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US Community Bank Profitability: A Cross-Sectional and Dynamic Panel Analysis of Rural and Metropolitan Banks, Global Journal of Accounting and Finance, 4(1), 158-177.


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This study compares 5,286 community banks operating in rural and metropolitan counties from 2000 through the end of 2013 on the variables attributing to bank profitability using pooled OLS, pooled time-series OLS, and dynamic panels methodologies. Following the SCP and competition-fragility literature, one would expect a difference in the variables contributing to profitability. The size of the coefficients indicates that the variables contributing to profitability differ in magnitude when comparing community banks in metropolitan counties to those in rural counties. Both the pooled and time-series OLS models indicate that bank size contributes to profitability more in metropolitan areas.
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