THE (DIS-/)INTEGRATION OF THE EU’S RAPID RESPONSE CAPABILITIES: THE CASE OF THE EU BATTLEGROUPS

Abstract

The post-Cold War circumstances challenged Europe in terms of security and defence. The European states realised that they had to share the responsibility for global security in order to ensure their own integrity. In other words, a common strategic culture was sought to be developed as an expression of an articulated intercultural communication aimed to act as a binding element between the EU member states formerly belonging to the Eastern and Western Blocs. The EU’s rapid response capabilities in general and the EU battlegroups in particular were chosen as the best answer to this strategic demand. Despite the EU battlegroups being considered the cornerstone of European ‘expertise’ in terms of crises management operations, this rapid response capability proved to be a disillusion. For a better understanding of the current status of the EU battlegroups concept, this paper is going to assess its feasibility. Special considerations will be offered regarding its itinerary, the strategic and operational challenges that this concept is facing and, not ultimately, regarding its prospects.

Full text

Redefining Community
in Intercultural Context
rcic’19
Selection of papers presented within the 8th International Conference
Redefining Community in Intercultural Context RCIC’19
Migration & Intercultural Dialogue, Vlora, 2-4 May, 2019
Brasov
vol.8, no.1/2019

4
© May, 2019
‘Henri Coanda’ Air Force Academy Publishing House
160, Mihai Viteazu st., Brasov, 500183
Phone: +40 268 423421, fax: +40 268 422004
e-mail: editura@afahc.ro
Editor-in-chief
Adrian LESENCIUC
-
‘Henri Coanda’ Air Force Academy, Brasov, Romania
Guest Editors
Bledar TOSKA
-
‘Ismail Qemali’ University, Vlora, Albania
Armela PANAJOTI
-
‘Ismail Qemali’ University, Vlora, Albania
Editors
Ramona HĂRŞAN
-
‘Henri Coanda’ Air Force Academy, Brasov, Romania
Daniela NAGY
-
‘Henri Coanda’ Air Force Academy, Brasov, Romania
Cosmina ROMAN
-
‘Henri Coanda’ Air Force Academy, Brasov, Romania
Migena BALLA
-
‘Ismail Qemali’ University, Vlora, Albania
Aulona HAXHIRAJ
-
‘Ismail Qemali’ University, Vlora, Albania
Designer
Mariana GHINDĂOANU
-
‘Henri Coanda’ Air Force Academy, Brasov, Romania
Printing
Daniela OBREJA
-
‘Henri Coanda’ Air Force Academy, Brasov, Romania
Scientific Directors of the Conference
Roland ZISI
-
‘Ismail Qemali’ University, Vlora, Albania
Gabriel RĂDUCANU
-
‘Henri Coanda’ Air Force Academy, Brasov, Romania
Scientific Board
Hussain al-SHAROUFI
-
Gulf University for Science and Technology, Kuweit City, Kuweit
Vittoria BOSNA
-
‘Aldo Moro’ University, Bari, Italy
Carlo BOSNA
-
‘Guglielmo Marconi’ University, Rome, Italy
Elena BUJA
-
‘Transilvania’ University of Braşov, Braşov, Romania
Irena CHIRU
-
‘Mihai Viteazul’ National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, Romania
Ella CIUPERCĂ
-
National Institute of Research and Development in Informatics,
Bucharest, Romania
Alberto FORNASARI
-
‘Aldo Moro’ University, Bari, Italy
Zbyšek KORECKI
-
University of Defense, Brno, Czech Republic
Diana ILIŞOI
-
‘Henri Coanda’ Air Force Academy, Brasov, Romania
Indira JUNGHARE
-
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA
Adrian LESENCIUC
-
‘Henri Coanda’ Air Force Academy, Brasov, Romania
Gabriela OAN
-
University of Coruna, La Coruna, Spain
Armela PANAJOTI
-
‘Ismail Qemali’ University of Vlora, Albania
Mariselda TESSAROLO
-
University of Padua, Italy
Bledar TOSKA
-
‘Ismail Qemali’ University of Vlora, Albania
Aleks TRUSHAJ
-
‘Ismail Qemali’ University of Vlora, Albania
ISSN 2285-2689
ISSN-L 2285-2689
First cover: The Map of Albania from 1445 (author: Bartolomeo Pareto, dedicated to Pope Nicholas V), recently
discovered by Artan Shkeli, where the Balkan territory was named Scandirbeco (Skanderbeg). This map suggests
the role of Albania in Balkans and in Europe. It also represents a metaphor for the Balkan routes of the waves of
history.

7
SUMMARY
Summary..........................................................................................................................................................
7
Migration and Intercultural Dialogue ........................................................................................................
9
Intelligence and Migration (Florian Coldea) ...................................................................................................
11
Migratory Waves: Historical and Social Aspects in the Shaping of Intercultural Dialogue (Mariselda Tessarolo)....
19
How to End the Syrian Civil War and its Refugee Crisis – A Possible Scenario (Gabriel Giuvara, Gabriel
Răducanu) ........................................................................................................................................................
25
Each Nation’s Ark on the Waves of New “Migration Flood”. Romania’s Institutional and Cultural
Preparedness (Adrian Lesenciuc, Ammar El Benni) ......................................................................................
29
Migration and Citizenship. The Pedagogical Approach for a Cosmopolitan Citizenship (Alberto
Fornasari, Mario Conte) ...................................................................................................................................
41
Adoption of the Global Compact for Migration and the Stepts to Follow in the European Regional Context
(Eduard Mihai, Ovidiu Moşoiu, Ion Bălăceanu) ............................................................................................
47
Illegal Migration, the Current Issue of the Security of Nations (Ovidiu Moşoiu, Eduard Mihai, Ion
Bălăceanu) ......................................................................................................................................................
53
Culture and Communication ........................................................................................................................
61
National Identity, Nourished from the Roots of History (Adrian Lesenciuc, Ioana Miruna Popescu) ...........
63
Romania’s Centenary and Young Romanians’ View of their Own Identity (Irina Erhan, Florentina Hăhăianu) ..
69
Cultural Lens of Critical Infrastructure Protection (Ella Magdalena Ciupercă, Victor Adrian Vevera) .........
75
Myopia and Hyperopia in Shaping Cultural Identity (Ioana Leucea, Brânduşa eican) ................................
81
From the Experience Inside Military Multinational Coalition from Afghanistan to a Cultural Educational
Model Proposal (Rita Palaghia) .......................................................................................................................
88
The Communicative Relationship as a Constitutive Dimension of the “Idea of Community”. The
Relevance of the Phenomenological Contribution of Edmund Husserl (Gabriella de Mita) ..........................
95
Internal Exclusion via Multicultural Policy in South Korea: Beyond the Multiculturalism (Jimhee Kim) ...
103
Linguistics. Discourse Analysis ...................................................................................................................
109
Empathy, Sympathy and Demonization of the Other in the Balkan Literature (Mariglena Meminaj) ...........
111
Romanian 21st Century Poetry and the Internet: Identity Marketing Policies from “Netpoets” to Virtual
Reading Community (Ramona Hărşan) ...........................................................................................................
117
Vocabulary: An Epitome of Social Realities (Denisa Drăguşin) ....................................................................
125
Pragmatism of Modal Verbs: Case Study of the ICAO Requirements (Daniela Nagy) ..................................
131
Power Distance in the Korean Culture as it Emerges from a K-Drama (Elena Buja) .....................................
137
Writing the Difference: The Minoritarian Perspective of Italian Migrants in Quebec (Ylenia De Luca)
148
Nationalist Discourse at the European Parliament. The Case of Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage (Liliana Alic) .
153
The Cult of Eagle Metamorphosed – A Semiotic Approach (Eleonora Hodaj) ..............................................
159
Justice, Politics and Intelligence. Quantum Synergies Computed within the Framework Contract of the
European Union (EU) Membership (Cristina Gelan) ......................................................................................
165
The New Museum of Contemporary Art as a Place of Communication for the Second Wave Feminist Art
World (Emanuele Stochino) ...........................................................................................................................
171
The Issues of Latin and Dacian Origin of the Language at the Dawn of Romanian Literature. The
Emergent Forms of Romanian Literature (Ionică Cîrciu, Evelina Cîrciu) ....................................................
177
The Pedagogical Communication (Vittoria Bosna) .......................................................................................
181
Hedging and Boosting Strategies in Albanian Newspaper Opinion Pieces for Dialogical Communicative
Purposes (Bledar Toska) ................................................................................................................................
185
Intercultural Dialogue for Internationalization at Home: The Case of Albanian Universities (Armela Panajoti)...
191
Security and Intercultural Communication ...............................................................................................
203
The Solidarist Discourse and Humanitarian Intervention. Revisiting Sovereignity, Responsibility and
Morality in Global Politics (Laura Her )
205

8
........................................................................................................
CIMIC Tasks During the Romanian Air Policing Mission in the Baltic States. “Baltica 07” (Cosmina-
Oana Roman) ...................................................................................................................................................
211
Terrorist Attacks – A Challenge in Crisis Communication (Delia Pop-Flanja) ..............................................
219
The Role of Security Culture in the Fight Against Fake News (Ruxandra Buluc, Ioan Deac, Răzvan
Grigoraş, Ciprian Lungu) .................................................................................................................................
226
The Concept of National Identity and Its Fall under the School of Constructivist Thinking. Arguments.
Identifying the Elements Belonging to the Constructivist Approach (Ioana Miruna Popescu) ......................
235
The (Dis-/) Integration of the EU’s Rapid Response Capabilities: The Case of the EU Battlegroups
(Adrian-Vasile Popa, Gheorghe Teodoru Ştefan) ............................................................................................
241
New Technologies, Resources, and Connections .......................................................................................
253
Marketing Albania through Foreign Social Media (Irena Skendo) .................................................................
255
The Strategic Place and Role of Integrity among Governance Principles and Values of Public
Administration (Aura Codreanu) .....................................................................................................................
259
Strategic Human Resource Management. A Millestone for Integrity Building in Public Administration
(Aura Codreanu) ..............................................................................................................................................
267
The Education of Interpersonal Intelligence in Schools, a Necessity for a Stable Development (Bukuroshe
Isufaj) ...............................................................................................................................................................
275
Extrinsic Meta-Programs with Influence on Workers Motivation (Bogdan-Alexandru Furdulescu) .............
281
Models Used in NLP for Motivation (Bogdan-Alexandru Furdulescu) ..........................................................
285
General Overview of the Project “Systems for Aerial Surveillance and Security” (Ecaterina Liliana Miron,
Daniela Nagy, Laurian Gherman, Marin Marinov) .........................................................................................
293

Security and
Intercultural
Communication

I N T E R N A T I O NA L CO N F E R E N C E RCIC’19
Redefining Community in Intercultural Context
Vlora, 2-4 May 2019
241
THE (DIS-/)INTEGRATION OF THE EU’S RAPID RESPONSE
CAPABILITIES: THE CASE OF THE EU BATTLEGROUPS
Adrian-Vasile POPA, Gheorghe-Teodoru ŞTEFAN
“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, Romania
Abstract: The post-Cold War circumstances challenged Europe in terms of security and defence. The European
states realised that they had to share the responsibility for global security in order to ensure their own integrity. In
other words, a common strategic culture was sought to be developed as an expression of an articulated intercultural
communication aimed to act as a binding element between the EU member states formerly belonging to the Eastern
and Western Blocs. The EU’s rapid response capabilities in general and the EU battlegroups in particular were
chosen as the best answer to this strategic demand. Despite the EU battlegroups being considered the cornerstone
of European ‘expertise’ in terms of crises management operations, this rapid response capability proved to be a
disillusion. For a better understanding of the current status of the EU battlegroups concept, this paper is going to
assess its feasibility. Special considerations will be offered regarding its itinerary, the strategic and operational
challenges that this concept is facing and, not ultimately, regarding its prospects.
Keywords: EU battlegroups; rapid response; security
1. INTRODUCTION
A coordinated (Western) European defence
was certainly a political chimera in the Cold War
era. The situation changed dramatically immediate
after the fall of Berlin Wall as the stability of the
bipolar world was replaced by the incertitude of
the globalised one. Despite the European states
were rarely more secure from military threats
originating within the region, salient high security
threats emerged from the ‘near abroad’. Frozen
conflicts such as in Balkans or Transnistria, WMD
proliferation, energy insecurity, cyber-attacks or
Islamist terrorism posed fundamental challenges.
Facing this new strategic context, the EU
member states’ military forces amounting a total
combined forces of over two millions troops -
theoretically, the largest in the world- were,
however, “unable to continue to provide the whole
range of capabilities in their army, navy, and air
force, and could not maintain certain capabilities
unless in cooperation with others” (S. Biscop
2005:29). As R. Gates put it, “the demilitarization
of Europe has gone from a blessing in the 20th
century to an impediment to achieving real security
and lasting peace in the 21st” (cited in Council on
Foreign Relations, February 2010). As a
consequence, the capitals of Europe became aware
that absence of war is not synonymous with
security and the newly-emerged challenges cannot
be addressed unless they pool and share assets.
Under these circumstances a reorganisation of
Europe’s military forces became a priority.
However, building trust among the EU
member states for achieving a recalibration of their
national armed forces from territorial defence to
expeditionary operations could have been a major
obstacle. Therefore, a common strategic culture
aimed to act as a binding element between the EU
member states formerly belonging to the Eastern
and Western Blocs was sought to be developed.
According to C. Gray, a “strategic culture can be
defined as the beliefs, attitudes and norms towards
the use of force, held by a security community
which has had a unique historical experience”
(cited in L. Chappell 2009:419). In fact, the EU
can fit only partially into this definition as its
‘unique historical experience’ can be discussed
only since the democratisation of the Eastern Bloc.
This post-Cold War status quo was surprisingly
a foundation for the EU battlegroups (EU BGs)
which came as a test bed for reaching a common
European strategic culture that would ultimately
lead to a coordinated European defence. But how
and why the EU BGs were chosen as the best
answer to this strategic demand?

Adrian-Vasile POPA, Gheorghe-Teodoru ŞTEFAN
242
2. THE (DIS-/)INTEGRATION OF THE EU’S
RAPID RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
Despite the EU’s structured interest in shaping a
coordinated defence can be traced back to the Cold
War period, a modern approach emerged through
the Maastricht Treaty. Signed on 7 February 1992
and entered into force on 1 November 1993, the
Maastricht Treaty established the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) as initial premises for
developing a common strategic culture. However,
the wars in the Balkan throughout the 1990s
revealed that “CFSP would only be credible if it was
backed up with the possibility to use military
power” (B. Schmitt, 2004:89) and as a consequence,
the EU member states were forced to place the
development of military capabilities at the centre of
their national policymaking. This necessity, as K.
Keulman put it, “resulted in intensifying motivation
on the part of the European Union members to
strengthen military collaboration among
themselves” (2006:46-47).
Probably the first response to the issue of
comparative military inadequacy and to the
necessity of a better cooperation in terms of
military capabilities was agreed at the Franco-
British summit in St. Malo in 1998. In fact, the
paragraph 2 of the joint declaration set a clear
strategic perspective for the EU “the Union must
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed
up by credible military forces, the means to decide
to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to
respond to international crises”(in M. Rutten
2001:8), meanwhile article 4 was visionary and
outlined for the first time in an official EU
document the demand for rapid reaction
capabilities: “Europe needs strengthened armed
forces that can react rapidly to the new risks” (in
M. Rutten 2001:9). As a consequence, at the
Cologne European Council of June 1999 all EU
member states agreed to transform this bilateral
initiative into a European reality by creating
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) -
EU’s own security brand. Indeed, ESDP - later
updated and renamed Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) - became an integral part
of the CFSP and was responsible to deal with all
the issues regarding EU security and defence,
including to set common capabilities goals, to
shape common strategic objectives or to conduct
joint crisis management operations. According to
K. Keulman, “the ESDP marks a movement away
from the civilian nature of the EU and its
institutional connection with NATO” (2006:47).
Another important event not only in the
crystallisation of the EU’s integrated military
capabilities but also in determining European
propensity for rapid reaction happened six months
later at the Helsinki European Council Summit of
December 1999. Apart from establishing the
Headline Goal 2003 and the commitment of EU
member states for the European Rapid Reaction
Force (ERRF) of 50,000-60,000 troops in the
mission spectrum of Petersberg tasks (military
tasks of humanitarian, peacekeeping or peace-
making nature), the Helsinki European Council
Summit created the political foundation of the
future EU BGs by offering special attention to
rapid-response capabilities
the Union will improve and make more effective
use of resources in civilian crisis management (…)
special attention will be given to a rapid reaction
capability (in M. Rutten, 2001:83).
The idea was reiterated and further developed
at the Franco-British summit of Le Touquet in
February 2003 (see in A. Missiroli, 2003:39).
Another important document urging the need
for rapid reaction forces was the European Security
Strategy (ESS). Being adopted in December 2003,
it retained in terms of rapid response that “active
policies are needed to counter the new dynamic
threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that
fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust
intervention (Council of the European Union
2003:11). As revealed by S. Biscop, despite its
severe criticism, the ESS was quite relevant
regarding the EU BGs as its ‘sermon’ was
connected to the further creation of the rapid-
response capabilities (2005:31).
2.1 A recipe for the development of the EU
rapid-response capabilities. The successful
outcome of the Operation Artemis, the first
autonomous EU military mission outside Europe, had
a major influence on the crystallisation of the EU
rapid-response concept. Launched in June 2003 as a
bridging operation for the United Nations Mission in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC),
Operation Artemis achieved its objective of
stabilising security conditions in parts of the Ituri
region of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
This first EU success in terms of crisis
management operation underlined the EU’s high
efficiency to operate with a small force and
“provided EU policy-makers and planners with a
real-life template for future rapid response
deployments” (G. Lindstrom 2007:10).
Subsequently, Operation Artemis became a
“reference model for the development of a BG

THE (DIS-/)INTEGRATION OF THE EU’S RAPID RESPONSE CAPABILITIES …
243
sized rapid response capability” (R. Hamelink
2005:8), affecting in several ways the formation of
the EU BGs.
Firstly, Operation Artemis influenced the
force structure of the EU BGs. In fact, the usage of
small scale units of approximately 1500 soldiers
proved to be efficient in the Democratic Republic
of Congo and EU found it as ideal in the context of
limited resources provided by its member states
towards a military operation under common
framework. Secondly, the mission spectrum of the
EU BGs was shaped according to the above-
mentioned operation. For instance, as J.Y. Haine
remarked, both of them were purposed for Africa –
at least, initially in the case of the EU BGs
(2004:21). Thirdly, the objective of Operation
Artemis was to stabilize the situation until
sufficient military forces were on hand to settle it;
this aspect of force’s sustainability was included
initially in the BG concept (M. Hatzigeorgopoulos,
2012:2). Fourthly, as G. Linsdstrom noticed, the
EU BG concept incorporated the rapid response
nature of the 2003 operation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (2007:11).
Overall, as J. Kaitera and G. Ben-Ari put it,
without the positive experience of Operation
Artemis, it is questionable whether the political
process for accepting and shaping the battlegroup
concept would have been as smooth and swift as it
has been (2008:2).
2.2 The enactment of the EU BGs and the
‘fratricide’. The EU BGS came into being
officially on 10 February 2004 when The
Battlegroup concept food for thought paper was
released by France, Germany and the United
Kingdom. This document envisaged the defining
features of the EU BGs by containing proposals
regarding its mission spectrum, deployability,
sustainability and command and control (Institute
for Security Studies, 2005:10-16). The final version
of the EU BG concept was agreed in Brussels on 14
June 2004 by the EU Military Committee and in
November same year the first thirteen EU BGs were
formed. The EU BGs reached Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) in January 2005 as one EU BG
was on stand-by for a period of six months before it
was replaced. Subsequently, the EU BGs reached
Full Operational Capacity (FOC) in January 2007 as
EU had the theoretical capacity to undertake two
concurrent single BG-size rapid response operations
and to launch them nearly simultaneously.
The EU BGs capability was also introduced in
the Headline Goal 2010 as ‘a key element’
(Council of the European Union, 2004:3). Initially,
EU assumed a dual capacity in terms of rapid
response comprising ERRF for ‘high-intensity’
operations and EU BGs for ‘low-intensity’ ones in
what L. Cladi and A. Locatelli called “a long
march to catch up with Washington” (2012:275).
However, the EU policy-makers understood that a
common European strategic culture was still
underway and large military projects such as the
ERRF conducted ab initio would have constituted
a chimera. As a consequence, the EU member
states stopped the formation of the ERFF and its
area of competence was meant to be fulfilled by
the EU BGs. Indeed, this decision was favoured by
the rising popularity of the EU BG concept among
the EU member states which perceived it as
requiring the minimum concession towards a
deeper military integration, meanwhile
representing an ideal safe haven for advancing
domestic priorities on the common European
agenda of security and defence. Overall, as R.
Gowan remarked, “rapid reaction, and the
battlegroups in particular, are no substitute for a
strategy” (2005:14); however, the pretext of a
possible integration of the national armies under a
common European framework was the most
plausible excuse of the pragmatic EU member
states for justifying the defence expenditures on
their national armies.
3. THE FEASIBILITY OF THE EU BG
CONCEPT
For a better understanding of the feasibility of
the EU BG, it is important to proceed to an
analysis of the concept by firstly illustrating its
main features; secondly, indicating its subsidiary
roles; thirdly, revealing the strategic and
operational challenges; and not ultimately,
highlighting its prospects.
3.1 Main features. The EU BG concept is
defined in the EU’s partial declassified document
EU Battlegroup Concept as:
the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly
deployable, coherent force package capable of
stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of
larger operations. It is based on a combined-arms,
battalion-sized force, reinforced with combat-
support and combat service-support elements (…)
In their generic composition, but depending on the
mission, Battlegroups are about 1,500 personnel
strong (Council of the European Union, 2012b).
In addition, the EU BGs need to be
“associated with a deployable force headquarters

Adrian-Vasile POPA, Gheorghe-Teodoru ŞTEFAN
244
and pre-identified operational and strategic
enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics”
(Council of the European Union, 2012b).
In terms of decision-making, the ambition is
that the European Council should be able to take
the decision to launch an operation within 5 days
and that forces start implementing their mission on
the ground no later than 10 days after that decision.
This requires that EU BGs are to be built on assets
and capabilities held at a readiness of 5-10 days
(Council of the European Union, 2012b).
Concerning their duration of deployment, EU BGs
are on standby for a six-month period, or multiples
of it, and should be initially sustainable for 30
days, extendable to 120 days if resupplied
appropriately (Council of the European Union,
2012b; Council of the European Union, 2013b:2).
The EU BGs need to be based “on the principle
of multinationality and could be formed by a
framework nation or by a multinational coalition of
Member States” (Council of the European Union,
2012b). Even though the EU BG concept allows
for national BGs as well, it is rather considered to
be an exception or an emergency solution. Indeed,
as of now, the EU BG roster was fulfilled to a high
extent by all EU member states - excepting
Denmark and Malta - and invited non-EU states
(for more details regarding EU BGs and
commitments, see for 2005-2012 European Union
Military Staff, June 2012; for 2013-2018 Council
of the European Union, 2013a; for 2019-2024
Council of the European Union, 2018b:2).
In addition, the EU BGs are expected to be
employed in the mission spectrum of Article 17(2)
of the Treaty of European Union - known as the
Petersberg tasks (Council of the European Union
2004:4). Indeed, the EU BGs can be used under
three specific situations: in bridging operations (in
support of troops already in the ground such in the
Artemis case), in initial entry rapid-response
operations (in advance of a larger follow-on force)
or in stand-alone operations (in limited scale crisis
that require rapid response) (G. Lindstrom
2007:19). Clearly, these situations are not
comprehensive or mutually exclusive as a potential
EU BG mission may have its own unique features
that are hard to be incorporated solely under one or
another category.
Taking aside these conditions of employment,
where should EU BGs operate? The theatre of
operations for the EU BGs is frequently referred to
a deployment radius of 6,000 kilometers. However,
as shown by L. Chappell, the planning assumption
of 6,000 km from Brussels is still an important-but
not exhaustive- guidance (2009:427). It is worth
mentioning though that the operational planning
process of this rapid response capability can be
hardly forecast as no EU BG has been deployed
until now.
The headquarters are also important
stakeholders in the operational planning process
due to their role as primary structures that form the
EU’s generic command and control (C2). In
general terms, a EU military action has to be led by
a Force Headquarter (FHQ) at the operational level
and a Component Headquarter(CCHQ) at the
tactical level; both under the supervision of an
Operational Headquarter (OHQ) at the strategic
level. However, in the case of the EU BG only the
FHQ and OHQ are compulsory, meanwhile the
emergence of a CCHQ depends on the decision of
the framework nation. To date, six countries
(France, UK, Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece)
have made available their national OHQ for EU
military missions. EU can also use NATO’s OHQ
under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements or the EU
Operations Centre – both located in Belgium – as a
substitute for a national OHQ (see Council of the
European Union, 2012a:1). Concerning the FHQ,
the contributing nations has to provide it as a
prerequisite for the formation of a EU BG.
In terms of EU BGs’ performance, EU developed
a system of validation that comprises: standards and
criteria, common training and certification. However,
this system of validation should be perceived as a
general guide because the EU places the
responsibility of delivering efficient forces on the
contributing countries meanwhile the responsibility
‘as a whole’ belongs to the leading nations (see
Council of the European Union, 2012b).
The whole process of forming a EU BG and its
possible deployment involves a high-stake burden.
In fact, how is the EU BG system financed? In
terms of financing, the EU BGs are not distinctive
from other CSDP military operations. Under this
framework, two categories of costs can be
determined: common costs and individual costs.
Common costs - including incremental costs
associated with operational headquarters, local
administration, transportation within the OHQ area
and lodging infrastructure - are covered by the
Athena mechanism which is formed by member
states’ contributions according to their gross
national income. In the meantime, individual costs –
including transporting troops from participating
countries to the theatre of operations as well as other
costs related to the formation of the EU BGs and
placing them on standby - are the responsibility of
the contributing nations according to the principle of
‘costs lie where they fall’. G. Lindstrom summarizes

THE (DIS-/)INTEGRATION OF THE EU’S RAPID RESPONSE CAPABILITIES …
245
very well the financial dimension of the EU BGs:
“the more personnel and equipment a participating
country contributes, the higher its expected
contributions costs to be” (2007: 25-26).
3.2 Subsidiary roles. Apart from offering EU a
specific tool in the range of rapid response
capabilities - as discussed above - the EU BG concept
was planned to assume other interrelated roles.
For instance, the EU BG concept was designed
as a driver for the national armed forces of the EU
member states in terms of capability development,
interoperability and rapid long-range deployments
(see EU Council Secretariat, 2007:3). In addition,
taking into account their wide-ranging scope and
‘low-intensity’ mission spectrum, the EU BGs
attracted for the first time the engagement of neutral
EU member states in collective ‘hard power’
endeavors. So far Austria, Finland, Sweden and
Ireland contributed to the formation of EU BGs.
Furthermore, taking into account that the EU
member states are allowed to invite non-EU
countries to participate in EU BGs as long as “this
will be done without prejudice to the rights of any
member state” (Council of the European Union,
2012b), some non-EU states have also contributed
to the formation of EU BGs – i.e. Turkey, Ukraine,
Norway, Serbia and North Macedonia; meanwhile
Albania has also committed to join an EU BG in
the second semester of 2024.
As a consequence, the EU BGs have the
potential to represent at European level a ‘forum’
for the expression of the strategic interests of the
EU member states independent of NATO;
meanwhile at global level, the EU BG concept
could represent a ‘strategic identity card’ for
Europe by reinforcing its military identity in a
concrete manner.
3.3 Strategic challenges. This section attempts
to indicate the strategic challenges posed to the EU
BG concept by its inter-organizational relations
with the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the
United Nations (UN).
Firstly, when analyzing the relation of the EU
BG with the NRF, there is always the dilemma
between their duplication and complementarity. On
the one hand, there are critical voices that sustain
that the EU BGs duplicate the efforts of
contributing nations towards the NRF. In this
sense, Y. Reykers indicates that
when one simultaneously puts troops on
Battlegroup standby and NATO standby, questions
of prioritization seem inevitable. Considerations on
financial and political costs of deployment, as well
as evaluations of which mechanism best reflects
one’s political and economic interests then become
increasingly decisive, inherently creating
competition (2017:10).
On the other hand, there are some voices that
highlight the complementarity of the EU BGs with
the NRF. For example, A. Mathewson gave the
example of Swedish input to the Nordic BG:
It has entered into arrangements [within the Nordic
BG] to provide strategic lift. This is capability
which did not exist before the Battlegroup existed.
This is an example of a formerly neutral country
with previously a focus on territorial defence
generating capacity which is usable for the sort of
expeditionary operations that both NATO and the
EU want to undertake (The Defence Committee of
the House of Commons 2008:77).
Taking aside these opinions, the EU and NATO
have agreed to coordinate development plans to
avoid duplication and redundancies. The most
known mechanism is the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement
meanwhile the most visible are the joint exercises.
Are these arrangements enough? Certainly not as
the identity crisis between these two military
capabilities is still seeking a resolution.
Secondly, as the EU BG concept was designed
as an ultimate mean of cooperation between EU
and UN, an analysis of the evolution of UN
prerogatives over the former is very relevant in
emphasizing the strategic disconnect of the EU
BGs. Recalling the The Battlegroup concept, it is
worth mentioning that the EU BGs were designed
to be employed in crisis management operations in
response to a request by the UN and under a UN
mandate (Institute for Security Studies 2005:10-
16); however, EU stated subsequently that the BGs
would remain under its political control and
strategic direction (Council of the European Union,
2005). In fact, EU signalled the potential
disconnect at the end of 2005 when UN requested
EU BGs in support of the Congolese elections of
2006. EU refused to deploy them and preferred to
support UN through an ad-hoc force formed by the
EU member states. Finally, in a note of the Policy
Department of the European Parliament of
September 2006, it is admitted that the EU BGs
can undertake missions “under, but not
exclusively, a UN mandate” (in G. Quille 2006:5).
Therefore, the EU reasserted its autonomy in the
decision-making of deploying EU BGs and as a
consequence, this rapid-response capability could
not be considered anymore at the UN’s exclusive
disposal. Finally, everything culminated in 2008

Adrian-Vasile POPA, Gheorghe-Teodoru ŞTEFAN
246
when UN requested military support for the
MONUC UN mission (DR Congo) with a bridging
operation. Despite the mission offered ‘ideal
conditions’ - similar to Operation Artemis -, EU
refused the deployment of its BGs (for a more
specific analysis of the reasons behind this
decision of non-deployment in DR Congo, see
L.M. Balossi-Restelli, 2011). In addition,
subsequent calls of UN or its members of the
Security Council to deploy EU BGs in Libya
(2011), Mali (2013) or Central African Republic
(2013) were further neglected by the European
Council – it is worth mentioning though that some
authors argue that the non-deployment of the EU
BGs should not be explainable only from the
perspective of the decision-making within the EU,
but rather from that of those taking the initiative to
tackle the above-mentioned crisis (for details
regarding the “demand-side” of the EU BGs
deployment-debate in Libya, Mali and Central
African Republic, see Y. Reykers, 2016:346-365).
As a consequence, it is important to highlight
the repercussions of this strategic disconnect on the
feasibility of the EU BGs. R. Gowan argued that
“ultimately, the battlegroup system’s flaws have
retarded EU-UN cooperation in crisis management
by diverting both institutions’ hopes an energies
into a mechanism that consistently fails to deliver
troops” (2009:58). In addition, the commitment of
the EU member states to contribute to the
formation of the EU BGs without a clear
perspective over the connection between this EU
military capability and UN provoked massive
internal debates in certain countries (see G.
Lindstrom 2007:52; L. Chappell, 2009:426-427).
Adding insult to injury, the possible employment
of the EU BGs in a Kosovo scenario - in other
words, without UNSCR - would definitely not only
blow up this EU military capability, but also would
impact severely the EU’s international reputation
as a security provider. Thus, the EU sermon stating
that the EU BGs are designed ‘specifically, but not
exclusively’ to be used in response to a request
from UN requires an immediate resolution.
Overall, the EU BG system is required to clarify
its role in the international framework. If relating to
the NRF the EU BG concept should solve
immediately the identity crisis, in the UN case it has
two options: either drawing a clear separation or
making sure that the EU-UN cooperation works as
well on ground as it does on paper.
3.4 Operational challenges. Firstly, the EU
BGs’ capacity of deployment poses some practical
challenges that not ultimately affect their
feasibility. EU BGs should be based on rapid
response and as a consequence, the challenge relies
on the ability of the military planners to mobilise
sufficient transport capacity at short notice. The
strategic transport of the EU BGs is based on a
combination of airlift and sealift: most of the
equipment is planned to be transported by sea
meanwhile the initial presence in the theatre of
operations should be assured by airlift.
Occasionally, some military analysts highlighted
the fragility of EU’s strategic transport (see G.
Lindstrom, 2007; C. Major and C. Molling, 2011;
Y. Efstathiou, 2019). Indeed, EU’s limited access
to strategic airlift coupled with the limited utility of
the strategic sealift - even though is more
accessible compared to the airlift, it is slow and
lacks applicability in case of landlocked operations
- place a doubt on the EU’s capacity of strategic
transport. As a consequence, the EU member states
have sought solutions to the deployment challenge
– i.e. pooling, joint acquisitions and leasing.
Pooling sources in the case of strategic airlift
could have been the best solution; however the
progress is slow due the lack of consensus over
assuming the burden. To date, one initiative seems
to offer good prospects though for the EU BGs’
capacity of deployment: the planned acquisition of
170 Airbus A400M Atlas by seven countries
contributing to the EU BGs (Belgium, Britain,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and
Turkey). As of 27th February 2019, 61 Airbus
A400M were delivered and entered in operation
meanwhile the rest are expected to be delivered in
the next decade (Airbus, 2019:1); however, as UK
is scheduled to leave EU this year, Brussels will
see its heavy transport aircraft total reduce by
around a third (Y. Efstathiou, 2019).
Joint acquisitions can also constitute a solution.
Indeed, the EU BGs could be provided since 2009
with access to strategic airlift through the Strategic
Airlift Capability (SAC). This is a multinational
initiative transcending NATO and EU that
provides its participating nations - excepting US,
the remaining 11 SAC members are also
contributing states to EU BGs - assured access to
military airlift capability though three common-
procured Boeing C-17 based at the Hungarian
Defence Forces Pápa Air Base. Even though SAC
has a limited capacity due to the reduced number
of aircraft available, its successful history (see
Strategic Airlift Capability, 2018) calls for
replication at a larger scale.
Leasing could be the ultimate solution. Indeed,
it was shaped through initiatives such as Strategic
Air Life Interim Solutions (SALIS) – that have

THE (DIS-/)INTEGRATION OF THE EU’S RAPID RESPONSE CAPABILITIES …
247
provided since 2004 the EU BGs with a potential
access to six Antonov (An) 124 through a joint
EU/NATO leasing agreement of 10 participating
states with a consortium formed by Russia-based
freighter aircraft group Volga-Dnepr and
Ukrainian-based Antonov Airlines. As revealed in
recent news, the former announced at the end of
December 2018 that it quits the contract
meanwhile the latter even though announcing at
the beginning of January 2019 a contract extension
with SALIS up until end of December 2021, it
supplies under the new terms only two An-124 and
as a consequence it is not clear how or from where
the resulting shortfall will be made-up (G.
Jennings, 2019).
Overall, the capacity of deployment seems to
be a long-term challenge for the EU BGs unless
EU member states reach a consensus over common
acquisition and fair share of burden. Indeed, as
proposed by the leader of the German party CDU,
the next step could be to start on the symbolic
project of building a common European aircraft
carrier (A. Kramp-Karrenbauer, 2019).
Secondly, as illustrated in the case of the
strategic transport capabilities, an important
deterrent is the cost of deployment because most of
the burden for the formation and the potential
deployment of the EU BGs is supported by the
contributing nations. A direct repercussion is
highlighted by C. Major and C. Molling:
since the member states contributing to a
battlegroup bear the bulk of the burden when an
operation takes place, they tend to favour
Battlegroup deployments in principle but not the
deployments of their own unit” (2011:22).
Therefore, even though one of the primary
roles of the EU BGs was to act as an incentive for
the transformation of the member states’ defence,
it seems that the financing system of this rapid-
response capability is still blocking this attempt.
However, as it will be further discussed, the
Athena mechanism is currently under revision and
the lack of deployment can be paradoxically a
window of opportunity.
Thirdly, there are certain EU BGs’ features
associated with the requirements of rapid-response
that can act as a double-edged sword. Indeed, the
size and the timeframe of the EU BGs can
represent a major operational deficit. For instance,
if acting in support of a bridging operation, the
vicissitudes of this type of mission can require a
wider timeframe or larger size of troops and so far
there is no consensus on how it would be dealt
with such a situation. This issue resides in the lack
of clarification on the need for a strategic reserve
or follow-on force and their usage (see G.
Lindstrom 2007:54; F. Kappen et. al., 2015:5).
Fourthly, another important operational deficit
of the EU BFs resides in the process of
certification which presents some clear drawbacks.
For instance, the autonomy of the contributing
nations in certifying their own forces within the
EU BGs can affect the interoperability and the
effectiveness of the force package. In addition, the
methodology of checking whether the standards
applied to a certain EU BG are in concordance
with the EU criteria is not defined and as a
consequence, this process is a pure exercise of
subjectivity. Not ultimately, another potential
drawback can be as well the optional character of
the EU-led exercises. As a consequence, the
certification process needs definitely a
revitalisation. Even though the EUMC agreed last
year a Revised EU Battlegroup Preparation Guide
(see Council of the European Union, 2018a), EU
has not delivered so far the widely-expected
centralised certification process figuring the
European Defence Agency as an independent
authority. This target would offer objectivity to the
certification process and it would eliminate the
potential doubts over the quality of the force
package. However, this is a matter of how far the
EU member states are willing to cooperate in terms
of military projects and as a consequence, reaching
this target can be only plausible in the near future.
Fifthly, the decision-making process can be in
some circumstances an operational deficit. For
example, balancing EU’s institutionalized
bureaucracy with the requirement of having an EU
BG on the ground within ten days after the
decision to launch an operation might represent an
operational challenge than can be addressed only
through exercises simulating the planning process
and accelerated decision-making. In addition, the
relationship between the domestic decision-making
procedures of the contributing nations and its
impact on deployment timeframe can be as well
very demanding. For instance, some countries need
an on-time informing of the decision-makers as
any military deployment must be authorized in
advance by the Parliament (e.g. Germany),
meanwhile other countries do not put a high stake
on informing as the deployment is decided by the
president (e.g. France). Even in the case of the
latter, it is a current trend that emphasizes the
requirement of public consultations in case of
deployment (see Y Reykers, 2017:8-9). However,
some EU member states depending upon a prior

Adrian-Vasile POPA, Gheorghe-Teodoru ŞTEFAN
248
parliamentarian approval such as Lithuania have
already harmonized the national decision-making
procedures with the rapid-response necessity of the
EU BGs (see The Seimas of the Republic of
Lithuania, 2018). Overall, the rapid decision-
making is certainly a major danger; however, the
progress achieved so far and the good prospects
revealed both at EU level and at national level
reveal that this challenge is the most approachable.
Finally, a crucial deterrent for the deployment
debate and not ultimately for the feasibility of the
EU BGs is the lack of credibility. Despite being
envisaged as the cornerstone of European
‘expertise’ in terms of crises management
operations, taking into account that no EU BGs
have been used so far, one could easily argue that
the EU BGs are nothing else than ‘paper armies’.
The price is very high if they are not used in the
near future because the interest of the member states
in maintaining and further developing the concept
could greatly diminish – indeed, a ‘rarefied’ EU BG
roster is to be expected for the period 2019-2024
(see Council of the European Union, 2018b:2). In
addition, the pressure of taxpayers on the reduction
of military spending can be more and more visible
and, as a consequence, it can have a detrimental
impact on the EU BGs, especially due to their lack
of records linked to deployment. Therefore, all these
challenges discussed above are not only important
stakeholders in the deployment debate, but also can
affect to a high extent the prospects of the EU BGs.
3.5 The way forward - shape it or lose it. The
Treaty of Lisbon attempted to offer an impetus to
the development of the EU BGs. Being the first EU
official document stipulating the Union’s role in
maintaining peace (2009, Art. 42.1) and assuming
the missions stipulated in the ESS of 2003 (2009,
Art. 43.1), the Treaty of Lisbon reiterated EU’s
ambition to become a global actor (2009, Art.
21.1). However, it could not fully-act in the benefit
of the EU BGs as it could not resolve the
deliberately preserved - but often not declared –
dilemma of the EU member states: national
sovereignty vs. EU collective defense and military
decision-making.
The newest EU Global Strategy (EUGS),
launched on 28th June 2016 by the current EU HR
Federica Mogherini, highlights not only EU’s
civilian role, but also for the first time its military
one (High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, 2016:4). It also
proposes the development of EU's rapid-response
capability by resolving the EU BG's emerging
obstacles in terms of decision-making, funding and
political will (High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016:47).
However, as M. Drent and D. Zandee warned, “the
Global Strategy process should not remain limited
to a paper exercise, but should be the catalyst for
much needed delivery” (2016:78). Indeed, a
window of opportunity arises as the Brexit may
have removed some obstacles towards a deeper EU
military integration. The effects of the EUGS on
the EU BGs seem to be so far positive as long as it
has already delivered some initiatives aimed to
tackle their above-mentioned obstacles – i.e. the
establishment of the Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence
Fund, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
(CARD) and the Military Planning and Conduct
Capability. In addition, EUGS created the premises
for the EU member states’ approval of increased
and more diversified ‘common costs’ in support of
the EU BGs – including those associated with
deployment – under the on-going negotiations on
the revision of the Athena mechanism (see Council
of the European Union, 2017; Council of the
European Union, 2018c). Indeed, according to a
recent recommendation of the EU Parliament, the
Athena mechanism might be incorporated into a
newly-established European Peace Facility (see
European Parliament, 2019) that is expected to
expand significantly the ‘common costs’, from 10
to 15 per cent of total costs at present to a
maximum of 45 per cent of costs (UK Parliament,
12 September 2018).
Overall, a successful outcome for the feasibility
of the EU BGs is going to be determined in the near
future by the ability of the EU member states to
address the strategic and operational challenges that
this concept is facing. Otherwise, as M. Gahler put
it, “at some point you have to wonder whether
another way to do this is not better” (in C.
Hasselbach, 1st of June 2013). As a consequence,
the current post-Brexit context calls for the EU
policy-makers to take a clear decision on the fate of
the EU BG concept: shape it or lose it!
4. CONCLUSIONS
The post-Cold War context was clearly hostile
to Europe as the newly-emerged global challenges
threatened its integrity meanwhile NATO’s
security umbrella could not be considered anymore
a guarantee. Finding a balance between the
necessity of cooperation and the ambition of
advancing domestic priorities on the common
European agenda was certainly a difficult task for
the EU member states. Hidden under the mask of a

THE (DIS-/)INTEGRATION OF THE EU’S RAPID RESPONSE CAPABILITIES …
249
chimeric European strategic culture and
encouraged by the Operation Artemis’ positive
result, the development of the EU’s rapid response
capabilities in general and the EU BGs in
particular were chosen as the best answer to this
strategic demand. Despite the EU BG system being
considered the cornerstone of European ‘expertise’
in terms of crises management operations, it has
proved so far to be a disillusion.
Firstly, various strategic challenges emerged
when the EU member states attempted to gain
legitimacy by placing the EU BGs in the
international frame on the basis of ‘effective
multilateralism’. This subterfuge was divulged by
the evolution of the EU BGs’ relationship with
NATO and UN. Indeed, the potential duplication
between the EU BGs and the NRF revealed that
their relationship is so far a ‘marriage of
convenience’ rather than a beneficial construction.
This is the case as well of the EU BGs’ connection
with UN which proved to be not only a
compromise, but also a potential deterrent for an
effective provision of international security.
Secondly, despite the EU BGs were designed as
panacea for EU’s several capability gaps, their
assignment with low potential features revealed many
operational challenges. Indeed, M. Kerttunen et. al.
illustrated very well this fiasco: “what does it tell
about the political ambitions and the military reach of
this economic giant of ours if we are deploying
expeditionary forces here and there for minor duties
and for a relatively short period of time?” (2005:48).
As a consequence, unless these strategic and
operational challenges are addressed in a coherent
manner, the future of the EU BGs will be dim, if
not dismal. As one EU official explained it, the EU
BG system is like “having a fantastic Ferrari in the
garage. It is there but you just don’t know how to
drive it” (in H. Hardt 2009:400). In this sense, the
post-Brexit context might be a window of
opportunity for the EU policy-makers to show they
know how to ‘drive’ it. However, taking into
account the well-known pragmatism of the EU
member states, it would be reasonable to say that
EU BGs have a minimal chance of survival.
Indeed, it is rather probable that the EU BGs will
have the same fate as the ERRF: a Potemkin
village for virtual units.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Airbus (February, 2019). Orders, Deliveries, In
Operation Military aircraft by Country –
Worldwide. Airbus - official website. [online].
URL: https://www.airbus.com/content/dam/
corporate-topics/publications/o&d/2019-
2%20_MRS_GEN_Ord-Deliv-by-country.pdf
[accessed 6 March 2019].
2. Balossi-Restelli, L. M. (2011). Fit for what?
Towards explaining Battlegroup inaction.
European Security, Vol. 20(2). 155-218.
3. Ben-Ari, G. & Kaitera, J. (2008). EU
Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force:
A Marriage of Convenience? EuroFocus, Vol.
14(1). 1-12.
4. Biscop, S. (2005). European Military
Integration: Beyond the Headline Goal. In
Biscop, S. (ed), E pluribus unum? Military
Integration in the European Union, Report
from the expert seminar of Egmont Institute,
Brussels, 28 February. 29-37.
5. Chappell, L. (2009). Differing member state
approaches to the development of the EU
Battlegroup Concept: implications for CSDP.
European Security. Vol. 18(4). 417-439.
6. Cladi, L. & Locatelli, A. (2012).
Bandwagoning, not balancing: why Europe
confounds realism. Contemporary Security
Policy. Vol. 33(2). 264-288.
7. Council of the European Union (2003).
European Security Strategy: A secure Europe
in a better world. Brussels, 12 December 2003.
8. Council of the European Union (2004).
Declaration on European Military
Capabilities, Military Capability Commitment
Conference. Brussels, 22 November.
9. Council of the European Union (2005). EU/UN
Relations in military crisis management –
Elements on the Battlegroups, Council
document 5660/1/05 Brussels, 27 January.
10. Council of the European Union (2012a).
Factsheet – The activation of the EU
Operations Centre, Brussels, 22 May.
11. Council of the European Union (2012b). EU
Battlegroup Concept, Council document
13618/1/06, Brussels, 11 December.
12. Council of the European Union (2013a).
EUMC Report to PSC on the Outcome of
BGCC 1/13, Council document 8368/13,
Brussels, 15 April, p. 2-4.
13. Council of the European Union (2013b). Press
Release 3236th Council meeting - Foreign
Affairs, Luxembourg, 22-23 April.
14. Council of the European Union (2017).
European Council conclusions on security and
defence, Brussels, 22 June.
15. Council of the European Union (2018a).
Revised EU Battlegroup Preparation Guide,
Brussels, 14 March.

Adrian-Vasile POPA, Gheorghe-Teodoru ŞTEFAN
250
16. Council of the European Union (2018b).
EUMC Report to PSC on the Outcome of
BGCC 2/18, Brussels, 14 November.
17. Council of the European Union (2018c).
Outcome of the Council meeting - 3662nd
Council meeting- Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 10
December.
18. Council on Foreign Relations (February,
2010). Gates’ Speech on the NATO Strategic
Concept. Council on Foreign Relations
[online]. URL: http://www.cfr.org/nato/gates-
speech-nato-strategic-concept-february-
2010/p21518 (accessed 5 March 2019).
19. Drent, M. & Zandee, D. (2016). European
defence: from strategy to delivery. Global
Affairs. Vol. 2(1). 69-78.
20. Efstathiou, Y. (January, 2019). European
strategic airlift: a work in progress.
International Institute for Strategic Studies.
[online]. URL: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/
military-balance/2019/01/european-strategic-
airlift [accessed 6 March 2019].
21. EU Council Secretariat (2007). Factsheet- EU
Battlegroups. Brussels. February.
22. European Parliament. (March, 2019). Decision
establishing a European Peace Facility.
European Parliament – official website.
[online]. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-
2019-0330&language=EN&ring=A8-2019-
0157 [accessed 28 March 2019].
23. European Union Military Staff (June, 2012). In
Hatzigeorgopoulos, M. CSDP Note 2.
International Security Information Service
Europe [online]. URL: http://isiseurope.eu/
sites/default/files/publications-downloads/
CSDP%20Note%202%20EUBattlegroups_M
H.pdf [accessed 5 March 2019].
24. Gowan, R. (2005). The Battlegroups: A
Concept in Search of a Strategy? In Biscop, S.
(ed), E pluribus unum? Military Integration in
the European Union, Report from the expert
seminar of Egmont Institute, Brussels, 28
February. 13-19.
25. Gowan, R. (2009). The case of the missing
battlegroups: is EU-UN military cooperation in
decline? The Brussels Journal of International
Relations. Vol.62(3).53-61.
26. Haine, J. Y. (2004). “Venus without Mars:
challenge ahead for ESDP” in Biscop, S. (ed),
Audit of European Strategy, Report from the
expert seminar of Egmont Institute, Brussels,
30 June 2004, pp. 18-26.
27. Hamelink, R. (2005). The battlegroups
concept: Giving the EU a concrete ‘military’
face. Eurofuture. Winter. 8-11.
28. Hardt, H. (2009). Rapid response or evasive
action? Regional organization responses to
peace operation demands. European Security.
Vol. 18(4). 383-41.
29. Hasselbach, C. (June, 2013). Debate surrounds
future of EU battle groups. Deutsche Welle.
[online]. URL: http://www.dw.de/debate-
surrounds-future-of-eu-battle-groups/a-
16852649 [accessed 5 March 2019].
30. Hatzigeorgopoulos, M. (2012). The role of EU
battlegroups in European Defence. European
Security Review. No.56. 1-11
31. High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy. (June, 2016).
Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger
Europe - A Global Strategy for the European
Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.
European External Action Service - official
website [online]. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/
archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_we
b.pdf [accessed 5 March 2019].
32. Institute for Security Studies (2005). EU
security and defence- core documents 2004,
Paris: The European Union Institute for
Security Studies.
33. Jennings, G. (January, 2019). NATO extends
Antonov’s SALIS contract. Jane’s 260.
[online]. URL: https://www.janes.com/article/
85557/nato-extends-antonov-s-salis-contract
(accessed 9 March 2019).
34. Kappen, F. et al. (2015). How to use EU
Battlegroups - suggesting solutions within the
existing legal framework. Executive summary,
Netherlands, 6 March.
35. Kerttunen, M. et al. (2005). EU Battlegroups:
Theory and Development in the Light of
Finnish-Swedish Co-operation, Helsinki:
National Defence College.
36. Keulman, K. (2006). European Security and
Defense Policy: The EU’s search for a
strategic role. In Adamski, J. (ed), Old Europe,
New Security: evolution for a complex world.
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. 43-56.
37. Kramp-Karrenbauer, A. (March, 2019).
Getting Europe right. CDU - official website.
[online]. URL: https://www.cdu.de/artikel/
getting-europe-right (accessed 9 March 2019).
38. Lindstrom, G. (2007). Enter the EU
battlegroups, Paris: The European Union
Institute for Security Studies.

THE (DIS-/)INTEGRATION OF THE EU’S RAPID RESPONSE CAPABILITIES …
251
39. Major, C. & Molling, C. (2011). EU
battlegroups: what contribution to European
defence? SWP Research paper, No. 8.
40. Missiroli, A. (2003). From Copenhagen to
Brussels. European defence: core documents,
Paris: The European Union Institute for
Security Studies.
41. Quille, G. (2006). Note: The EU Battlegroups,
Brussels: The Policy Department of the
European Parliament.
42. Reykers, Y. (2016). No supply without
demand: explaining the absence of the EU
Battlegroups in Libya, Mali and the Central
African Republic. European Security. Vol.
25(3). 346-365.
43. Reykers, Y. (2017). EU Battlegroups: High
costs, no benefits. Contemporary Security
Policy. 1-14.
44. Rutten, M. (2001). From St.-Malo to Nice.
European defence: core documents. Paris: The
European Union Institute for Security Studies.
45. Schmitt, B. (2004). European capabilities- how
many divisions? In Gnesotto, N. (ed), EU
Security and Defence Policy: the first five
years (1999-2004). Paris: The European Union
Institute for Security Studies. 89-110.
46. Strategic Airlift Capability (2018). SAC
Milestones 2006 -2018. SAC’s - official
website. [online]. URL: https://www.
sacprogram.org/en/Pages/SAC-Milestones-
2006-.aspx [accessed 6 March 2019].
47. The Defence Committee of the House of
Commons (2008). Ninth Report of Session
2007-2008 - The future of NATO and
European defence. London, The House of
Commons, 4 March.
48. The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania
(2018). Republic of Lithuania law on
international operations, military exercises
and other military co-operation events.
Vilnius, 27 June.
49. The Treaty of Lisbon (2009). The Lisbon
Treaty – the readable version, 3rd edition.
Foundation for EU Democracy. [online]. URL:
http://ro.euabc.com/upload/books/lisbon-
treaty-3edition.pdf [accessed 3 March 2019].
50. UK Parliament (September, 2018). European
Peace Facility. UK Parliament - official
website. [online]. URL: https://publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmeuleg/
301-xxxvii/30112.htm [accessed 6 March
2019].