Managing tensions as paradox in CEO succession: The case of nonfamily CEO in a family firm

Abstract

An increasing number of family firms choose to select a nonfamily CEO for the highest executive office. However, appointing a nonfamily CEO in a family firm tends to give rise to tensions that need to be managed for effective work relationships between the nonfamily CEO and the family owners. We draw on insights from the paradox literature to better understand these tensions and how they are managed. We performed real-time, in-depth longitudinal research into one family firm, which appointed a nonfamily CEO, and studied tensions in the work relationships between the nonfamily CEO and the family owners for a period of three years. We identified tensions arising in four specific areas after the transition from a family to a nonfamily CEO: professionalisation, collaboration, resource allocation and role transition. We found new insights regarding how an advisory board can provide support for the family owners in building work relationships with the nonfamily CEO, which makes the tensions salient and possible to manage through a paradox approach. These results inform a perspective of paradox management that shows by whom and how the different tensions are managed, that is, through changes in behaviour and/or through changes in the underlying subsystems of the family firm.

Full text

https://doi.org/10.1177/0266242619898609
International Small Business Journal:
Researching Entrepreneurship
2020, Vol. 38(3) 211 –242
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0266242619898609
journals.sagepub.com/home/isb
S
mall Firms
is
b
j
Managing tensions as paradox
in CEO succession: The case of
nonfamily CEO in a family firm
Judith van Helvert-Beugels
Windesheim University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands
Mattias Nordqvist
Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden; Jönköping University, Sweden
Roberto Flören
Nyenrode Business Universiteit, The Netherlands
Abstract
An increasing number of family firms choose to select a nonfamily CEO for the highest executive
office. However, appointing a nonfamily CEO in a family firm tends to give rise to tensions that
need to be managed for effective work relationships between the nonfamily CEO and the family
owners. We draw on insights from the paradox literature to better understand these tensions
and how they are managed. We performed real-time, in-depth longitudinal research into one
family firm, which appointed a nonfamily CEO, and studied tensions in the work relationships
between the nonfamily CEO and the family owners for a period of three years. We identified
tensions arising in four specific areas after the transition from a family to a nonfamily CEO:
professionalisation, collaboration, resource allocation and role transition. We found new insights
regarding how an advisory board can provide support for the family owners in building work
relationships with the nonfamily CEO, which makes the tensions salient and possible to manage
through a paradox approach. These results inform a perspective of paradox management that
shows by whom and how the different tensions are managed, that is, through changes in behaviour
and/or through changes in the underlying subsystems of the family firm.
Keywords
CEO succession, family firms, nonfamily CEO, paradox management, work relationships
Corresponding author:
Judith van Helvert-Beugels, Dutch Centre of Expertise in Family Business, Windesheim University of Applied Sciences,
Campus 2-6, 8000 GB Zwolle, The Netherlands.
Email: jmc.van.helvert@windesheim.nl
898609ISB0010.1177/0266242619898609International Small Business Journalvan Helvert-Beugels et al.
research-article2020
Article

212 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
Introduction
CEO succession and the choice to appoint a nonfamily CEO is one of the most critical decisions in
family firms. Family firms appoint nonfamily CEOs when there is no suitable family member
available (Blumentritt et al., 2007). Today, owner-family members from the next generation have
more career opportunities outside the family business because of their increasing education levels,
and a greater freedom in choosing their own career outside the family business (Zellweger et al.,
2011). Many family firms are already managed by nonfamily CEOs (e.g. Bennedsen et al., 2007;
Miller et al., 2014) and more will be in the future (PwC, 2014). So far, research on the transition
from a family to a nonfamily CEO has primarily focused on what effects this event has on the
performance and entrepreneurial behaviour of the nonfamily CEO and the firm (Bennedsen et al.,
2007; Huybrechts et al., 2013; Kelleci et al., 2019), on the factors that promote the success and
retention of nonfamily CEOs (Blumentritt et al., 2007; Mehrotra et al., 2011, 2013; Miller et al.,
2014; Waldkirch et al., 2018) and on the involvement of nonfamily CEOs in strategic decisions
(Salvato et al., 2010).
However, little is known about the process that commences after a member of the owner family
hands over the management to a nonfamily CEO, while she or he remains in an ownership position
and continues to control the firm. Whilst we know that this work relationship is challenging for the
stakeholders involved (Blumentritt et al., 2007; Hall and Nordqvist, 2008; Waldkirch et al., 2018),
there is a gap in our knowledge regarding the first phases of these work relationships in which
research has indicated that tensions arise. We do not yet know what these tensions specifically
involve, how they emerge and are managed to support an effective work relationship after a transi-
tion from a family CEO to a nonfamily CEO (Daspit et al., 2016; Hall and Nordqvist, 2008). In this
article, we address this gap by focusing on the following research questions: (1) What tensions
arise after the transition from a family to a nonfamily CEO in a family firm? and (2) How are these
tensions managed to support an effective work relationship after the transition? Seeking answers to
these research questions is important because at the same time as transitions from family to non-
family CEOs are becoming increasingly common among family firms, we know that many such
transitions fail as a result of poor work relationships between the new CEO and the incumbent and/
or other owner-family members (Blumentritt et al., 2007; Hall and Nordqvist, 2008; Minichilli
et al., 2014). Thus, it is justified to increase our understanding of how tensions arising in these
work relationships between the nonfamily members and family owners are managed effectively in
order to establish long-term continuity and positive development of family firms.
Conceptually, we draw on a paradox perspective introduced by Schad and Bansal (2018) that
applies a systems lens, which we link to the idea of the family firm as an organisational form where
the systems of family, business and ownership overlap (Pieper and Klein, 2007; Tagiuri and Davis,
1996). This view means that we see paradox management as an approach through which ‘persistent
contradictions between interdependent elements’ (Schad et al., 2016: 10) arising as a result of ten-
sions in complex organisational situations (Schad and Bansal, 2018), characterised by, for instance,
resource constraints (Miron-Spektor et al., 2018), conflicting goals and unclear expectations
(Raisch et al., 2018; Schad and Bansal, 2018) are dealt with.
Empirically, we rely on in-depth, longitudinal case-study research over a period of three years
into one family firm that underwent a transition from a family to a nonfamily CEO. The findings
of the study indicate four areas in which tensions arise in the work relationship between the non-
family CEO and the owner family: professionalisation, collaboration, resource allocation and role
transition. We uncover how the tensions emerge, the ‘ownership’ of the tensions, the ways in which
the tensions are managed as paradoxes and how an advisory board plays an important role in sup-
porting the family owners in managing the tensions as paradoxes.

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 213
The article offers contributions to the literature on tensions and paradoxes in management stud-
ies and to family business research. In keeping with the conceptual work on paradoxes of Schad
and Bansal (2018), we show that a system lens can help in understanding the underlying sources of
the tensions arising in newly formed work relationships. We extend this work by increasing our
understanding of what type of tensions may emerge as a result of a significant change in an organi-
sation, in our case CEO succession. We also add new knowledge regarding how these tensions can
be managed as paradoxes to build effective work relationship between a new CEO and other key
actors in the organisations.
We contribute to paradox theory in management with new theoretical understandings of the
emergence and management of tensions by identifying changes in the organisation as a system and
the resulting alterations in central work relationships (Schad and Bansal, 2018). Our main contri-
bution to the family business research is that we expand our knowledge with regard to the often
challenging process of building effective work relationships after a nonfamily CEO takes over
from a family CEO. Identifying four main areas where tensions arise in this process and showing
how these tensions emerge, who experiences the tensions as problematic, and who manages the
tensions, we specifically offer new insights regarding the role of the advisory board in managing
the tensions as paradoxes in the family firm setting. This expands our current knowledge on CEO
succession in family businesses with a perspective that considers how the involvement of external
advisors can ease the tensions that emerge after a CEO transition.
Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on advising in family firms by showing how an
advisory board, as a team of advisors (Su and Dou, 2013), over a period of time can help to make
tensions explicit and to support the family owners in integrating competing choices into a final
solution.
Guiding theory
Paradox theory in management studies
Paradox theory offers perspectives to study the management of persistent and seemingly contradic-
tory demands, goals, interests or perspectives locked in a relationship with each other (Farjoun,
2016; Schad et al., 2016). It focuses on how decision makers attempt to embrace and synthesise
these competing demands. Lewis and Smith (2014) argue that a paradox perspective shifts the
fundamental assumption in management from rational, logical and linear approaches to those that
are surprising, counterintuitive and tense. Scholars have drawn on paradox perspectives to under-
stand tensions in organisations and work relationships. The main type of tensions addressed in
paradox studies include belonging (i.e. individual vs collective), organising (i.e. control vs flexibil-
ity), performing (i.e. social vs financial) and learning (i.e. change vs stability; Lewis, 2000; Lüscher
and Lewis, 2008; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Tensions at the team and individual level have also been
studied, but to a lesser extent (Schad et al., 2016). Examples here include novelty versus useful-
ness, learning versus performance and self-focus versus other focus.
Paradox researchers seek insights into how decision makers can develop a paradox mind-set
and support opposing demands by embracing multiple, opposing forces, simultaneously (Lewis
and Smith, 2014; Miron-Spektor et al., 2018). The general premise underlying the paradox per-
spective is that managers are most effective when they accept contradictory elements as simultane-
ously valid and manage them through a combination of differentiation and synergy (Hargrave and
Van de Ven, 2017) or through separating the contradictory elements either temporally or in space
(Poole and Van de Ven, 1989). Managing tensions emerging in organisations and work relation-
ships as paradoxes enables actors to tap the positive potential of the contradictory elements (Ingram

214 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
et al., 2016; Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011) and to increase their complex thinking and
cognitive flexibility. It also contributes to continuous double-loop learning by questioning underly-
ing assumptions and exploring more effective responses (Lüscher and Lewis, 2008).
To further develop the paradox perspective, studies called for an understanding that involves the
interrelationships between one set of tensions and those around it, whether they are nested or inter-
woven (Fairhurst et al., 2016; Putnam et al., 2016; Schad et al., 2016). Paradox studies would
benefit from a longitudinal approach to understand how tensions emerge, change and dissolve or
reproduce over time, as well as giving attention to contextual and situational factors (Fairhurst
et al., 2016).
Thus, Schad and Bansal (2018) propose a systems lens on contradictory demands that discrimi-
nates between the perceived tensions and their underlying complexity. They build on Lewis and
Smith (2014) and Smith and Lewis (2011), who have suggested that tensions are both system-
inherent and socially constructed. Schad and Bansal (2018) criticise current studies for solely
focusing on the perceived tensions and approaches to deal with them. They argue that instead of
studying tensions at the surface, one should try to uncover what their underlying features are, how
the perceived tensions are grounded in the underlying system, how and why the tensions emerge,
and which behavioural changes are needed to deal with the tensions (Schad and Bansal, 2018).
This systems lens on paradoxes fits our focus on tensions that arise after a transition from a family
CEO to a nonfamily CEO. It can offer a useful integrative both/and approach to the contradictory
elements (tensions) that may arise in the new work relationships that need to be developed after the
transition (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2017; Raisch et al., 2018; Schad et al., 2016).
Paradox theory in family business studies
The systems lens on paradoxes is appropriate to study change in family businesses (Moores and
Barrett, 2002; Schuman et al., 2010; Zellweger, 2014). Family business research has for long
acknowledged the coexistence of family and firm logics and goals that can result in tensions
(Distelberg and Sorenson, 2009; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Schuman et al., 2010). A paradox per-
spective is relevant for studying tensions in family firms because ‘while certain social rules and
norms, such as support, commitment, cohesiveness, and interdependence, are particularly pro-
nounced in the family context, they are neither absent nor incompatible with the efficient function-
ing of the business sphere’ (Zellweger, 2014: 650). A paradox perspective implies that the systems
of the family and the business are not opposites of each other, but rather compatible and even
synergistic (Habbershon et al., 2003).
A paradox perspective has been used to discuss typical family firm tensions such as uncondi-
tional (family) versus conditional acceptance (nonfamily), business-first versus family-first objec-
tives, emotionality versus rationality, and equality versus merit (Zellweger, 2014). Ingram et al.
(2016) suggest that family firms generally deal with the following three contradictory demands: (1)
tradition and change, (2) control and autonomy and (3) liquidity and growth. The tension between
tradition and change is related to the need to adapt to a dynamic and changing environment, while
simultaneously wanting to hold on to embedded values, routines and norms. The simultaneous
demand for control and autonomy is about the tensions between the control of family and the
autonomy of individual in the situation of succession within or outside the family (De Massis et al.,
2008). The demand for liquidity and growth involves the tensions between family shareholders,
often involving multiple generations, and the desire for dividends versus the search to leverage
innovation opportunities. Furthermore, Chrisman et al. (2015) employ a paradox perspective to
study family influence on innovation and the simultaneous existence of two drivers: ability and

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 215
willingness. While family firms may have superior ability to engage in technological innovation
compared to nonfamily firms, they tend to show lower willingness.
Even though research on nonfamily CEOs in family firms shows that the work relationships
between the members of owner family and the nonfamily CEO after management succession is
challenging (Blumentritt et al., 2007; Hall and Nordqvist, 2008; Waldkirch et al., 2018), existing
research is still in an early phase to uncover which specific tensions emerge, how these tensions
emerge or how they are managed to support effective work relationships after the transition (Daspit
et al., 2016; Hall and Nordqvist, 2008). The next section elaborates on what is known about non-
family CEO involvement in family firms and how this study complements these existing insights.
Nonfamily CEOs in family firms
Owner-family members may work at various positions and levels in the firm and via their owner-
ship role they direct and control the nonfamily CEO (Waldkirch, 2019). The nonfamily CEO is
expected to lead the business, safeguard the family capital and, sometimes, function as a mentor for
the next generation (Blumentritt et al., 2007). Often, the owner family is inclined to pursue socioe-
motional goals in addition to financial goals for the family (Martin et al., 2013), which influences
the nonfamily work of the CEO. However, the nonfamily CEO may have divergent interests from
those of the family and lack the shared history of the family members in business, which creates an
information gap (Chang and Shim, 2015). The nonfamily CEO needs time to develop ‘cultural
competence’, that is, build an in-depth understanding of the dominant goals of owner family and
meanings of being in business (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008). Hall and Nordqvist (2008) argue that
reciprocal role taking is crucial for the nonfamily CEO to develop cultural competence; through
socialisation the nonfamily CEO develops an ability to consider situations from the perspective of
the family owners. Moreover, these authors propose that interaction and communication in both
formal and informal arenas are needed to create such cultural competence. As such, nonfamily
CEO involvement has important implications for the family and the firm (Blumentritt et al., 2007).
If these divergent interests or a lack of cultural competence result in tensions or conflict, they may
cause difficult work relationships within the family firm.
Current research on nonfamily CEOs in family firms highlights the importance of the work
relationships between the nonfamily CEO and the owner family (Chua et al., 2003; Waldkirch,
2019). Blumentritt et al. (2007) found that when a nonfamily CEO shows high business compe-
tence and acts in accordance with the values of family, the family tends to be more relaxed about
the presence of the nonfamily CEO. Moreover, Blumentritt et al. (2007) found that the support of
a strong board of directors (a board that consists, at least in part, of independent, nonfamily mem-
bers) is important in managing issues between the family and the nonfamily CEO. Waldkirch
(2019) suggests that nonfamily CEOs need to be able to collaborate and build a work relationship
with the family owners that is characterised by transparency and trust to avoid conflicts.
Thus, we may conclude from existing research that the quality of the work relationship between
the new nonfamily CEO and the representatives from the owner family involved in the family firm
is important for an effective transition to a nonfamily CEO. We may also conclude that it is likely
that tensions occur in the work relationships as a result of the change that including a new non-
family CEO entails in a family firm. Thus, in this study, we set out to identify the specific tensions
that arise and adopt a paradox perspective to explore how these tensions are managed after the
completion of a transition from a family to a nonfamily CEO.
In this pursuit, we use the systems perspective on paradoxes of Schad and Bansal (2018) for two
reasons. First, systems thinking shifts the focus from the individual to the system, with patterns of
relationships involving the roles, responsibilities and goals (Distelberg and Sorenson, 2009). As

216 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
such, a systems perspective assumes that problems usually exist between people, not within them.
Second, researchers have previously often used a systems lens to understand the dynamics that are
present in family firms (Distelberg and Sorenson, 2009; Pieper and Klein, 2007; Tagiuri and Davis,
1996). Because family firms comprised overlapping systems (family, firm and ownership), there
are often conflicting goals and values that give rise to tensions (Pieper and Klein, 2007; Tagiuri and
Davis, 1996).
Methodology
Case research strategy
This study seeks to build an understanding of a complex social phenomenon over time by focusing
on the collaboration between the owner family and the nonfamily CEO after a CEO succession. It
attends to how this transition gives rise to tensions and how these tensions are managed. We
adopted a single, longitudinal in-depth case research strategy, primarily using observations and
interviews to collect the data. This is a suitable approach when the case has revelatory potential and
provides richness of data (Langley and Abdallah, 2011). A single case is useful to describe and
understand a setting, and to develop conceptual insights in the relationship to that context (Dyer
and Wilkins, 1991). The aim of such research is not statistical generalisation but to contribute to
theory through ‘the force of example’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 12) and to generalise to theory (Yin, 2017).
From this single case, we make a conceptual leap to understand the tensions that arise during the
collaboration between the owner family and the nonfamily CEO after the transition and how these
tensions are managed, thereby addressing a gap in the literature.
Because of the focus on a transition process, the case research must involve a temporal compo-
nent. A longitudinal approach responds to the call for more longitudinal studies in family firms as
well as in the paradox research domain (Fairhurst et al., 2016; Sharma et al., 2014). Longitudinal
in-depth case research enables scholars to develop insights regarding relationships, activities and
views over time, as the process uncovers and provide new insights from structured data collection
methods and naturally occurring data.
Given the complexity of the phenomenon of interest, the limited extant knowledge, and the
nature of the study, which is geared towards discovery, we used an abductive research approach
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002, 2014; Van Maanen et al., 2007). Following a critical realist ontology, we
maintained theoretical flexibility when interpreting the data and we were as open as possible to
building an understanding of the topic. As such, we used the systematic combining approach (a
continuous, nonlinear, path-dependent process that combines empirics and theory) as a basis for
our study (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Two of the authors have been in close contact with the focal
family firm. One author collected data and another author served on the advisory board of the fam-
ily firm. The close involvement of the authors allowed a continuous back and forth process between
the findings and the guiding theory. This approach enabled us to modify our tentative framework
iteratively with the empirical data and theoretical insights gained in the research process. One
author kept an outside perspective during the iterative data collection and analysis of the data. This
approach is in line with ensuring relevant results, that is, practical solutions to practical problems
that are useful to a study’s subjects and valued by social science (Lüscher and Lewis, 2008).
Research setting
A purposeful sampling technique was used to select a case that exhibited the theoretical character-
istics of the phenomenon of interest (Emmel, 2013). The case selected is an information-rich,

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 217
unique and revelatory research site (Langley and Abdallah, 2011) to study work relationships after
the transition to a nonfamily CEO for three reasons. First, it is rare to gain full access to follow the
transition process to a nonfamily CEO in real-time. The study started when the owner family
handed over the management of the family firm to the nonfamily CEO in July 2016 and the study
ended in May 2019. Second, the case represents a 100% family-owned, first generation family
firm. Third, the selected family firm went through the ownership succession process from the first
to the second generation in 2015, a process that reinforced the dynamics at play in the collaboration
with the nonfamily CEO.
The research setting is an innovative and successful medium-sized engineering family firm, in
which the first and second generations of the family are involved and in which the family handed
over the leadership of the firm to a nonfamily CEO in July 2016. For reasons of confidentiality, the
identification details of the family, the firm, and their members have been changed. We use the
‘Van de Mast family’ and ‘Solar Innovations Group (SIG)’ as pseudonyms for the family name and
the family firm name, respectively. The family members include Joost (aged 67) and Joke (aged
62), and their three children Suzanne (aged 33), Matthijs (aged 31) and Maria (aged 29). SIG is in
Hellevoetsluis, a village in the western part of the Netherlands.
The firm was founded in 1996 by Joost and his wife, Joke. Joost has a technical background and
a passion for innovation. Since the start, the firm has expanded quickly, and it was split into differ-
ent units and located in different buildings over the years. The family is closely involved in the
firm. At the start of the study, two family members were working in the firm: Matthijs in the engi-
neering department and Maria as a human resources manager. Both Matthijs and Maria might be
interested in leading the firm in the future. However, in 2016 they felt they were too young to make
that decision and they still needed to discover and show whether they would be competent to do so.
The eldest daughter did not work in the firm, but she felt emotionally involved. The ownership of
the firm was shared by the five family members.
Before the arrival of the nonfamily CEO, the firm was loosely organised, lacking formal com-
munication structures and planning and control mechanisms. Joost felt that he was no longer able
to manage his highly educated workforce and further grow the firm because he lacked adequate
skills and competences. In addition, he did not like to manage. Instead, Joost wanted to spend more
time in the R&D department to work on product innovations. Joost discussed his wish to step down
as the CEO of the firm with his family, and together, they decided that it was a good idea to hire a
nonfamily CEO for the next few years. This choice would also allow Matthijs and/or Maria to work
elsewhere and to decide if they were willing and capable to take over the firm later. Joost and his
family believed that an advisory board could provide support in going through these developments.
As such, an advisory board was set up during the summer of 2014, and this board consisted of three
persons who covered the following areas of expertise: sales and coaching (Yvonne), family firm
management (Martijn) and accountancy and governance (Ed).1 Three-hour meetings were held
five times a year at the office of Joost, and the five family owners plus the external advisory board
members joined the meetings. Occasionally, a member of the management team was invited to
attend a part of the meeting. With the help and support of the advisory board, the ownership of the
firm was largely transferred from Joost and Joke to their three children in the spring of 2015, just
1 year before the arrival of the nonfamily CEO. The basic characteristics of the family firm are
shown in Table 1. The genogram and organogram can be found in Figure 1.
Data collection
Our complete data set includes mainly primary data (observations of the advisory board meetings,
interviews and casual conversations) and secondary data. The family members provided full access

218 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
to observing the advisory board meetings over a period of almost three years (July 2016 to May
2019) and all actors involved (family members, nonfamily CEO and advisory board members)
were willing to share their individual reflections on the evolving collaboration between the owner
family and the nonfamily CEO on multiple occasions. The observations during the advisory board
meetings and the interviews with the individuals involved at different stages of the transition pro-
cess are the primary units of observation. Table 2 summarises the data collected.
The first author observed all advisory board meetings, developed detailed meeting reports and
shared them with the individuals involved in the meetings. These observations allowed us to
observe firsthand the experiences and behaviour of the family members, the nonfamily CEO and
advisory board members in their own context (Waddington, 2004). The first author developed
relationships and participated in activities, but with the clear and explicit notion that the intention
was to observe events. One of the family members together with one of the external advisory board
members (the chairperson) checked whether the content of the detailed meeting reports
Table 1. Characteristics of the case.
Key characteristics of Solar Innovations Group
Industry Engineering
Year founded 1994
Turnover in 2014/2018 6 mio €/12 mio €
Number of employees 2014/2019 50/75
Number of family members working 2014/2019 3/0
Current generation managing Nonfamily CEO
Number of owners 2014/2019 2/5
Current generation owning First and second
Key informants
Joost van de Mast Founder, father, co-owner
Joke van de Mast Mother, co-owner
Suzanne van de Mast Eldest daughter, co-owner since Spring 2015
Matthijs van de Mast Son, co-owner since Spring 2015
Maria van de Mast Youngest daughter, co-owner since Spring 2015
Mark Sanders Nonfamily CEO since Summer 2016
Advisory board members
Figure 1. Genogram and organogram (situation before the arrival of nonfamily CEO).

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 219
realistically represented what was discussed. Another author is one of the external members (not
the chairperson) serving on the advisory board. It is, therefore, fair to conclude that subjectivity
plays a role in this study because of the close involvement of two of the authors. Instead of trying
to reduce the impact of this subjectivity to zero, we argue that this involvement adds relevance to
our study since we engaged in practice (Lewin, 1946; Van de Ven, 2007) and that it is essential for
our process of understanding (Maxwell, 2012). The detailed notes of the first author were also used
by the family owners and advisory board members as the meeting reports. Notes on who said what
and the order in which the discussion occurred (who reacted to whom and how this was done) were
taken as detailed and literally as possible. These notes contributed to a considerable amount of
empirical material, as shown in Table 2.
The second source of primary data was in-depth interviews (Appendix). The purpose of the
interviews was to create a more complete and accurate account of the phenomenon of interest
(Maxwell, 2012). We had the following three reasons for interviewing the former family CEO, the
nonfamily CEO and a member of the management team: (1) to include additional information that
was missed in the observations, (2) to include the perspectives and experiences of the nonfamily
CEO and a representative of the family firm on the developments taking place and (3) to check the
accuracy of our observations. Casual conversations and secondary data were used to contribute to
our understanding of the collaboration between the owner family and the nonfamily CEO and the
tensions involved. Only selected parts from the observations and interviews are reported in the text
because of space limitations. Quotations, illustrations and descriptions are used to provide a repre-
sentation of the case, of our interpretations and extended concepts.
Data analysis
We moved systematically from raw data to theoretical interpretations (Gioia et al., 2013; Smith,
2014) following delineated analytical stages but also allowing the data analysis to be iterative to
generate insights and improve the analytical generalisability (Langley, 1999; Locke et al., 2008).
Table 3 summarises the stages of the analytical process.
In the first stage, we developed an extensive description of the case, which incorporated the
various types of data (Langley, 1999) to describe the family and organisational context, the chro-
nology of the evolving collaboration and the challenges and responses of the stakeholders involved.
Consequently, this description was checked by the family owners, the nonfamily CEO and the
Table 2. Data collected at Solar Innovations Group from September 2016 to May 2019.
Method Material Moment
Observations at advisory
board meetings
(13 meetings)
Extensive written reports
(168 pages in total)
06-09-2016 (13 pages), 25-12-2016 (15 pages),
05-05-2017 (17 pages), 02-10-2017 (10 pages),
27-11-2017 (12 pages), 29-01-2018 (10 pages),
26-03-2018 (11 pages), 28-05-2018 (14 pages),
01-10-2018 (13 pages), 26-11-2018 (15 pages),
28-01-2019 (15 pages), 25-03-2019 (11 pages),
27-05-2019 (12 pages)
Interviews
(three interviews)
Transcripts of interviews
(66 pages in total) with:
Former family CEO,
Nonfamily CEO,
Member of MT
September 2018 (24 pages)
September 2018 (20 pages)
September 2018 (22 pages)

220 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
advisory board members for accuracy. From this description, three insights emerged that guided
the subsequent analyses. First, the family members as well as the nonfamily CEO mentioned issues
during the meetings regarding the new work relationship with the nonfamily CEO. The individuals
described these issues as challenging and problematic. Second, these issues persisted over time and
involved matters that were urgent and important to the individuals involved on a personal level, so
beyond the organisational implications, and decision-making regarding these issues was often
extended. Third, some of the issues were mentioned by the nonfamily CEO, some by the owner
family, and some by both the nonfamily CEO and the owner-family members. These insights led
us to focus on issues as a primary unit of analysis (Maitlis, 2005; Smith, 2014).
In the second phase, we further identified these issues by using three criteria. The first criterion
is that the issue was salient and challenging, following the descriptions of the stakeholders involved.
They would use words such as ‘difficult’, ‘very hard’, ‘uncertain’, ‘unclear’, ‘challenging’,
Table 3. Stages of the data analysis process.
Stage Analytical activities Output
1. Develop thick case
description to generate
initial insights
1. Generate the case description,
2. Check the case description with
the informants for accuracy and
comprehensiveness,
3. Identify issues as unit of analysis.
 Case study
 Issues as primary unit of
analysis
2. Identify the key issues
over time
1. Identify something as an issue
by using three criteria: salience,
multiple informants and urgency,
2. Code the issues,
3. Generate list of issues over time
and assign them to owner family,
nonfamily CEO or both (Table 4).
 Table 4
 Table 5
3. Identify tensions 1. Combine with literature to identify
four tensions.
 Table 4
 Table 5
 Four tensions experienced by
the case key actors involved
4. Identify system
developments of SIG
1. Identify the developments and
changes in the systems of SIG and
the overlap of the subsystems
 Figure 2
5. Identify the source of
emergence, the decision
contexts, the decisions
and the ways in which
the advisory board has
supported in managing
the tensions
1. Code data to identify how the
tensions are managed,
2. Combine codes into logical
categories,
3. Combine with literature to
generate dimensions in paradox
management.
 Classification of paradox
management
6. Combine data and
literature to develop a
theoretical model
1. Combine and integrate the findings
and theory,
2. Identify relationships between
the issues and themes to inform
a model of paradox management
in the transition process to a
nonfamily CEO.
 Model of paradox
management in transition
process to a nonfamily CEO
SIG: Solar Innovations Group.

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 221
‘tensions’ or ‘problem’. Second, the issue was raised by multiple stakeholders, further ensuring the
first criterion. Third, the issue had to involve a certain level of urgency to show the development of
the tension and the way it was managed. These issues were coded using QDA Miner 5.0.19, a
widely accepted tool for performing qualitative research (Lewis and Maas, 2007). Consequently,
we generated a list of the issues over time and we indicated whether they were mentioned by the
nonfamily CEO, by the family owners or by both (Table 4). The nonfamily CEO and the family
members initiated the meeting agendas. The nonfamily CEO prepared the agenda for the meetings
with the advisory board members. The family members held family meetings prior to the meetings
with the advisory board and from these family meetings the agenda for the meetings with the advi-
sory board members was deduced. The issues are illustrated by quotes, shown in Table 5, which
served as basis to identify the tensions in the next stage of the analysis process.
In the third phase, we incorporated literature and compared the literature with the issues identi-
fied. Consequently, the issues were thematically combined into the following four categories,
which we identified as the tensions (Figure 2):
1. Professionalisation, including issues around (a) formalisation, (b) processes, and (c) organ-
isational structure and hierarchy;
2. Collaboration, including issues of (a) expectations, (b) structure, and (c) ability. These
issue all related to a search and discovering ways to balance between the autonomy pro-
vided to the nonfamily CEO and the influence of the family members on strategy;
3. Resource allocation, including issues of allocating resources (financial resources, human
resources and time) to the organisation and commercial activities versus allocating resources
to innovation;
4. Role transition of the family owners, including issues related to (a) the difficulty of letting
go and (b) building trust.
These categories were shared with the second and third author to clarify and distinguish the emer-
gent tensions.
In the fourth phase, we identified the changes and developments in the subsystems of SIG and
the overlap between these subsystems over time. Among these changes are the development of the
advisory board into a supervisory board and the extension of the supervisory board with three fam-
ily members, who have become formal supervisory board members. We identified four phases,
developing from the situation before the arrival of the nonfamily CEO until the phase in which the
advisory board has developed into a formal supervisory board.
In the fifth phase of the data analysis process, we identified patterns of emergence of the ten-
sions, their ownership and management. Addressing our research questions, we read through the
raw data, asking how the family members and the nonfamily CEO responded to the issues identi-
fied. The following four types of code emerged: (1) the emergence of the tensions (source), (2) the
decision contexts describing who owned the tension and who came up with ideas to manage the
tension, (3) decisions and (4) the ways in which the advisory board supported in managing the ten-
sion. Again, the themes that emerged in the management of the tensions were shared with the
second and third authors for further clarification. The overview of the sources of the tensions, their
ownership, management and role of the advisory board are presented in Table 6.
In the sixth and last stage of the data analysis process, we integrated and combined the findings
to build a model by embedding the existing theory that helped to inform relationships between the
identified issues and the themes that emerged in ways in which the paradoxical tensions are
managed.

222 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
Table 4. Issues arise and evolve in advisory/supervisory meetings.
Date Issues discussed in meeting with nonfamily CEO Issues discussed in meeting with family owners
06-09-2016 Low level of organisational and commercial development of the firm (formalisation)
Standardisation of products (formalisation)
Collaboration with business partners (formalisation)
Automatisation (financial resources)
Expansion and optimisation (formalisation)
Human capital and knowledge management (human resources)
Personnel management (organisational structure and hierarchy)
Control mechanisms (ability)
Supervision of next generation family members (expectations)
Informal and formal communication with family members in their various roles (structure)
Communication between the advisory board members and
the nonfamily CEO; the family owners want to be involved
(difficulty of letting go)
Joost’s challenge to trust the nonfamily CEO and to avoid
interference in his activities (building trust)
How to control the nonfamily CEO from an owner’s
perspective (ability)
Priorities regarding the preferred focus of the nonfamily
CEO (expectations)
25-10-2016 How to inform the family owners about the meetings between the nonfamily CEO and the
advisory board members (structure)
How to support the family owners in going through the transition (ability)
Contents of the charter of the directors (ability)
Communication with family members about lack of organisation and structure in the firm
(expectations)
Formal communication structure with family owners (structure)
Update regarding developments in the different business units (formalisation)
Annual plan for one the business units; how was it developed, level of detail, discussion about
the content of the plan (strategy, market, return, quality management, risk management,
production capacity) (formalisation)
Supervision of next generation family members (expectations)
The family owners will have four formal meetings with Mark,
next to informal meetings. The owners receive summaries
of the minutes of the meetings of the advisory board and
the nonfamily CEO (structure)
Tasks of owners (role transition)
Bonus system for top level management and for Mark; what
is realistic? (expectations)
05-05-2017 Communication with family owners; the family owners are not able to keep up with the high
pace of development of the various business units (ability)
Topic of discussion with family owners: who decides on the vision and long-term strategy of
the firm? (expectations)
Nonfamily CEO would like to be controlled by the family owners, but they are not capable of
doing so > Mark would like to work with a supervisory board (ability)
Quality of personnel; not everyone is able to keep up with the developments (formalisation)
Creating structure in the organisation; meetings, tasks, responsibilities (organisation structure
and hierarchy)
Business development (formalisation)
Focus on process improvements (processes)
Mark’s expectations of owners (ability)
How to stay connected to the firm (difficulty of letting go)
Mark’s focus on the firm instead of on innovation (human
resources, financial resources and time)
How to provide input to Mark for the long-term strategy?
What topics can the family interfere with and in what ways?
(expectations, structure)
(Continued)

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 223
Date Issues discussed in meeting with nonfamily CEO Issues discussed in meeting with family owners
In between these meetings, the family owners have decided to develop the advisory board into a supervisory board. The advisory board members, together with the three children, will be the
supervisory board members. Also, Matthijs and Maria indicate to struggle with their multiple roles in the firm and they have both decided to start looking for another job for a while.
02-10-2017
(extra
meeting with
owners)
Dividend payments and dividend policy in relation to the
budgets of Mark for 2018 (expectations, structure)
27-11-2017 Business development (formalisation and processes)
Selecting the right management team members, responsible for the various business units
(organisation structure and hierarchy)
Business strategy (formalisation)
Discussion about how to maintain the innovative capacity with new standardisation approach
(resource allocation)
No issues discussed in the meeting
In between these meetings, the family owners have ended the relationship with the chair of the advisory/supervisory board. They were worried about the personal relationship between the
nonfamily CEO and the chairperson.
29-01-2018 No agenda prepared for this meeting because of the departure of the chairperson who
normally would take initiative to prepare the agenda together with the nonfamily CEO
Plans of Joost to connect his new firm to SIG (difficulty of
letting go)
In between these meetings, the eldest child has decided to withdraw from the advisory board for personal reasons. Joost takes over the role of Suzanne as supervisory board member.
26-03-2018 Dividend policy in combination with solvability management (expectations)
Expansion plans (expectations)
No issues discussed in the meeting
28-05-2018 Project, process management and time registration (processes)
Approval statement by the accountant (formalisation)
Separation between business and private finances (formalisation)
Communication with Mark about expectations (structure)
01-10-2018 No issues discussed in the meeting Innovation potential is decreasing; this is a concern (human
resources, financial resources, time)
26-11-2018 New marketing plan, development, main underlying assumptions, audience (formalisation)
Plans for underperforming business unit (expectations)
How to organise innovation in the firm; the owners have
discussed this with Mark and they have come up with the
suggestion to create a new position of Chief Innovation
Officer. Matthijs could possibly take on this role in the
future (human resources, financial resources, time)
28-01-2019 No issues discussed in the meeting No issues discussed in the meeting
25-03-2019 No issues discussed in the meeting No issues discussed in the meeting
27-05-2019 Developments over 2017 and 2018 (formalisation, processes, organisation structure and hierarchy)
Investments in innovation (human resources, financial resources, time)
Evaluation of the nonfamily CEO; he performs well
(expectations)
SIG: Solar Innovations Group.
Table 4. (Continued)

224 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
Table 5. Illustrative quotes from advisory/supervisory board meetings from which we interpreted tensions.
Meeting Professionalisation Collaboration Resource allocation Role transition
06-09-
2016
More hierarchy does not have to conflict with
culture. And controlling is not an ugly word, it
is different from micromanagement. We don’t
have a control framework here, or management
processes to keep track of things. The financial
reporting is good, but we do not use it to manage
the firm. I have had some tough discussion about
this with our financial manager. (Mark)
We need help; how do we judge Mark’s budgets
and plans? How do we assess him? (Joost)
I am curious about how the family owners want
to be informed. I understand that we need
shareholders’ meetings, but preferable not 12
meetings per year. I am looking forward to
receiving their proposal for the boundaries within
which I can operate. (Mark)
There’s too little knowledge available in the
firm to accelerate, we need to invest in human
capital. This costs too much according to Joost.
(Mark)
Sometimes I think I let him (Mark) free,
but then I wonder if I should. I wonder if I
let go too easily. It was a strange situation
when he went on a holiday after two
weeks. Mark said that he read his email
and would be available by phone, and we
have had contact a few times to discuss
some things. (Joost)
25-10-
2016
Last week I met with Joost, Matthijs and Maria to
discuss my assignment as director. We discussed
core values of the firm, about what they consider
important. They had a list with 16 values that we
discussed, I agreed with most of them. But if you
combine them, they more or less imply 2 things:
culture (locality, equality, offering opportunities)
and the innovative character of the firm. And we
all note that there is a lack of hierarchy, that is
a real challenge. I think that 50% of the current
employees were hired after one conversation.
They all say, we had a meeting and the next day I
worked here. (Mark)
We have also talked about objectives for 2017;
that was more challenging. I think that those
objectives should be deduced from the annual
plans and the family owners agree with those
objectives or not, we can talk about that. But
the family owners indicated that they want to
formulate the objectives, for example a sales
objective of selling X greenbells. I have indicated
that the objectives should be more abstract, like
investing X% of sales in commercial activities.
(Mark)
On 1 January it should be clear how you will
assess the CEO, using which criteria. You cannot
assess someone based on objectives and criteria
that develop during the year. (Ed in meeting
with family owners)
No tensions regarding resource allocation
identified.
How will you prepare for the shareholders’
meetings? Those meetings can last 2
hours; which questions will you ask? Who
will chair the meetings? Who makes notes?
(Yvonne)
05-05-
2017
I am looking for a solution regarding the structure
of meetings. A mindset of setting agendas, making
decisions, following up on those decisions is still
lacking. There are few senior persons in those
meetings. Perhaps I should consider management
support. We always talk about urgent issues
instead of important issues. [. . .] Fortunately, the
employees are happy with the new structure. But
it is still fresh, and their attitude is still wait-and-
see. I tell them that they are part of the change.
(Mark)
I have monthly meetings with the family; to
catch up, answer their questions etc. I feel that
we have not found the right relationships yet:
ownership issues, policy, strategy; everything is
mixed. Sometimes things get stringent and then
they fade again. We have to work on it. (Mark)
Mark has told us that he wants to be controlled
by us. [. . .] But how can we do that if we
operate at such a distance from daily operations?
(Joost)
How can we make sure that Mark progresses
in the right direction? By discussing our core
values? Regarding development, innovation;
Mark has little knowledge about that. I see that
as a potential danger. (Joost)
We note that Mark is an excellent CEO.
And he is very energetic, he just continues.
We also note a change in the setting. We
used to sit together and discuss ownership
matters, family matters, operational
matters, strategy. But that has changed.
And we conclude that if we don’t act, then
you will own a very nice firm, but you have
lost control. On strategy and decisions
for the future. We have to find a solution
for that. (Ed) We want to be in control.
We would like to have more influence in
developing plans for the future. (Joost)
(Continued)

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 225
Meeting Professionalisation Collaboration Resource allocation Role transition
In between these meetings, the family owners have decided to develop the advisory board into a supervisory board. The advisory board members, together with the three children, will be the supervisory board
members. Also, Matthijs and Maria indicate to struggle with their multiple roles in the firm and they have both decided to start looking for another job for a while.
02-10-
2017
(extra
meeting
with
owners)
The CEO comes with a suggestion on how the
profit will be used and the shareholders have
to decide on that. (Ed) But we have not done
that. We are still waiting for a liquidity prognosis.
(Matthijs) I understand, but as owners you
should develop a vision on dividend payments.
(Ed)
27-11-
2017
I worry most about the governance of the
business units. That’s a lot of work when you
want to implement quick change in 3 out of the 4
business units. Focus on one business unit implies
less focus on the others. (Mark)
No tensions regarding collaboration
identified.
The investments in innovation are made in
the business unit R&D. Incremental changes
are done in the other business units, but real
innovation happens at R&D. (Mark) But the
plan indicates that the innovations at R&D
should be market-driven. (Martijn) Market-
driven innovations often lead to adaptive
innovation, not to disruptive innovation.
Disruptions are realised by creativity. (Yvonne)
I feel that we should think about how to
maintain the innovative culture of this firm.
(Suzanne) I agree, but those innovations should
be in line with the current products and not
something entirely different. (Mark)
No tensions regarding role transition
identified.
In between these meetings, the family owners have ended the relationship with the chair of the advisory/supervisory board. They were worried about the personal relationship between the nonfamily CEO and the
chairperson.
29-01-
2018
No tensions regarding professionalisation
identified.
No tensions regarding collaboration
identified.
No tensions regarding resource allocation
identified.
Mark has indicated very clearly that he
does not want to be involved in the new
firm. I see much potential for cooperation
between the new firm and SIG and we
need to discuss that. (Joost)
In between these meetings, the eldest child has decided to withdraw from the advisory board for personal reasons. Joost takes over the role of Suzanne as supervisory board member.
26-03-
2018
No tensions regarding professionalisation
identified.
I will prepare a business model for expansion,
possibly internationally. But this is also a question
for the family owners, do they want to go
international or not? (Mark)
No tensions regarding resource allocation
identified.
No tensions regarding role transition
identified.
Table 5. (Continued)
(Continued)

226 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
Meeting Professionalisation Collaboration Resource allocation Role transition
28-05-
2018
The accountant has not provided an approval
statement on the annual report of 2017.
We are not able yet to connect the financial
information to the costs made over 2017. From
the interim control we concluded that progress
in managing processes and projects has taken
longer than expected. The project administration
should be further improved to get the approval
statement. (accountant) We are working on it.
Since the second half of 2017 we have our project
administration in order with monthly overviews.
(Mark)
I have a question. As owners we feel that Mark
should prioritise certain things. We expect more;
how should we communicate that? (Joost)
No tensions regarding resource allocation
identified.
No tensions regarding role transition
identified.
01-10-
2018
No tensions regarding professionalisation
identified.
No tensions regarding collaboration
identified.
We have discussed our ambition for innovation
during our last family meeting. Mark performs
very well, but we notice that the motivation to
innovate decreases. There are no innovation
front runners in the organisation. The
management level has increased, but the level
of radical innovation initiation has not. When
you came here, SIG was a super innovative firm
and we had to find a CEO who could help us
structure and formalise the organisation. He
has done that in an excellent way, but he is
not an innovator and he does not organise it.
So, we have to find someone who can stand
up to Mark and make sure that there is room
for innovation. We worry about that and in our
next shareholders’ meeting we want to discuss
our concern with Mark. (Joost)
No tensions regarding role transition
identified.
26-11-
2018
The new marketing plan is supported by the
family owners and the employees. We have
worked on this for more than one year, and we
will present the final result to the employees
at our Christmas event. A lot of people have
contributed: Mark, consulting agency, colleagues.
A lot has changed over the last few years. We
have entered a new phase and this plan should be
the result of that. We have a new strategy and a
new structure. We can show that with this plan.
(Marketing manager)
We need to discuss the planned investments
with the family owners: cleanrooms and laser
technique. (Mark)
Mark is aware of the issue. We discussed
to create a position at the group level of the
firm for someone who is responsible for new
innovations. A CIO. We have also talked
about how this was done in the past, and the
innovation source was of course Joost. It is
difficult to find this in a person from outside the
firm. (Matthijs)
No tensions regarding role transition
identified.
Table 5. (Continued)
(Continued)

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 227
Meeting Professionalisation Collaboration Resource allocation Role transition
28-01-
2019
No tensions regarding professionalisation
identified.
No tensions regarding collaboration
identified.
No tensions regarding resource allocation
identified.
No tensions regarding role transition
identified.
25-03-
2019
No tensions regarding professionalisation
identified.
No tensions regarding collaboration
identified.
No tensions regarding resource allocation
identified.
No tensions regarding role transition
identified.
27-05-
2019
2018 is the second full year after my arrival and
after the start of the professionalisation process.
In 2018 we have continued on the basis that was
set in 2017. This has resulted in an increase of
more than € 1 million in turnover, an increase of
8%. Progress has been made in every business
unit. We have invested in the organisation and the
people, and our plans for the last two years have
been realised. [. . .]Processes, support through
automatisation, building a foundation to further
build on. Being more in control in our projects,
more standardisation because of which the
lead time of customers has decreased, strategic
collaboration which is not always easy. (Mark)
I think it is so great to see now that Mark has
brought what was needed to further develop the
firm; the skills and competences that I did not
have. I see that very clear. (Joost)
I am happy with the progress we have made,
but what’s important to the family owners
are investments in innovation. The figures
show that those investments have decreased
in comparison with 2017. I don’t feel that
we don’t invest enough, we do it now in a
more structured way. So, it is less, but in my
view more effective. I think that’s a good
development, but it is important to take note
of it. (Mark)
CIO: Chief Innovation Officer; R&D: Research and Development; SIG: Solar Innovations Group.
Table 5. (Continued)

228 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
Emergence of the tensions: from latent to salient
An understanding of paradox management in CEO succession in family firms suggests that latent
tensions must become salient before they can be managed. Although we know that tensions in fam-
ily firms can arise and evolve from the overlap of the three subsystems of family firms (Tagiuri and
Davis, 1996), the findings from our study show that the transition from a family to a nonfamily
CEO involved a significant change that the actors needed to prepare and adapt to (Blumentritt
et al., 2007; Kets de Vries, 1993). The nonfamily CEO (Mark) was appointed and began to work at
SIG in July 2016. He was selected because of his strong formal qualifications and he seemed to be
a ‘nice’ person. Because Mark had already planned his holiday, he began working for 2 weeks and
then left for a period of 3 weeks. This leave was challenging for Joost, the former family CEO.
Joost had already given his office to Mark, and it was ‘tempting’ for Joost to take both the position
of CEO and the office back during this period. However, instead, he regularly contacted Mark
through telephone and email.
No one foresaw the tensions that would emerge in the work relationship between the nonfamily
CEO and the family owners over time. However, upon Mark’s return, when the collaborations
between the family owners and Mark and between Mark and the employees began to evolve, vari-
ous issues slowly emerged. Smith and Lewis (2011) suggest that three environmental factors, that
is, plurality, change and scarcity, can cause tensions to surface. The findings in this study indeed
show that in the context of a transition process from a family to a nonfamily CEO in a family firm;
plurality, change and scarcity are factors that render tensions salient. Plurality implies a multiplic-
ity of views in contexts of diffuse power (Smith and Lewis, 2011), which is the case in a situation
where a nonfamily CEO is appointed and the nonfamily CEO and the family owners still have to
discover how they will play their roles in the new work relationships. The transition implies a sig-
nificant change in itself. The scarcity (Miron-Spektor et al., 2018) involves the limited resources
of the family firm and the choices of the new nonfamily CEO about how to allocate them. In
Figure 2. Data structure.

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 229
Table 6. Paradox management.
Paradoxical
tension
How did the paradox
emerge?
Who experiences
the paradox as
problematic?
Who takes
initiative to manage
the paradox?
How is the paradox
managed?
Role of the advisory board
Professionalisation By the nonfamily CEO
getting to know the
organisation
The nonfamily
CEO
The nonfamily CEO Initiating development
and change while holding
on to core values and
culture > adjustments in
behaviour
Limited; acting as a sounding
board to the nonfamily CEO
Collaboration By discovering and
developing collaborative
relationships
The family and
the nonfamily
CEO
The family and the
nonfamily CEO
The advisory board
develops into a supervisory
board > adjustments in
behaviour and systems
Strong; the advisory board
formalises its role and controls
the nonfamily CEO on behalf
of the family owners
Resource
allocation
By the nonfamily CEO
reporting to the family
owners and discovering
the lack of focus on
innovation
The family and
the nonfamily
CEO
The family Appointing an innovation
director who operates
independent of the nonfamily
CEO > adjustments in
behaviour and systems
Strong; the advisory
board members back up
the nonfamily CEO while
acknowledging the worries of
the family
Role transition By the family having
difficulty to distance
themselves from
operational issues
The family The family Appointing family members
as supervisory board
members > adjustments in
systems
Strong; the external members
advise the family owners to
educate themselves and to
join the supervisory board to
become more involved

230 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
addition to these three factors, this study identifies the advisory board as a fourth factor that can
render latent tensions salient. The views of the advisory board members helped to identify latent
competing goals and inconsistencies in perspectives of the nonfamily CEO and the family owners.
By talking separately to the nonfamily CEO and the family owners, they stimulated opportunities
for sensemaking of those competing goals (Maitlis, 2005) and provided support in making the
competing yet coexisting role perspectives (firm, family and ownership) explicit when discussing
the cooperation between the family owners and the nonfamily CEO and its implications. These
factors of change, plurality, resource scarcity and the existence of the advisory board, served as
boundary conditions that intensified the salience and engagement with the tensions (Schad et al.,
2016) and challenged the bounded rationality and stress systems, which tend to limit individuals to
either/or decisions and understandings (Smith and Lewis, 2011).
The findings of this study revealed four different areas of tensions. These are explained in the
following subsections.
Professionalisation (tension experienced by the nonfamily CEO)
The professionalisation tension implies the challenge of balancing between organising (creating an
organisational structure and working with processes and budgets) versus not organising. This ten-
sion was deduced from the issues relating to formalisation, processes and the organisation structure
and hierarchy. This tension is closely related to the general paradox of organising (Lewis, 2000;
Lüscher and Lewis, 2008; Smith and Lewis, 2011).
Even though Mark indicated that he was very positive and happy about his first weeks at SIG
and about his collaboration with the family, he was also amazed by the informal organisation at
SIG:
I am surprised by the total lack of organisation and of hierarchy. People just go and work and I wonder,
why does this person perform this task and why am I not informed about it? Things have not been
organised. I find that remarkable. Changes are possible without detracting from the culture and the core
values of this family firm. (Mark)
The employees had a great deal of freedom in the past, and Mark felt that structure and control
were needed to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of the work being done. After some
months at SIG, Mark felt an increased urgency to organise:
I have noticed that there is so much potential in the various products that growth happens very fast, which
we also need to organise. It is not that it’s an obligation to grow so quickly, but it just happens because of
these great products and it is a shame not to utilise that potential. (Mark)
As such, the organisation needed to formalise and become more ‘professional’. Mark had to
start from scratch and convince the employees as well as the members of the management team
that things needed to change to prepare the firm for the future:
In the past, we worked on innovation based on intuition, without thinking about a business plan. Ideas and
products would also develop over time. It is very hard to convince Mark to work on good ideas. He wants
to know why we spend resources on that idea. What does it involve exactly? Mark sees that, in the past,
there was much more freedom in that sense. He tries to be a bit flexible. First, he wanted to have a business
plan for every idea. Now, he is already less rigid. (Member of the management team)

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 231
Collaboration (tension between the nonfamily CEO and the family owners)
The collaboration tension implies a tension between the autonomy of the nonfamily CEO versus
influence on strategy by the family owners. Issues from which this tension was deduced included
expectations, structure and ability. The collaboration tension relates to the paradox between control
and autonomy, which is specifically relevant in the family firm context (Ingram et al., 2016).
Tensions between Mark and the family owners started to develop when they discovered that
their collaboration was less evident and straightforward than they had thought. These tensions
involved a lack of clarity regarding the autonomy of the nonfamily CEO versus the continued
influence of the family owners on strategy and a discrepancy between the competences of the fam-
ily owners to assess the performance of Mark and the competences required. Mark believed that he
should develop annual plans and a long-term strategy that the family owners would reflect on dur-
ing the meeting of shareholders, and the family owners believed that they should provide input for
the annual plans and the long-term strategy and that the nonfamily CEO would have to consider
their input:
I would like to work with a formal document that stipulates the freedom I have in terms of strategic
decisions. (Mark)
Regarding the competences, both the family owners and Mark had noticed that Mark was able
to realise successful developments within a short time frame. The family owners were impressed
by the achievements of Mark but worried that they would not be able to keep up with him. They
did not know how to control Mark:
He moves so fast; we can’t keep track of him. (Maria). We talked about it, we have to catch up with him,
something needs to be done. He (Mark) thinks that we, as the family owners, should perform better and be
stronger. He wants to be able to talk to us, we need to be able to perform in our role as owner. (Joost)
The family owners worried that in a time of few years, they might end up with a successful firm
but that they would no longer recognise it as their firm, which had never been their intention when
deciding to start working with a nonfamily CEO.
Resource allocation (tension between the nonfamily CEO and the family owners)
The resource allocation tension refers to the tension between the focus on commerce and the organ-
isation of the nonfamily CEO versus the focus on innovation of the family owners. Issues from
which this tension emerged relate to the allocation of human resources, financial resources and
time (Miron-Spektor et al., 2018). This finding confirms earlier research that R&D productivity
decays during the tenure of outside CEOs, especially in firms with high R&D intensity (Cummings
and Knott, 2018).
Following the lack of formal organisation and a clear hierarchy, Mark felt that more resources
should be allocated to organisational support:
We lack the knowledge needed to accelerate; we need to invest in activities that support sales. But Joost
feels that these activities’ costs are too high. (Mark)
This new focus on organisational support was indeed not what the family owners had expected.
They were afraid that with the arrival of Mark and Joost a more distant role in the firm, the natural
inclination to work on innovations was lost:

232 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
He (Mark) does not initiate innovation. To me that is a potential danger. (Joost)
The family owners were not sure how to solve this issue. They had tried to prevent it by prepar-
ing a declaration of the core values of the family firm, which was used to find a CEO who would
fit the family firm culture. Moreover, they had assumed that the innovative capacity would be
sustained by the employees working in the R&D department and by Matthijs, who had become the
R&D manager. Even though Mark appeared to be very effective in his role as CEO, he had little
affiliation with the heart and soul of the firm, namely, the R&D department. Whereas, Mark
appeared to be proud of the innovative products that were invented, produced and sold by SIG, he
was not the driving force of the innovative capacity of the firm. The family owners felt that the
decisions made by Mark were not necessarily beneficial for the innovative capacity and, therefore,
were not in line with the family culture.
Role transition (tension experienced by the family owners)
The role transition tension refers to the tension experienced by the family owners between taking
distance versus wanting to stay involved in the daily activities of the firm. Issues from which this
tension seemed associated with the difficulty of letting go and the time needed to build trust in the
competences and mind-set of the nonfamily CEO. Even though this tension is related a bit to the
contradictory demands of control and autonomy (Ingram et al., 2016), it is different because none
of the family owners wanted the role of CEO. Instead, they wanted to take distance to pursue their
own paths.
Since the summer of 2016, with the arrival of Mark as nonfamily CEO, separate meetings were
held between the advisory board members and Mark and the advisory board members and the fam-
ily owners. The advisory board members commenced with a two hour meeting with Mark in the
former office of Joost, followed by a joint lunch, during which the advisory board members, Mark
and the five family owners all sat together, and ended with a two hour meeting with the family
owners. Even though this separation was beneficial to Mark, as he was able to speak freely with the
advisory board members, the family owners were less happy about the newly created situation.
They were very curious about what the advisory board members discussed with Mark and won-
dered how they would be informed about the things that were happening. It was difficult, espe-
cially for those family members who worked in the firm, to become more distanced from the
operational issues, to distinguish between their different roles of family owners and family employ-
ees and to separate formal from informal meetings with Mark:
Is it not so that you would like to sit in during the meeting with Mark and the advisory board? (Suzanne)
Well, I could learn a lot from the discussions in that meeting. (Matthijs)
From a development perspective, Matthijs would have liked to informally attend the meetings
between Mark and the advisory board member but was afraid that this attendance would conflict
with his formal role as family owner. Not only partly because of this complexity of working with
the nonfamily CEO, but also partly because they had had the idea before Mark came to work at
SIG, Matthijs and Maria decided to work elsewhere for a few years and to free themselves from
their double roles as owners and employees in communicating with the nonfamily CEO.
These four tensions emerged after the transition to the nonfamily CEO and were perceived by
the nonfamily CEO, the family owners or both. The tensions relate to the notion that nonfamily
CEOs in family firms have a hard time effectuating their change ambitions because they have
fewer explicit and implicit control right (Mullins and Schoar, 2016). Whereas, the nonfamily CEO

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 233
was directly confronted with the lack of organisation at SIG after his arrival and therefore, from
meeting one onwards showed to perceive a tension regarding professionalisation, the family own-
ers were directly confronted with their role transition. Both parties also were confronted with
another tension: the tension regarding collaboration. Only at a later stage, they discover tension
regarding the allocation of resources. Depending on how the tensions emerged, the actor(s) who
perceived them, as well as other elements influencing the decision context, the tensions were man-
aged in different ways. In the next section, we elaborate further on the management of the four
tensions we observed from the perspective of paradox.
Paradox management
To manage these tensions of professionalisation, collaboration, resource allocation and role transi-
tion, the nonfamily CEO and the family owners drew on various practices, that is, adjustment of
systems and/or adjustment of behaviour (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2017; Pieper and Klein, 2007;
Schad and Bansal, 2018). Whereas, the nonfamily CEO was capable of managing the tensions that
he came across while beginning to work as the first nonfamily CEO at SIG in an integrative manner
himself by adjusting his behaviour, the family owners needed the help of the advisory board to deal
with the tensions that emerged. The advisory board members engaged in embracing the tensions
and managing them accordingly in an integrative manner as paradoxes (Andriopoulos and Lewis,
2009; Smith, 2014). By making the tensions explicit and discussing them during the advisory
board meetings, the family owners started to embrace the tensions, as they realised that they could
not choose between the competing sides of the paradoxes (Lüscher and Lewis, 2008). It is impor-
tant to note that, whereas the family owners were capable of adjusting the subsystems of the family
business, the nonfamily CEO did not have a similar authority. The advisory board guided the fam-
ily owners throughout these different subsystem changes during the transition process (see Figure
3). The advisory board members supported in explicating the implications of changes in roles and
in guiding the communication between the individuals involved. The nonfamily CEO turned out to
be a driving force in making the transition from an advisory to a supervisory board, after which the
advisory board members actively encouraged the family owners to participate in the supervisory
board and thereby to deal with the information gap.
An overview of the tensions and how they were managed as paradoxes is provided in Table 6.
Professionalisation (paradox management by adjustments in behaviour)
This tension was perceived as problematic primarily by the nonfamily CEO. Mark discussed the
issues with the advisory board but came up with an approach to manage the paradox by himself.
He tried to solve the tensions of holding on to things as they were versus realising change to
develop and organise the business by initiating changes while holding on to the firm’s culture and
core values using integrative management techniques. He reformed the management team and
appointed business unit managers who would be responsible for their own business units, which
implied that they would develop annual plans and budgets and report to Mark. Moreover, an organ-
isation structure was put in place, with clear employee job descriptions, communication structures,
information processes and budgets. He closely involved the members of his management team in
developing his plans, stressing the goals and overarching strategy of SIG. For example, Mark initi-
ated a project to develop a new marketing strategy. Under the supervision of a consultancy firm, a
team was composed with employees from various departments and levels to launch the new strat-
egy by the end of 2018:

234 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
We have worked on this marketing project for more than a year. At the Christmas gathering, we will
present it to all our employees. Many people have cooperated on this plan: Mark, colleagues, the
consultancy firm. We have made great progress over the last years and this plan should be evidence of that.
(Member of the management team)
Collaboration (paradox management by adjustments in behaviour and systems)
The tension regarding collaboration was perceived by both the family owners and Mark. To man-
age the paradox, Mark suggested developing the advisory board into a supervisory board2 (regular
and formal board of directors) at an early stage because he preferred a formal controlling govern-
ance mechanism. Whereas at first, the advisory board members felt that a supervisory board would
Figure 3. Changes in systems over time. (a) Situation before the arrival of nonfamily CEO. (b) Situation
after the arrival of nonfamily CEO. (c) Situation after the arrival of nonfamily CEO and next generation
members decide to work elsewhere. (d) Situation with supervisory board.

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 235
be too formal for a family firm with 70 employees and limited family complexity, over time they
adjusted their opinion:
We have noted that Mark is an excellent CEO. He is very energetic. We have also noted a change of
this setting. We used to discuss shareholders’ issues, family issues, management, employees, all at
once in the same meeting. That has changed now. The conclusion is: if we do not change things, then
the family will own a great firm, but they have lost connection to it. They won’t have an influence on
strategy or other decisions regarding the future. We must find a solution for that. (Advisory board
member)
As the family owners were neither capable of keeping up with the pace of the nonfamily CEO
nor assessing his tasks and performance, they wondered whether the advisory board could perform
this role on their behalf. As such, following the advice of the advisory board and the request of
Mark, the family owners decided to develop the advisory board into a supervisory board. Through
this development, the family owners delegated their task of controlling the nonfamily CEO to the
supervisory board. Simultaneously, the family owners were challenged by the advisory board
members to determine priorities regarding the tasks of Mark and to provide clarity on how Mark
would be assessed:
At a shareholders’ meeting, you can comment on his plans, or ask him questions regarding the future, but
it is Mark’s job to plan. You must decide the boundaries within which he can act. (Advisory board member)
They helped the family members consider – from an ownership perspective – how they should
direct, reward and control Mark.
Resource allocation (paradox management by adjustments in behaviour and
systems)
The resource allocation tension was perceived not only as problematic primarily by the family
owners, but also by the nonfamily CEO, because it affected how his performance was perceived
by the family owners. Moreover, Mark saw the importance of innovation but did not consider it
as a priority. The advisory board members provided support regarding the resource allocation
paradox by explaining the need for innovation and the concerns of family owners regarding the
nonfamily CEO, while explaining the need for organisational structure and support to the family
owners:
Mark focuses on the right issues; those that add value to the firm. (Advisory board member)
A decision regarding this aspect of resource allocation was made at a rather late stage. By the
end of 2018, the family owners indicated that during the last meeting of shareholders, they had
discussed the topic of innovation with Mark. Together, they decided to initiate the new role of CIO,
which was a new position at the firm group level. Matthijs could potentially perform this role
because of his experience with innovating at SIG and because of his family role and potential as
future CEO:
The innovation focus has come from the family and is the connection between the family and the firm.
This is also important regarding the future. We could hire someone for this position, but I am afraid that
this person might choose a route I don’t like. I want to be involved in the innovation at Solar Innovations
Group. (Matthijs)

236 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
Role transition (paradox management by adjustments in systems)
The role transition tension is perceived as problematic by the family owners. On the one hand, the
family owners know that the transition to a nonfamily CEO is necessary for the firm to grow and
develop; on the other hand, they would prefer to remain involved in all the issues that are dealt with
by the nonfamily CEO. The family owners feel that they have become too distant from the firm.
The advisory board members have provided support by educating the family owners regarding the
shift in their roles, and they discussed with the family owners how to distance themselves from the
daily decision-making processes while staying connected. They explained the various roles and
relationships involved (1) between Mark and the owners, (2) between Mark and Joost, who might
sometimes be contacted for advice or information and (3) between Mark and the second-generation
family members who will be coached by Mark. When deciding to develop the advisory board to a
supervisory board, the advisory board members encouraged the three children to take on supervi-
sory board member roles. Eventually, Joost, Matthijs and Maria became supervisory board mem-
bers and began attending the meetings between the external supervisory board members and Mark.
This attendance has resulted in satisfaction and peace on behalf of the family owners, as they no
longer perceive an information gap.
Earlier, we described how the family owners and the nonfamily CEO experienced and dealt
with tensions arising as a result of the transition from a family to a nonfamily CEO. Also, we saw
how the advisory board provided support in making these tensions salient and in managing them
as paradoxes. We combine these findings with insights from our guiding theory and suggest an
understanding of paradox management in CEO succession in family firms. In Figure 4, we com-
bine the findings from the data with the literature and suggest a model of paradox management in
CEO succession in family firms.
Figure 4 depicts how latent tensions must become salient before they can be managed. In addi-
tion to the three boundary conditions identified by Smith and Lewis (2011), we have suggested that
the existence of an advisory board represents a fourth boundary condition in the specific situation
in which a family hands over the management of the firm to a nonfamily CEO. A fifth boundary
condition identified in this study is the mutual dependence of the nonfamily CEO and the family
owners and between the nonfamily CEO and the organisation to make the cooperation work. These
Figure 4. Paradox management after transitioning from a family CEO to a nonfamily CEO.

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 237
boundary conditions intensified the salience and engagement with the tensions by paradox man-
agement (Schad et al., 2016). This study, therefore, offers the insight that managing tensions in the
context of a transition to a nonfamily CEO, in which different individuals are highly dependent on
each other to make this transition successful, is handled by either adjustments in behaviour or
changes in the subsystems of the family firm, or by a combination of these approaches. It remains
undetermined to what extent the tensions are ‘solved’ by these adjustments. As we know from prior
research, tensions persist over time and adjusting in response to these tensions may spur new issues
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith, 2014). This persistence means that we can expect a feedback
loop between the management responses to the tensions and the creation of new ones.
Discussion
This article focuses on the tensions that arise in the work relationships between a nonfamily CEO
and the family owners after a CEO succession and how these tensions are managed as paradoxes.
This topic is important because the involvement of a nonfamily CEO is already common place in
many family firms and will become even more important in the future (Bennedsen et al., 2007;
PwC, 2014; Waldkirch, 2019).
Our study contributes to paradox theory in management studies. Specifically, we extend the
paradox perspective proposed by Schad and Bansal (2018), who suggested that by addressing the
underlying complexity of tensions, organisations and decision makers can more effectively man-
age them. In keeping with the work of Schad and Bansal (2018), we drew on a systems perspective
in family business research (Pieper and Klein, 2007; Tagiuri and Davis, 1996) to uncover the
underlying features of the tensions to understand how the tensions are grounded in the system, how
and why the tensions have emerged, and which changes are needed to deal with them. We add to
the work of Schad and Bansal (2018) by showing that in addition to the behavioural adjustments
resulting from understanding the underlying systems, there are also changes that take place within
the system of the family firm and between the subsystems of the family, ownership and business
that involve a form of paradox management in the context of a transition to a nonfamily CEO. This
means that tensions are not only managed by behavioural changes but also by structural changes of
the systems.
Furthermore, our study contributes to family business research. First, we have identified four
areas where tensions arise during the transition from a family to a nonfamily CEO in a family firm.
These are the tensions related to professionalisation, collaboration, resource allocation and role
transition. We show in detail how these tensions emerge, who experiences the tensions as problem-
atic, who manages the tensions as paradoxes and what the paradox management response involves
(adjustments in behaviour and/or adjustments in structure). This offers new insights to the litera-
ture on CEO succession in family firms.
This study also reveals how external advisors can ease the tensions that emerge after a CEO
transition. Thus, our study contributes to recent research on advisors and advisory boards in family
firms as well (Strike, 2013; Strike et al., 2018). While advising in family firms is a phenomenon
that we still know rather little about (Su and Dou, 2013; Van Helvert-Beugels, 2018), our findings
mean that that an advisory board can play a role in rendering tensions explicit and in integrating
the competing choices and directions into a new and creative solution. As such, we may say that
the advisory board moves beyond searching for a compromise. By adding new perspectives,
searching for and stressing opportunities after the CEO transition and guaranteeing additional
resources, the advisory board members can synthesise the competing forces and support the owner
family to reach solutions to complex decisions.

238 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
Limitations and future research
Our study is based on qualitative research on what happens after the transition from a family to a
nonfamily CEO in a family firm. A natural limitation is the lack of statistical generalisability of the
findings. The findings of the study could be extended by including more cases and observations
using both qualitative and quantitative research designs. For instance, in order to investigate how
different family and ownership structures may influence how tensions arise and are managed when
a nonfamily CEO takes over a multiple case study design would be appropriate. Another limitation
of the study is the geographical scope, which is constrained to the Netherlands. The role of the
advisory board in managing the tensions at play as paradoxes emerged as important in the studied
case.
Future research could focus on CEO succession without the help of an advisory board, or with
the help of other type of external advisors, such as consultants or non-executive directors of the
board. We also encourage researchers to apply complementary theoretical perspectives on how to
deal with the tensions and changes that emerge in CEO succession processes, such as conflict
theory and organisational design theory. Another interesting opportunity for future research is to
study tensions and their management in the situation of a transition from a family to a nonfamily
CEO in different ownership constellations. In addition, scholars could focus more specifically on
the tensions that emerge when ownership is transferred from the older to the next generation.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Special Issue Editors and two anonymous reviewers for their very thoughtful and
constructive suggestions on how to improve the manuscript
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article: This research was partly funded by a research grant provided by The Taskforce for Applied
Research, which is part of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and is financed by the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science.
ORCID iD
Judith van Helvert-Beugels https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1251-6162
Notes
1. An advisory board is not the same as a supervisory board/board of directors. An advisory board in this
context is understood as a team of committed externals who regularly meet with the family firm deci-
sion makers, and their role is primarily to recurrently reflect on and provide advice regarding strategic
matters. These advisors are generally appointed by the family firm decision makers and are paid for their
work on a contractual basis (see Van Helvert-Beugels, 2018).
2. The Dutch governance system has a two-tier board structure consisting of a management board (Raad
van Bestuur) and a supervisory board (Raad van Commissarissen). The supervisory board exclusively
consists of non-executives to assure independence and its tasks are to supervise and advise the manage-
ment board while acting in the best interests of the firm and all its stakeholders (Bezemer et al., 2012).
References
Andriopoulos C and Lewis MW (2009) Exploitation-exploration tensions and organizational ambidexterity:
Managing paradoxes of innovation. Organization Science 20(4): 696–717.

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 239
Bennedsen M, Nielsen KM, Perez-Gonzalez F, et al. (2007) Inside the family firm: The role of families in
succession decisions and performance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(2): 647–691.
Bezemer PJ, Peij SC, Maassen GF, et al. (2012) The changing role of the supervisory board chairman: The
case of the Netherlands (1997–2007). Journal of Management & Governance 16(1): 37–55.
Blumentritt TP, Keyt AD and Astrachan JH (2007) Creating an environment for successful nonfamily CEOs:
An exploratory study of good principals. Family Business Review 20(4): 321–335.
Chang S-J and Shim J (2015) When does transitioning from family to professional management improve firm
performance? Strategic Management Journal 36(9): 1297–1316.
Chrisman JJ, Chua JH, De Massis A, et al. (2015) The ability and willingness paradox in family firm innova-
tion. Journal of Product Innovation Management 32(3): 310–318.
Chua JH, Chrisman JJ and Sharma P (2003) Succession and nonsuccession concerns of family firms and
agency relationship with nonfamily managers. Family Business Review 16(2): 89–107.
Cummings T and Knott AM (2018) Outside CEOs and innovation. Strategic Management Journal 39(8):
2095–2119.
Daspit JJ, Holt DT, Chrisman JJ, et al. (2016) Examining family firm succession from a social exchange per-
spective: A multiphase, multistakeholder review. Family Business Review 29(1): 44–64.
De Massis A, Chua JH and Chrisman JJ (2008) Factors preventing intra-family succession. Family Business
Review 21(2): 183–199.
Distelberg B and Sorenson RL (2009) Updating systems concepts in family businesses: A focus on values,
resource flows, and adaptability. Family Business Review 22(1): 65–81.
Dubois A and Gadde LE (2002) Systematic combining: An abductive approach to case research. Journal of
Business Research 55(7): 553–560.
Dubois A and Gadde LE (2014) ‘Systematic combining’—A decade later. Journal of Business Research
67(6): 1277–1284.
Dyer WG Jr and Wilkins AL (1991) Better stories, not better constructs, to generate better theory: A rejoinder
to Eisenhardt. Academy of Management Review 16(3): 613–619.
Emmel N (2013) Sampling and Choosing Cases in Qualitative Research: A Realist Approach. London: Sage.
Fairhurst GT, Smith WK, Banghart SG, et al. (2016) Diverging and converging: Integrative insights on a
paradox meta-perspective. Academy of Management Annals 10(1): 173–182.
Farjoun M (2016) Contradictions, dialectics, and paradoxes. In: Langley A and Tsoukas H (eds) The Sage
Handbook of Process Organization Studies. London: Sage, pp.87–105.
Flyvbjerg B (2006) Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative Inquiry 12(2): 219–245.
Gioia DA, Corley KG and Hamilton AL (2013) Seeking qualitative rigor in inductive research: Notes on the
Gioia methodology. Organizational Research Methods 16(1): 15–31.
Gómez-Mejía LR, Haynes KT, Nunez-Nickel M, et al. (2007) Socioemotional wealth and business risks in
family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly 52(1):
106–137.
Habbershon TG, Williams M and MacMillan IC (2003) A unified systems perspective of family firm perfor-
mance. Journal of Business Venturing 18(4): 451–465.
Hall A and Nordqvist M (2008) Professional management in family businesses: Toward an extended under-
standing. Family Business Review 21(1): 51–69.
Hargrave TJ and Van de Ven AH (2017) Integrating dialectical and paradox perspectives on managing con-
tradictions in organizations. Organization Studies 38(3–4): 319–339.
Huybrechts J, Voordeckers W and Lybaert N (2013) Entrepreneurial risk taking of private family firms: The
influence of a nonfamily CEO and the moderating effect of CEO tenure. Family Business Review 26(2):
161–179.
Ingram AE, Lewis MW, Barton S, et al. (2016) Paradoxes and innovation in family firms: The role of para-
doxical thinking. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 40(1): 161–176.
Jarzabkowski P, Le JK and Van de Ven AH (2013) Responding to competing strategic demands: How organ-
izing, belonging, and performing paradoxes coevolve. Strategic Organization 11(3): 245–280.
Kelleci R, Lambrechts F, Voordeckers W, et al. (2019) CEO personality: A different perspective on the non-
family versus family CEO debate. Family Business Review 32(1): 31–57.

240 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
Kets de Vries MFR (1993) The dynamics of family controlled firms: The good and the bad news.
Organizational Dynamics 21(3): 59–71.
Langley A (1999) Strategies for theorizing from process data. Academy of Management Review 24(4): 691–
710.
Langley A and Abdallah C (2011) Templates and turns in qualitative studies of strategy and management. In:
Bergh DD and Ketchen DJ (eds) Building Methodological Bridges (Research Methodology in Strategy
and Management, vol. 6). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, pp.201–235.
Lewin K (1946) Action research and minority problems. Journal of Social Issues 2(4): 34–46.
Lewis MW (2000) Exploring paradox: Toward a more comprehensive guide. Academy of Management
Review 25(4): 760–776.
Lewis MW and Smith WK (2014) Paradox as a metatheoretical perspective: Sharpening the focus and widen-
ing the scope. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 50(2): 127–149.
Lewis RB and Maas SM (2007) QDA Miner 2.0: Mixed-model qualitative data analysis software. Field
Methods 19(1): 87–108.
Locke K, Golden-Biddle K and Feldman MS (2008) Perspective – Making doubt generative: Rethinking the
role of doubt in the research process. Organization Science 19(6): 907–918.
Lüscher LS and Lewis MW (2008) Organizational change and managerial sensemaking: Working through
paradox. Academy of Management Journal 51(2): 221–240.
Maitlis S (2005) The social processes of organizational sensemaking. Academy of Management Journal
48(1): 21–49.
Martin GP, Gómez-Mejía LR and Wiseman RM (2013) Executive stock options as mixed gambles: Revisiting
the behavioral agency model. Academy of Management Journal 56(2): 451–472.
Maxwell JA (2012) A Realist Approach for Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Mehrotra V, Morck R, Shim J, et al. (2011) Must love kill the family firm? Some exploratory evidence.
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 35(6): 1121–1148.
Mehrotra V, Morck R, Shim J, et al. (2013) Adoptive expectations: Rising sons in Japanese family firms.
Journal of Financial Economics 108(3): 840–854.
Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Minichilli A, et al. (2014) When do nonfamily CEOs outperform in family
firms? Agency and behavioural agency perspectives. Journal of Management Studies 51(4): 547–572.
Minichilli A, Nordqvist M, Corbetta G, et al. (2014) CEO succession mechanisms, organizational context, and
performance: A socio-emotional wealth perspective on family-controlled firms. Journal of Management
Studies 51(7): 1153–1179.
Miron-Spektor E, Ingram A, Keller J, et al. (2018) Microfoundations of organizational paradox: The problem
is how we think about the problem. Academy of Management Journal 61(1): 26–45.
Moores KJ and Barrett M (2002) Learning Family Business: Paradox and Pathways. London: Ashgate
Publishing.
Mullins W and Schoar A (2016) How do CEOs see their roles? Management philosophies and styles in family
and non-family firms. Journal of Financial Economics 119(1): 24–43.
Pieper TM and Klein SB (2007) The bulleye: A systems approach to modeling family firms. Family Business
Review 20(4): 301–319.
Poole MS and Van de Ven AH (1989) Using paradox to build management and organization theories.
Academy of Management Review 14(4): 562–578.
Putnam LL, Fairhurst GT and Banghart S (2016) Contradictions, dialectics, and paradoxes in organizations:
A constitutive approach. Academy of Management Annals 10(1): 65–171.
PwC (2014) Up close and professional: The family factor – Global family business survey. Available at:
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/pwc-family-business-survey/assets/family-business-survey-2014.pdf
Raisch S, Hargrave TJ and Van de Ven AH (2018) The learning spiral: A process perspective on paradox.
Journal of Management Studies 55(8): 1507–1526.
Salvato C, Chirico F and Sharma P (2010) A farewell to the business: Championing exit and continuity in
entrepreneurial family firms. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 22(3–4): 321–348.
Schad J and Bansal P (2018) Seeing the forest and the trees: How a systems perspective informs paradox
research. Journal of Management Studies 55(8): 1490–1506.

van Helvert-Beugels et al. 241
Schad J, Lewis MW, Raisch S, et al. (2016) Paradox research in management science: Looking back to move
forward. Academy of Management Annals 10(1): 5–64.
Schuman S, Stutz S and Ward J (2010) Family Business as Paradox. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sharma P, Salvato C and Reay T (2014) Temporal dimensions of family enterprise research. Family Business
Review 27(1): 10–19.
Smith WK (2014) Dynamic decision making: A model of senior leaders managing strategic paradoxes.
Academy of Management Journal 57(6): 1592–1623.
Smith WK and Lewis MA (2011) Toward a theory of paradox: A dynamic equilibrium model of organizing.
Academy of Management Review 36(2): 381–403.
Strike VM (2013) The most trusted advisor and the subtle advice process in family firms. Family Business
Review 26(3): 293–313.
Strike VM, Michel A and Kammerlander N (2018) Unpacking the black box of family business advising:
Insights from psychology. Family Business Review 31(1): 80–124.
Su E and Dou J (2013) How does knowledge sharing among advisors from different disciplines affect the
quality of the services provided to the family business client? An investigation from the family business
advisor’s perspective. Family Business Review 26(3): 256–270.
Tagiuri R and Davis JA (1996) Bivalent attributes of the family firm. Family Business Review 9(2): 199–208.
Van de Ven AH (2007) Engaged Scholarship: A Guide for Organizational and Social Research. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Van Helvert-Beugels J (2018) The emerging role of advisory boards in strategizing in family firms: A sense-
making perspective. PhD Thesis, Jönköping International Business School.
Van Maanen J, Sorensen JB and Mitchell TR (2007) The interplay between theory and method. Academy of
Management Review 32(4): 1145–1154.
Waddington D (2004) Participant observation. In: Cassell C and Symon G (eds) Essential Guide to Qualitative
Methods in Organizational Research. London: Sage, pp.154–164.
Waldkirch M (2019) Non-family CEOs in family firms: Spotting gaps and challenging assumptions for a
future research agenda. Journal of Family Business Strategy. Epub ahead of print 25 October. DOI:
10.1016/j.jfbs.2019.100305.
Waldkirch M, Nordqvist M and Melin L (2018) CEO turnover in family firms: How social exchange relation-
ships influence whether a nonfamily CEO stays or leaves. Human Resource Management Review 28(1):
56–67.
Yin RK (2017) Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Zellweger T (2014) Toward a paradox perspective of family firms: The moderating role of collective mindful-
ness in controlling families. In: Melin L, Nordqvist M and Sharma P (eds) The Sage Handbook of Family
Business. London: Sage, pp.648–655.
Zellweger T, Sieger P and Halter F (2011) Should I stay or should I go? Career choice intentions of students
with family business background. Journal of Business Venturing 26(5): 521–536.
Author biographies
Judith van Helvert-Beugels is researcher at the Dutch Centre of Expertise in Family Businesses at the
Windesheim University of Applied Sciences in the Netherlands. Her research focuses on the role of advisory
boards in family firms and the ways in which these advisory boards operate and potentially provide value for
the firms, the families and the owners.
Mattias Nordqvist is Professor in Business Administration with a focus on Entrepreneurship at the House of
Innovation, Stockholm School of Economics in Sweden. He is also a Professor at the Center for Family
Enterprise and Ownership at Jönköping International Business School, Jönköping University in Sweden. His
research, teaching and consulting focus on entrepreneurship and strategy within private companies, in particu-
lar family businesses.
Roberto Flören holds the Chair of Family Business and Business Transfer at Nyenrode since 2002. His
research focuses on family business and he teaches in a large number of executive programmes, among which

242 International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship 38(3)
the Private Wealth Management Programme, the New Board Programme and the Commissarissencyclus.
Roberto has served as Head of Faculty from 2011 to 2016. His special interests relate to the interaction
between the family, business and ownership systems within the family business. He serves as a chairman or a
member of several non-executive boards of Dutch family businesses.
Appendix
Interview protocol for the former family CEO
1. How is your work relationship with the nonfamily CEO? How do the other family members
feel about working with the nonfamily CEO?
2. Have you experienced tensions since the time that the nonfamily CEO has been working
here? Which ones?
3. How did these tensions arise and evolve?
4. How have you been able to deal with these tensions?
Interview protocol for the nonfamily CEO
1. How is your work relationship with the former family CEO? How is your work relationship
with the other family owners?
2. Have you experienced tensions since the time that you have been working here? Which
ones?
3. How did these tensions arise and evolve?
4. How have you been able to deal with these tensions?
Interview protocol for the member of the Management Team
1. How is your work relationship with the nonfamily CEO?
2. How was your work relationship with the former family CEO?
3. Do you notice differences between the approaches and focus of the former family and the
current nonfamily CEO? Which ones?
4. To what extent has the nonfamily CEO been accepted by the employees? How has he been
able to realise this?