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China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Concerns, Responses and Strategies 27
International Journal of China Studies
Vol. 10, No. 1, June 2019, pp. 27-45
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):
India’s Concerns, Responses and Strategies
S.Y. Surendra Kumar*
Bangalore University
Abstract
The rise of China in the era of globalization is signicant due to its global
implications and is attributed to various factors like rapid economic growth,
strategic modernization, reconnecting with the Chinese Diaspora, particularly
in the west, modernization of its military, and vibrant maritime trade strategy
and so on. In the process of sustaining its rise, China has initiated several
ambitious plans like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is a combination of Silk Road
Economic Belt targeting Central Asia and Europe and Maritime Silk Road
(MSR) focussed on Southeast, South and North Asian regions. To make this
a reality, the Chinese government has already made tremendous efforts to
mobilize political, economic and diplomatic resources. However, BRI will not
yield great results without the critical role of India. In this context, the paper
attempts to identify the guiding factors for China to initiate BRI and its impact
on its peaceful rise and the regions. India’s response and strategies to BRI is
critically analyzed. Finally, the paper also explores the mutual benets and
challenges for both India and China for successful implementation of BRI.
Keywords: BRI, China, India, South Asia
1. Introduction
China, in the process of sustaining its peaceful rise, has surprised the world
with the One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR). Many regard this as a
“Game Changer”, a “project of the century”, China’s “big play to seek world
dominance’ not just for China, but the world.” Apparently, Chinese President
Xi Jinping rst talked about the “Silk Road Economic Belt” in Kazakhstan
(September 2013), and went one step further and mooted the idea “Maritime
Silk Road” in Indonesia (October 2013). Both these ideas are termed as Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI), which is assumed as a grand geo-economic vision
28 S.Y. Surendra Kumar
as well as a long term geopolitical strategy for China (Hu, 2017: 108). To
keep up the momentum of BRI, President Xi continues to emphasize on the
implementation of BRI at international forums, such as the APEC summits in
Beijing (2014 and 2018), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summits
in Uzbekistan (2016 and 2018), G-20 Summit in Hangzhou (September
2016), China and Central and Eastern European 16 plus 1 Summit (November
2016), the World Economic Forum (January 2017) and so forth. At the World
Economic Forum, Xi delivered a speech at the opening session and pitched
for a win-win situation among the nations for cooperation, as the global
economy was facing downward pressure (Tekdal, 2018: 375). Furthermore,
in September 2018, China also announced new projects under BRI for the
African region during the China-Africa Summit.
Generally, the Chinese government argues that the main aim of BRI
is to deepen the cooperation and enhance development in the regions, by
connecting more than 60 countries along the ancient silk roads right from
Asia-Pacic to Europe (Clarke, 2017: 71). The connectivity would be through
trade, several infrastructure projects and economic linkages. Moreover, the
vision document of the BRI elaborates on the aim i.e., mutual consultation
to meet the interest of all the governments; and it is not just about roads and
railways, but is meant to be a comprehensive interaction process between
China and the other countries involved (Hu, 2017: 113). Overall, BRI moves
beyond infrastructure projects to policy coordination, facilities connectivity,
trade and investment, nancial integration and cultural exchange. Thus, the
Chinese Government continues to emphasize that the BRI is built on three
principles – negotiation/talks, construction/building and sharing results.
In addition, BRI covers 63 per cent of the world population, 32 per cent
of the world’s GDP, and 29 per cent of global merchandize trade (Kohli,
2018: 3). The six core economic corridors to realize the objectives of the BRI
are – China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Bangladesh-China-India-
Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic
Corridor, China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, New Eurasia
Land Bridge Economic Corridor, and China-Mongolia-Russia Economic
Corridor (Aoyama, 2016: 6). These corridors attempt to create more jobs
and reduce the wide regional disparities as the counties along the BRI are
low-income economies. At the same time, BRI is backed by nancial support
from China’s state-owned banks and the Silk Road Fund (SRF), which was
created in December 2014, where China promised a capital of US$40 billion
(Clarke, 2017: 71). Subsequently, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB), National Development Bank (NDB), Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) foundation and Eurasia foundation are funding some of
the BRI projects (Yu, 2017a: 353-368). Thus, the region covered through the
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Concerns, Responses and Strategies 29
economic corridors with adequate nance backing seems to be heading for
transforming the world order.
Ironically, some of the policy makers and critics of BRI tend to argue
that the main motives of BRI initiative could be: (a) Generally, the evolution
of BRI is linked to the thinking of Chinese foreign and security policy since
the 1980s, like the Chinese foreign policy that sought to “bide time and
build capabilities” with multiple objectives like developing multiple regional
and global linkages to increase economic growth; resolve the long-standing
disputes with neighbours, and to challenge US predominance in the region
(Gill, 2010: 22). Moreover, President Jiang Zemin, pitched for “cooperation,
multilateralism and regionalism” and later on President Hu Jintao, went one
step ahead from Deng’s approach of ‘peaceful development’ to “strategic
opportunity” for China (Clarke, 2017: 76). Thus, BRI is a result of strategic
thinking of successive Chinese Presidents to ensure China’s peaceful rise.
(b) Given that China has been successful in pursuing its soft power strategy
in most of the region, BRI will be a big boost and obviously allow China
to play more pro-active political and economic roles at the global level. (c)
Every strategic move by China is always seen as to counter US dominance.
In this regard, BRI is regarded as a response to former US President Barack
Obama’s ‘Pivot Asia Policy’ (March 2013), and provide an alternative model
and leader to US global hegemony (ibid). (d) BRI is not just to full China’s
global aspirations, but also its domestic needs like overcoming China’s
energy dependencies, addressing the under-development of western China,
reducing the over-capacity in manufacturing, stagnating exports, promoting
the go global, internationalizing the RMB, and reforming the global economic
governance (Tekdal, 2018: 378). (e) India’s analyst Mohan Guruswamy,
argued that “China has accumulated foreign exchange reserves of US$3.5
trillion and the capital it claims is prepared to subscribe for the NDB, AIIB
and SRF, which would amount to only around 7 per cent of its total foreign
exchange reserves invested in western banks. Moreover, the China-promoted
institutions will be providing infrastructure lending rather than grants, the
return on capital from these investments could be signicantly higher than
the returns China is getting from its foreign exchange reserves currently
invested in low-yielding US government bonds” (Guruswamy, 2017). (f)
Some even argue that China’s initiative is not like the normal expansionist,
but packaged and promoted as BRI. Thus, BRI is guided by addressing both
China’s domestic and global ambition.
Overall, despite BRI receiving mixed signals from the international
community and analysts, it has gained legitimacy to a certain extent through
holding of the BRI forum on 14-15 May 2017 (the second BRI forum was
held in April 2019) at Beijing. This was attended by major powers, 29 heads
of state and 130 delegations and 70 international organizations. As of now,
30 S.Y. Surendra Kumar
more than 68 countries have signed the initiative and despite countries like
the US, France, UK, Germany and Japan expressing their concerns over the
BRI, had sent representatives for the BRI Forum (Rana, 2017: 12). On the
contrary, India did not even send any representative, signalling its position
over BRI. Nevertheless, India’s non participation of BRI continues to be
widely debated.
2. India Joining BRI: Why Not?
Some policy makers and academicians in India have being arguing that there
is lot for India to gain through BRI, such as: (a) India will get access to
new markets, resources and commodities from Central Asia and the Middle
East. Moreover, for decades India has been making all efforts to integrate
and connect with both Southeast Asia and Central Asia. In this regard, the
BRI provides a golden opportunity to realize these objectives. (b) The BRI
is beyond road and rail connectivity, as it also includes connectivity and
building digital and cyberspace infrastructure. Given India’s strength in
information and communication technology (ICT), it will be advantageous
for India. At the same time, BRI will be domestically benecial, as India’s
quest for becoming the manufacturing hub of Asia can be realized, through
the “Make in India” campaign, and creating more job opportunities. Moreover,
it will not just provide business opportunities for the public sector, but also
for the private sector. (c) Except Bhutan, all the other South Asia countries
are ofcially part of BRI (Das, 2017: 130-133). Days before the 2017 BRI
Forum took place, China signed fresh agreements with Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar and Afghanistan. In addition, the head of
states of these countries in their respective speeches at the forum went on to
congratulate President Xi Jinping for his regional leadership and welcomed
Chinese investments in their respective countries. This clearly underlines
the countries backing of BRI and India’s failure in providing such kind of
development model/project for the growth of the region. Moreover, India
is yet to match action with words when it comes to its neighbourhood rst
policy. Even the Southeast Asia countries along with Central Asia have
expressed their desire to be part of BRI (Kohli, 2018: 3-11; Yu, 2017b:
117-122). In addition, despite the US, EU and Japan expressing concerns
about BRI over issues like transparency, public procurement, environmental
standards, reciprocity in trade and other issues, they did not hesitate to send
their representatives to the BRI Summit (May 2017). Overall, more than 100
countries and international organizations have supported BRI, even some
of the resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and
Security Council (Aoyama, 2016: 8) are connected with BRI. Even European
countries like the UK are keen on engaging with China. In this context, India
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Concerns, Responses and Strategies 31
remaining aloof will be unable to come up with any alternative model of
development led by Asia. Hence, it is better for India to be a part and benet
from the BRI. (d) India can assert its interest with regard to CPEC only by
being part of it, rather than remain outside. Moreover, India has being pushing
for the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) Initiative and the Bay
of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC), but so far its results are mixed, hence by being part of BRI,
it will be a big boost for BBIN and BIMSTEC. (d) India is one of the co-
founder of AIIB and is the second largest contributor to the AIIB, which has
also allocated US$100 billion for BRI. Hence, when India can be a part of
AIIB and BCIM and be successful in protecting its economic and strategic
interest, why can’t India do the same by being part of BRI? (e) Overall, India
by joining BRI can reclaim its glory and place on the Silk Road, which it has
lost over the centuries (Saran, 2017).
3. India’s Concerns over BRI
More than the Indian government’s pitching for BRI, its opposition has being
more vocal and visible. As a result, India is disappointed with China’s failure
to address the former’s concerns which are four folds.
3.1. Security Concerns on Economic Corridors
One of the foremost concerns of the Indian government’s opposition to the
BRI is the CPEC, which is regarded as a big investment project, for which
China has pledged US$54 billion until 2030 (Small, 2017: 81). This corridor
attempts to connect China’s Xinjiang autonomous region with Pakistan’s
Balochistan Province. Although, this is a welcome move, but the corridor
runs through the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), which Pakistan claims
as ‘Azad Kashmir’. Subsequently, it is alleged that in addition to Pakistan’s
15,000 security personnel, China is likely to deploy around 30,000 security
personnel for the CPEC, in a way a security concern for India (Singh, 2017a:
2). Apart from this, the Line of Control (LOC) is not yet accepted by both
India and Pakistan as international boundary, thus by giving consent to CPEC
would naturally be suicidal for India. Moreover, it will not only undermine
India’s sovereignty claims on disputed border territories, but put India in
a disadvantageous position in future negotiations on boundary and other
security interests vis-à-vis China and Pakistan.
Apart from the CPEC, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM)
economic corridor has also serious security concerns for India, as attempts
are made to connect China’s Yunnan province with India’s Northeast region
and it is assumed that China will enhance its inuence in the northeast region
32 S.Y. Surendra Kumar
– which is already a major security concern for India. Moreover, India
through BCIM wants to connect its northeast region with Southeast Asia
but with China pitching for the merger of BCIM with BRI, India thus feels
that already the progress of BCIM is lukewarm and merger would further
slowdown the progress. In addition, the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) attempts
to develop and enhance China’s presence in the Indian Ocean region, which
is already happening through the so-called ‘string of pearls strategy’. China
has continued to argue that more than 70 per cent of its oil imports go through
this region, hence its aims are for refuelling, commercial purpose and sea
lane security, rather than to contain India. However, India is not convinced
by these arguments as it threatens India’s future naval power projects and its
inuence in the region. In this context, during the 2018 BOAO Forum for
Asia, President Xi stated: “BRI is not a Chinese plot, neither is it the post-
World War II Marshall Plan, nor is it a Chinese conspiracy”1 and China is
willing to address the apprehensions of other countries regarding the BRI and
maintained that it is not targeted towards any country. But these statements
have yet to convince the Indian government.
3.2. A Debt Trap of Smaller Nations
Apart from CPEC issues, the Indian government (Ministry of External Affairs
in May 2017) from time to time has expressed serious concerns about the
possibility of BRI resulting in unsustainable debt burdens. For example,
in some recipient countries like Sri Lanka the increasing Chinese debt is a
cause of concern not just for the country, but has implications for the region
(Darshana, 2018: 7). As a result, in December 2017, the Hambantota port
was handed to China for a period of 99 years lease while China holds 70
per cent stake in this strategic port. Thus, this remains the best example of
unsustainable loans, which ultimately are allowing China to gain signicant
economic and strategic advantages in the Indian Ocean region. Furthermore,
some of the news reports and studies have shown that through BRI there is a
possible risk of Chinese companies grabbing host countries resources, with
unsustainable loan practices leading to high levels of debt and weakening
the economy of the recipient state. In this context, it is rightly pointed out
by one prominent European commentator that BRI is nothing but “One Belt,
One Road and One Trap”, as the projects could push smaller countries on the
road into a crushing debt cycle, destroying the ecology and disrupting local
communities.
The question of debt repayment to China by Ukraine, Zimbabwe,
Cambodia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka remains a questionable concern. According
to the 2016 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, out of Cambodia’s
USD3.9 billion bilateral public debts with China, 80 per cent is owned by
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Concerns, Responses and Strategies 33
China (Singh, 2018). Similarly, this has been the case with Pakistan; it is
estimated that by June 2019, Islamabad’s nancial debt to Beijing would
reach US$19 billion, which could be one fth of total formal debt. Moreover,
it is argued that CPEC loans will add US$14 billion to Pakistan’s total public
debt (Chansoria, 2018). However, some of the Chinese tend to argue that these
debts are less than 10 per cent of their total debts, but the big question remains
whether these countries – Ukraine, Zimbabwe, Cambodia and Pakistan – can
repay their debts, given their fragile economic conditions. To address these
concerns, at a forum organized by the IMF and the World Bank in Bali,
Indonesia in October 2018, China’s Vice Minister of Finance, Ms. Zou Jiayi,
reassured the international community about China’s commitment to solve
possible debt issues. Ms. Zou emphasized that projects developed under the
BRI are primarily commercial projects and host countries are free to develop
them or not.2 Nevertheless, the debt trap of smaller nations such as Sri Lanka,
Pakistan and Nepal is one of the concerns for India not being part of BRI.
3.3. BRI is Unclear
Similar to some of the European countries, the Indian government’s frequent
statements has emphasized on the prevailing ambiguity about the BRI. For
instance, on 13 May 2017 it stated that BRI is not based on principles such
as good governance, rule of law and transparency. It further stated that “we
are of rm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally
recognized international norms, openness and equality, and must be pursued
in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity” (MEA, 2018).
Overall, India argues that lack of detail and insufcient discussion of the
BRI proposal, prior to its launch is the reason for its silence. At the same
time, India also regard that BRI has been a unilateral decision without any
consultation with partners. Although, China tends to argue that it is open for
joint development and implementation of projects, but in reality it tends to
control projects. In this context, former Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar in
2015 had argued that “[BRI] wasn’t a multilateral initiative that they discussed
with the world, that countries are interested or affected … hence need of the
hour is discussion, that has not happened” (Pant and Passi, 2017: 90). At the
same time, whoever are investing in BRI still remains unclear, however it is
alleged that 90 per cent of funding comes from Chinese banks and companies.
As a result, India is so far cautious and reticent.
3.4. India’s Natural Sphere of Inuence
Generally, India has always considered the South Asian Region as its natural
sphere of inuence. However, in recent decades the region has witnessed
34 S.Y. Surendra Kumar
increasing political, economic, and cultural influence and presence of
China. This has intensied particularly in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka
and Maldives. For example, China has already invested US$14 billion in
infrastructure in Sri Lanka since 2005, it has pledged US$38 to Bangladesh
and planned to invest and provide US$8 billion credit for Nepal (Wagner and
Tripathi, 2018: 3). Moreover, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan is taking
Pak-Sino relations to the next level following his visit to China (in September
2018) and attempting to rope in Saudi Arabia to join the CPEC as the third
“strategic partner”.3 These developments constitute a major concern for India
due to China’s greater geopolitical inuence.
With the BRI initiative, India’s fear is intensifying, as apart from Bhutan,
all the other neighbours are now ofcially part of BRI. The three corridors –
CPEC, BCIM, the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor and the MSR linked
to South and Southeast Asian regions and the infrastructure projects associated
with them have a direct bearing on India’s strategic interests (Chung, 2018:
317). For instance, they run close to India’s continental and maritime borders
and are affecting its security interests and strategic environment. It also alters
the existing power dynamics in the region. Although, India is not opposed to
infrastructure development in the region, it is concerned about the strategic
implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives, also through BRI. A primary
concern for New Delhi is that Beijing will use its economic presence in
the region to advance its strategic interests. One notable example is the
strategically located port of Hambantota, which the Sri Lankan government
was forced to lease to China in December 2017. The port was built on
Chinese loans and labour with high interest rates. Sri Lanka was unable
to repay the loan and incurred a debt burden. Thus, India does not see the
Chinese projects as just an economic project, but as a latter grand strategy
making its hegemonic foreign policy goals and security policies (Darshana,
2018: 7).
Although Pakistan’s pro-active approach to BRI is not surprising,
however in recent times, there are concerns raised now and then in Pakistan,
for example in the Dawn newspaper which emphasized, “Pakistan is on the
verge of becoming an economic and military outpost of China”. According to
a recent Pentagon report, “China most likely will seek to establish additional
military bases in countries with which it has a long-standing friendly
relationship and have similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan” (Kaura,
2017). In this context, India cannot afford to lose sight of this dimension as it
directly impacts its security interests. If China emerges as Pakistan’s sole trade
window to the world, this will have repercussions for India. In addition, the
BRI is promoted as a process of connecting the South Asian region through
joint and complementary projects, but it undermines the role of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), BBIN and also India.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Concerns, Responses and Strategies 35
3.5. Other Concerns
Apart from the above, some other possible concerns are: (a) The critics of BRI
term it as China’s Marshall Plan, but a vital difference is that the Marshall
Plan was created in the aftermath of WWII, but BRI aims at regaining and
connecting China to the globalised world, which India cannot take lightly (Hu,
2017: 110). (b) China will gain an advantage over India in the neighbourhood
and extended neighbourhood and India has to play a secondary role to China,
thus with some suggesting India will have no alternative but to prefer a
US-orientated world order. (c) India is unhappy with China over the latter’s
blocking of India’s entry into the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), and opposed UN sanctions on Pakistan based terrorist organizations.
In this context expecting India to support BRI without any assurances is not
diplomatically viable. (d) Despite India’s objection, China continues to oppose
any welfare or infrastructure project in Arunachal Pradesh, a state in India.
China has even gone one step further by advising India to exercise “restraint”
on the Bhupen Hazarika Bridge in Arunachal Pradesh. This kind of response
from China is uncalled for. (e) Furthermore, the unresolved border disputes
following the 1962 war, and the existing trade decit of US$63 billion as
of July 2018, continues to curtail bilateral ties (Bhoothalingam, 2016: 49).
Thus, critics argue that China may use its economic power (BRI) to increase
geopolitical leverage and by doing so intensify the existing security concerns
for India.
4. India’s Response and Strategies
Although, India has decided not be part of BRI, but it needs to response and
evolve strategies to BRI. Some of its response and strategies are as follows.
4.1. Continues to Express its Concerns at all Forums
From time to time, India has been consistent in expressing its displeasures and
concerns over the BRI at all forums. For example, despite the invitation from
China to attend the BRI summit in May 2017 and April 2019, India did not
even send a representative to the forum. At the SCO Summit in June 2018,
India became the only member of the SCO that did not endorse the BRI in
the declaration issued after the summit. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, went
one step further and emphasised that “connectivity with the neighbouring
countries is India’s priority. We welcome the connectivity projects which are
sustainable and efcient and which respect territorial integrity and sovereignty
of the countries” (Sengupta, 2018). Apart from India expressing its concerns,
it has ensured that its reservation over BRI features in bilateral meetings like
36 S.Y. Surendra Kumar
the India-US bilateral meeting (June 2017). The joint statement noted that
both sides “support bolstering regional economic connectivity through the
transparent development of infrastructure and the use of responsible debt
nancing practices, while ensuring respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the rule of law, and the environment; and call on other nations
in the region to adhere to these principles” (Darshana, 2018). Similarly, in
September 2017, PM Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe issued
a joint statement indirectly criticising BRI’s “quality infrastructure – which,
among others, ensures alignment with local economic and development
strategies, safety, resilience, social and environmental impacts, and job
creation, as well as capacity building for the local communities”.4 Thus, India
has been pro-active in opposing BRI as and when opportunities arise.
4.2. Efforts to Counter MSR/BRI
India has made efforts to counter the BRI like establishing the International
North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a trilateral projects initiated by
India, Iran and Russia. As result, India reached an agreement with Iran in
May 2016 to develop the Chabahar port in Iran, and allocated US$500 million
to develop it. The port city is only about 70 km from the Pakistani port of
Gwadar, where China’s “new Silk Road” and “maritime Silk Road” meet.
In October 2017, India shipped its rst load of wheat to Afghanistan via
Chabhar (Wagner and Tripathi, 2018: 3). This port is vital for India’s trade
and commerce with West Asia and Central Asia by avoiding the land route
through Pakistan. A major advantage of INSTC is that, little investment is
needed to establish new trading routes as the infrastructure is already in place.
The development of the Chabahar port in Iran, only 500 kilometres away
from ports in Gujarat (especially Kandla), opens up opportunities for Indian
businessmen to export not only to Iran but also to markets in Afghanistan,
Central Asia, Russia and even Europe (Conference Proceedings, 2016).
Chabahar’s proximity to the Indian port cities of Kochin, Kandla and
Mumbai also provide many lucrative trading opportunities for India. This
route will be benecial not just for India, but also for Iran and Afghanistan.
India has also initiated a project connecting the northeast region of India with
the Chittagong port in Bangladesh to enhance trade and commerce (Das,
2017: 136). Thus, India has been successful in exploring the possibilities of
achieving its economic and strategic interest through trilateral arrangements.
To counter China’s MSR, India is being pro-active in strengthening
bilateral ties with countries in the Indian Ocean region. This has received
a big boost with India launching the Mausam project (2014). The Mausam
project is projected by India as a cultural one, as it is the initiative of the
Union Ministry of Culture and implemented by the Archaeological Survey of
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Concerns, Responses and Strategies 37
India (ASI) as the nodal agency with research support from the Indira Gandhi
National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA) and National Museum as associate
bodies. This project aims to “explore the multi-faceted Indian Ocean ‘world’
– collating archaeological and historical research in order to document the
diversity of cultural, commercial and religious interactions in the Indian
Ocean” (Press Information Bureau, 2017). It also aims to promote research
on themes related to the study of maritime routes. Subsequently, the Mausam
project is to inscribe places and sites identied as transnational nomination
for inscription on UNESCO’s World Heritage List. But the project is not
just cultural, it also has a strategic dimension as this project will provide an
opportunity for India to re-establish its ties with its ancient trade partners and
re-establish an “Indian Ocean world” along the littoral of the Indian Ocean,
stretching from east Africa, along the Arabian Peninsula, past southern Iran to
the major countries of South Asia and then to Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia.
Unfortunately, the Mausam project even after four years remains a distant
dream, “primarily due to India’s unsure methods and uncertain strategies”
(Seethi, 2018). Even though an amount of Rs60,039,297/- (i.e. Rs2,80,95,532
for 2018-19 and Rs3,19,43,765 for year 2019-20) has been approved and
allocated for the project, but the expenditure for the project during 2017-18
and rst three months of 2018-19 is Rs16,75,614 (Press Information Bureau,
2017). Furthermore, India should be the primary economic and security
provider in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) countries, however
it is likely to be outmatched by China, which is only an observer (Sidhu,
2015). Thus, the project has being very ambitious but is lacking on the
implementation part.
In a similar direction, PM Modi during his visit to Mauritius (March
2015) mooted the SAGAR (security and growth for all in the region) concept
with multiple objectives such as protecting maritime interests, enhancing
economic and security cooperation in the littoral, promoting collective action
to deal with maritime threats, building greater trust and promoting respect
for maritime rules, norms and peaceful resolution of disputes (Swaraj,
2017). PM Modi went one step further and pitched for establishing an Indian
Ocean University (IOU) by India and co-endorsed by Mauritius for which a
preliminary study has been prepared by the IORA secretariat (Ibid). SAGAR
is making progress, but not on the scale as it was anticipated.
In a joint effort by India–Japan, in May 2017 at the annual general
meeting of the African Development Bank, both countries unveiled the vision
document for an “Asia Africa Growth Corridor” (AAGC) with the aim to
enhance growth and connectivity between Asia and Africa focussing on areas
like development cooperation projects, quality infrastructure and institutional
connectivity, enhancing skills, and people to people partnership (Singh,
2017b: 6). Overall, it seeks to synergize between India’s Act East Policy and
38 S.Y. Surendra Kumar
Japan’s “expanded partnership for quality infrastructure to improve growth
and interconnected between Asia and Africa” (Ibid: 7). However, this corridor
is yet to take concrete shape. Overall, India has made efforts to counter BRI,
but its success remains to be seen in the near future.
4.3. QUAD – Yet to Take Off
The quadrilateral grouping QUAD – the US, Japan, Australia and India has
not been formally institutionalized since 2007 for various reasons such as: (i)
India was not keen on it. The regimes in the US (2008), Australia and Japan
(2007) were more inclined to view such coalitions as too provocative and
unproductive in an Asia-Pacic security context; (ii) the US moved from pro-
active to soft-pedalling; Australia moved from Quadrilateral to Asia-Pacic
Community; Japan from pro-active to lukewarm; and India from acceptance
in principle to noncommittal; and (iii) China continued to express its unease
over such a development. Moreover, all the four countries began to strengthen
their ties with China. As a result, the quadrilateral grouping did not take off.
Nevertheless, there is rethinking about reviving the quadrilateral in
recent years. For instance, in 2015, India hosted Japan and Australia for its
rst ever high-level trilateral dialogue in New Delhi. Some of the topics
discussed were maritime security, including freedom of navigation patrols;
they also suggested, “One idea to consider is initiating a Quad-lateral
Security Dialogue between India-Japan-Australia and the United States
(Chaudhury, 2016). Besides, with the successful trilateral dialogue of US-
Japan-India, US-Australia-Japan and so on for collective exercises, the
quadrilateral has gained momentum in recent years. Moreover, the QUAD
got a bit boost with US Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., commander of the
US Pacic Command (PACOM), pitching for institutionalizing QUAD in
March 2016 while speaking at an international security conference in New
Delhi. On the sidelines of the ASEAN senior ofcial meeting in Singapore
(November 2017), senior ofcials from all the four countries held their
second consultative meeting. The meeting was a follow up of the group’s
rst meeting in Manila (November 2017) again on the sidelines of ASEAN
summits. However, each of the four countries released a statement on the four-
way consultations, without making any reference to the arrangement being a
“quadrilateral.” All four statements noted some variant of the countries each
support a free, open, prosperous, and inclusive “Indo-Pacic region. But
the Quad continues to move along slowly and steadily. The hint of regular
meetings suggests that the four countries will continue to explore ways to
operationalize a common cooperative agenda in the Indo-Pacic (Pande,
2018). The expectations were high for the forthcoming Quadrilateral grouping
of India, Australia, Japan and the US meeting, on the sidelines of the East
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Concerns, Responses and Strategies 39
Asia Summit in Singapore in November 2018. In a nutshell, there is a need for
a quadrilateral alliance, although as of now it is on hold, however, it remains
to be seen if geopolitical forces will push the arrangement forward.
5. Scope for a Win-win Situation in BRI
Although, China is making all efforts to take the BRI forward with or without
India, however, there is still much scope for a win-win situation between both
nations in ensuring the success of BRI.
5.1. Problems Aplenty
Apparently, the prevailing perception in India among some of the government,
policy makers and academicians are that BRI has vast implications for India’s
strategic interest and it needs to be countered. However, BRI has plenty
of problems, in anyway it will be an uphill task. For instance, the slowing
down of the Chinese economy; most of the region that are part of BRI are
confronted with challenges like weak economy, insecurity, political instability,
uneven economic development, and the many countries which are part of
the BRI are underdeveloped in the manufacturing sector (Das, 2017: 135-
136). Moreover, the presence of terrorist organizations like ISI, Al-Qaeda
and Pakistani based outts might be a stumbling block for the successful
implementation of BRI. At the same time, reservations from European nations,
the US and Japan on issues like lacking transparency, no commitment from
China on social or environmental sustainability are still unaddressed by the
Chinese government. As a result, the full participation of these major powers
remains a distant dream. Above all, given the lower level of returns on
infrastructure projects, the possible construction delays due to political and
security risks like in Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan may have an adverse
impact on the investment. Interestingly, critics will be closely watching the
actual pledged and actual ow of Chinese investment, for example in the
case of CPEC, an amount of US$66 billion worth of Chinese investment
was promised from 2001 to 2011, but only 6 per cent of these were actually
realized (Small, 2017: 80). Thus, the success of BRI will depend on the actual
ow of investment.
One of the prevailing narrative in India is that it has not been a huge loss
in terms of investment by keeping away from the BRI, as Chinese investment
is primarily through loans with signicant interest rates and other conditions.
Moreover, the host nations have to purchase and use Chinese equipment,
technology and labour, which are already creating problems in host countries
like South Asia and Central Asia. At the same time, Beijing is yet to mobilize
a unied support among the countries for its ambitious BRI. For example,
40 S.Y. Surendra Kumar
despite the presence of many countries and organisations at the BRI Forum
Summit in May 2017, China was unable to issue a joint communiqué signed
by all nations present. Instead, the communiqué was signed by thirty nations
like Russia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan, Indonesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka
and so on. Ironically, the US, UK, France, Germany, Australia and Japan
abstained from committing to the joint statement, which suggests that they
too have concerns about the BRI and China’s intentions (Darshana, 2018).
Furthermore, China has been pushing the BRI as a grand global initiative,
however ensuring its success remains an uphill task.
5.2. Improving Bilateral Ties
Despite the perpetuating security and border irritants in Indo-Sino relations,
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping have met regularly
like their informal summit in Wuhan (April 2018), during the SCO meeting
in Qingdao (June 2018), at the BRICS summit (July 2018), and G-20 Summit
(November 2018). Subsequently, economic ties are increasing. This was well
reected in a meeting (June 2018) between Jinping and Modi, where they
agreed to enhance bilateral trade to US$100 billion by 2020 (the present
trade is US$84 billion), and China agreeing to import non-Basmati rice and
sugar from India. In return, India will allow China’s state-owned Bank of
China to open its branch in Mumbai (Sengupta, 2018). Moreover, there is an
ongoing trade war between the US and China as the US carries out its threat
to impose tariffs on all US$507 billion worth of Chinese exports to the US. If
this happens, then the Chinese economy will be severely hit with long-term
annual GDP growth estimated to fall below 4.5 per cent (Merchant, 2018).
In this circumstance, China will have to depend upon India to keep its trade
and economy running.
Over the decades, conflict and cooperation have become important
elements in India-China relations. The two countries have cooperated on
strengthening bilateral political and economic ties. They have increased
cooperation on transnational issues like terrorism (minus Pakistan-sponsored
terrorism), global warming, economic crisis, piracy, drug trafcking, Islamist
fundamentalism and other security issues. Both share common interests in
maintaining regional stability like promoting economic growth and achieving
energy security in the region (Panda, 2016). Both opposed the US use of
military around the world, clearly indicating that they both want a multi-polar
world. The relations was further enhanced with the signing of the China-India
strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity in 2015. At the
same time, China is also India’s largest bilateral trading partner. Both states
are also members of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South
Africa) and the SCO, among others; and they frequently take similar stances
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Concerns, Responses and Strategies 41
towards industrialized nations in international trade and climate negotiations.
However, there are many irritants which have the potential of snowballing
into a major conict like territorial and border disputes, river water disputes,
Tibet issue, China’s overwhelming economic, military, nuclear and political
support to Pakistan, China’s growing inuence in South Asia and South East
Asia, China’s attempt to deny India a major role in Asia-Pacic and counter
India’s legitimate aspirations as a major maritime power in the Indian Ocean,
and opposing India’s strategic interests in the South China Sea. Furthermore,
China continues to prevent India’s entry into the NSG and UNSC and other
economic, political and security forums and groupings. Hence, India-China
relations have been a policy of containment, confrontation and cooperation,
which will continue and is the same case in the Asia-Pacic. In this context,
both the countries can explore the possibilities of working over a win-win
situation with regard to BRI.
5.3. China should Consult and Provide Space for India
Although, China has frequently stated the BRI as open, equal and inclusive,
but the CPEC running through Pakistan, also runs through POK, in a way
ignoring India’s sentiment. Further, neither the Chinese media nor the
administration has made efforts to address India’s concerns over CPEC
despite India raising this issue at several forums (Jacob, 2017: 4). Moreover,
Beijing instead of consulting New Delhi on BCIM before proceeding with
CPEC, it went ahead with the latter without taking into consideration India’s
situation. Similarly, the connectivity projects do provide some benet for India
also, particularly the transport links in Afghanistan; however, Pakistan has
refused to give transit access to India to reach Afghanistan and central Asia.
Thus, instead of China taking the initiative in persuading its all-time friend –
Pakistan, it continues to stress that this is a bilateral issue and it has no role.
To ensure India is also part of the BRI, Beijing can explore possibilities of an
alternative route to POK like Kolkata to Gandhinagar and develop a port of
the coast of Gujarat, which will take care of India’s security concerns. Thus,
China needs to consult and also take India on board, particularly wherever
there are shared interests.
5.4. India should Move one Step
It is not just China taking a step forward, but India also needs to walk along
with China, that is: (a) as former Foreign Secretary Shyam Sharan stated
“its worth giving a chance to BRI, given that India do not have capacity to
provide an alternative in either scale or scope on the grounds that it might
help India to regain some cultural and strategic leverage by advancing its
42 S.Y. Surendra Kumar
own SAGAR mala project and cotton and spice routes via the MSR” (Saran,
2015). (b) Given that this century belongs to Asia and both China and India
have greater roles in shaping the destiny of Asia, hence both needs to balance
the short-term and long-term goals and need to relook and reach a consensus
where the interest of both are taken to build a better future for Asia. (c)
India can explore the possibilities of adopting selective approach to projects
connecting Iran, Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries and ignore
CPEC. Moreover, the CPEC might enhance the debt of Pakistan and leave
behind a host of white elephant projects and incomplete plans (Small, 2017:
83). Thus, India’s CPEC obsession can be condensed. (d) India has yet to nd
a credible/suitable response to China’s investment in the region. Moreover,
not being part of the BRI is not a response or strategy and the BRI has
reached a stage where India cannot ignore and stay isolated for long. There
is hardly any scope for India in stopping the BRI or its implementation, but
India not taking part also undermines the credibility, and not taking part is
difcult for India. (e) India’s participation in BRI will enhance South-south
cooperation, NDB and AIIB and the pro-active engagement of the two will
complement the soft infrastructure, given India’s strength in the service sector.
(f) The Indira doctrine emphasized and stipulated that all domestic political
conicts in the neighbouring states should be resolved with India’s help, and
the Gujral doctrine stressed no reciprocity with neighbours, while Modi put
forth the neighbourhood rst policy. Despite all these vital policies, it has not
prevented China’s entry and neighbours balancing India. Although, Modi’s
neighbourhood rst policy was welcomed, but in recent times, it has not
yielded results as expected. Furthermore, compared to China, India has limited
resources at its disposal to implement these concepts.
Hence, in this circumstance, India needs to relook its response and
strategies towards BRI and China also needs to address India’s concerns so
that both the powers are part of the game changer in ‘BRI’.
Notes
* Dr. S.Y. Surendra Kumar is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political
Science, Bangalore University, Bengaluru, India. He holds the M.Phil and
Ph.D degrees in South Asian Studies from the School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He is a recipient of the
Mahbubul-Haq Research Award and Short Duration Fellowship. He has edited
and authored several books. His latest book is titled Ballots, Bullets and Bhikkhus:
The Role of Buddhist Sangha in Sri Lankan Politics and Ethnic Conict (2018).
He has contributed more than 15 chapters in various edited books and published
more than 25 research articles in leading national and international journals. His
area of interests are South Asian security and Indian foreign policy with reference
to US and China. He can be reached at <surendrajnu@gmail.com>.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Concerns, Responses and Strategies 43
1. “Belt and Road Initiative is not a Chinese plot, Xi says”, 11 April 2018, available
at <https://in.reuters.com/article/china-boao-bri/belt-and-road-initiative-is-not-a-
chinese-plot-xi-says-idINKBN1HI1H8>.
2. “China ready to solve the so-called debt issue”, 16 October 2018, available at
<http://www.oboreurope.com/en/china-debt-issue/>.
3. “Pakistan wants Saudi Arabia to be third partner in trade corridor”, 20 September
2018, available at <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-wants-saudi-arabia-
to-be-third-partner-in-trade-corridor-1919684>.
4. “Modi-Abe Meet: India, Japan drop mention of South China Sea in Joint
Statement”, The WIRE, 14 September 2017. Available at <https://thewire.in/
external-affairs/modi-abe-meet-india-japan-drop-mention-of-south-china-sea-in-
joint-statement>.
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