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A Liquid Perspective on Democratic Choice
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Abstract
The idea of liquid democracy responds to a widely-felt desire to make democracy more "fluid" and continuously participatory. Its central premise is to enable users to employ networked technologies to control and delegate voting power, to approximate the ideal of direct democracy in a scalable fashion that accounts for time and attention limits. There are many potential definitions, meanings, and ways to implement liquid democracy, however, and many distinct purposes to which it might be deployed. This paper develops and explores the "liquid" notion and what it might mean for purposes of enhancing voter choice by spreading voting power, improving proportional representation systems, simplifying or aiding voters in their choice, or scaling direct democracy through specialization. The goal of this paper is to disentangle and further develop some of the many concepts and goals that liquid democracy ideas often embody, to explore their justification with respect to existing democratic traditions such as transferable voting and political parties, and to explore potential risks in liquid democracy systems and ways to address them.
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Objective
Fake news represents a particularly egregious and direct avenue by which inaccurate beliefs have been propagated via social media. We investigate the psychological profile of individuals who fall prey to fake news.
Method
We recruited 1,606 participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk for three online surveys.
Results
The tendency to ascribe profundity to randomly generated sentences – pseudo‐profound bullshit receptivity – correlates positively with perceptions of fake news accuracy, and negatively with the ability to differentiate between fake and real news (media truth discernment). Relatedly, individuals who overclaim their level of knowledge also judge fake news to be more accurate. We also extend previous research indicating that analytic thinking correlates negatively with perceived accuracy by showing that this relationship is not moderated by the presence/absence of the headline's source (which has no effect on accuracy), or by familiarity with the headlines (which correlates positively with perceived accuracy of fake and real news).
Conclusion
Our results suggest that belief in fake news may be driven, to some extent, by a general tendency to be overly accepting of weak claims. This tendency, which we refer to as reflexive open‐mindedness, may be partly responsible for the prevalence of epistemically suspect beliefs writ large.
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The massive spread of digital misinformation has been identified as a major threat to democracies. Communication, cognitive, social, and computer scientists are studying the complex causes for the viral diffusion of misinformation, while online platforms are beginning to deploy countermeasures. Little systematic, data-based evidence has been published to guide these efforts. Here we analyze 14 million messages spreading 400 thousand articles on Twitter during ten months in 2016 and 2017. We find evidence that social bots played a disproportionate role in spreading articles from low-credibility sources. Bots amplify such content in the early spreading moments, before an article goes viral. They also target users with many followers through replies and mentions. Humans are vulnerable to this manipulation, resharing content posted by bots. Successful low-credibility sources are heavily supported by social bots. These results suggest that curbing social bots may be an effective strategy for mitigating the spread of online misinformation.
The article begins with a discussion of definitional issues regarding human trafficking andmodern slavery and then briefly critiques some popular claims regarding each problem. Examples ofmacro-level research are critically evaluated, followed by a review of micro-level studies that illustrate tremendous variation and complexity in structural arrangements and individuals' lived experiences. These studies suggest that in this field micro-level research has at least three advantages over grand, macro-level meta-analyses-advantages that are quantitative (i.e., estimating the magnitude of the problem within a measurable universe), qualitative (i.e., documenting complexities in lived experiences), and well suited to formulating contextually appropriate policy and enforcement responses.
This paper examines how financial deregulation and the partisan underpinnings of deregulation shaped the path of income inequality in the United States. Using time series data from 1914 to 2010 we assess the effect of partisan politics on financial deregulation and, in turn, the effect of deregulation on income inequality. We find that financial deregulation has generally declined when Democrats attain more power in Washington and that deregulation has contributed to rising inequality. We also learn that the partisan effect on deregulation has diminished since the early 1980s, suggesting that one way partisan politics has contributed to the recent rise in inequality is related to convergence on matters of financial deregulation. We explore several potential explanations for this post-1980 partisan convergence, finding evidence supporting the idea that globalization, the increasing availability of credit, and shifts in campaign finance were contributing factors.
The Turing test asked whether one could recognize the behavior of a human
from that of a computer algorithm. Today this question has suddenly become very
relevant in the context of social media, where text constraints limit the
expressive power of humans, and real incentives abound to develop
human-mimicking software agents called social bots. These elusive entities
wildly populate social media ecosystems, often going unnoticed among the
population of real people. Bots can be benign or harmful, aiming at persuading,
smearing, or deceiving. Here we discuss the characteristics of modern,
sophisticated social bots, and how their presence can endanger online
ecosystems and our society. We then discuss current efforts aimed at detection
of social bots in Twitter. Characteristics related to content, network,
sentiment, and temporal patterns of activity are imitated by bots but at the
same time can help discriminate synthetic behaviors from human ones, yielding
signatures of engineered social tampering.
In recent years, Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have become a relevant object of political science research. The aim of this paper is to develop a map of the existing literature and to outline a research agenda for this increasingly relevant tool and its role within modern democracies. Starting point of the paper is the dissemination of VAAs in Europe, focusing on the differences and similarities between the main types of VAAs. After having outlined the reasons for the dramatic spread of VAAs among European countries and voters, we provide an overview on the existing VAA literature. We then present a comparative research agenda for the VAAs by identifying questions that could be posed to the tools and their role out of different analytical perspectives. In the conclusion, we bring forward the argument that VAAs might matter even more in the future, indicating the need for a coordinated research effort.
At the grass roots level, the emergence of the Tea Party movement can best be understood as an outgrowth of the increased conservatism of the Republican electoral base, and especially the more politically engaged segment of that base, since the 1970s. I present evidence from American National Election Study surveys showing that Republican identifiers have been trending in a conservative direction for several decades and that this trend has been most evident among the most active partisans. I then present evidence from the October, 2010 wave of the American National Election Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey about the social characteristics and political beliefs of Tea Party supporters. The overwhelming majority of Tea Party supporters were Republicans and supporters were much more conservative than other Republicans. While conservatism is by far the strongest predictor of support for the Tea Party movement, racial hostility also has a significant impact on support. Along with their greater conservatism, Tea Party supporters were much more politically active than other Republicans. These results suggest that the Tea Party movement has the potential to strongly influence the 2012 Republican congressional and presidential primaries, putting considerable pressure on Republican candidates to embrace issue positions well to the right of the median general election voter.
In Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank. They find that the traditional model--transforming the "preference lists" of individuals into a "preference list" of society--is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. Balinski and Laraki propose a more realistic model. It leads to an entirely new theory and method--majority judgment--proven superior to all known methods. It is at once meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet's and Arrow's. They offer theoretical, practical, and experimental evidence--from national elections to figure skating competitions--to support their arguments. Drawing on insights from wine, sports, music, and other competitions, Balinski and Laraki argue that the question should not be how to transform many individual rankings into a single collective ranking, but rather, after defining a common language of grades to measure merit, how to transform the many individual evaluations of each competitor into a single collective evaluation of all competitors. The crux of the matter is a new model in which the traditional paradigm--to compare--is replaced by a new paradigm--to evaluate.
Decision-making procedures in online social networks should reflect participants' political influence within the network.
his final solution is then an optimal solution. To start the iterative process, we need an initial feasible solution x 1 , x 2 , . . . , w 3 . For our example, this is easy. We simply set all the original variables to zero and use the defining equations to determine the slack variables: x 1 = 0, x 2 = 0, x 3 = 0, w 1 = 5, w 2 = 11, w 3 = 8. The objective function value associated with this solution is # = 0. We now ask whether this solution can be improved. Since the coefficient of x 1 is positive, if we increase the value of x 1 from zero to some positive value, we will increase #. But as we change its value, the values of the slack variables will also change. We must make sure that we don't let any of them go negative. Since x 2 = x 3 = 0, we see that w 1 = 5 2x 1 , and so keeping w 1 nonnegative imposes the restriction that x 1 must not exceed 5/2. Similarly, the nonnegativity of w 2 imposes the bound that x 1 11/4, and the nonnegativity of w 3 introduces the bound that
Following the 2016 US presidential election, many have expressed concern about the effects of false stories ("fake news"), circulated largely through social media. We discuss the economics of fake news and present new data on its consumption prior to the election. Drawing on web browsing data, archives of fact-checking websites, and results from a new online survey, we find: 1) social media was an important but not dominant source of election news, with 14 percent of Americans calling social media their "most important" source; 2) of the known false news stories that appeared in the three months before the election, those favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared 8 million times; 3) the average American adult saw on the order of one or perhaps several fake news stories in the months around the election, with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them; and 4) people are much more likely to believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks.
Approval voting (AV) system is well suited to elect a single winner, which almost all the literature on AV since the 1970s has addressed. Satisfaction approval voting (SAV) works as follows when the candidates are individuals. A voter's satisfaction score is the fraction of his or her approved candidates who are elected, whether the voter is relatively discriminating or not. This chapter considers the conditions under which, in a 3-candidate election with 2 candidates to be elected, a voter's ballot might change the outcome, either by making or breaking a tie. In 2003, the Game Theory Society used AV for the first time to elect 12 new council members from a list of 24 candidates. A decision-theoretic analysis shows that all strategies under SAV, except approving of a least-preferred candidate, are undominated, so voters may rationally choose to approve of more than one candidate.
Over the last several years political actors worldwide have begun harnessing the digital power of social bots - software programs designed to mimic human social media users on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit. Increasingly, politicians, militaries, and government-contracted firms use these automated actors in online attempts to manipulate public opinion and disrupt organizational communication. Politicized social bots - here 'political bots' - are used to massively boost politicians' follower levels on social media sites in attempts to generate false impressions of popularity. They are programmed to actively and automatically flood news streams with spam during political crises, elections, and conflicts in order to interrupt the efforts of activists and political dissidents who publicize and organize online. They are used by regimes to send out sophisticated computational propaganda. This paper conducts a content analysis of available media articles on political bots in order to build an event dataset of global political bot deployment that codes for usage, capability, and history. This information is then analyzed, generating a global outline of this phenomenon. This outline seeks to explain the variety of political bot-oriented strategies and presents details crucial to building understandings of these automated software actors in the humanities, social and computer sciences.
Do Americans live in a liberal capitalist society, where evenhanded competition rules the day, or a society in which big money, private security, and personal relations determine key social outcomes? Vladimir Shlapentokh and Joshua Woods argue that the answer to these questions cannot be found among the conventional models used to describe the nation. Offering a new analytical tool, the authors present a provocative explanation of the nature of contemporary society by comparing its essential characteristics to those of medieval European societies. Their feudal model emphasizes five elements: the weakness of the state and its inability to protect its territory, guarantee the security of its citizens, and enforce laws; conflicts and collusions between and within organizations that involve corruption and other forms of illegal or semilegal actions; the dominance of personal relations in political and economic life; the prevalence of an elitist ideology; and the use of private agents and organizations for the provision of safety and security. Feudal America urges readers to suspend their forward-thinking and futurist orientations, question linear notions of social and historical progression, and look for explanations of contemporary social problems in medieval European history. Copyright
Conventional democratic institutions aggregate preferences poorly. The norm of one-person-one-vote with majority rule treats people fairly by giving everyone an equal chance to influence outcomes but fails to give proportional weight to people whose interests in a social outcome are stronger than those of other people. This problem leads to the familiar phenomenon of tyranny of the majority. Various institutions that have been tried or proposed over the years to correct this problem-including supermajority rule, weighted voting, cumulative voting, "mixed constitutions," executive discretion, and judicially protected rights-all badly misfire in various ways, for example, by creating gridlock or corruption. This Article proposes a new form of political decisionmaking based on the theory of quadratic voting. It explains how quadratic voting solves the preference-aggregation problem by giving proper weight to preferences of varying intensity, how it can be incorporated into political institutions, and why it should improve equity.
Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics—which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, and two types of interest-group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism—offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented.
A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. We report on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues.
Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.
Laws that regulate the financing of campaigns are one attempt to attenuate the role of money in politics and promote more egalitarian policy outcomes. Do states with stricter campaign finance regulations represent citizens’ interests more equally? Using data on state spending priorities from 1977 to 2008, this article finds that states with stricter campaign finance laws devote a larger proportion of their annual budget to public welfare spending in general and to cash assistance programs in particular. In contrast, there is no relationship between the strictness of campaign finance laws and spending decisions for non-redistributive policy areas. I also investigate possible causal mechanisms and uncover evidence that stricter campaign finance laws alter incentives for candidates to respond to wealthy constituents by lessening the proportion of contributions that originate from business interests. These results suggest that laws that regulate the financing of political campaigns can play an important role in promoting the interests of disadvantaged citizens and enhancing political equality.
I develop a hybrid of direct democracy and representative democracy in which each citizen may vote directly on each issue, or delegate his vote on any issue to a representative (that is, a proxy) of his own choosing. I construct both an axiomatic argument for such a system and an argument based on its ability to ameliorate the information problems inherent in both direct and representative democracy. I also propose practical measures for implementation, including new variations on existing proxy system proposals. These new variations include a ‘Dodgsonesque’ procedure, a proportional agenda-setting procedure, a provision for virtual committees, and a provision for continual consideration of issues.
Concern that donations to political campaigns secure preferential treatment from policy makers has long occupied judges, scholars, and the public. However, the effects of contributions on policy makers' behavior are notoriously difficult to assess. We present the first randomized field experiment on the topic. The experiment focuses on whether contributions facilitate access to influential policy makers. In the experiment, a political organization attempted to schedule meetings between 191 congressional offices and the organization's members in their districts who were campaign donors. However, the organization randomly assigned whether it revealed to congressional offices that prospective attendees had contributed to campaigns. When informed prospective attendees were political donors, senior policy makers made themselves available between three and four times more often. These findings underscore concerns about the Supreme Court's recent decisions deregulating campaign finance.
When defined in terms of social identity and affect toward copartisans and opposing partisans, the polarization of the American electorate has dramatically increased. We document the scope and consequences of affective polarization of partisans using implicit, explicit, and behavioral indicators. Our evidence demonstrates that hostile feelings for the opposing party are ingrained or automatic in voters' minds, and that affective polarization based on party is just as strong as polarization based on race. We further show that party cues exert powerful effects on nonpolitical judgments and behaviors. Partisans discriminate against opposing partisans, doing so to a degree that exceeds discrimination based on race. We note that the willingness of partisans to display open animus for opposing partisans can be attributed to the absence of norms governing the expression of negative sentiment and that increased partisan affect provides an incentive for elites to engage in confrontation rather than cooperation.
Netizens is an ambitious look at the social aspects of computer networking. It examines the present and the turbulent future, and especially it explores the technical and social roots of the Net.— Thomas Truscott, co-developer of Usenet While working on my own history of the Net, I watched the Haubens' documentation of Net development evolve and grow as they posted it to the Net itself. Now, with a hardcopy version of their work out, the authors have given us a valuable shelf reference to complement their online work.— Katie Hafner, coauthor of Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the Internet Inspired by the writings of Thomas Paine and Jean Jacques Rousseau, Michael and Ronda Hauben sketch an=out a provocative declaration of Netizen rights in their appendix to this engrossing, well-researched, and very useful book. The Haubens reserve the term Netizen for positive contributors to the Net, the good citizens whose heroic precursors from the 1960s are reicly chronicled in a flowing historical and sociological account that is not to be missed.— Martin Greenberger, Director of the Center for Digital Media, UCLA
This article examines the relationship between electoral systems and extremist political parties. Focusing on the West European parties of the extreme right, it first investigates the extent to which district magnitude and electoral formula - the two main dimensions of electoral systems - influence the scores of these parties. It then considers the overall impact of the disproportionality of the electoral system. The article concludes that whilst proportional electoral systems do undeniably make it easier for extremist parties to gain legislative representation, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that they promote extremism. Instead, the share of the vote going to extremist parties appears unrelated to the type of electoral system employed.
This paper has argued that changing technology has increased opportunities for voter participation in the legislative process and has presented a proposal which takes some advantage of such possibilities. The objective has not been so much to criticize our present legislative voting arrangement, but to suggest for the future an alternative that might prove superior.
The New Left balks at the “establishment”, and conservatives look with dismay upon the “liberal clique”. Direct participation largely would solve these problems, by-passing intermediaries and allowing direct voter or voter-proxy approval of all legislation. If we accept the principal that, with constitutional guarantees, qualified individuals should determine as democratically and as directly as possible the decisions that affect their personal and corporate welfare, then the future holds opportunities for greater efficiency in collective action.
By many accounts, Ralph Nader had a substantial effect on the dynamics of the 2000 presidential campaign. While Nader's place in history is unique due to his impact on the election's outcome, Nader's campaign follows in a long tradition of significant third party candidacies in the twentieth century. We explore the 2000 Nader campaign with the goal of placing its appeals - as well as its effect on voters - within this broader context of recent third party candidacies for the presidency. Based on the nature of his issue appeals, we can characterize the Nader campaign as a blend of left-wing populism and anti-system sentiment. Noting the similarity of this appeal with those of other significant third party candidates (excepting Wallace in 1968), we go on to look at the electoral impact of Nader and these other candidates. Our analysis of state-wide voting patterns yields surprisingly large correlations between the Nader vote and votes for recent third party campaigns that were ideologically different from the Green Party campaign. Moving to indi- vidual-level analysis, we find that third party voting is driven largely by alienation from the major parties and the political system as well as identification with third parties. As a result, we find that Democrats in 2000 were unlikely to defect from Al Gore, suggesting that people who did vote for Nader did so because of their repulsion from the major parties or attraction to Nader and/or the Green Party.
In America, entertainment celebrities have entered politics, and the news media have become part of the entertainment industry. At the same time, political figures cultivate their role as celebrities, with image handlers and engineered media campaigns that treat voters like fans. President Bush has modeled himself on Ronald Reagan—the “western” movie actor as much as the president. The role bears little relation to reality, but it has become commonly accepted by a politically obsequious press and amovie-loving public. The persona is actively promoted by the White House as part of the politics of distraction—a strategy designed to keep the public from learning about what is being done in its name and with its tax dollars. The politics of distraction can explain why the public has failed to perceive the global climate crisis, but Americans will need to awake soon from this dream state if they wish to survive.
This essay examines if the emergence of more partisan media has contributed to political polarization and led Americans to support more partisan policies and candidates. Congress and some newer media outlets have added more partisan messages to a continuing supply of mostly balanced news. Although political attitudes of most Americans have remained fairly centrist, evidence points to some polarization among the politically involved. Proliferation of media choices lowered the share of less interested, less partisan voters and thereby made elections more partisan. But evidence for a causal link between more partisan messages and changing attitudes or behaviors is mixed at best. Measurement problems hold back research on partisan selective exposure and its consequences. Ideologically one-sided news exposure may be largely confined to a small, but highly involved and influential segment of the population. There is no firm evidence that partisan media are making ordinary Americans more partisan. Expected final...
In the aftermath of a potentially demoralizing 2008 electoral defeat, when the Republican Party seemed widely discredited, the emergence of the Tea Party provided conservative activists with a new identity funded by Republican business elites and reinforced by a network of conservative media sources. Untethered from recent GOP baggage and policy specifics, the Tea Party energized disgruntled white middle-class conservatives and garnered widespread attention, despite stagnant or declining favorability ratings among the general public. As participant observation and interviews with Massachusetts activists reveal, Tea Partiers are not monolithically hostile toward government; they distinguish between programs perceived as going to hard-working contributors to US society like themselves and “handouts” perceived as going to unworthy or freeloading people. During 2010, Tea Party activism reshaped many GOP primaries and enhanced voter turnout, but achieved a mixed record in the November general election. Activism may well continue to influence dynamics in Congress and GOP presidential primaries. Even if the Tea Party eventually subsides, it has undercut Obama's presidency, revitalized conservatism, and pulled the national Republican Party toward the far right.
Recent research on uninhibited behavior in computer-mediated communication (CMC) systems have sug-gested that flaming is social-context dependent and not a media characteristic of CMC. This study takes a closer look at the social context in which flaming occurs, which need not necessarily be developed online but, as well, can be the social, religious, and political background and affiliations of the participants. The study analyzed messages posted during 1 week to 4 Usenet social newsgroups that represent different national and cul-tural groups. The levels of flaming in these groups were found to be higher than any reported in other studies. The findings show that the frequency of flaming differed between the newsgroups, and differed within news-groups according to the general topic under discussion, confirming that social context and not the medium is the primary determinant of online uninhibited behavior.
Approval voting is a well-known voting procedure for single-winner elections. Voters approve of as many candidates as they
like, and the candidate with the most approvals wins (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983, 2005). But Merrill and Nagel (1987) point
out that there are many ways to aggregate approval votes to determine a winner, justifying a distinction between approval balloting, in which each voter submits a ballot that identifies the candidates the voter approves of, and approval voting, the procedure of ranking the candidates according to their total numbers of approvals.
The magnitude of mutual funds’ business ties with their portfolio firms is documented and is linked to funds’ proxy votes at specific firms and to overall voting practices. Aggregate votes at the fund family level indicate a positive relation between business ties and the propensity to vote with management. Votes at specific firms, however, reveal that funds are no more likely to vote with management of client firms than of non-clients. Because the votes took place when funds knew their votes would be publicly scrutinized, fund families with a larger client base may have adopted voting policies that led to less frequent opposition to management at all firms.
Over the past five years a new approach to privacy-preserving data analysis has born fruit [13, 18, 7, 19, 5, 37, 35, 8, 32]. This approach differs from much (but not all!) of the related literature in the statistics, databases, theory, and cryptography communities, in that a formal and ad omnia privacy guarantee is defined, and the data analysis techniques presented are rigorously proved to satisfy the guarantee. The key privacy guarantee that has emerged is differential privacy. Roughly speaking, this ensures that (almost, and quantifiably) no risk is incurred by joining a statistical database.
In this survey, we recall the definition of differential privacy and two basic techniques for achieving it. We then show some interesting applications of these techniques, presenting algorithms for three specific tasks and three general results on differentially private learning.
Usenet is a complex socio-technical phenomenon, containing vast quantities of information. The sheer scope and complexity make it a challenge to understand the many dimensions across which people and communication are interlinked. In this work, we present visualizations of several aspects and scales of Usenet that combine to highlight the range of variation found in newsgroups. We examine variations within hierarchies, newsgroups, authors, and social networks. We find a remarkable diversity, with clear variations that mark starting points for mapping the broad sweep of behavior found in this and other social cyberspaces. Our findings provide the basis for initial recommendations for those cultivating, managing, contributing, or consuming collectively constructed conversational content.
Conducting an exit poll to forecast the outcome of a national election in terms of both votes and seats is particularly difficult in Britain. No official information is available on how individual polling stations voted in the past, use of single-member plurality means that there is no consistent relationship between votes and seats, electors can choose to vote by post and most of those who vote in person do so late in the day. In addition, around one in every six intended exit poll respondents refuses to participate. Methods that were developed to overcome these problems, and their use in the successful 2005 British Broadcasting Corporation-Independent Television exit poll, are described and evaluated. The methodology included a panel design to allow the estimation of electoral change at local level, coherent multiple-regression modelling of multiparty electoral change to capture systematic patterns of variation, probabilistic prediction of constituency winners to account for uncertainty in projected constituency level shares, collection of information about the voting intentions of postal voters before polling day and access to interviewer guesses on the voting behaviour of refusals. The coverage and accuracy of the exit poll data are critically examined, the effect of key aspects of the statistical modelling of the data is assessed and some general lessons are drawn for the design and analysis of electoral exit polls. Copyright (c) 2008 Royal Statistical Society.
Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting. The Review of Financial Studies
- K Ashwini
Ashwini K. Agrawal. Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from
Proxy Voting. The Review of Financial Studies,
25(1):187-226, January 2012.
What to do with silence? exploring the political significances of sociotechnical absences
- Mike Ananny
Mike Ananny. What to do with silence? exploring the political significances of sociotechnical absences, June 2018. Digital Technology and Democratic Theory Workshop.
Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting
- Haris Aziz
- Serge Gaspers
- Joachim Gudmundsson
- Simon Mackenzie
- Nicholas Mattei
- Toby Walsh
Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Joachim Gudmundsson, Simon Mackenzie, Nicholas Mattei, and Toby
Walsh. Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS),
pages 107-115, May 2015.
Donald Trump Didn't Really Win 52% of White Women in 2016
- Molly Ball
Molly Ball. Donald Trump Didn't Really Win 52%
of White Women in 2016. TIME, October 2018.
Liquid Democracy: Web Platform Makes Professor Most Powerful Pirate. Spiegel Online
- Sven Becker
Sven Becker. Liquid Democracy: Web Platform
Makes Professor Most Powerful Pirate. Spiegel Online, March 2012.
Weaponized Health Communication: Twitter Bots and Russian Trolls Amplify the Vaccine Debate
- David A Broniatowski
- Amelia M Jamison
- Sihua Qi
- Lulwah Alkulaib
- Tao Chen
- Adrian Benton
- Sandra C Quinnand Mark Dredze
David A. Broniatowski, Amelia M. Jamison, SiHua
Qi, Lulwah AlKulaib, Tao Chen, Adrian Benton,
and Sandra C. Quinnand Mark Dredze. Weaponized
Health Communication: Twitter Bots and Russian
Trolls Amplify the Vaccine Debate. American Journal of Public Health, September 2018.