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Fintech and Blockchain Based Innovation: "Uberization" of Banks in the Context of Financial Intermediaries Theory

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Both Fintech and Blockchain are very topical subjects nowadays, and they are of a major importance in the context of the development of new technologies for financial services. The spread of the so-called disruptive technologies , with reference to the prior setup framework, is radically changing the connotations of financial markets, as the new technologies gain success. The concepts to the base of this type of innovation, despite appearances, are few and quite simple. That is not the first time that information technology and the engineering of procedures populate the world of finance. This time, however, the process follows new channels and pursues different objectives. The spread of structured finance that followed the former applications of ICT, has shown all its limits with the lack of information (asymmetric information) derived from a poorly intelligible innovation. The paper explores the differences between the first digital revolution and the present one, within the context of Financial Intermediaries theory. It also focuses on the analogies with other so-called «disruptive technologies» now well established, from mobility and lodging sectors (Uber and Airbnb being best examples), in order to emphasize some huge differences, and trying to guess future scenarios. Regulation, and new frontiers of Fintech being experienced right now, like tokenomics, are also dealt with. We conclude that the term disruption is inappropriate, as the experience from the sharing economy does prove that the new technologies are now complementing and transforming financial industry, more than disrupting it. And that «uberization» of banks is for financial intermediaries more a matter of embedding, and exploiting new technologies, than being crowded out.
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Fintech and blockchain based innovation
9
ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ
УДК 336
FINTECH AND BLOCKCHAIN BASED INNOVATION:
«UBERIZATION» OF BANKS, IN THE CONTEXT
OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES THEORY
2019 г. M. Pompella, L. Costantino
Pompella Maurizio, PhD political economy; full professor, BSc Economics and Banking, MSc Banking,
University of Siena, Siena, Italy
pompella@unisi.it
Costantino Lorenzo, MA International Economics & Relation, Johns Hopkins University (USA);
Law Degree, University of Bologna (Italy), Senior Partner, IDP European Consultants, Brussels, Belgium
l.costantino@idpeuropa.com
Статья поступила в редакцию 04.09.2019
Статья принята к публикации 29.10.2019
Both Fintech and Blockchain are very topical subjects nowadays, and they are of a major importance in the con-
text of the development of new technologies for financial services. The spread of the so-called disruptive technolo-
gies, with reference to the prior set-up framework, is radically changing the connotations of financial markets, as the
new technologies gain success. The concepts to the base of this type of innovation, despite appearances, are few and
quite simple. That is not the first time that information technology and the engineering of procedures populate the
world of finance. This time, however, the process follows new channels and pursues different objectives. The spread
of structured finance that followed the former applications of ICT, has shown all its limits with the lack of infor-
mation (asymmetric information) derived from a poorly intelligible innovation. The paper explores the differences
between the first digital revolution and the present one, within the context of Financial Intermediaries theory. It also
focuses on the analogies with other so-called «disruptive technologies» now well established, from mobility and
lodging sectors (Uber and Airbnb being best examples), in order to emphasize some huge differences, and trying to
guess future scenarios. Regulation, and new frontiers of Fintech being experienced right now, like tokenomics, are
also dealt with. We conclude that the term disruption is inappropriate, as the experience from the sharing economy
does prove that the new technologies are now complementing and transforming financial industry, more than disrupt-
ing it. And that «uberization» of banks is for financial intermediaries more a matter of embedding, and exploiting
new technologies, than being crowded out.
Ключевые слова: digital economy, Fintech, Blockchain, cryptocurrencies, distributed ledger technologies, shar-
ing economy, uberization, securitization, financialisation, tokenomics.
Introduction
Both Fintech and Blockchain are very topical
subjects nowadays, and they are of a major im-
portance in the context of the development of new
technologies for financial services. The spread of
the so-called disruptive technologies, with refer-
ence to the prior set-up framework, for instance in
the banking sector, is radically changing the conno-
tations of financial markets, as the new technolo-
gies gain success.
The concepts to the base of this type of innova-
tion, despite appearances, are few and quite simple,
as well as the keywords are.
That’s not the first time that information tech-
nology and the engineering of procedures populate
the world of finance. This time, however, the pro-
cess follows new channels and pursues different
objectives. The spread of structured finance that
followed the former applications of ICT, has shown
all its limits with the lack of information (asymmetric
information) derived from a poorly intelligible inno-
vation (and consequently useless, or even harmful,
from a social perspective). The benefits brought by
the opportunities and the variety of products made
possible by ICT reached only a few market actors, at
the same time imposing huge costs on the community,
as a result of the financial crisis.
From this perspective, the diffusion of the «cul-
ture of distributed databases» (better, of the Distribut-
ed Ledger Technology DLT) represents a revolu-
tionary philosophy, because its foundation lies in the
immediate, simultaneous and shared dissemination of
information related to any «market fact», so making
Вестник Нижегородского университета им. Н.И. Лобачевского. Серия: Социальные науки, 2019, № 4 (56), с. 922
M. Pompella, L. Costantino
10
information asymmetries virtually impossible, or re-
ducing them drastically. Nevertheless, the most
known blockchain applications relate for instance to
cryptocurrencies that already provide ground for in-
formation asymmetries to materialize widely.
According to the new logic, which applies to an
endless series of economically relevant cases, the
role of networks (networking) becomes predomi-
nant. The «ledger», which traces the transactions and
retains a memory which may be relied on against
third parties (thus validating any transaction), passes
from the hands of the individual certifier (bank, insur-
ance, public register, etc.) to a series of nodes (serv-
ers), thus making the process irreversible and frauds
impossible, as well as misappropriation of funds. Eve-
ryone knows everything about each transaction, at the
moment when it is finalized.
Given that ICT for Finance and «Fintech» are
intimately connected, they do represent two differ-
ent phenomena. On one hand, ICT means the use of
informatics in the financial sector, on the other
hand Fintech identifies some sort of business mod-
el, some sort of revolutionary way of intermediat-
ing funds and influence markets, a new philosophy.
Fintech and the Blockchain technologies devel-
oped at different paces in various ecosystems in
Western Europe, the United States of America,
China and Russia, just to mention a few of the
global hubs of these technologies.
Whatever article, or volume had been produced
by academics risks becoming «obsolete» in a rela-
tively short time, so that the literature related to this
topic is often not qualitatively reliable. Instead, as
a consequence of the interest by innovators, inves-
tors and financial markets’ participants, a consider-
able literature about crypto-currencies has been
developing during the last few years. Crypto-
currencies represent a somehow marginal imple-
mentation of Blockchain as a concept and technol-
ogy. This is why this contribution would be origi-
nal in comparison with previously published works,
as it deals with Fintech (as a business model) and
the technology behind cryptocurrencies, and not
just with cryptocurrencies themselves.
Many observers, especially from the fintech
sector and mass media, have found inspiration in
similarly disruptive technologies and applications
in other industries, such as mobility and lodging, to
describe the disruption potential of DLT and block-
chain on banking and finance1.
Some have even gone further to predict a revo-
lutionizing disruption of the banking and financial
systems, mimicking the impact of Uber and Air
BnB on traditional sector that were transformed
and «disrupted». This line of thought has led to the
expression of «Uberization of banks», by which it
is expected that traditional banking will be disrupt-
ed in the same way Uber transformed and is
transforming the mobility sector.
In this paper we refer to Uber as the symbolic
representative of the cohort of Transportation Net-
work Companies that rely on Internet technologies
to connect mobility service providers (often unli-
censed) to users. There is a plethora of Transport
Network Companies that operate on the concept of
«sharing economy» and use technology platforms
to connect drivers with users, such as Bolt, Cabify,
Careem, DiDi, Gett, Grab, Haxi, Lyft, Pathao, Ub-
er. By the same token, we refer to Air BnB as rep-
resentative of the short-term rental and accommo-
dation facilitation companies such as FlipKey,
HomeAway, HomeToGo, HouseTrip, Tripping.com,
VRBO, Wimdu.
The research problem of this paper hinges on
the interest in gauging whether the technological
developments and innovations that are bringing
about new patterns of banking and financial inter-
mediation equate to the developments and disrup-
tions observed in the sectors of mobility and lodg-
ing and understanding whether such a comparison
is at all meaningful.
The raise in the phenomenon of the «sharing
economy» empowered by technology applications
and «always on connectivity» is spurring creativity
and innovation in several sectors, among which on-
demand services, fashion and food delivery seem to
land themselves to potential creative disruptions2.
At first sight, one should recognize that simi-
larities do exist and also provide for interesting
examples of user-driven mechanisms such as moni-
toring and feedback loops. One of the theoretical
underpinnings of this paper is the delegated moni-
toring theory in fact, by which individuals delegate
the role of monitoring to a bank / intermediary ra-
ther than independently monitoring borrowers3.
The aim is to assess the real implications and
changes that the second wave of technological in-
novation is brining into the banking and financial
systems and put forward a method to evaluate the
impact of new technologies, their actual degree of
disruption and potential regulatory implications.
This paper wishes to stir the debate on the disrup-
tive impact of innovation on the banking and finan-
cial sectors and, with a certain provocative attitude
to deflate the hype while providing options to
gauge the disruptive (or rather, innovative) impact
that new technologies and practices can have on
financial innovation.
1. Stylised facts
Since the 1950s, the debate about the role and
function of financial intermediaries revolved
around the key themes of the social role of banks,
Fintech and blockchain based innovation
11
their relevance and contribution to socio-economic
development. In academic circles, innovative and
at times, provocative thinking led to questioning
the essence of banks, suggesting even the option of
not needing banks in the first place, representing a
useless layer of intermediation in the circulation of
money and facilitation of credit. This innovative
and provocative thinking was also gaining momen-
tum on the premise of growing concerns about the
issue of asymmetry of information that have always
characterized the debate about the role of financial
intermediaries and facilitation of financial interme-
diation, that took place at a later stage since the
1970s and 1980s.
Such provocative thinking is currently being re-
vamped by the second wave of technological de-
velopments that is investing the financial and bank-
ing sector with innovations such as blockchain,
fintech and peer-to-peer intermediation that have an
impact on banks as well as Non-Banking Financial
Intermediaries, users, etc. Such phenomenon is not
relegated only to financial intermediation and banking
services, but interests also the non-banking financial
intermediaries, above all the insurance sector that is
poised to being affected by technology applications
such as big-data and Internet of Things.
The first wave of technological development of
the 1980s and 1990s (often referred to as «FinTech
1.0») changed the financial and banking sector by
providing innovative tools and solutions that made
intermediation easier and faster, led to new busi-
ness models and interaction modalities between
banks and clients4.
In some instances, the technological advance-
ments led to the fast obsolescence of what were
considered successful applications: above all the
example of phone banking that was, in a relatively
short period of time, replaced by the advent of fast-
er and more reliable connectivity coupled with
almost ubiquitous ICT hardware. Specifically,
the advent of smartphones allowed the introduction
of «home banking» superseding «phone banking»
thanks to increased convenience for customers and
cost-cutting opportunities for providers.
The first technology revolution of the industry
changed the way banks and clients interacted and
accelerated the development of new products. On
the one hand, technologies led to the categorization
of functions within the banking sector, defining
clearer boundaries and interactions between the so-
called front-office and back-office. On the other,
technologies allowed to by-pass «internal interme-
diaries» within the financial institutions between
the bank and the client (automated transactions
through machines and personal computers) as well
as developing new products (electronic payment
systems that are also challenging the validity and
use of plastic money, although credit cards remain
the underlying and backing mechanism for such
innovative payments).
Another considerable impact of the first wave of
technological change came from the advancements
in computational capacity that allowed the devel-
opment of innovative financial products thanks to
enhanced means and methods to gather, collate,
crunch and process large amounts and flows of da-
ta. Technological advancements coupled with in-
novative modelling techniques led to the prolifera-
tion of financially engineered products that, in dif-
ferent forms and for various reasons, paved the way
to the financial crisis with the banks and financial
intermediaries as the main perpetrators5. Nonethe-
less, the origin and motivation for derivatives was a
virtuous (since the 1920s in the Chicago trading
floor) mechanism for hedging operational and
business risks. The evolution of such instruments
lead to financial engineering and structured finance
strictu sensu that resulted in a mechanism to rise
funds irrespective of the credit worthiness of com-
panies beyond the scope of cnvential forms of «on
balance sheet securities» (bond, debt and equity6),
reversing the innate purpose of structured finance.
Thanks to technological advancements, the in-
troduction of innovations in forms of payment such
as credit/debit cards and automation in transaction
intermediation such as phone and e-Banking were
accompanied by innovation in financial products.
Such innovative products covered the whole cycle
of banking services and financial intermediation,
from saving and investment products like ETFs and
structured products, lending that was enhanced by
automated credit scoring and algorithms to acceler-
ate credit worthiness assessment and risk manage-
ment techniques that used derivatives and asset
securitization.
Securitization and related financial products
were soon deemed the main culprit of the financial
crisis, notwithstanding that financial innovation
was just one prong of a multifaceted system that
led to the global financial crisis (i.e. excessive risk
taking by financial firms, uncontrolled information
asymmetries, increased complexity of structured
financial products combined with weak corporate
governance systems and laxed regulatory oversight
and/or lagging regulation.
The second wave of technology innovations that
are now interesting the financial sector and banks
are the above mentioned DLTs and blockchain (of-
ten referred to as «FinTech 2.0»). Such innovations
are poised to redefine the way financial intermedia-
tion is structured and carried out, potentially over-
coming barriers to access to financial services, fa-
cilitating interaction and by-passing intermediaries.
Ledgers have been used since ancient times to
keep track and record transactions, ensure certainty
M. Pompella, L. Costantino
12
and provide transparency in commerce and finance.
In the financial industry, each bank and financial
intermediary keeps their own repository of infor-
mation and data about transactions, assets and actors.
This requires the presence of intermediaries that
ensured interoperability, transparency and certainty
of transaction, such as clearing houses. The first
technological revolution in banking and financial
intermediation was the introduction of electronic
ledgers that informatized and automated the crucial
function within banks to keep track and record
transactions.
The «FinTech 2.0» technologies promise to
transforming the way information about assets and
transactions are collected, collated, stored, pro-
cessed and shared: the concept of distributed ledg-
ers allows the processing of data across shared
ledgers (record of data) across different parties that
are linked through the Internet. This generates a
network that, coupled with cryptography and algo-
rithms, allows to process and record data in an ab-
solute manner, as none of the participants in the
network can revert operations and none of the par-
ticipants in the network has the sole control of in-
formation, data and processes.
This epitomizes the value of DLTs as the «silver
bullet» to overcome the steps and actors of traditional
intermediation and the need for a third party that cen-
tralizes interactions with inevitable layers and associ-
ated transaction costs and processing time.
Distributed ledgers are divided into public, in
which any «peer» or «node» can participate with-
out access restrictions, and private, in which a cen-
tral party that launches the ledger sets access crite-
ria. In this instance, the distinguishing element is
the presence of an authentication process that em-
powers the central party to allow only those nodes
that meet certain requirements7.
Another layer of distinction for distributed
ledgers is between permission-less and permis-
sioned ledgers:
Permission-less ledgers allow any node to
participate in the ledger and execute any sort of
transaction. In this type of ledger, there is no
«owner» and any node are free to operate. Each
node has access to the same copy of the ledger
Permissioned ledgers are those that entail an
authorization for nodes to carry out specific activi-
ties and play specific roles in the network. For in-
stance, within the same ledger some nodes can
have the role of initiator, validator, executor. In
this type of ledgers, there are a number of owners /
operators (or even one) who started the network
and manage it (or defined access criteria when
launching it). The operator provides access inter-
face to nodes that then hold a copy of a given ledg-
er, depending on their role.
As such, the DTL seems to have the potential of
eliminating the need for intermediaries breaking the
silos of individual repositories of information, re-
placing them with a transparent and safe mecha-
nism.
These innovative features of DLT and block-
chains are triggering a vivid debate among practi-
tioners and academia on the potentially disruptive
impact on traditional banking and finance8.
The topics for debate all revolve around the key
themes of safety, stability, consumer protection,
need for regulation and depth of public sector in-
Centralized Ledger
All parties direct and settle their
local databases with a centralized
electronic ledger that is operated by
a trusted central party.
Permission-less Distributed Ledger
Every node of the network retains a
full and up-to-date copy of the entire
ledger. Any element added to the
ledger by a network participant is
shared to all the nodes. In turn, nodes
collectively validate the change
through algorithmic consensus. Once
the validation is accepted, the new
addition is automatically added to the
ledgers for sake of data consistency
across the network.
Permissioned Distributed Ledger
In order to participate in the network,
each node requires explicit permission
from a central party, which defines
access criteria.
Fintech and blockchain based innovation
13
tervention, role of governing bodies and regulatory
authorities such as Central Banks and so on. Some
of them (depth of public sector involvement and
role of Central Banks) being always debated upon
by practitioners and scholars.
2. From securitization to tokenomics
As mentioned above referring to the role of se-
curitization in the context of the global financial
crisis, the «financialization» and financial engineer-
ing changed the playing field of traditional fund-
raising and risk management for both corporate and
retail financial intermediation. This phenomenon
paved the way to a new paradigm shift from «risk
warehousing» to externalization.
The use of DLTs spurred the development of
innovative financial services and products, among
which the one that goes under the name of «to-
kenomics», the framework in which digital tokens
are used by blockchain projects to raise capital.
Tokenomics hence is an innovative form of fund-
raising that hinges on blockchain technology: a
new model of Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is gain-
ing momentum especially in the sphere of innova-
tive start-ups in high-tech sectors.
In «tokenomics» an initiator (i.e. a company)
launches the creation of tokens to raise capital
through an ICO for a business proposition that is
based on the use of the tokens. As opposed to an
Initial Public Offering (IPO) by which investors
acquire shares of a company, in an ICO the investor
purchases tokens that may become tradable at a
later stage (this would be a «security token» that
entitles to a share of the company once the business
becomes operational) and/or entitles the bearer to
access products or services provided by the compa-
ny (in this case it would be a «utility token»). To-
kens are denominated in a cryptocurrency that then
allows for the trading and exchange of the tokens
within and outside the ICO’s ecosystem for which
they were created.
Notwithstanding the increasing popularity of
ICOs, uncertainty persists with regards to the na-
ture of the tokens, often referred to as «crypto as-
sets», which are difficult to classify as a commodi-
ty, currency or investment/security. Such uncer-
tainty has relevant ramifications for various ele-
ments of investors’ protection, liability, and so on.
The definition of «crypto-asset» in itself is deceiving
and is dangerously close to the neologisms of struc-
tured finance, such as «alternative», «hybrid», «grey»,
«repackaged», «synthetic», «contingent», «collateral-
ized», «parallel», «backed», «linked» and even the
most commonly used «over the counter».
The innovative instrument of ICOs has raised
interest as an alternative means for SME financing
and its potential has been initially investigated in a
recent OECD study that highlights a few salient
challenges, in particular in the domain of valuation
of tokens.
If tokens are considered as currencies, their valua-
tion would hinge on the cash and/or cryptocurrency of
reference: this would lead to instability due to the high
volatility of the cryptocurrencies (just as a reference,
Bitcoin recently traded at 3,920$, down from its peak
of almost 20,000$).
If the ICO issues utility tokens, their value
would be based on the commercial value of the
service/product to be launched by the initiator: this
would imply a high degree of uncertainty as a func-
Table 1
Technology Revolutions in Banking and Finance
Traditional Banking
First ICT Innovations
FinTech 1.0
Blockchain & Banks
FinTech 2.0
Consumer
Experience
Uniform scenarios
Homogenous service
Poor customer experience
Rich scenarios
Personalized service
Good customer experience
Rich scenarios
Personalized service
Good customer experience
Efficiency
Many intermediate links
Complex clearing process
Low efficiency
Many intermediate links
Complex clearing process
Low efficiency
Point-to-point transmission,
disintermediation
Distributed ledger, transac-
tion= clearing
High efficiency
Cost
Large amount of manual
inspection
Many intermediate links
High costs
Small amount of manual
inspection
Many intermediate links
High costs
Completely automated
Disintermediation
Low costs
Safety
Centralized data storage
Can be tampered
Easy to leak users’ per-
sonal information
Poor safety
Centralized data storage
can be tampered
Easy to leak users’ personal
information
Poor safety
Distributed data storage
Cannot be tampered
Use of asymmetric encryp-
tion,
Users’ personal information
is more secure
Good safety
M. Pompella, L. Costantino
14
tion of the type of service/product whose value can
be of difficult estimation.
If the token is an investment (security or equity
stake), the value of the token would rely upon the
company’s valuation, and also in this case there is a
high degree of uncertainty as ICOs’ initiating com-
panies are seldom valuated using traditional corpo-
rate finance techniques and investment metrics.
ICOs are an innovative instrument, and it is
hence too early to draw conclusions on their ro-
bustness and validity. Nonetheless, recent studies
of ICO examples raise concerns about their viabil-
ity. While in principle tokens valuation should fol-
low market dynamics to establish a «fair value»,
initial comparative studies indicate that tokens’
valuation hinges upon simplistic indicators, such as
such as Twitter followers and social media activity,
rather than robust business metrics.
Moreover, the same research provides interest-
ing insights on returns and survival rates of ICOs,
with average returns of 179% between ICO price
and the value of the token on its first day of trading,
while less than 50% of projects surviving after
120 days from ICO.
The purpose here is not to delve into the aspects
of ICOs and tokenomics, reference to which is
made to lead to a key message of concern: to-
kenomics and ICOs provide worrisome similarities
to the misuse of securitization that contributed to
triggering the global financial crisis, in combina-
tion with excessive risk taking, dramatic infor-
mation asymmetries, complexity of financial prod-
ucts, weak governance mechanisms and loose regu-
latory oversight.
Using the lenses of a skeptical reader, ICOs may
provide dangerous entry points for reckless initiatives.
With the intent of being provocative, tokenomics ap-
pear as «no-asset-backed securities» (or «Nothing-
Backed Securities», NBSs) denominated in cryptocur-
rencies in an unregulated environment.
As such, notwithstanding the great merit of ICOs
as innovative financial instruments that are poised to
provide new forms of intermediation, it appears that
tokenomics is a mechanism still in its infancy that
requires a clear definition of actors, products and ser-
vices for it to materialise their potential.
The above considerations lead to the vexing is-
sue about regulatory frameworks and attitudes for
DLTs, blockchain and crypto-currencies.
3. Current regulation
The use of distributed ledgers and the involve-
ment of many actors scattered across various net-
works in a virtually uncontrollable mechanism,
lends blockchain applications in particular cryp-
to-currencies for being used in transactions often
associated with not very transparent, if not outright
illegal, activities. The adoption of crypto-currencies
has seen a spike in those countries characterized by
high political instability and corruption, a case in
point for all is the case of Venezuela. A World Bank
paper establishes statistically significant inverse corre-
lations between bitcoin adoption and the four ele-
ments of «Rule of Law», «Regulatory Quality», «Po-
litical Stability» and «Control of Corruption».
Crypto-currencies and ICO volumes are in ag-
gregate still negligible to be considered a systemic
risk for the global financial system. Nonetheless,
regulators are on the alert and constantly monitor
the evolution of the DLT and cryptocurrencies. In
addition to investors’ protection and transparency,
other priority concerns relate to Know Your Cus-
tomer, money-laundering, financing of terrorism
and other illicit activities. In this sense, Central
Banks, regulatory authorities and supervisory bod-
ies are all keen to ring-fence potential negative im-
pact and in most instances maintain the behavior of
external observers.
Cryptocurrency and blockchain was high on the
agenda of the meeting of the Central Banks’ repre-
sentatives of the G20 countries in Buenos Aires in
2018. Paragraph 25 of the G20 Joint Statement and
G20 Leaders’ Declaration is all about DLTs, block-
chain and cryptocurrencies: «We look forward to
continued progress on achieving resilient non-bank
financial intermediation. We will step up efforts to
ensure that the potential benefits of technology in
the financial sector can be realized while risks are
mitigated. We will regulate crypto-assets for anti-
money laundering and countering the financing of
terrorism in line with FATF standards and we will
consider other responses as needed».
The G20 statement is representative of a gener-
alized policy shift from previously softer stance to
a more proactive attitude towards regulation and
«other responses» on a need basis and on either
individual (i.e. country/ies specific) or collective
(i.e. international efforts under the aegis of interna-
tional fora and/or organizations) initiatives.
Nonetheless, regulatory approaches towards
cryptocurrencies are still developing, with a hand-
ful of countries with outright bans of the technolo-
gy to a few countries devising control systems and
mechanisms. The most recent and reliable effort to
take stock of regulation of cryptocurrencies at interna-
tional and global is the USA Library of Congress
survey of cryptocurrency regulation around the world
of 2018 that provides a very interesting picture of the
regulatory landscape and diverse attitude towards
blockchain, cryptocurrencies and ICOs.
A first takeaway is the fragmentation in the def-
initions and terms used to describe the same phe-
nomena: digital currency (Argentina, Thailand, and
Fintech and blockchain based innovation
15
Australia), virtual commodity (Canada, China,
Taiwan), crypto-token (Germany), payment token
(Switzerland), cyber currency (Italy and Lebanon),
electronic currency (Colombia and Lebanon), and
virtual asset (Honduras and Mexico).
Second, the survey reveals that most of the
countries have official notices to warn investors
and consumers about the risks associated with in-
novative financial instruments, products and in-
vestments based on DLTs, blockchain, ICO or
cryptocurrency. Such warnings establish direct
linkages between such innovative products and
potential frauds, corruption, illicit activities, money
laundering and terrorism financing.
Conversely, in a handful of countries cryptocur-
rencies are accepted as a means of payment: in se-
lected Swiss local authorities, cryptocurrencies are
accepted as a means of payment by government
agencies. The Isle of Man and Mexico allow cryp-
tocurrencies as a means of payment along with
their national currency. The government of Antigua
and Barbuda allows the funding of projects and
charities through government-supported ICOs.
Some countries also address ICOs: banning
them (mainly China, Macau, Pakistan) or trying to
define regulatory boundaries of ICOs, like New
Zealand where obligations may apply depending on
whether the token offered is categorized as a debt
security, equity security, managed investment
product, or derivative.
The regulatory landscape is poised to evolve as
technology solutions and products will become
more mature, widespread and significant (both in
terms of number and volumes of intermediation).
As highlighted by the G20 Statement, there is
growing attention by the part of governments and
regulatory agencies/authorities to clear the ground
from uncertainties and safeguard investors while
reducing the risks of illicit behaviors.
As any evolution, blockchain technologies will
have an impact on products, processes and inter-
mediaries, hence we foresee a “transformation”
rather than a “disruption”, in which once technolo-
gy solutions are tested and validated, and once
business models are mature, trusted intermediaries
(i.e. the incumbents at the various layers of finan-
cial intermediation) will adopt those solutions,
technologies and business models to provide “in-
termediation” services (with the understanding that
the concept of intermediation, number and types of
actors may vary as a result of such an evolution).
4. More on uberization
4.1. Extrapolating from Transport Network
Companies in the Mobility Sector
Reference to the term «Uberization of banking»
links the disruption (or changes) that Uber brought
about in the mobility industry, facilitating the way
people choose solutions and pay for their mobility
needs. What appears to be a «democratization»
process, in reality is leading towards a consolida-
tion of what was a highly fragmented industry, with
a plethora of service providers that now converge
towards the use of a single platform Uber to
seek customers.
The real impact of Uber, hence, seems to be a
disaggregation of the supply with a consolidation
of the demand and vertical integrations9:
Uber has empowered individual drivers to pro-
vide mobility services irrespective of licensing re-
quirements, so that an unauthorized driver can offer
riding services. On the demand side, Uber has cen-
tralized and consolidated the market, channeling
requests through a single platform. What is worth
noting in the case of urban mobility, is that the
Pic. 2
Source: Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World, June 2018; The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Re-
search Center
M. Pompella, L. Costantino
16
providers still need to abide by regulations while
providing their services, namely the drivers still need
to comply with road-code and traffic regulations.
Translating this model in the financial interme-
diation system, DLTs provide a platform to «decen-
tralize» supply, enabling multiple participants to
provide financing to a single entity, but once the
financing is provided there is no «regulatory net»
policing the transaction, i.e. there are no «road-
codes» and «traffic regulations» still governing the
relationship between supplier(s) and recipient of
financing. While not being necessarily unregulat-
ed, this would result in financial intermediation
occurring in a grey area with softened regulatory
pressures, which would be coherent with a noninva-
sive regulatory approach that would risk to limit inno-
vation and curb potentially positive socio-economic
spillovers. This resembles in financial intermediation
the phenomenon of «shadow banking»10.
This leads to an evident vacuum that generates
inherent risks.
Still using the analogy of Uber, the transaction
of urban mobility is typically characterized by ele-
ments that would be foreign to a DLT facilitated
financial intermediation, such as:
Clearly identified pick-up location.
Clear destination.
Predefined and agreed terms and conditions,
such as fares, indicative duration of the service,
characteristics of the means of transport, etc.
Precautionary measures, such as cancelling
the order or interrupting the service.
Recourse mechanisms such as complaints
mechanisms with the centralized application.
Regulatory certainty, or predictability, as
most typically Uber transactions do not have a
cross-border nature, being both Point A and Point
B in the same jurisdiction.
Feedback loops that allow to rate the provider,
serving the purpose of building reputation, trans-
parency and reliability.
This last element of feedback loops appears to
be a crucial and pivotal element of applications like
Uber in the mobility sector. Feedback help gener-
ate trust in a mechanism of «self-regulation» sus-
tained by users (both providers and clients) and
facilitated by the platform that behaves as an «hon-
est broker», as an entrusted entity or third party.
Such third party’s «authority» is supported by the
continued use of participants (both providers and
clients) in a mechanism that is initiated and self-
sustained to establish reputation and legitimacy.
The model above establishes clear incentives to
behave from all the participants thanks to the im-
mediacy of the transaction, clarity of conditions
and ability to provide feedback.
Nonetheless, the feedback mechanism also pro-
vides for vulnerability in the mechanisms of online
reputation due to possible fake and/or biased re-
views11.
All in all, the typical Uber transaction would re-
sort to transportation services from point A to point
B with recourse mechanisms to manage contingen-
cies and the plausible expectation that the provider
(and the user) still have an incentive to behave due
to enforced regulations that constraint the provider
(road-code and traffic regulations). Moreover, the
negligible nature of the service (short haul mobili-
ty) and amount of the transaction may compensate
for any inconvenience.
None of those elements above would considerably
apply to financial intermediation that would entail
more significant implications: financial intermediation
could entail more meaningful transactions both quali-
tatively (a loan on which a business venture or an ed-
ucation may depend upon, as opposed to a short ride
from Point A to Point B) and quantitatively (an inter-
mediation of thousands of EUR as opposed to a trans-
action of dozens of EUR).
When it comes to comparing Uber or other TNCs
to baking and financial intermediation, more consid-
erations come to mind along a series of elements that
may not find direct application in the context of fi-
nancial intermediation facilitated by DLTs:
The mobility service provider, while not (nec-
essarily) fully licensed to provide mobility services,
at the very least holds a drivers’ license certifying
her/his ability to operate a vehicle, a condition cer-
tified by a public authority.
The car used to deliver the service is (or
should be) in appropriate conditions for circulation,
a situation of “fit for purpose” that is certified by
competent authorities accredited by public agencies
The provider of the service is bound to rules
and regulations that apply to any car in circulation
(as mentioned above).
The user has relevant knowledge about the
provider (allowing for feedback, complaint and
recourse mechanisms).
The user has full real-time traffic information to
discern routing options and assess quality of service.
The provider has full knowledge of the user:
name, contact info, order history, and most im-
portantly has certainty about the payment.
Table 2
Defining the Participants
Mobility
Lodging
Financial
Services
Users
Individual
Tourist
Corporate
Retail
Provider
Individual
Individual
Individual
Incumbent
Taxi
Hotels
Banks
Fintech and blockchain based innovation
17
In the example provided above, the application
addresses asymmetries of information and provides
for a high degree of transparency that may not nec-
essarily be guaranteed in the case of financial in-
termediation, unless with the direct inclusion of
certification mechanisms that provide for reliability
(such as drivers’ license, traffic regulations, car
conditions, etc. mentioned above).
As an application that allows for democratiza-
tion of service provision, Transport Network Com-
panies may also provide opportunities for loopholes
to replicate traditional business models in an un-
regulated environment. A phenomenon that is cur-
rently developing and is almost unknown or not
noticed is the mechanism of structured Uber pro-
viders, with an investor that establishes an informal
company with a fleet of cars that are rented to driv-
ers. Drivers sign-up as TNC providers, and in ad-
dition to paying the daily rental of the car to the
informal company, pay the due commission to the
application and a commission to the owner of the
car. This model is replicating a traditional taxi
company but in a completely unregulated setting,
whereby the owner of the fleet completely by-
passes incorporation laws, licensing requirements,
fiscal reporting and employment regulations.
While not representative of the entire model of
sharing economy of systems based on Network
Transport Companies, the example above can pro-
vide valuable insight on how DLTs could provide
opportunities to by-pass regulation and control
mechanisms established to govern financial inter-
mediation, provide certainty and ensure consumer
protection.
The «shadow providers» would hence be able to
break into service provision avoiding regulatory
and/or market barriers to entry that would not oth-
erwise allow them to operate.
The advent of technology innovation may raise
concerns about the risks associated with innovative
means of financial intermediation and innovative
financial products. Extrapolating from the example
above, for instance, a similarity can be drawn into a
case where a large holder of funds (regulated or
not) could use DLTs or other innovations to enter
the mainstream financial intermediation segment
by-passing regulations and oversigth mesasures put
in place by regulatory agencies for sake of trans-
parency and consumer protection.
When looking at the impact of applications like
Uber to the mobility sector, there are tangible and
concrete examples of efficiencies that were brought
about at systemic level:
Widened the supply, empowering drivers to of-
fer services irrespective of a licensing requirement.
Lowered costs of service thanks to (uncon-
ventional) competition.
Increased transparency by allowing feedback
mechanisms of rating.
Transport Network Companies are also trigger-
ing regulatory efforts in many countries, each with
different approaches towards licensing and/or fiscal
requirements up to banning of TNC services.
4.2. Extrapolating from Short-Term Rental Appli-
cation in the Accommodation and Lodging Sector
Other applications that are considered to have
disrupted traditional sectors are the applications
that opened up the lodging industry12. We will refer
to Air BnB as the most widely recognized applica-
tion representative of the short-term rental segment.
Short-term rental applications allow private
providers to offer accommodation and short-term
rental of properties outside of the mainstream hotel
sector. While in the mobility segment, the service
provided by the incumbent and the new providers
are very similar (a car ride), in the case of hospitali-
ty the service of the short-term rental providers
may differ considerably from the traditional hotel
services (for instance, hotels may provide addition-
al services such as room service, food and bever-
age, concierge and so on). Air BnB is often referred
to as an example of an Internet Based Service Firm
whose disruption in a traditional sector can serve as
an example of how DLTs can disrupt traditional
banking and financial services.
A key feature of applications like Air BnB is the
feedback loops that allow users to rate providers,
establishing a branding and reputation to establish
trust and reliability. Another interesting feature is
the process of «self-regulation» that is characteriz-
ing those applications, with service suppliers defin-
ing terms of use and policies, as well as different
pricing schemes. In a sense, the feedback mecha-
nisms, coupled with the self-regulatory approach,
are somehow compensating for the lack of regula-
tory supervision and licensing requirements: pro-
viders establish rules and terms of use that are
transparently communicated to potential users; us-
ers provide feedback about their experience.
This combination addresses asymmetries of in-
formation and provide a functioning model that
promotes intermediation while widening supply
and potentially lowering costs.
In the case of Air BnB, what was an initially un-
regulated and uncontrolled phenomenon is evolv-
ing into a more mainstream service provision, due
to the perceived potential negative socio-economic
impact (depopulation of neighborhoods) consumer
protection concerns (safety regulations) and fiscal
implications (taxation and revenues for public fi-
nances, especially at city level).
A new phenomenon among city and local gov-
ernments is to regulate the phenomenon of short
M. Pompella, L. Costantino
18
rentals: the trend is not prohibition but rather con-
trol, with cities establishing requirements concern-
ing number of guests, occupancy rates, compliance
with minimum safety requirements and/or residen-
cy requirements from the tenant. Most of those
efforts aim to minimizing neighborhood impacts
rather than regulating the unconventional lodging
sector. Key challenges persist on the implementa-
tion and enforcement mechanisms13.
The debate about the real positive socio-
economic impact of Air BnB is far from over: re-
cent studies challenge some of the efficiencies
brought about by Air BnB and suggest that a regu-
latory approach should be considered to level the
playing field of the lodging sector as well as miti-
gating possible negative social impacts14. In De-
cember 2018, the City of Los Angeles approved an
ordinance regulating short-term rentals, allowing
only primary residents for a maximum of 120 days
of occupancy. Other cities around the world, like
Paris, Barcelona, New York, have regulated short-
term rentals.
5. Summing-up from sharing economy
models
When looking at the evolution of technology
and its impact on the banking system, it is possible
to argue that technology greatly impacted on the
rationale for the real existence of banks as financial
intermediaries. When defining the rationale for
banks’ role, technology has already challenged two
of the three main motivations for the
1. Money circulation: banks have always exist-
ed to ensure certainty and predictability in the cir-
culation of money.
2. Credit capacity: attitude of banks to repack-
age risky assets in form of risk-free deposits thanks
to their experience, competence and technology.
3. Information Asymmetry Management (new
view).
Having technology and service evolutions al-
ready undermined the pillar of money circulation
and somehow affected the credit capacity, the key
research question of this paper remains as whether
the DLTs will make banks and financial intermedi-
aries obsolete.
Elaborating on the similarities suggested by ob-
servers that the process of «Uberization» of banks
has started and is inevitable, we provide an alterna-
tive perspective, suggesting that DLTs definitely
provide fertile grounds to streamline financial in-
termediation but will not replace banks as we know
them for the years to come.
A first consideration to be made is that neither
Uber nor Air BnB have replaced taxi and hotels;
those applications widened competition allowing
new entrants (unconventional providers) into tradi-
tional markets. Their greatest merit is that they
triggered and accelerated efficiencies that are bene-
ficial to both supply and demand sides, leading to:
Further segmentation and specialization of
services from incumbent providers that face an in-
novative competitive pressure;
Enhanced economic opportunities for new en-
trants;
Lower barriers to entry in heavily regulated
and traditional industries;
Innovative public policies and regulatory ap-
proaches, including industry self-regulation.
The evolution of Uber in the mobility sector
provides interesting elements and similarities. The
case of Uber is an interesting model that allows to
observe an initial disruption of the sector (mobility
services provided openly and without limitations).
Uber has then evolved from disruptive to a “ma-
ture” mechanism in which the business model is the
same (transportation services from Point A to Point
B) but with an evolution in the service provision.
Such evolution of service provision has created an
innovative playing field in which incumbents (offi-
cial taxi providers) resisted or adjusted to new
competitive pressures. In the meantime, this play-
ing field has allowed also for new entrants to com-
pete with Uber, testified by the proliferation of sim-
ilar platforms in different geographical contexts.
An interesting case in point is provided by Uber
entry into the Russian and CIS markets: rather than
entering the market with its brand name, Uber opt-
ed for a merger with Yandex.Taxi to start opera-
tions in 127 cities in Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia and Kazakhstan. Such partner-
ship does not preclude competition nor coexistence
of different operational models. In countries like
Armenia there is room for other Transport Network
Companies such as the local GG Taxi service pro-
vider. In the countries where Yandex.Taxi operates,
users can use indifferently Yandex.Taxi and Uber,
on which drivers from official taxi companies, li-
censed drivers and «free-lancers» advertise their
services indifferently (example of coexistence).
A similar model of disruption, maturity and di-
verse playing field may possibly occur in banking
and financial intermediation. New technologies are
poised to sustain the development of new products
and business models, improving service provision
with possibly a plethora of new entrants that will
potentially consolidate (or simply disappear due to
competitive pressures and maturing of the market)
and incumbents that will adjust to new products,
means and technologies. The question will be to
see which services, with which operational modali-
ties and technologies such innovations will occur
and how effectively will affect consumers’ choices
and behaviors. Moreover, banks and financial in-
Fintech and blockchain based innovation
19
termediaries not only enjoy incumbent position in
the market, but also have a competitive advantage
by having experience, expertise and ICT savviness
and investment capacity.
Hence, rather than «disruption» that will lead to
the disappearance of banks, we shall prepare for a
new way of banking and financial intermediation
provided by new entrants and a new way of «doing
banking» with traditional banks innovating and
adjusting servicing and products. Hence, we sug-
gest that the advent of new technologies will not
necessarily disrupt the banking and financial inter-
mediation, rather will trigger innovation and evolu-
tions that may lead to a «new breed of banks and
financial intermediaries» that will adjust to those
evolutions and embed such innovations.
A similarity that can be drawn from the examples
of Uber and Air BnB is their initial disruption, evolu-
tion into maturity and an adjustment period that led to
a segmentation of the market, increased competition,
differentiation in service provision and, to a certain
extent, increased transparency and trust.
The applications like Uber and Air BnB that dis-
rupted mobility and lodging industries provide inter-
esting inputs into the debate of how technology can
change banking and finance, but remain far from be-
ing the role model as similar impacts cannot be rea-
sonably expected: while DLTs can improve certainty,
transparency and efficiency in intermediation, banks
will remain a key player in financial intermediation,
adopting (and adapting) DLTs and new technologies
to widen their service provision.
A second consideration is that both Uber and
Air BnB led to regulatory efforts to provide a level-
ling playing field and ensuring minimum consumer
protection and safety standards. While in some cas-
es regulatory efforts were promoted by interest
groups representing the incumbents of the tradi-
tional sectors (i.e. taxi and hotel companies), safety
and consumer protection, together with fiscal and
revenue concerns, are leading to diverse regulatory
approaches that are still evolving.
Examples of regulatory approaches vary. A lo-
cal legislation passed in New York City in Decem-
ber 2018 caps the number of for-hire vehicles per
year and sets minimum wage for drivers. In differ-
ent states of Australia, Transport Network Compa-
nies’ operators are subjected to different require-
ments that range from background checks of driv-
ers, vehicle inspections to insurance requirements
and payment of fees. In the Member States of the
European Union there is a high degree of fragmen-
tation in regulatory approaches to Transport Net-
work Companies, with different approaches from
banning to laissez-faire. A recent judgement from the
Court of Justice of the European Union of December
2017 (Case C-434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite
Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL) ruled that Uber ser-
vices are tantamount to taxi services, rather than a
mere digital intermediation service, letting individual
Member States to regulate it as such15.
This reflects the evolving nature of those appli-
cations from “disruptive” to “mature” models of
intermediation in traditional sectors. The gradual
public sector intervention is also an indication of a
public policy and regulatory approach of letting the
market evolve to gauge the social and economic
impact of those applications before devising regula-
tory frameworks.
Notwithstanding the above concerns, n interest-
ing feature of Uber and Air BnB is in the relation-
ship between provider and user that is facilitated by
a network with functionalities that can apply to the
financial intermediation world, such as:
Transparent information
Clear terms and conditions
Feedback loops
Reputation-based transactions.
The above elements, translated in financial in-
termediation environments, could provide interest-
ing inputs into an innovative mechanism in which
the interaction between «Principal» and «Agent»
are reversed.
Conclusions
Uberization of banking has been often referred
to as the disruptive impact of new technologies and
applications such as DLTs, Blockchain and crypto-
currencies on the banking sector and financial in-
termediation. Nevertheless, the term in itself is nei-
ther appropriate nor relevant. First, there is an is-
sue of definitions: Uber as well as other Transpor-
tation Network Companies have not «disrupted»
the urban mobility sector: rather than interrupting,
altering or destroying the sector, those companies
are complementing and transforming the industry
with innovative business models that are pushing
for innovation (and revision) of market dynamics
and regulatory approaches. As such, disruption
may not be the most appropriate way to describe
the impact of those innovation on traditional indus-
tries and sectors. Second, the dynamics of banking
and financial intermediation do not lend themselves
to being associated with the intermediation in urban
mobility, hence making the reference to «Uber» in
banking and finance daring. Financial intermedia-
tion is about financial empowerment and inclusion:
financial transactions concern key aspects of peo-
ple’s life (education, health, employment, business,
and so on) that require and demand certainty, regu-
latory oversight and protection. In a typical Uber
ride, the small monetary value of the transaction
and the short duration of the service alter the dy-
M. Pompella, L. Costantino
20
namics of consumer protection: by nature, the
transactions, industries and even the new technolo-
gies/innovative services are different. Third, bank-
ing and finance have been evolving over the past
decades with the advent of new technologies and
products. As such, banks appear to be well posi-
tioned to absorb and adjust to any disruptive
impact of DLTs and blockchain by developing new
services and capitalizing on their dominant position
by embedding those technologies and services.
Nevertheless, a few key elements of the rationale
for the existence of banks are challenged by those
innovations: DLTs and blockchain are yet another
novelty that undermines the money function of
banks. More, these technologies are poised to be-
coming an effective means to manage information
asymmetries to the benefit of transparency.
On a separate note, there is the need to «distin-
guishing» between blockchain and cryptocurren-
cies. Blockchain applications can provide valuable
solutions in specific segments, such as certainty of
transactions (not only financial, but also adminis-
trative, especially in the case of sectors and/or
countries affected by low transparency and high
levels of corruption), «serving the underserved»
(blockchain applications for cross-border payments
and financial intermediation that could overcome
the lack of reliable payment systems and banking
infrastructure, as is the case of remittances), over-
coming fragmentations along value chains (as
could be the case of international trade and com-
mercial transactions with multiple layers of inter-
mediation). Those positive elements of blockchain
may be undermined by the low awareness and un-
derstanding of the technologies involved: often
blockchain is indifferently associated to cryptocur-
rencies by the general public.
In addition, tokenomics and its dynamics dan-
gerously resemble the reckless financial product
innovation that contributed, together with many
concurring factors, to the international financial
crisis. The lack of a regulatory framework, the hype
of innovative financial instruments (in addition
always associated with «high-tech» or other appeal-
ing ventures) coupled with no supervision and gov-
ernance mechanisms may lend tokenomics to
providing opportunities and venues for financial
frauds. This may serve as an entry point for indus-
try participants and regulators to seek innovative
mechanisms of consumer/investor protection, as the
concept of tokenomics is undermining and revers-
ing yet again the models of creditworthiness, finan-
cial and business decision making based on due-
diligence assessment and valuation.
The above stresses the need to tackle regulatory
aspects: it is exactly in this domain that lies the real
disruption of DLTs, blockchain and cryptocurren-
cy. Those technologies and innovations are trigger-
ing diverse approaches that range from banning to
laissez faire. While regulation may hinder innova-
tion limiting the ability of technology to push the
boundaries of new services and applications, con-
sumer protection, transparency and money launder-
ing are all legitimate concerns of regulators. Iden-
tifying the right balance and regulatory depth will
be the most pressing challenge. In the current regu-
latory vacuum, alternative measures can be under-
taken to prevent or at least minimize the impact
of possible negative applications of the new tech-
nologies and services: increased awareness among
the public (tailored for specific target groups) as
well as transparency about information and data
available on new products and services. Although,
this last element of transparency and availability of
information would in any case require some forms
of monitoring (ideally from a public agency) and/or
impose some forms of reporting. Just as an exam-
ple, ICOs should be in any case reported and/or pre-
pared with adequate information disclosure clauses
and procedures. Light reporting requirements may
be developed for those businesses, ventures and ini-
tiatives benefitting from ICOs to monitor their sur-
vival rates.
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ability of Reviews on the Internet: The Case of TripAd-
visor. Alton Y.K. Chua and Snehasish Banerjee, Pro-
ceedings of the World Congress on Engineering and
Computer Science 2013 Vol I WCECS 2013, 23-25 Oc-
tober, 2013, San Francisco, USA. The Role of Power and
Incentives in Inducing Fake Reviews in the Tourism
Industry, Sungwoo Choi, Anna S. Mattila, Hubert B.
Van Hoof, Donna Quadri-Felitti, Journal of Travel Re-
search, 2016.
12. Providers mentioned above such as Air BnB,
FlipKey, HomeAway, HomeToGo, HouseTrip, Trip-
ping.com, VRBO, Wimdu and the likes.
13. Nieuwland, Shirley & Melik, Rianne. (2018).
Regulating Airbnb: how cities deal with perceived nega-
tive externalities of short-term rentals. Current Issues in
Tourism. 1-15. 10.1080/13683500.2018.1504899.
14. Bivens (2019). The economic costs and benefits of
Airbnb: no reason for local policymakers to let Airbnb
bypass tax or regulatory obligations. Economic Policy
Institute.
15. The Court declared that an intermediation service
such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the purpose
of which is to connect, by means of a smartphone applica-
tion and for remuneration, non-professional drivers using
their own vehicle with persons who wish to make urban
journeys, must be regarded as being inherently linked to a
transport service and, accordingly, must be classified as ‘a
service in the field of transport’ within the meaning of EU
law. Consequently, such a service must be excluded from
the scope of the freedom to provide services in general as
well as the directive on services in the internal market and
the directive on electronic commerce. It follows that, as
EU law currently stands, it is for the Member States to
regulate the conditions under which such services are to be
provided in conformity with the general rules of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the EU.
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ИННОВАЦИИ НА ОСНОВЕ ФИНТЕХ И БЛОКЧЕЙН:
«УБЕРИЗАЦИЯ» БАНКОВ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ТЕОРИИ ФИНАНСОВЫХ ПОСРЕДНИКОВ
М. Помпелла,1 Л. Константино2
1Университет г. Сиены, Италия
2Ассоциация IDP European Consultants, Бельгия
Финтех и блокчейн в настоящее время очень актуальны и имеют большое значение в контексте развития
новых технологий для финансовых услуг. Распространение так называемых «подрывных инноваций»
оказывает радикальное воздействие на принципы функционирования финансовых рынков. Банковский сектор
переживает новую волну цифровизации и финансового реинжиниринга, однако на этот раз процесс обновле-
ния идет по новым каналам и преследует иные цели. Распространение структурированного финансирования,
закрепившегося в результате прежнего применения ИКТ, выявило проблемы, связанные с дефицитом инфор-
мации или информационной асимметрией в отношении сложных для понимания инновационных продуктов. В
статье проводится сравнительный анализ воздействия первой и второй волны цифровизации в контексте тео-
рии финансовых посредников. Рассматриваются вопросы распространения и регулирования передовых финан-
совых технологий и токеномики. Авторы приходят к выводу, что нельзя квалифицировать технологические
изменения, происходящие в финансовом секторе, как «подрывные инновации», поскольку другие примеры
экономики совместного пользования, такие как Uber и Airbnb, говорят о том, что новые технологии дадут
новый импульс развитию финансовой индустрии, не вытесняя ее.
Ключевые слова: цифровая экономика, финтех, блокчейн, криптовалюты, экономика совместного пользо-
вания, уберизация, технология распределенного реестра, секьюритизация, финансиализация, токеномика.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Article
Full-text available
This paper reviews what stage the central banks of the world’s leading economies are at in their study and adoption of distributed ledger technology (DLT) to reengineer their various systems and functions. A brief description of DLT will be given, followed by an analysis of central banks’ publications and pronouncements to determine what each central bank is doing on their journey to DLT adoption. It was found that of the central banks for which information was available, all of them have expressed interest in DLT and have evaluated it to some extent. Nevertheless, no central bank has an operational DLT-based system at this point. This is because some issues remain regarding the speed, cost of processing, security, transparency and privacy, legal settlement finality, scalability and network effects of the technology. As DLT matures, the expectation is that these issues will begin to be resolved.
2. «Digital Disruption beyond Uber and Airbnb -Tracking the long tail of the sharing economy
«The Uberization of Banking», Wall Street Journal, April 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/theuberization-of-banking-1461967266. Digital Disruption: Banks Have Their Uber Moment, https://www.digita listmag.com/customer-experience/2016/10/18/digital-dis ruption-banks-uber-moment-04579272. Banking's 'Uber moment' is a 'big threat' Published Fri, Jan 22 2016, https://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/22/bankings-uber-mome nt-is-a-big-threat.html. 2. «Digital Disruption beyond Uber and Airbnb -Tracking the long tail of the sharing economy»; A. Geissingerab, C. Laurell, C. Sandströmbde; In Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2018. Wall Street Journal, 2015, «There's an Uber for everything now», www.wsj.com/articles/theres-an-uber-for-everything-no w-1430845789.
Performance and Customer Service Delivery in the Banking Industry. The Economic Effects of Technological Progress: Evidence from the Banking Industry
The Impact of Information and Communication Technology on Banks" Performance and Customer Service Delivery in the Banking Industry. The Economic Effects of Technological Progress: Evidence from the Banking Industry, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Volume 35, 2003. Allen N. Berger Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. A Historical Appraisal of Information Technology in Commercial Banking, Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo and Douglas wood, Electronic Markets Vol. 12. №. 3. 2002.
Research on Financial Services Innovations: A Quantitative Review and Future Research Directions. International Journal of Bank Marketing
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G. Nejad, Mohammad. (2016). Research on Financial Services Innovations: A Quantitative Review and Future Research Directions. International Journal of Bank Marketing. 34. 10.1108/IJBM-08-2015-0129. IMF Working Paper «Securitization and Monetary Policy: Watch Out for Unintended Consequences», prepared by Andrea Pescatori and Juan Solé, March 2016. ECB Working Paper Series 1335 / 2011, The Bank Lending Channel: Lessons from the Crisis, L. Gambacorta D.
Distributed Ledger Technology
«Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Block Chain», A Report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, 2016. ECB -IN FOCUS Issue 1, 2016, "Distributed Ledger Technology. "Distributed Ledger Technology and Blockchain", FinTech Note 1, 2017, the World Bank.
The economic costs and benefits of Airbnb: no reason for local policymakers to let Airbnb bypass tax or regulatory obligations
Regulating Airbnb: how cities deal with perceived negative externalities of short-term rentals. Current Issues in Tourism. 1-15. 10.1080/13683500.2018.1504899. 14. Bivens (2019). The economic costs and benefits of Airbnb: no reason for local policymakers to let Airbnb bypass tax or regulatory obligations. Economic Policy Institute. Список литературы
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. A Historical Appraisal of Information Technology in Commercial Banking. 4. BIS Quarterly Review
The Impact of Information and Communication Technology on Banks" Performance and Customer Service Delivery in the Banking Industry. The Economic Effects of Technological Progress: Evidence from the Banking Industry // Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Volume 35, 2003. 2. Bank for International Settlements / Distributed ledger technology in payment, clearing and settlement: An analytical framework, February 2017. URL: https://www. bis.org/cpmi/publ/d157.pdf 3. Berger A.N. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. A Historical Appraisal of Information Technology in Commercial Banking. 4. BIS Quarterly Review, September 2017 / Central bank cryptocurrencies. URL: https://www.bis.org/publ/ qtrpdf/r_qt1709f.pdf 5. Bivens. The economic costs and benefits of Airbnb: no reason for local policymakers to let Airbnb bypass tax or regulatory obligations / Economic Policy Institute, 2019.
The Role of Power and Incentives in Inducing Fake Reviews in the Tourism Industry
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Vol. I WCECS 2013, 23-25 October, 2013, San Francisco, USA. The Role of Power and Incentives in Inducing Fake Reviews in the Tourism Industry, Sungwoo Choi, Anna S. Mattila, Hubert B. Van Hoof, Donna Quadri-Felitti, Journal of Travel Research, 2016.
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