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Fact or Fiction? Case C-616/17 and the Compatibility of the EU Authorisation Procedure for Pesticides with the Precautionary Principle

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Abstract

This contribution analyses whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provides clarifications on the normative implications that the precautionary principle entails in the context of Regulation 1107/2009, laying out the EU authorisation procedure for pesticides, in its recent judgement in Case C-616/17. In this judgement, which is a response to a request for a preliminary ruling by a French criminal court on the compatibility of certain aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle, the CJEU concludes that the questions of the referring court reveal nothing capable of affecting the validity of the regulation. According to the CJEU, to ensure conformity with the precautionary principle, the EU legislature must establish a normative framework that makes available to competent authorities sufficient information to adequately assess the risks to health resulting from the pesticide in question. However, the CJEU’s substantive analysis of the compatibility of the different aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle is not conducted concretely in light of this legal standard, but constitutes a mere testing of the general adequacy of Regulation 1107/2009. Furthermore, the CJEU’s judgement examines Regulation 1107/2009 in a vacuum without considering problems that have occurred in its implementation or application.
Fact or Fiction? Case C-616/17 and the
Compatibility of the EU Authorisation Procedure
for Pesticides with the Precautionary Principle
Sophia PAULINI*
This contribution analyses whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provides
clarifications on the normative implications that the precautionary principle entails in the
context of Regulation 1107/2009, laying out the EU authorisation procedure for pesticides,
in its recent judgement in Case C-616/17. In this judgement, which is a response to a request
for a preliminary ruling by a French criminal court on the compatibility of certain aspects of
Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle, the CJEU concludes that the
questions of the referring court reveal nothing capable of affecting the validity of the
regulation. According to the CJEU, to ensure conformity with the precautionary principle,
the EU legislature must establish a normative framework that makes available to competent
authorities sufficient information to adequately assess the risks to health resulting from the
pesticide in question. However, the CJEUs substantive analysis of the compatibility of the
different aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle is not conducted
concretely in light of this legal standard, but constitutes a mere testing of the general
adequacy of Regulation 1107/2009. Furthermore, the CJEUs judgement examines
Regulation 1107/2009 in a vacuum without considering problems that have occurred in its
implementation or application.
I. I
NTRODUCTION
The circumstances leading to the request for a preliminary ruling in Case C-616/171are
rather curious: a number of individuals were charged with criminal offences for entering
and causing damage to weed killer products containing glyphosate in a shop in Ariège,
France. Before the Tribunal Correctionnel de Foix (Criminal Court of Foix or referring
court), the defendants argued that their acts were meant to serve to warn shops and their
customers about the dangers of weed killers containing glyphosate, to prevent sales of
glyphosate products as well as to protect public health and their own health. The
defendants raised necessity and the precautionary principle as defences and requested
*Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands; email: paulini@law.eur.nl. I would like to thank the
anonymous reviewer for the constructive comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
European Journal of Risk Regulation (2020), page 1 of 17 doi:10.1017/err.2020.19
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1Case C-616/17 Blaise and others [2019] EU:C:2019:800.
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the Criminal Court of Foix to refer questions on the legality of Regulation 1107/2009
concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market2to the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court).3This was accepted by the public
prosecution as it found that the legality of Regulation 1107/2009 may affect the legal
foundation of the prosecution of the defendants.4The Criminal Court of Foix thus
referred to the CJEU questions on the compatibility of Regulation 1107/2009 with the
precautionary principle as regards four particular aspects related to risk assessment:
the lack of definition of the concept of active substances; the insufficient
consideration of cocktail effects in the authorisation procedure of plant protection
products; the scientific evidence of the safety of the products being submitted by the
applicant intending to place the product on the market; and, finally, the exemption of
the authorisation application for plant protection products from long-term toxicity and
carcinogenicity tests.
There are a few aspects of the judgement of the CJEUs Grand Chamber in Case
C-616/17 that would be worth a more detailed discussion: first, the judgement is a
continuation of the saga around glyphosate, the omnipresent5pesticide that appears to
divide politicians and scientific bodies, occupies courts, concerns the public and
ultimately casts major doubts on the viability of the European Union (EU) authorisation
procedure for pesticides in Regulation 1107/2009 to protect public health and the
environment. Another interesting element of this judgement is the circumstances of the
request for a preliminary ruling, the Courts acceptance of the latter and the peculiar
situation of a national criminal court expressing doubts as to the legitimacy of an EU
regulation on the placing on the market of pesticides. This article, however, will focus
on the CJEUs testing of the compatibility of Regulation 1107/2009 with the
precautionary principle. As will be explained, the concept of the precautionary principle
in EU law is subject to ambiguities, due to which the concrete normative implications
that the principle entails are not certain. In this article, the extent to which the Court
provides clarifications on the normative implications of the precautionary principle in
the context of Regulation 1107/2009 will thus be analysed.
As a first step, this article will provide a brief description of the authorisation
procedure for pesticides in Regulation 1107/2009, followed by an overview of the
legal status and definition (or lack thereof) of the precautionary principle in EU law.
The article will then move on to analyse the CJEUs judgement in Case C-616/17
by first examining what are, in the view of the Court, the obligations that the
precautionary principle poses to the legislature in the context of Regulation
1107/2009. The findings of the Court as to the compatibility of Regulation
1107/2009 with the precautionary principle will then be analysed to finally present
two observations on the reasoning of the Court.
2Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the
market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC [2009] OJ L309/1.
3Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 28.
4Case C-616/17 Blaise and others, Opinion of Advocate Sharpston [2019] EU:C:2019:190, para 33.
5European Parliament, EUs Pesticide Risk Assessment System: The Case of Glyphosate(Study for the ENVI
COMMITTEE 2016) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/587309/IPOL_STU(2016)
587309_EN.pdf>(last accessed 26 February 2020).
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II. T
HE
EU
PESTICIDE AUTHORISATION PROCEDURE IN
R
EGULATION
1107/2009
The EU authorisation procedure for the placing on the market of plant protection
products commonly referred to as pesticides is set out in Regulation 1107/2009.
Among the objectives of the regulation is to lay down harmonised rules on the
placing on the market of plant protection products as well as their use and control
and to thereby ensure a high level of protection of human and animal health as well
as the environment.6Pursuant to recital 8 and Article 1(4) of Regulation 1107/2009,
the precautionary principle is to be applied and is underpinning the regulation.
Regulation 1107/2009 lays down a prior authorisation system, according to which
substances can only be placed on the market if approved or authorised, whereas the
burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the active substance or plant
protection product does not have harmful effects on human or animal health or
unacceptable effects on the environment.
The authorisation system in Regulation 1107/2009 follows a hazard-based approach.
This means that in an assessment of a respective substance, the latter is tested for certain
harmful properties, such as carcinogenicity, and in the case of a harmful property being
found, it will not be authorised.7This stands in contrast to a risk-based approach,
according to which a substance could, despite its harmful properties, still be
authorised if its harmful properties are low, manageable or simply worth accepting
due to the benefits that the substance in question provides.8However, Regulation
1107/2009 allows for the approval of an active substance that does not satisfy the
necessary safety criteria for a limited period if the substance is necessary to control a
serious danger to plant health that cannot be contained by other available means.9In
addition, the approval of an active substance (as well as of safeners and synergists)
may be made subject to certain conditions and restrictions, such as the manner and
conditions of application.10
Regulation 1107/2009 lays down a centralised EU-wide approval procedure for
active substances (the active components operating against pests and plant
diseases),11,12 safeners (substances added to plant protection products to eliminate or
reduce phytotoxic effects)13,14 and synergists (which can give enhanced activity to
active substances).15,16 There is a separate authorisation procedure at the Member
State level for plant protection products, which are products in the form in which they
6Art 1 of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
7E Bozzini, Pesticide Policy and Politics in the European Union, Regulatory Assessment, Implementation and
Enforcement (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) at p 30.
8ibid.
9Art 4(7) of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
10 Art 6 of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
11 European Commission, Approval of active substances<https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/approval_
active_substances_en>(last accessed 26 February 2020).
12 Section 1 of Chapter II of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
13 Art 2(3)(a) of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
14 Section 2 of Chapter II of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
15 Art 2(3)(b) of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
16 Section 2 of Chapter II of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
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are provided to the user (ie compounds containing actives substances, safeners or synergists)
to be used to protect plant products against harmful organisms and other related uses.17
An approval procedure for the use of an active substance, safener or synergist starts with
the submission by the applicant who intends to place the substance on the market of an
application for authorisation to any Member State, which acts as the Rapporteur
Member State for the purpose of the authorisation procedure.18 In the application for
approval, the applicant must submit information that demonstrates neither the substance
nor its residues have any harmful effects on human health, including that of vulnerable
groups, and animal health taking into account known cumulative and synergistic
effects or any unacceptable effect on the environment.19 The Rapporteur Member
State draws up a draft assessment reportin which it determines whether the
substance in question meets the above approval requirements.20 The draft assessment
report of the Rapporteur Member State is then forwarded to the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA) for it to adopt conclusions on the safety of the substance in light of
current scientific and technical knowledge.21 Taking into account the assessment of the
Rapporteur Member States and EFSA, the Commission draws up a review report and a
draft regulation,22 on which the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal
Health takes a vote.23
The authorisation of plant protection products takes place at the level of Member
States.24 The applicant of the authorisation must submit certain information to prove
the safety of the product to the competent authority in the Member State. The latter
conducts an assessment of the application and either grants or refuses the
authorisation.25 The applicant may then apply for the mutual recognition of the
authorisation by other Member States under a zonal system.26 Pursuant to this
zonal system, the holder of an authorisation of a plant protection product in one
Member State may apply for mutual recognition of the authorisation in a different
Member State in the same geographical zone, as determined in Annex I of Regulation
1107/2009. In order to have a plant protection product authorised in a zone other than
that in which a respective plant protection product has already been authorised, a new
authorisation procedure must be initiated.27
According to Bozzini, EU policy is commonly criticised for the existence of a gap
between the ambition of adopted regulations and the modesty of results on the
ground.28 It appears that Regulation 1107/2009 is accused of the same by a number
17 Chapter III of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
18 Art 7(1) of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
19 Art 4 of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
20 Art 11 of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
21 Art 12 of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
22 Art 13(1) of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
23 Art 13(2) of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
24 Art 28(1) of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
25 Arts 36(1) and (2) of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
26 Art 40 of Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 2.
27 Bozzini, supra, note 7, 43.
28 Bozzini, supra, note 7, 109.
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of civil society and regulatory initiatives launched with the aim of improving Regulation
1107/2009. Following the controversy around glyphosate and the application of the
renewal of its authorisation, a Special Committee the PEST Committee was set
up in the European Parliament to conduct an assessment of the EUs authorisation
procedure for pesticides and to focus on, among other things, the independence of the
procedure from industry and its transparency.29 According to the findings of the
PEST Committee, which were relied on by the defendants in the proceedings of Case
C-616/17,30 the EU has one of the most stringent systems for the authorisation of
pesticides in the world, but both [Regulation 1107/2009] as such and its
implementation need to be improved for it to achieve its purpose.31 Similarly, a
coalition of stakeholders and scientists called Citizens for Science in Pesticide
Regulationcriticises that the rules [of Regulation 1107/2009] are not implemented
properly and the regulatory system is allowing private interests to be given priority
over health and the environment, and it calls for [a] full reform of the current
pesticide risk assessment and risk management systems.32
In another development, a European Citizens Initiative called for, among other things,
the ban of glyphosate and the reform of the EU procedure to approve pesticides.33
In particular, the European Citizens Initiative expressed concern about the reliability
and transparency of the risk assessment and demanded that scientific studies in support
of pesticide approval should be commissioned by public authorities and should
be published.34 The European Commission responded with Regulation 2019/138135
on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain,
which will be applicable as of 2021 and stipulates that EFSA is to carry out its
activities with a high level of transparencyand make public ::: scientific data,
studies and other information supporting applications, including supplementary
information supplied by applicants.36 Regulation 2019/1381 is also establishing an
additional verification toolby way of which the Commission, in exceptional
circumstances of serious controversies or conflicting results, may request [EFSA] to
commission scientific studies with the objective of verifying evidence used in its risk
assessment process.37 Arcuri and Hendlin argue that Regulation 2019/1381 is a first
29 European Parliament decision of 6 February 2018 on setting up a special committee on the Unions authorisation
procedure for pesticides, its responsibilities, numerical strength and term of office (2018/2534(RSO)).
30 Blaise and others, Opinion of Advocate Sharpston, supra, note 4, para 82.
31 European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2019 on the Unions authorisation procedure for pesticides
(2018/2153(INI)).
32 Citizens for Science in Pesticide Regulation A European Coalition<https://citizens4pesticidereform.eu/>(last
accessed 26 February).
33 European CitizensInitiative: Ban Glyphosate and Protect People and the Environment from Toxic Pesticides
<http://www.banglyphosate.eu/>(last accessed 26 February).
34 Annex to the European CitizensInitiative: Ban Glyphosate and Protect People and the Environment from Toxic
Pesticides<https://europa.eu/citizens-initiative/initiatives/details/2017/000002_en>(last accessed 26 February).
35 Regulation (EU) 2019/1381 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the transparency
and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain and amending Regulations (EC) No 178/2002, (EC) No
1829/2003, (EC) No 1831/2003, (EC) No 2065/2003, (EC) No 1935/2004, (EC) No 1331/2008, (EC) No 1107/2009,
(EU) 2015/2283 and Directive 2001/18/EC.
36 Art 1(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1381, supra, note 35.
37 Recital 25 and Art 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1381, supra, note 35.
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step in changing the current system towards more stringent accountability and
transparency, but it fails to meet the requests of the European citizens.38
Notably, Regulation 1107/2009, together with Regulation 396/2005 on maximum
residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin,39 is
currently subject to the European Commissions Regulatory Fitness and Performance
(REFIT) programme. The REFIT programme aims to assess the accomplishment of
the objectives, the efficacy of the enforcement as well as the effectiveness of the
pesticides legislation,aswellastoidentify the problems of compliance and
underline which factors hinder the achievement of the objectives of the legislation.40
III. T
HE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN
EU
LAW
Pursuant to Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU),41 the policy of the EU on the environment must aim at a high level of
protection and be based on, among other principles, the precautionary principle. The
latter was added to the foundational environmental principles that are to guide
environmental policies in the EU by the Maastricht Treaty42 in 1992. However, long
before the formalisation and codification of the precautionary principle in the
Maastricht Treaty, the principle was albeit not being named as such tacitly
endorsed in the jurisprudence of the European Courts and in the legislation of the
European Economic Community.43
Although the only express reference to the precautionary principle in the EU treaties is
made in Article 191(2) TFEU in the field of environmental policy, the scope of
application of the precautionary principle is not limited to the environmental field.
Article 11 TFEU stipulates that environmental protection requirements must be
integrated into the definition and implementation of the Unionspoliciesand
activities. Relying on the horizontal nature44 of Article 11 TFEU in combination
with Article 191(2) TFEU, the EU Courts extended the scope of the principle beyond
environmental policy. In Artegodan, the Court of First Instance (CFI) found that the
precautionary principle is intended to be applied in order to secure a high level of
human health, environmental and consumer protection in the definition and
38 A Arcuri and YH Hendlin, The Chemical Anthropocene: Glyphosate as a Case Study of Pesticide Exposures
(2009) 30 Kings Law Journal 248.
39 Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 2005 on
maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food andfeedofplantandanimalorigin and amending Council
Directive 91/414/EEC [2005] OJ L70/1.
40 European Commission, Evaluation and Fitness Check (FC) Roadmap<https://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/
roadmaps/docs/2016_sante_197_ealuation_plant_protection_products_en.pdf>(last accessed 26 February 2020); at
the time of writing, the adoption of the draft Report to the Council and the European Parliament on the REFIT
evaluation is still pending.
41 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47.
42 Treaty of Maastricht [1992] OJ C191.
43 For examples of jurisprudence, see Case C-174/82, Officier van Justitie v Sandoz BV ECR 2445 and Case C-83/80,
Officier van Justitie/Kaasfabriek Eyssen ECR 409; for examples of legislation, see Council Decision 80/372/EEC of 26
March 1980 concerning chlorofluorocarbons in the environment [1980] OJ L 90/45 and Council Directive 90/220/EEC
of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms [1990] OJ L 117.
44 A Alemanno, Trade in Food: Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EC and the WTO (Cameron May 2007)
at p 111.
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implementation of all EU policies, as is required by the treaties, and can be defined as a
general principle of Community law.45
Despite the pronouncement of the precautionary principle as a general principle of EU
law by the EU Courts, there does not exist a universally accepted definition of the
precautionary principle in EU law.46 While it is argued that this is because the
application of the precautionary principle is contextual, dependent on the policy area
concerned and by its nature discretionary,47 the ambiguity around its precise meaning
is a particular issue of contention for its critics, who have argued that the
precautionary principle can lead to arbitrary decision-making and protectionism.48
The lack of a universally endorsed definition of the principle creates ambiguity around
its normative implications. The majority of definitions of the precautionary principle in
EU law put forward an understanding of the principle as providing public authorities with
the discretion to take protective measures in situations of scientific uncertainty. For
example, a frequently reiterated articulation of the concept of the precautionary
principle was provided by the CJEU in the BSE judgements and constitutes one of
the first times that the CJEU expressed the essence of the principle.49 According
to the CJEU, Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of human
health, the institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until the
reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent.50 Article 7 of Regulation
178/2002, the General Food Law Regulation,51 contains the first definition of the
precautionary principle in EU legislation.52 According to Article 7(1), In specific
circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, the
possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists,
provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health
protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further scientific
information for a more comprehensive risk assessment.
45 Joined Cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00 to T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00 Artegodan v Commission
[2002] ECR II-04945, paras 18384.
46 JZander,The Application of the Precautionary Principle in Practice: Comparative Dimensions(Cambridge
University Press 2010) at p 93; E Stokes, The EC Co urtsContributio n to Refining the Parameters of Precaution
(2008) 11 Journal of Risk Research 493; D Bourguignon, The Precautionary Principle: Definitions, Applications
and Governance(European Parliamentary Research Service 2015) at p 6; R Lofstedt, The Precautionary Principle
in the EU: Why a Formal Review Is Long Overdue16 Risk Management 140; J Scott, Legal Aspects of the
Precautionary Principle(A British Academy Brexit Briefing 2018) at p 7.
47 N de Sadeleer, The Precautionary Principle in European Community Health and Environment Law: Sword or
Shield for the Nordic Countries?in N de Sadeleer (ed.), Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Approaches
from the Nordic Countries, EU and USA (Earthscan 2007) p 12; Stokes, supra, note 46, 492.
48 GMajone,What Price Safety: The Precautionary Principle and Its Policy Implications(2002) 40 Journal of
Common Market Studies 89.
49 Curiously, the CJEU in the BSE judgements did not refer to the precautionary principle by its name, even though
the two judgements were issued following the codification of the precautionary principle by the Maastricht Treaty.
50 Case C-157/96 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Others ex parte: The National
FarmersUnion and Others [1998] ECR I-02211, para 63; Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v Commission of the
European Communities [1998] ECRI-02265, para 99.
51 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the
general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down
procedures in matters of food safety [2002] OJ L31/1.
52 Alemanno, supra, note 44, 122.
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However, there are also instances in the jurisprudence of the EU Courts where the
precautionary principle is defined as an imperative requiring action to be taken in
certain situations of scientific uncertainty. For example, in Pfizer, the CFI found
that by reason of [the precautionary principle] a public authority can be required to
act even before any adverse effects have become apparent.53 In French Republic v
European Commission, the CFI stated that where [a risk faced] exceeds the level of
risk deemed acceptable for society, the institution is bound, by reason of the
precautionary principle, to adopt provisional risk management measures necessary to
ensure a high level of protection.54 There is thus a variety of definitions expressing
the precautionary principle with a range of normative implications, leaving
ambiguous the precise positive obligations that derive from the principle under EU
law. For example, in the case of a regulation setting out a regulatory framework for
the authorisation procedure for a specific object of substance such as Regulation
1107/2009 in a policy field in which the precautionary principle applies, it is clear
that pursuant to Article 191(2) TFEU such a regulation has to be based on the
precautionary principle. Less certain, however, are the concrete normative
implications that derive from Article 191(2) TFEU in such cases (ie what the
obligation to be based on the precautionary principle actually entails).
The questions of the referring court concerned with the compliance of several risk
assessment aspects in Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle also touch
upon the role of the precautionary principle in risk assessment. According to the
European Commission, the precautionary principle is exclusively part of risk
management and, in particular, weighs in on the questions of whether to act and how
to act. The European Commission emphasises that views according to which the
precautionary principle is also part of risk assessment policy confuse the
precautionary principle with a prudential approach to risk assessment.55 de Sadeleer,
on the other hand, argues that [f]rom a legal point of view, nothing precludes that
the risk assessment stage has to be carried out in accordance with the obligations
stemming from the precautionary principle,aswellasthatin order to deal
effectively with uncertainty, ambiguity, and ignorance, assessors should apply
precaution at an early stage.56 Similarly, Stirling finds that insisting that precaution
relates only to risk management entirely misses its real value in highlighting more
diverse ways to gather relevant knowledge,suchasbydraw[ing] attention to a
broader range of non-reductive methods, which avoid spurious promises to determine
science-basedpolicy.57 According to Peel, the implementation of the precautionary
principle in the context of risk assessment will require attention to the issue of
53 Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health v Council [2002] ECR II-03305, para 444.
54 Case T-257/07 French Republic v European Commission [2011] ECR II-05827, para 81.
55 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle(Communication)
COM (2000) 1 final.
56 N de Sadeleer, The Precautionary Principle in EC Health and Environmental Law(2006) 12 European Law
Journal 139, 148.
57 AStirling,Risk, Precaution and Science: Towards a More Constructive Policy Debate. Talking Point on the
Precautionary Principle(2007) 8 EMBO Reports 31213.
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how regulatory frameworks incorporate broader input most usually from the general
public into processes for the selection and assessment of health and environmental
risks.58
IV. T
HE JUDGEMENT
1. Testing conformity of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle
Due to the above-mentioned ambiguity as to the concrete normative implications of
the precautionary principle, it is worth taking a closer look at what are, in the view of
the Court, the obligations that derive from the precautionary principle in the context
of Regulation 1107/2009.
Firstly, the Court confirms the applicability of the precautionary principle to
Regulation 1107/2009 as constituting a policy protecting public health within the
common agricultural policy or internal market policy.59 According to the Court,
There is therefore an obligation on the EU legislature, when it adopts rules
governing the placing on the market of plant protection products, such as those laid
down in Regulation 1107/2009, to comply with the precautionary principle, in order
to ensure ::: a high level of protection of human health.60 The Court then defines
the precautionary principle as providing the possibility of taking protective measures
in a situation of uncertain risk, without having to wait for the materialisation of that risk.61
The CJEU proceeds to elaborate how the legislature can ensure compliance with the
precautionary principle in the context of Regulation 1107/2009. First of all, the Court
finds that mere references to the precautionary principle within the Regulation such
as those in recital 8 and Article 1(4) of Regulation 1107/2009 are insufficient to
prove compliance with the principle.62 According to the CJEU, A correct application
of [the precautionary principle] in the area covered by Regulation No 1107/2009
presupposes, first, identification of the potentially negative consequences for health of
the use of the active substances and plant protection products falling within its scope,
and, second, a comprehensive assessment of the risk to health based on the most
reliable scientific data available and the most recent results of international research.
The CJEU finds that in order to be able to undertake these two steps in the
application of the precautionary principle, it is for the EU legislature to establish a
normative frameworkthat makes available to competent authorities sufficient
information in order to adequately assess ::: the risks to health resulting from the
use of those active substances and those plant protection products.63 Thus, according
to the Court, for the legislature to be in conformity with the precautionary principle,
the regulatory framework that the legislature sets up must ensure that the competent
58 J Peel, Precautionary Only in Name? Tensions between Precaution and Risk Assessment in the Australian GMO
Regulatory Frameworkin E Fisher, J Jones and R von Schomberg (eds), Implementing the Precautionary Principle,
Perspectives and Prospects (Edward Elgar 2006) p 203.
59 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 41.
60 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 42.
61 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 43.
62 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 45.
63 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 47.
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authorities have all of the information to properly assess the risks involved. The Court is
silent as to whether this is the only obligation that the legislature needs to fulfil in order to
be in conformity with the precautionary principle. Nonetheless, unlike the European
Commission, according to which the precautionary principle only applies in risk
management, the Court clearly regards the precautionary principle as having a role in
risk assessment.
Finally, the standard of review that the Court is applying to test the validity of
Regulation 1107/2009 is whether the EU legislature committed a manifest error of
assessment in adopting Regulation 1107/2009 in that the general rules of the
regulation do not satisfy the requirements arising from the precautionary principle.64
2. Findings of the CJEU
The Criminal Court of Foix referred four questions on the compatibility of the risk
assessment aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle for a
preliminary ruling to the CJEU. In particular, the questions of the Criminal Court of
Foix are concerned with the lack of definition of the concept of active substances,
the insufficient consideration of cocktail effects in plant protection products in the
authorisation procedure, the scientific evidence on the safety of the product being
submitted by the applicant and, finally, the exemption of the authorisation application
for plant protection products from long-term toxicity and carcinogenicity tests. The
Court, after having examined the latter aspects of Regulation 1107/2009, concludes
that the questions of the referring court reveal nothing capable of affecting the
validity of the regulation.65 In the following, the reasoning of the Court is analysed in
more detail.
a. Designation of active substances
The first question referred to the CJEU by the Criminal Court of Foix is concerned with
the compatibility with the precautionary principle of the lack of precise definition of
active substancein Regulation 1107/2009. According to the Criminal Court of
Foix, the ambiguity as to the meaning of the concept of active substancein
Regulation 1107/2009 could enable the applicant in an authorisation application for a
plant protection product to freely designate what is the active substance in a given
product and focus the dossier for its authorisation application only on one substance,
despite the end product being made of several substances.
The CJEU finds that the concept of active substanceis sufficiently delineated
for the purposes of Regulation 1107/2009 and also rejects the concern of the referring
court that the applicant has the discretion to freely choose a substance of a product to
be regarded as the active substance. Although the term active substanceis not
defined in Article 3 setting out various other definitions, Article 2(2) gives sufficient
meaning to it. According to Article 2(2), active substancesfor the purpose of
Regulation 1107/2009 are substances, including micro-organisms having general or
64 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, paras 5051.
65 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 117.
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specific action against harmful organisms or on plants, parts of plants or plant products.
Moreover, in the view of the Court, the specific information required for the dossiers to be
submitted by the applicant for the authorisation application for a plant protection product
enable the identification of the respective active substances. The Court further refers to
the task of the competent authority of the Member States to assess whether the
identification of the active substance by the applicant has been carried out and to
verify whether each of the active substances contained in the plant protection product
has been subject to prior approval (as a precondition for the authorisation of a plant
protection product). Finally, the holder of an authorisation risks the withdrawal of the
authorisation if not all active substances have been identified in the authorisation
application.
b. Disregard of cocktail effectsin plant protection products
The referring court also asks about the compatibility of the precautionary principle with
Regulation 1107/2009 given that it disregards the presence and cumulative effect of
multiple active substances and, in particular, there being no analysis at the EU level
of the cumulative effect of several active substances in a plant protection product.66
The CJEU holds that both the authorisation procedure for active substances (Chapter
II) and the procedure for plant protection products (Chapter III) in Regulation 1107/2009
set out requirements according to which the potential effects of the combination of
various constituents need to be considered. In the approval procedure for active
substances, the safety of one or more representative uses of at least one plant
protection product containing the respective active substance must be established. In
the view of the CJEU, this assessment cannot be carried out in an objective fashion
while failing to take into account the effects deriving from a possible combination of
various constituents of a plant protection product.67 Moreover, the regulation
mandates taking into account the cumulative and synergistic effects of an active
substance in the assessment of its safety, which must also be considered in the
assessment by EFSA.68
In the assessment of the safety of plant protection products, the Court finds that
cumulative and synergistic effects are again sufficiently considered pursuant to the
general approval criteria, as well as by way of the uniform principles for the
evaluation and authorisation of plant protection product that are to be adopted by
Member States.69
Furthermore, according to the Court, based on applicable data requirements, the
applicant of the authorisation must submit information on likely cumulative and
synergistic effects caused by interactions between active substances, safeners,
synergists and the co-formulants.70 The Court further finds that the specific rules on
66 Notably, while it has also been criticised that the assessment of the cumulative effects of several plant protection
products on one crop is disregarded by the authorisation procedure in Regulation 1107/2009, the question of the referring
court is limited to the cumulative effects of various active substances in one plant protection product.
67 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 68.
68 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, paras 6869.
69 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, paras 7172.
70 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 73.
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safeners, synergists and co-formulants in Articles 25 and 27 further ensure that if there are
any safeners, synergists and co-formulants contained in a product, the safety of those
must also be assessed.71
c. Bias in studies, tests and analyses submitted by the applicant and
confidentiality rules
The Criminal Court of Foix further asks whether in the authorisation procedure of
Regulation 1107/2009 in which tests, analyses and evaluations for the dossier are
conducted by the applicant of the authorisation alone the precautionary principle is
observed and impartiality is maintained. According to the Criminal Court of Foix, the
applicant may be biased in the presentation of the scientific evidence and there is no
independent counter-analysis of the material submitted by the applicant, nor are the
application reports published for reasons of protecting industry secrets.
According to the Court, the rules setting out that it is the applicant intending to place
the product on the market who for both active substances and plant protection products
submits the studies, tests and analyses are the corollary of the principle ::: that it is for
the applicant to prove that the active substance or plant protection product that is the
subject of an application for approval or authorization fulfils the relevant criteria laid
down by that regulation.72 These rules ensure that it is not presumed that the
substances in question have no harmful effects and therefore contribut[e] to
achieving compliance with the precautionary principle.73
The Court sees sufficient safeguard against potential bias in a number of information
requirements Regulation 1107/2009 sets out: the summary dossiers submitted as part of
the authorisation application must contain specific information (eg results of tests and
studies, the names of their owners and of the persons or institutes that have carried
out the tests and studies), the methods of analysis of an active substance must be
validated, its sufficiency must be demonstrated and the tests and analyses submitted
need to be official or officially recognised. In addition, evidence has to be submitted
that tests, studies and analyses have been carried out by a reliable institution and with
models that meet recognised scientific principles. Finally, the applicant is obliged to
submit scientific peer-reviewed open literature on the active substance published
within the last 10 years.74
According to the Court, the competent authorities and EFSA must take into account in
their assessment evidence beyond that submitted by the applicant and must not give in
all cases preponderant weight to the studies provided by the applicant.75 EFSA also has
the option of consulting experts or a Community reference laboratory.76
Regarding the applicable disclosure rules, the Court concedes that increased
transparency could enable the public to put forward arguments against the approval
71 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 74.
72 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 79.
73 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 80.
74 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, paras 8391.
75 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 94.
76 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 98.
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of a substance and therefore have the potential to improve the assessment of the risk.77
However, according to the Court, there already exists ways for the public to get access
to the authorisation or approval application dossier. In the approval procedure for active
substances, EFSA must make a summary dossier (which includes summaries and results
of tests and studies) and the draft assessment report by the Rapporteur Member States
available to the public.78 Moreover, a person requesting any of the latter information to
remain confidential must prove that disclosure would undermine commercial
interests.79 The Court also refers to Directive 2003/4 on public access to
environmental information,80 which provides that Members States cannot deny
access for information on emissions into the environment due to concerns around
the protection of confidentiality. Referring to its judgement in Bayer CropScience
and Stichting De Bijenstichting,81 the Court states this covers to a great extent
studies that assess harm that could be caused by the use of plant protection products
as well as residues following the application of plant protection products.82
d. Testing of long-term carcinogenicity and toxicity of plant protection products
The final question of the referring court asks whether the compatibility of Regulation
1107/2009 with the precautionary principle is affected by Regulation 1107/2009
exempting plant protection products from toxicity tests and requiring only summary
testing performed by the applicant.
The Court finds that although Regulation 1107/2009 does not contain detailed
requirements on the nature of tests, analyses and studies as regards the authorisation
of plant protection products (while there are some specific tests required for active
substances), there is no exemption with respect to the submission of long-term
carcinogenicity and toxicity tests. According to the Court, the applicant has the
burden of proof to establish that the plant protection product intended to be placed on
the market has no immediate or delayed harmful effect on human health, whereas the
applicants burden of proof is not met if the product in question exhibits any long-
term carcinogenicity and toxicity. The Court concludes that the material submitted by
the applicant (ie tests, analyses, studies and other material) must therefore be
sufficient to exclude risks of toxicity and carcinogenicity, which will be verified by
the competent authorities in their examination of the application for the authorisation.
Cursory tests or summary tests, as the Court emphasises, are not sufficient to exclude
these risks.
77 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 102.
78 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, paras 10304.
79 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 105.
80 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to
environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC [2003] OJ L41.
81 C-442/14 Bayer CropScience and Stichting De Bijenstichting [2016] EU:C:2016:890; for other jurisprudence on
the access to risk assessment information in the context of pesticides, see, for example, Case T-716/14 Anthony C
Tweedale v European Food Safety Authority [2019] EU:T:2019:141; Case T-329/17 Heidi Hautala and Others v
European Food Safety Authority [2019] EU:T:2019:142; Case C-673/13 P Commission v Stichting Greenpeace
Nederland and PAN Europe [2016] EU:C:2016:889.
82 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, paras 10608.
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3. Observations on the reasoning of the Court
a. The Court does not explicitly apply the standard that it has established for
Regulation 1107/2009 to be in conformity with the precautionary principle
As explained above, in its judgement, the Court lays down the standard that Regulation
1107/2009 has to meet to ensure conformity with the precautionary principle. According
to this standard, the normative framework set up by Regulation 1107/2009 must make
available to the competent authorities sufficient information for the assessment of the
risks to health that are posed by an active substance or plant protection product.
When the Court proceeds to assess the different aspects of Regulation 1107/2009,
however, it does not specifically and explicitly examine those aspects in the light of
how they contribute to or compromise such a normative framework. Instead, the
CJEU appears to merely test the general adequacy of Regulation 1109/2009.
For example, when the CJEU discusses the potential bias in the presentation of the
scientific evidence by the applicant, the Court does not appear to concretely assess
the extent to which the applicant producing the scientific evidence and studies on
which the risk assessment largely relies could affect the competent authorities
availability of sufficient information. A potential concern that the Court could have
considered here is the risk of industry applicants omitting from the submission of
scientific evidence possible negative health effects, as was alleged in the context of
the approval of glyphosate and the Monsanto Papers.83 In a White Paper of the
Citizens for Science in Pesticide Regulationcoalition, it is argued that bias [on the
part of the applicant] could lead to toxic effects being hidden, misrepresented, or
misinterpreted (as not exposure-related, spontaneously occurring, or irrelevant to
humans, etc.).84 According to the European Parliament, although the Regulation
requires the applicant to add scientific peer-reviewed open literature on the active
substance ::: for new active substances, normally only data from regulatory studies
generated by the applicant are available.85 In particular, in such situations, the
possibility of the applicant omitting evidence of harmful health effects in an
authorisation application for a new substance and how the regulation is or is not
able to counteract against the risk of this happening would have been important
aspects for the Courts assessment. Indeed, the fact that this is addressed in
Regulation 2019/1381 which, among other things, obliges business operators to
notify EFSA of the title and the scope as well as the laboratory or testing facility of
any study commissioned or carried out by them to support an application shows
that this aspect had been recognised as problematic by the EU legislator.86 The Court
could have also addressed how the procedure according to which scientific evidence
as to the safety of a substance is presented by the applicant relates to the main
83 Citizens for Science in Pesticide Regulation, Letter to EU Ministries Concerning: Action needed to ensure a higher
level of protection from pesticides in Europe (Brussels 2018) <https://citizens4pesticidereform.eu/wp-content/uploads/
2018/12/Coalition-letter-to-Permanent-Representatives-20181123.pdf>(last accessed 26 February 2020).
84 Ensuring a Higher Level of Protection from Pesticides in Europe The Problems with Current Pesticide Risk
Assessment Procedures in the EU And Proposed Solutions, White Paper prepared for Citizens for Science in
Pesticide Regulation(2018) p 10.
85 European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2019, supra, note 31.
86 Recital 21 and Art 1(6) on Notification of Studiesof Regulation 2019/1381, supra, note 35.
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objective of a company to generate profits independently of the effects on public health
and the environment.87
In another instance, when responding to the referring courts concern about the lack of
definition of the concept of active substancein plant protection products, the Court
makes the general finding that it is not clearly evident that the criteria set out in
[Article 2(2) of Regulation 1107/2009] are insufficient to permit an objective
determination of the substances concerned.88 However, if the Court strictly applied
the standard it set for testing the compatibility of the regulation with the
precautionary principle, the question it should ask is not whether it is clearly evident
that criteria are insufficient, but rather whether it is clear that they are indeed
sufficient for the competent authority to properly assess the risk. Here, the Court
could have also discussed the extent to which a flexible and open definition of the
concept of active substance could be beneficial for risk assessment in compliance
with the precautionary principle, as it could encompass novel types of active
substances that may fall out of a static definition.
Furthermore, in its discussion of long-term carcinogenicity and toxicity studies in the
authorisation procedure for plant protection products, the Court states that authorisation
applications for plant protection products are not exempt from testing long-term
carcinogenicity and toxicity. Despite it not being explicitly demanded in the
regulation, according to the Court, by way of the applicants burden of proof to
establish the safety of plant protection products, the applicant must provide
sufficient evidence to include long-term carcinogenicity and toxicity. The Court
does not, however, consider if in practice this is the case, and scientific evidence on
long-term carcinogenicity and toxicity is in fact submitted by the applicant or, if not
initially submitted, requested to be submitted by the competent authorities. In her
opinion, Advocate General (AG) Sharpston paints a different picture about why
long-term carcinogenicity and toxicity tests are not explicitly requested by
Regulation 1107/2009. AG Sharpston finds that requiring the applicant to submit an
assessment of long-term toxicity would involve additional costs and a longer
authorisation procedure. According to AG Sharpston, the non-existence of such a
requirement is thus a result of a balance that was struck between achieving an
appropriately high level of protection and the added value of authorised products
with the ability of enhancing agricultural productivity.89 The Court, however, has
not tested whether this balance was struck correctly and in conformity with the
precautionary principle. Again, testing whether this balance was struck correctly
would have been material in the assessment of whether the normative framework set
out by Regulation 1107/2009 makes available to competent authorities sufficient
informationtoassesstherisks.Inparticular,itwouldhavebeeninterestingtosee
whether the Court when balancing obligations to submit evidence on long-term
87 H Vainio, Public Health and Evidence-Informed Policy-Making: The Case of a Commonly Used Herbicide
(2020) 46 Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health 107.
88 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 57.
89 Blaise and others, Opinion of Advocate Sharpston, supra, note 4, para 79.
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carcinogenicity and toxicity distinguishes between first-time authorisations and
renewals of authorisations for plant protection products.
b. The Court adopts an analysis of the text of Regulation 1107/2009 in a vacuum
and disregards concerns around its implementation and application
Before the Court presents its findings in response to the questions of the referring court, it
clarifies that general criticism around the approval of glyphosate cannot by itself be
taken to mean that Regulation 1107/2009 is unlawful. According to the Court, [T]he
validity of a provision of EU law is to be assessed according to the characteristics of
those provisions themselves and cannot depend on the particular circumstances of a
given case.90 However, experiences of past cases could make visible potential
problems with the regulation, just as the case of glyphosate has put the shortcomings
of the regulation into focus and led initiatives, such as the European Parliaments
PEST Committee, in their aim to improve the regulation. In her opinion,
AG Sharpston acknowledges this, stating that concerns relating to glyphosate do not
affect the integrity of the regulation [u]nless concerns relating to glyphosate are
shown to be representative of a systemic and fundamental failure undermining the
[Plant Protection Product] Regulation and the aim that that regulation seeks to
achieve.91 There are certainly lessons to be learnt from the glyphosate saga as
elaborated in other contributions in this Special Issue that are nevertheless not
considered by the Court. As can be seen from all of the above examples, instead the
Court adopts a purely mechanical interpretation of the text of Regulation 1107/2009
in a vacuum, without any reference to frequently raised issues around the practical
implementation and application of its respective provisions.
V. C
ONCLUSIONS
By establishing that for Regulation 1107/2009 to be compatible with the precautionary
principle it needs to contain a normative framework that provides to competent
authorities sufficient information to assess the risk of a substance, the Courts
judgement has provided helpful clarification about the normative implications of the
precautionary principle. The latter obligation is likely applicable to similar
regulations setting out authorisation procedures for substances or objects. However,
the standard established by the Court has not been explicitly applied to the different
aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 that the Court is examining in its judgement, and
the judgement therefore lacks guidance as to the practical application of this
standard. Furthermore, the CJEUs judgement examines Regulation 1107/2009 in a
vacuum without considering problems that have occurred in its implementation or
application and therefore constitutes a rather limited assessment of the authorisation
procedure.
90 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 48.
91 Blaise and others, Opinion of Advocate Sharpston, supra, note 4, para 44.
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In a Postscript to her opinion, AG Sharpston refers to the conclusions of the report of
the PEST Committee of the European Parliament, according to which the regulation as
such and its implementation need to be improved for it to achieve its purpose, and she
states that nothing in the AGs opinion should be taken as meaning that there are no areas
of improvement. Her findings merely relate to whether the Regulation is vitiated by a
manifest error and therefore invalid, which she concludes is not the case.92 Possibly,
the Court adopted a rather cursory analysis of Regulation 1107/2009 as is also
evidenced by the relative brevity of the judgement considering the complex subject
matter at hand as it took account of the fact that the authorisation procedure
has already been reviewed by the European Parliament, improved by Regulation
2019/1381 and is currently undergoing the European CommissionsREFIT
programme.93 It is further important to note that the Court finding Regulation
1107/2009 invalid due to its incompatibility with the precautionary principle would
have had vast consequences, as it would remove the legal basis of numerous
substances approved and authorised under Regulation 1107/2009. Thus, the question
of whether the conformity of the EU authorisation procedure for pesticides in
Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle is a fact or merely fiction is
not settled with the CJEUs judgement in Case C-616/17.
92 Blaise and others, Opinion of Advocate Sharpston, supra, note 4, paras 8283.
93 In its Resolution of 16 November 2019, the European Parliament calls on the Commission ::: to submit a specific
legislative proposal to amend the Regulation outside of the ongoing REFIT procedure, with a view to enabling a rigorous
high-quality fast-track evaluation, authorisation and registration process, see European Parliament resolution of
16 January 2019, supra, note 31.
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Article
Full-text available
Few issues in contemporary risk policy are as momentous or contentious as the precautionary principle. Since it first emerged in German environmental policy, it has been championed by environmentalists and consumer protection groups, and resisted by the industries they oppose (Raffensperger & Tickner, 1999). Various versions of the principle now proliferate across different national and international jurisdictions and policy areas (Fisher, 2002). From a guiding theme in European Commission (EC) environmental policy, it has become a general principle of EC law (CEC, 2000; Vos & Wendler, 2006). Its influence has extended from the regulation of environmental, technological and health risks to the wider governance of science, innovation and trade (O'Riordan & Cameron, 1994).
Article
"Despite substantial evidence that Roundup weed killer is safe and non-carcinogenic if used properly, a federal judge last week appointed attorney Kenneth Feinberg to oversee court-mandated settlement talks between Bayer AG (the company that owns Roundup's producer, Monsanto) and plaintiffs who claim that the product caused their non-Hodgkin's lymphoma." (1). For almost half a century, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has run a Monographs programme, which has been the premier global resource for the identification of agents that cause cancer (2). The Monographs apply rigorous procedures for the scientific review and evaluation of carcinogenic hazards by independent experts, free from conflict of interest. Since publishing Monograph conclusions on some pesticides (3), the IARC has been subject to intense efforts to undermine its evaluation and the whole organization. The conclusion in March 2015 that glyphosate is "probably carcinogenic to humans" in addition to being genotoxic and carcinogenic in animals led to unprecedented lobbying by the herbicide producer Monsanto, and resulted in high profile court cases in the USA (4). Monsanto's tactic has been to discredit the glyphosate evaluation, the scientists involved, the Monograph programme and the IARC in general (see the Monsanto papers, 5-7). This has manifested in an orchestrated exercise of damage-generation played out through a coordinated and repetitive misrepresentation of facts, planned already before the March 2015 meeting took place (5). The once-confidential Monsanto papers have exposed the "cozy connections" between the company leadership, some regulatory agencies, and the media to undermine and discredit the actions and evaluation report of the IARC. They have revealed company scientists casually discussing "ghost-writing" scientific papers and suppressing science that conflicts with corporate assertions of Roundup's safety. The Monsanto documents demonstrate the company's manipulation of science and regulators, which may have reflected on the conclusions around the safety of the herbicide (6-8). Evaluations of pesticides IARC has evaluated more than 60 of the 100s of active ingredients in pesticide formulations, less than 12 of which have been formally evaluated as either group 1 (human carcinogens) or 2A (probable human carcinogens) (2). Some of these, such as dichlorodiphenyltrichloromethane (DDT) and lindane, have now been banned in most countries. The evaluation of pesticides typifies the problems associated with research and regulation of commonly used consumer and agricultural products. IARC's evaluation of "probably carcinogenic to humans" (group 2A) is the second strongest category of evidence in a four-tier scale. The industry reaction to the evaluation of glyphosate was not foreseen. The two other chemicals evaluated in the same meeting as probably carcinogenic to humans (group 2A), diazinon and malathion, engendered no public debate. If a widely used herbicide turns out to be a putative cancer-causing chemical, the consequences for the producer can be potentially devastating. In May 2019, a court in California ordered Bayer AG to pay US2billiontoacouplewhoclaimedtheircancerswerecausedbyyearsofusingRoundup.ThiswasthethirdlegallosssinceAugust2018forBayerAG,whichhasseenitsmarketvalueplummetto2 billion to a couple who claimed their cancers were caused by years of using Roundup. This was the third legal loss since August 2018 for Bayer AG, which has seen its market value plummet to 52 billion, cut nearly in half since it acquired Monsanto a year ago (9). More than 13 000 similar claims have been lodged (1). How is the herbicide used 'properly'? Ever since Monsanto introduced its line of Roundup weed-killers in 1974, the products have been touted as extremely safe. The company's statement that glyphosate is "safe and non-carcinogenic if used properly" is difficult to interpret in practice: even if you were dealing with a putative carcinogen, the cancer risk is not realized if you are not exposed to the agent, ie, the product is "safe if used properly". So what is the "proper use" of a herbicide? One would assume it is use that is according to instructions on the label and guidance given by the producer. But when spreading the weed killer, it may be difficult to avoid human exposure. The occupational exposure in agriculture is likely to carry the most significant risk, followed by environmental exposures and risks to the consumers. Occupational exposure of glyphosate may occur via inhalation, dermal contact, and/or ocular contact during manufacture, transport, use and disposal. The absorption through skin is a real possibility. The general population may be exposed to glyphosate through dermal contact with consumer products, crops, foliage, or soils containing residues of this chemical. As a result of the widespread usage, glyphosate is present at low levels in a wide range food items (10). The health risk is dependent on the level of exposure - it is the dose which makes the poison. The more intensively you are exposed, the longer the exposure period, and the higher the risk. The IARC evaluation does not take a position on the quantity or acceptability of the risk. This is not the task of the Agency but rather that of national decision-makers. The IARC evaluation constitutes a 'hazard evaluation' step in the risk assessment and management process - it is followed by an exposure analysis, quantitative risk assessment and risk-benefit analysis done in the policy-making process usually at the national regulatory level. What is evidence-informed policy-making? Simply put, evidence-informed policy is when decision-makers use the best available evidence to guide policy and regulations. Policy-makers in contemporary societies want to use evidence to make well-informed decisions, and scientists and scientific organizations are expected to provide the best evidence for their attention. A good supply of quality evidence and a healthy independent research community that is producing robust policy-relevant research is thus needed. A common issue is how to synthesize evidence that is more often than not sparse, full of gaps, and difficult to manage, to do it in a transparent fashion and to transfer the conclusions into reasonable policy decisions. Evidence-informed policy-making can be undermined by the manipulation or selective use of data, which is often driven by vested interests (11, 12). The point is well-taken in public health, with tobacco a prime example (13). Analysis of millions of internal tobacco industry documents has revealed the multiple strategies via which the tobacco industry has sought to, and often successfully, undermine public health policies (14). Tobacco is clearly an exceptional product; no other consumer product kills two in three users when used exactly as intended (15). But there is little to suggest that, as a corporate actor, "Big Tobacco" differs fundamentally from, eg., "Big Booze" or "Big Food" (16, 17). Disruptions of the scientific process and creation of doubt may lead to delays in translating evidence into policy, with the potential to cost lives (11). Consequently, scientists, toxicologists, epidemiologists, other health professionals, patients and populations have a collective responsibility not simply to be originators of scientific data but to be scrutinizers of their use, thereby protecting the interests of the many rather than the few. Some national regulatory bodies have asserted that glyphosate poses no public risk The regulatory European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have asserted that glyphosate poses no public risk. But the US Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry (ATSDR) has joined IARC in concluding that there is a potential cancer hazard with glyphosate and its formulations (3, 18). Several of the national health agencies in Europe, the USA, and elsewhere have sided with the interpretation of the producer - that the herbicide is safe when used properly. Campaigns against glyphosyte are the strongest in the European Union, where member nations in 2017 only narrowly reapproved a 5-year authorization of the compound. Why this discrepancy? As stated by Alfredo Morabia in a recent American Journal of Public Health editorial, "to defend what they perceive as in their best interests, some corporations not only pressure governmental agencies, they fight them." (19) In the same journal, Jonathan Samet (20) describes how Monsanto has moved extremely aggressively against the science, the unpaid expert volunteers, and institutions such as the IARC. The independent assessment of risk by "unpaid expert volunteers cannot be replaced by reviews from scientists paid by the industry." (20) The risk management may go beyond scientific evidence and imply the contribution of social values and social theory, in contrast to independent risk assessment (21). Through the Monsanto papers, it has become clear that while the company was not willing to conduct the proposed long-term product safety studies (eg, a long-term carcinogenicity bioassay on the formulated product), the company spent millions of dollars on secretive PR campaigns - including 17millioninoneyearaftertheIARCevaluationhadbeenpublishedtofinance"ghostwritten"studiesandeditorialsaimedatdiscreditingindependentscientistswhoseworkhadfounddangerswithMonsantospesticides.Thesecontroversial"ghostwritten"papershavebeenavailableasevidencefornoncarcinogenicityintheregulatoryprocesses.TheEFSAhashadapparentlinkswiththepesticidesindustry,eg,throughorganizationssuchasInternationalLifeSciencesInstitute(ILSI).ArecentanalysisofILSIsactivitiesconcludedthattheorganisation"shouldberegardedasanindustrygroupaprivatebodyandregulatedassuch,notasabodyactingforthegreatergood"(22).WhileILSIpurportstobeworkingforhealthandwellbeingofpopulationsinternationally,theauthorsoftheanalysis"identifiedovertattemptsbyILSItoinfluenceindividuals,positions,andpolicy,bothatnationalandinternationallevels,alongsideclearstatementsthatILSIscorporatemembersdeployitasatooltothwartpoliciesorleaderswhoarehostiletotheirinterests."(22)ItisnoteworthythatthechairofILSIsBoardofTrusteeschairedtheUNsjointFoodandAgricultureOrganization(FAO)/WorldHealthOrganization(WHO)meetingonglyphosatethatfoundtheherbicidetobe"probablynotcarcinogenictohumans"(23).ThiswasofgreatinteresttoILSImajordonorsMonsantoanditsindustryrepresentativeCropLifeInternational.Thefinalmeetingreportincludednoconflictofintereststatement,eventhoughILSIEuropehadreceiveddonationsworthmorethanUS17 million in one year after the IARC evaluation had been published - to finance "ghost-written" studies and editorials aimed at discrediting independent scientists whose work had found dangers with Monsanto's pesticides. These controversial "ghost-written" papers have been available as evidence for non-carcinogenicity in the regulatory processes. The EFSA has had apparent links with the pesticides industry, eg, through organizations such as International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI). A recent analysis of ILSI's activities concluded that the organisation "should be regarded as an industry group - a private body - and regulated as such, not as a body acting for the greater good" (22). While ILSI purports to be working for health and wellbeing of populations internationally, the authors of the analysis "identified overt attempts by ILSI to influence individuals, positions, and policy, both at national and international levels, alongside clear statements that ILSI's corporate members deploy it as a tool to thwart policies or leaders who are hostile to their interests." (22) It is noteworthy that the chair of ILSI's Board of Trustees chaired the UN's joint Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)/World Health Organization (WHO) meeting on glyphosate that found the herbicide to be "probably not carcinogenic to humans" (23). This was of great interest to ILSI major donors Monsanto and its industry representative CropLife International. The final meeting report included no conflict of interest statement, even though ILSI Europe had received donations worth more than US1 million (from Monsanto and Croplife International) (23). The EU hazard-based approach Individuals connected to ILSI continue to play a role in the EU's advisory mechanisms. These activities have contributed to recommendations such as a slew of industry positions on pesticides (23). Their report recommended inter alia that the EU's precautionary hazard -based approach should be re-examined to determine whether it is delivering the intended levels of protection. The report recommended replacing current rules that outlaw any product that could harm with a US-style concept of "acceptable risk" (24). Unique to Europe, "the hazards approach" means that any pesticide found to be carcinogenic, mutagenic, reprotoxic, persistent or bioaccumulative, occurring even at low levels, can be regulated or even banned. Monsanto has been careful to ensure that the US EPA is on board (25). Ominously, EPA staff has been accused of collusion with Monsanto to downgrade the health hazards of glyphosate (26). Jess Rowland, formerly a manager in the EPA's pesticide division, is said to have boasted in an April 2015 conversation with a Monsanto regulatory affairs manager that "If I can kill this, I should get a medal" (27). In October 2015, the EPA's Cancer Assessment Review Committee (CARC), chaired by Rowland, produced an internal report claiming that glyphosate, contrary to the IARC findings, was "not likely to be carcinogenic to humans" (28). The US EPA has recently reconfirmed its position of "no risks to public health when glyphosate is used in accordance with the its current label" and "glyphosate is not a carcinogen" (29). Health risks are not the only concern with glyphosate. The vast increase in its use has also caused a substantial increase in glyphosate-tolerant weeds, dubbed "superweeds" by some (30). Conflict of interests As the proverb states: "Who pays the piper, calls the tune", most of us understand what is meant by "conflict of interest". The professional ethics codes have paid attention to conflicts of interest since 1970s, with better or worse consequences. Connected with conflict of interest, "duty of loyalty" is a term used in corporate law to describe a fiduciary's "conflict of interest". Accordingly, fiduciaries must put the corporation's interests ahead of their own (31). Indeed, the fiduciary responsibilities of all corporations require them to maximize their profits regardless of consequences to health, society, or the environment and thus to oppose policies that could reduce their profits (32). This obviously causes problems in evaluating evidence if the topic of evaluation - such as a particular pesticide - falls under the interest of the corporation. Corporations defend their rights and their primary interests, which most often are financial ones. In the case of public health, the health of the population is the primary interest. In some situations, corporations have meddled in public policy-making on chemicals and topics where they have vested interests in terms of financial profits, trade and market shares. This all means a strong conflict of interest situation: the primary interests in public health are displaced by the interests of the corporations (21). Corporations cannot be expected to assess impartially the potential toxicity of their own products. The independent creation of evidence requires specific procedures and skills necessary to draw conclusions based on the review and summary of a large body of evidence in order for it to be transparent and useful for policy decisions. As Morabia puts it: "IARC Monographs are an ingenious way to do exactly that" (19). Discussion Drawing conclusions on the causation of adverse health effects by environmental chemicals can have important societal consequences, leading to policy-making which can control, limit or even prevent the exposure to the pollutant through regulation and litigation. There are critical lessons to be learned from the Monsanto saga. The whole process of evidence-informed policy-making is under threat. The case of glyphosate is by no means over; further research is needed to cover the knowledge gaps, but this should be done independently and with full transparency. The IARC Monographs provide the scientific evaluation of the evidence based on comprehensive review of the scientific literature, but it remains the responsibility of individual governments and other international organizations to recommend, if any, regulations, legislation and other public health interventions. The IARC Monographs evaluate the hazard, but the societal decisions take also other factors into account while making the risk management decisions. The risk management philosophies for pesticides in various countries are different - in the EU, for example, the hazards (inherent properties) are emphasized while, in the US, the utilitarian acceptable risk approach prevails. The active ingredients for pesticide formulations are under constant development. Sometimes the dominant role of one ingredient may have a damping effect in the innovation paths. This seems to have been the case with the weed-killing chemical glyphosate. The company which produces glyphosate has a central role in the weed-killer and the associated genetically modified tolerant crops market. Glyphosate dominates the field of weed killers worldwide: no compound with a new way of attacking weeds, or mode of action, has been commercialized for more than 30 years (9). Glyphosate is at the center of a public herbicide debate. Cropping systems are currently very reliant on herbicides. If glyphosate is pulled out of the market, what are the alternatives? It is clear that companies need to ramp up their R&D efforts to develop new candidate chemicals - or nonchemical alternatives - and new technologies for sustainable weed control, such as targeted spraying of herbicides directly into weeds, use of lasers, blades or electricity to kill weeds, are needed. Evidence based on independent research provides the best tools to protect humans from harmful products, behaviors, and policies. Many responsible companies that market products that may have wide-spread exposure (such as pesticides) or potentially pose a risk to humans are collaborating internationally to gather the evidence. Instead of attacking the science, scientists, and science organizations and manipulating the media, such companies are working with the science community to secure human health and protect the environment. Disclosure statement In my past career, I served on the IARC Monographs program as a staff member from 1983 to the early 1990s. I have not been involved in the evaluation of glyphosate at any level. I currently have no employment links to the IARC or any financial interests in writing this commentary. While my spouse serves currently as the Director of IARC, she is in no way responsible for any part of the text. All the responsibility lies with me and me only. References 1. Braceras JC. Rounding Up the Science Behind the Roundup Nuisance Litigation. Independent Women's Forum, May 28, 2019. 2. International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). Agents Classified by the IARC Monographs, Volumes 1-124.Available from: https://Monographs.iarc.fr/agents-classified-by-the-iarc/ [Accessed May 30, 2019.] 3. Guyton KZ, Loomis D, Grosse Y, El Ghissassi F, Benbrahim-Tallaa L, Guha N et al. Carcinogenicity of tetrachlorvinphos, parathion, malathion, diazinon, and glyphosate. Lancet Oncol. 2015;16(5):490-1. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1470-2045(15)70134-8 4. Reuters. Monsanto ordered to pay $289 million in Roundup cancer trial. The New York Times; 10 August 2018. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/business/monsanto-roundup-cancer-trial.html. [Accessed May 30, 2019]. 5. Monsanto. Exhibit 42 - IARC Carcinogen Rating of Glyphosyte Preparedness and Engagement Plan. UCSF Library, Chemical Industry Documents. Available from: https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/chemical/docs/#id=xhmn0226. 2015. [Accessed May 31, 2019]. 6. Horel S, Foucart S. The Monsanto Papers, Part 1 - Operation: Intoxication. Environmental Health News. Available from: https://www.ehn.org/monsanto-glyphosyte-cancer-smear-campaign-250910888.html. 2017. [Accessed May 30, 2019]. 7. Horel S, Foucart S. The Monsanto Papers, Part 2 - Reaping a bitter harvest. Environmental health News. Available from: https://www.ehn.org/monsanto-takes-on-world-health-organization-2509721283.html. 2017. [Accessed May 30, 2019]. 8. McHenry LB. The Monsanto Papers: poisoning the scientific well. Int J Risk Saf Med 2018;29(3-4):193-205. https://doi.org/10.3233/JRS-180028. 9. Stokstad E. Costly cancer lawsuits may spur search to replace world's most common weed killer. Science 2019;(May):22. Available from: https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/05/costly-cancer-lawsuits-may-spur-search-replace-worlds-most-common-weed-killer 10. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Health Organization. (WHO). Pesticides residues in food 2016. Special session of the joint FAO/WHO meeting on pesticide residues. FAO plant production and protection paper. Geneva: FAO and WHO; 2017;25(April). Available from: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5693e.pdf 11. Michaels D. Doubt is their Product, How Industry's Assault on Science Threatens Your Health. 1st edition ed., New York: Oxford University Press; 2008. 12. Pearce N. Corporate influences on epidemiology. Int J Epidemiol 2008 Feb;37(1):46-53. https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dym270. 13. Bero L. Implications of the tobacco industry documents for public health and policy. Annu Rev Public Health 2003;24:267-88. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.publhealth.24.100901.140813. 14. World Health Organization. Tobacco Industry Interference with Tobacco Control. Geneva: WHO; 2008. Available from: http://www.who.int/tobacco/resources/publications/Tobacco%20Interference-FINAJ. 15. Roberts M. Tobacco 'kills two in three smokers'. BBC News, 24 February 2015. 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This article, through a series of case studies, ranging from European court cases to the Swedish decision to ban Bisphenol A, shows how regulators, policy makers and the European courts are misinterpreting the precautionary principle and not following the European Commission’s Communication on the topic. In conclusion, the article puts forward a number of short-term and long-term recommendations on how to make the precautionary principle more evidence based and risk informed going forward. Among the recommendations highlighted include the updating of the Communication on the precautionary principle, establishing a proper European academy of sciences and training regulators and policy makers in evidence-based risk communication.
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By virtue of its ambiguity, it has largely been left to the courts to flesh out the scope and application of the precautionary principle. This paper examines the contribution made by EC courts to defining the parameters of precautionary decision making. In so doing, it illustrates that, though the precautionary principle is seen to operate in a number of regulatory contexts, discernible trends in judicial interpretations of precaution and the underlying notion of ‘uncertainty’ can nevertheless be identified. In contrast with early judgments, the courts are beginning to explicitly interpret risk assessment processes as having a pivotal role in determining precautionary intervention. Rather than finding simply that circumstances of uncertainty warrant precautionary measures, the courts have started to require that clear, or ‘concrete’, evidence of harm, deriving from risk assessment, is established before intervention is justified. This paper posits three explanations for this shift: (i) the ‘better regulation’ initiative within Europe; (ii) the Commission's Communication on the Precautionary Principle; and (iii) WTO litigation on precautionary safeguard measures. The judicial move to affiliate precaution with risk assessment processes in decision making can be seen as a reflection of these factors.
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Envisaging anticipatory preventive action in response to uncertainty, the precautionary principle represents an important milestone in risk reduction. The question is no longer merely how to prevent assessable risks, but rather how to anticipate risks pervaded by uncertainty. By leaving behind the realm of "sound science," precaution necessarily gives rise to conflict. As regards the status and the implementation of that principle, the aim of this article is to explore some of the key issues arising in environmental and food safety cases brought before the Tribunal of First Instance, the European Court of Justice and the EFTA Court.
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Abstract The European,Commission,is actively promoting,the precautionary,principle as a “key tenet” of Community,policy as well as a general principle of international law. This paper explains why,this promotional,effort is likely to fail or to produce,unanticipated and undesirable,consequences.,The principle has a legitimate but limited role to play in risk management, for example whenever there is an imminent danger of irreversible damage. As a general approach to risk regulation, however, it suffers from a number of shortcomings: it lacks a sound logical foundation; it may distort regulatory priorities; it can be misused to justify protectionist measures; it undermines international regulatory cooperation; and it may have undesirable distributive consequences. What is perhaps even more worrisome, the principle, as interpreted by the Commission, tends to favour a double standard for what is permissible internationally,and,in intra -Community ,relations. Thus ,the ,Commission ,seems ,willing ,to risk international isolation and,the segmentation,of the European market,for the sake of an ambiguous,and poorly understood principle. This paper suggests some possible explanations of this puzzle, but its main focus is on the conceptual problems,and policy implications of the principle itself. I.,Introduction Like the English constitution according to Walter Bagehot, the precautionary approach includes two distinct sets of elements: the “dignified” parts (“those which bring it force”), and the “efficient” parts (“those by whic h it, in fact, works”). In its “dignified” aspect the approach purports to provide a legitimate basis for taking protective regulatory measures,even when,reliable scientific evidence
Public Health and Evidence-Informed Policy-Making: The Case of a Commonly Used Herbicide" (2020) 46 Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health 107. 88 Blaise and others, supra, note 1
  • H Vainio
H Vainio, "Public Health and Evidence-Informed Policy-Making: The Case of a Commonly Used Herbicide" (2020) 46 Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health 107. 88 Blaise and others, supra, note 1, para 57.