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Islamophobia and anti-antisemitism: the case of Hungary and the ‘Soros plot’
Abstract
The more than a million, mostly Muslim, arrivals in the European Union in recent years have given mainstream politicians an opportunity to generate and exploit the public racist, xenophobic and ultra-nationalist urges of the sort that had previously been the exclusive preserve of the extreme right. This successful vote-getting strategy hingeS on disassociating ethno-religious hatred, which Islamophobia is, from its most stigmatized example in Europe: antisemitism. Nowhere has this process been clearer than in Hungary, infamous for ‘solving’ the migration crisis by erecting a wire fence along its borders. Viktor Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party have stolen the racist thunder of the far-right Jobbik party, but without the latter’s once open antisemitism. Jobbik has responded by also seemingly renouncing antisemitism, ignoring the protests of its more die-hard neo-Nazi supporters. Kalmar’s article focuses on the government’s use of a conspiracy theory about the Jewish financier George Soros as an example of exploiting antisemitism while claiming to oppose it. It suggests that the process of rejecting antisemitism, if disingenuously, in order to legitimize Islamophobic racism in Hungary is a useful model for examining similar processes in much of the Euro-Atlantic world.
... Pada dasarnya, benua ini sedang diuji komitmennya terhadap hak asasi manusia, toleransi, dan pluralisme. Peningkatan xenofobia dan gerakan ultra-nasionalis berkaitan erat dengan meningkatnya Islamofobia (Kalmar 2020). ...
... Studi menunjukkan peningkatan sentimen negatif terhadap Muslim di Eropa Barat sejak akhir 1980-an, bahkan melebihi sentimen antiimigran (Bell, Valenta, and Strabac 2021;Kalmar 2020). Laporan tahunan Islamofobia Eropa oleh Enes Bayrakli (2023) mencatat Prancis, Austria, dan Denmark sebagai negara paling rentan terhadap Islamofobia pada 2022, dengan Prancis dan Austria mewakili Eropa Barat, dan Denmark mewakili Eropa Utara (Ali 2023;Bayrakli and Hafez 2023b). ...
This study is motivated by the ongoing debates surrounding France and Islam over the past decade, particularly the re-emergence of laïcité as a historical ideology rooted in the late 18th century. The research aims to examine how French citizens express their perspectives on issues related to Islam, Islamofobia, and Muslim identity through narratives on Twitter, and to analyze how the racialization and marginalization of laïcité are perceived comprehensively. Using tweet harvesting for data collection and analysis facilitated by MAXQDA, the study identifies key events in 2023 that sparked public discourse: the ban on the abaya in schools and the celebration of Hanukkah at the Presidential Palace. Analysis of tweet content reveals three primary groups of public opinion: feminists (notably in the context of the abaya), nationalists who advocate for laïcité, and neutral humanists who, while often critical, also challenge the racialization of political actions. In addition to the frequent use of offensive language and calls for the exclusion of Muslims opposing government policies, secondary sources indicate tangible forms of racialization in society. These findings highlight that many view the Muslim population as outsiders, despite being born and raised in France.
... The encouragement of cross-cultural dialogue and open discussions about transgenerational and historical trauma, coupled with a steadfast rejection of hate and discrimination, is crucial for promoting empathy and unity among diverse communities. This is particularly pertinent in the current political context of Hungary (Kalmar, 2020). ...
The intergenerational impact of genocide has been studied in various contexts, however, the mechanisms of trauma transmission remain unclear. The present study aimed to better understand the relationship between parental trauma and offspring mental health by exploring mechanisms of trauma transmission in the children (n = 599) and grandchildren (n = 311) of Holocaust survivors (HS) in Hungary. In a cross-sectional online survey study, we used the paradigm developed by Danieli, Norris, Lindert, Paisner, Engdahl, et al. (2015) and Danieli, Norris, Lindert, Paisner, Kronenberg, et al. (2015) to assess HS parental styles (i.e., parenting impacted by efforts to cope with past traumatic experiences), as reported by offspring participants, as well as participants’ reported level of adaptational impact, that is, their efforts to cope and adapt, and current mental health symptoms posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD, complex PTSD [C-PTSD], anxiety, depression). We found differences in parental styles reported by generation; however, the mechanism of how it impacted offspring mental health was similar. Mediation analyses showed that more intense parental styles were associated with higher adaptational impact, which, in turn, was related to more mental health symptoms, in both generations. This is the first study to apply the Danieli paradigm in a third-generation sample and the first to assess the psychological impact of the Holocaust in an Eastern European country (Hungary), using systematic quantitative assessment. Our findings highlight the Holocaust’s continued impact on the third generation, and the importance of raising awareness of the impact of collective traumas through educational programs, enhancing culturally sensitive and transgenerational trauma-informed mental health services, and fostering tolerance and diversity in public policy.
... Environmental issues and COVID-19 policies have more recently emerged as loci of political contestation in far-right circles. Other issues of significance to far-right actors are more localized, including discourses over women's access to abortion in Poland, which enacted a near-total ban on the procedure in 2021 (Kulczycki 2023), the promulgation of antisemitic tropes as a means of criticizing George Soros' funding of pro-democracy NGOs in Hungary (Kalmar 2020), and the contestation of the post-1989 narrative of German reunification by the Alternative für Deutschland to "reshape the country's memory culture to celebrate national greatness rather than focus on atoning for past misdeeds" (Richardson-Little, Merrill, andArlaud 2022, 1360). Clearly, the demands that give expression to far-right positions are manifold and cannot be distilled, in the aggregate, to any singular touchstone, though xenophobia, racism, Islamophobia, antisemitism, and homophobia often figure prominently. ...
In this special issue, our contributors move the academic conversation beyond methodological nationalism and approaches that analyze far-right movements only within their respective state contexts by interrogating the circulation of ideologies, funds, and people across sociopolitical boundaries. Our goal is to scrutinize the far right in post-communist Eastern Europe by examining the multitudinous and multidirectional ties that exist between groups at the local, regional, national, and transnational levels. Attention, moreover, is paid not just to those factors that facilitate such linkages, but also to the obstacles that hamper these flows via various detours, omissions, and other forms of resistance. In this introduction, we offer a theoretical overview and discussion of contributors’ findings to argue that conduits for the dissemination of far-right discursive frames are hardly unidirectional in nature. As a result, the transitological narratives of progress and regress typically invoked to explain the emergence of the far right offer only a partial understanding of how it mobilizes, builds alliances, and circulates ideas. We unpack the conceptual pitfalls and fallacies of transitological narratives and instead foreground the concept of multidirectionality, which opens up new avenues through which to understand how far-right groups mobilize and disseminate their narratives.
... The contextual specificity to Hungary limits generalizability; hence, comparative cross-cultural studies are needed to assess these dynamics in various socio-political settings. Hungary's public discourse is often considered monolithically xenophobic compared to other European nations (Halasz, 2009;Kalmar, 2020;Nyíri, 2003). This specificity raises questions about the generalizability of our results to other contexts. ...
... The excerpt reflects how far-/extreme-right actors frequently use anti-Semitic discourses and especially conspiracy myths about George Soros to scapegoat Jewish communities and mobilise support (Kalmar 2020). The documentary refutes the activist's conspiracy beliefs by subsequently fact-checking and interviewing a political scientist who contextualises the interviewee's views. ...
... In Hungary, as in many other societies, attitudes toward different ethnic and religious groups can be influenced by a variety of factors, including empathy and cosmopolitan orientation. Within the Hungarian context, there is a unique historical and social backdrop that affects intergroup relations and the public's perception of Roma, Jews, and Muslims (Goździak & Márton, 2018;Kalmar, 2020;Kende et al., 2021). ...
... Conspiracy theories in countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not restricted solely to the fringes of society, as we have indicated but can be permanent contenders in mainstream political discourse as well, as shown by Turza (2023), Kreko and Enyedi (2018) or Kalmar (2020) in the case of Hungary, where such conspiracy narratives about Soros were incorporated into official governmental communication for a long time. The Hungarian government under Prime Minister Viktor Orban splattered posters of Soros all over Hungary, saying 'Soros wants to transplant millions from Africa and the Middle East. ...
This article aims to shed light on the phenomenon of conspiracy theories prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe. Countries in the region share several common characteristics while also having distinctive historical experiences. The focus of our study is to identify global, regional, and local conspiracy theories that are currently circulating in the region. We aim to explore the prevalence of such conspiratorial beliefs among the population, with particular attention given to the impact of the recent coronavirus pandemic, which has given impetus to many conspiracy theories, especially in times of near ubiquitous social media, not helped by the rise of populist politics. As conspiracy theories can be understood as a dynamic set of arguments, images, and interpretations that are continuously used, adjusted, discussed, and applied to novel circumstances in the course of the ongoing events (e.g. Byford 2014), we seek to identify the key elements of COVID-19 conspiracy theories in Central and Eastern Europe considering conspiracy theories that have circulated in the region in the recent past.
... The present work builds on this theoretical background, adapting it for a Hungarian context, where research demonstrates how dehumanizing rhetoric and migrant-related fearmongering are intertwined in media and public discourse (Bernáth and Messing, 2016)-a link needing no further psychological replication (Bruneau et al., 2018). But as frames and discourse shape thinking and sentiment above and beyond their narrower focus (Price et al., 1997;Moskowitz, 2005), in this case the single target group on which it centers, we theorized that due to the all-permeating nature of xenophobic reporting and communications (Kalmar, 2020) in Hungary, a more general tendency of dehumanization (affecting humanity perceptions regardless of group membership) may emerge. Conceptualized on a general level we still expected it to be strongly associated with perceived threat from migrants (both driven by the same media coverage and discourse), but hoped to find a mediator of this link, which could provide insights for prejudice-reduction efforts. ...
Examining the humanness attributed to several groups in a comprehensive Hungarian sample (N = 505) at the height of the “European refugee crisis of 2015,” we found that Hungarians dehumanize Eastern ethnic groups more and Western ethnic groups less than they do to their own ethnic ingroup. Interestingly, we also found that a general tendency of dehumanization is expressed across all national groups. This general tendency of dehumanization was strongly associated with threat perceived from migrants, but the relationship was mediated by group malleability—the belief that human groups can change and are not set in their ways irreversibly. Malleability beliefs were negatively linked to dehumanization tendencies and threat perceived from migrants. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the findings that point to the critical role of fixed mindsets about groups in the mechanisms linked to prejudice in a highly xenophobic Hungarian context.
... The NRM believes that the Nordic/white race can only be protected and can only survive through the creation of a pure Nordic National Socialist white ethno-state, by the repatriation and deportation of all foreigners and 10 Global Zionism is an old conspiracy theory founded on the myth that an international Jewish elite (also called 'cabal' that includes Jews, the Rothschilds, the Freemasons and The Illuminati) controls a secret world government, which aims to destroy local cultures by inventing globalisation, multiculturalism and flooding white nation states of the 'global North' with immigrants and refugees from the 'global South' (see e.g. Byford, 2011;Kalmar, 2020;Plenta, 2020). ...
This presentation will explore how the transnational far- and extreme right co-opted climate activism and clean living during the COVID-19 pandemic. By mainstreaming ecofascist propaganda, white supremacists not only increasingly blame non-white populations, minorities and refugees for pollution, overpopulation and the destruction of the environment but also scapegoat them for ‘creating’ and spreading the virus. The rampant spread of these conspiracy theories has also led to a spike in violent hate speech against minorities and non-white populations worldwide, culminating in the recent ecofascist terrorist attack in Buffalo, New York.
Based on corpus-assisted Appraisal and cluster analyses of white supremacist materials, this presentation will illustrate how weaponizing the COVID-19 pandemic has provided an opportune moment for white supremacists to recycle ‘old’ conspiracy theories such as the ‘New World Order’, ‘global Zionism’ and ‘The Great Replacement’. Findings reveal clusters of meaning that form oppositional constellations of ecofascist grievances and their ‘solution’, the accelerated creation of eco-nationalist, pre-industrial, white ethno-states. This talk concludes by discussing the implications of ecofascist disinformation campaigns for democracy and peace.
... Von den mittel-und osteuropäischen Vertreter*innen wird er teils offen zur Schau gestellt. So richten sich Kampagnen der ungarischen Fidesz direkt gegen den Investor George Soros, der der äußeren Beeinflussung der ungarischen Politik bezichtigt wird (Kalmar 2020 : 74-79). Neben den Nativismus, der sich in der feindlichen Haltung gegen-über der kulturellen Herkunft der Zuwanderer*innen ausdrückt, tritt ein Geschlechterbild, in dem Frauen vor dem Übergriff der "Fremden" beschützt werden müssen. ...
Das Lehrbuch bietet eine einführende Darstellung des Populismus in allen relevanten Facetten. Namentlich adressiert das Buch seine unterschiedlichen Manifestationen (als Ideologie, Parteiprogramm und individuelle Einstellung), stellt den Populismus in vergleichender Perspektive vor und analysiert die Ursachen für den Wahlerfolg populistischer Parteien. Ferner diskutiert das Buch die Auswirkungen populistischer Parteien auf die Demokratie und den Parteienwettbewerb.
... The analysis provided in this study extends from previously published papers that focus on the role of George Soros in Lithuania (Ibid.), Hungary (Kalmar, 2020), or in comparative perspective in Hungary and Slovakia (Plenta, 2020). ...
... The NRM believes that the Nordic/white race can only be protected and can only survive through the creation of a pure Nordic National Socialist white ethno-state, by the repatriation and deportation of all foreigners and 10 Global Zionism is an old conspiracy theory founded on the myth that an international Jewish elite (also called 'cabal' that includes Jews, the Rothschilds, the Freemasons and The Illuminati) controls a secret world government, which aims to destroy local cultures by inventing globalisation, multiculturalism and flooding white nation states of the 'global North' with immigrants and refugees from the 'global South' (see e.g. Byford, 2011;Kalmar, 2020;Plenta, 2020). ...
This presentation was part of the session on 'Accessing axiologies: Methods for identifying constellations':
Constellation analysis is a powerful way to identify and conceptualize values and ideologies present within texts, but how do you identify them? We show three approaches to analyzing constellations and explain how to identify which approach is right for you.
... The story then starts circling international far-right media in connection with the UN climate summit in New York in September 2019, with a manipulated photo of Thunberg and Al Gore made to look like she is standing next to Soros. The anti-Semitic conspiracy theory surrounding Soros can be traced back to the 1990s and has been especially focal in Hungary the last five years (Kalmar 2020). ...
In the autumn of 2018 Greta Thunberg started her school strike. Soon she and the Fridays For Future-movement rose to world-fame, stirring a backlash laying bare the intrinsic climate change denial of Swedish far-right digital media. These outlets had previously been almost silent on climate change, but in 2019, four of the ten most read articles on the site Samhällsnytt were about Thunberg, all of them discrediting the movement and spreading doubt about climate science. Using the conceptualisation of industrial/breadwinner masculinities as developed by Hultman and Pulé [2018. Ecological Masculinities: Theoretical Foundations and Practical Guidance. Routledge Studies in Gender and Environments. New York: Routledge], this article analyses what provoked this reaction. It explores how the hostility to Thunberg was constructed in far-right media discourse in the years 2018–2019, when she became a threat to an imagined industrial, homogenic and patriarchal community. Using conspiracy theories and historical tropes of irrational femininity, the far right was trying to protect the usually hidden environmental privileges, related to unequal carbon emissions and resource use, that Thunberg and her movement made visible.
... The NRM believes that the Nordic/white race can only be protected and can only survive through the creation of a pure Nordic National Socialist white ethno-state, by the repatriation and deportation of all foreigners and 10 Global Zionism is an old conspiracy theory founded on the myth that an international Jewish elite (also called 'cabal' that includes Jews, the Rothschilds, the Freemasons and The Illuminati) controls a secret world government, which aims to destroy local cultures by inventing globalisation, multiculturalism and flooding white nation states of the 'global North' with immigrants and refugees from the 'global South' (see e.g. Byford, 2011;Kalmar, 2020;Plenta, 2020). ...
Harmony with nature, pristine countryside, organic farming, a vegan diet, renewable energy, sustainable development. This imagery tends to be associated with ‘green liberal’ environmentalist movements and more broadly, left-wing political ideologies. However, concern for the environment and warnings about the imminent climate crisis are gaining traction within far-right and white supremacist movements. This article focuses on the revival of white supremacist environmentalism based on a qualitative text analysis of an English-language manifesto published by the violent extremist neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement. Drawing on the concept of axiological cosmologies from Legitimation Code Theory and the Appraisal framework from Systemic Functional Linguistics, this paper shows how an ecofascist ideology is built up through clusters of meanings that reinforce neo-Nazi grievances such as ‘global Zionism’, ‘mass immigration’ and multiculturalism. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of what the promotion of eco-fascist ‘solutions’ to the climate crisis could mean for climate justice from a human rights perspective and preventing violent extremism from an educational perspective.
... An even larger reduction occurred in the share of Hungarian respondents worrying about being attacked verbally or physically because of being Jews. This appears somewhat puzzling given the widespread concern over authoritarian developments and accusations of state-sponsored antisemitism in Hungary (Dunai 2014;BBC 2017b;Krekó and Enyedi 2018;Kalmar 2020). Nevertheless, the share of respondents who said they had considered emigrating because of safety concerns remained substantial (at 40 percent in 2018). ...
Existing scholarship on contemporary antisemitism tends to sacrifice breadth for depth, typically focusing on a specific dimension of the phenomenon or a single national or ideological context. This myopia threatens to limit our understanding of current antisemitism because separate parts of a complex picture are studied in isolation, and because crucial questions about temporal and cross-national variation remain understudied. To help remedy this situation, this article introduces a more comprehensive conceptual and empirical framework along with a new dataset intended to encourage the study of antisemitism as a multidimensional, cross-national, and dynamic phenomenon. The framework provides a model for studying antisemitism in four core dimensions—attitudes, incidents, cultural imagery, and Jews’ exposure—and specifies relevant variables and indicators, thus facilitating future research and data collection efforts. To supplement the framework, the article introduces a new dataset (DIMA—Dimensions of Antisemitism) featuring publicly available data covering three of the four dimensions: attitudes, incidents, and exposure. Based on patterns emerging from these data, hypotheses for further study are suggested. These contributions are intended to prepare the ground for a new and theoretically more ambitious research agenda in the field of contemporary antisemitism research.
This study examines self-identification and belonging of EU and non-EU highly skilled migrants and the role of patriotism and cosmopolitanism in their identity construction based on the discourse analysis of 30 semi-structured interviews conducted in Budapest in Fall 2022. The study finds that highly skilled migrants invent hybrid identities by weaving particularistic and universal attachments into an ensemble of cultural and moral cosmopolitanism embedded in constructive patriotism, which this study calls patriotic cosmopolitanism. The analysis advances thinking on the inception and manifestations of cosmopolitanism from below within everyday diversity of transnational urban spaces in complex anti-immigrant contexts.
Háttér, cél: A kirekesztő társadalmi attitűdök hagyományosan jellemzők a magyar társadalomban, amelyekre a kormány 2010-es évek közepe óta alkalmazott retorikája és politikája ráerősített. A tanulmány célja annak felmérése, hogy két határmenti, alkoholtermelő térségben, illetve egymást követő két évben, hogyan alakultak az egyes társadalmi csoportokat övező ellenérzések. Módszer: A Siklósi járásban 2020-ban és a Záhonyi járásban 2021-ben készült kismintás kérdőíves adatfelvételek eredményeit elemezzük az SPSS és az R szoftverek segítségével. Eredmények és következtetések: Magyarországon – de legalábbis a tanulmányban vizsgált két járásban – az iskolai végzettségnek különösen fontos hatása van az egyes társadalmi csoportokkal szembeni ellenséges (vagy éppen elfogadó) attitűdök fennállásában. Rámutat arra is az elemzés, hogy feltételezhetően a kormány közvéleményt alakító törekvéseinek is van jelentősége ezen attitűdök alakulásában.
The portrayal of ethnic communities in the media can have a significant impact on the everyday life of these groups – both in a positive and negative way. Often, the dominant depictions in mainstream media are created without the community's involvement and are dominated by stereotypes. To deal with a lack of access to mainstream media channels or even to establish an own positive identity, a community can launch its own ethnic or minority media initiatives. However, as evidence from Hungary shows, there are situations in which those in power are interested in capturing successful ethnic media outlets to influence how members of the minority group make meaning of the world. This paper aims to elaborate on the dynamics of media capture in ethnic settings. Relying on interviews with representatives of post-transition Hungary's Romani media, the authors provide a field theory-based explanation, which they see as a fruitful new addition to the concept of media capture.
Advancing a consistent anti-racist analytic to challenge antisemitism demands standing with all those who suffer from systemic racism, and specifically with Palestinians. However, antisemitism and anti-Palestinian racism are rarely understood and opposed in a unified movement of solidarity. Here, we address what antisemitism is not, especially the false claim that equates antisemitism with criticism of the state of Israel – a claim that is reaching fever pitch at the current moment. Turning to context, we consider periodisations about how antisemitism has changed over time and place, suggesting we are in a new period of increasing supposed legitimacy for antisemitism in Western liberal-democratic capitalist states, associated with the rising influence of white nationalism. We then consider what antisemitism as anti-Jewish racism is, and how it is coded in certain ways, including: elite privilege; conspiracy claims; and symbolic marking for threats and violence. We conclude with notes on the potential for solidarity.
This chapter explores the emergence of the compliance-industrial complex in post-socialist Czechia, utilizing Michel Foucault’s theoretical concepts of problematization and apparatus. The argument is framed as a three-stage process: repressive, preventive, and pre-emptive. The repressive phase, which began in the early 1990s, involved the assimilation of the organized crime concept into Czech discourse. In the preventive phase, around the turn of the twenty-first century, corruption gained autonomy from organized crime discourse. The pre-emptive phase witnessed the transformation of corruption control into a transactional commodity known as compliance. The chapter also examines the diverse actors and techniques engaged in crime control, encompassing state ‘elite’ police departments, media, anti-corruption organizations, investigative journalists, political parties, and private enterprises. These actors often operate in hybrid capacities within, below, and beyond state government. Finally, this exploration reveals the implications of the evolving crime control landscape for society, shedding light on the intricate complexities characterizing Czechia’s serious crime control evolution.
This article focuses on the rise of anti-antisemitic discourse in Britain over the past fifteen years. It explores the relationship between the increasingly emotional tone of public discourse in Britain and other western countries and the miring of anti-antisemitism in dynamics of competitive victimhood and ethnic antagonism. The development of this dynamic is traced from the bitter arguments over the representation and reporting of the Palestine/Israel conflict at the time of the Israeli ground assault in the Gaza Strip in early 2009 – with special attention to Caryl Churchill’s short play Seven Jewish Children – through to recent anti-antisemitic interventions such as David Baddiel’s bestselling polemic Jews Don’t Count (2021) and Jonathan Freedland’s verbatim play recently staged at London’s Royal Court Theatre (2022). These interventions, the article shows, call for the ‘normal’ treatment of anti-Jewish prejudice while simultaneously appealing on exceptionalist grounds for public sympathy with Jewish perceptions of antisemitism. The exceptional moral authority widely accorded to anti-antisemitism has made the cause an attractive one for those who resent what they believe to be the unwarranted priority accorded to non-white victimhood. Various forms of anti-antisemitism, such as Baddiel’s, have thus become front-line arguments in shrill culture-war tussles suffused with intellectual confusion and racially tinged rhetorical combat. This racialization, politicization and emotionalization of anti-antisemitism has reached new heights, the article concludes, following the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023.
While conspiracy theories have traditionally received attention from the Turkish public and political elite, recently, however, they have proliferated when explaining complex situations. This paper examines conspiracy theories in Turkey and the role of entertainment media, specifically the popular period drama, Payitaht: Abdülhamid, in mainstreaming conspiracy theories. Payitaht: Abdülhamid, as an ideological state apparatus, repurposes anti-Semitism as salient conspiracy theories by creating scapegoats and existential others. This paper argues that the state uses entertainment media to disseminate conspiracy theories and, in effect, endorses anti-Semitism. As a result, anti-Semitism has transformed from a marginal movement to a mainstream movement.
Since the 2019 and 2022 terrorist attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, El Paso, Texas, and Buffalo, New York, both mainstream media and scholarly interest in ecofascism have increased significantly. This policy brief will illustrate how the contemporary far- and extreme right are exploiting the climate crisis and reviving white supremacist environmentalism. Specifically, it will identify recurring linguistic patterns, which construct ecofascist grievances that link environmental degradation to ‘old’ conspiracy theories, such as ‘global Zionism’ or ‘white genocide’. It will also identify the eco-accelerationist solutions white supremacists propose to the climate crisis. The policy brief concludes with a discussion on the implications of these findings for building resiliency to ecofascist radicalisation.
The experience of managing the COVID-19 and the migration crises in Hungary has been highly criticized in academic literature. The article delves deeper into the matter by scrutinizing the dual challenge of managing the given crises while facing disciplinary measures from the EU. The study uses the system approach to explain and predict the interactions between the affected nation states and the EU institutions in times of turbulent crises. The article’s affirmations are inspired by the system approach and are substantiated by comparative findings of empirical studies. The article finds that disciplinary interventions are likely to increase autopoietic tendencies in the targeted member states. Disciplinary measures apparently add to the member states’ challenges inevitably increasing self-reliance and autonomous decision-making.
Existing scholarship on contemporary antisemitism tends to sacrifice breadth for depth, typically focusing on a specific dimension of the phenomenon or a single national or ideological context. This myopia threatens to limit our understanding of current antisemitism because separate parts of a complex picture are studied in isolation, and because crucial questions about temporal and cross-national variation remain understudied. To help remedy this situation, this article introduces a more comprehensive conceptual and empirical framework along with a new dataset intended to encourage the study of antisemitism as a multidimensional, cross-national, and dynamic phenomenon. The framework provides a model for studying antisemitism in four core dimensions—attitudes, incidents, cultural imagery, and Jews’ exposure—and specifies relevant variables and indicators, thus facilitating future research and data collection efforts. To supplement the framework, the article introduces a new dataset (DIMA—Dimensions of Antisemitism) featuring publicly available data covering three of the four dimensions: attitudes, incidents, and exposure. Based on patterns emerging from these data, hypotheses for further study are suggested. These contributions are intended to prepare the ground for a new and theoretically more ambitious research agenda in the field of contemporary antisemitism research.
This article deals with the role that different rationalities of power play in current authoritarian and right-wing populist governance. Referring to Foucauldian power theory, I will argue that power rationalities and practices in current authoritarian and right-wing populist rule are diverse and variable. I intend to show that various aspects of the sovereign, disciplinary, governmental, and pastoral types of power as outlined by Foucault play an important role in contemporary authoritarianism and right-wing populism. Thereby, this article pursues a twofold aim. On the one hand, the Foucauldian discussion of power in authoritarian and populist rationalities and practices should contribute to better understand current phenomena of new authoritarianism and right-wing populism. On the other hand, the following considerations should also provide a more detailed theoretical insight into the relation between, and compatibilities as well as incompatibilities of, the different types of power described by Foucault.
Far-right ideologies are gaining strength and visibility in Europe and in North America. The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis have seemingly had important repercussions on both continents, reenergizing sentiments and parties that were dismissed as marginal and negligible until then. Contrary to the past, far-right parties would be willing to cooperate and find a common stance on major issues. With a little help from Donald Trump’s former chief strategist Steve Bannon, the European far-right seems to have found a set of issues it can unite around, becoming a transnational force. Right-wing extremist groups have apparently undergone a similar revival, with far-right political violence accounting for the majority of terrorist incidents in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated this trend. In this article, we assess the narrative of the cross-national, even cross- continental links between far-right parties. To this end, we first conduct a literature review to highlight the transnational nature of extreme- right parties and movements. Then we analyze how the European far- right may have spurred negative sentiments against migrants to unleash the feeling of ontological insecurity and foment the “us” vs. “them” dichotomy. In particular, we discuss the tactics employed by the Hungarian government and explain why Italy risks becoming the epicenter of a new far-right earthquake.
This chapter analyses and depicts the state of social democracy in Slovakia as represented by the Smer-SD (Smer-Sociálna demokracia, Direction-Social Democracy). This in-depth analysis primarily focuses on the last decade of Smer-SD governing. Amongst others, it answers the questions such as What is the position of the Slovak left in its political system? How does the party organise itself internally? Who are the voters of the Smer-SD, and how is the electorate geographically distributed? The chapter explores not only how Smer-SD lost support between 2012 and 2022 and how the single-ruled party has become an opposition party but also points out that as an opposition party, Smer-SD has strengthened and radicalised its nationalistic and populist rhetoric and is getting closer to far-right rhetoric than ever before. Finally, the chapter discusses a possible scenario of future development for both the Slovak left and the political system per se after the Smer-SD split when the former Smer-SD members established Hlas-SD (Voice-Social Democracy).
The aims of the research were to present the spatial structure of voting behaviour, its long-term changes in-time, and the socio-economic context of its (re)arrangement, as well as the peculiarities of post-socialist countries through the case study of the capital of Hungary – Budapest. To do this, a comprehensive and long-time database was developed as a prerequisite for the research, which included the integration of the lowest scale election results (at precinct) and census data (at census tracts) at different times in a complex metropolitan environment. This was necessary due to the nature and inner diversity of the study area, since a statistically significant result can only be obtained using an integrated database.
In order to achieve the research goal, in the first part of the dissertation I elaborated on the theoretical background of the topic, in which I described the general and then the spatial explanations and theories of voting behaviour and their embeddedness in the urban environment, all of which have been associated with socio-economic status and its diversity, the factors that most describe the urban inner spatial structure. Based on these, developed democracies were characterized by extremely stable socio-economic cleavages before the 1970s, which largely covered the voting bases of parties. Both micro- and macro-sociological and psychological-based theories agreed on the stability and further inheritance of the system through the established communication networks and relationship systems. Electoral geography joined the explanation of voting behaviour theories by embedding these explanations in the geographical space, as they were inseparable from their physical environment, even in the period dominated by the mass media at the time. In connection with this, I also developed a conceptual framework for the neighbourhood and contextual effect that has appeared less so far in the Hungarian psephology literature. Based on these, not only the different social composition of the areas influences the voting behaviour, but also the context of the given locations itself.
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Overall, the dissertation sought to explore the electoral structure of the Hungarian capital, its changes, and to provide some socio-economic explanation for all of this, using a wide-ranging quantitative methodology. In addition, in many cases the election results provided additional information on the composition, political thinking and attitudes of local society. However, research also has several limitations. On the one hand, I determined the reasons behind the correlations indirectly with the help of available mathematical-statistical methods and the existing literature, but I did not use primary (even from a questionnaire survey) data to test the validation of my statements. On the other hand, the risk of ecological inference may arise in all research using a (spatially) aggregated database, which also rightly arises in the case of the present dissertation. At the same time, in my opinion, a small-scale examination of election results can provide useful – additional – information for both political science and urban geography or even urban planning in exploring conflict areas in the specific city.
Over the last decade, the world has watched in shock as populists swept to power in free elections. From Manila to Warsaw, Brasilia to Budapest, the populist tide has shattered illusions of an inexorable march to liberal democracy. Eschewing simplistic notions of a unified global populism, this book unpacks the diversity and plurality of populisms. It highlights the variety of constitutional and extraconstitutional strategies that populists have used to undermine the institutional fabric of liberal democracy and investigates how ruling populists responded to the Covid-19 crisis. Outlining the rise of populisms and their governing styles, Wojciech Sadurski focuses on what populists in power do, rather than what they say. Confronting one of the most pressing concerns of international politics, this book offers a vibrant, contemporary account of modern populisms and, significantly, considers what we can do to fight back.
One of the salient features of the recent populist turn in Europe has been a redefinition of the European. Traditionally, (far) right-wing parties defined themselves as Eurosceptic and focused on national identity. Increasingly, however, they have referred to pan-European heritage, although against the mainstream conceptualization of it. The article looks at the case of Hungary and the image of Europe constructed by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, whose rhetoric has become a key reference point for other European populist movements. The past decade his government has witnessed, on the one hand, a tendency to redefine what is European against the dominant and institutionalized interpretations, and, on the other, an attempt to single-out the concept of Central Europe as the locus for maintaining and nurturing European values in contrast to perceived Western decline. This paper examines this discourse through a close reading of major speeches delivered by Orbán on the anniversaries of historical events. Analysis of these speeches reveals the ideological foundations of his political project and presents historical and philosophical interpretations of the European political situation. It seeks to identify how Orbán’s discourse evolved across time, by putting the speeches about the past into the present political context.
Buildings of the burial complex of Suleiman the Magnificent were excavated between 2015–2019 in Szigetvár. This paper investigates why, despite the traditional anti-Muslim sentiments in the local community, the FIDESZ-KDNP failed to turn the Suleiman story into local political success after the 2015 migration crisis, during a period of extensive anti-Muslim campaigning. This analyses focuses on the opportunities, challenges and concerns of the creation of a Muslim pilgrimage site and cultural tourism attraction based on the death place of the Ottoman emperor. The Muslim rule in the early modern period has left deep memorial traces on Hungary. Despite the superficial similarities, opinions about Muslims in Szigetvár are more complex than in the wider Hungarian public and are influenced by acts of reconciliation and economic considerations. Results of a deep empirical research are presented on local identity and Muslim related sentiments in this paper.
The European Union is often seen as a bulwark of progressive values, including LGBTI rights. By restricting such rights, politicians thus appear to reject the EU’s fundamental principles. This paper argues, however, that anti-gender politics is often a surprisingly pro-European phenomenon. Many of its practitioners rebuff accusations of Euroskepticism. For them, rights restrictions are less an attempt to reject European integration than to redirect its trajectory. They aim to reconnect the EU with Europe’s civilizational roots. The paper illustrates this argument by analyzing the discourse actors have used to justify anti-gender policies in three countries: Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia.
Soon after the outbreak of the pandemic, antisemitism connected to the coronavirus appeared in the world. In our research we analyzed a large Hungarian online text corpus from December 1, 2019, to July 10, 2020 to examine whether coronavirus-related antisemitism was present in the Hungarian online space, and if so, what its content was. We differentiated between two layers of communication: the professionalized layer represented by online articles, and the lay one represented by comments and posts. After providing the conceptual background regarding conspiracy theories and conspiratorial- and coronavirus-related antisemitism, we present the mixed-method approach that we employed. This approach includes quantitative LDA topic models, human annotation, and the qualitative analysis of various discourses. Our research indicates that coronavirus-related antisemitism appeared in the Hungarian online space at the very beginning of the pandemic. However, at this time, until July, it was present almost solely at the lay level. Its content was mainly related to various tropes (conspiracy theories) about Jews. However, additional content was also identified. Based on our results and international examples, we propose a comprehensive typology that proved to be a suitable means of analyzing coronavirus-related antisemitic content.
This article evaluates the international influence of Open Society Foundations (OSF) based on its goals and allocation of resources and takes into consideration the concerns raised by its critics. The study analyzes the objectives of this private philanthropic organization as well as its origins and the goals of its founder, George Soros. By assembling and using an original database, it also provides an overall analysis of all OSF grants assigned worldwide in the years 1999–2018 and quantitatively assesses their macro-level impact on democratic governance, freedom of expression, government accountability, and societies that promote justice and equity. Based on the available data, we find no evidence that OSF grants produce a positive impact at the macro-level on these goals nor that they effectively contribute to destabilize countries through protests and mass migrations as its critics claim. These results may have to do with lack of effectiveness or with motivations not matching the outcomes measured here. However, it is early to draw conclusions due to limited data.
The article conceptualizes character assassination (CA) as a tactic of populist communication on social media by using the case study of Italian politician Matteo Salvini. CA consists of personal attacks aimed at damaging the reputation of individuals, used as political means to attack the “enemies of the people.” By means of CA, populists operate a shift from issues and arguments toward individual traits and behaviors. CA’s importance is linked to the features of social media communication (i.e. disintermediation, speed, virality, fragmentation, emotionality). The article uses content analysis of tweets, and qualitative analysis of relevant examples; it demonstrates the strategic nature of CA in Salvini’s communication and identifies five functions (i.e. polarizing, personalizing, symbolic, discriminating, emotional) of CA in right-wing populist communication. CA’s logic is unpacked, by showing how the delegitimization of individuals is used to reinforce a populist communication strategy. Potential implications and responses to CA are discussed.
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