the final chapter, I will use Michel Foucault’s theories on power techniques to analyse
how subjectivities can be shaped through institutions. I will analyse how the value-based
approach of the EU is driven by a specific conviction of how individuals and groups are best
4
Richmond and Mac Ginty, 177
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6
governed. Through Foucault’s concept of ‘pastoral power’ I will analyse how values have
emerged into a power (that attempts to) direct the ways in which both group and individual
identities are shaped. I will analyse how universal values have been established as a commonly
accepted creed: a form of orthodoxy that guides approaches to sustainable peace. In line with
Foucault’s ideas I will analyse this through how the EU explains resistance. I will argue that the
universal value framework can empower and constrain certain, sometimes contradictory,
approaches to managing ethnic relations and minority rights.
3. Background
3.1. A Liberal Peace
After the Cold War, international organisations such as the UN, OSCE and EU launched
transformative programs around the world, with the vision of promoting a ‘liberal peace.’
5
Core
tenets of the liberal peace approach is the pursuit of pluralist and multi-ethnic state building
encompassing democracy, free markets, development and the rule of law.
6
This is often driven
by international organisations, aiming in the long term to construct self-sustaining peace. With
its grounds in universal values, Franks and Richmond argue that liberal peace has become a
‘universal blueprint’ to conflict resolution, aiming to construct pluralist and multi-ethnic
communities.
7
3.2. Kosovo
In 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 establishing the
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The resolution provided a framework for conflict resolution
by authorising deployment of a transitional UN-led administration and security presence.
8
This
evolved into a network of multinational organizations led by a UN-commanded four-pillar
structure. Within this structure, different organisations were responsible for democratisation and
institution building, civil administration, reconstruction, economic development and
humanitarian assistance.
9
This structure and their respective tasks, as Oliver Richmond and Jason
Franks argue, was characterised by the core tenets of liberal peace.
5
Rampton, David, and Suthaharan Nadarajah. "A long view of liberal peace and its crisis." European Journal of
International Relations 23, no. 2 (2017): 442
6
Franks, Jason, and Oliver P. Richmond. "Coopting liberal peace-building: Untying the gordian knot in Kosovo."
Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 1 (2008): 82-83
7
Franks and Richmond, 99
8
"RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)." A/RES/69/186 - E. June 10, 1999. Accessed January 05, 2019.
http://www.undocs.org/fr/S/RES/1244(1999).
9
Richmond and Franks, 84
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7
Building on this, Anita McKinna adds that the international community’s strategy for
post-war reconstruction of Kosovo and governance were centred on standards aimed at EU
accession.
10
Under Pillar IV, the EU was tasked with supporting economic development in line
with its European perspective.
11
The EU has therefore been significantly involved since the
beginning of international administration in Kosovo. Florian Bieber further attests that since the
early 2000’s, the EU has become the primary actor in statebuilding in the Western Balkans,
seeking to replace other actors by a dual approach of institution building and European
integration (an approach largely relying on conditionality).
12
The aims to build a multi-ethnic state was solidified in UNMIK’s Standards for Kosovo
document (2003) -predicated on Kosovo’s progress towards European standards. These
standards comprise a set of benchmarks for democratic development in Kosovo and include a
focus on Kosovo’s ethnic communities. The document explicitly states that these standards aim
for a multi-ethnic society, with equal rights regardless of ethnic background.
13
As McKinna
points out, creating a multi-ethnic state was one of the primary goals of statebuilding in Kosovo,
aiming to prevent future hostilities. This implies that the process envisioned horizontal rights that
would be largely blind to ethnic difference. In other words, ethnic identities were not envisioned
to be a primary political marker. Rather, their perceived intractable differences were to be
reconciled in undifferentiated rights.
The perspective that ethnic tensions can be relieved by replacing this form of
identification with an overarching European identity, reflect a perspective that ethnic identity is
synonymous with irreconcilable differences. In practice, it has difficulty sustaining the narrative
that an identity can be both inclusive and ethnic. The fear that extreme, destructive nationalism
grounded in ethnic difference will lead to violence has resulted in attempts to make ethnic
identities less salient by promoting a common identity based on universal values. However,
concurrently, ethnic segregation has been pursued in order to ensure peace. Although seemingly
in contradiction with values of multiculturalism and interethnic coexistence- ethnic segregation
can be seen as compatible with the liberal peace perspective due to conventional approaches to
10
McKinna, Anita. "Kosovo: The International Community's European Project." European Review 20, no. 1 (2012):
10
11
McKinna, 11
12
Bieber, Florian. "Building impossible states? State-building strategies and EU membership in the Western
Balkans." Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 10 (2011): 1783
13
McKinna, 11
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8
minority rights: the perspective that minorities should have rights to a certain degree of self-
governance and/or territory.
3.3. EU Accession: The Copenhagen Criteria
EU membership is conditional upon achieving a set of criteria outlined in the contracts
between the EU and the prospective member state. Conditionality is often seen as a means to
‘Europeanise’ prospective member states, since prospective members are bound to assimilate
their legal and social frameworks in order to become members.
14
This establishes an incentive
structure and power asymmetry, giving further scope for the EU to shape structures and policy
processes in prospective member states.
15
In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council
established criteria mandatory to admission into the EU. Through its acquis communautaire (EU
law) the EU outlines in its Copenhagen Criteria its demands for improvements to minority rights
and good neighbourly relations. In order to begin accession negotiations, a country must
demonstrate ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities.’ In order to be considered for accession, prospective
members are bound to establish stable institutions that guarantee the protection of minorities,
which is part of the EU’s political criteria. In that way, the EU has great impact on shaping the
minority rights framework in countries in the Western Balkans who seek EU membership.
16
3.4. The Stabilisation and Association Process
In April 2016, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between Kosovo and
the EU entered into force.
17
The EU policy towards the Western Balkans, known as the
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), aims to stabilise the region and establish a free
trade area, with the prospect of eventual EU membership. The SAA was made possible due to
the Lisbon Treaty (2009), which allows the European Commission to sign agreements on behalf
of the Union without requiring ratification by all EU members (since not all EU member states
14
Smith, Karen. ‘Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy’, in: Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, (eds.), 2001.
Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, International and Transnational Factors. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. 2001. p. 31;
15
Sasse, Gwendolyn. 2019. 2005. Accessed January 19, 2019.
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/3365/05_16.pdf. p. 4
16
Nordman, 152
17
"Kosovo." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations - European Commission. February 05,
2018. Accessed March 22, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-
information/kosovo_en.
Gunnarsdottir
9
recognise Kosovo independence).
18
The process outlines common political and economic goals
adapted to each country through an individualised SAA: establishing contractual relationships,
trade relations, financial assistance, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations.
Evaluations are conducted regularly assessing each country’s merits and progress.
19
According to the European Commission, the SAA was negotiated between the EU and
Kosovo with the aim of promoting stability in communities with a recent history of ethnic
conflict.
2021
The reforms aim to strengthen institutional capacities and adherence to democratic
values. The EU Enlargement strategy highlights that the latter justify the existence, relevance
and enlargement of the EU, and emphasises that these values form preconditions for
membership.
3.5. The Brussels Dialogue
Two years after Kosovo’s declaration of independence (not recognised by Serbia),
22
the
United Nations adopted Resolution 64/298 (2010) encouraging the European Union to facilitate a
dialogue process between the Government of Kosovo and the Government of Serbia.
23
This
aimed to promote peace, stability and security in the region, improving relations, cooperation and
progress towards European Union membership. This culminated in an EU mediated dialogue
between representatives of Kosovo and representatives of Serbia in 2011,
24
often referred to as
The Brussels Dialogue.
25
In April 2013, the dialogue partners reached the First Agreement on
18
"KOSOVO-SERBIA DIALOGUE CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD." March 2018. Accessed
March 21, 2019. http://kdi-kosova.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/18-Sfidat-ENG-04.pdf.
19
"Stabilisation and Association Process." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations -
European Commission. December 06, 2016. Accessed March 22, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.
20
"Stabilisation and Association Process - European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement
Negotiations - European Commission." European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement
Negotiations. 06 December, 2016. Accessed December 02, 2017.
21
Nordman, Jenny. (2016). "Nationalism, EU Integration, and Stability in the Western Balkans."
OSCE Yearbook 2015, 2016: 151
22
"Mandate." UNMIK. February 17, 2016. Accessed January 08, 2018. 1 Security Council, Resolution 1244,
S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999), available from https://undocs.org/S/RES/1244(1999)
23
General Assembly Resolution 64/298. Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on
whether the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international law, Distr.:
General (13 October 2010), available from https://unmik.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/GA64298.pdf
24
Now between Presidents Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia and Hashim Thaci of Kosovo. Formerly former Deputy
Prime minister of Kosovo Edita Tahiri and then Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo and Borko Stefanovic, Political
Director of the Serbian Ministry
25
European Parliament (March 2016). Serbia and Kosovo: Normalisation of relations | European Parliamentary
Research Service. [online] Available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/579079/EPRS_ATA%282016% 29579079_EN.pdf
[Accessed 30 Nov. 2017].
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10
Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations commonly known as The Brussels
Agreement. Six out of the 15 paragraphs are concerned with establishment of an ‘Association of
Serb Majority Municipalities’(henceforth the Association) that aims to relieve ethnic tensions
and ensure the protection of the Kosovo Serb minority.
26
As part of its approximation towards
EU membership, progress on the Association could be considered an indicator demonstrating
Kosovo’s institutional commitment to minority rights- constituting a tangible benchmark in
meeting the political criteria.
3.6. The Association of Serb Majority Municipalities
The objective of the proposed Association is to represent collective interests of
municipalities in Kosovo with an ethnic Serb majority. Adem Beha argues that the application of
minority rights, in general, has the tendency to appear as a compromise: aiming simultaneously
to ensure protection for Kosovo Serbs and statehood for Kosovo Albanians.
27
Taking up such a
large portion of the Brussels Agreement,
28
the proposal for the Association implies that there is a
perception that Kosovo Serbs cannot adequately be represented and protected within Kosovo’s
general legal framework.
The Association aims to dismantle Belgrade-run parallel institutions in Northern Kosovo:
a complex system where many in Serb majority municipalities (particularly in the North), refuse
to submit to the authority of Prishtina and instead receive salaries and other state run services and
benefits under de facto authority of Belgrade.
2930
Furthermore, permitting a degree of
cooperation between the Association and Belgrade authorities, it aims to accommodate the
interest of Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade to maintain ties. However, the governments of Prishtina
and Belgrade disagree on its premises. While the latter desires the Association to have a degree
of autonomy, the former maintains it should operate within the jurisdiction of the Prishtina
26
Adrian Zeqiri, Pieter Troch and Trim Kabashi, The Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities:
Breaking the Impasse (2016): 8
27
Beha, Adem. "Minority rights: An opportunity for adjustment of ethnic relations in Kosovo." JEMIE 13 (2014):
101
28
European Parliament (March 2016). Serbia and Kosovo: Normalisation of relations | European Parliamentary
Research Service. [online] Available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/579079/EPRS_ATA%282016%29579079_EN.pdf
[Accessed 30 Nov. 2017].
29
Whether organically or by intimidation or incentivisation
30
OSCE. "PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN KOSOVO - Osce.org." 2007. Accessed March 15, 2019.
https://www.osce.org/kosovo/24618?download=true.
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11
central government.
313233
Disagreements on the rights and functioning of the Association led the
dialogue into a stalemate. The EU has made continuous calls for its establishment.
The lack of transparency of the dialogue makes it difficult to know from what standpoint
these proposals are emerging and in whose interest. While there are likely strategic purposes for
maintaining confidentiality in respect to contents and details of the dialogue process, the lack of
transparency means that Kosovo citizens are largely kept in the dark about what the Association
and Land Swap (which I will explain below) is intended to do, what it represents and how it will
function in practice.
While minority rights and the management of ethnic relations is considered a vital part of
ensuring sustainable peace and equal representation, excluding citizen and lower level
participation from negotiating this framework does little to foster a sense of ownership. This top-
down approach implies that whatever agreements result from the dialogue will accommodate
different interests of the negotiating parties (without evaluating their representativeness) and
import whatever identities these frameworks will imply onto those who become subjected to the
chosen frameworks. In chapter 7, I will analyse assumptions inherent in the transformation of
identities.
3.7. Constitutional Court ruling
In December 2015, the Constitutional Court of Kosovo raised a series of concerns
regarding whether the Association was in full compliance with the constitution of Kosovo.
Specifically, the Constitutional Court raised the issue of whether its strong ethnic character (as a
separate unit of self-governance) and linking ethnicity to territoriality is in line with a
fundamental constitutional principle of non-discrimination and respect for ethnic diversity.
34
The
day after these concerns were published, the EU released a statement asserting that the
Constitutional Court had called for the Association to be established in accordance with the
31
Bajrami, Agron. “Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (Association Impasse).” Policy Note 01. Group for
Legal and Political Studies, 2017. http://legalpoliticalstudies.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/The-Association-of-
Serb-Majority-Municipalities-in-KosovoAssociation-Impasse.pdf 9
32
One in five Kosovo Serbs from Northern Kosovo likewise expect the ACSM to have executive competencies.
Admin, Author. "BIG DEAL: Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue 'Split Asunder'." BIRN. November 30, 2015: p.37 Accessed
November 15, 2017. https://birn.eu.com/uncategorized/big-deal-kosovo-serbia-dialogue-split-asunder/.
33
"The community of Serb municipalities must have key competences." Government of Serbia. March 12, 2013.
Accessed December 30, 2017. http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=186043.
34
Weber, Bodo. "BIG DEAL - Awkward Juggling." 2016. Accessed March 21, 2019.
https://prishtinainsight.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/BIRN-Report-2016-ENG.pdf.: 11-14,
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12
Constitution. The EU called for all political parties to respect this decision in order to proceed
with its establishment as soon as possible.
35
Every year since 2014, networks of investigative reporting, research institutes and other
organisations based in both Serbia and Kosovo publish BIG DEAL which reports on agreements
made in the Brussels Dialogue. The 2015 report highlights that the EU response presented an
interesting interpretation of the concerns raised by the Constitutional Court. The report argued
that political actors including the EU emphasised the parts of the judgment that suited themselves
the most.
36
Indeed, for the EU, progress on the Association could be seen as tangible verification
that Kosovo is making progress towards accession, both in terms of normalising relations with
Serbia and on demonstrating commitment to institutionalise minority rights. By calling for its
establishment, the EU makes the Association a benchmark in the process towards accession, as a
measurable indicator suitable with its conditional approach. The BIG DEAL report points out that
the agreement on the Association intended to demonstrate progress with palpable results that
would allow the EU to open the first chapters in accession talks with Serbia before the end of
2015.
37
The EU’s response, however, makes little note of the concerns raised by the
Constitutional Court about the potential conflict with ideas of horizontal rights and non-
discrimination. Given that these factors are enshrined in Kosovo’s Constitution and commonly
associated with EU’s fundamental principles and Enlargement objectives, one might expect that
the EU would give more attention to these concerns.
3.8. Territorial Exchange
Despite many strategies to manage ethnic relations in Kosovo, the emergence of new
proposals indicates that current approaches have not been deemed sufficient in reducing ethnic
tensions. In September 2018 (although it is not the first time it has been proposed), President of
Serbia Aleksandar Vucic and President of Kosovo Hashim Thaci proposed an exchange of
territories along ethnic lines. The assumption is that this will entail that the largely Albanian
inhabited areas around the Presevo Valley will become a part of Kosovo, in exchange for the
35
Weber, 8
36
Weber, 9
37
Weber, 15-16
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largely Serb-inhabited area around North Mitrovica- with the prospect of Serbia recognising
Kosovo’s independence.
38
This proposal has been heavily criticised by opposition parties, Kosovo’s Prime
Minister, NGOs and civil society. In August 2018, 37 NGOs from both Kosovo and Serbia sent
an open letter urging EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica
Mogherini to take a stance against the exchange of territories. They warned it could set a
dangerous precedent to the entire region, that it legitimises ethno-territorial claims that have
resulted in the pasts’ conflicts and that it will lead to a new exodus of those who will become
minority in a new state (the ethnic Serbs in Presevo Valley and the ethnic Albanians in North
Mitrovica).
3940
Others have argued it implies that ethnic groups cannot learn to coexist and are
better of settling with their own.
41
The EU does not explicitly endorse the proposal for territorial exchange and there is great
disagreement among EU member states.
42
German representatives, for instance, have expressed
that they are strongly opposed to any such arrangement. However, Federica Mogherini has been
criticised for not excluding the possibility of border change.
43
She has, in fact, indicated
willingness to accept this if it is consistent with international law.
44
If the EU allows for ethnicity
to be a criteria for (altering) borders of governance (within the accession perspective), this
implies that the EU accepts ethnic homogenisation of territories as a legitimate way to shape
communities (and establish territories of governance), and implies that this logic is compatible
with EU membership. This seems in stark contrast with their stated goals of diversity and inter-
ethnic coexistence. Critics argue that, while striving for a ‘multiethnic Kosovo,’ these proposals
38
MacDowall, Andrew. "Could Land Swap between Serbia and Kosovo Lead to Conflict?" The Guardian. August
22, 2018. Accessed March 21, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/serbia-kosovo-could-land-
swap-between-lead-conflict.
39
"EU Urged to Speak up against Kosovo Partition." Prishtina Insight. August 08, 2018. Accessed March 22, 2019.
https://prishtinainsight.com/eu-urged-to-speak-up-against-kosovo-partition/.
40
"Open Letter to Federica Mogherini- Kosovo Civil Society Organizations." KDI. Accessed March 22, 2019.
http://kdi-kosova.org/en/activities/leter-e-hapur-per-federica-mogherini-nga-organizatat-e-shoqerise-civile-ne-
kosove/.
41
Maloku, Edona. "The Shaping and Reshaping of Kosovo Identity." Prishtina Insight. October 19, 2018. Accessed
March 21, 2019. https://prishtinainsight.com/the-shaping-and-reshaping-of-kosovo-identity/.
42
They may indeed be attempting to act as a neutral mediator supporting the agreements reached in the Prishtina-
Belgrade dialogue
43
Ivković, Aleksandar. "Tariffs the Immediate Obstacle to Negotiations, Border Change Still a Possibility."
European Western Balkans. February 19, 2019. Accessed March 22, 2019.
https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/02/19/tariffs-immediate-obstacle-negotiations-border-change-still-
possibility.
44
"Kosovo PM Attacks EU Commissioner Mogherini." Emerging Europe. February 14, 2019. Accessed March 21,
2019. https://emerging-europe.com/news/kosovo-pm-attacks-eu-commissioner-mogherini/.
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14
risk entrenching ethnic divides into the political system.
45
This leaves little room for other
political identities to emerge and makes it difficult for notions of a common identity and sense of
community to develop.
If we imagine the absence of an EU process: how would these proposals be legitimised?
Would they not be reminiscent of ethno-territorial claims that brought the Western Balkans to
war in the 1990s? In the next chapter, I will analyse how specific ideas regarding ethnic
nationalism influences approaches to managing ethnic conflict.
4. Ethnic Nationalism
4.1. Ethnic conflict in Kosovo
Many have accepted the war in Kosovo in the 1990s as an ‘ethnic conflict’ between
Albanian and Serb ethnic groups.
46
According to Richmond and Mac Ginty, characteristics of
ethnic conflicts are normally seen as fuelled by conflicting structures, opposing identities,
national discourses and historical narratives. These are, according to Richmond and Mac Ginty,
territorialized and historicized, creating ‘implacable enmities.’ In other words, active opposition
and hostilities that are unable to be appeased or pacified.
47
As a countermeasure, EU Enlargement focuses on developing European ‘civic’ identities.
This aspires to create unity in common values that EU members adhere to (democracy, human
rights and multicultural diversity). Despite such efforts to make ethnic identities less salient, the
EU has simultaneously supported proposals for ethnically delineated communities. Nationalism
(in a specific form), I will demonstrate, is seen as incompatible with the EU project. This form of
identification thus must, given this logic, be diminished in order to fit into a European whole.
However, when these efforts have been unsuccessful, ethnic markers have become a criteria for
the establishment of rights to self-governance, territory and other group-differentiated rights.This
approach risks institutionalising divides and further diminishes the prospect of developing a
common, unified identity.
45
For instance among Kosovo Albanian collumnists- many have written critiques in Prishtina Insight: Maloku,
Edona. "The Shaping and Reshaping of Kosovo Identity." Prishtina Insight. October 19, 2018. Accessed March 21,
2019. https://prishtinainsight.com/the-shaping-and-reshaping-of-kosovo-identity/.
"EU Urged to Speak up against Kosovo Partition." Prishtina Insight. August 08, 2018. Accessed March 22, 2019.
https://prishtinainsight.com/eu-urged-to-speak-up-against-kosovo-partition/.Demi, Agron. "What Is the President
'correcting'?" Prishtina Insight. August 10, 2018. Accessed March 22, 2019. https://prishtinainsight.com/what-is-the-
president-correcting-mag/.
46
Richmond and Mac Ginty list several authors:
Richmond, Oliver P, and Roger Mac Ginty. “Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?” Cooperation and
Conflict 50, no. 2 (June 2015): 85. doi:10.1177/0010836714545691.
47
Richmond and Mac Ginty, 85
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15
4.2. Nationalism: antithetical to the EU project?
When the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, President of the
European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso delivered an acceptance speech stating that
'the concrete engagement of the European union in the world is deeply marked by our continent’s
tragic experience of extreme nationalism, wars and the absolute evil of the shoah. It is inspired
by our desire to avoid the same mistakes being made again.’
48
Barroso evokes a particular part of
European history associated with the dangerous consequences of extreme nationalism, implying
that the EU is a project that aims to counter this phenomenon. This particular narrative framing
of nationalism (alluding to the horrors of the Holocaust) is often evoked in speeches and
documents that speak to the purpose, continued relevance and reason for expansion of the EU.
Stefan Auer argues that the tragic memory of World War II, the Holocaust and the
destructive tendencies of nationalism in its extreme form, was intended to unite Europeans in the
EU project.
49
Strategic evocation and a specific narrative framing of certain events in history
aims to facilitate a common understanding of the necessity of the EU. As Markus J. Prutsch
notes in a study on European Identity on behalf of the European Parliament, the most common
reference point when talking about the EU’s purpose is the horrors of the Holocaust during
World War II.
50
Marita Sturken argues that ‘what memories demonstrate are the stakes held by
individuals and institutions in attributing meaning to the past.’
51
In other words, memories placed
within a particular and repeated narrative aims to shape a intersubjective understanding of
common values, norms and beliefs united by a common memory of a tragic past.The collective
remembrance of this aims to inspire unity between Europeans. This proposes that the EU’s
continued existence constitutes a form of assurance that this will not happen again as long as we
are committed to the European project.
In fact, combating extreme nationalism has been one of the goals of Enlargement of the
EU towards the Western Balkans. In the updated Enlargement strategy titled A Credible
Enlargement Perspective for the Western Balkans (April 2018), the European Commission stated
48
Barroso, José M.D. "From War to Peace: A European Tale." Speech, Oslo. December 10, 2012.
Accessed November 12, 2018. https://europa.eu/europeanunion/
sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/npp2013_en.pdf.
49
Auer, Stefan. 2010. ‘’New Europe’: Between Cosmopolitan Dreams and Nationalist Nightmares’,
Journal of Common Market Studies 48:5: 1175
50
Prutsch, M. "Research for CULT Committee: European Identity." Département des politiques structurelles et de
cohésion (2017), 19
51
Sturken, M. 2007. Tourists of history: Memory, kitsch, and consumerism from Oklahoma City to
Ground Zero. Durham, NC: Duke University Press: 9
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16
that leaders of the region must ‘avoid and condemn any statements or actions which would fuel
inter-ethnic tension and [they should] actively counter nationalist narratives.’
52
The statement
makes explicit the link between inter-ethnic tension and nationalist narratives.
A specific, negative view of ethnic nationalism, I will argue, influences the EU accession
perspective and its approaches to peace and institution building. Through the framework of
Enlargement, the EU suggests that destructive nationalism can be countered by adopting liberal
values akin to the fundamental principles of the EU. In other words, this entails the promotion of
civic national identities as a form of more inclusive, tolerant ‘counter-nationalism.’
4.3. A counter-nationalism?
Former director of Carnegie Europe Jan Techau wrote in 2016 that 'for almost
everybody, nationalism, in its current usage, is an indisputably terrible thing, and European
integration is a political project designed to overcome it.’
53
However, he argues, nationalism
understood as extreme, hurtful and exclusive is not necessarily the sole or dominant narrative.
Many scholars have argued that there is a way of understanding nationalism not as something
destructive. Rather, as Techau argues, it can be a way of forging a common identity that
promotes solidarity and empathy with others outside of one’s immediate circles. Nationalism,
from both of these perspectives, is understood as a common, uniting identity that establishes in-
and out groups and fosters a sense of common values and ideas of what it means to belong within
(and outside of) a community. This has led several scholars to distinguish between types of
nationalism- proposing ethnic and civic nationalism as distinct categories. While ‘ethnic
nationalism’ has been characterised as exclusive, xenophobic and violent- ‘civic nationalism’ is
seen to embrace diversity, unity, human rights and other ‘universal values.’ The promotion of
civic nationalism, united by a set of ‘fundamental universal values’ rather than ethnic belonging,
has been seen as a way to counteract ethnic nationalism.The EU might avoid the term
‘nationalism’ to describe common universal or European values, yet the strategic promotion of
‘civic national identities’ is, as I will demonstrate, consistent with theories on civic nationalism.
Below I will survey some literature on civic and ethnic nationalism.
4.4. Theories on civic and ethnic nationalism
52
"A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans." February 6,
2018. Accessed March 21, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-
enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf.: 7
53
His intention was to critique this assumption, arguing how it can be seen as a positive as well.
Techau, Jan. "Nationalism Destroys Europe-or Does It?" Carnegie Europe. February 23, 2016. Accessed January 01,
2019. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/62846.
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Roger Brubaker points out that since the late 19th century, theories on nationalism have
emerged in two contradictory ways.
54
He argues that how people evaluate nationalism has
depended on what they have understood it to be. Some scholars have distinguished between
negative ethnic nationalism based on common ethnicity, characterised as exclusive and illiberal,
and positive civic nationalism based on common citizenship characterised as liberal and
inclusive.
55
The negative, ethnic type is commonly associated with intolerance, irrationalism,
chauvinism, xenophobia, forced assimilation and homogenisation. The civic kind has been
associated more positively with solidarity, democracy, self-determination, identity and political
legitimacy.
Brubaker argues that these theories tend to acquire neo-orientalist tendencies as the
former is associated with Eastern Europe and other world regions while the latter, more positive
variety, tends to be associated with Western Europe.
56
Furthermore, they tend to invoke a series
of questionable linked oppositions- universalism versus particularism, inclusion as opposed to
exclusion, civility versus violence, modern tolerance as opposed to ancient hatreds, transnational
integration and nationalist disintegration, and finally civic nationhood versus ethnic nationalism.
Obvious hypocrisies make this sort of complacent theorising of Western civic nationalism
questionable at best; one might for instance list the triumph of xenophobic parties in Western
Europe. Furthermore, the problematic sorting of nationalisms into simple boxes of civic and
ethnic
57
is inherently reductionist and oversimplified. The terms ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ are too
ambiguous to allow for a useful distinction.
Despite the problematic aspects of these distinctions, tensions between ethnic groups are
often attributed to the characteristics set forth by theories on ethnic nationalism: ancient hatreds,
exclusion and illiberalism. Ethnically distinct groups, from this perspective, are inclined to
irreconcilable interests and constantly on the verge of conflict. Within this logic, a degree of
separation can be seen as necessary to sustain peace between ethnically different groups.
Theories that juxtapose civic and ethnic nationalism tend to see ethnic conflict as an
inevitable consequence of cohabiting the same space. A peace and institution-building process
that results in dividing territory and assigning some degree of self-governance and enhanced
54
Brubaker, Rogers. "The Manichean myth: Rethinking the distinction between ‘civic’and ‘ethnic’nationalism."
Nation and national identity: The European experience in perspective(1999): 55
55
Brubaker, 56
56
Brubaker, 56
57
Brubaker, 56-57
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rights based on ethnicity (even if its a reluctant approach)- I argue, is the result of this particular
understanding of ethnic nationalism as antagonistic, exclusive and based on irreconcilable
differences. Thus, any attempt to promote civic nationalism that fosters multiculturalism falls
short in finding alternatives to segregation as a strategy to sustain peace. This rationale results in
problematic endorsements or acceptance of ethno-territorial approaches and self-determination
claims. This can be considered legitimate, consistent with the liberal peace framework within the
minority rights criteria. Furthermore, the tendency to see one (the promotion of civic national
identities) as a means of overcoming the other (ethnic nationalism) has led to a confused
approach that borders on a homogenising logic. It cannot reconcile goals of multiculturalism
with interethnic coexistence. Instead, it compromises in ‘solutions’ of territorial segregation and
enhanced rights or self-governance. Below I will analyse some attempts to promote civic
national identities in order to make ethnic identities less salient with the perspective that it will
reduce the potential for conflict.
5. Civic National Identities
Jenny Nordman points out that international organisations see strengthening the capacity
of institutions and promoting adherence to democratic values as a way to prevent conflicts in the
long term. She argues that international organizations view ethnic tensions and aggressive
nationalism as threats to democracy and international security.
58
After a series of wars spurred on
by politics promoting nationalism and ethnic unity, Nordman argues that Western Balkan
countries have ‘faced the task of creating civic national identities.’
59
These identities are
grounded in international norms of democracy, human rights and free markets within political
and economic frameworks provided by organisations such as the EU, OSCE, NATO and the UN.
According to Nordman, political elites have used ethno-nationalist rhetoric to increase
pressure on the EU in order to advance on the European agenda (especially in the face of
Enlargement fatigue). This pressure consistently led to responses by the EU to reiterate the
Western Balkans’ European future. The fact that this was an efficient strategy demonstrates that
the fear of ethno nationalism is a driver behind EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: it
envisages EU integration as a counteragent to the dangers of extreme ethno-nationalism. A
crucial part of this is the promotion of civic national identities embracing universal norms of
58
Nordman, Jenny. "Nationalism, EU Integration, and Stability in the Western Balkans." In OSCE Yearbook 2015,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2016: 151
59
Nordman, 151
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19
democracy and human rights. The promotion of these identities is seen as a remedy to ethno-
nationalism in the Western Balkans. The goal is to inspire unity grounded in common identities
around multiculturalism and ethnic diversity that accepts peaceful co-existence of many different
identity groups.
5.1. European identity as policy
A driving force behind the promotion and construction of civic identities is the belief that
a common identity will ensure support for the EU and thus contribute to its sustainability. The
belief that these ‘ideal’ subjects will contribute to the survival of the EU (as an ideal structure),
actively attempts to define ‘who we are’ -or, rather, who we should be- as a European
community. In fact, this has become a strategic aim for the EU, making its way into concrete
policy documents and activities around Europe.
60
In 2017, the European Parliament published a study entitled European Identity.
61
The
goal was to examine challenges and prospects for a collective European identity, assessing the
potential to foster allegiances with and strengthen a sense of belonging towards the EU. Author
Markus J. Prutsch, senior researcher and administrator at the European Parliament, argues that
the appeal of identity as a political tool rests on its perceived ability to reinforce unity and create
a ‘sense of belonging,’ which is seen as crucial to legitimise any political order.
62
He writes that
‘overcoming differences in communities as large as nations and making their constituent
members accept an assumed sameness and common identity has proven a difficult task.’ Its
conceptual ambiguity, he argues, has restricted its useability as reference point in policy making.
Identity has nevertheless become ‘one of the most pervasive concepts to describe and politically
steer community-building processes.’
63
In order to analyse attempts to develop a European Identity in EU processes (in this case
Enlargement), we must first identify how a European identity is conceptualised in the context of
the EU. Prutsch argues that there are two competing understandings. The first is of Europe as a
cultural community of shared values- emphasising common cultural legacies and historical
experiences. The second is of Europe as a political community of shared democratic practices. In
60
Erasmus, for instance, has been identified as an effort to promote a European identity alongside national ones.
"From Erasmus to Erasmus A Story of 30 Years." November 2018. Accessed February 15, 2019.
https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/sites/erasmusplus2/files/e_30_book-november-web.pdf: 2
61
Prutsch, M. "Research for CULT Committee: European Identity." Département des politiques structurelles et de
cohésion (2017).
62
Prutsch, 12
63
Prutsch, 5
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20
other words, the capacity of democratic institutions and active civic engagement to create bonds
and consequently give rise to a democratic political culture.
64
Wavering between these two
alternatives, the concept of civic identities (as constituting what it means to be European) has
been used as a guideline for policies that aim to foster a collective transnational identity.
Helene Sjursen highlights that organisations form an idea of its own fundamental
purposes in order to establish criteria for inclusion and exclusion.With the prospect of accepting
new members, the EU is faced with questions regarding what kind of values characterise the EU
and ‘who we are’ as Europeans. In other words- where should Europe stop?
65
Sjursen suggests
that the EU could be considered a value-based community: a geographically limited entity that
aims to revitalise traditions and memories of common European values and affiliations. Common
identity then functions as a basis for integration and the community itself rests on a feeling of
commonality that can facilitate solidarity across members.
66
A central way in which this unifying identity has been promoted has been through efforts
to construct a common ‘culture of remembrance.’Prutsch argues that fostering a European sense
of belonging among citizens is essential to its legitimacy, to maintain public support and
consequently the EU’s endurance as a political entity.
67
Such an identity has largely been
enforced through a common collective historical remembrance. Prutsch argues that it has been a
problematic approach due to a narrow focus on experiences of 20th-century totalitarianism
(primarily Stalinism, the Holocaust and National Socialism). This historical remembrance is
followed by a ‘barely disguised rationale of self-legitimisation.’
68
In other words, the history of
destructive nationalism and the EU as its antidote is reductive and thus will have difficulty
sustaining itself. It creates a problematic juxtaposition between a ‘dark past’ and ‘bright present,’
he argues, unjust to the complexity of European history. Further, evocations of such
‘unquestionable evils’ reduces incentives to critically examine stereotypes and to develop a sense
of shared responsibility for the past and present. As an alternative to this- what Prutsch calls an
‘imposed and prescriptive remembrance culture’ with ‘standardised views and reference points
for Europe’s past’- he argues for a reflexive and process oriented ‘culture of remembering.’ This
64
Prutsch, 5
65
Sjursen, Helene. Enlargement in Perspective: The EU's Quest for Identity. No. 5. Arena, 2008: 1
66
Sjursen, 3
67
Prutsch, 6
68
Prutsch, 6
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21
requires self-critical ‘reworking of the past’- enforcing a ‘civic culture.’ In other words, a sense
of shared possession and responsibility for the common good.
69
5.2. The pursuit of multi-ethnicity: United in Diversity?
In 2000 the European Union adopted the motto ‘United in Diversity’ to signify that
diverse individuals across its member states are united in the EU to work towards peace and
prosperity.
70
As McKinna argues, although ‘multi-ethnicity’ has been evoked as basis for
policies by the international community, there is no clear definition of the term. While EU
membership is conditional upon shaping a multi-ethnic state, the term itself is largely
ambiguous. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why policies and practices have at times,
as McKinna argues, been confused and contradictory.
71
She argues that the international
administration has both made promoting multi-ethnicity a priority and simultaneously made
efforts to promote a new Kosovo identity that transcends ethnicity (my emphasis).
72
The latter is
evident in attempts to make ethnicity less salient in Kosovo. For instance, pushing for a Kosovo
flag (representing Kosovo’s six major ethnic groups) separate from the Serbian and Albanian
flag- which many feel attachment to- has, McKinna argues, made an attempt to erase ethnic
identity.
73
This attempt to promote a common identity has thus largely focused on overriding or
reducing the salience of others. Proving difficult in practice, McKinna concludes that the
international administration has consistently prioritised separation and stability over
multiethnicity.
74
Michael Rossi argues that the awareness that ‘ethnic conflicts’ tend to involve
some degree of contestation over territory and self-determination has resulted in approaches that
believe ethnic groups need either to be segregated or provided a degree of self-governance or
differentiated rights, some of which I will analyse below.
75
6. Management of Ethnic Relations
Much of the logic that has underpinned the approach to peacebuilding and the
construction of liberal democracies in the aftermath of ethnic conflict has, as Rossi argues, been
based on this assumption of contestation over territory and self-determination.This background
69
Prutsch, 6-7
70
"The EU Motto." European Union. February 13, 2019. Accessed March 19, 2019. https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/symbols/motto_en.
71
McKinna, 10
72
McKinna, 11
73
McKinna, 11
74
McKinna, 19
75
Rossi, Michael. "Ending the impasse in Kosovo: partition, decentralization, or consociationalism?." Nationalities
Papers42, no. 5 (2014): 267
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22
has led to two commonly preferred strategies by policy-makers and academics.The first is
territorial partition, which he argues risks instability. The second involves some degree of
regional autonomy with power-sharing arrangements of the contested area and ethnic group.
Arguably, both of these strategies are proposed in Kosovo, as the former resembles the proposal
for territorial exchange and the Association may have been shaped by the latter.
While institutions involved in peacebuilding are vary of directly endorsing and pursuing
ethnic segregation (evident in ‘multiculturalism’ as an explicit goal) separation sometimes
appears to be the only way. This suggests ethnic identification is perceived as easily manipulated
by destructive nationalism (ethnonationalism), that will lead to conflict if ethnic groups do not
compromise on territory or are granted rights to self-governance.
Kosovo Serbs, McKinna argues, have been rewarded for non-cooperation by receiving
greater autonomy. This, combined with an ethnically based territorial sorting, accepts associating
ethnicity with territory and autonomy (even if as a form of compromise) with the perspective of
achieving cooperation and peaceful coexistence. This implies a dual and at times contradictory
understanding of identity within the framework of liberal peace- and statebuilding. The ideal: a
civic identity that embraces multi-ethnic acceptance and diversity. While proposing that civic
identities can be constructed, it simultaneously implies that ethnic identities are static, conflictual
and in need of the right and ability to govern own interests and to a geographically limited
territory (enforced through ‘minority rights’).
6.1. Individual and group identities
Prutsch argues that the concept of identity concerns itself both with a person’s sense of
self (individual level) and how the individual might fit into a larger social collective and the
dynamics within that group (group level).
76
These two levels, he argues, are not independent
from each other- and the complexity of identity can only be taken into account by addressing
both, acknowledging its dual nature.
77
Social groups, he argues, emphasise certain
characteristics- constructed, learned and dynamic- that outline a fundamental sameness used to
draw boundaries, promote solidarity and justify their connection as a group. European identity,
he suggests, concerns itself with collective identity (group level).
76
Prutsch, 9
77
Prutsch, 10
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23
Prutsch argues that moments of demarcation are crucial in that they highlight the unique
character of a nation or specific minority groups within that nation.
78
He argues that
homogenising such territories (such as those within the borders of a nation state) is a ‘daring
enterprise.’
79
Yet he also speaks of divisions (caused by heterogeneity within such territories) as
something to ‘be overcome.’ In other words, heterogeneity is seen as posing difficulty to
building standards on which to base a universal ‘national identity.’
80
This can help explain some
of the discrepancies between attempts to construct a common European identity based on civic
values and- its compromise: resulting in the perceived need for the homogenisation of territories
(spaces of governance) to facilitate governing and diminish potential for conflict.
Brubaker argues that promoting multiculturalism de-stabilises the conventional contrast
between civic and ethnic nationalism.
81
More recent movements have ascribed value to particular
cultural attachments and identities that include ethnic and ethnocultural. They see public
recognition of these as central to citizenship, rather than incompatible with it. Multiculturalism-
as a fundamental part of civic national identities- is permissive of ethnic belonging: it even holds
it as a value or a fundamental right. An antagonistic view of ethnic nationalism (as opposed to
civic) sees ethnic identification as exclusive, xenophobic and tainted by ancient hatreds.
Multiculturalism, with its permissive view of ethnicity, may seem strange as a civic value if
taking the view that civic identities should replace or reduce ethnic ones. Furthermore, it
suggests that the erosure of ethnic identities stands in contrast to multiculturalism, which
endorses them. In the EU approach, I will argue, we can see evidence of this constant tension and
grappling with approaches that simultaneously attempts to make ethnic identities less salient and
empower them. This contradiction has dual battlegrounds: identity as a fundamental human right
within the framework of minority rights (permissive of emancipatory claims) and as an attempt
to relieve ethno-nationalist tensions by conceding territory and a degree of autonomy, as
compromise, in order to avoid conflict by separating ethnic groups. Below I will analyse some
approaches to manage ethnic conflict and identities in Kosovo.
6.2. Approaches to managing ethnic relations
Rossi argues that in reconstructing a state, where conflict adversaries become neighbours,
it is nearly impossible to reach mutually acceptable settlements when pursuing a negotiated
78
Prutsch, 13
79
Prutsch, 13
80
Prutsch, 14
81
Brubaker, 67
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24
solution to ethnic conflict.
82
Most such conflicts involve some type of contestation over territory
and self-determination. According to Rossi, two common strategies have been pursued by policy
makers and advocated for by academics. The first is territorial partition and the second involves
some form of regional autonomy with power-sharing arrangements (in the contested area) based
on ethnic groups.
83
Rossi identifies two central risks to these approaches. In the first approach,
redefining borders might lead to further instability and could encourage domino-effects in the
region. In the second approach, producing complicated peace settlements to end conflict might
weaken future prospects for cohesiveness and shared community in the long-term.
Kosovo, one might argue, finds itself balancing between proposals reminiscent of both
the former and the latter. For instance, ethnic quotas and rights for the Serb minority to be taught
in their own language in Kosovo seeks to enforce prospects of sustainable peace by ensuring
protection of those who might otherwise be excluded and marginalised.
The proposal for the Association is reflective of the regional autonomy approach Rossi
proposes. It resembles a weak form of territorial autonomy based on ethnic belonging. The
proposal offers the prospect of enhanced rights and self-determination for municipalities
consisting of a majority of ethnic Serbs (although this remains to be agreed between Prishtina
and Belgrade). The Association might have been proposed with the aspiration that Kosovo Serbs
and Kosovo Albanians could agree to live together in peace under a unitary Kosovo state.
However, the September 2018 proposal to redraw the borders of Kosovo and Serbia by ethnic
majorities,
84
purports an idea that Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanian ethnic groups cannot
coexist in Kosovo. Although this is not a new idea, its re-emergence suggests that other attempts
have failed to guarantee sustainable peaceful relations between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo
Serbs.
6.2.1. Power-sharing: Together but (un)equal
Much of the (rationale for) peace and institution building process in Kosovo resembles
theories of consociationalism. According to Rob Aitken, consociational theory holds that the best
approach towards political stability in divided societies is by guaranteeing participation and
autonomy of significant groups within that society.
85
One of the pioneers of academic
82
Rossi, 867
83
Rossi, 867-868
84
"Serbia and Kosovo Are Talking about Border Change." BBC News. September 06, 2018. Accessed March 15,
2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-45442776/serbia-and-kosovo-are-talking-about-border-change.
85
Aitken, 257
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discussions of consociationalism, Arend Lijphart, argues that in deeply divided societies, ethnic
power-sharing and a proportional presence of ethnic groups in political institutions are necessary
in order to ensure peace and democratic stability.
86
Jelena Loncar argues that this was an
approach largely favoured by the international community in Kosovo, who led the process of
designing political institutions in Kosovo. In that way, the international community plays a large
role in moderating interethnic relations in Kosovo.
In Kosovo, ethnic quotas are institutionalised both in legislature and executive with veto
powers for ethnic minorities. One of the purposes of ethnic quotas has been to integrate Kosovo
Serbs particularly in North Kosovo, many of whom do not view Kosovo institutions as legitimate
and tend instead to operate under parallel Belgrade-run institutions.
87
As Loncar demonstrates,
ethnic quotas have aimed to facilitate a certain level of trust in Prishtina institutions and reduce
insecurity in acting outside of their immediate communities. This, Loncar argues, has to some
degree succeeded in facilitating trust and reducing insecurity. However, she argues, long term
stability relies on quality of representation, not simply presence.
88
Power-sharing approaches have been deemed necessary by some and criticized by others,
(sometimes criticised yet deemed necessary). Loncar argues that the rationale behind power-
sharing is that ethnic group interests cannot be adequately represented by non-members.
89
Proponents argue that since politicians wish to remain part of government and stay in power,
they can be expected to cooperate, compromise and reach agreements.
90
Loncar points out that
this has been widely criticised in that it risks entrenching ethnic divisions and deepening conflict.
Despite disagreements, this approach has been pursued by many states and international
organisations with the underlying objective of promoting minority rights. On (what she calls) the
much understudied topic of ethnic power-sharing, Loncar concludes that ethnic quotas in Kosovo
have been necessary to include communities in political institutions. However, she argues that
designated seats and the minority veto has negative effects on stability, inter-ethnic cooperation
and integration of communities in Kosovo.
91
In other words, while ethnic consociationalism has
86
Lonar, Jelena (2015). Power-sharing in Kosovo: Effects of Ethnic Quotas and Minority Veto. In: J. Teokarević,
B. Baliqi and S. Surlić (ed.) Perspectives of a Multiethnic Society in Kosovo. Belgrade, Prishtina: Youth Initiative
for Human Rights: 360
87
Loncar, 19
88
Loncar, 19
89
Loncar, 4
90
Loncar, 4
91
Loncar, 3
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ensured representation of minorities in political institutions, it has negatively impacted ethnic
relations.
Loncar conducted interviews tracing perceptions of minority and majority MP’s of each
other. Ethnic quotas and power-sharing can ensure participation of ethnic representatives who
may otherwise be absent from influence and decision making. Such guaranteed representation
can also facilitate a degree of trust in institutions. However, her study suggests that this has led
some Albanian MPs to resent Serb MPs since their presence is due simply to the right of quotas.
Loncar’s interviews with MPs in Kosovo suggest that securing minority presence through
guaranteed seats are widely accepted, although Albanian MPs are concerned about veto-rights
and reserved seats (which give proportional overrepresentation to minorities according to
population size percentage).
92
The institutional design thus seems to be the result of
compromises aiming to empowering minorities, that instead risk diminishing inter-group
cooperation and reconciliation.
93
Furthermore, Loncar argues that ethnic quotas contribute to maintaining divisions by
privileging ethnic parties over multi-ethnic coalitions and cooperation. When actually, minority
MPs she interviewed tended to favour the latter approach.
94
Guaranteed seats and ethnic quotas
means coalitions are not impossible. However, political parties comprising both majority and
minority politicians is difficult to envision in the near future.
6.2.1.1. Power-Sharing
Some argue that power-sharing may be useful in the direct aftermath of conflict in order
to get parties to interact and reach agreements with each other. The same authors, however, argue
that it may later become an obstacle to the consolidation of peace and democracy.
95
Rotchild and
Roeder argue (as summarised by Loncar) that a shared national identity and strong legitimate
state are necessary preconditions to the success of power-sharing arrangements.
96
In the absence
of these conditions, such as in Kosovo, Rotchild and Roeder argue that encouraging voting along
ethnic lines may instead reproduce and entrench ethnic divides. By institutionalising guarantees
of power-sharing along ethnic lines, this can diminish long-term prospects for stability and
peace.
92
Loncar, 13
93
Loncar,
94
Loncar, 17
95
Loncar, 5
96
Loncar, 5
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The establishment of the Association, I would argue, is similarly justified by logic of
ethnic representation. Despite all the highlighted problems, what are the merits of further
enhancing differentiated rights- aimed particularly at the Serb majority municipalities? As
Loncar suggests, there are compelling reasons to believe that removing ethnic power-sharing at
this stage would result in minorities disappearing from political institutions. So while there may
be reason to maintain some form of guaranteed representation, adding further ethnically based
institutions indicates that current strategies have not accomplished their goals of relieving
tensions and promoting interethnic coexistence. Consequently, new proposals for managing
ethnic relations are proposed. But are separation and differentiated rights not incompatible with
the aforementioned aims of diversity? In the next chapter, I will analyse how ‘minority rights’
within the state-peace building and EU accession framework may be compatible with proposals
that assert territorial segregation and group-differentiated self-governance as a right inherent in
liberal peace values.
6.2.2. Ethnofederalism as an approach to minority rights
Some scholars view allowing a degree of self-government over education, language and
religion as a useful arrangement, accommodating demands and interests of ethnic groups.
97
Proponents believe these arrangements will alleviate ethnic tensions by removing these sensitive
issues from the central level. This in turn will diminish secessionist desires while preserving
territorial integrity of the common state. Others believe creating autonomous ethnic units
institutionalises ethnic identities that deepen divides, encourages groups not to integrate and
diminishes incentives to cooperate with the central government.
Institutionalising minority rights in the form of differentiated group rights and the
unforeseeable consequences it allows for raises concerns of whether this will induce or reduce
tensions and encourage or discourage secession (and ethno-territorial claims). Liam Anderson
defines ‘ethnofederalism’ as ‘ethnically defined territorial autonomy’ where ‘one or more
subunits is ethnic’ and ethnic autonomy is granted by an otherwise unitary state.’
98
Anderson
suggests that the main problem in the debate on whether or not to pursue ethnofederalism (which
merits, he argues, can only be evaluated empirically) is that critics struggle to come up with a
viable alternative.
97
Liam Anderson points out several:
Anderson, Liam. "Ethnofederalism and the management of ethnic conflict: assessing the alternatives." Publius: The
Journal of Federalism 46, no. 1 (2016): 2
98
Anderson, 3
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7. Minority rights: The challenge to Unity in Diversity
7.1. International Frameworks for Minority Rights
How are we going to develop an approach to minority rights that avoids entrenching
ethnic divides into political systems, while holding governments accountable to the protection of
rights and interests and ensures representation in political institutions? An approach that does not
attempt to homogenise shared political space nor sees ethnicity as primary political identity-
demanding segregation and differentiation?
Minority rights is considered a fundamental human right core to the expansion of the EU
project. Respecting and protecting minorities through demonstrable commitment to providing
adequate means and institutions to facilitate this, is a precondition to EU membership within the
political criteria- consistent with the fundamental values of human rights. Respect for human
rights, as proposed in the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, was embedded into the Treaty of
Amsterdam (TEU) of 1997 in Article 6 (1), which outlines the fundamental values upon which
the Union is founded.
99100
The principles of Article 6 (1) are pre-conditions to EU membership
application. The article excludes mention of minority rights protection, but a footnote in the
Commission’s Regular Reports (2002) highlights that the Copenhagen political criteria have
been made a constitutional principle in the Treaty on the European Union.This implies that
minority protection falls under the value and criteria of human rights in Article 6 (1).
101
Gwendolyn Sasse argues that in the absence of a common definition of national
minorities, the condition of minority rights is open to interpretation and individualised
approaches in prospective Member States. As Sasse points out, current Member State practices
range from constitutional and legal minority protection, guaranteed political participation (e.g.
power-sharing and consociationalism), political unitarism- to outright denial of the existence of
national minorities.
102
However, there have been some efforts to develop guidelines for
identifying minorities in order to develop frameworks ensuring their protection.
The Council of Europe (CoE) aims to uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of
law in Europe. Although a separate entity from the EU, most EU member states are also
members of CoE. Furthermore, the EU shares the same fundamental values and regularly uses
99
Sasse, 4
100
"TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION ..." 1997. Accessed
March 21, 2019. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf. 8
101
Sasse, 4-5
102
Sasse, 5
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CoE standards as reference point.
103
In a Memorandum of Understanding, the CoE and the EU
affirm their commitment to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
104
(a de facto condition for EU membership).
105
In 1993, the Council of
Europe defined ‘national minority’ as a group of persons whose relations with a state include
residing on the territory, being citizens of and maintain long standing, firm and lasting ties with
the state. Furthermore, these groups display distinct ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic
characteristics. They are sufficiently representative yet smaller in number than rest of the
population of a state. Minorities are motivated by a concern to preserve what constitutes their
common identity including culture, traditions, religion or language.
106
Three years preceding this definition, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) provided a security rationale justifying minority protection. With the 1990 Paris
Charter, this explicitly linked minority protection with conflict prevention, democracy and
human rights.
107
It saw peace, stability, democracy and justice as dependent on the protection of
ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities. The charter emphasised
that this requires establishment of adequate conditions to promote that identity.
108
7.2. How can we evaluate minority rights?
Minority rights are considered one of the fundamental principles of the EU. Yet, as Sasse
points out, minority rights lacks firm foundation in EU law and concise benchmarks. Lack of the
latter complicates the strategy of compliance and conditionality upon which the accession
process depends. Sasse argues that ensuring credibility, consistency and continuity through clear
103
"The Council of Europe and the European Union." Council of Europe. Accessed March 22, 2019.
https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/european-union.
104
"Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union." Accessed March 20,
2019.
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680597b32.
105
Sasse, Gwendolyn. 2019. 2005. Accessed January 19, 2019.
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/3365/05_16.pdf.
106
"Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities ..." February 1993. Accessed March 21, 2019.
https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=6772.
107
"The Charter of Paris for a New Europe | CSCE." 1990. Accessed March 21, 2019.
https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/publications/charter-paris-new-europe.
108
"The Charter of Paris for a New Europe | CSCE." 1990. Accessed March 21, 2019.
https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/publications/charter-paris-new-europe.
(These norms were adopted by the EU through the Badinter Arbitration Committee, when the European Community
in 1991 gathered to provide advisory opinions to ‘resolve differences’ between ‘relevant authorities’ (undefined) in
Yugoslavia).
Radan, Peter The Badinter arbitration commission and the partition of Yugoslavia, Nationalities Papers, 25:3, 537-
557,(1997) DOI: 10.1080/00905999708408523
Haklai, 464
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benchmarks, enforcement mechanisms and consensus on norms and rules are crucial to a
conditional approach.
109
She argues that minority rights in the Copenhagen Criteria defy these
basic principles due to the lack of an EU internal consensus on norms and practices in the field.
In other words, the ambiguity and improvised approach to minority rights (resulting from lack of
standard framework and methodology) challenge the conditional approach to Enlargement in that
it is difficult to enforce (consensus-based) norms and rules, to establish concrete benchmarks and
enforcement mechanisms. Success in meeting this criteria can therefore result in an endless
process of opinion-based experiments vulnerable to conflicting and confused approaches to
protection and empowerment of minorities. Therefore, it is in the EU’s interest to develop
tangible indicators to measure progress on the minority rights criteria. Their advocacy for
establishing the Association can be considered an attempt to establish a concrete benchmark in
the EU approximation process.
This is not to say that approaches to minority rights should not be context-dependent.
Admittedly, any peace, state- and institution building process can be considered an experiment
with unpredictable outcomes. But given the conditional approach and minority rights as political
criteria, the EU cannot simultaneously be a neutral observer and rule-maker and enforcer of
policies that concern minorities. While institutionalisation of minority rights are a condition, it
does not lay out how. This makes it understandable why managing ethnic relations and
empowering minority rights has not been fulfilled by ethnic quotas for representation,
differentiated group rights and territorial polarisation. So while a context-dependent approach is
not inherently bad, it does allow for the possibility of ethno-territorial claims and demands for
individualised and group-differentiated rights to emerge under the guise of minority rights.
7.3. From self-determination to multiculturalism and interethnic coexistence: the
evolution of minority rights
Many authors have talked about the evolution (of preferred) approaches to minority rights
within strategies for peace and state building.
110
After World War I, definitions of self-
determination in the UN Charter for Universal Human Rights made explicit links to minorities.
Woodrow Wilson claimed that territorial and self-governance rights for minorities was necessary
109
Sasse, Gwendolyn. 2019. 2005. Accessed January 19, 2019.
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/3365/05_16.pdf., 4
110
See for instance:
Haklai, Oded. From Independent Statehood to Minority Rights: The Evolution of National Self-determination as an
International Order Principle in the Post-State Formation Era, Ethnopolitics, 14:5. Oxford University Press 2015:
460-461
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31
to ensure peace.
111
With the fall of communist regimes and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the rhetoric
largely shifted from self-determination to minority rights protection within a unitary state.
112
Instead, the idea of multiculturalism and inter-ethnic co-existence (within the borders of a
common state) gained prominence within liberal theories on peace and state building.
However, as I will demonstrate, EU strategies for peace, state and institution building
allow for a degree of acceptance of the idea of rights to (a degree of) autonomy and territory
because of identifying as a minority. This makes inherent links between self-determination with
identities as a numerically inferior ethnic group, particularly evident in proposals emerging out
of the Brussels Dialogue (on Association and Territorial Exchange). Despite the explicit goal of
multiculturalism and interethnic coexistence, perceptions of the need to counter ethnic
nationalism (as a threat to peace) results in strategies that attempt to either make ethnic identities
less salient or by separating ethnic groups- within a rights-based framework of minority rights.
8. Power and Subjectivities
The EU Enlargement framework for Kosovo alludes to a broader rationale that
sustainable peace and statebuilding will result from the shaping of civic subjects. Using Michel
Foucault’s theories on techniques of power over the shaping of subjectivities, I will problematise
these attempts to construct and transform identities. Furthermore, this framework can allow us to
see how the aims to promote multiculturalism (as a specific EU value) and the value of minority
rights (legitimising differentiated rights and territorial autonomy) can result in contradictions in
practice.
French philosopher Michel Foucault is the author of many influential theories on
relationships of power. Most notably, on the relationship between power and knowledge and
how this can be exercised as a form of social control- facilitated and perpetuated through
institutions. Foucault sought to develop an expansive definition of power that could lend itself
useful to the study of how humans become subjects and how subjects can become objectivised.
In other words, how power techniques and mechanisms can remove subjects from influence of
their personal feelings or opinions.
111
Haklai, 462-463
112
Smith, Karen. ‘Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy’, in: Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, (eds.),
2001. Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, International and Transnational Factors. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 2001. p. 31;
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Foucault wrote that it is possible (and useful) to study power relationships by focusing on
carefully defined institutions.
113
These intentional, planned-out structures demonstrate a
diversified, concentrated, orderly and efficiency-maximising concentration of the dynamics at
play. The objective of this analysis, he emphasises, is not to attack ‘institutions of power,’groups,
elites or class- but rather to confront a form of power- a technique.
114
I intend to use this theory
in order to analyse the complex relationship between institutions, statebuilding, peace and
universal values.
One of the reasons to study power, Foucault argues, is to keep in check our current social
reality: to check excessive powers of their political ‘rationality’ and limit ‘reason’ from going
beyond what is lived experience. For instance, to accept that ‘pathologies’ of certain oppressive
and destructive political regimes have used and extended ideas and mechanisms already present
in most societies. What he terms ‘diseases of power,’
115
(he mentions Fascism and Stalinism) is
that despite their ‘internal madness’ these are not exclusively ‘mad’ ideas, and not necessarily
‘original.’ In other words, the point is to analyse the ways in which politics and modes of
governance are rationalised- in order to prevent that this rationalisation serves as a tool leading to
excess power. We should not have to wait for- to use Foucault’s example- concentration camps
and bureaucracy to demonstrate the consequences of power in excess.
116
This framework can be
useful in order to study how ‘universal values’ have come to constitute a form of power to shape
identities, states and peacebuilding. This theory can help problematise value-driven approaches
that despite their good intentions, can lead to policies that entrench ethnic divides. Policies
grounded in universal values are not exempt from having impacts that can negatively jeopardize
sustainable peace in the long term simply due to their novel virtues.
8.1. Pastoral Power: shaping civic subjectivities
As Foucault emphasises, the goal is not to attack institutions of power, but rather a form
of power that constrains an individual to their own identity, individuality that oneself must
recognise and others must recognise in them. This form of power, he argues, makes individuals
subjects. It subjugates them to someone else’s control and dependence. This happens by means
of conscience or self-knowledge and ties them to their own identity.
117
Furthermore, these
113
Foucault(1982), 791
114
Foucault (1982), 781
115
Foucault (1982), 779
116
Foucault (1982), 779
117
Foucault, (1982), 781
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33
struggles can also be against ideological structures that attempt to define and determine the form
of subjectivity.
118
For instance, in attempting to shape civic subjects according to liberal peace
values.
Foucault argues that while state power has tended to be totalising and in that way ignores
the individual; a new form of rationale has emerged placing more emphasis on the latter. What
he refers to as ‘Pastoral Power,’ he argues, has come to dominate the social body.
119
He argues
the form of power technique present in what we understand as modern Western states, has
emerged out of Christian institutions and a ‘code of ethics’ brought into being by Christianity.
This form of power, he argues, emerges out of knowledge of and ability to direct conscience,
which permeates into all aspects of social life (he lists family, medicine, politics). The objective
of pastoral power is to direct humans towards salvation.
120
The prospect of salvation can indeed
constitute a modality of power. It governs how humans behave. It is not imposed by force
(although certainly some degrees of fear or devoutness has facilitated the emergence of this
power), but rather ‘directs’ or encourages human behaviour to conform to an idea of ‘what is
right’ and ‘what it means to be good.’
Foucault argues that these types of sophisticated structures that govern behaviour have
developed along with individuals (not above them). It is not exclusively imposed onto
individuals, but is shaped according to evolving values, ideologies and modes of thought about
what humans hold dear. Accordingly, people negotiate and outline a set of appropriate
behaviours and shape a form of governing structure. To belong within this structure, people are
expected to conform to the principles set forth. Belonging is either determined by desire or
consciousness or enforced through violence. The former assumes that people can be integrated
into these structures, by means of shaping their subjectivities to conform to a set of specific
patterns. This is where Foucault sees the links between pastoral power and the modern state and
institutions. Salvation, in modern day context, is ensuring well-being, security, good standards of
living in this lifetime- facilitated by various institutions.
121
8.2. Resistance
Foucault suggests that one of the crucial ways to understand power relations, is by
analysing resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations of power. For instance,
118
Foucault, (1982), 782
119
Foucault, (1982), 782
120
Foucault, (1982), 783
121
Foucault, (1982), 784
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resistance has taken place historically through oppositions to administrations over how people
live.
122
Franks and Richmond argue that liberal peace discourse assumes that conflict (triggers)
will be resolved by the fulfillment of its principal components -democracy, human rights and
rule of law- and that this will lead to a sustainable peace.
123
This value-based approach to
conflict resolution and peace building tends to explain failures and lack of progress as a
consequence of non-compliance. In the Indicative Strategy Paper for Kosovo 2014-2020 (2014)
evaluating the accession process, lack of progress on the political criteria is explained by ‘lack of
implementation and political will.’ The solution, consequently, must be for local actors to ‘take
full ownership.’
124
Robert Mac Ginty argues that the drivers of liberal peacebuilding tend to view
resistance and any deviation from ‘approved’ types of action’ as negative.
125
It may be fair for the EU to set conditions for membership (specifically, since it is
voluntary). However, such a top-down conditional approach- gaining its legitimacy (and
necessity) from moral values such as human rights and democracy- risks perpetuating a
narcissistic and self-fulfilling narrative that sees local resistance as illiberal and anti-democratic
(i.e. ‘lack of political will’ by elites).
Oliver Richmond writes that liberal forms of peacebuilding ‘operates at many levels of
denial.’ Like Mac Ginty, he argues that international actors blame diversions in peacebuilding on
local actors and communities, through an essentialising and romanticising colonial gaze.
126
The
lack of critical inquiry into its own framework (and challenges arising from implementation) can
only find blame in candidates (not itself). It also undermines that Enlargement is an ambiguous
and experimental process: a continuously negotiated and cooperative process of trials and
failures. Richmond argues that this relieves international actors of any responsibility to others
and rules out the possibility of flaws in ‘their own ineffective hegemony.’
127
A framework grounded in universal values condemns resistance as something emerging
out of power-grabbing, anti-democratic and ethno-nationalist desires. Explaining ‘lack of
122
Foucault, (1982), 780
123
Franks and Richmond, 99
124
9 Indicative Strategy Paper for Kosovo* 2014-2020 (august 2014), Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA
II). https://cdn5-
eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/eoPXEgXAn_NMU0BhWkHqt2JwXCIg0VnCbuvKgxCtHk/mtime:15311
40634/sites/eeas/files/indicative_strategy.pdf Accessed: 20.11.2018
125
Mac Ginty, Roger. "Hybrid peace: How does hybrid peace come about." A liberal peace (2011): 223
126
Richmond, Oliver P. "Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace." Millennium 38, no. 3 (2010): 227
127
Richmond, 226
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35
political will’ as the primary reason for lack of progress and enforcing that ‘leaders must avoid
ethno nationalist discourse’ suggests that elites are impeding efforts for liberal peacebuilding. It
is worth to be conscious that, as Nordman argues, elites can take advantage of ethno-nationalist
discourse to put pressure on EU. However, the process makes itself vulnerable to this fact by not
engaging with difficulties- in excluding any other explanations for resistance. Mac Ginty
acknowledges that while investigating the cause for resistance is necessary- the possibility is
overlooked that people can create their own solutions to local issues that can create a more
comfortable and sustainable form of peace. However, he argues, resistance can be motivated by
selfish interest and must therefore not be entirely romanticised.
128
Liberal peace thus should
neither romanticise nor overestimate the agency, capacity and resistance of the local. Neither
should it uncritically view liberal peace as appropriate in all contexts or assume a respective
local context is inherently and completely incompatible with liberal values. Discourse needs to
move beyond simple local ownership, and onto recognising that there is no linear approach,
universally understood approach to peace and state building.
The inclusion of local actors, although vital, must not pretend to solve the problems of
liberal peacebuilding simply by ‘checking the box’ of a more palatable bottom-up approach and
local involvement that relieves colonial anxieties. Furthermore, as Richmond points out, how
local actors are selected to take part in shaping the process of EU progression, peace- and
institution building is crucially important for what kind of peace and state is being built.
Facilitating the Brussels Dialogue, the EU puts themselves in a position to decide who is (and is
not) a legitimate actor and shaping of policies that impact ethnic relations and minorities in
Kosovo as set forth in the SAA. When it comes to the Brussels Dialogue and the proposed
policies, only state leaders are seen as legitimate actors- largely excluding others from any part in
shaping the dialogue (and keeps them in the dark about the content). The new turn towards
including the local is worthy of critical inquiry into whether it functions as a way of legitimising
liberal peace, without any questioning of whether it is necessary to reform or question the merits
of liberal peace itself. While there are demonstrable EU efforts to include NGOs, civil society
and other actors outside of government and state leaders,
129
the non-transparent and exclusive
nature of the High Level Brussel Dialogue inevitably raises the question of whose approach
holds merits and legitimacy in the process and whose peace is being pursued and to what
128
Mac Ginty, 223
129
Richmond, 234
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36
ends.This is after all the space in which dominant proposals for minority rights and inter-ethnic
peace are formulated.
Instead of seeing resistance as an assertion of a right to take part in shaping modes of
governance and the values that we live by; the EU has tended to view resistance as antithetical to
progress. When emerging from governing elites in Kosovo, it is perhaps interpreted as a struggle
for power of an illiberal, selfish and undemocratic kind, or tainted by ethno-nationalist agendas.
Characterising resistance towards (compliance with) EU strategies as illiberal and non-compliant
can, from this perspective, be understood as an exercise of power to shape subjectivities that
conform or are submissive to civic values. In other words, this can be considered a way of
shaping docile subjects who are easy to govern- not by force of institutions- but rather by the
fundamental principles of universal values. EU in this sense, is not necessarily a machinery of
power seeking to construct easily governable subjects. One may consider how the EU is in a way
governed by universal values. Since this has developed as a form of orthodoxy- the belief that we
need to adhere to these fundamental universal values in order to sustain peace (resulting from
intersubjective, repeated construction of universal values as something we should all live by).
These struggles, taking place in different avenues, over different topics and by different
agents, hold in common that they question the status of the individual.
130
On the one part by
asserting the right to be an individual- the right to be different. On the other hand, it confronts
how individualism can be imposed upon the subject, separating their links with others and
breaking up communities. In other words, it forces the individualistic identity upon the subject
and in that way constrains them. This struggle takes place against what Foucault calls a
‘government of individualisation.’ Individualism, as virtue, can also become constraining. Power
is thus not only totalising, but also individualising. These struggles come down to the
fundamental questions of who we are both in society and as individuals.
8.3. Dividing Practices: Individual and Group identities
The Association and Land Swap proposals could be seen as a way of constructing
policies, in accordance with group identities. It can also be seen as a way to direct individuals to
arrange themselves according to group identities. This implies that what best shapes their
interests, rights and the means for sustainable peace- the best form of governance for them-
comes down to who they are as a group. Ideas about group belonging is translated into a
130
Foucault, (1982), 781
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37
delineated structure that enforces certain behaviours presumed to be conducive to peaceful
relations.
Foucault argues that a mode of objectification- ‘dividing practices’ means individuals are
divided either within themselves or from a group.
131
Consequently, the subject becomes
objectivised- separated from his own personal feelings and opinions. In this way, they are forced
to relinquish their ability to act independently of these identities and governing structures
imposed upon them). What does it mean for someone to be of Serb or Albanian ethnicity and
simultaneously from Kosovo? What does it mean for someone to feel belonging to Serbia and
simultaneously to Kosovo-Serb communities- specifically if these are reinforced by municipal
divides and Association? What does it mean for someone to be themself across different
boundaries categorised as state, municipality and belonging to a network of states through
international organisations?
Through Foucault’s perspective, the Association and Territorial Exchange could be
considered as mechanisms imposing a form of group identification. Enforcing the salience of this
ethnicity both empowers and confines them to a set of rights and interests. Yet it also limits the
potential for development of individual subjectivities. In this way, the power to condition and
shape individuals into civic identities can be counteracted by the very structure that tries to
enforce it. The modality of power- the universal values- in its attempt to shape subjectivities, is
constrained by a political rationale of minority rights associated with self-determination and
territory. The latter favours separation into groups that are more easily governed, that is
incompatible with the perspective for a multiethnic state. The EU thus must not overestimate the
power they have to shape and govern subjectivities. They must also be wary of the various
influences that shape their identities, the ways in which these can be imposed both in
individualising and totalising forms.
Additionally, tt is important to be conscious of the ways in which value-driven
approaches to identity construction can lead to unintended consequences and how negative
objectives can be shaped in a way that is consistent with the value criteria. Homogenising
territory may be a consequence both of the logic of minority rights and of shaping civic
identities. They both intend to accomplish the same thing- more homogenous identities within
borders (that have an individual governing framework). This then, suggests how peace can both
131
Foucault (1982), 777
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38
be liberal- driven by values of peace and acceptance, and segregationist: believing individuals
are best governed within borders of a group with whom they share a common identity.
8.4. Universal values and the EU: pastoral power?
Foucault argues that power requires either violence or consent in order to achieve its
ends- that these are the instruments of power.
132
For instance, presumably, most would not
consider EU Enlargement as coercive. Explicitly, it is a voluntary process where states
themselves seek membership. Indeed, this may be where the process itself (and EU membership)
gains its legitimacy. Along with its proclaimed fundamental roots in universal values, the power
of the EU may lie precisely in its ability to shape desires. Legitimacy and sustainability of the
EU project comes from countries wishing to join it (nonetheless the desire of some to depart, as
we are seeing today, i.e. Brexit).
In this context, what the EU promises to these countries in terms of economic, political
and social reforms to benefit their competitiveness, development, growth and peace- its ability to
shape and grant desires is a power that incentivises countries to conform to a process and
conditions the EU sets out. Power seduces, to borrow Foucault’s terms.
133
Whether these values
shapes the way the EU behaves or whether EU shapes the ways in which values are used to
govern and shape outcomes, is most likely mutually constitutive.
One might say that studying the EU and its increasing promotion of value-based
approaches to peace and statebuilding through the shaping of civic subjectivities is consistent
with Foucault’s concept of pastoral power. Modern day salvation, in this context, lies in the
pursuit of universal values along with social, political and economic benefits of being a part of
this structure. Economic gain and the aspect of values are, from this perspective, not separate
from each other. Rather, they take part in shaping the complex, interconnected web of human
desires negotiated and promoted by modes of thought that characterise our time.
These values could be considered a technique of power in that they attempt to shape the
ways in which governance is constructed, the kind of peace and societies desired and the types of
subjectivities it is believed will best be governed to maintain peace within territories and borders
that we deal with. That is not to say that values are an independent or top-down form of power
that takes shape outside and above individuals and governing structures. Rather, these values
have been shaped and negotiated by intersubjective- and perpetuated understandings of what
132
Foucault, (1982), 789-790
133
Foucault, (1982), 789
Gunnarsdottir
39
kinds of values we wish to govern us and are employed as a way of legitimising certain actions
and processes.
Against this background, it is tempting to critique the EU as a form of self-legitimating
dogma attempting to shape and govern docile individuals into manageable subjectivities within
the modern state framework and inter-state cooperative networks. This could be a worthy
critique, allowing us to question the a blind acceptance and promotion of assumed ‘superior
values.’ However, it may likewise be important to analyse universal values as its own form of
orthodoxy: as a technique of power that institutions such as the EU themselves may be
subjugated to. Since these institutions continue to shape and perpetuate these values, it is
important to be wary of the ways in which the EU is governed by the universal value framework
and to use this justification responsibly. When strategies and purpose are legitimated by
uncritical assertion of their basis in universal values, this can be a productive form of power in
that it legitimises certain actions. At the same time, they can be constraining in that they shape
what one ‘should not do’ if this behaviour deviates from expectations set forth in the universal
values framework. While, more positively, it can hold perpetrators accountable, constrain them
from and disciplines behaviour that can cause harm to humans.
The realisation of this can empower perspectives permissive of questioning values and
their content. Not simply whether these values are ‘right’ or applicable to given contexts, but
rather the ways in which they function as a form of power to guide and shape group and
individual subjectivities. This reduces the risk of being victim to blind acceptance of ‘values’ as
a mode of shaping behaviour. More specifically, it relieves from the chains of the ideological
piousness, believing that these values hold static and unambiguous meaning. This can allow
perspectives to emerge that view Enlargement, resistance and minority rights as promoted yet
also constrained by the value-framework.
While this does not necessarily mean to call for the abolishment of values, it does intend
to shed light on the possibility that practicing ‘values’ is vulnerable to contradictions and to
failures in practice. It is not an unambiguous practiceable framework: ambiguity in values allows
for ambiguity in practice. A conditional approach, legitimated by an orthodoxy of universal
values and the dogmatic approach of international organisations- that see themselves as the
institutionalisation of these- cannot pretend not to be vulnerable to uncertainty, ambiguity and
even failure in practice- even by its own design. The tendency to assign blame to others and to
matters of non-compliance is reflective of the constraining ways in which universal values, as
Gunnarsdottir
40
orthodoxy, cannot be questioned (who would object to human rights?)
134
Such uncritical
acceptance could indeed lead to dire consequences if failure is only attributed to lack of
compliance with these strategies and processes. The process itself must allow for questioning of
its own design- further, the questioning of the power that governs it (universal values and their
acceptance).
8.5. Conclusion
Historian Gale Stokes argues that ever since traditional multi-ethnic empires were
transformed into more ethnically homogeneous states, ethnicity has become associated with
demarcations of territory.
135136
This history, he argues, substantiates a rationale that territories are
more easily governed when they are ethnically homogeneous. Despite efforts to promote civic
identities that embrace ethnic diversity, the EU’s approach in Kosovo has tended to accept that
ethnicity has clear borders and boundaries. In other words, ethnicity is perceived as a static
identity, that ethnic relations need to be managed in a way that assumes their permanence and
keeps them separate from others. This, I have argued, is influenced by a perception that ethnic
nationalism is incompatible with the EU project. Believing that ethnically distinct groups hold
irreconcilable and static differences is a perspective that fears the prospect of conflict.
Furthermore, minority rights have tended to be associated with rights to a degree of self-
governance and territory. The EU Enlargement approach is in that way both driven and
constrained by fear of potential conflict alongside the value-based approach that demands
empowering minorities. The result is a perception that ethnic groups are better off kept separate.
Proposals to establish the Association and Territorial Exchange in Kosovo challenge virtues of
‘Unity in Diversity’ and the promotion of common civic identities within a unitary multiethnic
state. The dual logic of fear of conflict and empowerment of minorities seems to justify how
these proposals can be conceived of as productive ways to ensure peace consistent with EU
Enlargement, due to its roots in universal values.
Through theories on ethnic nationalism, I have argued that EU Enlargement process
attempts to make ethnic identities less salient by promoting civic national identities. This has led
134
The purpose here is not to question whether we should have human rights, but rather, in what ways these are
shaped, understood and governed in practice is also open to flaws, failures and can be vulnerable to harmful actions
and policies.
135
Stokes, Gale “Solving the Wars of Yugoslav Succession,” in Yugoslavia and Its Historians, eds. Norman M.
Naimark and Holly Case (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 194
136
Toal, Gerard, and Carl Dahlman. Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011: 317
Gunnarsdottir
41
to a confused and at times contradictory approach, simultaneously striving for multiethnic
coexistence that promotes and preserves ethnic identities, and for a unified civic national identity
that attempts to make ethnic identities less salient. Analysing how EU Enlargement process in
Kosovo is shaped by core tenets of liberal peace, I have problematised the ways in which
universal values have come to shape a new form of orthodoxy. Deriving its legitimacy from
universal values, resistance therefore tends to be attributed to illiberal, undemocratic claims and
blamed on local actors, which progress reports on Kosovo have reflected.
Although it seems to be a contradiction to EU’s fundamental values, proposals endorsed
on the European trajectory have tended to result either in diminishing ethnic identities or
separating them. In this light, homogeneity seems to be a perceived necessity to maintain
peace.This makes it comprehensible that the EU has trouble substantiating the idea of how
multiculturalism and heterogeneity can function peacefully within a nation state. Even if it is
unintentional or subconscious, it seems to manifest itself in practice- endorsing ethnically
divided communities at times becomes a perceived necessity.
The EU’s efforts to promote civic identities indicates that they perceive identities as
socially constructed, or at least the possibility that they can be. However, further entrenching
ethnic difference into governance structures limits the possibility for a collective identity to
develop. It also reduces incentives to interact with others outside of one’s own ethnic group.
Proposing that ethno-territorialism is compatible with EU membership implies a primordial
conceptualisation of ethnic identities- ones that must be defended. Commenting on the proposal
for territorial exchange, lecturer and social psychologist Edona Maloku wrote in an article for
Kosovo newspaper Prishtina Insight that ‘a threatened identity makes people show an even
stronger attachment to it.’
137
There is therefore also reason to expect a degree of resistance
towards efforts that attempt to ‘erase’ ethnicity.
The assumption that the spread of universal values will lead to stability and peace on a
global scale, has an intrinsic homogenising rationale, believing sameness to be the solution to
conflict and tensions. Even when this attempts to embrace diversity, it has difficulty
substantiating the idea that ethnic difference can work within a unitary governance structure.
Given its consistently affirmed commitment to multiculturalism, it is interesting that the EU has
not taken a more firm stance in condemning the entrenchment of ethnic divides. There is still a
137
Maloku, Edona. "The Shaping and Reshaping of Kosovo Identity." Prishtina Insight. October 19, 2018. Accessed
March 21, 2019. https://prishtinainsight.com/the-shaping-and-reshaping-of-kosovo-identity/.
Gunnarsdottir
42
tendency to lean on conventional approaches that consider homogenised territories the most
conducive to effective and peaceful governance.
Gunnarsdottir
43
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