ArticlePDF Available


This article argues that although some of the short-term consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for international trade may be serious, they do not appear to be unmanageable. From this perspective, one could expect that once the pandemic disappears (or is at least under control), international trade will go back to business as usual. However, in a different time frame, the potential impact of the pandemic can be more profound than initially anticipated, leading to structural changes in the process of economic globalisation. While the seeds of such a process were sown some time ago, the COVID-19 pandemic may exacerbate existing tendencies for states to turn inwards and compete more openly for economic and political dominance in the world. Whether this actually happens will greatly depend on the length and severity of the current pandemic. The bigger its impact, the greater are the chances that we will see the paradigm shift in international trade relations and governance.
The COVID-19 Pandemic and International
Trade: Temporary Turbulence or Paradigm
I. I
The COVID-19 epidemic has taken the world by surprise. Initially, it was seen as a
Chinese, and later South-East Asian, problem. Decision-makers around the world
apparently believed that the disease could be contained and controlled within the
region, following a pattern that was evident in previous outbreaks, such as SARS.
However, due to a combination of different factors of natural, political and regulatory
character,1the epidemic has quickly spread to other parts of the world and has been
eventually recognised by the World Health Organization as a pandemic. The existing
interconnectedness among countries obviously facilitated that expansion.
So far, the pandemic has been predominantly seen as a public health problem. As
of 3 April 2020, there were more than 1 million confirmed cases globally, with
almost 60,000 registered deaths.2These numbers are expected to rise sharply in the
near future. While some countries appear to be gaining control over the situation (eg
China), others are either still battling to slow down the spread of the disease (eg Italy
and Spain) or are in the early stages, which are typically characterised by exponential
growth in cases (eg the USA and Poland). There are, however, other potentially
equally serious consequences, the importance of which will only be appreciated as
time passes. The current public health emergency will be followed by the mutually
reinforcing economic and political crises that may ultimately lead to serious social
disturbance as the costs of the pandemic will not only be high, but also unevenly
distributed, both among countries and among different social groups within states.3
*Associate Professor, Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland; Research Fellow, CSS Institute for Legal Studies,
Budapest, Hungary; email: This research has been financed by the National
Science Centre (Poland) pursuant to grant number UMO-2018/31/B/HS5/03556. All electronic sources were last
accessed on 3 April 2020.
European Journal of Risk Regulation, 11 (2020), pp. 337342 doi:10.1017/err.2020.29
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (, which permits unrestricted re-
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1The size of the initial outbreak is due to the Chinese authorities ignoring, for political reasons, early signs of the
unfolding epidemic, while many other countries have been late with their regulatory responses. COVID-19 as such has
turned out to have a relatively high transmission rate, with a considerable number of infected people remaining
symptomless, which facilitates new infections.
2Cf John Hopkins University & Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center <>.
Downloaded from IP address:, on 31 Aug 2020 at 12:16:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
As far as the economic aspect is concerned, most experts expect to see in 2020 a global
recession that may take a severe form for some countries or regions. For example,
JP Morgan Research anticipates a two-quarter GDP contraction in the USA of
between 10% and 25%, and for the Euro Area of between 15% and 22%.4The
pace and extent of potential recovery still remain open questions. The political crisis
may manifest not only at the national level, by undermining the electoral support for
current governments, but also at the regional or international level. In this context,
some experts, for example, worry about the future of the European integration
project, pointing to the inadequate response of the European institutions. Others see
the COVID-19 pandemic as an existential threat to liberal democracy. Indeed, there
are some early signs indicating that current autocratic tendencies may be strengthened
in the future.5
International trade is also one of the potential victims of the current pandemic. As it is
too early to assess the real impact of the various processes that are taking place now, the
objective of this text is limited. Instead of identifying and analysing the probabilities of
different scenarios, the intention is to highlight one possible course of action that seems to
be emerging in the field. To this end, the two following sections discuss the short- and
long-term consequences of the current pandemic for international trade. The final section
offers some brief conclusions.
The COVID-19 outbreak has already caused deep disruption to world trade, affecting
both the supply and demand sides of the global economy. Many governments have
ordered temporary closure of non-essential manufacturing facilities, while numerous
corporations either have taken such measures voluntarily (eg because of the reduction
in the supply of labour) or have simply decreased production due to disruptions in their
supply chains. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is, however, most visible in the
international service sector. The main victims are international tourism, passenger air
travel and container shipping. Global financial transactions as well as information and
communications technology services have also declined significantly.6Moreover,
according to the recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) assessment, which is actually based on conservative assumptions, the
3For an interesting overview of different narratives on the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences, see A Roberts
and N Lamp, Is the Virus Killing Globalization? Theres No One Answer,Barrons, 15 March 2020 <
4JP Morgan, Fallout from COVID-19: Global Recession, Zero Interest Rates and Emergency Policy Actions,
27 March 2020 <>.
5For example, the Hungarian Parliament has recently passed a law that gives virtually unlimited power to the Prime
Minister (see L Gall, Hungarys Orban Uses Pandemic to Seize Unlimited Power,Human Rights Watch, 23 March
2020 <>). China is also using the current crisis to cement the power of the ruling communist
6WTO, Services Trade Barometer, 11 March 2020 <>(note that those data cover January
2020 and the whole situation has worsened in the subsequent months as the epidemic unfolded).
338 European Journal of Risk Regulation Vol. 11:2
Downloaded from IP address:, on 31 Aug 2020 at 12:16:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
COVID-19 outbreak will cause global foreign direct investments (service mode 3) to
shrink by 515% in 2020.7The demand side has also been affected as consumers
around the globe are unwilling at the moment to spend their money. This phenomenon
can be attributed to a common fear of loss of income (eg due to unemployment) and
heightened uncertainty. Overall, one may expect to see a continued decline in the
volume of international trade in the coming months. The extent of this decline is
difficult to predict.
These past weeks have also seen a significant increase in statesrecourse to
COVID-19-related trade policy measures. In particular, some countries have decided
to establish export controls over certain medical products (eg medical ventilators,
certain drugs, personal protective equipment) in the form of temporary export bans or
the addition of licensing/authorisation requirements.8Other countries, concerned with
the security of their food supplies, have introduced export restrictions over specific
agricultural products, and these decisions have generated genuine concerns about
potential food shortages in the global market in the second part of the year.9The
problem appears sufficiently serious that it has led to a joint statement by the
Directors-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health
Organization and the World Trade Organization (WTO), in which they noted that
uncertainty about food availability can spark a wave of [additional] export
restrictions, creating a shortage on the global market.Inthiscontext,theycalledon
countries to ensure that their trade-related measures do not disrupt the food supply
However, it would be a mistake to think that the current epidemiological situation has
only resulted in a wave of trade restrictions. The picture is much more complex. In fact, a
number of states have recently removed or suspended some trade controls. For example,
Argentina has suspended its anti-dumping duties on imports of certain medical products
from China, while Canada has temporarily eliminated tariffs for specific categories of
products if they are imported by public health agencies, hospitals and testing sites, or
for use by first-response organisations.11 The aim of all of these measures is to ensure
that there are sufficient supplies to domestic markets (either by decreasing exports or
increasing imports). Interestingly, some trade restrictions have been reduced (at least
temporarily) even between the USA and China, the two rivals that have been stuck in
a trade war for the last two years. In particular, the USA has decided to exclude a
range of medical protective gear and equipment from additional duties imposed
previously under its Section 301, and new products may be added to that list in the
7UNCTAD, Impact of the Coronavirus Outbreak on Global FDI, March 2020 <>.
8In principle, those measures are WTO-compatible. While they may be regarded as prohibited quantitative
restrictions on exports, they are potentially justified as necessary to protect public health. Of course, they need to be
applied in a manner that does not discriminate between WTO Members and cannot constitute a disguised restriction
on international trade.
9S Nguyen, Coronavirus: Vietnam Stockpiles Rice as Outbreak Spreads and Food Security Concerns Grow,South
China Morning Post, 28 March 2020 <>.
10 Joint Statement by QU Dongyu, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and Roberto Azevêdo, Directors-General of
FAO, WHO and WTO, 31 March 2020 <>.
11 WTO, COVID-19: Trade and Trade-Eelated Measures (as of 29 March 2020)<
2020 The COVID-19 Pandemic and International Trade 339
Downloaded from IP address:, on 31 Aug 2020 at 12:16:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
future. Similarly, China has granted temporary exclusions for certain US goods (eg
reagents or disinfectants) from its counter-duties.12
The pandemic has also slowed down the progress of various international trade
initiatives around the globe, as states are currently preoccupied with the crisis.
A good example is the new agreement between the USA, Mexico and Canada
(so-called USMCA) that is supposed to replace the current NAFTA arrangement.
Although it has already been ratified by all three parties, its entry into force depends
on the successful implementation of its obligations at the national level. While the
initial plan was slated for 1 June 2020, this initiation date is now unsustainable.13
Similar problems may be faced by the USChina Phase 1 trade deal concluded in
January 2020 the preliminary agreement that sets prerequisites for ending (again, at
least temporarily) the trade war between the two countries. On its basis, China
undertook to purchase more US goods and service, while the US agreed to lower
some of its tariffs introduced for Chinese products between 2017 and 2019. It is
unclear whether, in the present situation,Chinawillbeabletomeettherequired
purchase thresholds, and equally whether the USA will be able to deliver a sufficient
amount of goods and services.
On the other side of the Atlantic, talks between the UK and the European Union over
future trade relations have also stalled.14 According to the withdrawal agreement, the
transition period for the UK ends on 31 December 2020. If no deal is reached, the
mutual trade relations will be governed by WTO rules. That seems to be a very
unappealing option, particularly for the post-COVID-19 world, so one may expect to
see (probably relatively soon) the extension of the deadline.
The global economy is built on the specialisation of labour across countries. In line with
the theory of comparative advantage, which provides the foundation for the current
system of the international exchange of goods and services, such specialisation allows
for maximisation of total output and improvement in welfare. The COVID-19
pandemic has shown, however, that clear benefits of the system come with costs. As
noted by two commentators, single-source providers, or regions of the world that
specialize in one particular product, can create unexpected fragility in moments of
crisis, causing supply chains to break down.15 Such disruptions can have significant
impacts, both on individual companies and on global systems of distribution. For
example, China is a dominant global supplier of active pharmaceutical ingredients for
many important medications. In 2018, it accounted for 95% of the US imports of
12 DW Layton, J Zhang and H Li, The Impact of COVID-19 on the USChina Trade Relationship,Mayer Brown,
13 March 2020 <>.
13 J McGregor, Revised NAFTA Will Not Take Effect on June 1, as Trump Had Hoped,CBC, 31 March 2020
14 S Payne, G Parker and J Brunsden, Brexit Transition Deadline in Doubt as Talks Called Off,Financial Times ,17
March 2020 <>.
15 H Farrell and A Newman, Will the Coronavirus End Globalization as We Know It?,Foreign Affairs, 16 March
2020 <>.
340 European Journal of Risk Regulation Vol. 11:2
Downloaded from IP address:, on 31 Aug 2020 at 12:16:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
ibuprofen, 91% of hydrocortisone, 4045% of penicillin and 40% of heparin.16 Such a
situation becomes particularly problematic in times of crisis when production facilities
are not fully operational, while the demand of the domestic market may require countries
to redirect part of their export. This is also true for other sectors, even if the consequences
of possible disruptions are not so dramatic.
This newly discovered risk may eventually lead to profound changes in existing supply
chains. The early signs of such a process have been visible over recent years with the
Trump Administration pressuring American companies (albeit for different reasons)
to move their production back to the USA, or at least to outside of China.17 These
efforts have been only partially successful, but the current outbreak may trigger a
more strenuous response. Interestingly, it seems that both private companies and
governments may now be interested in introducing such modifications. From the
point of view of private companies, shortening and diversifying supply chains can be
a rational strategy that allows them to ensure smoother operations and eliminates the
risk of supply shortages. For governments, this may be a way to limit dependence on
one country (particularly in emergency situations) and as a consequence make them
better prepared for future crises. This way of thinking is well illustrated by the recent
statement from US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during an interview in which he
stressed the need to fundamentally review our supply chains and make sure that we
know those supply chains and have control over them for moments just like this.18 It
seems that this approach will be followed regardless of who wins the upcoming
presidential election. In the past, regulatory initiatives aimed at reducing
vulnerabilities in supply chains have attracted bipartisan support in the American
Drawing on historical parallels, some commentators argue that the consequences of the
pandemic will be even more far-reaching. They forecast a resulting deep and lasting
transformation of the process of globalisation.20 The new world, as expected to
emerge, will be characterised by tighter immigration rules, newly erected trade and
investment barriers and technological decoupling, with a central role reserved for
states rather than for international institutions (as it seems that only states are capable
of offering solutions to existential challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic).21
The probability of this scenario is further increased by various recent developments.
It seems that some fundamental reorganisation of the global economy and
16 D Palmer and F Bermingham, U.S. Policymakers Worry about China WeaponizingDrug Exports,Politico,20
December 2019 <>.
17 JR Reed, President Trump Ordered US Firms to Ditch China, but Many Already Have and More Are on the Way,
CNBC,1September2019<>. For an analysis of the American trade policy under Trump,
see L Gruszczynski and J Lawrence, Trump, International Trade and Populism(2018) 49 Netherlands Yearbook
of International Law 19.
18 Secretary Michael R. Pompeo with Hugh Hewitt of the Hugh Hewitt Show, US Department of State, 26 March
2020 <>.
19 Cf J Whalen, Commission That Advises Congress on China Warns of Prolonged Strategic Competition,The
Washington Post, 14 November 2019 <>.
20 H James, A Pandemic of Deglobalization?,Project Syndicate, 28 February 2020 <>.
21 I Bremmer, Why COVID-19 May Be a Major Blow to Globalization,Time, 5 March 2020 <
5796707/coronavirus-global-economy>. For the contrary view, see Z Karabell, Will the Coronavirus Bring the End of
Globalization? Dont Count on It,The Wall Street Journal, 20 March 2020 <>.
2020 The COVID-19 Pandemic and International Trade 341
Downloaded from IP address:, on 31 Aug 2020 at 12:16:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
international order has actually been going on for some time. In this context, it is worth
noting that some multilateral institutions have already been marginalised. The WTO may
serve here as a perfect example with its partially paralysed dispute settlement system.22 In
response to the series of recent migration crises, immigration rules have also been
strengthened in many countries. Global trade restrictions have been on the rise for
last couple of years, and they are not limited to the economic relations between the
USA and China.23 The European Union, which is traditionally very open to
international trade, has recently taken a more assertive stance in its willingness to
impose more vigorously its anti-dumping duties, countervailing measures and trade
sanctions, as well as to undertake strategic investment screening.24 Technological
decoupling seen by both China and the USA in terms of competition for global
technological supremacy has been an important part of their trade war.25 A series of
the recent competition proceedings by the European Commission against American
technological companies also seems to constitute one of the elements of this process.
Whether this will lead to the resurrection of national states (as suggested above) or
rather to a segmentation of the world that will be based on regional economic blocs
around local hegemons that compete against each other in the global power game is
still an open question.26
Although some of the short-term consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for
international trade are serious, they do not appear to be unmanageable. From this
perspective, one could expect that once the pandemic disappears (or is at least under
control), international trade will go back to business as usual. However, in a different
time frame, the potential impact of the pandemic may be more profound than initially
anticipated, leading to structural changes in the process of economic globalisation.
While the seeds of such a process were sown some time ago, the COVID-19
pandemic may exacerbate existing tendencies for states to turn inwards and compete
more openly for economic and political dominance in the world. Whether this
actually happens will greatly depend on the length and severity of the current
pandemic. The bigger its impact, the greater are the chances that we will see the
paradigm shift in international trade relations and governance.
22 For an in-depth analysis of this crisis, see C Lo, J Nakagawa, T-F Chen (eds), The Appellate Body of the WTO and
Its Reform (Amsterdam, Springer 2020).
23 Eg WTO, Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment. Annual Report by the Director-
General (Mid-October 2018 to Mid-October 2019), 29 November 2019, WT/TPR/OV/22.
24 H von der Burchard, J Barigazzi and K Oroschakoff, Here Comes European Protectionism,Politico,23
December 2019 <>.
25 C Ting-Fang and L Li, The Great USChina Tech Decoupling: Where Are We Now?,Nikkei Asian Review,30
December 2019 <>.
26 See, eg, RD Kaplan, Coronavirus Ushers in the Globalization We Were Afraid of,Bloomberg Opinion, 20 March
2020 <>.
342 European Journal of Risk Regulation Vol. 11:2
Downloaded from IP address:, on 31 Aug 2020 at 12:16:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
... Although there are many studies focusing on how international trade affected on crisis, the research on the effect of crises on economic performance in one country to another remains limited. But in a way to understand more about this paper objective, we will take a look through the condition of the international trade as one of the potential victims of the pandemic (GRUSZCZYNSKI, 2020). According to research using trade network analysis in the world's top 15 trading countries, (Vidya & Prabheesh, 2020) reveal that the crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic has caused a drastic decline in interconnectedness, connectivity, and trade density between countries. ...
Full-text available
The COVID-19 pandemic has spread all over the world and with it, it has disrupted the global economy in various ways and sectors. In this day and age, global economies are associated with international trade. International trade is important due to providing many opportunities and benefits to the nations through global value chains. Thus, a disruption in any major economy will create a domino effect in other countries' economic performance. In this case, the economic fallout experienced all over the world caused by the pandemic will have a significant impact on various countries' economic performances. This is no exception to the Indonesian economy. Major economic disruptions experienced in other countries will have an impact on Indonesia's economic performance to various degrees. This study mainly focuses on measuring the various impacts on Indonesian economic performance caused by the economic recession in Asian and Oceanian countries due to the COVID-19 pandemic. InterRegional Input-Output (IRIO) analysis is utilized to determine each country's effects on the Indonesian economy as a whole and sectoral basis. Three periods of data (2020, 2021, and 2022) are applied to seek not only the economic downturn caused by the pandemic but also to seek further potential economic recovery in upcoming years. There are 9 countries analyzed in this study through data obtained from the International Monetary Fund and World Input-Output Database. In terms of sectoral basis, the most impacted sector in Indonesia due to the pandemic in these regions is in the manufacturing and mining sector. This study also concluded that, in these regions, Japan and India have the highest negative impact due to the COVID-19 pandemic while China and India lead the impact on economic recovery both in 2021 and 2022.
... Unfortunately, the global spread of COVID-19 in early 2020 and today has significantly impacted the global economy. The pandemic has severely impacted the global economy's supply and demand (Gruszczynski, 2020). The transportation restrictions during COVID-19 have interrupted supply chains and resulted in supply shortages, delays or lags in procurement, and increased prices of imported raw materials (Boughton et al., 2021). ...
... En términos de la economía internacional, la paralización temporal del comercio dejó en evidencia que el sistema de comercio internacional y las cadenas globales de valor no estaban preparadas para un evento de tal magnitud e impacto (Gruszczynski, 2020). Cabe recordar que la arquitectura y el marco de acción de la gobernanza internacional se desarrollaron institucionalmente después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y desde entonces no han introducido cambios sustanciales. ...
La etapa inicial de la pandemia de la covid-19 en el primer semestre de 2020 dejó en evidencia algunas vulnerabilidades de las cadenas globales de valor (cgv), y el comercio internacional se vio drásticamente disminuido, debido a las medidas de contención del virus, en particular las restricciones a la movilidad humana, instrumentalizadas a través de órdenes de confinamiento, cierres de establecimientos de comercio no esenciales, entre otras. Sin embargo, en términos de comercio internacional de bienes, el impacto más evidente se percibió en productos de equipo médico, medicamentos y equipos de protección personal, elementos cruciales para enfrentar la inminente crisis. Como evidencia en el presente análisis se advierte que la disrupción no solo fue producto de las limitaciones en la movilidad humana decretadas por las autoridades, sino producto de distorsiones de comercio deliberadas por parte de los países productores de suministros médicos, medicamentos y equipo de protección personal. Aunque las medidas de distorsión al comercio adoptadas tenían un carácter temporal y estaban contempladas dentro de los acuerdos internacionales pactados, la emergencia sanitaria puso en cuestionamiento algunos pilares del andamiaje institucional del comercio internacional y permitió, una vez más, visibilizar la heterogeneidad de los países en cuanto a su capacidad institucional para afrontar la crisis, la fragilidad de las cadenas de suministro de bienes considerados estratégicos y cruciales ante este tipo de crisis, y la ausencia de medidas preventivas efectivas ante un riesgo global como una pandemia.
... Many closed their production facilities on government instructions, while some did so voluntarily because there was insufficient demand for manufactured goods. They would only be stored, which would increase costs (Gruszezynski, 2020). As employers closed stores overnight, shoppers increasingly bought the necessary items online. ...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Communication in companies is essential to achieve the set goals of the company. If all team members are not equally committed to achieving organizational goals, they will not be achieved or will not be achieved to the extent planned. With the joint action and effort of all employees and managers, the synergy effect in companies will be more significant, and the involvement of all workers. Without communication, it would be impossible to achieve the set goals in companies, the desired planned profit and customer satisfaction, or customers. Managers are responsible for the communication process in companies, and all stakeholders in the communication process, all employees, are co- responsible. When there are “noises” in communication, then communication in the company is one-way, which reflects very quickly on the business process and ultimately on the company’s profits and customer or customer satisfaction. Communication between co-workers or co-workers and managers is not twoway but one-way, inefficient, even stressful, and harmful. The scientific contribution of this paper is to determine the reasons for unclear, one-way, or even harmful communication in the company between employees and their superiors, from the point of view of employees and find out and define possible ways to improve the communication process of employees with their managers. There is no statistically significant difference between the sexes of the respondents with the respondents’ attitudes about the importance of communication in their workplaces. A high percentage of respondents stated that communication in their workplaces is essential. The success of managers’ communication with employees is not related to a higher executive education level. As the leading reason for unsuccessful communication of managers with employees, respondents state the lack of time of managers. They also state that the first way to improve the communication process is for managers to find time to communicate more often with employees, individually, and more often by organizing meetings with employees and asking employees how they feel.
... The contraction in Swiss exports appears to be related to with the number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 in importing countries, while Swiss imports are more strongly linked to the severity of government measures on the export economy. It is also recorded that the impact on foreign trade has been negative both on the demand and supply side (Baldwin, 2020;Gruszczynski, 2020;Büchel et al., 2020). In Spain, looking at the monthly data on trade in goods and services for the period March -August 2020, compared to the same period in 2019, there is a decrease in exports by 31.0%, ...
This paper examines the foreign trade of Greece compared to the foreign trade of EU28 during the Economic Crisis (2008) and the Health Crisis (2020). Based on the findings of relevant scientific literature, the quantitative data of external trade (exports, imports, trade balance) are recorded and analyzed methodologically. At the same time, the terms of trade and the degree of extroversion of Greek commerce compared to the corresponding figures of the EU28 during the period of the economic crisis (2008-2018) and the health crisis (2020-2021) are extracted. According to previous scientific literature in times of crisis, the volume of foreign trade at international, regional and national level is also bearing, among other financial figures.The economic crisis (2008) and the implemented harsh restrictive measures due to fiscal contraction resulted, among other consequences, in the reduction of income and internal demand, that the businesses confronted, strengthening their commercial extroversion, while for the same reasons imports decreased, resulting in an improvement in the trade balance, the terms of trade and the degree of commercial extroversion. Accordingly, from the current data, it seems that the exports of both Greece and the EU28 decreased to about the same extent during the period of the Health Crisis (2019-2020). As far as the external trade figures are concerned, it appears that the Greek degree of sensitivity to the effects of crises is greater than that of the EU28. Indeed, it appears that exports are less vulnerable to the effects of crises than imports. This behavior of Greek foreign trade can be explained by the sectoral composition of exports, in which the greatest relevance is attributed to the products with great elasticity of demand in terms of income, by the smaller size of enterprises and hence the limited access to commercial loans and external financing, but also by the lack of competitiveness of exported products in terms of added value, quality and price, compared to those of the EU28 and especially of the most developed countries. Suggestions for further research are to expand the period of the data taking into consideration the period of 2021 and solving dilemma how the new geopolitical crisis of Russia and Ukraine will affect the international trade relations, bonds and transactions.
Cette étude consiste à analyser la relation entre les réserves de change et la Covid19 en Algérie. Pour réaliser ce travail, les données de la Covid19 sont collectées à partir de la plateforme Reuters et celles des réserves de changes provenant de la Banque d'Algérie. Ces données couvrent la période allant de 23-mars-2020 au 05-janvier-2021. Pour remettre en question la relation entre ces dernières, on a utilisé l'approche ARDL, appliquée aux séries chronologiques avec un ordre d'intégration mixte et aux séries chronologiques non stationnaires. Selon les résultats d'analyse, il existe une relation de cointégration, et elle est statistiquement significative. Ainsi, il existe deux Causalités bidirectionnelles: la 1ére entre les réserves de change et les cas de la Covid19 cumulés et la seconde entre les réserves de change et les nouvelles contaminations, et Une causalité unidirectionnelle entre la variable décès cumulés de la Covid19 qu'est causée par les réserves de change. Abstract: This study consists of analyzing the relation between foreign exchange reserves and Covid19 in Algeria. To carry out this work, Covid19's data is collected from the Reuters platform and foreign exchange reserve's data from the Bank of Algeria. This data covers the period from March-23-2020 to January-05-2021. To interrogate the relationship between these last, we used the ARDL approach which applies to non-stationary time series and time series with a mixed order of integration. According to the analysis results, there is a cointegrating relationship, and it is statistically significant. Thus, there are two bidirectional causalities: the 1st between foreign exchange reserves and cumulative Covid19 cases and the second between foreign exchange reserves and new contaminations, and a unidirectional causality: the variable cumulative deaths of Covid19 caused by the foreign exchange reserves.
Conference Paper
Full-text available
The effects of the COVID-19 outbreak in many areas have the potential of leading to a subtle transformation. The spread of the disease around the globe is a multilayered issue that affects both politics and economics. Globalization and new world order debates took on a new dimension with the COVID-19 pandemic. These debates on the course of international politics and the global economy have brought up the need to reconsider the concepts of democracy, authoritarianism, economic nationalism, xenophobia and so on, which have been ignored for some time. It is one of the primary curiosities that the states, which have been tending to concentrate the power in a single center for a long time and gradually turn into them, will waive the powers they have acquired with many measures they have taken due to this pandemic. Just after the first shock of the outbreak, many discussions have started in many platforms about how to shape the world. What effects will governments' approach to the global pandemic with national solutions will have on the future of the international system? Moreover, which of the states that put forward different methods in combating the outbreak will ultimately succeed and their position in the post-epidemic world order, whether being a dominant actor at a global level is completely related to the response to this epidemic. As these debates continue, the handling of corona virus as a “security” issue by states has also begun to be on the agenda. Recently, these and similar issues caused by the new type of corona virus have been occupying the agenda of the global public opinion. In this regard, there are some questions to be answered in the minds of the global community such as could the coronavirus epidemic really open the door of a new era in which states become stronger and nationalist feelings are increasingly revived? Are we going to witness the change of the definition of globalization that we are now getting accused after the pandemic? Can we think that trade wars and economic isolation efforts will gradually strengthen? With political and economic effects, will the post-epidemic order bring about a social collapse? What transformation awaits states and international organizations, which are the main actors of the international system? What kind of future are the states that highlight their "national" policies and interests even during the “global” pandemic period? In this context, this study tries to express possible changes and transformations in the political and economic order after COVID-19 in the light of the questions above. Keywords: COVID-19 Pandemic, International Order, Globalization, Political and Economic Order, Post-Corona Global Order, USA- China Rivalry, Supply Chain
Bu çalışmanın temel amacı ihracatçı firmaların Covid-19 salgını sonrası dış pazar stratejilerinde etkili olabilecek faktörleri belirlemektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda üç aşamalı bir analiz yapılmıştır. Analizin birinci aşamasında Akdeniz İhracatçı Birlikleri’ne bağlı sekiz birliğe üye firmaların genel ihracat performanslarının değerlendirilmesi için ürün grupları bazında ürün/ülke yoğunlukları 2009-2020 dönemine ait 71 ürün grubu için hesaplanmıştır. Analizin ikinci aşamasında, ürün grupları bazında ihracatı etkileyen faktörler olduğu literatürde genel kabul gören değişkenler ile ( ihracat yapılan ülkenin milli geliri, Türkiye’nin milli geliri, reel döviz kuru ve ülkeler arası uzaklık) panel ekonometrik analiz yapılmıştır. Analizin üçüncü aşamasında, birinci ve ikinci aşamada elde edilen sonuçlar gözönünde bulundurularak politika önerilerinde bulunulmuştur. Analiz sonuçları değerlendirildiğinde 15 ürün grubunda ülke çeşitlendirmesinin azaldığı gözlemlenirken 56 ürün grubunda ülke çeşitlendirmesinin arttığı tespit edilmiştir. Ülke çeşitlendirmesinin arttığı ürün gruplarında literatürde genel kabul gören değişkenlerin anlamlı etkisi, ülke çeştilendirmesinin az olduğu ürün gruplarına göre daha fazla olduğu tespit edilmiştir.
Full-text available
zet Kovid-19 süreci gerek dünya genelinde gerekse Türkiye'nin ekonomi üzerinde etkisi kaçınılmaz olmuştur. Ülkelerin uluslararası ticaret faaliyetlerinde daralma meydana gelmiştir. Salgın tüm dünyayı etkisine altına almış ve salgının bitmesi yönünden belirsizlikler devam etmektedir. Ülkeler tarafından salgınla mücadele etmek için birçok önlemler, kısıtlamalar uygulanmış ve bu doğrultuda ülke ekonomilerinde daraltıcı etki meydana gelmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Kovid-19 sürecinin Konya İhracatına etkisini tespit etmektir. Çalışmada 2019 Ocak-2021 Haziran dönemlerini kapsayan aylık ihracat verileri analiz edilmiştir. Kovid-19 sürecinin Konya ihracatına etkisi, Makine ve aksamları, otomotiv endüstrisi, savunma ve havacılık sanayi, iklimlendirme sanayi, Hububat, bakliyat mamulleri, çelik, kimyevi maddeler ve mamulleri gibi sektörel açısından değerlendirilmiştir. Sonuçlara göre pandeminin ülkemizde ve Konya ilinde ihracat faaliyetlerini nisan ve mayıs aylarında en çok etkilendiği değerlendirilmiştir. Pandeminin etkisi ülkemizde ilk çeyrekte görülmemesine rağmen ikinci çeyrekte bu etki çok yüksek seviyede gerçekleşmiştir. Konya ihracat bakımından değerlendirildiğinde, makine ve aksamları ihracatının mayıs ayında % 25 oranında düşme, otomotiv endüstrisinin ihracatının mayıs ayında %35 oranında düşme, iklimlendirme sanayisi ihracatının mayıs ayında %42 oranında düşme, hububat, bakliyat mamulleri ihracatının mayıs ayında %37 oranında düşme, kimyevi maddeler ve mamuller ihracatı mayıs ayında % 4 oranında düşme, çelik ihracatında mayıs ayında %53 düşme meydana gelmiştir ve savunma ve havacılık sektörü pandemi döneminde yükselişe geçen sektör konumundadır. Abstract The impact of the Covid-19 processes on the economy both in the World and in Turkey has been inevitable. There has been a contraction in trade activities of the countries. The pandemic has affected the whole World and uncertainty continues pandemic which is finished. Many measures and restrictions have been implemented by countries to combat the pandemic, and this direction a contracting effect has occurred in the economies of the country. period were analyzed. The impact of the Covid-19 process on Konya exports will evaluated in terms of sectors such as machinery and components, automotive industry, defense and aviation industry, air conditioning industry, grain, pulses products, steel, chemicals and products. According to the results, it was evaluated that the pandemic affected the export activities in our country and Konya most in April and May. Although the impact of the pandemic was seen in our country in the first quarter this effect was very high in second quarter. When Konya is evaluated in terms of exports, exports of machinery and parts decreased by 25% in May, automotive industry exports decreased by 35% in May, air conditioning industry exports decreased by 42% in May, exports of cereals and pulses decreased by 37%, in May and chemical substances and products exports fell by 4% in May, steel exports decreased by 53% in May the defense and aviation sector is sector that has been on the rise during pandemic.
Full-text available
The aim of the study is to examine the relationship between the COVID-19 pandemic and stock market performance under the structural break in case of Turkey for the period from April 10, 2020 to March 19, 2021. Here, the confirmed cases, deaths, tests and recoveries during COVID-19 pandemic were carried out as the COVID-19 pandemic variables. The obtained empirical findings indicated that i) the series were integrated at I(1), ii) the series were cointegrated in the presence of structural break, iii) the confirmed number of cases and deaths reduced the stock market performance, while the confirmed number of tests and recoveries enhanced the performance of the stock market under the structural break, and iv) in the long run the bidirectional causality among the confirmed number of cases, deaths and recoveries with stock market performance and the unidirectional causality running from the confirmed number of tests to stock market performance were found. In brief, the study's empirical results could provide several policy suggestions to governments, policy makers, investors and risk managers to take several precautions that decreased the negative effects of the epidemics on the Turkish stock market performance.
A Pandemic of Deglobalization?
  • H James
H James, "A Pandemic of Deglobalization?", Project Syndicate, 28 February 2020 <>.
Will the Coronavirus Bring the End of Globalization? Don't Count on It
  • Bremmer
I Bremmer, "Why COVID-19 May Be a Major Blow to Globalization", Time, 5 March 2020 < 5796707/coronavirus-global-economy>. For the contrary view, see Z Karabell, "Will the Coronavirus Bring the End of Globalization? Don't Count on It", The Wall Street Journal, 20 March 2020 <>.
Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment
  • Wto Eg
Eg WTO, "Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment. Annual Report by the Director-General (Mid-October 2018 to Mid-October 2019)", 29 November 2019, WT/TPR/OV/22. 24
Here Comes European Protectionism
  • J H Von Der Burchard
  • K Barigazzi
  • Oroschakoff
H von der Burchard, J Barigazzi and K Oroschakoff, "Here Comes European Protectionism", Politico, 23 December 2019 <>.
The Great US-China Tech Decoupling: Where Are We Now?
  • C Ting
  • Li
C Ting-Fang and L Li, "The Great US-China Tech Decoupling: Where Are We Now?", Nikkei Asian Review, 30 December 2019 <>.
Coronavirus Ushers in the Globalization We Were Afraid of
  • Eg See
  • Kaplan
See, eg, RD Kaplan, "Coronavirus Ushers in the Globalization We Were Afraid of", Bloomberg Opinion, 20 March 2020 <>.
U.S. Policymakers Worry about China 'Weaponizing' Drug Exports
  • D Palmer
  • Bermingham
D Palmer and F Bermingham, "U.S. Policymakers Worry about China 'Weaponizing' Drug Exports", Politico, 20 December 2019 <>.
Commission That Advises Congress on China Warns of Prolonged Strategic Competition
  • J Cf
  • Whalen
Cf J Whalen, "Commission That Advises Congress on China Warns of Prolonged Strategic Competition", The Washington Post, 14 November 2019 <>.