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14 — ISSUE 1/2020
Spotlight: Advancing Climate Resilience in ASEAN
The ASEAN member states are among the world’s
most vulnerable countries to climate change.
Some climate change impacts may have spillover
effects on bilateral and regional relations in Southeast
Asia. Climate change could affect human security in the
region by threatening traditional livelihoods, exacerbating
existing intra-state security threats, transforming
territorial disputes and bilateral tensions, and straining
already limited resources. This can in turn incentivise
inter-state competition for scarce resources and trigger
large-scale migration, exacerbating old political tensions,
giving rise to new ones, and causing difficulties for
integration and multilateral initiatives within ASEAN.
The Global Climate R isk Index 2020 produced by
Germanwatch names the Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand
and Vietnam among the ten countries bearing the greatest
costs in the last 20 years from climate-induced disasters
and weather events. Climate change is likely to further
intensify severe weather events, with signif icant human
and financial costs for ASEAN member states. Moreover,
most of their populations are concentrated along the
seaboards and on f lat fertile plains threatened by sea level
rise. Loss of substantial territory due to sea level rise is a
major threat for Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Thailand and Vietnam. Without swift technological
progress, rice yields may be 50% lower in 2100 than in
1990 in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam,
according to a 2017 study by the Asian Development Bank
and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.
The loss of agriculturally productive territory threatens
food security in most ASEAN countries, as does the
impact on riverine and oceanic fishing resources. The
fisheries are already threatened by over-exploitation, and
the acidification of oceans can harm stocks and further
intensify regional competition over these resources.
Furthermore, as weather patterns change, varying
Himalayan precipitation will directly impact the flows
of the Mekong, Salween, and Irrawaddy rivers, on which
riverine communities in the Greater Mekong region
depend. This might not only increase f looding, but also
destabilise ecosystems and by extension fisheries. This will
likely have a profound effect on agricultural communities
along the region’s rivers, such as in Laos, where the
agricultural sector depends on the Mekong f loodplains.
Loss of livelihoods may incentivise migration, both from
within and outside the region. The population of ASEAN
is projected to reach 770 million in 2040, according to the
World Population Review, and this may further exacerbate
possible migration-related and other tensions caused
by climate change. While internal migration might be
possible in some cases, most ASEAN member countries
do not have sufficient fertile land to accommodate large
inf luxes of people on a long-term basis.
Climate Change, Security and
Regional Cooperation in ASEAN
Haakon Fossum Sagbakken, Indra Overland, Monika Merdekawati, Hoy-Yen Chan, Beni Suryadi,
and Roman Vakulchuk argue that ASEAN member states face a choice between cooperating more
closely on mitigating climate change now or risking greater regional tensions in the future.
Rohingya children in school provided by NGOs in Kuala Lumpur
Gaie Uchel@Shutterstock
15 — ISSUE 1/2020
Migration is not new to Southeast Asia, especially labour
migration. The status and welfare of citizens working
abroad have been an area of concern in bilateral relations
among regional states. For instance, around 10% of the
Philippine population work abroad, with remittances
constituting close to 10% of its GDP in 2019, according
to the Philippine Central Bank. Irregular labour
migration, ref ugee and repatriation issues have already
caused tensions in bilateral relationships among some
ASEAN member states, and migration flows of a greater
magnitude could accentuate the frequency and urgency of
such tensions.
Climate-induced mass migration from South Asia,
particularly from low-lying Bangladesh, is a scenario
that could cause significant tensions with neighbouring
Myanmar or other ASEAN member states. Similarly, loss
of coastal land in China raises the possibility of southward
migration f lows on a magnitude that could pose significant
material and political challenges for Southeast Asian
countries. The intractable issue of refugees, exemplified by
their long-term presence in Malaysia and Thailand, as well
as the recent case of the Rohingya from Myanmar, has
caused tensions within ASEAN in recent years and proven
a difficult topic to resolve at the regional level. Climate-
induced migration flows could exacerbate such frictions.
Loss of traditional livelihoods can also make populations
in impacted areas more vulnerable to recruitment by
separatist and extremist groups, a recognised security
threat in Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines, where
such groups take advantage of economic grievances to
boost recruitment. This equally applies to longstanding
irredentist groupings and communities vulnerable to
piracy, such as in the Sulu Sea between the Malaysia and
the Philippines.
Geopolitically, climate change can alter the strategic
calculus in the South China Sea disputes for the
claimant states. Rising sea-levels might imperil man-
made installations on the various reefs and island groups,
while pressures on inland fisheries increase the relative
importance of the fish stocks in the South China Sea. In
some cases, rising sea-levels might submerge entire reefs or
islands, undermining claims to Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZ) as defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Aside from the direct impacts of climate change, the
hither to modest contribution of ASEAN member states
to climate change mitigation may have implications for
their international standing. Southeast Asia is one of the
few regions in the world where coal consumption has
grown in recent years, and the nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) of ASEAN member states to the
Paris Agreement are modest. As investors become more
stringent about environmental sustainability, Southeast
Asian companies and countries may lose out on much-
needed foreign investment. Limited regional cooperation
on climate change mitigation also exposes ASEAN and its
member states to international criticism, and limits their
credibility in shaping the discourse on climate justice and
sustainability issues in the global arena.
If ASEAN member states can cooperate effectively to
mitigate climate change, it could preempt potential
political conflicts and reputational costs, instead of
allowing climate change to negatively affect regional
relations and the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation.
Greater tensions over migration issues and resource
competition might make it more diff icult to reach regional
consensus, a cornerstone of ASEAN multilateralism.
Climate change-induced political tensions might lower
inter-state trust, which in turn can hamper cooperation
in other environmental areas, such as the longstanding
transboundary haze issue. Furthermore, deeper ASEAN
integration in other policy fields might be further delayed
as each member state struggles to adapt to a more
volatile climate.
There are several policy areas where ASEAN could foster
regional cooperation to counteract climate change, with
the added benefit of enhancing regional trust. Firstly, the
implementation of the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) should
be accelerated to facilitate the expeditious roll-out of
intermittent renewable energy sources such as solar and
wind power by enhancing grid connectivity and utilising
the region’s unevenly distributed renewable natural
resources. Secondly, ASEAN member governments should
develop new financial incentives and market mechanisms
to facilitate investments into renewable energy projects
and infrastructure in cooperation with multilateral
financial institutions. Thirdly, they should engage
multilateral organisations and private sector stakeholders
to intensify climate adaptation measures in agriculture
and river management. These measures may be financially
and politically diff icult to implement, yet they offer a more
affordable option than the predictable and unforeseen
political consequences of climate change for ASEAN
member states and ASEAN as a regional community.
Mr. Haakon Fossum Sagbakken, Prof. Indra Overland,
Ms. Monika Merdekawati, Dr. Hoy-Yen Chan, Mr.
Beni Suryadi, and Mr. Roman Vakulchuk are
participating researchers in the ASEAN Climate
Change and Energy Project (ACCEPT)
implemented by the ASEAN Centre for Energy in
cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs.
baotainguyenmoitruong.vn
Vietnam’s Mekong delta coping with record high
levels of drought and salinisation in March 2020