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Difference between Problem solving and
Decision Making
Mustafa Fazli
Supervisor: Kaplar Matyas
Psychology BA Pecs
Cognitive Psychology
Contexts:
1. Abstract
2. Introduction
3. Literature Review
4. Hypothesis
5. Methodology
6. Problem Solving: What is problem solving?
7. What types of problem there?
8. How do people solve problems?
9. The two system
10. Decision Making
11. What is optimal decision making?
12. What is sub-optimal decision making?
13. How do people cope with problems and conflicts?
14. Conclusion
Abstract:
In the following paper I argue that problem-solving and decision-making are just different
features of the same multi-stage goal-oriented cognitive procedure. I prove my hypothesis by
comparing stage by stage both the decision-making and problem-solving advise pan and the
account etiquette. If indeed problem-solving and decision-making processes are homological,
scientist, studying the same process from different point of view, might be able to learn from
each other and their dialogue may be make easier through the common vocabulary proposed
in this paper.
Introduction:
The review of literature discloses that concurrent accounts of the relationship between
problems-solving (PS) and decision-making (DM) are opposed confusing. In this paper I
attempt to clarify the terms and to put them in order.
The thesis that I present in this paper is that PS and DM refers to the same process. I prove my
thesis by comparing these processes stage by stage.
Problem-solving is often about to be based upon application of an algorithm, while decision-
making is considered to be based upon experience and instinct. I argue that division between
“algorithmic” and “naturalistic” or experience-based thinking cannot work for as a basis of
difference between problem-solving and decision-making, as problems are often agreement
with haphazardly and decisions are often made methodically, and conversely. In fact,
algorithms for problem-solving and decision-making bear striking similarity Moreover, I
establish that “naturalistic” problem-solving and decision-making patterns, both productive
and unproductive, are similar.
The first chapter starts with the diverse definitions of the term “problem”, contain from the
different approaches. Then, the various types of categorization of the problem are presented.
Next, the term “solution” is investigated and a “proper” five-stage PS strategy is described,
phase by phase. The conditions under which the problem are being properly solved are
discussed further. As most problems are not properly solved by people, an account of the
different of the different ways in which they cope with unsolved problems is also provided.
Coping is described as a correspond to the stress that problems cause. A theory of two
cognitive systems - rational and experiential - is presented in brief. The difference between
the two systems explains what makes people solve problems properly or quickly, or not at all.
The second chapter starts with the investigation of the concepts of “decision conflicts” and
their relationship to problems. Next, an “optimal” five stage DM strategy is described and
compared to the “proper” PS strategy, stage by stage. Further “sub-optimal” DM patterns then
presented and correlated with coping mechanisms and the functioning of the experiential
cognitive system. Next, the circumstances and the conditions that are conductive for using the
rational, procedural system is discussed, including when it is better and when it is not. Finally,
the expert and beginner use the two cognitive systems are discussed.
Literature Review:
Regarding the question of the relationship between problem-solving (PS) and decision-
making (DM) no option has been remove from the current learned discussion. The full range
of answers - from “they are the same” to “they have nothing in common” - all have their
champions. Some claims that they overlap and argue about where the true division lies.
Others claims that one is part of another or the other way around. In numerous articles, PS and
DM related terms are replaceable (Sadier and Zeidler, 2005; Lee and Grace, 2012;
Papadouris, 2012).
Cenkseven-order and Colakkadiolugu (2013) present a survey different outlook on the
relationship between PS and DM which are still pertinent today. The authors note that some
researchers argue that problem-solving and decision-making processes share similarities; thus,
these ideas must be used together (Adair, 2010; Ivey et al., 1993; Churney, 2001). According
to another popular opinion, decision-making and problem-solving are entirely different
(Baron and Brown, 1991; Elstein and Schwartz, 2002; Isen, 2001). PS-oriented and DM-
oriented researchers perceive these concepts and their interrelation differently. In a succession
of works dedicated to social PS, D’Zurilla (D’Zurilla and Goldfried, 1971; D’Zurilla and
Chang, 1995; Nezu, D’Zurilla and Nezu, 2012) recognizes DM, or selecting the best solution
out of many, as one of the five stages of PS. The conflict theory of decision making (J anis
and Mann, 1977) sees systematic search for information, careful thought of all viable
alternatives and the unhurried, non-impulsive making of the final decision, in other words, PS,
as one of the five DM-patterns.
The task of categorizing the different conceptions of PS and DM is complicated by the
diversity of domains and contexts in which they appear. In different branches of science,
medicine, management, customer services, the classroom, and the social lives of adolescents,
different aspects of PS and DM are considered central and slight. For example, in medicine,
PS mention to the ability to formulate and test good hypotheses, while DM refers to the ability
to avoid prejudice (Elstein and Schwartz, 2012). In costumer services, PS is considered good
if it is inventive, diverse, and flexible in categorization, while quality DM is considered good
if it is fast, thorough, and well organized (Isen, 2001). In the social lives of adolescents, good
decisions are those that one would not regret upon reflection (Baron and Brown, 1991).
The situation is further complicated by researchers relying upon different mind-theories and
world-theories. For example, Adair (2010) believes that problems and decision situations are
separate and that decisions create problems. However, he also believes that the mental
framework used in PS and DM is similar.
Ohlsson (2012), while find fault with the classical approach to PS (Newel and Simon, 1972),
argues that PS involves five distinct cognitive actions to perceive the problematic situation,
retrieve relevant actions, conceptualize the top goal, activate and apply action selection
preferences, and gather a way to evaluate problem states. Theories of these five cognitive
functions might be forthcoming from psychological research on perception, memory,
intentionality, decision making, and judgement, in which case there is nothing specific to say
about them in the context of problem solving. If so, PS is not a proper field of study, and there
might not be a distinct theory of PS.
In other words, contemporary conceptualizations of both PS and DM are confusing and
opposed. In this paper I attempt clarify the terms and the quid-pro-quos.
Hypothesis:
Among the numerous theses regarding the relationship between PS and DM I support the
thesis that states these concepts refer to the same complex process, compound of discrete
stages, each stage demanding different cognitive operations. This process may be defined as
any goal-directed succession of cognitive operations. This definition does not differentiate
between a series of actions that one knows will achieve a goal and a sequence of actions one
understates when one does not immediately known how to reach the goal (Anderson, 1980,
quoted by Robertson, 2001).
According to Anderson (1990), PS is a general term used to cover deciding which action to
take. DM also appropriately mention to the same process, but this term emphasizes the
evaluation of alternatives, whereas research on PS has traditionally focused on the
combinatorial explosion of progression of action that occur in PS search.
Thus, the hypothesis that I try to defend is one among the others, it is not original or new. The
new element that I present in this paper is the systemic approach, considering different
approaches to the subject, and the argumentation supporting the hypothesis.
Methodology:
In the numerous items written on the subject, the authors’ approach to the conceptualization of
DM and PS. Including Anderson and others, is usually unquestioned by them. It is either
suggested or quoted from another source. In this paper I would like to investigate all the
possible conceptualizations of DM and PS, and present an argument in support of the
hypothesis state above.
I will rely on the methodology of conceptual analysis as well as process analysis. Both DM
and PS processes are thoroughly described and prescribed in professional literature. There is
no need for me to add a new etiquette or to suggest a new algorithm. I will only compare the
existing prescribed and the described DM and PS algorithms and procedure in different
contexts.
I will argue that both the prescribed and the described PS and DM processes are homological,
stage by stage. In other words, if to each stage of proper PS there is a corresponding optimal
DM stage and vice versa, we are prescribing about the same algorithm or master plan. We are
talking about the same synthetic algorithm or strategy for dealing with problems. If the
reasons why people do not solve problems properly and make sub-optimal decisions are the
same, if the errors or mistakes they make at each stages are the same, DM and PS processes
are the same.
Problem-solving is often considered to be based upon application of an algorithm, while
decision-making is considered to be based upon experience and instinct. I argue that the
division between “algorithmic” and naturalistic” or experience-based thinking cannot serve as
a basis of the distinction between problem-solving and decision-making, as problems are
often dealt with haphazardly and decisions are often made methodically, and vice versa. In
fact, algorithms for problem-solving and decision-making bear striking similarity and
“naturalistic” problem-solving and decision-making patterns, both productive and
unproductive, are similar.
Problem Solving:
What is a “problem”?
According to Anderson (1990), finding a rest room or getting two diet sodas are exemplary
problems. In footnote, Anderson writes that finding a rest room might not seem like much of a
problem, but in certain cases (details purposely omitted) it was.
A problem, in the wide sense, is a gap between the given situation and the desired one.
Bridging the gap is solving the given number (Laughlin, 2011; Censkseven-Onder &
Colakkadioglu, 2013). For example: “How much is two plus two?” Or “Who was the first
president of the United State?” Are problems, while “4” and “George Washington” are
solutions, in the broad sense, ad hoc. This definition is instinctive and simple, but it is not
accepted by all experts on the subjects. It controls from the classical definition of a problem as
the gap between the given and the desirable, which the individual does not immediately know
how to bridge (Newel and Simon, 1972). This definition has been accepted by different
scholars until this day (Beyth-Marom et al., 1989; Brest and Krieger, 2010; Shoenfled, 2013).
According to this view, the above questions are not problems - for those who knows the
answers.
This definition of a problem depends on the person solving it. However, it is important to note
that finding a solution to a problem does not or should not mean that the problem has come to
an end to be a problem. For example, a booklet in which I have solved all the problems does
not stop being a pamphlet with problems, either for me or for others. Therefore, we must
differentiate between a problem, in the wide sense, and a “real” problem, in relation to and
individual who does not know how to solve it immediately.
Dewey’s (1910) approach is very close to that of Schonfeld, with one notable difference. In
Dewey’s terms, a problem is “real” if it arises out of the real life of the one facing it, if it is
interesting, and if it is grounded in the social situation. Such problems can be called “real life”
problems. If this is indeed the case, a number of math problems may be real problems for a
student, but may not automatically represent problems in his life.
This is main source of confusion regarding the idea of a problem: if someone does not admit a
problem to be a problem, is it still a problem? Well, of course it is. A person may be in
conflict about having a problem or a problem might not really deal with him; in spite of that,
it is still a problem.
A problem in itself is timeless and often impersonal. Its “realness”, however, relates to the
subject facing it. It's “real-lifeness” refers to the subject within a specific time-frame. With a
real-life problem, it is a given that unless something changes, life will become worse at a
certain point in time. This will happen either because one will no longer be satisfied with the
persisting conditions, or because something is threatening to change these conditions for the
worse.
What types of problems are there?
In fact, there are many types of problems. According to Robertson (2001), a problem is
defined by the following four factors: they're given situations, the required state, the types of
actions that can be taken to resolve the problem, and the problem-solving restriction.
Problems can be type into category pairs: problems requiring great or little knowledge
(domain-specific or generic), well or ill-defined problems (closed or open) semantically rich
or poor problems (requiring familiarity with the type of problem or not), problems of instinct
or problems requiring the application of an algorithm (Robertson, 2001).
Laughlin (2011) defines a problem by its domain, complication, detail (well or ill-defined),
and relationship to other problems.
Each type of problems calls for different sets of skills, knowledge, and tactics to solve it. The
overall strategy for PS is the same for all types of problems. One of the stages of PS strategy,
though, is recognizing the type of problems once is facing. Ploya (1957), for example,
suggests a four-step strategy (understanding a problem, devising a plan, carrying out the plan,
looking back) and numerous tactics for solving mathematical problems.
Newel and Simon (1972) have attempted a huge challenge of formalizing both the strategy
and the tactics of PS at once. Their work proved to be extremely powerful; yet in the 1990s,
their approach stumbled upon difficulties as it became obvious that the cognitive processes
involved in PS are of a distinct and separate nature (Ohlsson, 2012). Research in cognitive
psychology, however, has helped classify and order these processes into a sequence of stages.
How do people solve problems?
Ps proper refers to the logical search for a solution through the application of PS skills and
techniques that are designed to maximize the probability of finding the “best” or most flexible
solution for a particular problem (D’Zurilla and Chang, 1995). D’Zurilla’s five-phase process
of successful social PS can serve as a model overall PS strategy. It differs from Ploya’s model
in one particular, but notable, step.
The first phase of PS, positioning, involves the formation of a set or an attitude to recognize
and accept problematic situations when they occur and too hinder the tendency to either
respond automatically or avoid the problem by doing by doing nothing. In other words, PS
starts with a particular mindset: one is adapt towards finding problems. One must first
displease with the situation in order to be resourceful and seek out problems. This is not a
natural attitude. PS id by no means a natural process; it just achieve better result than anything
else.
In the second phase, one must formulate the problem. In the first stage, the question was a
matter of identify a problem as a problem; in this phase, the question is recognizing the
problem type and its framework. In other words, one must recognize the given situation and
the desired outcome(s), as well as what kind of a problem one is dealing with: wether it is
domain-specific or general; open or closed, semantically rich or poor, and wether it is a
problem of insight or a problem requiring the application of an algorithm.
During the fourth phase, called the DM phase by D’Zurilla, one expect the possible results of
each alternative, the value and likelihood of these consequences occurring, and selects the
most sufficient alternatives. It is called the DM phase because it involves a rough estimation
according to one’s natural and experience. This is the least formal, “managerial” phase. Our
math teacher must now make a calculated guess as to which pedagogical tactics has the best
chance of banish the misapprehension or tightening the classes’ grasp of the subject matter.
This would be unnecessary if the teacher were to follow Ploya’s strategy.
The final phase, verification, involves trying out the chosen decision. The teacher must apply
his tactic and make sure that it works. Of course, if the attempt fails, one has to revert to the
previous phase: the teacher must reassess the remaining strategies available to him, pick the
one he thinks is the best, and give it a try. After several failed attempts, one might be forced to
either give up or revert back to previous phase - perhaps all the way to phase two, or even
phase one, if the problem is regard as unsolvable. The idea behind in the present strategy is
that the time invested is coming up with and weighing different tactics would be returned in
the form of the time saved, as the person using this strategy is likely to regress through stages
fewer times, compared to the one using Polya’s strategy of testing the first good plan that
comes to mind.
Among composite PS strategies inspired by both Ploya’s concepts and D’Zurilla’s scheme one
could count TIPS (Newton et al.., 2012) and DECIDE (Welch, 1999). Team-initiated PS
(TIPS) being with set up the readiness to solve problems. It then divides understand the
problem into two steps: understanding the conditions and understanding the reasons. The tram
is encouraged to hypostatize both the reason that lead to the problem and come up with
different possible solutions to the problem. The solutions are then discussed, and upon the
democratically selected solution, action plan is developed and implemented. TIPS turned the
PS process into a cycle by adding another step: examine and revision. As soon as one problem
is solved, environment is scanned for new problems, and the cycle continues as life goes on.
Data is collected through all the stages of the cycle.
DECIDE begins with three conceptualization stages: Define a problem, Examine the
environment, Create a goal statement. The next step, originate an involvement plan, includes
both brainstorming for multiple hypotheses and identifying an intervention, taking into
account the availability of resources. Further, the team delivers the action plan and then
evaluates it.
The Two Systems:
Many author (Epstein, 2003; Evans and Frankish, 2008; Kahneman, 2011; Evans and
Stanovich, 2013) suggest there are two separate systems operating within our minds: one is
logical and the other is experience-based.
In order to take full advantage of this paradigm, its wording must be further clarified. It
should be noted that the word “rational”, as used in the rational system, refers to a set of
systematic principles and has no consequence with respect to the reasonableness of one’s
behavior, which is an alternative meaning of the word. The experiential system in humans is
the same system by which non-human animals modify to their environments (Epstein, 2003).
These systems work in parallel and are two-way. One does not just solved problems while
completely disconnect from the emotions. Surveying the thinking patterns of adolescents
solving socioscientific problems, Sadler and Zeidler (2005) report that all the adolescents
taking part of their study engaged in at least one of the three distinct informal reasoning
patterns while problem-solving: rationalistic; emotive; and intuitive.
It is a misunderstanding to identify rational, algorithm thinking with PS and experience-based,
“naturalistic” thinking with DM. As we shall see, people often solve problems by relying on
their past experiences and make decisions through the application of algorithms.
By default, our experiential system is activated. One has to defeat his automatic reactions in
order for the rational system to take over. This is not like turning on a switch - one has to
continuously conserve the rational process, such as proper PS. Otherwise, the experiential
system, which is permanently present, will once again take over. Thus, one must continuously
monitor oneself throughout the process.
The most important factor be monitored is one’s stress level. If one’s stress level is too high,
he will “take a shortcut” through process. If one’s stress level falls too low - he will slip into
nonchalance.
How do people solve problems?
D’Zurilla’s (1971) five-phase process of solving social problem supposes the potential to
either fall or choose out of the process at each phase. One always has an option of acting
automatically, either successfully or not. Once again, already in the first phase, facing social
or work-related problems, one can either refuse to acknowledge that a problem exists, and
either do nothing or act automatically. Acting automatically does not automatically lead to bad
results. Experienced professionals, such as athletes, pilots and even teachers, may act out of
instinct - before they have time to cognitively register their actions (Feldon, 2007). They do
this in order to avoid cognitive pressure which happens whenever the total processing request
of external stimuli and internal cognitions exceed available attentional resources (Sweller,
1989). They reduce their cognitive load by acting automatically. There is a functional dynamic
between intentional (i.e., conscious, rational) and automatic (i.e., non-conscious, experience
based) processing. The mental events available for conscious manipulation and control occur
in the working memory, function more slowly, and require more effort than other processes
(Feldon, 2007). There is a limit to the capacity of our consciousness, a fact which is vividly
obvious in novice teachers. The attempt to attend to the needs and behaviors of an entire
classroom, while also trying to remember and implement a lesson plan, flood their available
cognitive resources. Therefore, this cognitive overloads limits the abilities of novice teachers
to effectively alter to complex classroom energetic (Doyle, 1986). Expert teachers have no
need to consciously address every problem that comes up in the classroom because they
automatically depend on their experience. The more problems one can representative to the
automatic cognitive system, the more resources become available to the conscious system. To
put it conversely: if one cannot rely on his experience-based automatic behavior, his cognitive
abilities will be severely disabled by cognitive overload.
Experts are better than beginners primarily at pattern recognition (Fadde, 2009). Where a
novice recognize a problem, an expert recognizes a familiar pattern, particularly because he
has solved a multitude of similar problems. Now he no longer hat to. It is a routine situation
for him; he can push the “auto-pilot” button.
The second phase is that of interpretation. Textbook problems usually make the job of
interpretation easy for the students, but this is not to say that students always understand
textbook problems properly. Tversky and Kaheman’s (1974, 1981, 1986) groundbreaking
research on decision problems showed that people who possess enough knowledge to solve a
decision problem often fail, in most cases, at the phase of reformulating it. This happens
because they naturally and automatically settle for the first interpretation that comes to mind,
instead of going through process of solving the problem properly. In Tversky and Kahneman’s
experiments, the phrasing of the problems was controlled by them, influencing which
interpretation was perceived by this subjects first.
During emergency situation, however, there is often no time to solve all the problems by
orderly going through the PS stages. Thus, opting of the PS process may be the right course of
action.
Another good way out of a problem was exemplified by Alexander the Great. The Gordian tie
could not be united by any problem-solver, through any algorithm. Alexander choose not to
even attempt to disentangle the knot, but rather to cut through.
In the third phase, one may fail because his knowledge or tactical repertoire may not suit the
type of problem he faces, or one may skip to phase four or even five, trying to implement the
first idea that comes into one’s head. When a good idea seems to come to mind, one tends to
get swept away in a “eureka” moment. This is sometimes referred to as “opportunistic
problem-solving” (Kuo, et al., 2013) or “dodge” (Johnstone and El-Banna, 1986). The proper
way to go about PS is, of course, to keep producing ideas before attempting to evaluate them,
let alone try them out. There is an old saying, often ascribe to the mathematician and the
second chess wold champion, Emanuel Lasker: “If you find a good move, look for a better
one”. This, however, does not apply to raid games.
In the fourth phase, the process of evaluating the alternatives strategies may drag into
endlessness as well. It is hard to estimate whether a COA will be successful without actually
trying it out. Thus, the most natural thing to do is to try and implement the first COA that
seem promising.
In the fifth phase, one might fail to implement the COA successfully, because it was faulty, he
was not adept as using it, because he gave up too soon.
B: DECISION MAKING
What is optimal decision-making?
A decisional conflict refers to concurrent opposing tendencies within the individual to accept
and reject a given course of action (J anis and Mann, 1977). When there is no conflict, no
decision or choice among alternatives needs to be made - one goes on doing what he normally
does. On the most basic level, any decision is a choice between doing what one normally does
and doing something else. If there is no problem with one’s normal routine, then is no
conflict, and no decision needs to be made. One only starts intentional about changing when
there is a problem: a given state is no longer desirable or the existing conditions are
threatened.
Whenever a problem arises, one continuously decides whether he wants to follow through
with the proper PS process or return to “normal” functioning: doing what nature or experience
has taught him to do. Thus, proper DM must be similar to proper PS: a series of consecutive
stages through which the decision to change the situation is carried out.
If the hypothesis is correct, one would expect to see rational decision-makers actually solving
their problems. In fact, the protocols describing optimal DM procedures are very similar to
the prescribed PS procedures such as those suggested by D’Zurilla, stage by stage. In other
words, people who make good decisions in fact approach decisions conflicts by identifying
the problems and solving them properly.
Like D’Zurilla, J anis and Mann (1977) describe a five-stage proper DM process. These
stages are: assessing the challenge; surveying alternatives; weighing alternatives; deliberating
about commitment; and adhering despite negative feedback.
In the first stage, one appraises the challenge. This stage corresponds to D’Zurilla’s second
phase (problem statement and definition). Janis’s protocol refers to situations where a problem
is already important, thus D’Zurilla’s first phase (Positioning, involving the formation of a set
or an attitude to recognize and accept problematic situations when they occur and to inhibit
the tendency to either respond automatically or avoid the problem by doing nothing) is
presupposed. Being aware of a problem is a pre-condition to successfully dealing with it. In
Janus’s terms, the right orientation is labeled as vigilance, as opposed to inactivity, different
types of avoidance, and hyper-vigilance. In other words, one must be able to regard an issue
with the appropriate seriousness in order to even begin the process leading to a good decision.
There are, of course, different aspects of the first stage that J anis and Mann emphasize more
than D’Zurilla and Nezu. In this stage or phase, according to both approaches, one tries to
make sense of the challenge, explain the information, and categorize it. However, while the
PS approach draw attention to the wording and the conceptualization of the issue, the DM
approach accentuates the assessment of the issue’s seriousness or, in other words, whether it is
important enough to be taken seriously, and if so, then how seriously. If it is not very
important, I.e., no grave consequences are foreseen, one is unlikely to bother making a quality
decision about it, and rightfully so.
In the second stage, corresponding to D’Zurilla’s third phase, one surveys alternative COAs.
Both J anis and D’Zurilla believe that quality coping with a serious issue make necessary
producing or finding numerous coping tactics: seeing only one or two options is perceived as
careless.
In the third stage, corresponding to D’Zurilla’s fourth phase, one weighs the alternative COAs
and decides which one is most likely to be the best. This is the decision stage of the decision-
making process. The problem of choosing the COA that is most likely to yield the best results
is often referred to as decision problem.
In the fourth stage, corresponding to D’Zurilla’s fifth and final phase, one implement the
decision reached in the previous stage. What is emphasized in DM the commitment to the
decision. In Schoenfeld’s paradigmatic example, a teacher, deciding upon particular course of
action which he consider the most appropriate, will probably consider what will happen if it
fails. If a teacher asks a student with COA he will choose to solve problem, the student might
hesitate; he most likely would not have hesitated, had he not been asked, but rather allowed to
proceed without declaring his COA aloud.
The final stage of DM, adhering despite negative feedback, is not accounted for in PS,
because it is considered by D’Zurilla (1971, 2012) to be a separate issue. In DM literature,
post-decisional activity received its share of attention, particularly in the context of the
differentiation and Consolidation theory (Svenson, 1992, 1996; Verplaken and Svenson,
1997). According to this theory, the process of DM consists of three major parts: identifying
the problem, differentiating among alternatives until there is only a single satisfactory one
remains; and operate data to support the decision made. Svenson’s protocol can be refined
into eight-stage protocol (Lee and Grace, 2012), but it would still describe the same process.
It has two identification stages, four distinction stages and two consolidation stages. In
addition to the previously considered protocols, a “formulating criteria for evaluating options”
stage is inserted into this one.
This additional stage deserve special attention. Setting different basis for weighing the
alternative COAs will probably lead to choosing different COAs. In the most important cases,
with human lives or large amounts of money on the line, decision problems are solved
through application of algorithms that take multiple specification into account (Olcer and
Odabasi, 2005; Yang et al, 2015). These algorithms assign different value to different criteria.
Moreover, there is competition among these algorithms as well (Naili et al., 2014). Thus, in
order to make the absolutely best decision, one has to decide upon the relevant criteria, their
relative weight and the algorithm that would calculate them.
What is sub-optimal decision-making?
People do not always make optimal decisions. People do not always approach DM vigilantly
or in the optimal manner. It is safe to assume that people neither can nor should optimize each
of their decisions. Buying a house and selecting a door-knob should not be approached
similarly, and normally are not. In a general sense, involvement is an issue, product, or
decision is often considered as a motivational factor that affects the cognitive effort that
individuals expend on a problem, and on strategies that are used to form a judgement or make
a decision (Verplanken and Svenson, 1997; Johnson and Eagly, 1989). The outcome of the
decision ought to be worth the mental resources invested in it. Thus, in most cases it is
optimal not to optimize the outcome.
How do people cope with problems and conflicts?
Janis and Mann (1977) describe 5 distinct patterns of coping with decisional conflicts, which
as we have seen, stem from problems. Later, the list of coping patterns was revised to fit the
results of empirical research (Mann et al., 1997); yet, the overall division remained intact. If a
person pay little or no attention to the problem, either because he fails to notice it or he does
not find it serious enough, he will display a pattern or unconflicted inertia, or doing nothing
new, characterized by low levels of stress, until the problem becomes too serious to ignore.
By that time, however, it might be too late to deal with it effectively. The next pattern is
unconflicted change to another course of action. When a problem seems serious and
something needs to be done, varying levels of stress may arise. However, if a new course of
action (suggested by someone else or generated spontaneously) promises to suffice to fix the
problem, the switch will be made and the levels of stress will will decrease. This “repair job”
might not necessarily be optimal, but unless the situation change dramatically, it will not
empty mental energy from the decision-maker. If neither non-action nor the new course of
action will be enough to fix the problem, one could begin to vigilantly produce new ideas.
Alternatively, thinking (perhaps after a few failed attempts), he will fail into one of the
patterns of defensive avoidance: buck-passing, procrastination, bolstering/rationalization (the
latter dropped in 1997). He will avoid investing energy on a project that he has no hope of
successfully finishing. His levels of stress will vary from low to high, as he feels the fame of
failure, but is too afraid to think about anything that would remind him of his helplessness and
the consequences. Hyper-vigilance occurs when one feels that he can find a solution; yet, he
does not have enough time to carry out a proper DM process, step by step. People are under a
lost of stress they find themselves under. Being vigilant means avoiding all the pit-falls of the
other patterns: the desire too lower the level of stress by ignoring problems or rushing the
process, having enough knowledge, believing in one’s ability to solve the problem, and
having enough meta-cognitive skills to manage one’s time and levels of stress.
Conclusion:
I would like to suggest the following nomenclature of terms, relating to PS and DM. Using
the common nomenclature should bring the two scientific domains closer together and
provide the scientists from both field with tools to better communicate and understand each
other.
Problem is a gap between the given and the desired.
Real problem is a gap which the person facing it does not immediately know how to bridge. It
always relates to the person facing the gap.
Real-life problem is a real problem in the social or professional life of the one facing it. The
gap in such problems can be stated as dissatisfaction with the given conditions (one would
like to graduate, get promoted, etc.) or as a threat to the existing conditions (one would not
like to get expelled or fired).
Solutions to the problem is that which bridges the gap.
Optimal solution means that there is no better solution to the problem. If two or more
solutions are equally good or they cannot be compared, they are each called optimal.
Coping refers to managing life conditions that are stressful. Coping works through two
functions: the problem-solving function and emotional function.
Useful coping is attempt to deal with a problem through changing environment.
Emotional coping is attempting to deal with the problem by reappraising it without changing
anything in the environment.
Effective solution is any solution allows one to cope with a problem, either constructively or
emotionally.
Sufficient solution is any solution that satisfies the minimal requirements for bridging the gap,
but is not necessarily optimal.
Proper solution is the existing optimal solution. Sometimes a problem has no proper solution.
Proper problem-solving process is a five-stage process that gives the one facing the problem
the best chances to optimally solve the problem. Trying to solve the problem properly does
not guarantee that one finds the proper solution.
Proper decision-making process is a five-stage process, similar to the proper problem-solving
process.
Decision refers to a choice between alternative courses of action. Usually, continuing with the
current course of action is one of the alternatives. Deciding upon the a course of action is a
part of the decision-making process.
Decision conflict refers to simultaneous opposing propensity within the individual to accept
the reject a given course of action. It stems from real-life problems. Decision conflict does not
stop until the problem is effectively solved. Thus, while going through the stages of the
problem-solving process one experiences decision conflict continuously.
Strategies is a conscious, rational approach to PS in general. Proper PS procedure is one of the
possible PS strategies.
Course of action or tactic is particular approach to solving a concrete problem or a type of
problem.
Decision problem is the problem of choosing the COA that is most likely to yield the best
results. They are often problems within larger problems.
Experts is someone who’s experiential cognitive system allows for achieving better results
than this rational system, particularly in complex situations under time constraints. Experts
should not be advised to follow standard procedures under such circumstances. In some
contexts, such procedures should be tailored to take advantage of their vast experience.
Rushing through stages occurs when one feels that one will reach a satisfying solution to his
problem while saving time and reduce stress and cognitive load.
Regression through stages occurs when the barrier interferes with PS at any stage. In such
cases, one ay suspect that redoing a previous stage could lead to better results.
Experience-based cognitive system is the same system by which human and non-human
animals adapt to their environments.
Rational cognitive system is a set of analytical principles and has no implications with the
respect to the reasonableness of the behavior, which is an alternative meaning of the word.
The two systems operate in parallel and are interactive. One does not just solve problems
while completely detaching from emotions. It is a misconception to equate rational thinking
with problem-solving and the application of experience with decision-making.
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