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Przegląd Narodowościowy / Review of Nationalities • nr 9/2019 • Sports as the expression of nation issues
* Correspondence address: 8 Ilia Chavchavadze Avenue, Tbilisi, 0179, Georgia, Tbilisi State University,
Academic Building N6, e-mail: sandro.tabatadze010@sps.tsu.edu.ge.
ISSN 2084-848X (print) • ISSN 2543-9391 (on-line) • DOI 10.2478/pn-2019-0016
Sandro Tabatadze*
Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Georgia
https://orcid.org//0000-0002-9239-7441
Far right political stances: the same trend in Georgia?
Introduction
Nowadays, the study of the new far right social movements and political parties is be-
coming more and more popular. e primary reason for this can be explained with their
growing electoral support and success. e experience of European countries shows that
some of these groups have managed to become the government coalition member or
created a new political agenda (Mudde, 2017: 5). Approximately the similar trends have
been observed in Georgia which independent statehood has been around for three dec-
ades. e principled foreign policy course of European integration is recognized at the
constitutional level (e Constitution of Georgia, Article 78, 1995). During the rise of
Europeanization and the European lifestyle, ultra-nationalist forces are becoming active
in Georgia (Wales, 2017). ey are in formation process and have less public visibili-
ty, though they may echo the political stances of some citizens. Although recent public
opinion polls show that more than 70% of population supports Euro-Atlantic foreign
course of the country, still anti-European sentiments appears (Results of Public Opinion
Polls in Georgia, 2019). As there is no successful experience of such political forces in
Georgia, it is not easy to characterize their political positions and values. In this point
of view, it is interesting to set up the major features of far right movements based on the
contemporary experience of Georgia.
As the goal of the study is to determine how relevant European understanding of
far right with the similar movements’ political positions in Georgia is, it is essential to
choose theory of radical/extreme/far right that meets the context of Georgia. Studying
the issue, scholars usually focus on political parties and movements that avowed state
already mentioned political positions. While in some European countries the tradition
of far right has been around for several decades (Taggart, 1995: 34), Georgia, with its
Soviet past, has the history of independence only from 1991. On the one hand, under
the inuence of Europeanization, it still remains the part of the wave, and on the oth-
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Sandro Tabatadze
er hand, the crisis of legitimization of political system is also emerging (Nodia, Scholt-
bach, 2006: 30). In the wake of turbulent political landscape and non-inclusive econom-
ic growth, the country faces a serious problem of emigration: 2.5% of the population
leaves it annually (Geostat, 2019). e outcome of the challenges has been reected in
various forms, including the activation of nationalist forces. eir political messages
stress threats of the disappearance of family values and traditions by the political West
that supports LGBT community (Roth, 2019). Nevertheless, in the party spectrum, only
conservative, but not far right, groups are on the stage, which can be explained with
turbulent party landscape. us, nowadays in Georgia, the forces expressing ultra-na-
tionalistic messages are not parties, but movements and some of them informal groups.
e most visible is Georgian March ocially founded in 2017, occasionally making
radical political statements and holding demonstrations (Stephan, 2018). ey most-
ly support anti-immigration and anti-LGBT policies, sharing pro-Church (Orthodox
Christian) positions rejecting Western anti-religion propaganda. In 2018, the leaders
(Sandro Bregadze and Gia Korkotashvili) of the movement declared to form national
patrol against illegal immigrants (e anatomy of Georgian neo-Nazism, 2018). Inter-
estingly, that in April 2019, Georgian March announced that the new, nationalistic po-
litical party can be merged that would be similar to Marine Le Pen’s National Rally and
would support to write Georgian ethnicity in Georgian citizens passports (Georgian far-
right groups reach agreement about forming new political party, 2019).
Another distinguished movement is Georgian National Unity that is friendly with
Georgian March during demonstrations. Founded in 2016 as non-governmental orga-
nization, it has its leader and chancellor and uses black antlers as the symbol instead
of swastika (Who threatens to create the civilian guard, 2019). During the Family Puri-
ty Day (against the international day of Homophobia, Transphobia, Biphobia) found-
ed by Georgian Orthodox Christian Church, one of the protesters, Beka Lolashvili, said
to the journalist that their movement ideology is “Georgian Fascism” (Member of Na-
tional Unity: We are Georgian fascists, 2018). Also, the leader of the movement, Giorgi
Chelidze, declared that they support fascism and national-socialism. He also stressed
that their organization would form the army of black armbands who will use dierent
types of weapons and rearms. In addition, as Chelidze assumes, they have strict rules
and use Fascist greetings (How women are accepted into the Georgian fascist organiza-
tions and where they are forbidden to love, 2018). Nowadays, he is in prison on charg-
es of illegal possession of rearms and ammunition (13 lawyers are defending the lead-
er of National Unity, 2018).
Anti-liberals as a Facebook group was founded in 2016. Citizens who share the sim-
ilar political positions and values are joined in the group. e social media platform is
private and claims that abusing the Orthodox Christian religion is inadmissible. In 2017,
they made page named as Anti-liberal club that usually posts news connected to LGBT
community rights, rising numbers of immigrants, importance of maintaining Christian
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Far right political stances: the same trend in Georgia?
and family values (Anti-liberal club, 2019). Most of the posts are made by Alt-Info that
usually writes about the anti-political correctness, anti-abortion, anti-LGBT, anti-im-
migration issues (Alt-Info, 2019). Another, but informal, underground group is Edel-
weiss whose members meet and share anti-system views. Most of them are young and
rarely emerging at public places. e group was founded in 2015 and they participat-
ed in September 27, 2016 demonstration against immigrants on Agmashenebeli Ave-
nue. e rally participants shouted repetitively: “Georgia for Georgians” (e EMC re-
sponds to the violence on September 27 by ultranationalist groups, 2016), which reveals
xenophobic sentiments. e social media page of Edelweiss protested “the existence of
Turkish and Arab bar brothels where Georgian girls work” (Neo-Nazis march in Tbili-
si – symbol of white nationalism, 2016). Although these movements have not institu-
tionalized yet, the rise of the similar sentiments in Europe and the Europeanization of
Georgia itself can establish the fertile ground for ultra-right positions. It is possible for
them to become more inuential social movement or political party that increases their
chances at 2020 parliamentary election with the lowest natural threshold. Hence, we be-
lieve it is noteworthy to study political positions of these four movements. First of all,
this allows us to characterize their political visions at the formation level and compare
it with their further development. Moreover, it is interesting how congruent Georgian
experience with understanding of far right in Europe is.
e article is divided into three parts. e rst presents the theoretical framework
and research methodology, the second overviews the recent political features of Geor-
gia and the third part presents the results of the research.
Theoretical framework and methodology
ere are active discussions about “right-wing radicalism”, “right-wing extremism” and
“far right” in contemporary social and political sciences. It can be said that the major
challenge for scholars is to select the appropriate term and serious debates go on about
the concept that meets the content of ultra-nationalism. ere have been several empir-
ical works on the issue over the last two decades (Koopmans, 1997: 149-164; Rydgren,
2005: 413-437; Von Beyme 2007: 1-18). However, as Paul Hainsworth points out the
discussion about the term is delayed as these political forces, in some cases, are already
government coalition members of European countries. e author stresses that the uni-
versal understanding of the concept has been disappearing (Hainsworth, 2008: 4). Cas
Mudde believes that nowadays right-wing extremism is more socio-political jargon and
has no clear denition (Mudde, 1996: 205). According to Roger Eatwell, it is a conve-
nient, but awed report (Eatwell, 2003: 11). ese academic debates about the notion
may continue perennially, unless we focus on the content and characters of the term it-
self. In this point of view, we can distinguish Anglo-Saxon and German schools of un-
derstanding of the right-wing. In the rst case, radical and extremists political right are
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synonyms, the margins between them does not occur and, in general, this understand-
ing means opposition platform to liberal democracy and globalism. e German school
distinguishes right-wing extremism and radicalism. e rst type, extremism, is based
on the counter-vision of constitutional democracy and may resemble the well-known
concept of friend-enemy in political theory. For the second type, radicalism, it has inter-
mediate location between democracy and extremism and, therefore, this political plat-
form stays in the democratic framework (Ivaldi, 2004). We can assume that the major
dierence between German and Anglo-Saxon schools stems from the Nazi background.
e rst one sees a clear dierence between anti-system extremism and anti-government
radicalism, while the second focuses of any opposition to liberal democratic regime.
One of the rst scholars interested in the origins of the far right political forces was
Piero Ignazi. e representative of German school, in his article “Silent Counter-Revo-
lution” outlined the four key reasons for strengthen radical right: neoconservative cul-
tural character, polarization, crisis of legitimacy and anti-migration policy (Ignazi, 1992:
3-34). e author believes that the growing public dissatisfaction with Post-materialistic
“new politics” has transformed into the neoconservative cultural character that largely
based on the principles of anti-minority and strong law and order. Ignazi points out that
polarization of party politics and crises of legitimacy strengthened aggressive groups,
focusing on anti-immigration and xenophobic political messages. At the same time, de-
mocracy has failed to respond and this process became “silent counter-revolution” ex-
pressed in right-wing radicalism. e author assesses the socio-political shis in West-
ern European countries in 1980s. As Ignazi points out, before 1980s far right has been
the synonymous of neo-Nazi (Ignazi, 2003: 1). at is why he also dierentiates between
the groups with Nazi political experience and new radical right-wing movements. We
can conclude that the major ndings of the author caused the further interest on the is-
sue and development of new research elds. However, the goal of that study covers dif-
ferent historical and geographical areas and is less relevant to use as the modern under-
standing of far right. In addition, the variables of that research are more likely proxies
for far right politics more than basic characteristics.
Another noteworthy theory has been developed by Gilles Ivaldi. He identies four
main components of far right: negative attitudes toward immigration, authoritarian
trends, economic protectionism and anti-systemic populism (Ivaldi, 2004). e author
draws on the experience of the Anglo-Saxon school as he does not dierentiate the rad-
ical and extremist positions. Although the criteria presented by Ivaldi can be used to
characterize the political positions of modern far right, the understanding of the con-
cept pose a number of questions. First of all, economic protectionism can be character-
istic of any conservative or social-democratic government too, and labelling it denite-
ly as far right makes it less valid. In addition, for the author, the far right political par-
ty or movement should share all four of these components that limit the content of the
term, focusing only on these criteria. Also, it is unclear what kind of positions move-
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Far right political stances: the same trend in Georgia?
ment share if it satises only two or three components from this list. Finally, it is un-
known how to measure whether political party or movement meets the criteria. Like
Ivaldi, Mudde also presents the key indicators of far right that unlike the discussed the-
ories rely on rankings and use German school experience. According to the author, the
main indicators are: nationalism, xenophobia, belief in authoritarianism and a chau-
vinistic social programme (Mudde, 2007: 15-22). Mudde notes that if social or politi-
cal group shows the rst and second indicators (nationalism and xenophobia), it shares
nativism. If the third (belief in authoritarianism) is added, it expresses the radical right-
wing and in the case of supporting social chauvinism policy, it reaches the right-wing
extremism. is typology is less rigid and more exible. Nevertheless, it pays less atten-
tion to how to measure the levels of nationalistic or xenophobic political stances. For
the author, it is possible to label any type (nativist, radical, extremist) to any political
group by analyzing its manifestos and public speeches. We reckon this theory is more
relevant not to newly founding, but already institutionalized political unions, while our
research tries to determine political positions of emerging far right groups, so this ap-
proach will be less relevant.
As we can see, the authors are trying to formulate the features of the far right. While
the German school, unlike the Anglo-Saxon experience, focuses on the distinction be-
tween radicalism and extremism, the authors of both approach agree that the under-
standing of the concept should include these issues: anti-system and anti-immigration
sentiments, strong law and order, nationalistic and xenophobic policies. Synthesizing
these basic principles, Hainsworth proposes the features of far right aer empirical re-
search (Hainsworth, 2008: 5-23). It can be argued that it is more the results of the de-
velopment of existing academic literature than the attempt to create a new classication.
Interestingly, the author draws on the experience of both schools and features, and on
the one hand, focuses on the opposition to globalization and liberal democracy (Anglo-
Saxon school) and on the other hand, stresses the dierence between radicalism and ex-
tremism (German school). Also, Hainsworth shares the components that occur in both
approaches. e author’s four major criteria (features) are: foreign policy, identity pol-
icy, socio-ethical issues, neo-populism/democracy framework. It should be highlight-
ed that it allows us to represent them as measurable indicators. For instance, foreign
policy covers the attitudes towards globalization, immigration and neighborhood poli-
cy (Hainsworth, 2008: 5-23). At the same time, this approach can be used to study cas-
es when the positions of political movements are not clear, which meets the goal of our
research. Hence, we use the Hainsworth’s understanding of the far right as the theoret-
ical framework of this study.
e empirical research on this issue is one of the rst in Georgia, so it is important
to process the primary data. As the selected movements do not have manifestos, the
understanding of their platform could only be done with a survey. erefore, we used
questionnaire in a form of face-to-face interview. is method helps us to compare re-
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spondents positions on the same issues with the same items. Interestingly, not all the
movements specied the number of their members, as mostly they do not have insti-
tutionalized organizational structure and permanent members. ey usually have sup-
porters and protesters who join them during the protests. erefore, the political po-
sitions of these movements can be examined through the permanent representatives
of these groups: founding members and political leaders. Hence, we used convenience
sampling: surveys with the criteria of ocial leader or/and founder. Aer that, we asked
them to be tied with their deputies, active and permanent members of their movement,
so snowball sampling was used. Because of the less organized structure and lack of the
will to share the exact number of their members, some of these movements represent-
ed only 3 respondents (political leaders, active permanent members and founders). To
ensure the same proportion, making survey with the same number of respondents was
decided. erefore, 3 members from 4 most visible movements (Georgian March, Edel-
weiss, Georgian National Unity, Anti-liberals) were surveyed anonymously, as some of
them are underground community members.
e questionnaire is divided into 4 thematic categories (according to the theoretical
framework): foreign policy, identity policy, socio-ethical issues, neo-populism/democ-
racy framework. Table 1 shows categories and relevant indicators we set out at state-
ments in the questionnaire.
Table 1. Criteria and indicators of the questionnaire of this study
Criteria Indicators
Foreign policy Positions on globalization, migration and neighborhood
(Russia, Turkey, EU, NATO), political neutrality
Identity policy Positions on national, regional (Caucasian, European)
identity, multi-culture, Christian values
Socio-ethical issues Positions on death penalty, abortion, violence over
women, anti-discrimination law, gender equality, social
chauvinism
Neo-populism/frame
of democracy
Position of representation of general will of the people,
politicians and parties, political system, supremacy of law
Source: own elaboration.
In order to ensure diversity of political positions, the questionnaire contains 50 state-
ments that cover 4 categories. Respondents should rate the statements on 1-5 point Lik-
ert scale, where 1 means – “strongly disagree”, 2 – “disagree”; 3 – “neutral”; 4 – “agree”,
5 – “strongly agree”. It is important to compare positions of the movement members, as
well as the average score of the dierent categories that allows us to determine whether
respondent answers vary with dierent category. During processing the data, the scores
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Far right political stances: the same trend in Georgia?
for statements will be positioned that 5 reects far right political position (though in
the questionnaire some statements are reverse, as respondents do not consider the same
number with the same positions). e results will be presented with average scores.
If this gure is between 4 and 5 in each category, we can assume that it meets with far
right political positions by theoretical framework. However, this technique of research
has several limitations. Firstly, it determines the positions of movement members by al-
ready formulated statements so some special opinion of a respondent can be neglected.
In addition, the consistency of statements is under the question that can face the lack
of validity. And last, but not least, when respondents “strongly agree” with some state-
ments, it can be radical right position, but it is hard to determine which political stance
expresses the answer “strongly disagree” on the same statement. Nevertheless, as the goal
of the research focuses on characterization of the political positions of newly emerged
movements, this methodology can be relevant. Taking into account that this research is
the rst attempt to collect the data, it has crucial importance to provide the same state-
ments for all respondents to avoid interpretations. is technique allows us to compare
movements’ positions on dierent category, as well as between their members. Moreo-
ver, calculating Cronbach’s Alfa, it can be possible to discuss about the internal consist-
ency of the statements. As for the opposite benchmark of far right, we can present the
scale as measurement of non-far right/far right political positions.
Overview of contemporary politics of Georgia
Before presenting the results of the research, for a better understanding of the context,
we reckon it is essential to present a brief overview of key political paradigms of modern
Georgian history. Georgia declared independence in 1991 aer the collapse of the Sovi-
et Union. is was preceded by a few years of powerful national-liberation movement.
While standing on nationalistic political platform, its narrative was clearly anti-Soviet
and we cannot identify it with any king of far right position. In the rst half of the 1990s,
on the one hand, the collapse of the Soviet centralized economy and on the other hand,
the series of civil wars in the country made signicant changes in the social structure
of the population. In 1995-2003, the new, but soviet-experienced, government tried to
established relations with the West and supported economic cooperation and ‘freezing’
of existing territorial conicts with Russia. e level of poverty had been increasing and
corruption had become integral part of daily life of the Georgian citizens. Although de-
clarative nationalistic forces had been emerging from time to time, their political posi-
tions and inuence were insignicant as the sustainability of the state institutions them-
selves were under the question (Wheatley, 2005: 114). Public dissatisfaction turned into
the Rose Revolution in November 2003 when the new political group gained the con-
stitutional majority and stressed the Euro-Atlantic integration as the only foreign pol-
icy goal of Georgia (Wheatley, 2005: 114). Following the footsteps of the democratiza-
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tion and Westernization path, the citizens who has failed to make a drastic change have
been marginalized. We can assume that society was divided into winners and losers of
Rose Revolution. Finally, due to authoritarian actions, the government lost public sup-
port and as a result of the 2012 parliamentary elections, for the rst time in the history
of independent Georgia, the government was replaced by elections.
Under the new government, the Euro-Atlantic foreign policy course was declared
once again (Wheatley, 2005: 175), demonstrated by the Association Agreement with the
EU, the 90-day visa-free travel to the Schengen area and joint military exercises with
NATO. In addition, on every step on the Western integration path, Russia (with which
Georgia has severed diplomatic relations since the 2008 Georgia-Russia war) is shiing
its creeping occupation line and incorporating several Georgian villages (Coey, 2018).
Although there is a little support for pro-Russian political parties (usually non-parlia-
mentary opposition) in Georgia, in 2018 in the constitution of the country it was still
written down that “constitutional bodies should take all measures to ensure full inte-
gration into the European Union and NATO” (e Constitution of Georgia, Article 78,
1995). It can be assumed that this record was done to avoid potential threats in future.
In Georgia, where the major social-economic conditions remain the biggest challenge,
the anti-discrimination law (adopted in 2014 during the process of Associate Agree-
ment with the EU) has become controversial, as it gives equal rights and opportunities
to all minorities (New anti-discrimination law: Challenges and achievement, 2014). e
value-based debate started on the issue of selling/not selling agrarian land to foreign-
ers. Initially, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the bill to protect limited land resourc-
es, though later the Constitutional Court declared it unconstitutional. Proponents of
the idea (including the Georgian March that we are studying in this research) believed
foreigners should not own Georgian historical lands, while opponents emphasized the
necessity for investments and an open economy.
During the last two decades in Georgia (with the growing process of Europeaniza-
tion), the political elite have referred to any change as synonymous with European, West-
ern and progressive. us, citizens who have felt the poverty and ination during this
time are alienated, and may be opposed, from the mentioned concepts. An alternative
to these empty words can connect with far right platform with supporting anti-system
agenda focusing on anti-minority and anti-immigration stances. ough, as we already
stressed, there have not been the vivid positions in the party spectrum so far and, there-
fore, for the research we have chosen political unions that are in the formation process.
Results of the research
First and foremost, to determine and provide the internal consistency of the state-
ments, we calculated Cronbach’s Alpha that is +0.7. is allows us to present the aggre-
gate average scores from all items. Also, the standard deviation for each movement is
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Far right political stances: the same trend in Georgia?
less than 0.4, which shows we can present average score for each movement aggregated
their member positions. As the statements in this questionnaire are divided into 4 cate-
gories, we believe it is more appropriate initially to review the results for each category.
Although it does not express each movement positions, still it shows the general trends
among respondents. Aer that, we will compare results between selected movements.
Foreign policy
is part of questionnaire consists of propositions on globalization, immigration, neigh-
bourhood policies and political neutrality. First of all, it should be mentioned that if the
aggregate average score is in 4-5 gap, it allows us to talk about the far right political po-
sitions. Data processing revealed that the respondents generally agree (+4.5) that “the
process of globalization is against with national Georgian interests”. e greater sup-
port is visible for the proposition that the citizenship rule should be stricter. e simi-
lar results show that the respondents clearly expressed the desire to adopt the strict mi-
gration policy. In addition, there is a strong support with the idea that increasing share
of ethnic minorities in Georgia is a problem for the security of the country. If we take
into account the recent demographic trends (natural growth of ethnic Georgian is de-
creasing), it is easier to explain why the far right position is so unanimously supported.
As we have already mentioned, the reinforcement of these sentiments can be the
counter-reaction to the process of Europeanization. us, prepositions also covered
EU-Georgia relations. Interestingly, according to the respondents, by the rapproche-
ment process with Europe, Georgian values (+3.7) are more harmed than Georgian
economy (+2.8). Such Euro-skeptic positions should be explained by cultural aliena-
tion factors rather than economic ones. However, the clear position about the given is-
sue is not expressed by the aggregated data. e more nihilistic stance is presented on
the issue of membership of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that declared
to support (+4.3) the preposition that under the occupied territories, it is impossible to
join this military-political organization. Despite the avowed Euro-Atlantic foreign po-
litical course, the answers of the respondents are dierent. In this point, questionnaire
also included prepositions that measured the respondents support for political neutral-
ity and strategic partnership with Russia (see Table 2).
Table 2. Respondent support for foreign policy directions
of Georgia
Political
neutrality
Strategic
partnership
with Russia
Membership
of the UE
Membership
of NATO
+2.3 +2.5 +2.7 +3.2
Source: own elaboration.
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As it turns out, the general trend shows that membership of NATO has relatively high
support, though this score is closer to the neutrality benchmark. erefore, we assume
that these groups have not yet come to the common position on this issue. However, in
the context of the neighbourhood policy, at least two issues have been identied, with
relatively similar positions. e rst is desire to restore political relations with Russia,
while the second is to perceive Turkey’s policy as the threat to Georgia. Although Tur-
key is one of Georgia’s major economic partners, Adjara (the border region of Georgia
with Turkey) has signicant Turkish inuences in social-cultural elds too. Interest-
ingly, political groups loyal to Russia usually portrait Turkey as the historical enemy of
Georgia, stressing religious dierences between the countries.
Identity policy
In this part of the questionnaire, the majority of respondents completely agreed with the
statement that Georgian identity is in danger. At the same time, all of them see process
of globalization as being against the national interests and identities. As we can assume,
for the respondents, global political processes are one of the causes of the national iden-
tity crisis. Also, the strong link between Georgian and Caucasian or European identi-
ties was not revealed. e responses are close to the neutrality benchmark that the re-
gional identity issue is not problematic for these political unions. Nevertheless, the is-
sue of the religious identity is clearly outlined. e respondents believe that Christian
values should be further strengthened as nowadays they are weakened (+4.7). When we
link this position with the citizenship rule and growth of ethnically non-Georgian pop-
ulation, we can assume this chain of reasons can be proxy for undermining Georgian,
Christian values for given political union members.
Socio-ethical issues
In this part of the questionnaire, only a few positions of the respondents were unani-
mous. is concerns the priority of employing ethnic Georgians, banning the sale of ag-
ricultural land to foreigners and anti-abortion policy. First and foremost, the emphasiz-
ing the prioritization of ethnic Georgians is not grounded by general economic problems
rather than manifests social chauvinism. is is also evidenced by strong opposition to
sell agrarian land to foreigners. is picture reminds already tested political message in
Europe which in this case sounds like: “Georgia for Georgians”. e anti-abortion stance
is somehow linked to necessity of reinforce Christian values that is also a trend in West-
ern politics. is issue is related to strongly supported statements that “Christianity is
superior to other religions” (+4.8) and “propaganda of Islam should be restricted” (+4).
e religious cleavage has two main reasons. e rst one is linked to the Turkish issue,
as most of the respondents believe that this country conducts policy against the Geor-
gian interests and in this point, religion can be seen as the so power of Turkish policy.
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e second is the statement about Asian immigrants who are incompatible with Geor-
gian culture (+4.2) in the context of their Muslim religion.
It is also noteworthy that some respondents attribute highlighting gender equality
and family violence issues to Western propaganda and mass media manipulation. At
the same time, they are against of free manifestation and expression of sexual minor-
ities and are strongly opposed to civil partnership between them (+4.8). ese topics
are related to anti-discrimination law that is seen as damageable for Georgian interests
for most of the respondents. Although the stances in this part are more or less similar,
there is no consensus on the issues of law and order. For instance, the death penalty and
stricter laws are unresolved topics for many respondents. However, as a rule, generally
European far right parties have clear positions on law and order issue.
Neo-populism/framework of democracy
e dierences between the respondents’ positions are clearly outlined from this part
of the questionnaire. A third of them see their future activities in the legislative frame-
work, while others do not refuse to violate the law. e results suggest that while these
unions are in the formation process, radical and extremist assumptions may already
be drawn that comes from German school experience. However, all of the respondents
share the idea that political elite and politicians are corrupted, foreign-funded and do
not express the general will of the people. At the same time, they believe that their un-
ion shares “the will of the people”. ese stances are linked to the neo-populism and in-
crease the likelihood of their future participation into party politics.
We presented the average score for all respondents for each category (see Table 3).
According to the aggregated data, the foreign policy category fails to meet 4.0-5.0 gap,
while the category of identity policy is on the margin of error. However, it should be
Table 3. Average scores (from 1 to 5) of all respondents by c ategories
Source: own elaboration.
3,31
3,96
4,31
4,36
neo-populism (+4,36) social-ethical issues (+4,31) identity policy (+3, 96) foreign policy (+3,31)
3,3
3,9 4,1 4,4
anti-liberals Georgian National Uni ty Georgian Marsh edelweiss
3,31
3,96
4,31
4,36
neo-populism (+4,36) social-ethical issues (+4,31) identity policy (+3, 96) foreign policy (+3,31)
3,3
3,9 4,1 4,4
anti-liberals Georgian National Uni ty Georgian Marsh edelweiss
218 Sandro Tabatadze
Przegląd Narodowościowy / Review of Nationalities
nr 9/2019
noted that the average scores outlined by the members of the two unions (Edelweiss
and Georgian Marsh) were above 4.0 even in these two categories. More similar results
are shown with socio-ethical and neo-populism parts, average score for each union ex-
ceeded 4 and meets far right political positions.
On the other hand, dierent results are outlined between political unions (see Ta-
ble 4). e average score of Anti-liberals is 3.3 which means its member positions are
close to the neutrality benchmark according to the aggregated data from all statements.
e result of Georgian National Unity almost coincides (with a deviation of only 0.1)
the threshold of 4. As for Georgian Marsh and Edelweiss, their scores are in the gap of
far right political platform.
It should be highlighted that results calculated both at category and political union
levels show a few exceptions from the general trend. In the case of foreign policy, respond-
ents overall reported the least radical positions. Also, in comparison to other political
union members, representatives of Anti-liberals outlined more neutral attitudes towards
the questionnaire statements. Due to the small number of the respondents, using the cor-
relation coecient is less relevant. However, it is still possible to nd more or less strong
links between dierent variables. For instance, the respondents who perceive globaliza-
tion as the threat to national identity are more likely to be in favour of stricter immigra-
tion policy. Also, the more they believe the idea that Turkey is conducting disingenuous
policy with Georgia, the more they support the limitation necessity of Islam propaganda.
In addition, aer cross-tabulation analysis, several issues can be observed. e respon-
dents who believe that politicians in Georgia are largely foreign-funded are more likely
to support Georgia’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization than join-
ing the EU and support of the idea of political neutrality (see Table 5). Although 75% of
the respondents support the restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia, the idea of
strategic partnership is still unfavourable. Generally, according to the data, it can be con-
Table 4. Average scores (from 1 to 5) of all respondents by political movements
Source: own elaboration.
3,31
3,96
4,31
4,36
neo-populism (+4,36) social-ethical issues (+4,31) identity policy (+3, 96) foreign policy (+3,31)
3,3
3,9 4,1 4,4
anti-liberals Georgian National Uni ty Georgian Marsh edelweiss
3,31
3,96
4,31
4,36
neo-populism (+4,36) social-ethical issues (+4,31) identity policy (+3, 96) foreign policy (+3,31)
3,3
3,9 4,1 4,4
anti-liberals Georgian National Uni ty Georgian Marsh edelweiss
219
Przegląd Narodowościowy / Review of Nationalities
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Far right political stances: the same trend in Georgia?
Table 5. Crosstab analysis: answers on foreign policy course out of the respondents
who believe that Georgian politicians are mostly foreign-funded
Source: own elaboration.
cluded that for these political unions foreign policy course is undetermined. erefore,
we can assume that cleavages of their politics are focused on domestic political issues.
Another observation shows on Table 6. 77,5% of the respondents who “strong-
ly agree” that “ethnic Georgians should be given priority at the workplace” (referring
to social chauvinism), “fully” or “mostly” share all of the core principles of democracy.
e explanation of these surprising results can be typical understanding of the values
Table 6. Crosstab analysis: answers on sharing all democratic principles out of the respondents
who believe in prioritization of ethnical Georgians on the workplace
Source: own elaboration.
22,50%
40%
37,50%
neutral positions
mostly agree
absolutely agree
sharing all democratic principles
0% 0%
25%
37,50% 37,50%
12,50% 12,50%
37,50%
25%
12,50%
12,50%
25%
50%
12,50%
0%
strongly disagree mostly disagree neutral positions mostly agree strongly agree
NATO membership EU membership political neutrality
22,50%
40%
37,50%
neutral positions
mostly agree
absolutely agree
sharing all democratic principles
0% 0%
25%
37,50% 37,50%
12,50% 12,50%
37,50%
25%
12,50%
12,50%
25%
50%
12,50%
0%
strongly disagree mostly disagree neutral positions mostly agree strongly agree
NATO membership EU membership political neutrality
22,50%
40%
37,50%
neutral positions
mostly agree
absolutely agree
sharing all democratic principles
0% 0%
25%
37,50% 37,50%
12,50% 12,50%
37,50%
25%
12,50%
12,50%
25%
50%
12,50%
0%
strongly disagree mostly disagree neutral positions mostly agree strongly agree
NATO membership EU membership political neutrality
22,50%
40%
37,50%
neutral positions
mostly agree
absolutely agree
sharing all democratic principles
0% 0%
25%
37,50% 37,50%
12,50% 12,50%
37,50%
25%
12,50%
12,50%
25%
50%
12,50%
0%
strongly disagree mostly disagree neutral positions mostly agree strongly agree
NATO membership EU membership political neutrality
220 Sandro Tabatadze
Przegląd Narodowościowy / Review of Nationalities
nr 9/2019
of democracy for these political union members who do not hesitate to stress the eth-
nicity in their homeland.
Conclusions
e goal of the study has been to determine the major features of Georgian far right
movements using the European-experienced understanding of the concept. It should be
mentioned that there is no consensus about the term in the academic society. Instead of
the notions of radical and extremist right, we used more general term – far right. How-
ever, we provided the statement about the supremacy of law in the questionnaire. e
members of Edelweiss and Georgian March are ready to violate the law and the consti-
tution if necessary, while representatives of the Georgian National Unity and Anti-liber-
als declare to act in the legislative framework. Rating the respondents’ statements from
1 to 5, for each case the average score from 4 to 5 is considered to be far right political
position (and the signicant proportion of the respondents were exactly in this gap).
us, according to the aggregated data, it is possible to discuss the key political
characteristics of these far right movements. First of all, it is undecided or neutral
position on foreign policy both on political neutrality or partnership with Russia,
EU or NATO. However, the similar stances are visible with non-friendly perception
of Turkey, limitation necessity of Islam propaganda and strong link between grow-
ing number of non-ethnic Georgians and national security issues. Moreover, it in-
cludes portrayal of globalization as damaging Georgian national identity (that is nei-
ther part of the Caucasian not European) and support for a strong immigration poli-
cy with sharing the ideas of incompatibility with Georgian culture and restrictions to
sale agriculture land to foreigners. Another important point is connection between
Georgian identity with traditional Christian values that appear in anti-abortion, an-
ti-sexual minority rights and gender inequality positions. e majority of respon-
dents also support social chauvinism in the terms of prioritizing of ethnic Georgians
at the workplace that can be echo of hard socio-economic problems of the country.
In addition, the respondents share the ideas that European new anti-system parties
present. In particular, they perceive other politicians and political groups as corrupt,
elite, foreign-funded institutions and at the same time, self-identify as the protectors of
“the will and national interest of the people”. is neo-populist approach suggests that
surveyed political movements may become anti-system parties in the future.
is study has made it possible to identify the major features of far right groups in
Georgian political reality. It allows us to develop the research into several directions.
Firstly, understanding and analyzing the reasons for these political positions, if there is
the link between socio-economic and demographic variables and political stances of the
movement members. Secondly, how these groups are organized and structured, as well
as their governance style and funding. And lastly, what kind of political positions are ex-
pressed by similar movements in other post-soviet or the Eastern Partnership countries.
221
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Far right political stances: the same trend in Georgia?
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Abstract:This article deals with the emerging far right movements in Georgia, where the grow-
ing Europeanization process is taking place. erefore, it aims to determine how relevant the
European-experienced understanding of the far right with the similar movement political
positions is. e article presents the stances of the members of far right movements (Geor-
gian March, Anti-liberals, Georgian National Unity and Edelweiss) on foreign and identity
policy and dierent socio-ethical issues, also assessed the neo-populist manner and belief in
supremacy of the law. e conclusion summarizes the major characteristics of these far right
movements in comparative way.
Keywords: political positions, far right, Georgian politics, political movements
Article submitted: 4.10.2019; article accepted: 10.11.2019.
