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The multilevel identity politics of the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest
Abstract
This article uses the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) that took place in Tel Aviv to explore how cultural mega-events serve both as political arenas and as tools for identity construction, negotiation and contestation. These processes of identity politics are all conducted across national–subnational–international–transnational levels. The hosting of mega-events fleshes out these multiple processes in a very strong manner. We first discuss the politics of hosting mega-events in general. We then examine the identity politics associated more specifically with the Eurovision Song Contest, before examining in depth the complex forms of identity politics emerging around the competition following the 2018 Israeli victory. We suggest that it is important to study together the multiple processes—domestic, international and transnational—of identity politics that take place around the competition, as they interact with each other. Consequently, we follow the various stakeholders involved at these different levels and their interactions. We examine the internal identity negotiation process in Israel surrounding the event, the critical actors debating how to use the stage to challenge the liberal, western, ‘normal’ identity Israel hoped to project in the contest and how other stakeholders (participating states, national broadcasting agencies, participating artists) reacted to them, and finally we examine the behaviour of the institution in charge, the European Broadcasting Union, and national governments. We contribute to the study of mega-events as fields of contestation, to the understanding of the complex, multilevel nature of national identity construction, negotiation and contestation in the current era, and more broadly to the role that popular culture plays in this context.
... The symbolic impact of FIFA as an international institution governing sports relates to wider literature on soft power and the role of sports and culture in international politics. This literature addresses the impact of sports on foreign policy (Reiche 2015), their symbolic importance to national identity construction (Ismer 2011;Scheve et al. 2014), and the political significance of cultural megaevents for the host country, including the host's vulnerability to naming and shaming campaigns (Alekseyeva 2014;Black 2007;Bowersox 2016;Cornelissen 2008;Giulianotti et al. 2015;Gorokhov 2015;Jaskulowski and Majewski 2016;Press-Barnathan and Lutz 2020). ...
This article focuses on the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement's utilization of ‘fluidity,’ conceptualized as the ability to adapt campaign tactics to multiple arenas and political opportunity structures simultaneously. Framing BDS as both a social movement and a transnational advocacy network, it demonstrates the movement's fluidity in the context of three campaigns: the campaign at the 65th FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association) congress in 2015, which illustrates an ‘outsider’ strategy aimed at intergovernmental institutions; the 2014 Olive Declaration of municipalities endorsing BDS, which illustrates how local ‘insider’ campaigns can combine to create a translocal campaign; and the ‘Ferguson-Gaza moment’ in 2014, which illustrates how movements can engage at the level of civil society and embed themselves in the broader global justice movement.
... Political discourse concerning Israel is exceptionally active, attracting strong emotions, driving engagement on social media, and significantly impacting real-world events. In particular, discourse on Israel has spread beyond the domain of politics to encourage a boycott of Israeli products, companies (Society, 2016) and various events, such as the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest (Riesman, 2019;Press-Barnathan and Lutz, 2020) and an Israel-Argentina football match (Staff, 2018;Eglash, 2018). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the context of Twitter has been studied several times, mainly in order to understand virality trends (Heemsbergen & Lindgren, 2014) and to analyze communication patterns regarding major conflicts (Liu & Weber, 2014). ...
Social networks' ability to disseminate content to millions of users with just one click has made them a major playground for political marketing. Campaigners seek to identify a small subset of seed users in a social network to maximize the spread of influence. However, political content diffusion has a distinct nature —some users may invert a message's content before sending it onward, thereby propagating a view that contradicts the one held by the original author. Here, we developed a novel transmission model tailored to analyze the effect of debate dynamics in realistic settings of social networks. We demonstrate our model on a real-world network we developed based on a large-scale dataset of 715K tweets discussing active political content concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our simulations reveal that even a minute probability of tweet content inversion could result in the message being echoed, spread, and amplified by opposing users. The profile of the optimal seed users who would maximize exposure, too, drastically changes, and “echo chambers” are intensified compared to a no-inversion setting. Neglecting the effect of inversion may even result in a counterproductive outcome from the perspective of the original authors. Campaigners can significantly benefit from explicitly accounting for the impact of content inversion in social networks.
... The study of popular culture in world politics has surged (Dittmer and Dodds 2008;Muller 2008;Grayson, Davies, and Philpott 2009;Dittmer 2010;Sucharov 2013;Caso and Hamilton 2015;Dodds 2015;Payne 2016;Shapiro 2016;Furman and Musgrave 2017;Kirby 2017;Crilly 2020), complementing the aesthetic turn in international political theory (Bleiker 2001). However, while scholars of politics and international relations have considered fiction (Edkins 2013), visual culture (Hughes 2007;Eroukhmanoff 2019), television programs (Weldes 1999;Neumann 2001;Shepherd 2013;Deylami and Havercroft 2016;Clapton and Shepherd 2017;Press-Barnathan 2019), video games (Robinson 2012;Auchter 2016;Eken 2016), cartoons (Reinke de Buitrago 2019), alcoholic beverages (Jackson 2015;Saunders and Holland 2018), film (Dodds 2005;Shapiro 2008;Löfflmann 2013;Larson 2015;Eken 2019;), and music (Davies and Franklin 2015;Franklin 2016;Baker 2017;Press-Barnathan and Lutz 2020), they have neither focused on food nor considered cookbooks more specifically. One exception is Ferguson (2020), who higlights the different ways that cookbooks have political characteristics. ...
The paper explores the political narratives produced in English-language Israeli cookbooks. We examine an understudied, yet central component of everyday international relations, everyday nationalism, and identity contestations as practiced through gastronomy, and highlight the dilemma between the different political uses of popular culture in the context of conflict resolution and resistance. Our argument identifies different narratives represented in what we term Culinary Zionism. One narrative is explicitly political, discusses Israeli cuisine as a foodway, and contributes to creating a space of, and a path for, coexistence and recognition of the Other. A second narrative is found in tourist-orientated cookbooks that offer a supposedly apolitical story of culinary tours in Israel. We problematize the political and normative implications of these narratives by exploring the potential role of these books to open space for dialogue and to increase the familiarity and interest of foreign audiences of Israel and the conflict. We contrast this possibility with their potential to what we term foodwashing, namely the process of using food to symbolically wash over violence and injustices (the violence of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in this case).
Since 2013, the Nordic Council prizes have been awarded at live broadcast ceremonies in the Nordic countries. The Nordic Council Prize in Literature is the most prestigious, but like the other prizes, it is also part of a regional political project by the Nordic Council based on a culture of prize‐giving. Rather than focusing on book content or the literary award alone, this article investigates the prize‐giving ceremony. It examines how the idea of the Nordic is expressed in the prize‐giving culture of broadcasted ceremonies from 2013 to 2023. It explores how organizers use narratives, audio, text, and visuals in the ceremonies to convey the prizes' meaning through an arrangement merging culture, politics, and media. The article shows the prizes are tied to the broader regional political project—the promotion of a Nordic “imagined community.” The ceremony must navigate the paradox of being both a competition between Nordic countries and an expression of Nordic cooperation. National characteristics are downplayed by avoiding national symbols, shifting focus to Nordic identity. This article contributes to the study of (literary) prize culture by showing how such prizes can be vehicles for a broader political project.
The quest for legitimacy has traditionally been intrinsic to the political phenomenon of populism, while (de-)legitimation struggles are increasingly relevant once populist leaderships take government control. However, the rich literatures on populism and legitimacy have hardly interacted and, therefore, analysis of populists’ international (de)legitimation strategies has been scarce. This chapter addresses the ways in which incorporating theoretical frameworks on legitimacy and (de)legitimation into the ideational approach can contribute to better understand the drivers, patterns, and impact of the global rise of contemporary populist leaderships, suggesting new avenues for research on the potential international mitigation of populism.
TV shows and movies, as dominant forms of modern popular culture, often trigger domestic discussions, especially when dealing with sensitive and thorny issues in society. But what happens when these domestically-created cultural productions are globally circulated and consumed? In recent years, especially following the streaming revolution, there have been increasing numbers of national TV shows and films that are internationally distributed and broadcast. Focusing on the Israeli case, this article examines discursive responses to conflict-related TV shows and films that were created in Israel and are broadcast to an international audience. Situating these responses within International Relations constructivism and Social Psychology literature, we argue that the Israeli harsh and emotional response is a result of three dimensions related to these productions: (1) they deal with culturally intimate issues; (2) they expose Israeli vulnerabilities to outsiders; and (3) they are created by Israeli citizens, expected to align with group norms. In addition to bringing to the surface domestic identity debates, these internationally consumed cultural productions add another layer of ontological anxiety—the uncomfortable feeling associated with “airing the dirty laundry in public.”
This article examines children’s political agency in the context of the Junior Eurovision Song Contest. The Eurovision Song Contest is widely recognized as a political arena—a space for nation branding and soft diplomacy, narratives of European musical and democratic harmony, and protests over global political events. But despite filling similar roles to their adult counterparts, the young performers’ age and the organizers’ emphasis on ensuring the event is safe and fun mean these dynamics are frequently downplayed or overlooked at Junior Eurovision, with significant consequences for how we understand children’s political and politicized roles in international cultural spaces. I work with Lauren Berlant’s concepts of genre and the juxtapolitical to argue that recognition of children’s political—as opposed to artistic—agency by adults is tempered by both the format of Eurovision as entertainment and by broader conceptions apparent in international discourses of children as apolitical innocents. I suggest that while each of these genres can work separately to quiet the political dimensions of events, issues, and identities, it is Junior Eurovision’s double-edged status as a spectacular musical event and one starring and aimed at children that keeps the young performers from being recognized as having political identities and agency twice over.
European integration scholars have paid little attention to the visual dimension of Europeanization. We fill this gap by analysing how European Union integration reshapes political parties’ most visible symbols: their logos. We examine 579 party logos in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe before and after countries became European Union members, obtained the status of candidates or joined the European neighbourhood policy. Our difference-in-differences models show that European Union integration corresponds to a decrease in extremist and nationalist symbols as well as national flag colours. This ‘visual Europeanization’ process, prompted by population ecology and rebranding, cannot be solely explained by democratization or economic growth. Our analysis considers potential mechanisms that explain this correlation, including Europarty membership and normative diffusion, and discusses implications for the Europeanization literature.
This article examines the role of norms and culture in perceptions of the European Union. Conceptually, it offers a distinction between the image of the European Union as a normative actor and attitudes toward one's country's relations with the European Union. It also explores whether the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC), a cultural event which symbolizes the cultural understanding of contemporary Europe, is related to perceptions of the European Union. Empirically, it uses a public opinion survey ( n = 1050) following Israel's hosting of the ESC in 2019. The findings indicate that Israelis distinguish between the image of the European Union as an entity with positive features and their attitudes toward Israel's connections with the European Union.
Israel has participated in the Eurovision, the largest European music festival, since 1973. The Jewish state regularly invests substantial resources in the contest and goes to great lengths to shine; with four victories, as well as two second places, it has been highly successful. Given its symbolic significance, as well as its actual impact on Israeli cultural diplomacy and nation-branding efforts, the annual media event and the process of selecting an artistic representative frequently elicit values-laden debates. Against this backdrop, the article investigates the evolution of the ways in which Israelis have presented themselves on the Eurovision stage, as well as the country’s internal discourse surrounding this annual cultural ritual. Israel’s participation in the yearly spectacle, I argue, has become an important element of ongoing Zionist-Israeli nation-building.
Following (Kraidy, M. M., & Murphy, P. D. (2003). Media ethnography: Local, global, or translocal? In P. D. Murphy & M. M. Kraidy (Eds.), Global media studies: Ethnographic perspectives (pp. 299–307). Routledge; Kraidy, M. M., & Murphy, P. D. (2008). Shifting Geertz: Toward a theory of translocalism in global communication studies. Communication Theory, 18(3), 335–355. 10.1111/j.1468-2885.2008.00325.x) call to look at global communication through lenses of translocalism and hybridity, I find that global boycotts are hybridized sites that facilitate translocal recognition. Using Boycott Eurovision as a case study, two locales are investigated: petitions and Globalvision. By uncovering the translocal recognition in each locale, global boycotts become crucial avenues of inquiry to understand how global social movements grapple with globalization. The essay describes the importance of understanding the vulnerabilities of international boycotts’ hybridized status, calling forward analysis of structure, specific initiatives, and the enactments of hegemonic ideologies found in locales.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in March 2022, Ukrainians have been displaced from their country in record pace and in massive numbers. Although some have been displaced within Ukraine, most have fled to Poland, Moldova, and other European countries. The European and American public’s reaction to these large refugee numbers has been overwhelmingly positive, with outpourings of humanitarianism and solidarity. This reaction stands in stark contrast with the apprehensive and rather negative reactions from Europeans toward Afghan refugees following the Taliban’s violent takeover in May 2021. In this IMR Dispatch from the Field, I reflect on the similarities and differences in reactions to Ukrainian refugees in the current crisis and Afghan refugees following the Taliban takeover in May 2021. Despite important similarities between these two refugee groups, there are, I argue, various reasons why the European and American public may feel closer to Ukrainian than Afghan refugees or why they perceive the former to be more deserving of aid. I highlight the role of symbolic threat, a conscience collective, and ethnicity. Furthermore, the looming fear of the aggressor in this conflict (Russia) may play a larger role in the European and American public’s reactions than in other refugee crises.
This paper aims to contribute to the growing academic debate on the transnational drivers and patterns of contemporary populism. As populist leaderships expand both politically and geographically, the very nature of the populist phenomenon is changing, as it is increasingly being projected on the international stage. Contemporary populist leaders show a growing willingness to transfer the discursive construction of a struggle between 'the people' and 'the elites' to the regional and global levels as a way of obtaining internal and external legitimation. In so doing, they exploit the symbiotic two-level game that links national and international (de-)legitimation dynamics, seeking to gain 'abroad' the kind of legitimacy that they cannot obtain 'at home'. This paper suggests three mechanisms that explain the populist 'way out' from various legitimation traps based on the traditional distinctions between input, throughput, and output legitimacy. The paper's argument is illustrated with reference to prototypical cases of populism in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The incorporation of the literature on international legitimacy enhances our understanding of the strategic activation of populist attitudes through the transnational articulation of empty signifiers, the global diffusion of this phenomenon, and the possibilities for its contestation and mitigation.
In 2019, the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) was hosted in Tel Aviv. Like other national contests such as the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup, the ESC is a political event. For gay Israeli men who are ESC fans, this was an opportunity to become more integrated in the gay and national communities through homonormativity and homonational processes. However, as this case study shows, Israeli gay men ESC fans mostly rejected homonational masculinity in favor of a counterhegemonic identification, self-characterized as "ESC geeks." In that, they adhered to their marginal space and adopted a subversive queer perspective. Analytically, this means that homonationalism should not be considered a political form of normalizing power that is accessible to all gay men. Rather, it is a process that produces manifold, including queer practices, and it can no longer be seen as accessible to all LGBTs, or as something into which LGBTs are duped.
Social networks’ ability to disseminate content to millions of users with just one click has made them a major playground for political marketing. Campaigners seek to identify a small subset of seed users in a social network to maximize the spread of influence. However, political content diffusion has a distinct nature—some users may invert a message's content before sending it onward, thereby propagating a view that contradicts the one held by the original author. Here, we developed a novel transmission model tailored to analyze the effect of debate dynamics in realistic settings of social networks. We demonstrate our model on a real-world network we developed based on a large-scale dataset of 715K tweets discussing active political content concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our simulations reveal that even a minute probability of tweet content inversion could result in the message being echoed, spread, and amplified by opposing users. The profile of the optimal seed users who would maximize exposure, too, drastically changes compared to a no-inversion setting. Neglecting the effect of inversion may even result in a counterproductive outcome from the perspective of the original authors. Campaigners can significantly benefit from explicitly accounting for the impact of content inversion in social networks.
This article aims to contribute to the growing academic debate on the transnational drivers and patterns of contemporary populism. As populist leaderships expand both politically and geographically, the very nature of the populist phenomenon is changing, as it is increasingly being projected on the international stage. Contemporary populist leaders show a growing willingness to transfer the discursive construction of a struggle between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’ to the regional and global levels as a way of obtaining internal and external legitimation. In so doing, they exploit the symbiotic two-level game that links national and international (de-)legitimation dynamics, seeking to gain ‘abroad’ the kind of legitimacy that they cannot obtain ‘at home’. This article suggests three mechanisms that explain the populist ‘way out’ from various legitimation traps based on the traditional distinctions between input, throughput, and output legitimacy. The article’s argument is illustrated with reference to prototypical cases of populism in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The incorporation of the literature on international legitimacy enhances our understanding of the strategic activation of populist attitudes through the transnational articulation of empty signifiers, the global diffusion of this phenomenon, and the possibilities for its contestation and mitigation.
Cultural boycotts of mega-events often receive high media profile, but their effectiveness remains questioned. This effectiveness is influenced by their ability to generate ontological insecurity within the target state. However, measuring the impact of such threats is challenging in light of the evasive nature of the concept of ontological insecurity. Hence, we advance a new way to operationalize the impact of both hosting and boycotting mega-events on ontological security (OS), using quantitative indicators on the societal level, thus allowing for a more systematic cross-national exploration of the dynamics of OS. We also contribute to the research on cultural sanctions and the politics of mega-events, by offering an empirical assessment of their actual impact on society’s sense of OS. Finally, the paper points to the importance of de-constructing the concept of ‘national’ ontological (in)security and to the possibility that different segments in society may be more or less vulnerable to such threats. Using data from a national-wide survey among Jewish-Israelis in the context of the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest in Israel, we found a positive association between its hosting and OS, a perception of threat to OS to some extent following calls to boycott the event, and differences in these perceptions among various social groups.
This study examines the influence the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC), on national identity. Taking the case of the 2019 ESC which took place in Israel, this study employed a longitudinal design to examine its impact on different aspects of the national identity of Israeli Jews. The findings showed some substantives differences between those exposed to the contest and those not and conflicting trends in the contest's influence on the public: cultural patriotism and increased chauvinism, on the one hand, and some cosmopolitan affects, on the other. The article discusses these findings in light of theories on national identity and mega-events.
As tourists become more politically conscious, the number of boycotts grows. Despite their proliferation, tourism boycotts rarely succeed. This study explores why tourists reject boycotts in the context of mega-events that are often subject to boycott calls. The paper focuses on the attempted boycott of the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest in Tel Aviv, Israel, by the Palestinian activist group BDS. Qualitative and quantitative insights from a questionnaire sent to tourists who attended the event provide several reasons for boycott rejection. Tourists were antagonistic to the boycott and shared concerns about its rationale, deeming it unnecessary and unwarranted. This was motivated by a desire to keep the Eurovision free of the contested politics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The findings highlight the potential risks of using boycotts in tourism, where boycott demands of non-consumption rub against the innate desire for consumption (or self-gratification) in tourism. Based on these findings, the paper suggests alternative ways of working for peace through tourism in settings of intractable conflict.
The quest for legitimacy has traditionally been intrinsic to the political phenomenon of populism, while legitimation struggles are increasingly relevant once populist leaderships take government control. However, the rich literature on populism and legitimacy has hardly interacted and, therefore, analysis of populists' international (de)legitimation strategies has been scarce. This chapter addresses the ways in which incorporating theoretical frameworks on legitimacy and (de)legitimation into the ideational approach can contribute to better understand the drivers, patterns, and impact of the global rise of contemporary populist leaderships, suggesting new avenues for research on the potential international mitigation of populism.
Surprisingly, the emergent and increasingly popular phenomenon of nation branding has received only scant attention from International Relations scholars. While most analyses account for the phenomenon by emphasizing the perceived material benefits to be derived from establishing a positive national brand, this article provides an alternative perspective. It argues that nation-branding processes need to be understood as responding to the need of states and state leaders to enhance both their citizens and the nation's sense of ontological security and (self)-esteem. Moreover, this quest for self-esteem and ontological security is unfolding in the context of broader realignments occasioned by the advent of late modernity. While nation branding represents an understandable response to these developments, the article questions the strategy's overall efficacy by highlighting its implications for how national subjectivity is constituted, its notable disciplining elements and its potentially undemocratic implications.
This paper contributes to the discussion of links between sports, nationalism, and globalization by focusing on the political aspects of the preparation of Russian national teams for sports mega-events staged in Russia. By analyzing the cases of the XXVII Summer Universiade in Kazan, the XXII Winter Olympics in Sochi, and the XXI FIFA World Cup scheduled to take place in 12 Russian cities, the paper provides a comparative study of the benefits that mega-events provide for the host nation in terms of building national identities. To involve the sports component in the study of the nation-building processes, the paper applies the concept of the “spillover effect” of sporting nationalism which presumes that nationalist sentiment or ideology configured and promoted through sports affects non-sporting political processes, actors, and institutions. The paper argues that the “spillover effect” of sporting nationalism allows for the converting of excellence in sports mega-events – the centerpiece of global sports – into political excellence and displays the strengths of the nation to both the global and domestic public. Therefore, showing excellence as the host nation is the main objective that Russian political actors pursue in both their rhetoric and course of action.
To understand the motivations and intentions of Olympic bidding cities, scholars frequently situate the staging of Olympic mega-events within a framework that extends beyond economic considerations and encompasses the soft power concepts of branding and image creation. In this paper, I compare the international community's rejection of the Sochi 2014 brand to the Russian population's relative acceptance of the discourse surrounding the Sochi Olympics. By using a constructivist methodological framework and applying the concept of diffuse support, both of which emphasise language and symbolism as central to public opinion formation, I argue that Olympic discourse – even when not substantiated by actual policies – can catalyse domestic support in the short-run. I use the Russian context to outline the potential and the perils of attempting to project a new self-image without fundamentally altering social realities, and illustrate how discursive power has shaped and may continue to shape the responses to Sochi 2014.
1 In this article the term “football” is used for the sport that US readers know as soccer. View all notesThe article intends to combine contemporary debates about nations and nationalism with a sociological perspective on collective emotions in its attempt to gain a better understanding of the process of constructing national identity. It will further present interdisciplinary evidence that collective emotions evoked in rituals instigate a number of group-related sociocognitive processes that reinforce enduring feelings of belonging and an emotional priming of collective representations. I will suggest that states of “collective effervescence” (Durkheim) do not only tie individuals to a community, but also provide a strong frame for the creation of symbols and the embodiment of shared meanings defining a community. The second part of the article analyzes examples taken from the football media coverage of the FIFA World Cups 2006 and 1974 (both were held in Germany) in order to provide a comparative case study exemplifying the proposed theoretical approach. The sample illuminates some interesting changes that invite further hypotheses about corresponding changes of national identity in a larger context.
Arising from the growing commercial and broader importance of sport, politics around the hosting and bidding for major sport events have become key elements of state engagements in the contemporary era. This essay explores the role of sport mega-events in the processes of foreign policy-making and state-building in post-apartheid South Africa. A key argument is that such events have become an important instrument in the development of foreign policy and domestic goals for the country. Two particular strategies are evident: that of dualling, referring to the twofold use of events toward the achievement of national and international objectives; and that of linking internal and external policy targets, as a means of raising the effectiveness with which goals are pursued. As the country prepares to host the prestigious FIFA world football finals in 2010, some lessons may be taken for the foreseen and undesired corollaries such strategies may pose for the country.
The symbolic politics of sport mega-events: 2010 in comparative perspective
See e.g. David Black, 'The symbolic politics of sport mega-events: 2010 in comparative perspective', Politikon
34: 3, 2007, pp. 261-76;
- Rogel Alpher
Rogel Alpher, 'What if Tel Aviv declared independence?', Haaretz (Hebrew), 19 May 2019, https://www.
haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.7253932.
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Despite death threats, France's Eurovision entrant looking forward to Tel Aviv', Times of Israel
- Ben Beaumont-Thomas
Ben Beaumont-Thomas, 'British cultural figures urge BBC to boycott Eurovision in Israel', Guardian, 29 Jan.
2019, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2019/jan/29/british-cultural-figures-urge-bbc-to-boycotteurovision-in-israel.
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49 'Despite death threats, France's Eurovision entrant looking forward to Tel Aviv', Times of Israel, 30 Jan. 2019,
https://www.timesofisrael.com/despite-threats-france-eurovision-entrant-looking-forward-to-tel-aviv-visit/.
We're the pink elephant in the room
- Rob Holley
- Iceland's Eurovision Hopefuls Hatari
Rob Holley, 'Iceland's Eurovision hopefuls Hatari: "We're the pink elephant in the room"', Independent, 12
March 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/features/hatari-interview-eurovision-2019-iceland-song-israel-tel-aviv-boycott-a8818626.html.
Iceland's Eurovision hopefuls Hatari
- Holley
Holley, 'Iceland's Eurovision hopefuls Hatari'.
Iceland's Hatari collaborate with Palestinian artist Bashar Murad in "Klefi/Samed"', wiwibloggs
- See David Smith
See David Smith, 'Iceland's Hatari collaborate with Palestinian artist Bashar Murad in "Klefi/Samed"',
wiwibloggs, 24 May 2019, https://wiwibloggs.com/2019/05/24/icelands-hatari-collaborate-with-palestinianartist-bashar-murad-in-klefi-samed/239460/.
Despite death threats
See 'Despite death threats', Times of Israel.
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Israel to examine whether Iceland's Eurovision reps plan to violate boycott law
- Noa Landau
- Itay Stern
Noa Landau and Itay Stern, 'Israel to examine whether Iceland's Eurovision reps plan to violate boycott law',
Haaretz, 10 March 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/eurovision/.premium-israel-to-examinewhether-iceland-s-eurovision-reps-plan-to-violate-boycott-law-1.7004517.
Israeli culture minister criticises Palestinian flags at Eurovision', Guardian
- Agence France-Presse
Agence France-Presse, 'Israeli culture minister criticises Palestinian flags at Eurovision', Guardian, 19 May
2019, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2019/may/19/israel-culture-minister-criticises-palestineflags-at-eurovision.
Netherlands wins Eurovision contest; Madonna flag display causes stir', Reuters
- Dan Williams
- Rami Ayyub
Dan Williams and Rami Ayyub, 'Netherlands wins Eurovision contest; Madonna flag display causes stir',
Reuters, 19 May 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-music-eurovision-idUSKCN1SO0RP.
Iceland's protest at Eurovision rejected as fig-leafing by Palestinian group
- Emma Kelly
Emma Kelly, 'Iceland's protest at Eurovision rejected as fig-leafing by Palestinian group', Metro, 19 May 2019,
https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/19/icelands-protest-israel-eurovision-rejected-fig-leafing-palestinian-group-9598471/.
Officially, the members of the EBU and the participants in the ESC are not states but national broadcasting services. In practice, however, it is clear that they represent states
Officially, the members of the EBU and the participants in the ESC are not states but national broadcasting
services. In practice, however, it is clear that they represent states.
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60 'Eurovision clashes with Israel as host country', Deutsche Welle, 5 Sept. 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/
eurovision-clashes-with-israel-as-host-country/a-45359511.
RTÉ won't sanction employees who refuse to travel to Israel for Eurovision
- Órla Ryan
Órla Ryan, 'RTÉ won't sanction employees who refuse to travel to Israel for Eurovision', TheJournal.ie, 30
NDR does not support a boycott of Eurovision
- Anthony Granger
- Germany
Anthony Granger, 'Germany: NDR does not support a boycott of Eurovision 2019', Eurovoix, 11 Sept. 2018,
https://eurovoix.com/2018/09/11/germany-ndr-does-not-support-a-boycott-of-eurovision-2019/.
Boycott campaign-Eurovision Song Contest
EBU, 'Boycott campaign-Eurovision Song Contest 2019', 22 Jan. 2019.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ia/iiaa004/5810417 by Hebrew University of Jerusalem user on 24 March 2020